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Chapter Three
• Monitors morale of the company.
• Provides recommendations and expedites the procurement and
preparation of enlisted replacements for the company.
• Coordinates medical, mess, supply, administrative, and other logistics
support.
• Conducts informal investigations.
• Leads company ground movements when required.
SUPPLY SECTION
3-150. The supply section provides unit-level supply support for the brigade
HHC. It requests, receives, stores, issues, turns in, and accounts for
necessary supplies and equipment. It maintains supply records and secures
weapons and other equipment. The supply section is often only one or two
persons and may not be able to handle all weapons, which include NVS and
other sensitive items. It performs unit maintenance on all individual and
crew-served ground weapons.
AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE SECTION
3-151. The automotive maintenance section provides unit maintenance and
recovery operations for vehicles, generators, and other ground equipment.
FOOD SERVICE SECTION
3-152. The food service section determines subsistence requirements and
requests supplies. It prepares, cooks, and serves food for the brigade HHC. It
maintains food service records and prepares subsistence reports.
Water Storage
3-153. The company headquarters is equipped with a water trailer. It
supplies water necessary to perform various maintenance functions and
satisfy the company's daily requirement for potable water.
SECTION VI - BRIGADE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES
GENERAL
3-154. CPs throughout the brigade serve the C2 needs of the commander and
staff. The dynamics of the battlefield require the highest level of
organizational and operational efficiency within every CP. C2 facilities
include—
• Command group
• Main CP.
• TOC.
• ALOC.
• Tactical CP.
• Rear CP.
• Alternate CP.
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EMERGING COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
3-155. The introduction of automated systems will minimize the time
required for administrative and operational processing of information.
Whether manual or automated, C2 systems must accurately—
• Depict the situation (friendly, enemy, noncombatant).
• Depict readiness status of friendly units.
• Provide data verification and audit trails.
• Provide other information, as required.
Digitized Challenges
3-156. As digitized systems are fielded, C2 nets and procedures will change.
The challenge will be to integrate those changes and train to standard to
ensure that the increased capabilities of new systems are maximized. This
requires focused initial training and sustainment training.
Command and Control Warfare
3-157. Confronted by overwhelming combat power, the enemy often resorts
to asymmetric responses to offset our advantages. For example, potential
adversaries may attempt to counter U.S. advantages in precision firepower
with a focused attack on C4I systems. Advanced jamming systems may be
used from ground and airborne platforms or emplaced by artillery.
electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) effects are sufficient to disable electronic
components at tactical ranges and make protection of sensitive electronic
components difficult. Direction finding and emitter location equipment are
improving and are available worldwide. As these technologies advance,
signature reduction and electronic deception become increasingly critical. An
adversary can threaten digital systems in three fundamental ways:
• Compromises data by gaining access to sensitive or classified
information stored within information systems.
• Corrupts data by the alteration of electronically stored or processed
information so that it becomes misleading or worthless.
• Disrupts of operations by destruction, damage, or delays (physically or
electronically).
3-158. Threats include spoofing, electronic attack, signals intelligence,
technical attack, directed energy, malicious code
(viruses), physical
destruction, and unconventional warfare. Individually or collectively, these
threats can distort the picture of the battlefield. They can affect tempo,
lethality, survivability, and battlefield synchronization. All can affect the
mission performance.
Traditional Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
3-159. Digitized units must be able to operate in various stages of system
degradation. Enemy asymmetric attacks and system failures can interrupt
ABCS subsystems. Degradation of digital operational capability should not
lead to major reduction of SA and the lethality, survivability, and operating
tempo (OPTEMPO) that characterize digitized forces. In case of catastrophic
system failure, commanders may find it necessary to make significant
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changes to the operation or reduce the size of their battle space. SOPs and
nondigital contingency plans must ensure operational continuity.
COMMAND POST SURVIVABILITY
3-160. CPs present electronic, thermal, acoustic, visual, and moving-target
signatures that are easy to detect. Upon detection, CPs can be destroyed
through overt enemy action or disrupted and exploited by electronic means
unless measures are taken to reduce vulnerability. Measures include—
• Maintaining local security.
• Locating on reverse slopes to deny enemy direct and indirect fire
effects.
• Locating in urban areas to harden and reduce infrared (IR) or visual
signatures. Collateral damage to the local population must be
considered if exercising this option.
• Remotely locating and dispersing antennas.
• Dispersing CP subelements.
• Displacing as required by METT-TC.
• Using low probability of interception
(LPI) techniques—landlines,
directional antennas, and messengers.
• Providing ommunications security.
3-161. In most cases, survivability requires that the above techniques be
combined. These measures must also be balanced against retaining
effectiveness. Frequent displacement might reduce the vulnerability of a CP;
but such movement may greatly degrade its C2 functions.
COMMAND POST LOCATION
3-162. CPs are arrayed on the battlefield according to METT-TC. Three
common methods are—
• CPs set up separately from unit locations.
• CPs set up with units.
• CPs use a combination of the above.
3-163. Setting up the CP separate from subordinate units separates the
signatures associated with CP and helicopter operations. However, it makes
face-to-face coordination more difficult unless adequate digital connectivity is
available. Commanders decide which method to use during the IPB process.
COMMAND POST STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
3-164. CP organization, operations, and sustainment must be standardized
in the SOP. All personnel associated with a CP must be completely
knowledgeable of all aspects of the CP. Training drills are essential for CP
movement, setup, tear down, security, and operations. Drills to counter loss
of critical personnel and equipment must be standardized and practiced both
day and night. Critical SOP items include—
• Personnel duties for each phase of CP operations and movement.
• Communications setup priorities—radio, wire, LAN, tactical internet
(TI), SATCOM.
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• Critical friendly and enemy information reporting.
• Maintenance of maps and graphics.
• Maintenance of C4I equipment.
• Set-up, tear down, and movement duties.
• Camouflage priorities.
• Light and noise discipline.
• Maintenance of generators.
• COMSEC changeover times.
• Maintenance of journals.
• CP security and admission procedures.
MAIN COMMAND POST
3-165. The main CP includes the soldiers, equipment, and facilities needed to
provide C2 for the brigade. The brigade XO is responsible for the main CP.
MAIN COMMAND POST ELEMENTS
3-166. The main CP consists of the TOC, ALOC (if not part of the rear CP),
HHC support elements, and associated CS assets, such as communications.
Most of the brigade staff operates from the main CP. The staff includes the
S2, S3, FSO, ALO, S6, and personnel of the signal platoon. It also includes
the S1 and S4, if they are not required to establish a rear CP. Other
representatives can be included, such as engineer, AD, and the United States
Air Force (USAF) weather team.
MAIN COMMAND POST FUNCTIONS
3-167. The main CP coordinates, directs, and controls operations and plans
for future operations. The main CP—
• Communicates with subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.
• Informs and assists the commander and subordinate commanders.
• Operates on a 24-hour basis.
• Plans ahead continuously.
• Estimates the situation continuously.
• Maintains SA across the BOS.
• Maintains the status of the reserve.
• Receives, evaluates, and processes tactical information from
subordinate units and higher headquarters.
• Maintains maps that graphically depict friendly, enemy, and
noncombatant situations.
• Maintains journals.
• Validates and evaluates intelligence.
• Controls all immediate FS including CAS for units under aviation
brigade C2 (may also be done by tactical CP).
• Coordinates airspace C2 and AD operations.
• Relays instructions to subordinate units.
• Coordinates combat, CS, and CSS requirements.
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• Coordinates terrain management for C2 facilities.
• Maintains CS and CSS capabilities and status.
• Submits reports to higher headquarters.
• Makes recommendations to the commander.
• Prepares and issues FRAGOs, OPORDs, OPLANs, intelligence
summaries (INTSUMs), intelligence reports (INTREPs), and situation
reports (SITREPs).
MAIN COMMAND POST CRITICAL ITEM REPORTING
3-168. The commander must be notified immediately of factors that affect
the mission.
Friendly Factors
3-169. The status of friendly forces that can affect the mission include—
• Changes in higher, subordinate, or adjacent unit mission.
• Changes in task organization.
• Changes in boundaries.
• Changes in supporting fires or tactical air (TACAIR) priority.
• Loss of unit combat effectiveness including DS or attached units,
whether maneuver, CS, or CSS.
• Critical changes in Class III and V availability or location.
• Changes in status of obstacles and contaminated areas.
• Employment of smoke.
• Employment of nuclear and directed-energy weapons.
• Other elements of information according to the brigade commander's
guidance.
• Status of the reserve.
Enemy Factors
3-170. Enemy factors that can affect the mission include—
• Contact with or sighting of enemy maneuver or FS forces.
• Absence of enemy forces in an area or zone.
• Movement of enemy units—withdrawal, lateral, or forward.
• Employment of the enemy's reserve.
• Employment of NBC weapons or sighting of NBC capable equipment.
• Employment of directed-energy weapons.
• Employment of smoke.
• AD forces.
• Logistical stockpiles.
• Other elements of information according to the brigade commander's
guidance.
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MAIN COMMAND POST SITE SELECTION
3-171. The most important considerations for selecting any CP site are
security and communications with higher, subordinate, and adjacent
headquarters. Range of enemy artillery, accessibility to adequate entry and
departure routes, cover, concealment, drainage, space for dispersing are other
considerations. An adequate LZ should be nearby. The S3 selects the general
location of the main CP. The HHC commander and S6 normally select the
exact location. When selecting the general location of the CP, the S3 selects
at least one alternate site should the primary site prove inadequate.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-172. During offensive operations, the main CP should be well forward. In
fast-moving operations, the main CP may have to operate on the move. Staff
coordination and communications are usually degraded when CPs are
moving; thus, CPs must train to operate while moving.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-173. During defensive operations, the main CP normally locates farther to
the rear to minimize its vulnerability. The exact location depends on the
enemy, terrain, the road network, and the ability to communicate.
URBAN OPERATIONS
3-174. The main CP often sets up in built-up areas. Barns, garages, and
warehouses minimize the need for detailed camouflage. Basements offer
protection from enemy fires. Built-up areas also reduce IR and
electromagnetic signatures.
REVERSE SLOPES
3-175. Reverse slopes cover and conceal CPs from direct observation and
fires. Reverse slopes can degrade the enemy's ability to collect, monitor, and
jam electronic transmissions. Electronic profiles run by the S6 provide the
information to determine the ability to transmit and receive. Analysis of
those profiles by the S2 provides the information to determine the enemy's
ability to degrade CP capabilities or intercept traffic.
PROMINENT TERRAIN FEATURES
3-176. Prominent terrain features or major road junctions should be avoided
to make it harder for the enemy to determine CP location. Such features are
often enemy preplanned artillery and air targets.
MAIN COMMAND POST DISPLACEMENT
3-177. The main CP displaces in either a single or a phased move. The
method selected depends on METT-TC, the distance to be moved, and
communications requirements. Movement degrades communication on all
nets; however, the higher headquarters, brigade, and subordinate command
nets must be maintained. An administrative move may entail both the TOC
and the tactical CP moving simultaneously to a new AO. Maintaining contact
with higher headquarters may require alternate communications means,
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such as aircraft or vehicle mounted systems. When operations are ongoing,
moving the main CP is accomplished in a phased move requiring
displacement of the tactical CP. During displacement, critical aspects of C2
must be maintained. Displacements are planned to ensure that the main CP
is stationary during critical phases of the battle.
DISPLACEMENT STEPS
3-178. The S3 establishes the general area for the new CP. The HHC
commander, signal officer, and a NBC team conduct detailed reconnaissance.
Steps for the reconnaissance are listed below.
• The reconnaissance party identifies possible routes and sites. Locations
must provide effective communications and accommodate all required
vehicles and equipment. Several possible sites must be identified,
reconnoitered, and planned to provide flexibility and alternate sites.
• The reconnaissance party makes route and site sketch maps showing
the exact element locations within the new CP location.
• The S3 or commander approves the primary and alternate sites.
• A movement order is published. An SOP that has been practiced and
drilled greatly reduces the effort required to produce the order.
• Security and guides are dispatched. The security force ensures the area
is clear of enemy and contamination, and the guides prevent wrong
turns and assist elements in occupation. Signals are especially
important for low visibility and night displacements.
• Reporting and coordinating functions are shifted as required. This may
be within main CP echelons, to the tactical CP, or to the rear or
alternate CP.
• CP and HHC elements prepare and execute movement per SOP. The
main CP may displace in one echelon if the tactical CP can provide C2
for the interim. If the tactical CP cannot execute the required C2, the
main CP displaces in two echelons. The first echelon displaces with
enough assets and personnel to establish minimum C2. The second
echelon remains is place and provides C2 until the first echelon
assumes control, then it displaces.
MAIN COMMAND POST AUSTERITY
3-179. The main CP is a major source of electromagnetic and IR energy. If
the enemy detects these emissions, they can fix its location and place indirect
fire, CAS, or EW strike on it. In such an environment, frequent movement is
required.
• The TOC should be as light as possible and drilled in rapid tear down,
movement, and setup. The larger and more elaborate a CP, the less
rapidly it can move.
• Movement for movement's sake should be avoided. Too frequent
movement hinders TOC operations, degrades communications, and
sacrifices time. It may also increase the chances of enemy detection.
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MAIN COMMAND POST SECURITY AND DEFENSE
3-180. The HHC commander plans and organizes the security and defense of
the main CP. The plan establishes teams, squads, sections, and platoons and
a chain of command for perimeter defense and the quick reaction force (QRF).
The brigade XO approves the plan.
3-181. Positions are well prepared, mutually supporting, and known to all.
Alarms are established and known to all. Minimum alarms include ground
attack, air attack, and NBC attack. Rehearsals are conducted. All actions are
greatly simplified if they are part of the SOP and drills are conducted often to
ensure readiness. For unit personnel who have not been in combat,
commanders should demonstrate what enemy personnel look like when
advancing at night. Such training precludes erroneous sightings and time-
consuming reactions to false alarms.
3-182. The staff supports the HHC commander by providing personnel for
defense and security. In an actual attack, the main CP continues C2 of the
brigade unless the situation compels the use of all personnel in the defense.
Reaction Forces
3-183. Reaction forces and attachments must be fully integrated into the
overall plan. Each individual must have a clear and current SU of friendly
and enemy forces in the AO. For example, a CP reaction force should know if
military police (MP) are conducting mounted patrols near the CP. The overall
reaction force plan must integrate those MP units or establish boundaries
between the reaction force and the MP unit.
3-184. A clear chain of command and training supported by battle drills are
essential for reaction force preparedness. They must assemble and be ready
to fight in no more than 10 minutes.
• Alarms should be the same throughout the brigade, division, and corps.
These alarms should be in the SOP.
• Reaction plans are rehearsed and executed on a routine basis. Prior to
deployment and at in-country training centers, MILES gear and live or
blank ammunition supplemented by pyrotechnics should be used
whenever possible to enhance the realism. The reaction to a night
attack on the main CP must be second nature if the enemy force is to be
repelled.
3-185. Each reaction force assembles based on an alarm or orders. Personnel
move to a predetermined rally point, establish communications, and conduct
operations as required to counter the threat.
Preparation for the Security and Defense of the Main Command Post Site
3-186. Physical preparation for the defense of the main CP site includes—
• Ensuring each soldier is briefed, has a copy the ROE, and understands
the ROE (for complicated ROE, it is often necessary to conduct
situational training exercises to ensure understanding).
• Concealment—use of urban areas and camouflage.
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• Cover—fighting positions, protective shelters.
• Vehicle revetments, transitory vehicle dismount points and parking
areas.
• Protective wire barriers.
• Prepared defensive positions.
• Prepared alternate and supplementary positions.
• Prepared routes for supply and evacuation.
• Minefields to cover avenues of approach, if approved for use. Adherence
to correct procedures makes mine recovery less dangerous when it is
time to displace. Minefields must be observed.
• Prepared sleep areas that are dug in or revetted to protect against
enemy direct or indirect fires.
• Listening posts/observation posts (LPs/OPs) that cover approaches to
the main CP. These positions must be prepared so they cannot be seen
when approaching them from the front.
• Devices such as ground surveillance radar, personnel detection devices,
and field expedients to enhance early warning of enemy approach or
infiltration.
• Crew served weapons emplaced to cover suspected avenues of approach.
Cleared fields of fire.
• Wire and directional antennas to prevent detection by enemy EW
elements.
• Air and ground patrols to inhibit observation and attack of the main
CP. Returning aircraft should be given patrol areas to surveil before
landing. Ground patrols should conduct reconnaissance as required to
detect enemy observers or civilians who may be enemy informants.
• Daily stand-to is to establish and maintain a combat-ready posture for
combat operations on a recurring basis. Stand-to includes all steps and
measures necessary to ensure maximum effectiveness of personnel,
weapons, vehicles, aircraft, communications, and NBC equipment.
Units assume a posture during stand-to that enables them to commence
combat operations immediately. Although stand-to is normally
associated with begin morning nautical twilight
(BMNT), unit
operations may dictate another time.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER
3-187. The TOC is the primary C2 structure for the brigade. Its primary
mission is to control operations and prepare and publish orders and plans.
The commander operates from the TOC when not operating from the tactical
CP, command vehicle, or an aircraft. The XO is responsible for all aspects of
TOC operations. The TOC is usually organized into two groups— the
operations cell and the plans cell. The operations cell usually operates in
shifts to ensure 24-hour ability. The plans cell may or may not operate on a
24-hour cycle, and may or may not be in a separate facility from the TOC.
The TOC—
• Is composed of the S2, S3, and S6 sections, representatives from
attached combat and CS elements, and the tactical CP when it is not
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deployed. The TOC also includes the FSE, ALO, engineer, and S5, when
available.
• Monitors and assists in C2 by maintaining contact and coordination
with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units and continuously updating
the enemy and friendly situation.
• Analyzes and disseminates tactical information (including A2C2).
• Maintains situation maps.
• Ensures reports are submitted and received on time.
• Plans future operations and forecasts requirements.
• Coordinates with the ALOC to ensure that CSS is integrated and
synchronized into the mission effort.
OPERATIONS CELL
3-188. The operations cell includes the following functional positions:
• The battle captain is usually the most experienced S3 officer other than
the S3. He continuously monitors operations within the TOC to ensure
proper personnel are available for the mission at hand. He does not
command the battle, but performs battle tracking and makes
operational decisions within assigned responsibilities.
• The operations NCO is the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC)
of the TOC. He moves and sets up the TOC. He is responsible for the
physical functioning of the TOC. He also is responsible for shift
schedules, organization within the TOC, and other functions as
assigned.
• The TOC NCOIC is assisted by other S3 NCOs and assigned personnel,
who maintain unit status, receive and process reports, and keep the
unit journal.
• The S2, S2 NCO, and intelligence analysts are responsible for all
intelligence functions. They alert the commander, XO, or S3 to
situations that meet the established CCIR. Intelligence personnel
receive incoming tactical reports and process intelligence information.
They also assist in moving, setting up, and the physical functioning of
the TOC.
• When available, the FSO and fire support noncommissioned officer
(FSNCO), as part of the FSE, are responsible for FS. They coordinate
for responsive fires and expedite clearance of fires. They assist in
moving, setting up, and the physical functioning of the TOC.
• Radio telephone operators (RTO) are critical links in the C2 structure.
They often use radio headsets, answer telephones, and operate
computer consoles. As such, they may be the only people who hear
transmissions or see a critical piece of information. They must be aware
of the operation so they can alert the leadership of any situation that
might require their attention. RTOs cannot assume that all calls,
information, and reports they monitor are also monitored or seen by the
TOC at large.
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PLANS CELL
3-189. The plans cell is activated as required. It consists of personnel
required to plan for the operations, such as S2, S3, FS, ALO, S1, S4, S6,
engineer, S5, and attached units. Normally the chief of the plans cell is the
senior S3 representative.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER AND TACTICAL COMMAND POST
3-190. The TOC remains operational even when the tactical CP has the
battle. When communications allow, the TOC monitors the actions of the
tactical CP and is always prepared to assume control of the battle if the
tactical CP is disabled or destroyed. In cases where the TOC can control the
battle without employment of the tactical CP, tactical CP assets and
personnel augment the TOC.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTER
3-191. The ALOC is the primary C2 structure for the brigade's CSS
operations. The ALOC is composed mostly of the S1 and S4 sections, and
representatives from attached CSS elements. The S6 section supports its
communications requirements. The ALOC—
• Monitors and assists in C2 of CSS assets by maintaining contact and
coordination with higher and adjacent units, while continuously
updating the personnel and logistics situation. The ALOC must have
SA and understanding to ensure CSS elements are not adversely
affected by enemy actions, friendly movements, or ongoing operations.
• Analyzes and disseminates CSS information, maintains the CSS
situation map, and requests and synchronizes CSS as required.
• Ensures reports are submitted and received on time.
• Plans for future operations in synchronization with the TOC to ensure
that CSS is integrated into the mission effort.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC CENTER ORGANIZATION
3-192. The ALOC normally is organized into two sections—personnel and
logistics. Two areas generally are established within the ALOC—an S1 area
for personnel, ministry, and medical actions; and an S4 area for all other CSS
requirements. Other considerations are listed below.
• The S4 is generally the ALOC officer in charge (OIC). He coordinates
closely with the S1 to monitor CSS operations and ensure proper
personnel and equipment are available to support the mission.
• The ALOC NCOIC is generally the S4 NCO. He moves and sets up the
ALOC. He is responsible for the physical functioning of the ALOC. The
ALOC NCOIC is also responsible for shift schedules, organization
within the ALOC, and other functions as assigned.
• The ALOC NCOIC is assisted by the other ALOC NCOs and personnel.
Among other duties, they maintain unit status, receive and process
reports, and keep the CSS journal.
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• RTOs are as critical in the ALOC as in the TOC and perform the same
functions.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC CENTER LOCATION
3-193. Until digital communications allow greater separation, the ALOC is
frequently near the main CP to ensure close coordination within the brigade
staff. However, the ALOC may form the central part of the rear CP and
operate the rear assembly area (RAA). It may operate a split-section with the
S4 section as part of the main CP and the S1 section as part of the rear CP or
vice versa.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC CENTER AND TACTICAL COMMAND POST
3-194. ALOC functions continue from the ALOC even when the tactical CP
controls operations. When the main CP displaces, the ALOC normally sends
at least an S4 representative to the tactical CP to monitor CSS operations
until the ALOC is reestablished.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST
3-195. The tactical CP is established to enhance C2 of current operations. It
is employed when operations might be degraded or distances are too extended
to operate from the main CP. It must communicate with higher
headquarters, adjacent units, the employed subordinate units, and the main
CP. The normal mode of communications at the tactical CP is radio and MSE.
The tactical CP helps the commander control current operations by—
• Maintaining SA and understanding.
• Analyzing information for immediate intelligence.
• Developing combat intelligence of immediate interest to the
commander.
• Maneuvering forces.
• Controlling and coordinating FS.
• Coordinating operations.
• Coordinating with adjacent units and forward AD elements.
• Monitoring and communicating CSS requirements(Classes III and V) to
the main CP.
3-196. The tactical CP is small in size and electronic signature to facilitate
security and rapid, frequent displacement. Its organization layout, personnel,
and equipment must be in the unit SOP. The TOE tactical CP paragraph
provides a tactical operations warrant officer, four 15P positions, and a 96B
intelligence specialist as a dedicated tactical CP contingent; however, the
tactical CP section must be augmented for most operations.
3-197. Designated personnel from the appropriate staff sections augments
the tactical CP. The S3 section is responsible for the tactical CP.
Augmentation may include—
• SP, Tactical Operations Officer, SO, and other selected warrant officers.
• S2, FSO, ALO, engineer, and S5, if assigned.
• Representatives from the ALOC (if the main CP is displacing).
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3-198. METT-TC may dictate that an effective tactical CP operates from a
C2- equipped UH-60.
REAR COMMAND POST
3-199. A rear CP may be used to coordinate sustainment. If used, it may be
within the EAC, corps, or division support area (DSA) or elsewhere in the
rear. The S4 or S1 normally is the rear CP commander. However, if the TSC,
COSCOM, or DISCOM commander agrees, the AVIM company commander or
aviation support battalion commander may serve as the brigade rear CP
commander.
3-200. The rear CP commander is responsible for the security of rear area
units of the aviation brigade. He ensures that they are integrated into an
established base or base-cluster defense for mutual security. The brigade XO
monitors the operations of the rear area. The S4 and S1 maintain continuous
contact with the main CP to coordinate the required support. They also
coordinate extensively with higher echelon, support command elements for
their support functions.
ALTERNATE COMMAND POST
3-201. The commander may designate an alternate CP to ensure continuity
of operations during displacements or in case of serious damage to the TOC.
The alternate CP may be the tactical CP, rear CP, or a subordinate battalion
headquarters. Provisions for an alternate headquarters are normally
established in unit SOPs.
COMMAND GROUP
3-202. The command group consists of the brigade commander and the
representatives from the brigade staff and supporting units that the
commander chooses. At a minimum this normally will be the S3, an S2
representative, and the FSO and ALO, if they are available. The command
group may operate from ground vehicles or an aircraft. The command group
is not a command facility per se, but a grouping of critical decision makers
that may operate separately from the main CP or the tactical CP periodically.
The command group may deploy when personal observation or presence is
necessary to accomplish the mission.
SECTION VII - COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS,
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
OVERVIEW
3-203. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a designated
commander of assigned and attached forces. Command includes both the
authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to
accomplish missions. Communications and computer systems provide the
means to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect information.
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ISR is an integral part of information support. It combines to produce
information about enemy, weather, and terrain necessary to make critical
decisions.
COMMAND
3-204. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people
and organizations to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the
current state of friendly and enemy forces, the future state of those forces
that must exist to accomplish the mission, and formulates concepts of
operations to achieve victory. Prior to execution, commanders influence the
outcome of operations by—
• Defining his intent.
• Assigning missions.
• Designating the priority efforts.
• Prioritizing and allocating CS and CSS.
• Deciding what level of risk to accept.
• Placing reserves.
• Assessing the needs of subordinates and seniors.
• Guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.
3-205. Once operations begin, commanders influence the operations by—
• Changing task organization.
• Changing allocation of CS.
• Changing priority of CSS.
• Changing boundaries.
• Allocating more time.
• Personal presence.
CONTROL
3-206. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the
commander's intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and
staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is
necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify
variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards.
Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their
intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it
provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.
Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place
themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout
the operational area. Commanders exercise authority and direction through
and with the assistance of a C2 system. The C2 system consists of the
facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential
for planning, directing, and controlling operations of forces pursuant to the
missions assigned.
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Chapter Three
COMMAND AND CONTROL
3-207. While C2 may be discussed separately for understanding, in practice,
C2 is an entity. The commander cannot command effectively without control,
and cannot exercise control without command. The commander uses C2 to
make effective decisions, manage the uncertainty of combat, employ forces
efficiently, and direct successful execution of military operations. In short,
the goal of C2 is mission accomplishment, while the object of C2 is force
effectiveness. The staff is the commander's most important resource to
exercise C2 when he is unable to exercise it by himself.
COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS
3-208. Communications, often aided by computers, allow the exchange of
intelligence, intent, orders, plans, and direction in a timely manner. The
mission and structure of the brigade determine specific information flow and
processing requirements. In turn, the brigade's information requirements
dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the
communications and computer systems. Unit SOPs should address the use of
communications and computers.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
3-209. ISR are distinct from the larger framework of information support
because they focus primarily on the enemy. Poor intelligence has been the
immediate cause for innumerable defeats. Inadequate surveillance and
reconnaissance are prime contributors. Conversely, excellent intelligence
breeds bold action that can negate enemy superiority. Normally, timely and
accurate intelligence depends on persistent surveillance and aggressive,
efficient reconnaissance.
3-210. The brigade is a key supplier of ISR; however, it is also a consumer of
higher echelon (Army, joint force, and national) ISR products. By its tie-in to
the higher echelon ISR information, the brigade executes its mission in an
environment characterized much more by what is known rather than what is
unknown.
COMMUNICATIONS
3-211. Reporting combat information and exploiting that information is
fundamental to combat operations. This information and the opportunities it
presents are of interest to other maneuver units and higher headquarters
staffs. It requires wide and rapid dissemination. Brigade elements frequently
operate over long distances, wide fronts, and extended depths from their
controlling headquarters. Communications must be redundant and long
range to meet internal and external requirements. Long-range
communications can be augmented through signal support. The systems
must be in place before they are needed.
HIGHER TO SUBORDINATE
3-212. The brigade headquarters ensures that its communications
architecture (command, operations and intelligence (O&I), administrative
and logistics (A&L), FS, MSE, and SATCOM) are operational at all times.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
The retransmission system is dedicated to on-call restoration of
communications on any net. Possible retransmission locations must be
identified and checked before starting operations. The brigade must have
MSE support during operations over great distances from higher
headquarters.
SUBORDINATE TO HIGHER
3-213. Battalions and separate companies continually monitor the brigade
nets as directed
(usually command and O&I). Likewise, the brigade
continually monitors its higher headquarters nets.
SUPPORTING TO SUPPORTED
3-214. Liaison elements supporting the brigade maintain communications
between their organization and the brigade.
COMMUNICATIONS DISRUPTION
3-215. Communications, particularly electromagnetic, are subject to
disruption. Disruption may result from unintentional friendly interference,
intentional enemy action, equipment failure, atmospheric conditions, EMP,
or terrain interference. To compensate for these, the commander should—
• Provide for redundancy in means of communication.
• Ensure subordinates understand the commander's intent so they know
what to do during communications interruptions.
• Avoid overloading the communications systems.
• Minimize use of radio.
• Ensure signal security and COMSEC practices are followed.
COMMUNICATION RESPONSIBILITIES
3-216. All levels of command gain and maintain communications with the
necessary headquarters and personnel. Communications methods and
procedures should be established in unit SOPs and practiced during battle
drills and flight operations. Traditional communications responsibilities
are—
• Higher to lower. The higher unit establishes and maintains
communications with a lower unit. An attached unit of any size is
considered lower to the command to which it is attached.
• Supporting to supported. A supporting unit establishes and maintains
communications with the supported unit.
• Reinforcing to reinforced. A reinforcing unit establishes and maintaines
communications with the reinforced unit.
• Passage of lines. During passage of lines (forward, rearward, or lateral),
the passing unit establishes initial contact with the stationary unit.
However, the primary flow of information must be from the unit in
contact.
• Lateral communications. Establishing communications between
adjacent units may be fixed by the next higher commander, by order, or
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Chapter Three
by SOP. If responsibility is not fixed, the commander of the unit on the
left establishes communications with the unit on the right.
• Rear to front communications. The commander of a unit positioned
behind another unit establishes communications with the forward unit.
RESTORATION
3-217. Regardless of establishment responsibility, all units take prompt
action to restore lost communications.
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
3-218. The brigade uses the full spectrum of communications means.
MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT
3-219. The MSE system is the backbone of the higher headquarters
communications system. It provides voice and data communications from the
corps rear boundary forward to the maneuver brigade's main CP. The MSE
integrates the functions of transmission, switching, control, COMSEC, and
terminal equipment (voice and data) into one system. MSE provides a
switched telecommunications system extended by mobile radiotelephone and
wire access. Users can communicate throughout the battlefield in either a
mobile or static situation.
VIDEO TELECONFERENCE
3-220. Video teleconferences (VTCs) among corps, divisions, and brigades are
becoming more common. Some brigades are already fielded with that
capability. VTCs are an excellent method for coordination over long distances
and can save commanders time.
WIRE/COMMERCIAL LINES
3-221. Normally wire is used for communications within the CP, AA, and
support area. It is the primary means of communication whenever the
situation permits. Initially, wire is laid on the ground. Then, if time permits,
wire is buried or installed overhead. Buried wire is the preferred method to
counter enemy intrusion and EMP. However, wire should be overhead when
crossing roads, except where culverts and bridges are available. Overhead
wire should be a minimum of 18 feet above ground. Wire should be tagged
according to a system in the SOP. At a minimum, tags should be at the ends
of each line. This facilitates reattaching wires when they are pulled out or
cut. Overhead wire in vicinity of helipads and airfields should be avoided;
however, if used, overhead wires must be clearly marked.
3-222. Commercial lines are used when approved by higher headquarters. To
deny enemy collection efforts, secure devices should be used with commercial
lines. If a unit is forced to withdraw, and with the approval of higher
headquarters, existing wire lines (including commercial lines) are cut and
sections removed so the enemy cannot use them.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
RADIO
3-223. Operations often depend on radio as the primary means of
communication. This is especially true during mobile combat operations.
Radio communications should be kept to an absolute minimum until enemy
contact is made.
3-224. FM communications are the primary O&I and A&L nets, and the
means of communicating with ground forces. However, aviation has a broad
range of other radios that facilitate joint, internal, long-range and NOE
communications. These radios include—
• HF—long distance and NOE communications.
• UHF—internal communications and communication with joint aircraft.
• VHF—internal communications and communications with ATS.
• Tactical
satellite
(TACSAT) and SATCOM—long distance
communications.
Appendix E discusses these systems.
3-225. To avoid detection by enemy direction finding equipment, the brigade
uses all other means of communication to supplement radio. Although secure
equipment may prevent the enemy from knowing the content of the
communications, location and volume are easy to detect and analyze. This
gives the enemy valuable combat information.
RADIO RETRANSMISSION
3-226. The brigade retransmission stations are employed according to the
tactical situation to provide FM radio communications between stations too
far apart to communicate directly. The brigade can deploy both ground and
air retransmission stations. Ground retransmission normally support the
brigade command net. Airborne retransmission has a limited time on station,
but is a vulnerable asset. Preplanning is essential to the effective use of
airborne retransmission. Moving ground retransmission by sling load is an
efficient and effective method of emplacing radio retransmission.
MESSENGERS
3-227. Messengers may be used anywhere but normally are used for critical
communications between CPs, trains, and higher and lower headquarters.
Messengers also are used during electronic and radio silence. While ground
messengers are slower than other means of communications, aviation
provides a rapid capability if preplanned. Aviation messengers may be
particularly useful in carrying A&L messages when en route to and from rear
units. They can be used even if units are in contact and especially when
jamming or interception hampers radio communication. During electronic
and radio silence, opening and closing flight plans by land lines may be
required to control helicopter movements.
Message And Document Delivery
3-228. The electronic transmission of messages and documents may not be
possible because of nuclear weapons employment, enemy jamming
operations, imposition of radio silence, or inoperable equipment. Messages
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Chapter Three
and documents that may warrant aerial delivery include combat plans and
orders, written coordination and control measures, and graphics. They also
include public affairs materials to sustain public understanding and support
for the Army's continued operations. Using aviation to deliver messages or
documents is a sound technique; however, it is most efficient when there is a
prepared plan for execution. If an aviation messenger service is anticipated,
it should be part of the aviation brigade and higher headquarters SOPs.
VISUAL AND AUDIO
3-229. Visual and audio signals are in the SOI or SOP. SOP may establish
signals not included in the SOI. Commanders and staff planners carefully
determine how sound and visual signals will be used and authenticated.
Sound and visual signals include pyrotechnics, hand-and-arm, flag, metal-on-
metal, rifle shot, whistles, horns, and bells. Visual cues are especially
valuable in the FARP.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
3-230. OPSEC includes measures taken to deny the enemy information
about friendly forces and operations. OPSEC consists of physical security,
information security, signal security, deception, and counter-surveillance.
Because these categories are interrelated, the commander normally chooses
to employ multiple techniques to counter a threat. Commanders analyze
hostile intelligence efforts and vulnerabilities, execute OPSEC counter-
measures, and survey the effectiveness of countermeasures. Commanders can
then counter specific hostile intelligence efforts.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
3-231. LOCs include roads, supply routes, relay and retransmission sites,
critical signal nodes, microwave facilities, and telephone and wire systems.
The brigade may conduct reconnaissance and security operations of any of
the critical LOCs on a periodic basis or for a specified time to keep the route
open and update information about the route.
AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL
3-232. Inherent in the brigade mission, less those brigades without assigned
UH-60 and fixed-wing aircraft, is transport for commanders and staff officers
so they can see the battlefield and more effectively C2 their units.
3-233. When fielded, the Army airborne command and control system
(A2C2S) will provide tactical CP with the same digital capabilities as the
ground tactical CP. Appendix L provides additional information.
LIAISON OFFICER TRANSPORT
3-234. Aerial transport can help effect vital liaison between units. Since the
UH-60 is in great demand, movement of LNOs must be planned and executed
at the higher headquarters.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
3-235. Brigade elements may be employed to verify unit locations or even
their existence. For example, if the higher headquarters commander loses
communications with a subordinate unit, that commander may ask the
aviation commander to verify the unit's location and status.
RADIO RELAY/RETRANSMISSION
3-236. The brigade can insert and resupply ground retransmission teams
into sites inaccessible by ground. Brigade aircraft may carry retransmission
equipment, relay equipment, or both. Aircrews also can transmit or relay
with onboard equipment.
SECTION VIII - COMMUNICATION NETS
3-237. Each aviation brigade communicates by one or more of the following
systems:
• LAN (secure and nonsecure).
• Amplitude modulated (AM)/frequency modulated (FM) radio.
• HF radio.
• SATCOM.
• MSE.
• MCS/FBCB2.
• Commercial lines.
• Wire.
AMPLITUDE MODULATION/FREQUENCY MODULATION RADIO NETS
3-238. Brigades normally operate on their own and their higher
headquarters command, O&I, and A&L nets. Aviation maneuver brigades
also operate on fire nets. Additionally, each aviation brigade must often
monitor lower, adjacent, and supported unit radio nets. This can be especially
valuable when supporting and conducting air assaults and close fires.
3-239. Critical higher headquarters radio nets must be monitored at all
times.
• Higher command net. The brigade commander, all brigade CPs, and the
S3 enter and operate.
• Higher O&I net. The S2 and all brigade CPs enter and operate.
• Higher A&L net. The S1 and S4 and the ALOC enter and operate.
• Other staff sections and staff officers enter other higher nets as
appropriate.
BRIGADE COMMAND NET
3-240. A secure command net, controlled by the S3, is used for C2 of the
brigade. All subordinate and supporting combat and CS units normally
operate in this net. As a rule, only commanders, XOs, or S3s will
communicate on the net (Figure 3-2).
3-52
Chapter Three
BRIGADE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE NET
3-241. The S2 controls the O&I net. Routine operations and INTREPs are
sent on this net. It functions as a surveillance net when required. O&I is not
normally monitored by the brigade or subordinate commanders. The net is for
details and discussion that leads to analysis. That analysis, when completed,
is relayed to the appropriate commander. The unit XO, operating in the TOC,
ensures that analysis is done and relayed in a timely manner and by the
appropriate means. If the rear CP is used, it also monitors O&I. This allows
the rear CP to anticipate critical support requirements and problems (Figure
3-3).
Figure 3-2. Brigade Command Net
Figure 3-3. Brigade O&I Net
BRIGADE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS NET
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
3-242. This net is controlled by the S1 and S4. It is used for A&L traffic. The
A&L net, like the O&I net, normally is not monitored by the brigade or
subordinate commanders. The net is for details and discussion that leads to
the resolution of administration and logistics matters. Critical information is
relayed to the appropriate commander or discussed on the command net. The
unit XO, operating in the TOC, ensures that analysis is done and relayed in a
timely manner and by the appropriate means. If the rear CP is used, it also
monitors O&I. This allows the rear CP to anticipate critical support
requirements and problems (Figure 3-4).
Figure 3-4. Brigade A&L Net
COMBAT AVIATION NET
3-243. The air mission commander (AMC), air assault task force commander
(AATFC), infantry force commanders, and PZ control officer use this secure
FM net for air-to-ground communication at the PZ/LZ and to transmit
situation reports and mission changes. All aviation forces monitor this net,
especially in the vicinity of the PZ/LZ.
FIRE CONTROL NETS
3-244. The FSO operates in the supporting FA command net and in a
designated fire direction net to coordinate artillery fires. The USAF ALO,
when attached, controls TACAIR through a USAF TACAIR request net
(HF/single side band [SSB]) and a UHF/AM air-ground net.
MONITORED RADIO NETS
3-245. Aviation brigades must often monitor the nets of subordinate,
adjacent, supporting, or supported units. This can be especially valuable in
complex or fast moving operations.
3-246. During Desert Storm, an aviation brigade supported a ground
brigade with attack helicopter fires. The aviation brigade tactical CP
monitored the supported ground brigade command net and its subordinate
battalions' command nets. The aviation brigade tactical CP—listening to its
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Chapter Three
own command net, the attack battalion command net, and the command nets
of the supported ground battalion—detected a friendly fire incident and
issued a cease fire before other friendly elements were engaged, averting an
even worse catastrophe.
3-247. The brigade commander should have three FM nets, one UHF/VHF
net, one HF radio and one SATCOM radio—all in addition to brigade and
higher headquarters command nets. These nets enable him to monitor
subordinate unit, supported unit command, O&I, A&L, or any other nets he
deems important to the missions at hand.
STANDARD ARMY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETS
3-248. Standard Army management information systems (STAMIS) consist
of computer hardware and software systems that automate diverse functions
based on validated customer requirements and facilitate the vertical flow of
logistics and maintenance status information to units Army wide. Chapter 8
addresses the STAMIS architecture.
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM NETS
3-249. Appendix K addresses digitized unit nets.
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Chapter 4
Common Operational Procedures
SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS
GENERAL
4-1. Aviation brigades are tailored to execute operations that support the
unit to which they are assigned. The principal role of the brigade is to set the
conditions for success for its units.
4-2. Each aviation brigade can C2 combat, CS, and CSS missions as a whole,
or with one or more of its subordinate units. However, each brigade is
tailored for its specific TOE mission and does not have the organic assets to
accomplish the full range of combat, CS, and CSS missions. For example, a
TAB can C2 attack helicopter operations, but it is not organized with attack
helicopter assets because its TOE mission is air movement and C2 support.
The corps aviation brigade, through its attack regiment and aviation group,
conducts the full gamut of aviation operations. However, if it requires fixed-
wing support, it must coordinate for that support from the TAB. Because
combat operations may cause task organizations that differ from the
brigade's primary mission focus, brigade commanders and staff should be
familiar with the current doctrinal literature for all elements of each type
brigade.
TIME REQUIRED TO PLAN
4-3. Planning time is critical for every type of military mission. While
aviation units can move rapidly, planning time is essential for coordination,
clearing routes, mission briefings to soldiers and leaders, and unit SOP
compliance. WARNORDs maximize time available by allowing subordinate
units to prepare for pending action. Planning and operations are greatly
simplified by SOPs that are understood, followed, and internalized through
training.
WARNING ORDER
4-4. A WARNORD is a preliminary notice of an order or action that will
follow. It serves as a planning directive that describes the situation, allocates
forces and resources, and establishes command relationships. It provides
other initial planning guidance and initiates subordinate unit mission
planning. Planning and coordination begin when the unit receives a notice of
mission. The aviation commander, LNO, or a staff officer may be sent to a
supported commander's headquarters to assist in planning. Aviation units
may begin to reconfigure or reposition to support the upcoming operation.
4-0
Chapter Four
COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
4-5. Commanders personally designate critical information that derives from
their intent—the CCIR. The CCIR are elements of information required by
commanders that directly affect decision-making and dictate the successful
execution of military operations.
4-6. As part of the MDMP, commanders visualize the battlefield and the
fight. Information collected to answer the CCIR either confirms the
commander's vision of the fight or indicates the need to issue a FRAGO or
execute a branch or sequel.
4-7. CCIR must be focused enough to generate relevant information.
Unfocused requests, such as "I need to know if the enemy moves," may
provide data but not much useable information. However, "I need to know
when the enemy lead brigade reaches NAI 2" or "I need to know if the
multinational unit on our right flank advances beyond Phase Line Blue" are
examples of CCIR specific enough to focus collection and information
management priorities.
FRIENDLY FORCE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
4-8. Friendly force information requirements (FFIR) are information the
commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation.
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
4-9. Priority intelligence requirements are intelligence requirements that the
commander has anticipated and designated a priority in planning and
decision making.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION
4-10. Essential elements of friendly information
(EEFI) are the critical
aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would
subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation;
therefore, they must be protected from enemy detection. EEFI help
commanders understand what enemy commanders want to know about
friendly forces and why (see FM 6-0 [FM 100-34]). They tell commanders
what cannot be compromised. For example, a commander may determine
that if the enemy discovers the movement of the reserve, the operation is at
risk. In this case, the location and movement of the reserve become EEFI.
EEFI provides a basis for indirectly assessing the quality of the enemy's SU
(if the enemy does not know an element of EEFI, it degrades his SU).
COMMON PLANNING PROCESS
4-11. The planning process for aviation brigade operations does not differ
from the doctrinal processes already in place. Because the brigade may have
units joining it from each aviation mission area, it is critical to discuss the
commonality and the differences that each brings to the brigade. Critical
planning includes reconnaissance, security, attack, air assault, air
movement, aerial mine emplacement, AD, A2C2, FS, CAS, C2, and
aeromedical evacuation. Brigade planners may be available from each
aviation mission area. If not available, planners still must plan missions to
4-1
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
the same level of expertise and detail expected of a mission area subject
matter expert.
REVERSE PLANNING PROCESS
4-12. Planning begins with the terminal end of the mission—actions at the
objective, the cargo delivery point, and the passenger drop-off point. Table 4-1
shows the commonality of the planning phases of each mission area. It is
intended as a starting point to assist in team building.
Table 4-1. Planning Phases
Command and
Air Assault
Attack
Air Cavalry
Air Movement
Control
Ground tactical plan
EA plan
Observation/
Pax and cargo
C2 support plan
engagement plan
delivery plan
Landing plan
BP/holding area
Recon/OP
Landing plan
Landing plan
(HA) occupation
occupation plan
plan
Air movement
Air movement
Air movement
Air movement
Air movement
plan
plan
plan
plan
plan
Loading plan (pax
Loading plan
Loading plan
Loading plan (pax
Loading plan (cdrs
and equip)
(ammo)
(ammo)
and cargo)
and staff)
Staging plan (PZ)
Staging plan
Staging plan
Staging plan (PZ)
Staging plan
(forward assembly
(FAA)
(pickup point)
area [FAA])
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
4-13. SA involves knowing enemy and friendly positions and capabilities, as
well as the status of environmental factors
(weather, terrain, civilian
populations). SA is critical to achieving SU and operational success.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR COMMAND POSTS
4-14. CP personnel must remain situationally aware. Among systems
assisting them are the intelligence systems of the division, corps, and EAC,
as well as the brigade's own force
4-15. s. Every CP must know the current situation and be able to present
COAs to the commander on demand, along with a recommendation for the
best COA.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR AIRCREWS
4-16. The navigation systems in the AH-64 and the OH-58D allow
commanders and aircrews to know their exact location. The same is true of
UH-60s equipped with global positioning system (GPS). Other information,
friendly and enemy, is available through the AMPS planning and preparation
process. The OH-58D also has a moving map display, and other aircraft are
scheduled to receive them.
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Chapter Four
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR THE AH-64D
4-17. The AH-64D Longbow Apache
(LBA) has vastly superior SA
capabilities over other aviation brigade aircraft. Each Longbow crew can
query the location of other AH-64Ds automatically and provide their accurate
locations. It can receive and post digital messages automatically from other
friendly forces. Aircraft systems automatically post and show the crew digital
messages and enemy information from the fire control radar (FCR).
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
4-18. There are four types of operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and
support (Tables 4-2 through 4-5).
Table 4-2. Types of Offensive Operations
OFFENSE
DEFINITION
Movement to
Used to develop the situation, establish, or regain contact with the enemy.
Contact
An operation characterized by movement supported by fire. The purpose is to destroy,
delay, disrupt, or attrit the enemy.
Hasty attack: An operation in which preparation time is traded for speed to exploit an
opportunity.
Attack
Deliberate attack: An action characterized by preplanned, coordinated employment of fires,
and movement to close with and destroy the enemy.
Special Purpose: Special purpose attacks achieve objectives different from those of other
attacks. Spoiling attacks and counter attacks are usually phases of a larger operation. Raids
and ambushes are generally single-phased operations conducted by small units. Feints and
demonstrations are military deception operations.
Exploitation
The follow-up of gains to take full advantage of success in battle.
Pursuit
An action against a retreating enemy force.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
Table 4-3. Types of Defensive Operations
DEFENSE
DEFINITION
Orients on the defeat or destruction of the enemy force by allowing it to
Mobile
advance to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack.
Orients on denying the enemy designated terrain. Conducted to defend
specified terrain, when the enemy enjoys a mobility advantage over the
Area
defending force, when well-defined avenues of approach exist, and the
defending force has sufficient combat power to cover the likely enemy
avenues of approach.
Retrograde
Mission that trades space for time while retaining flexibility and freedom of
(Delay)
action.
Retrograde
A planned, voluntary disengagement that anticipates enemy interference.
(Withdrawal)
Retrograde
A force not in contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy.
(Retirement)
Table 4-4 Types of Stability Operations
STABILITY
DEFINITION
Peace Operations
Operations conducted to support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain
(PO)
peace.
Foreign Internal
Operations in support of a foreign government to free and protect its society
Defense (FID)
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
A group of programs that support U.S. national policies and objectives by
Security
providing defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services
Assistance
to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales.
Humanitarian and
Assistance provided with military operations and exercises.
Civic Assistance
On National Command Authority (NCA) order, Army forces (ARFOR) support
Support to
insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten U.S. interests or regional
Insurgencies
stability.
Support to
ARFOR always conduct counter-drug operations that support other U.S.
Counter-Drug
government agencies. When conducted inside the U.S. and its territories, they
Operations
are domestic support operations.
Combatting
Operations to deter or defeat terrorist attacks.
Terrorism
Noncombatant
Operations to relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a
Evacuation
foreign nation to secure areas.
Operations (NEO)
Arms Control
Conducted to prevent escalation of a conflict and reduce instability.
Conducted to bolster and reassure allies, deter potential aggressors, and gain
Show of Force
or increase influence.
4-4
Chapter Four
Table 4-5. Types of Support Operations
SUPPORT
DEFINITION
Domestic
Assistance to U.S. civilian authorities in activities such as civil
Support
disturbance control, counter-drug operations, combatting terrorism,
Operations
and law enforcement.
Foreign
Operations to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made
Humanitarian
disasters including conditions such as pain, disease, hunger, or
Assistance
privation that present a serious threat to life or loss of property.
COMMON TERMS
4-19. The terms defined below are terms common to aviation operations.
ASSEMBLY AREAS
4-20. There are three types of AAs used by Army aviation units—heavy
assembly areas (HAA), FAA, and RAA. Appendix D contains additional
information on AAs.
General
4-21. An AA is a location where the unit prepares for operations. Activities
include planning, orders, maintenance, and Class I, III, and V resupply. AAs
should be located out of enemy medium artillery range and be large enough
for dispersion of the unit. AAs should not be located along an axis of advance.
Other considerations involved in selecting appropriate AAs are—
• Security.
• Concealment.
• Accessibility to main supply routes (MSR).
• Air avenues of approach.
• Location of friendly units.
• Suitability of ingress and egress routes.
Heavy Assembly Areas
4-22. HAAs are locations where aviation units conduct routine maintenance,
resupply, planning, and other preparations for combat operations. They
contain all the life support requirements for combat crews and are the normal
place for crew endurance activities. The main CP always locates in the HAA.
All elements in this area can relocate while unit aircraft are fighting forward.
HAAs relocate according to METT-TC (Figure 4-1).
4-5
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
Figure 4-1. Heavy AA
Forward Assembly Areas
4-23. Units use FAAs to reduce response time, plan mission changes, conduct
final planning, and task-organize as required by the situation or mission
changes. Normally, only operational helicopters and tactical CPs (brigade and
battalion) are found in an FAA. Because of the FAA's distance from the HAA,
some circumstances require a contact team to provide a more timely response
to maintenance needs. Vehicles other than those assigned to the tactical CP
are the exception rather than the norm. Units normally use FAAs for no more
than 6 to 12 hours (Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2. Forward AA
Rear Assembly Areas
4-24. Units establish RAAs for aircraft maintenance not feasible in the HAA
because the unit HAA may have to move often. When the enemy air threat is
not high, the RAA collocates with the HAA to better facilitate aviation
maintenance. The RAA relocates according to METT-TC. If withdrawing,
units may have to destroy disabled aircraft. The AVIM should position so
that it moves as little as possible to allow more time to conduct maintenance
(Figure 4-3).
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Chapter Four
Figure 4-3. Rear AA
BATTLE POSITIONS
4-25. BPs are areas in which aviation units can maneuver and fire into a
designated EA or engage targets of opportunity. BPs contain firing positions
(FPs) and attack positions (Figure 4-4).
Figure 4-4. Battle Position
HOLDING AREAS
4-26. HAs provide cover and concealment from enemy direct fire or
observation. Units establish HAs to loiter short of FPs to resolve timing
errors, and conduct reconnaissance or final coordination before attack.
Helicopters should not shut down or go to auxiliary power units in HAs
without a thorough risk assessment. Do not use HAs to plan unless
absolutely necessary. Planning should be done in a FAA or HAA (Figure 4-5).
Figure 4-5. Holding Area
4-7
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
FIRING POSITIONS
4-27. Units use FPs to engage the enemy. Standoff must be maintained. As a
general guideline, FPs are no closer to the enemy than the distances shown
below. Ranges may be altered by METT-TC (Figure 4-6).
• Rockets: 5,500 meters.
• Hellfire:
5,000 meters.
• 30mm: 2,500 meters.
Figure 4-6. Firing Position
ATTACK BY FIRE
4-28. Attack by fire (ABF) are fires (direct and indirect) employed to destroy
the enemy from a distance, normally used when the mission does not dictate
or support occupation of the objective. This task is usually given to the
supporting element during the offensive and as a counterattack option for the
reserve during defensive operations. An ABF is not done in conjunction with
a maneuvering force. When assigning this task, the commander must specify
the intent of the fire—either to destroy, fix, or suppress. ABF positions are
less restrictive than BPs and better suited to a fluid battlefield. They allow
the unit to maneuver and engage the enemy, but not maneuver over the
enemy (Figure 4-7).
Figure 4-7. Attack by Fire
SUPPORT BY FIRE
4-29. Support by fire is a tactical task in which a maneuver element moves to
a position on the battlefield where it can engage the enemy by direct fire. It
supports a maneuvering force by either support by fire by overwatching or by
establishing a base of fire. The maneuver element does not attempt to
maneuver to capture enemy forces or terrain (Figure 4-8).
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Chapter Four
Figure 4-8. Support By Fire
RALLY POINT
4-30. Units designate a rally point to reassemble separated or dispersed
elements (Figure 4-9). A rally point is used to—
• Reform units before, during, or after an operation.
• Regroup a team, platoon, or company after a hasty withdrawal from
contact.
• Assemble personnel after their position has been overrun.
• Assemble reaction teams.
Figure 4-9. Rally Point
FLIGHT MODES AND MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
4-31. Flight modes include low-level, contour, and NOE. Movement
techniques include traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
Aviation elements choose the flight mode and movement technique based on
available terrain and the probability of enemy contact.
Traveling
4-32. Traveling is used for moving rapidly over the battlefield when enemy
contact is unlikely, or the situation requires speed to evade the enemy. All
aircraft move at the same speed. Units often employ low-level flight with the
traveling movement technique.
Traveling Overwatch
4-33. Traveling overwatch is used when speed is essential and enemy contact
is possible. Lead aircraft move constantly and trail aircraft move as
necessary to maintain overwatch of lead. Units often employ contour flight
with the traveling overwatch technique.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
Bounding Overwatch
4-34. Bounding overwatch is used when expecting enemy contact. It is the
slowest movement technique. It uses alternate or successive bounds, with
lead aircraft moving to a position while trail aircraft overwatch. The
overwatching aircraft then bound to a position ahead of the lead aircraft.
Each aircraft bounds separately while the other overwatches the movement.
Length of the bound depends on the terrain, visibility, and the effective range
of the overwatching weapon system. Units normally employ NOE flight with
the bounding overwatch technique.
AVIATION BRIGADE OPERATIONS
4-35. An overview of the brigade's major mission categories follows.
AIR ASSAULT AND AIR MOVEMENT
4-36. All aviation brigades can C2 multibattalion air assaults or air
movements, as well as small team movements. However, proficiency in large-
scale air assaults or air movements requires training and rehearsals. Air
cavalry and attack helicopters normally provide aerial escort, overwatching
fires, route reconnaissance, and security for air assaults. Careful analysis of
the factors of METT-TC and a detailed, precise, reverse planning sequence
lead to successful execution of air assault operations. Planning begins with
the ground tactical plan and works backwards to the staging plan as
indicated in Figure 4-10. Reverse planning is imperative, as each successive
planning step impacts the phase that precedes it. For example, the landing
plan helps air assault planners determine the sequence and composition of
lifts during the air movement phase.
Figure 4-10. Air Assault Planning Stages
SLINGS AND RIGGING EQUIPMENT
4-37. The aviation brigade must ensure supported units understand their
responsibility to supply all slings and rigging equipment for air movement
and air assaults. The supported unit prepares all loads for movement. Failure
to establish this responsibility early in the planning process may lead to
major mission delays and even mission failure. Aviation brigades should
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Chapter Four
work with their higher headquarters to ensure that this fact is part of the
higher headquarters SOP.
ATTACK
4-38. The primary attack mission is to destroy enemy ground forces. A well-
suited secondary mission is cavalry operations—reconnaissance, counter-
reconnaissance, and security. A third mission is defensive air combat against
enemy helicopter forces. Given USAF capabilities to establish air superiority,
Army counter-air training lacks emphasis. However, at a minimum, attack
units must plan for and practice defensive counter-air.
4-39. Attack units can conduct operations in deep areas or attack with
ground maneuver units during close and rear battle operations. Attack units
normally are most effective when used in mass on the enemy's flanks and
rear. An aviation brigade may be called upon to conduct attack operations as
a whole, or with one or more subordinate units. Assault and heavy helicopter
units provide substantial flexibility in resupply of Class III/V, mine
emplacement, and insertion of ground troops at blocking positions or OPs.
4-40. Attack aviation normally operates under aviation brigade control.
Based on METT-TC, the aviation brigade staff backward plans (just as in air
assault operations) from actions in the EA, method of employment
(continuous, phased, or maximum destruction), occupation of BPs, HAs, air
movement routes (to include passage of lines, if required), to preparatory
actions in the AA.
4-41. In the example shown in Figure 4-11, the aviation brigade has a
mission to attack to destroy the enemy reserve tank regiment. The aviation
brigade commander decides to attack with two battalions simultaneously and
to keep his third battalion in reserve. The first battalion, in the north, moves
via route Hawk to positions to ABF the northern half of EA Chris. The second
battalion, in the south, moves via route Wren to attack positions to attack by
fire the southern half of EA Chris. The aviation brigade commander acts as
the AMC to ensure coordination of the attacks and inflict maximum
destruction. The brigade provides its own UH-60 aircraft, or another brigade
provides UH-60 aircraft to conduct airborne C2, CASEVAC, downed aircrew
recovery, and, if required, to conduct emergency resupply of the FARP. For
this operation, attacking with two battalions simultaneously, no attack
helicopter fires across the battalion boundaries are allowed. This reduces the
potential of fratricide. FM 3-04.112 (FM 1-112) contains a detailed discussion
of attack helicopter operations.
4-11
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
Figure 4-11. Attack Mission Planning
CAVALRY
4-42. Each type of aviation brigade, when task-organized, is an adequate air
cavalry force. The divisional brigades, the air assault division brigades (task-
organized), the corps aviation brigade, and the corps attack regiment (with
support from the corps aviation group) are ideally suited to conduct
reconnaissance, screens, and economy of force operations. Inherent in all
cavalry operations is counter-reconnaissance. When augmented with ground
forces and UAV support, aviation brigades are even more capable. They can
operate as a reaction force to develop the situation, occupy ground OPs, seize
key terrain, and conduct raids. METT-TC determines whether the brigade
commander operates with battalions pure or task-organized. Even though the
UH-60 lacks sophisticated weapons and sensors, when pressed, the brigade
may use assault units to conduct limited reconnaissance and screening,
according to METT-TC. The level of training in the aviation brigade will
dictate its ability as an air cavalry or cavalry force (Figure 4-12).
Reconnaissance
4-43. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort to obtain information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or about the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an area. It is performed before,
during, and after other combat operations to provide information.
Reconnaissance missions are divided into five categories—route, zone, area,
reconnaissance in force, and multi-dimensional. FM 3-04.114 (FM 1-114) and
FM 3-20.95 (FM 17-95) address these categories.
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Chapter Four
Figure 4-12. Cavalry Screen
Security
4-44. Security operations are undertaken to—
• Provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations.
• Provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy.
• Develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the
protected force.
4-45. Security operations are characterized by reconnaissance to reduce
terrain and enemy unknowns, gaining and maintaining contact with the
enemy to ensure continuous information flow, and providing early and
accurate reporting of information to the protected force. Pure aviation
security missions are limited to screening. When augmented with the
appropriate ground forces, it can guard. The brigade participates in covering
force operations as a part of a larger force. To act as the covering force
headquarters, the aviation brigade requires ground maneuver forces and DS
artillery. FM
3-04.114
(FM 1-114) and FM 3-20.95 (FM 17-95) contain
detailed discussions of security operations.
Screen Lines
4-46. The graphical symbol for the screen (lightning bolts) indicates the
general area for screening operations. In no way does the symbol indicate a
requirement for physical occupation.
4-47. Once the order to screen is received, the aviation brigade S3
coordinates with all units that will be adjacent to the screen. The S3
establishes boundaries, contact points, passage points
(PPs), and other
coordinating measures as required to allow the cavalry squadron to pass
through and operate in vicinity of main body units.
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
4-48. The cavalry squadron then provides the orders and graphics necessary
to accomplish the screen. The squadron provides exact OP locations, how long
OPs will be occupied, routes between OPs, and other graphics required.
4-49. The cavalry troops then execute the screen mission from the OPs
assigned by squadron.
AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
4-50. An ATS battalion provides ATS throughout the corps. Supported
brigades provide the DS ATS companies with Class I, maintenance, and fuel.
Whenever they deploy, they must be sustained by their supported brigade.
The supported brigade must include the DS ATS company in all of its
movement, CS, and CSS plans.
SECTION II - PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
GENERAL
4-51. Planning considerations are predicated on METT-TC. Some of these
elements are specific to the mission and are discussed in the appropriate
chapter of this manual. This section addresses planning considerations that
are common to any mission the brigade might be assigned.
MISSION
4-52. Higher headquarters assign missions to the aviation brigade.
Commanders determine their specified and implied tasks by analyzing their
assigned mission and coordinating with supported units. The results of that
analysis yield the essential tasks that, together with the purpose of the
operation, clearly indicate the actions required. The mission includes what
tasks must be accomplished; who is to do them; and when, where, and why
the tasks are to be done. It includes risk management considerations.
MISSION CRITERIA
4-53. For any mission, the commander seeks to establish criteria that will
maximize his probability of success (such as ground conditions, visibility, and
force ratios). The supported commander and the brigade higher headquarters
set mission criteria. During the planning process, mission criteria are
quantified and stated in easily understood terms. If any of the stated criteria
are achieved before or during the mission, the designated commander should
execute predetermined actions.
ENEMY
4-54. Analysis of the enemy includes information about his strength,
location, activity, and capabilities. Commanders and staffs also assess the
most likely enemy COAs. Analysis includes adversaries, potentially hostile
parties, and other threats to success. Threats may include the spread of
infectious disease, regional instabilities, or misinformation. Commanders
consider asymmetric as well as conventional threats.
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Chapter Four
THREAT ANALYSIS
4-55. The brigade conducts a threat analysis during planning, based upon
the IPB prepared by it and higher headquarters. A common mistake is to
orient too much on terrain as opposed to the enemy. Knowing the enemy's
location, his forces, capabilities, and intentions are key to success. Knowledge
of the enemy ensures the best use of terrain to exploit his weaknesses and
capitalize on friendly strengths.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
4-56. Terrain includes man-made features such as cities, airfields, bridges,
railroads, ports, and contaminated areas. Terrain and weather also have
pronounced effects on ground and air maneuver, precision munitions, air
support, and CSS. To find tactical advantages, commanders and staffs
analyze and compare the limitations of the environment on friendly, enemy,
and neutral forces.
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
4-57. Commanders and staffs perform terrain analysis whether using
digitized tools or paper maps. They evaluate terrain for cover and
concealment, its impact on maneuver, and the enemy's movements. The key
elements of terrain analysis are summarized in the following mnemonic
OCOKA:
• Observation and fields of fire.
• Cover and concealment.
• Obstacles to movement.
• Key terrain.
• Avenues of approach.
OBSTACLES
4-58. Obstacles and reinforcement of terrain must be included in the tactical
plan. Engineers use obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy.
Disruptive obstacles cause enemy formations to separate or bunch up, which
disrupts their maneuver and attack. Fixing obstacles slow enemy progress
and allow friendly fires the opportunity to mass effects. Turning obstacles
drive the enemy toward friendly EAs and massed fires or force them to
expose their flanks. Blocking obstacles deny the enemy access to an area or
prevent advance in a given direction. Although the brigade probably will not
have engineer support to establish obstacles, the commander must
understand the ground force commander's obstacle plan and use it to his
advantage.
TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE
4-59. Because maps are sometimes inaccurate or incomplete, commanders
should conduct detailed, personal reconnaissance. Brigade commanders
should create the conditions where battalion commanders can ensure their
aircrews are familiar with the terrain and scheme of maneuver. If possible,
battalion commanders—and their crews—should perform a map
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FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111)
reconnaissance; visit LZs, PZs, and BPs and FPs; and conduct rehearsals.
These actions help them understand the scheme of maneuver and
commander's intent, and quicken their reactions during the chaos of battle.
Commanders consider all sources of intelligence. Aerial photographs, satellite
imagery, and human intelligence (HUMINT) can be critical.
WEATHER
4-60. Weather affects soldiers, equipment, operations, and terrain. Cloud
cover, wind, rain, snow, fog, dust, light conditions, and temperature extremes
combine in various ways to affect human efficiency. They also limit the use
of weapons and equipment. Weather impacts both friendly and enemy assets.
For example, rain can degrade forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems, but
it also inhibits the cross-country maneuverability of enemy forces. Each
system used on the battlefield has its strong and weak points in relation to
the weather. Commanders must know the strengths of their systems and use
them to attack the weaknesses of the enemy systems.
VISIBILITY
4-61. Limited visibility affects operations and often favors ground maneuver.
Fog and smoke reduce the effective range of many weapon systems, including
AD weapons, and friendly SAL Hellfire. Commanders use the concealment of
limited visibility to maneuver forces to a positional advantage. The brigade
should plan operations to maximize the advantages of its superior sensor
systems.
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
4-62. Commanders assess the training level and psychological state of
friendly forces. The analysis includes availability of critical systems and joint
support. They examine combat, CS, and CSS assets, including contractors.
The status of all aviation brigade units should be readily available for the
commander and the staff per SOP.
FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT CONSIDERATIONS
4-63. A brigade normally employs FARPs and rapid refueling points (no
ammunition) in a DS or GS role. In DS, FARPs support cavalry and attack
units, while rapid refueling points support assault and heavy helicopter
units. In GS, FARPs support all units in the AO, while other FARPs move or
set up in new locations for future operations. Also, brigades can set up FARPs
in GS and keep others in reserve or it can set up all FARPs in one location,
providing mass support to units as they rotate through.
AIRSPACE COORDINATION
4-64. Total familiarity with the TAGS is essential to deconflict operations
and prevent mission delays. Brigades may need to comply with provisions in
the ACO, ATO, and SPINS. They have strict timelines and FSCMs to take
into account during brigade and subordinate planning cycles.
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Chapter Four
SUPPORTED UNIT COORDINATION
4-65. All aspects of the mission must be thoroughly planned, coordinated,
and rehearsed with the supported unit. Supported unit graphics are essential
for SU. Aviation often conducts passage of lines with supported units, and
those operations require close coordination. Fires must be considered to
ensure the necessary artillery is available when called.
TIME AVAILABLE
4-66. Commanders assess time available for planning, preparing, and
executing the mission. They consider how friendly and enemy forces will use
the time and the possible results. Proper use of time available can be a key to
success. The one-third, two-thirds rule should be used whenever possible.
Concurrent planning makes the best use of time. Emerging digital systems
enhance concurrent planning capabilities. For operations in deep areas,
concurrent planning also must involve the aviation brigade's higher
headquarters staff.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
4-67. Civil considerations relate to civilian populations, culture,
organizations, and leaders within the AO. Commanders consider the natural
environment (Appendix O), to include cultural sites, in operations directly or
indirectly affecting civilians. They include political, economic, and
information matters, as well as more immediate civilian activities and
attitudes.
CIVIL IMPACT
4-68. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the
immediate impact of civilians on current operations; however, they also
consider larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and information issues. Civil
considerations can tax the resources of tactical commanders. The local
population and displaced persons influence commanders' decisions. Their
presence and the need to address their control, protection, and welfare affect
the choice of COAs and allocation of resources. In stability operations and
support operations, civilians can be a central feature of planning.
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES
4-69. Political boundaries of nations, provinces, and towns are important
considerations. Conflict often develops across boundaries, and boundaries
may impose limits on friendly action. Boundaries, whether official or not,
determine which civilian leaders and institutions can influence a situation.
MEDIA PRESENCE
4-70. Media presence guarantees that a global audience views military
activities in near real-time. The activities of the force—including individual
soldiers—can have far-reaching effects on domestic and international opinion
(see appendix M).
4-17
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