|
|
|
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
relationship between the source and HUMINT collectors, to meetings
whereby only the collector and the source know the meeting has occurred.
When contact operations are conducted using this methodology, the operation
must be coordinated in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) policy cited in Appendix J. Specific direction regarding
documentation required for recruitment, and the designation of approval
authority (usually the J/G2X) for recruitment of a formal contact, will be
specified in Appendix 5 (HUMINT) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the governing
OPLAN or OPORD.
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-30. Debriefing operations refer to the systematic questioning of individuals
not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection
tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories
of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians including refugees,
DPs, and local inhabitants.
5-31. Debriefing operations are those operations directed towards collecting
information from a segment of the target population using primarily
debriefing techniques. These debriefing operations are separate from the
G2/S2 debriefing program to debrief personnel returning from missions.
Debriefing operations often include the debriefing of personnel who may not
usually be debriefed as part of their assigned duties.
5-32. Normally Army debriefing operations will be directly related to
collection tasks at the operational and tactical levels. Strategic debriefing of
high-level personnel in response to theater and national level requirements
is often under the purview of the DIA/DH. Army HUMINT collectors
frequently participate in this type of collection, which is under the control,
rules, regulations, and operational guidance of DH.
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-33. Debriefing operations are conducted under the guidelines of
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). They are further subject to
applicable execute orders and the specific ROE and classified “umbrella
concept” that apply to the specific AO.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
5-34. Debriefing requires relatively unconstrained access to the target
audience. Debriefing operations are frequently constrained by the umbrella
concept, overt operational proposal (OVOP), and OPORDs. Debriefing is a
time- and resource-demanding operation that often shows limited immediate
results. Since the potential target audience is so large, debriefing operations
require careful planning and careful screening and selection of specific
targets.
6 September 2006
5-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
5-35. Debriefing operations at the tactical level include the debriefing of
elements of the local and transient civilian population in support of ongoing
tactical operations. This is different from but often supportive of tactical
SCOs as described in Chapter
1. Although tactical SCOs use specific
identified sources to obtain and report information, tactical debriefing
operations use one-time and continuous contacts to answer requirements.
Tactical debriefing operations are frequently combined with tactical
interrogation operations and may identify potential sources for tactical SCOs.
REFUGEE FACILITY AND CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS
5-36. Refugee facility and checkpoint operations involve placing HCTs at
points where US forces expect to encounter large numbers of refugees.
Deployment of HUMINT collectors at checkpoints is normally preferred due
to their ability to collect and report more timely information. As in the
questioning of detainees, the debriefing of refugees should not delay their
movement out of the danger area.
5-37. Checkpoint debriefing is normally done in coordination with MP or
combat forces that are manning the checkpoint. Debriefing at refugee camps
is used to obtain longer term and less immediate information. HUMINT
collection units established at refugee camps coordinate their activities with
the CA, MP, NGO, or other organizations that has responsibility for
operating the refugee camp.
5-38. In internment facilities operated by the MPs, HUMINT collectors
coordinate with MPs for access to the detainees and for guard support. In
facilities operated by NGOs, HUMINT collectors coordinate with NGOs for
permission to speak to the refugees. NGOs are civilian agencies and may
decide not to permit HUMINT collectors to have access to refugees.
FRIENDLY FORCE DEBRIEFING
5-39. Every member of the friendly force is a potential source for HUMINT
collection. Friendly force personnel frequently have contact with the threat,
civilian population, or the environment. Although many individuals report
their information in the form of combat information, many do not report the
information, do not realize its significance, or do not know how to report key
information. Frequently a systematic questioning by a trained HUMINT
collector will identify key information that can contribute to the intelligence
picture and help an individual recall details. It also helps to place his
information into a systematic format for the analyst to use.
5-40. HUMINT collectors debrief selected friendly force personnel including
combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long-range surveillance teams, deep
insert special forces teams, and other high-risk mission personnel. Often the
personnel assigned to a sector of responsibility are the first to notice changes
in the attitude of the local populace or differences in the mission
environment.
5-41. They are also able to provide indicators concerning the mission
environment. HUMINT collectors also conduct debriefings of returned
5-8
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
prisoners of war (POWs), freed hostages, returned US defectors, and soldiers
reported as missing in action. These debriefings help to determine enemy
methods of operations, enemy intentions, POW handling and interrogations,
enemy weaknesses, information concerning other POWs not returned, and
battle damage assessment (BDA).
5-42. HUMINT assets lose access to valuable information if they are not
regularly coordinating with the following elements:
•
Cavalry Troops, Unit Patrols, and Scouts. Unit patrols and scouts
have a unique view of the battle area that sensors cannot detect.
During operations, units and scouts often patrol villages or populated
areas that are contentious and therefore of interest. The unit will gain
valuable information on the current status of the AO, potentially
answering intelligence requirements, through mission reporting and
debriefing by their unit S2 or HUMINT collector.
•
Military Police. HUMINT collection assets work with the MPs who
gain area knowledge through their extensive foot patrols and vehicular
convoys. MPs also staff checkpoints and traffic control points (TCPs)
where they interact with large numbers of the civilian populace and
encounter people and situations that often answer intelligence
requirements. MP guards at any internment facility are a valuable
source of information on the attitude and behavior of detainees.
HUMINT collectors should coordinate with the MP detainee facility
commander in order to obtain information on detainees obtained
through custodial observation and conversations.
•
Civil Affairs. CA units have daily interaction with the civilian
populace including key members of the civilian community such as
politicians, technical personnel, and military leadership.
•
Psychological Operations. PSYOP teams often interview civilians
on the battlefield to determine the effectiveness of friendly and threat
PSYOP campaigns. PSYOP elements also gather information on
political, social, and other PSYOP requirements. PSYOP elements
produce and disseminate intelligence products based partially on their
interaction with the civilian populace.
•
Special Operations Forces. The Special Operations Forces (SOF)
team often has greater access to humans and areas on a battlefield
than any other collection asset. Their observation of and interaction
with the local population provides them access to information that
often answers collection requirements. The following are examples of
these types of collection missions:
Special reconnaissance missions into denied territory to satisfy
intelligence gaps or to confirm information from another source.
Unconventional warfare (UW) missions normally of a long duration.
SOF are inserted into hostile territory to conduct sensitive
operations that support US tactical and national objectives. During
these missions, SOF units often come in contact with the local
population and gather information that meets intelligence
requirements.
•
Long-Range Surveillance. Direct observation and reporting on
targets such as activities and facilities may provide timely and
6 September 2006
5-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
accurate intelligence to support a decision or cross-cue other collection
capabilities. Long-range surveillance (LRS) is often employed when
discreet observation of an activity is necessary over a long period of
time or when a collection system that can respond to redirection is
necessary.
• Criminal Intelligence Operations. CID personnel, in cooperation
with MP soldiers, play a key role by linking criminal intelligence to
specific groups and events. The criminal intelligence collection effort
specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and identities of
smuggling routes. The identification of smuggling routes results in a
significant increase in numbers of weapons being confiscated. The
timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units
enables a rapid response to serious confrontations, increased
confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in a TF
and AO. The Fusion Cell within the ACE develops intelligence
products from national, theater, and operational sources. Due to the
significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID military agents
and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the Fusion Cell to
facilitate the police intelligence function.
STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-43. Strategic debriefing is debriefing activity conducted to collect
information or to verify previously collected information in response to
national or theater level collection priorities. This avoids surprises of a
strategic nature and is used to support long-range strategic planning.
Strategic debriefing is conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. It often
fills intelligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or areas. The sources for
strategic debriefing include but are not limited to émigrés, refugees,
displaced
persons,
defectors,
and selected
US personnel.
Strategic debriefing guidance is provided in DIAM
58-11
(S//NF),
DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and DODD 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence, Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning."
5-44. Strategic debriefing is conducted in a non-hostile, business-like
manner. The rapport posture is usually amicable as the source is usually
willingly answering national level intelligence needs. Although voluntary
sources may not be motivated by a desire for money or other material
incentives, it is necessary to ensure that any promised incentives are
delivered. The time used in a strategic debriefing can range from days to
years. Sources typically have high-level backgrounds in scientific, industrial,
political, or military areas.
5-45. Information gathered as strategic intelligence is categorized into eight
components. Each of these components can be divided into subcomponents.
These components and subcomponents are neither all-encompassing nor
mutually exclusive. This approach enhances familiarization with the types of
information included in strategic intelligence. An easy way to remember
these components is the acronym "BEST MAPS":
5-10
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Biographic Intelligence
Economic Intelligence
Sociological Intelligence
Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence
Military Geographic Intelligence
Armed Forces Intelligence
Political Intelligence
Science and Technological Intelligence
•
Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or
potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and
backgrounds. For further guidance on collecting and reporting
biographic intelligence, see DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). The subcomponents
are—
Educational and occupational history—civilian and military
backgrounds of individuals.
Individual accomplishment—notable accomplishments of an
individual's professional or private life.
Idiosyncrasies and habits—mannerisms and unusual lifestyles.
Position, influence, and potential—present and/or future positions of
power or influence.
Attitudes and hobbies—significant interests that may affect an
individual's accessibility.
•
Economic intelligence studies economic strengths and weaknesses
of a country. The subcomponents are—
Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps
a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with
its enemies.
Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military
would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
Manufacturing—information on processes, facilities, logistics, and
raw materials.
Source of economic capability—any means a country has to sustain
its economy (for example, black market trade, legitimate business or
trades, and imports and exports).
•
Sociological intelligence deals with people, customs, behaviors, and
institutions. The subcomponents are—
Population—rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
Social characteristics—customs, morals, and values.
Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.
Welfare—health and education.
Public information—information services within the country.
•
Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies
systems dedicated to and used during military emergencies and
peacetime.
6 September 2006
5-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors
(physical and cultural) that may affect military operations. Physical
geography is concerned with natural or manmade geophysical features.
Cultural geography provides demographics information.
•
Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground, sea,
and air forces of the country. The subcomponents are--
Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain,
economics, and politics.
Tactics—military deployments and operations doctrine.
OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.
Equipment—analysis of all military materiel.
Logistics—procurement, storage, and distribution.
Training—as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
Organization—detailed analysis of command structures.
Manpower—available resources and their conditioning.
•
Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect
military operations. The subcomponents are—
Government structure—organization of departments and ministries.
National policies—government actions and decisions.
Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
Propaganda—information and disinformation programs.
Policy and intelligence services—organization and functions.
Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.
•
Science and technological intelligence studies the country's
potential and capability to support objectives through development of
new processes, equipment, and weapons systems. The subcomponents
are—
Weapons and weapon systems.
Missile and space programs.
Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
NBC developments.
Basic applied science.
Research and development systems.
LIAISON OPERATIONS
5-46. Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate
or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand
counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government,
military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition
infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is quid pro quo. An exchange of
information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the
transaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely depending upon the
culture, location, and personalities involved.
5-47. Because the nature of liaison tasks varies widely, the general goals of
the liaison operation and the objective of each liaison contact should be
5-12
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
clearly defined. The objective should include the type of information to be
collected, methods of operations unique to the area, and the command
objectives. Additionally, the collector should know limitations on liaison
activities. These limitations include--
• Prohibitions against collecting certain types of information or
contacting certain types of individuals or organizations.
• Memorandums of understanding with other echelons which delineate
each echelon’s AOR and AORs for subordinate units.
• Coordination requirements per DCID 5/1 dated 19 December 1984,
which are required for selected types of liaison activities.
5-48. Administrative considerations include--
• Type, method, and channels of reporting information obtained from
liaison activities.
• Project and contingency fund site numbers to be used.
• Funding and incentive acquisition procedures.
• Limitations on the use of ICFs or incentives.
• Reporting system used.
• Authority under which the specific liaison program is conducted and
guidelines for joint and combined operations are set.
5-49. Benefits of liaison include--
• Establishing working relations with various commands, agencies, or
governments.
• Arranging for and coordinating joint and combined operations.
• Exchanging operational information and intelligence within legal
limits.
• Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies not
otherwise accessible.
• Acquiring information to satisfy US requirements.
• Accessing a larger pool of information.
INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-50. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved
interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain
reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with
applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law
of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained
and certified to use legal, approved methods of convincing EPWs/detainees to
give their cooperation. Interrogation sources are detainees, including EPWs.
5-51. Definitions of EPWs and rules for their treatment are contained in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).
The definition and rules for the treatment of civilians are contained in the
6 September 2006
5-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (GC). (See Appendix A.) For persons covered by those Conventions,
applicable GPW and GC provisions must be adhered to at all times.
(Regarding treatment of detained personnel, see also paragraph 5-74.)
5-52. There is an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions called
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, which also contains
definitions of who is a civilian and who is an EPW (Articles 50 and 44). The
US has not ratified Protocol I nor does it accept the expanded definition of
EPWs that it contains. Requirements managers, J/G/S2X personnel, and
HUMINT collectors should understand, however, that coalition military
personnel with whom they may work may be bound by Protocol I, and those
coalition personnel may be required to treat additional personnel as EPWs.
Any questions concerning the GPW and Protocol I must be directed to the
SJA office for clarification.
5-53. Interrogation operations are specific operations normally conducted at
detainee collection facilities directed at the wide-scale collection of
information from detainees using interrogation techniques. Although field
interrogations are conducted at all echelons and during all operations in
which there are detainees, detention facilities where interrogation operations
occur are normally located only at theater or JTF level.
5-54. Compliance with laws and regulations, including proper treatment of
detainees, is a matter of command responsibility. Commanders have an
affirmative duty to ensure their subordinates are not mistreating detainees
or their property. HCT leaders must effectively supervise their subordinate
collectors during all interrogation operations. Supervisors must ensure that
each HUMINT collector has properly completed an interrogation plan and
sound collection strategy, and fully understands the intelligence
requirements he is seeking to satisfy prior to beginning an interrogation.
NCOs and WOs should regularly participate in interrogations with their
subordinates to ensure that the highest standards of conduct are maintained.
Interrogation supervisors should also monitor interrogations by video, where
video monitoring is available. The production, use, and dissemination of
interrogation videos must be tightly controlled by HCT leaders. Such videos
must not be released for dissemination outside the Intelligence Community
without the express permission of the SECDEF or his delegate.
NON-DOD AGENCIES
5-55. Non-DOD agencies may on occasion request permission to conduct
interrogations in Army facilities. These requests must be approved by the
JTF commander or, if there is no JTF commander, the theater commander or
appropriate higher level official. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort non-DOD interrogators to
observe their interrogation operations. The non-DOD personnel will sign for
any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same
established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all instances,
interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be
observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must
observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and
5-14
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
treatment of detainees as do Army personnel. All personnel who observe or
become aware of violations of Army interrogation operation standards will
report the infractions immediately to the commander. The personnel who
become aware of mistreatment of detainees will report the infractions
immediately and suspend the access of non-DOD personnel to the facility
until the matter has been referred to higher headquarters. Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogation operations in an Army facility must sign
a statement acknowledging receipt of these rules, and agree to follow them
prior to conducting any interrogation operations. Non-DOD personnel
working in DOD interrogation facilities have no authority over Army
interrogators. Army interrogators
(active duty, civilian, or contractor
employees) will only use DOD-approved interrogation approaches and
techniques.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INTERROGATORS
5-56. Foreign governments may request to participate, or may be invited to
participate in interrogations in Army facilities. Requests for foreign
government access to detainees will be forwarded through the operational
chain of command for appropriate action pursuant to DOD policy. Foreign
government personnel must comply with US DOD policies and observe the
same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do Army personnel. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort foreign government
interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The foreign
government personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from
the MPs, following the same established procedures that US DOD personnel
must follow. In all instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by
foreign government interrogators will be observed by US DOD personnel. In
all instances, foreign government interrogators must observe the same
standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do US Army personnel.
MP FUNCTIONS IN ASSOCIATION WITH INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-57. MP and MI personnel both have responsibilities with regard to
EPW/detainees, but with different goals and responsibilities.
(See DOD
Directive 3115.09.) Therefore, close coordination must occur between MP and
MI personnel in order to facilitate the effective accomplishment of the MP
and MI missions. Both MP and MI personnel must ensure that they treat
detainees in accordance with the baseline standards of humane treatment.
5-58. MPs are responsible for the humane treatment, evacuation, custody
and control (reception, processing, administration, internment, and safety) of
detainees; force protection; and the operation of the internment facility,
under the supervision of the provost marshal. The MPs do not conduct
intelligence interrogations. Intelligence interrogation is strictly a HUMINT
function. DOD policy requires that all detainees in its control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, are assigned an internment serial number as
soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. (See AR 190-8.)
6 September 2006
5-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-59. The standard MP security and internment functions are the only
involvement the MPs have in the interrogation process. MPs will not take
any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, “softening up” a
detainee). For purposes of interrogation, military working dogs will not be
used.
5-60. MPs may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody,
control, escort, and/or additional security
(for example, for combative
detainees). When interrogators promise an incentive to a detainee, the
interrogators must coordinate with the MPs to ensure that the detainee
receives the incentive and is allowed to retain it. MPs may provide
incentives in support of interrogation operations under the following
conditions:
• Using incentives is coordinated with and approved by the MP facility
commander.
• Providing and withdrawing incentives does not affect the baseline
standards of humane treatment. This means that MPs can provide
incentives such as special food items. However, when the incentive is
withdrawn, the MPs still must provide the normal rations.
• Using incentives does not violate detainee custody and control or
facility security. This means that if a HUMINT collector requests MPs
to provide an incentive (for instance, specialty food) but the detainee
has been spitting on the guards, then MPs would not provide the
incentive because it might reinforce inappropriate behavior.
5-61. MPs exercise the overall responsibility for the safety of detainees, even
in those cases in which detainees are in the temporary custody of HUMINT
collectors or other agency personnel for the purpose of interrogation.
HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP supervisor to debrief MP
guards. Guards who observe and interact with detainees can report the
detainees’ disposition, activities, mood, and other observable characteristics.
5-62. HUMINT collectors conduct interrogations for intelligence information.
They normally work within the confines of the detainee detention facility, but
have no involvement in the mission of the security of detainees. MPs follow a
strict protocol concerning access to detainees. Accompanied and
unaccompanied access to detainees must be coordinated and approved in
advance by the MP commander responsible for the detainees or that
commander’s designated representative.
5-63. When HUMINT collectors coordinate for a detainee interrogation in an
internment facility, the MPs escort the detainee to the interrogation site,
which is collocated with, or located within the internment facility. MPs verify
that the HUMINT collector is authorized access to the detainee. Depending
on security concerns, the HUMINT collector may request that the MP
remain, or he may request the MP depart until the detainee needs to be
returned to the living area. If the MP remains, his functions are to maintain
the security, accountability, and safety of the detainee and the safety of the
interrogator, interpreter, and others in the interrogation site. The MP will
perform no role in the interrogation. When conducting interrogations in a
holding area such as a detainee collection point (DCP), MPs may not be
available to provide security for interrogation operations. In that case, the
5-16
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collector will need to arrange for security from the unit that has
established the holding area.
5-64. If the MP departs the immediate area where the detainee is being
questioned (for example, asked to wait outside the interrogation room), the
HUMINT collector will assume custody and responsibility for the detainee by
signing for the detainee, noting the detainee’s physical condition.
5-65. SOPs should be written to comply with a requirement that
interrogation operations will always be under observation, whether
conducted in fixed sites, holding areas, or in the field. Physical setup and
logistical availability will dictate whether observation is conducted directly,
from a concealed location, or by video monitoring. HUMINT collectors should
never be alone with a detainee without being under observation.
5-66. Once a HUMINT collector has assumed custody of a detainee, he will
not turn the detainee over to anyone other than an MP. Specifically, he will
not allow another government agency to assume custody from him. The
HUMINT collector will instead return the detainee to the custody of the MP,
and the agency seeking custody of the detainee will then be required to do so
from the MP. Likewise, HUMINT collectors will not assume custody of a
detainee directly from another government agency, but will require them to
return the detainee directly to the custody of the MP.
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-67. The GPW (Appendix A, Section I), the GC (Appendix A, Section III),
and the UCMJ are relevant documents pertaining to interrogations of
detainees.
5-68. The approaches, psychological techniques, and other principles
presented in this manual must be conducted in accordance with applicable
law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war;
relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including
FRAGOs. US policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations,
wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with this commitment.
Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military
forces rests primarily upon the traditional concept that the commander may
use all available resources and lawful means to accomplish the mission and
to protect and secure the unit.
6 September 2006
5-17
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
“Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the
safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.”
▬Napoleon, The Military Maxims of Napoleon
1927, ed. Burnod
POINT OF CAPTURE THROUGH EVACUATION
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
• Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations
• Screen and question detainees at TCPs and
• Area Security
checkpoints
• Internment and Resettlement Operations
• Question contacts, local civilians, refugees,
• Law and Order Operations
and EPWs
• Police Intelligence Operations
• Conduct liaison with military and civilian
agencies
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
• Report information obtained
reported
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
reported
• Support DOCEX
DETENTION FACILITY
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
• Detain and guard EPWs, civilian internees,
• Debrief guards
and other detainees
• Screen detainees and EPWs for PIR and IR
• Conduct reception and processing
• Provide linguist support when possible
• Coordinate Classes I, II, and VIII supplies
• Observe detainees under MP control
• Coordinate NGOs, PVOs, and interagency
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
visits
reported
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported
• Conduct interrogations
•
Transport detainees within the detention
• Report information obtained
facility to interrogation area
• Cross-cue other intelligence disciplines
•
Maintain security during interrogation
(as needed)
operations
• Support DOCEX
Figure 5-1. MP vs HUMINT Responsibilities.
5-69. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care
and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by US
military forces and its allies. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to
report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals,
such as the SJA or IG. For example, HUMINT collectors who are working
with others must ensure that no incidents of detainee abuse occur, whether
committed by a fellow HUMINT collector, an interpreter, HN or coalition
personnel, MP, representative of another government agency, or anyone else.
5-70. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may
subject the service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva
Conventions committed by US personnel may constitute violations of the
UCMJ. The commander is responsible for ensuring that the forces under his
command comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the
conduct of warfare, the commander bears primary responsibility for
investigating and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators.
5-71. Every soldier has the duty to report serious incidents, whether
observed or suspected, in accordance with AR 190-40. Such incidents are
reported to the chain of command. If the chain of command itself is
5-18
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
implicated, the soldier can report the incident to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or
provost marshal.
5-72. There are reasons for reporting serious incidents beyond those related
to legal requirements. For instance, the publishing of enemy war crimes can
be used to influence public opinion against the enemy. Also, reporting war
crimes of other countries provides important information that may become
relevant, since we would not be able to transfer detainees to any power that
we could not rely on to treat them appropriately under the law of war,
including the Geneva Conventions.
5-73. Several articles of the GPW apply to HUMINT collectors and
interrogation operations. Excerpts from some of the most relevant articles of
the Geneva Conventions are listed below. Although the following excerpts are
specific to EPWs, service members must treat all detainees captured during
armed conflict consistent with the provisions of the GPW unless a
determination to the contrary is made. Moreover, US policy requires that US
forces apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, during military
operations. (See Appendix A.)
•
Article
5 - Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
•
Article 13 - PWs must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a PW in its custody is prohibited. Likewise,
PWs must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
•
Article 14 - PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all regard due to their
sex, and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that
granted to men.
•
Article 15 - The Power detaining PWs shall be bound to provide, free of
charge, for their maintenance and medical attention required by their
state of health.
•
Article 17 - This article covers several requirements with direct impact
on interrogation.
Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental,
personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If
he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or
status.
For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this
information he loses status as a prisoner, only special privileges. An
example might be an officer who fails to identify himself as such. An
officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49). An officer who fails
to identify himself as such could lose this privilege.
6 September 2006
5-19
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
The questioning of PWs shall be carried out in a language they
understand.
No physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion may be
inflicted on EPWs to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. PWs who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
any kind.
•
Article 18 - All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses,
military equipment and documents, shall remain in the possession of
PWs, likewise their metal helmets and protective masks and like
articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for
their clothing or feeding shall also remain in their possession, even if
such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having
above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from
PWs.
Sums of money carried by PWs may not be taken away from them
except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of
the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized
receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and
unit of the person issuing said receipt. (Note: Unit SOP should
require initial impounding of all sums of money from detainees,
properly documented and accounted for, in order to prevent
detainees from using money to buy influence of any kind, or
participate in black market or other improper activity.)
•
Article 19 - PWs shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their
capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone
for them to be out of danger. Only those PWs, who, owing to wounds
and sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by
remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger
zone.
•
Article 33 - Medical personnel and chaplains, while retained by the
Detaining Power with a view to assisting PWs, shall not be considered
as PWs. They shall, however, receive as a minimum, the benefits and
protection of the Geneva Convention. They shall continue to exercise
their medical and spiritual functions for the benefits of PWs.
5-74. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall
be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of
Defense Detainee Program,” and no person in the custody or under
the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location,
shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law. All
intelligence interrogations, debriefings, or tactical questioning to gain
intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted in
accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include
US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives
including DOD Directive
3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E,
5-20
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
“The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. Use of torture is not only illegal
but also it is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may damage
subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks
the HUMINT collector wants to hear. Use of torture can also have many
possible negative consequences at national and international levels.
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Prohibited
All prisoners and detainees, regardless of status, will be treated humanely. Cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
defines “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” as the cruel unusual, and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. This definition refers to an extensive body of law developed by the
courts of the United States to determine when, under various circumstances, treatment of
individuals would be inconsistent with American constitutional standards related to
concepts of dignity, civilization, humanity, decency and fundamental fairness. All DOD
procedures for treatment of prisoners and detainees have been reviewed and are consistent
with these standards, as well as our obligations under international law as interpreted by
the United States.1
Questions about applications not resolved in the field by reference to DOD publications,
must be forwarded to higher headquarters for legal review and specific approval by the
appropriate authority before application.
The following actions will not be approved and cannot be condoned in any circumstances:
forcing an individual to perform or simulate sexual acts or to pose in a sexual manner;
exposing an individual to outrageously lewd and sexually provocative behavior;
intentionally damaging or destroying an individual’s religious articles.
___________________________
1 Nothing in this enclosure should be understood to affect the U.S. obligations under the
law of war.
5-75. If used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations,
prohibited actions include, but are not limited to—
• Forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a
sexual manner.
• Placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape
over the eyes.
• Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical
pain.
•
“Waterboarding.”
• Using military working dogs.
• Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
• Conducting mock executions.
• Depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care.
5-76. While using legitimate interrogation techniques, certain applications of
approaches and techniques may approach the line between permissible
actions and prohibited actions. It may often be difficult to determine where
6 September 2006
5-21
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
permissible actions end and prohibited actions begin. In attempting to
determine if a contemplated approach or technique should be considered
prohibited, and therefore should not be included in an interrogation plan,
consider these two tests before submitting the plan for approval:
• If the proposed approach technique were used by the enemy against
one of your fellow soldiers, would you believe the soldier had been
abused?
• Could your conduct in carrying out the proposed technique violate a
law or regulation? Keep in mind that even if you personally would not
consider your actions to constitute abuse, the law may be more
restrictive.
5-77. If you answer yes to either of these tests, the contemplated action
should not be conducted. If the HUMINT collector has any doubt that an
interrogation approach contained in an approved interrogation plan is
consistent with applicable law, or if he believes that he is being told to use an
illegal technique, the HUMINT collector should seek immediate guidance
from the chain of command and consult with the SJA to obtain a legal review
of the proposed approach or technique.
(See paras
5-80 and
5-81 for
information on responding to illegal orders.) If the HUMINT collector
believes that an interrogation approach or technique is unlawful during the
interrogation of a detainee, the HUMINT collector must stop the
interrogation immediately and contact the chain of command for additional
guidance.
CAUTION: Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible
coercion, certain acts are clearly prohibited. Certain prohibited physical
coercion may be obvious, such as physically abusing the subject of the
screening or interrogation. Other forms of impermissible coercion may be
more subtle, and may include threats to turn the individual over to others to
be abused; subjecting the individual to impermissible humiliating or
degrading treatment; implying harm to the individual or his property. Other
prohibited actions include implying a deprivation of applicable protections
guaranteed by law because of a failure to cooperate; threatening to separate
parents from their children; or forcing a protected person to guide US forces in
a dangerous area. Where there is doubt, you should consult your supervisor or
servicing judge advocate.
5-78. Security internees are detainees who are not combatants but who pose
a security threat, may be under investigation, or who pose a threat to US
forces if released. HUMINT collectors are required to treat all detainees
humanely. EPWs are entitled to additional protections guaranteed by the
GPW that security internees may not be eligible for. For example, allowing a
security internee to communicate with a family member (a right that an
EPW has under the Geneva Conventions) could allow him to pass
information that would compromise a sensitive investigation and endanger
the lives of soldiers and civilians. HUMINT collectors should consult with
their SJA for clarification of detainees’ status and rights.
5-79. HUMINT collectors are employed below brigade level when the combat
situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or lower.
5-22
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collectors should also provide training in the area of tactical
questioning to designated S2 personnel. The potential for abuse of the
detainee is greatest at initial capture and tactical questioning phase. With
the excitement and stress of the battlefield, unskilled personnel may exercise
poor judgment or be careless and thus resort to illegal techniques to elicit
critical information. Personnel who are not trained HUMINT collectors will
not attempt to use approach techniques. Instructions must stress the
importance of the proper treatment of detainees. Emphasize that in addition
to legal requirements, the abuse of a detainee at the initial stage of contact
often renders future interrogation futile. All treatment of detainees must be
consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
(See ST
2-91.6 for further
information on tactical questioning.)
5-80. Orders given to treat detainees in any way that violate the Law of War,
including the Geneva Conventions, or that result in detainees being treated
in any prohibited manner are unlawful. Every soldier must know how to
respond to orders that he perceives to be unlawful. If a soldier receives an
order that he knows to be unlawful, or that a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be unlawful, or if the order is not clear enough
to determine if it is legal or not, he should follow the steps set out below
(preferably in the order listed):
• Ask for clarification.
• State that the order is illegal if he knows that it is.
• Use moral arguments against the order.
• State the intent to report the act.
• Ask the senior interrogator to stop the act.
• Report the incident or order if the order is not withdrawn or the act in
question is committed.
• If there appears to be no other recourse, refuse to obey the unlawful
order.
NOTE: If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a
lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.
5-81. None of the above actions should be taken in the presence of any
detainee. Witnessing actions taken to determine the legality of an order may
lead to increased resistance of the detainee and could lead to increased
resistance throughout the detainee population if they believe they are being
treated unlawfully.
5-82. Illegal orders or incidents must be reported to the chain of command.
However, if the chain of command itself is implicated, report the incident or
order to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or provost marshal.
6 September 2006
5-23
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
EPW Evacuation System
5-83. The MPs are responsible for evacuating detainees, civilian internees,
and other detainees, as stipulated in AR 190-8. HUMINT collection assets
must be placed to take advantage of the evacuation system the MPs will put
into place. The evacuation of detainees and civilian internees normally is a
slow and cumbersome process that can severely tax a maneuver unit’s
resources. Appendix D explains the handling of detainees in detail, including
the 5Ss—Search, Silence, Safeguard, Segregate, and Speed to the Rear. The
5Ss are authorized with respect to handling detainees for the purposes of
movement of detainees and security. The 5Ss are not authorized for use as
interrogation approach techniques.
5-84. The initial evacuation of detainees and civilian internees is the
responsibility of the capturing unit. That unit is normally responsible for
moving the detainees and civilian internees from the point of capture to the
nearest DCP. Under MP doctrine, the MPs are responsible for the detention,
security, processing, safety, well-being, accountability, and humane
treatment of detainees and civilian internees.
5-85. Normally the MPs assume responsibility for the further evacuation of
the detainees and civilian internees; however, under certain circumstances,
other units could be charged with this task. The detainees are normally
evacuated from a DCP to a short-term collection facility and then finally to a
theater internment facility. Once the theater internment facility (joint) is
established, dependent on METT-TC factors, the internment facility escort
guard units may go forward as far as the initial collection points and escort
detainees and civilian internees to a short-term collection facility or straight
to a theater internment facility.
5-86. Senior MP commanders coordinate and synchronize transportation
and security requirements with MP divisional and BCT leaders. It may take
8 hours for a detainee to reach the DCP; 8 to 16 hours more to reach a short-
term collection facility; and
24 additional hours to reach the theater
internment facility. Mandatory timelines will be determined in command
policy guidance. Critical during this process is that MPs work closely with
MI, SJA, and interagency personnel to determine the proper status of
individuals detained. Determining whether an individual is an EPW, a
criminal insurgent, or in another status is crucial to facilitate the release or
transportation, holding, and security requirements. This determination will
be used when the individual’s biometric data is taken and entered into the
Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT).
5-87. The HUMINT collection assets need to be positioned to maximize their
collection potential and take advantage of the time available during
evacuation. The rapidity of operations and the need to facilitate the
commander’s situational understanding--coupled with the technological
innovations that link the HUMINT collector to databases, analysts, and
technical support from anywhere on the battlefield--require placing the
HCTs forward into brigade and even maneuver battalion areas to provide
5-24
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
immediate access to EPWs/detainees. EPWs/detainees are normally
interrogated for tactical information in the maneuver battalion trains areas
and then questioned in detail at the theater JIDC.
Security
5-88. When dealing with detainees, the HUMINT collector faces two security
considerations: his own physical security and information security.
Particularly when operating in support of tactical operations, the HUMINT
collector is in close contact with enemy soldiers who could attempt to escape
and may attack the HUMINT collector in doing so. Detainees during a
stability and reconstruction operation are often people committed to a cause
who find themselves in desperate circumstances. Although the detainees are
normally under guard, the HUMINT collector must always be alert to any
physical threat posed by these individuals. He must also ensure that his own
actions do not provide the detainee with the means with which to harm the
collector or anyone else.
5-89. The HUMINT collector should also be aware that EPWs and other
detainees may attempt to elicit information. Since HUMINT collectors, by
virtue of their position, may possess a great deal of classified information,
they must be careful not to reveal it unwittingly in the process of questioning
a detainee.
6 September 2006
5-25
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE
Acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or exposure to inhumane
treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation are expressly prohibited. Acts in violation of these
prohibitions may be a violation of US law and regulation and the law of war, including the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and may be criminal acts punishable under the UCMJ and other US law.
Moreover, information obtained by the use of these prohibited means is of questionable value. If
there is doubt as to the legality of a proposed form of interrogation, the advice of the SJA must be
sought before using the method in question.
Limitations on the use of methods identified herein as expressly prohibited should not be confused
with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent or non-coercive subterfuge used by the
trained HUMINT collector in the successful interrogation of hesitant or uncooperative sources. Use
of torture by US personnel would bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces while
undermining domestic and international support for the war effort. It also could place US and allied
personnel in enemy hands at a greater risk of abuse by their captors. Conversely, knowing the
enemy has abused US and allied POWs does not justify using methods of interrogation specifically
prohibited by law, treaty, agreement, and policy. In conducting intelligence interrogations, the
J2/G2/S2 has primary staff responsibility to ensure that these activities are performed in accordance
with these laws and regulations. [*The commander bears the responsibility to ensure that
these activities are performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and policy.
The unit must have an internal SOP for execution of the interrogation mission.]
The psychological techniques and principles in this manual should neither be confused with, nor
construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, physical or
mental torture, including drugs that may induce lasting or permanent mental alteration or damage.
Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source's free will, and are
expressly prohibited by GWS, Article 13; GPW, Articles 13 and 17; and GC, Articles 31 and 32.
Torture is an act committed by a person under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain and suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon
another person within his custody or physical
control. (Extracted from Title 18 of the United States
Code, Section 2340A).
*Emphasis added for use in this manual.
Capture Rates
5-90. Anticipating not only overall capture rates but also capture rates
linked to specific operations is vital to the correct placement of HUMINT
collectors supporting interrogation operations. Defensive and stability and
reconstructions operations normally provide a small but steady flow of
detainees while successful offensive operations can overwhelm HCTs. To be
successful, HUMINT collection support to tactical operations must be
carefully planned and prioritized. Available HUMINT collection assets must
be balanced against the operations objective, enemy situation estimate, and
projected EPW capture rates. The unit S2 is responsible for projecting
capture rates.
Interrogating Wounded and Injured Detainees
5-91. Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees receive adequate
health care. Decisions regarding appropriate medical treatment of detainees
and the sequence and timing of that treatment are the province of medical
personnel. Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with
5-26
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs, applicable to all
detainees to ensure they are fit for interrogations. Detainees determined by
medical personnel to be medically unfit to undergo interrogation will not be
interrogated. Health care personnel will be on call should a medical
emergency arise during interrogation. Health care personnel will report
detainees’ conditions, as appropriate, to the commander. Health care
providers shall not be placed in a position to advise on the application or
duration of interrogation approach techniques.
5-92. Wounded and otherwise injured detainees can be a valuable source of
information. For evacuation purposes, medical personnel may classify
detainees as walking wounded or sick or as non-walking wounded or sick.
Walking wounded detainees are evacuated through normal evacuation
channels. Non-walking wounded are delivered to the nearest medical aid
station and evacuated through medical channels.
5-93. HUMINT collectors may interrogate a wounded or injured detainee
provided that they obtain permission from a competent medical authority
and that the questioning will not delay or hinder medical treatment.
Questioning will not delay the administration of medication to reduce pain or
the evacuation of the detainee to where they may receive medical treatment,
nor will interrogation be allowed if it would cause a worsening of the
condition of the detainee. In most cases, this simply requires the HUMINT
collector to ask the doctor, medic, or other medical personnel if it is all right
to talk to the detainee.
5-94. With the doctor’s permission, the HUMINT collector may talk to the
detainee before, after, or during medical treatment. The HUMINT collector
cannot at any time represent himself as being a doctor or any other type of
medical personnel. Nor can he state, imply, or otherwise give the impression
that any type of medical treatment is conditional on the detainee’s
cooperation in answering questions.
TYPES OF INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-95. There are two general categories of interrogation operations: field
interrogation operations and interrogation facility operations.
FIELD INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-96. Field interrogation operations constitute the vast majority of
interrogation operations at echelons corps and below. Field interrogations
include all interrogation operations not conducted at a fixed facility. Current
doctrine emphasizes the placement of HCTs forward with maneuver units to
provide immediate interrogation support while the information is fresh and
the detainee may still be susceptible to approaches, due to the shock of
capture. The rationale for this method of employment is twofold:
• First, the pace of the modern battlefield no longer allows the luxury of
waiting for a detainee to reach a collection point prior to interrogation.
Commanders need more timely information, including HUMINT. Also,
automated tools and improved communications now permit rapid
transmittal of information from forward-deployed HCTs.
6 September 2006
5-27
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Second, current MP doctrine has the theater level EPW escort
companies picking up detainees as far forward as the division forward
collection points and bypassing the intervening collection points.
5-97. An added benefit of placing the HCTs with maneuver units is that it
allows them to conduct other HUMINT collection activities, such as the
debriefing of local civilians and refugees concurrently with interrogation
operations. HCTs are allocated to maneuver units based on—
• The relative importance of that subordinate element’s operations to the
unit’s overall scheme of maneuver.
• The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees,
documents, and materiel or encounter civilians on the battlefield.
• The criticality of information obtained from those sources to the
success of the parent unit’s overall OPLANs.
5-98. As the mission and situation change, the HCTs are redistributed. As
MI assets, they should never be kept in reserve.
5-99. During offensive and defensive operations, HCTs normally operate
with maneuver brigades and battalions. HUMINT collectors with battalions
or brigades should be equipped with vehicles and communications systems
that are compatible with the systems organic to the supported unit.
HUMINT collectors with brigades and battalions receive their collection
priorities from the S2 of the supported unit. In stability and reconstruction
operations, the HCTs normally operate in the AOs of battalion and brigade
TFs.
INTERROGATION FACILITY OPERATIONS
5-100. Joint interrogation operations are operations conducted at higher
echelons, usually at, and in coordination with, EPW and detainee internment
facilities. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) normally tasks the Army
component commander to establish, secure, and maintain the EPW
internment facility system. The corps may have the mission of establishing
an interrogation facility when it is acting as the Army Forces (ARFOR) or
Land Component Command (LCC) element.
5-101. An echelon above corps (EAC) MP brigade normally operates the
theater internment facility. The subordinate JFC with a J2 staff lead
establishes a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center as an activity within
the theater internment facility. The MI Brigade Commander or other named
SIO is normally designated as the JIDC commander. Army interrogation
operations are normally carried out in an area of the MP-operated
internment facility set aside for that use.
5-102. The JIDC is normally administratively and operationally self-
sufficient. A JIDC will function as part of an overall detainee command and
control structure as outlined in FM 3-19.40 and/or by policy. Continuous
coordination between the JIDC commander and internment facility
commander is essential. The JIDC will—
• Normally consist of facility headquarters, operations, analysis,
editorial, interrogation, screening, and DOCEX elements.
5-28
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
• Collocate with the theater detainee internment facility.
• Organizationally structure itself to meet METT-TC requirements
within the theater.
• Include HUMINT collectors, CI personnel, technical experts, personnel
for CEDs and DOCEX, and intelligence analysts, as applicable, from
the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and other government
agencies.
• Maintain the capability to deploy HCTs forward, as needed, to conduct
interrogations or debriefings of sources of interest who cannot be
readily evacuated to the JIDC.
• Often establish a combined interrogation facility with allied HUMINT
collector or interrogator augmentation if operating as part of a
multinational operation.
• Receive collection guidance from the C/J/G2X and send its intelligence
reports to the C/J/G2X and to the supported C/J/G/S2.
5-103. The exact size and organizational structure of these elements will
vary dependent on METT-TC.
Headquarters Element
5-104. The activity headquarters provides all command, administrative,
logistic, and maintenance support to the JIDC. It coordinates with—
• Higher headquarters for personnel, intelligence, and operational and
logistical support prior to and after deployment.
• Theater J2 for reporting procedures, operational situation updates,
theater and national level intelligence requirements, and collection
priorities.
• Provost marshal for location of theater detainee internment facilities
and for procedures to be followed by HUMINT collectors and MPs for
the processing, interrogating, and internment of EPWs.
• Commanders of theater medical support units and internment facility
for procedures to treat, and clear for questioning, wounded EPWs.
• Commanders of supporting CI and TECHINT assets to establish
support requirements and procedures.
• The servicing SJA.
• Magistrate for Article 78 issues.
• Commanders of Air Force, Marine, Navy, and national level
organizations to arrange administrative and logistic interoperability.
Operations Element
5-105. The operations element controls the daily activities within the JIDC.
The JIDC operations element—
• Ensures that work areas are available for all JIDC elements.
• Establishes and maintains JIDC functional files, logs, and journals.
• Makes detainee files available to detainee release boards to assist the
board members in their determinations.
• Establishes interrogation priorities.
6 September 2006
5-29
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Disseminates incoming and outgoing distribution.
• Conducts coordination with local officials, adjacent and subordinate
intelligence activities, CI, MP, PSYOP, the Joint Captured Materiel
Exploitation Center (JCMEC), Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and
provost marshal.
• Conducts coordination with holding area officer in charge (OIC) for
screening site, medical support, access, movement, and evacuation
procedures for detainees.
• Conducts operations briefings when required.
• Supervises all JIDC operations and establishes SOPs.
• Supervises all intelligence collection activities within the JIDC.
• Ensures observers are present when OGAs use the JIDC’s
interrogation rooms.
Analytical Element
5-106. The analytical element normally is directly subordinate to the
operations element. The JIDC analytical element ensures that collection
requirements are current and validated. It reviews reports to ensure that the
information reported is in response to validated collection requirements. In
addition, they ensure an up-to-date common operational picture (COP) by
maintaining digital mapping of the current tactical situation and with OB
updates to help HUMINT collectors maintain their situational awareness. At
locations where digital mapping is not possible, paper situation maps
(SITMAPs) are maintained. This element also--
• Obtains, updates, and maintains the database.
• Works with interrogators to provide collection focus for interrogations.
• Establishes and maintains OB workbooks and files including data
generated by intelligence information which has not been verified.
• Maintains digital or paper SITMAPs, as available, displaying enemy
and friendly situations.
• Catalogs, cross-references, and disseminates collection requirements to
JIDC collection elements.
• Reviews interrogation reports for inclusion into the database.
• Conducts situation briefings when required.
• Conducts intelligence reach with the J2 analytical cell and other
analytical elements, such as INSCOM Information Dominance Center,
for relevant information and analysis.
Editorial Element
5-107. The editorial element is normally directly subordinate to the
operations element. It reviews all outgoing reports for format, content, and
completeness.
DOCEX Element
5-108. At a minimum, the JIDC will contain a small DOCEX element to
translate, screen, and extract information from and report on information of
5-30
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
intelligence interest from source-associated documents. The theater joint
document exploitation facility (JDEF) may be collocated with the JIDC. In
this instance, the JDEF will translate, screen, categorize, and exploit all
types of CEDs.
Screening Element
5-109. The JIDC normally has a separate screening element to receive and
screen all incoming detainees and their personal effects. The screening
element will review previous screening reports, which should have been sent
along with the detainees; recommend priorities for interrogation; identify
individuals of interest to other agencies; and may conduct limited
interrogations for PIR information. The exact size of the element will vary
based on detainee capture rates and detainee flow. Interrogation elements
should use their most experienced interrogators as screeners in order to
quickly and effectively select the detainees for interrogation who are most
likely to possess useful information.
Interrogation Element
5-110. The interrogation element assigns HUMINT collectors to specific
detainees, uses interrogation and other HUMINT collection methods to
obtain information in response to intelligence requirements, and produces
intelligence reports (IIRs and SALUTE reports) as well as source-related
operational reports. The interrogation element may also debrief returning US
POWs and other personnel as deemed relevant.
6 September 2006
5-31
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
PART THREE
The HUMINT Collection Process
Part Three discusses the logical progression of phases involved in all HUMINT
collection. There are five phases and the related task of screening that are critical to
HUMINT collection. This remains consistent with previous doctrine as captured in
the interrogation process but adds screening as a phase and combines approach
and termination. The five phases are screening, planning and preparation, approach
and termination strategies, questioning, and reporting.
Chapter 6
Screening
6-1. Available human sources and documents almost always exceed the
qualified HUMINT collection assets and resources that can be applied
against them. Screening facilitates the efficient application of these limited
assets and resources to maximize the collection of relevant information.
HUMAN SOURCE SCREENING
6-2. As it applies to HUMINT operations, screening is the process of
evaluating and selecting human sources and documents for the prioritized
collection of information based on the collection requirements and mission of
the unit conducting the screening or its higher headquarters. Screening
categorizes and prioritizes sources based on the probability of a particular
source having priority information and the level of cooperation of the source.
Screening is also used to determine if a source matches certain criteria that
indicate that the source should be referred to another agency. Screening is
conducted at all echelons of command and in all operational environments.
There are two general categories of screening: human source screening and
document screening. Human source screening will be explained in depth in this
chapter. Document screening is explained in Appendix I.
6-3. The resources
(time and personnel) allocated to screening must be
balanced against those required for interrogations, debriefings, and other
collection methodologies. Although screening is not in itself an information
collection technique, it is vital to the rapid collection of information. Through
screening, the effectiveness of limited collection assets can be maximized by
targeting those assets against the sources with the highest potential of
providing key information. Screening requires experienced individuals with
6 September 2006
6-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
maturity and judgment who are totally knowledgeable of the collection
requirements and able to make well-reasoned decisions based on limited
information. Collection
(interrogation, debriefing, and elicitation) can be
integrated into screening activities; however, it slows the screening process
and decreases the number of potential sources that can be screened.
6-4. Human source screening is the evaluation of an individual or a group of
individuals to determine their potential to answer collection requirements or
to identify individuals who match a predetermined source profile. The
purpose of screening is to--
• Identify those select individuals among the target audience who have
information of potential value and who are willing or can be persuaded
to cooperate.
• Identify individuals who match certain criteria that indicate them as
being potential subjects for source operations or matching the profile
for collection by special interest groups such as TECHINT or CI.
6-5. Screening requires the development of criteria that are indicators of
potential information. These might include rank, position, gender, ethnic
group, appearance, and location.
6-6. Screening is an integral part to all HUMINT collection operations.
While questioning an individual source, a HUMINT collector may switch
between screening
(finding out general source areas of knowledge) to
interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation
(finding out detailed information
about a specific topic). In operations, such as EPW or refugee operations that
involve large numbers of potential sources, screening will normally be
conducted as a separate but collocated operation as part of the overall
interrogation or debriefing effort. The high number of potential sources being
dealt with in most human source screening operations requires a systematic
approach be developed and utilized to make the most effective use of the
personnel and resources being allocated to the source screening operation.
SCREENING OPERATIONS
6-7. Like all intelligence operations, human source screening operations are
focused on certain targets. Although the exact target population group will
depend on the requirements of the theater of operations, the target focus of
source screening operations is best described as the permanent and
transitory population in the AO. This definition includes local indigenous
populations, refugees, and travelers in the area, and detainees (including
EPWs). Specifically excluded from this definition are members of the HN
forces (military and paramilitary), members of allied forces, and members of
HN government agencies who are available to US forces through liaison
operations. Other personnel not indigenous to the AO (such as legitimate
NGOs, humanitarian organizations, UN personnel) are available to US forces
for voluntary debriefing and should be excluded from screening operations.
6-8. Screening operations may be conducted in a variety of situations and are
dependent on the operational situation and the population. Although every
source screening operation has the same basic purpose, each can be directed
against different segments of the population in different locations throughout
6-2
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
the AO. In order to accommodate the differences in the screening audience
and location, different types of source screening operations are employed.
•
Tactical Screening. Tactical screening is conducted in support of
combat or contingency operations. It can include the screening of
EPWs or detainees at the point of capture, the screening of refugees, or
the screening of local civilians in cordon and search. At the tactical
level, there is no time for elaborate approach techniques so the degree
of cooperation becomes a prime concern. Tactical area screening is
characterized by rapidly changing requirements, the need to evacuate
noncombatants and detainees to a secure area, and the need to collect
priority tactical information while operations are in progress. Although
the most lucrative type of source is often the detainee, all available
sources should be screened for priority tactical information. In tactical
screening, the HUMINT collector normally accompanies the maneuver
force (OPCON or DS). If the HUMINT collector establishes that the
source has information of value during screening, he immediately
questions the source. Information collected is passed to the maneuver
commander, normally via SALUTE reports. The HUMINT collector
may recommend to the commander that individual sources be further
detained for additional questioning. Screening must be done accurately
in order that a commander can make a decision to detain or release
possibly hostile personnel, based on the recommendation of a HUMINT
collector.
•
Checkpoint Screening. Checkpoints are often established to screen the
local populations as they transit through and within the AO or to
screen large numbers of individuals such as refugees or DPs as they
enter the AO. Screening checkpoints can be static or mobile. HUMINT
collectors must pay particular attention to refugees leaving the area
ahead of friendly forces (AO or AOI). It is likely that refugees can
provide information of tactical value more quickly and easily than
detainees. Refugees know the area and may be able to identify for the
collector anything that is out of the ordinary, such as insurgent or
terrorist activities.
•
Local Population Screening. This refers to the screening of the local
population within their own neighborhoods. When HUMINT collectors
move into a new area, they must observe the local population and
determine who may be able and willing to provide the information they
have been tasked to collect. Once this determination is made, the
collectors must engage those individuals in conversation to assess their
level of knowledge.
•
Collection Facility Screening. Screening is conducted as a normal part
of HUMINT collection operations at collection facilities such as theater
interrogation and debriefing facilities and refugee camps. Screening is
coordinated with the unit, normally an MP unit that is responsible for
the operation of the facility.
•
Local Employee Screening. CI personnel periodically screen local
employees to determine possible security risks. Concurrently, local
employee screening may identify sources who can provide information
to answer the CCIRs. Close coordination between HUMINT and CI
collection assets is a must in local employee screening.
6 September 2006
6-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Variations and Combinations. All types of screening can be adapted to
meet specific circumstances slightly different from those for which they
were designed. Additionally, it is possible to use more than one type of
screening in an operation if the specific circumstances require it.
6-9. Screening of refugees, EPWs, and other detainees normally occurs at
two locations: initially at the point where friendly forces first encounter them
and again when they arrive at the theater and other holding areas or refugee
camps. The capturing or detaining forces should enforce segregation of EPWs
from refugees and other detained civilians; they should be screened in
separate operations, one screening for EPWs and one for refugees and other
detained civilians. Depending on METT-TC factors, segregation should be
conducted as follows:
•
Refugees: Refugees, even if of the same nationality as the enemy, are
not treated as enemies exclusively based on their nationality and are
not automatically subject to control measures. If refugees are
encountered on the battlefield, they are segregated from EPWs and
screened separately. They are generally not detained further unless
some additional reason requires their detention. At a refugee camp,
screening will be done in coordination with the NGO operating the
refugee camp. If there is a reason to detain refugees for further
questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security
threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Under all
circumstances, refugees will be treated humanely. If they are
transported to an internment facility, they will be in-processed by MPs
and their Geneva Conventions status will be determined. Their status
under the Geneva Conventions will afford them certain privileges.
•
EPWs: Officers are segregated from enlisted. The enlisted are divided
into NCOs and lower enlisted. Males are segregated from females. This
segregation facilitates rapid screening for EPWs who may have
information to answer PIRs and IRs as well as prohibits officers from
influencing enlisted personnel to resist questioning.
•
Other Detainees: Civilians should be screened separately from EPWs.
As with refugees, if there is a reason to detain civilians for further
questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security
threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Whether or not civilian
detainees are released or detained further, screeners should ensure
that the civilian detainees are treated humanely. If the civilian
detainees are transported to an internment facility, they will be in-
processed by MPs and their Geneva Conventions status will be
determined. Once detainees are in-processed into an internment
facility, they are then considered to be civilian internees and their
status as such will afford them certain privileges under the Geneva
Conventions.
SCREENING AT FORWARD LOCATIONS
6-10. The initial screening and subsequent questioning should be
accomplished as far forward as is operationally expedient. If a HUMINT
collector is not available, the unit S2 must ensure initial screening and
questioning of sources are completed by qualified personnel. At this level, the
individual (military or civilian) is questioned for job, unit (if applicable),
6-4
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information (JUMPS). If time allows,
the HUMINT collector may collect additional information, such as the
source’s name, to start a formal source file to preclude duplication at higher
echelons. S2s and personnel other than HUMINT collectors should not
attempt an approach at this stage.
6-11. HUMINT collectors will only use approach techniques as time and
circumstance allow. The prime requirement is to identify the individuals
with information of immediate tactical value, to collect that information
expediently, and to evacuate the source. In this case, tactical questioning is
normally integrated seamlessly into the screening process. This initial
screening can also be used to identify individuals for immediate evacuation
to a higher echelon facility for detailed questioning. Any screening reports or
information reports generated at this level must accompany the EPWs or
detainees as they are evacuated. Typically, battlefield screening reports, such
as the screening sheet shown in Figure 6-1, will be done on paper in order to
allow multiple screeners to work simultaneously. If automation support is
available for each screener, an electronic version of the screening report is
used, or the “KB Easy” (Figure 10-2), which allows the screener to easily
put screening information into a DIA report format and transmit it
electronically. (See Chapter 10 for a KB-EZ worksheet.)
6-12. US forces capturing enemy forces or detaining civilians on the
battlefield search each individual for weapons, documents, or other material
of intelligence interest. Each individual receives a Capture Tag which records
basic biographic data such as name, rank, serial number, unit of assignment
(military), location of capture, and any special circumstances concerning the
capture. (See Appendices E and F.) Each document or item removed from the
captive is also “bagged and tagged” to identify from whom it was taken. This
initial step is vital, as properly processing captives and their equipment
greatly simplifies the screening process. All documents associated with the
source and any possessions taken from him must be evacuated with the
source, but not on his person. This is to ensure that the next echelon of
screeners and interrogators will have the ability to exploit these items for
intelligence value, or to support determination of approach strategies.
SCREENING AT REFUGEE CAMPS OR DETENTION FACILITIES
6-13. When a detainee or refugee arrives at an internment facility, refugee
camp, or similar facility, a more extensive screening is conducted. The
screening sheet is used to facilitate this process. This screening is normally
done in conjunction with in-processing into the facility. During in-processing,
the MP will assign an Internment Serial Number (ISN) that is registered
with the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC). The ISN will be used to
track the detainee throughout the MP detention system. The ISN should not
be used in intelligence channels; however, HUMINT collectors should record
the ISN on the screening sheet to aid in locating the detainee again. For
intelligence reporting purposes, HUMINT collectors will assign the detainee
a source reporting number that will be used to identify the detainee and
information associated with him, regardless of whether or not the detainee is
transported to another facility. The J2 issues source reporting numbers to
HUMINT collectors through the OMT.
6 September 2006
6-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
MP ISN NUMBER:
EVACUATION DATE:
LNAME(P):
_________________
C
DATE:
__________________
A
LNAME(M):
_________________
TIME:
__________________
P
P
E
FNAME:
_________________
T
PLACE:
__________________
R
U
__________________
MNAME:
_________________
CAP UNIT:
S
R
SVC/ID NO:
_________________
CIRCUMSTANCES:
_____________
O
E
N
DOB:
_________________
__________________
A
D
LANGUAGES: _________________
DOCUMENTS:__________________
L
A
MARITAL STATUS: M S W D
________
____________________
T
A
WPNS/EQUIP: __________________
C = Civilian
______
______
__________________
***
STATUS:M =Military
P = Paramilitary ? = Other
BRANCH: AF AR CG MC NY ___
PHYSICAL
CONDITION: SEX: M F
RANK:
__________________
WOUNDED: Y N _____________
M
I
FULL UNIT DSG: ________________
REMARKS:
____________________
A
L
_______________________________
______________________________
S
I
DUTY PPSN:
_________________
S
T
MENTAL CONDITION:
E
JOB: __________________________
A
S
EDUCATION = _______YRS
R
STATION: ______________________
S
INTELLIGENCE: AVG+ AVG AVG-
Y
SKILLS: _______________________
M
MENTAL STATE:________________
E
EXPERIENCE: ______ ______
_____
M
______________________________
T
SCREENER: ___________________
JOB: _________________________
C
D
DATE:_________TIME:___________
ORG: _________________________
I
A
COOPERATION: 1(High)
2
3(Low)
V
DUTIES: _______________________
T
I
KNOWLEDGE: A(High) B C(Low)
_______________________________
A
L
BGW LIST: Y N BGW CODE:____
I
SKILLS: _______________________
SOURCE CATEGORY: A B C D
A
______________________________
N
APPROACH: _____________________
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENT CODES:______________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
P
______________________________
______________________________
R
I
______________________________
______________________________
E
R
______________________________
M
______________________________
______________________________
A
______________________________
&
R
______________________________
______________________________
K
I
______________________________
______________________________
S
R
______________________________
______________________________
Figure 6-1. Screening Sheet.
6-6
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6-14. When a detainee is in-processed into an internment facility, MPs will
assign the detainee’s status as an EPW, retained person, protected person, or
other status under the Geneva Conventions. Figure 6-2 provides excerpts
from FMI 3-19.40 on MP internment and resettlement operations. In an
international conflict, individuals entitled to POW status (EPWs) include—
• Members of the regular armed forces.
• Other militias or volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements
of a State Party to a conflict, provided they meet each of the following
criteria:
■ Commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
■ Having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
■ Carrying arms openly.
■ Conducting operations in accordance with the law of war.
• Civilians who accompany the force.
• Crew members of the merchant marine and crews of civilian aircraft of
a State Party to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6-15. There are other categories specified in Article 4, GPW. Questions with
respect to an individual’s entitlement to EPW status should be directed to
your SJA.
6-16. Retained personnel (see Articles 24 and 26, GWS):
• Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in
the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or
sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in
the administration of medical units and facilities.
• Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
• Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid
Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to
assist Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided
they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection,
transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of
disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to
military laws and regulations.
6-17. Protected persons include civilians entitled to protection under the GC,
including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the
reason. A “civilian internee” is a person detained or interned in the United
States or in occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or
because they have committed an offense against the detaining power, and
who is entitled to “protected person” status under the GC.
6-18. The term “detainee” may also refer to enemy combatants. In general,
an enemy combatant is a person engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy
combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy
combatants.”
• Lawful enemy combatants: Lawful enemy combatants, who are
entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include
members of the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict;
6 September 2006
6-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements
belonging to a State Party to the conflict, which are under
responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and,
members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
• Unlawful enemy combatants: Unlawful enemy combatants are
persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts
against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the
laws and customs of war during armed conflict. For purposes of the
war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined to
include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of
supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.
Excerpts from FMI 3-19.40, Military Police
Internment/Resettlement Operations
ACTIVITIES
The MPs assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that
support PIR and IR. Because MPs are in constant contact with captives, they see how
certain captives respond to orders and see the types of requests they make. The MPs
ensure that searches requested by MI personnel are conducted out of sight of other
captives and that guards conduct same-gender searches.
The MI screeners examine captured documents, equipment and, in some cases,
personal papers (journals, diaries, and letters from home). They are looking for
information that identifies a captive and his organization, mission, and personal
background (family, knowledge, and experience). Knowledge of a captive’s physical
and emotional status or other information helps screeners determine his willingness
to cooperate.
LOCATION
Consider the following when planning an MI screening site:
• The site is located where screeners can observe captives as they are segregated
and processed. It is shielded from the direct view of captives and is far enough
away that captives cannot overhear screeners’ conversations.
• The site has an operation, administrative, and interrogation area. The
interrogation area accommodates an interrogator, a captive, a guard, and an
interpreter as well as furniture. Lights are available for night operations.
• Procedures are implemented to verify that sick and wounded captives have
been treated and released by authorized medical personnel.
• Guards are available and procedures are implemented for escorting captives to
the interrogation site.
• Procedures are published to inform screeners who will be moved and when
they will be moved.
• Accountability procedures are implemented and required forms are available.
Figure 6-2. MP Support to Screening.
6-8
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6-19. It may not be immediately evident in a particular theater of operation
whether an individual is an unlawful enemy combatant or is associated with
or supporting the unlawful enemy combatants of the United States. Consult
your J/G/S2 and servicing SJA for information relevant to your theater of
operations.
6-20. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be
treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 and DOD Directive
2310.1E,
“Department of Defense Detainee
Program”, and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD,
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with
and as defined in US law. (See Appendix A, GPW Articles 3, 4, 5, 13, and 14.)
6-21. The rights of EPWs are stated in the GPW. They include the right to
quarters, rations, clothing, hygiene and medical attention, property, and
other rights. EPWs may not renounce their rights to renounce EPW status.
(See Appendix A, GPW Article 7, Section I.)
6-22. Retained personnel must receive at least the same benefits as EPWs.
They may only be required to perform religious or medical duties, and they
may only be retained as long as required for the health and spiritual needs of
the EPWs. Retained persons must be returned to their home country when
no longer needed.
6-23. Protected persons’ rights include protection from physical or moral
coercion and from being taken hostage. Protected persons are protected from
murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, medical experimentation,
and any form of brutality. Protected persons rights are limited, though.
They do not have the right to leave captivity and are not immune from
prosecution. Protected persons can be screened and identified for intelligence
purposes.
SCREENING PROCESS
6-24. At the internment facility, the screening process normally is distinct
from the questioning (interrogation or debriefing) process. Dependent on the
criticality of the information identified, the source may be questioned
immediately for relevant information but will more likely be identified for
future questioning. The screening is a more formal process in which the
screener attempts to obtain basic biographic data, areas of general
knowledge, source cooperation, and vulnerability to select approach
techniques in addition to identifying knowledge of critical intelligence tasks.
Once the screener has established the basics
(source identification,
cooperation, and knowledge), he normally passes the source on to the
personnel that conduct the questioning. The screener will complete a
screening report that will be forwarded in accordance with unit SOPs (see
Chapter
10). If a detainee’s knowledge is of Joint Forces interest, a
knowledgeability brief (KB) should be written and submitted electronically.
(A short form KB worksheet is shown at Figure 10-2.) Complete guidance on
KBs is contained in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
6 September 2006
6-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-25. If the source freely discusses information of PIR value, the screener
normally exploits the information fully and completes a SALUTE report. (See
Appendices H and I.) If the source’s knowledge of PIR information is
extensive and he is freely giving the information, the senior screener and the
OIC or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the interrogation or
debriefing element are notified immediately. They decide if the screener
should continue questioning the source or if the source should be handed off
to another HUMINT collector. If source-associated documents contain PIR
information, the collector will exploit them as fully as possible and write a
SALUTE report. (See Appendix H.)
6-26. The source normally is assigned a standard screening code. The
screening code is an alphanumeric designation that reflects the level of
cooperation expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the
source may possess. Table 6-1 shows the codes for assessing sources. Those
sources assigned to the same category are interrogated in any order deemed
appropriate by the interrogation or debriefing element.
Table 6-1. Source Screening Codes.
CODE
COOPERATION LEVEL
1
Responds to direct questions.
2
Responds hesitantly to questioning.
3
Does not respond to questioning.
KNOWLEDGEABILITY LEVEL
A
Very likely to possess PIR information.
B
Might have IR information.
C
Does not appear to have pertinent information.
6-27. Figure
6-3 shows the order in which detainees in the assessed
screening categories should be interrogated. Category 1-A sources normally
should be the first priority to be questioned. Category 1-B and 2-A would be
Priority II. Category 1-C, 2-B and 3-A would be next as Priority III sources,
with 2-C, and 3-B being in the fourth group to be interrogated. Category 3-C
sources are normally not questioned. This order ensures the highest
probability of obtaining the greatest amount of relevant information within
the available time. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher
the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach. Appendix B
discusses the reliability ratings of information obtained.
6-10
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE
Most
Least
Priority
I
II
III
IV
V
1-A
1-B
1-C
2-A
2-B
2-C
3-A
3-B
3-C
Least
Figure 6-3. Interrogation Priorities by Screening Category.
SCREENING METHODOLOGIES
6-28. Depending on the specific operation or echelon, screening may be a
separate operation or may be integrated into a specific collection mission. For
example, a HUMINT collector accompanying a patrol encounters a civilian
who may have information that is relevant to collection requirements. The
HUMINT collector screens the source (that is, asks some general questions to
determine the source’s level of cooperation and knowledge). Upon receiving a
positive response, the HUMINT collector may debrief the civilian on a
specific topic or question him on areas of PIR interest. He then reverts to the
screening role to determine other relevant knowledge. If the HUMINT
collector determines through screening that the source either has no relevant
information or cannot be persuaded to cooperate within an operationally
expedient timeframe, he is not debriefed as part of the screening process. In
detainee or refugee operations, a separate element will normally conduct all
screenings. They establish a prioritized list of sources who are then
systematically questioned on specific topics by other HUMINT collectors or
other technical specialists.
6 September 2006
6-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
6-29. In addition to potential sources, screening requires several components.
•
Collection Requirements. Without a clear list of specific collection
requirements, screening becomes virtually impossible. The concept
behind screening is to rapidly identify source knowledgeability as it
relates to requirements. Screeners should obtain a copy of the
supported element's collection requirements and become familiar with
the intelligence indicators listed therein. Screeners must use their
experience and imagination to devise ways to identify EPWs and
detainees who might possess information pertinent to these indicators.
Vague requirements (such as “What is the threat doing?”) do not
provide the focus necessary to make a source selection. The HUMINT
collection element must break these SIRs into indicators if the
supported intelligence officer has not already done this. The indicators
must take into account the type of sources anticipated. For example, a
refugee probably will not know if the threat intends to defend a
particular ridgeline. However, he might know whether or not there are
threat forces on the ridge, if an improvised explosive device (IED) is
being employed on a route, if they are digging in, or if engineer type
equipment is in the area.
•
Selection Criteria. After reviewing the collection requirements, the
HUMINT collection element will develop preliminary criteria to
identify the source type that will most likely have the required
information. The source type may include gender, appearance, military
rank, age, or occupation. Some of these criteria are determined by
visual observation, thereby saving time in not having to question
everyone. Other criteria such as occupation or place of residence may
require brief questions.
•
Trained Screeners. Screening is possibly the most difficult HUMINT
skill. A HUMINT collector must use his experience, questioning skill,
cultural knowledge, and knowledge of human nature to decide in a
matter of minutes or possibly seconds whether limited HUMINT
collection assets and valuable time should be spent talking to an
individual based on the way he looks and the answers to a few
questions. A wrong decision will mean wasted assets and valuable
information missed.
•
Language Capability and Cultural Awareness. Screening involves
more than asking a series of questions. The HUMINT collector must be
able to evaluate the answers, the specific language used, and other
clues such as body language to determine the value of an individual to
the collection effort. This requires a mature and experienced screener.
If the HUMINT collector does not possess the target language, he and
his interpreter must be able to work together quickly with mutual
trust and confidence.
•
Area Conducive to Screening Operations. Effective screening
operations must allow the HUMINT collector to speak to the source
where the source is not exposed to outside influences or dangers that
may inhibit his responses. For that reason, sources should never be
screened within the sight or hearing of other potential sources.
6-12
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collectors can use rooms within a building, tents, or other
field-expedient methods to isolate the individual being screened.
Screening a source within view or hearing of other potential sources
may not only pose a danger to the source but also will tend to inhibit
the source from freely cooperating.
• Security. The personnel conducting the screening need to be able to
concentrate on the individual being screened. Although the collector is
ultimately responsible for his own personal security, screening is
facilitated by having dedicated personnel present (for example, MPs)
who are responsible for security. Screeners coordinate with MP or
other security personnel concerning their role in the screening process.
INITIAL DATA AND OBSERVATIONS
6-30. Screening is a filtering process whereby, under ideal circumstances, all
potential sources would be questioned to determine if they have information
of intelligence interest. In actuality this is often impossible. Screeners often
use visual and other aids to “prescreen” the sources in order to eliminate a
substantial portion of the target population before conducting detailed
screening. For example, if the HUMINT collector at a checkpoint is only
interested in information concerning a specific denied geographic area,
screeners may ask all refugees if they are from or have been in that denied
area recently. A less experienced screener could do this allowing the
experienced screener to conduct more extensive screening of the select target
audience.
6-31. If time and circumstances permit, screeners should question any
friendly personnel who have had extensive contact with the persons to be
screened. In the case of detainees, this could include holding area personnel
or personnel from the capturing unit. These personnel may be able to help
identify sources that might answer the collection requirements or who might
match a particular source profile.
6-32. Normally the screener will not have time to conduct any extended
observation of the person to be screened; however, the screener should make
a quick visual observation of the source prior to questioning him. He should
note anything in the source’s appearance and behavior that indicates he is
willing to cooperate immediately or is unlikely to cooperate. The screener
should also note any physical indicators that the source may have the type of
information or belong to a certain source profile category.
6-33. Physical indicators include overall appearance such as rank, insignia,
and condition of the uniform and type and condition of equipment for
military sources and general type and condition of dress
(for example,
business suit as opposed to work clothes) for civilians. Certain physical
indicators (dress, medals such as religious medals, physical type) may be
indicators that the source belongs to a specific ethnic or religious group. The
source’s physical reactions may also indicate a willingness or lack of
willingness to cooperate. For example, does the source move forward in the
group or attempt to hide within the group; does he intentionally place
himself in the wrong segregation group; or does he show any overt signs of
nervousness, anxiety, or fright?
6 September 2006
6-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-34. The screeners will also examine all documents and possessions found
on the source (if any) and all documents pertaining to the source (if any). At
a minimum, a detainee should have a properly filled out capture tag,
which will indicate to the screener where the detainee was captured,
by which unit, and under what circumstance. (See para 6-12 and
Appendix D.) Documents such as personal letters, orders, rosters, signal
operating instructions (SOIs) and map sections can provide information that
identify the source, his organization, mission, and other personal background
information
(family, knowledge, experience, education). They may in
themselves provide information, may identify a source for questioning, and
may provide information helpful in assessing a source’s susceptibility to an
approach.
6-35. Documents pertaining to the source, beginning at the point of capture
throughout the evacuation process, such as previous screening and
intelligence reports and administrative documents (such as source personnel
records prepared by the MPs) help the screener by providing information
concerning the source’s physical status, emotional status, level of knowledge,
level of experience, and other background data. Making timely use of reports
from lower echelons can be difficult for the screener, especially when dealing
with large numbers of potential sources.
SOURCE ASSESSMENT
6-36. Screeners use standard reporting formats to identify the results of
their screening (see Chapter 10). The determination must be made as to
whether the source is of any intelligence value to the HUMINT collector. The
HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four
categories.
• Of Immediate Intelligence Interest. This category includes personnel
who are assessed, based upon the screening process, who possess
information in response to requirements. They are interrogated or
debriefed (dependent on their status) to retrieve relevant information.
This questioning may be conducted by the same person conducting the
screening or by another HUMINT collector.
• Of Interest to Other Agencies. In most cases, the HUMINT collector
will be provided with collection requirements by other agencies or
disciplines such as TECHINT or CI. In this case the HUMINT collector
will question the source on these requirements and report the
information appropriately. However, in some instances, particularly in
the case of CI, the HUMINT collector may be given a list of topics or a
profile of personnel who are of interest to CI. The HUMINT collector
will notify the local CI representative when a person matching the “CI
profile” is identified. After the HUMINT collector has extracted any
relevant intelligence information, he will “pass” the individual off to
the CI agents. In many cases, particularly with individuals of
TECHINT or other specialized interest, the HUMINT collector will be
asked to conduct the questioning with the technical support of the
individual from the interested agency. This is coordinated through the
HUMINT collector’s OMT and the chain of command.
6-14
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
• Of Potential Interest as a Contact Source. On occasion, especially
during stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collector
may identify an individual who has the potential to provide
information in the future, due to his placement or access. Although the
individual may not have information of immediate interest, the
HUMINT collector will pass his recommendation to the appropriate
office, normally the C/J/G/S2X, provided that source operations are
authorized (see Chapter 5).
• Of No Interest. This category includes sources who prove (based upon
the screening process) to be of no interest to the HUMINT collector or
other agencies. Their biographic data is recorded, but they are not
questioned further. This category will likely include the bulk of
individuals screened. Individuals who have been screened are kept
separated from those who have not yet been screened.
OTHER TYPES OF SCREENING OPERATIONS
LOCAL EMPLOYEE SCREENING
6-37. CI personnel conduct local employee screening, primarily to identify
individuals who may be a security risk. HUMINT collectors also can use local
employee screening as a means to obtain intelligence information or to
identify personnel with placement and access to answer information
requirements. Employee screening must be conducted in a secure
environment and out of the hearing and sight of other employees. Formal
written reports of the screening must be maintained.
LOCAL COMMUNITY OR AREA SCREENING
6-38. Local area screening is normally done in coordination with other
operations such as a cordon and search operation. The HUMINT collectors
accompany the forces conducting the operation and screen the general
population to identify individuals of intelligence or CI interest.
SCREENING FOR CI REQUIREMENTS
6-39. Before initiating the screening process, the HUMINT collector
establishes liaison with supporting CI agents. The CI element provides CI
requirements and provides a profile of personnel of CI interest. CI is
normally interested in personnel who--
• Have no identification documents.
• Have excessive or modified identification documents.
• Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.
• Are illegal border-crossers.
• Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
• Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an
intelligence service.
• Request to see CI personnel.
• Have family in the denied area.
• Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.
6 September 2006
6-15
|
|