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FM 3-19.13
26-6. The plan may include a cover story for each person, specialized
surveillance equipment, and communication needs. Surveillance operations
should always be planned with a primary and alternate means of
communications. Two-way radio contact is vital with vehicle surveillance. Cell
phones can be used effectively for all types of surveillance operations;
however, there are some precautions to consider. They include the following:
z
Cell phone conversations can be intercepted.
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The ring volume must be set to a low setting or to vibrate mode to
avoid drawing attention.
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The investigator should speak only loud enough to be heard on the cell
phone but not by others around him.
26-7. Investigators should rehearse communication techniques to become
familiar with what methods work best. What works best in one situation may
not work in another.
26-8. Before initiating surveillance, team members should review all
available information relating to the suspect to include the following:
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The names and aliases used by the suspect.
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The suspect’s characteristics and mannerisms.
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Possible weapons involved.
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The suspect’s habits and normal daily routine.
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The suspect’s known criminal activity.
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The suspect’s work and neighborhood environment.
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A full description of vehicles that the suspect may use.
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The description, names, and aliases of the suspect’s known contacts or
associates and their history with weapons, if known.
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Feedback resulting from the reconnaissance of the area where the
surveillance will take place.
z
Information resulting from the coordinated efforts of other agencies.
26-9. Each member of the surveillance team should know the scope and
extent of crimes and activities in which the suspects are involved. For
example, a drug dealer may also be involved in a fencing operation; he may be
trading guns in exchange for drugs. Knowledge of all these activities will
better prepare the team and greatly increase the success of the operation.
GATHERING INFORMATION
26-10. As part of the surveillance preparation, the investigators must
consider their appearance. They must dress and adopt the demeanor of local
inhabitants in order to blend into the setting. The type of clothing worn by
investigators will determine if the concealment of weapons will be a problem.
Investigators should also carry items, such as caps, jackets, and glasses to
effect quick changes in appearance. They should carry sufficient money to pay
for meals, transportation, or other expenses incurred during the surveillance.
The investigator should have a reserve fund for use in emergencies.
26-11. A reconnaissance of the neighborhood should be performed to
supplement file information. Someone who is familiar with the suspects
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should point out the suspects to the surveillance investigators. A physical
reconnaissance should be made to study the areas where the surveillance will
take place and to identify vantage points that are suitable for the
investigators. Similarly, traffic conditions can be observed and the
investigators can become familiar with the names and locations of streets in
the area including locations of dead-end streets that may be used by the
suspect to spot surveillance investigators. The reconnaissance will also yield
information on the neighborhood and its inhabitants that would not be in
police files.
MAINTAINING A SURVEILLANCE LOG
26-12. Whether it is a moving surveillance or a stationary surveillance, it is
extremely important that the surveillance team maintain a log. Much like an
investigator's notes, the surveillance log records the suspect’s activities. The
notes also document the significant activities of the surveillance teams. Some
activity considered insignificant or unrelated to the surveillance at the time it
is observed may become important later. It is then difficult, without notes, to
recollect or reconstruct such events. Inadequate or improper notes can result
in failure of prosecution of the violators due to insufficient evidence.
26-13. The log should specifically include the identity or detailed description
of individuals and vehicles; the occurring activity; and the date, time, and
place of occurrence. In addition, the investigators should include the weather
conditions, the distance between the observation post and the site of the
activity, and other factors affecting the surveillance. These notes should be so
accurate and complete that the team can refer to them months later and recall
in detail the activity observed.
SELECTING SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
26-14. Technical surveillance devices can greatly enhance surveillance
efforts. These devices range from digital cameras to more sophisticated
satellite-tracking systems. Technical equipment, such as binoculars,
night-vision devices, video cameras, and amplified listening equipment may
be used for stationary surveillance.
26-15. Devices that are difficult to operate or hard to hide should not be
selected as they may distract the surveillance team. Some electronic
surveillance equipment may have certain legal restrictions. Investigators
must always obtain advice from the office of the SJA before using electronic
surveillance equipment and receive approval for its use from the appropriate
headquarters.
SURVEILLANCE METHODS
26-16. There are three basic surveillance methods: loose, close, and a
combination of the two. Loose surveillance can be used to spot-check a
suspect. It can be used to compile long-term information on a subject. Loose
surveillance is broken if the suspect seems to suspect that he is being
observed. Close surveillance requires continued alertness on the part of the
surveillance team. If the suspect is lost or is unfamiliar with the area, close
surveillance must be continued under an alternate plan. Usually, a
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combination of the methods works best. Surveillance teams may need to move
from a loose to a close surveillance because of an act or contact made by the
suspect. If a place, such as a known crack house is under close surveillance,
loose surveillance may be required at the same time on some of the
individuals who frequent the place.
SURVEILLANCE TYPES
26-17. There are two general types of surveillance: stationary and mobile.
Stationary surveillance is known as a stakeout. A stakeout is used when the
suspect is stationary or when all of the important information can be learned
at one place. However, in a stakeout, the surveillant may remain mobile
moving from one vantage point to another for closer observation of the area or
the suspect. A mobile surveillance is commonly known as tailing or
shadowing. A mobile surveillance can be conducted on foot, in a vehicle, or a
combination of the two. The choice depends on the suspect’s movements.
STATIONARY SURVEILLANCE
26-18. A stationary or fixed surveillance is conducted to observe a home,
building, or location to obtain evidence of criminal activity or to identify
suspected offenders. Surveillance teams can use a parked van or a truck with
a camper shell. However, the preferred method is to use another building that
offers an unobstructed view of the area or person being observed. Unattended
parked surveillance vehicles may create suspicion or become the target of
criminal activity.
26-19. Primary consideration for beginning a stationary surveillance is
whether the observation position affords the surveillance team a necessary
vantage point to observe significant activity in detail without being observed.
The position selected must give the team the opportunity to make close
observations and allow them to see the details of the activity with the ability
to identify the suspects involved.
26-20. The entrance and exit routes for the team must afford them the ability
to come and go undetected. The suspects and their associates will be cautious
and suspicious of any strangers in the surveillance area. In rural areas,
investigators may have to walk a considerable distance in the dark with their
supplies and equipment in order to avoid being detected.
26-21. Once inside the observation post, the team must not make any
unnecessary noise or do anything that will draw the attention of anyone else
in the area. An isolated observation post in a rural area requires that the
team be very restricted in movement and have great patience and endurance.
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Investigators perform stationary surveillance either by assuming a surface
undercover role or by establishing an observation post.
z
Surface undercover role. In urban areas, when an observation post
is located in an apartment or home, it is often necessary to assume a
surface undercover role in order to ensure the security of the
surveillance team's identity. When an activity is in an area that does
not readily lend itself to the use of a concealed observation position for
a stationary surveillance, the team leader has to consider making
observations from an open position. From an open position, the team's
identity is kept hidden by assuming a role. Possible undercover roles
include the following:
Power company lineman.
Telephone repairman.
Meter reader.
Road survey crew.
Road repair crew.
Door-to-door salesman.
z
Observation post. An alternative to a surface undercover role is the
installation of an observation post by the surveillance team. The most
common observation post is a utility van or a pickup truck equipped
with a camper shell referred to as a peek truck. This form of
stationary surveillance has been used effectively in some areas, but
the placing of the vehicle must be considered with respect to the type
of activity in the area. There should be an obvious reason for where
the vehicle is parked, such as because of a breakdown. The selection of
a truck or van marked with slogans or advertisements work best.
MOBILE SURVEILLANCE
26-22. There are two methods of mobile surveillance: foot and vehicle. The
means in which these methods are employed varies based on the
circumstances presented, such as traffic congestion or rural area verses city
area.
Foot Surveillance
26-23. There are three types of foot surveillance: the one-man foot
surveillance, the two-man foot surveillance, and the ABC or three-man foot
surveillance. Any of these methods may be used in a given situation, but the
ABC foot surveillance is considered the most effective and is used more often.
z
One-man foot surveillance. A successful one-man foot surveillance
is extremely difficult to accomplish and should be avoided, if possible.
There are situations that will suddenly require the initiation of a one-
man foot surveillance, but the number of people in the area almost
wholly dictates the distance between the surveillant and the suspect.
For this reason, the distance between the suspect and the surveillant
is usually either too great or too close. If the suspect and the
surveillant are on the same side of the street, the suspect is kept in
view at all times. It is necessary to be close enough to immediately
observe the subject if he enters a building, turns a corner, or makes
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any other sudden similar moves. Generally, the efforts of a one-man
foot surveillance are unsuccessful due to the limitations placed on the
surveillant. He is in a position that does not allow him to be flexible,
unlike the two-man or ABC foot surveillance. Flexibility is all-
important during surveillance, and the one-man foot surveillance has
few options open other than what the suspect, the circumstances, and
the people in the area offer.
z
Two-man foot surveillance. The use of at least two surveillants
greatly increases the chances of success because the second
investigator provides flexibility. With two surveillants, the position of
the investigator directly behind the suspect can be changed frequently
and allows for relatively close positioning behind the suspect. The use
of two surveillants affords greater security against detection and
reduces the risk of losing the suspect. Normally, both surveillants are
on the same side of the street with the suspect, with the first
investigator behind the suspect fairly close. The second surveillant is
positioned behind the first with more distance between them. On
streets that are not crowded, one surveillant may walk on the opposite
side of the street.
z
ABC foot surveillance. The ABC foot surveillance is considered the
best and is the most frequently used. This method should be used
whenever possible. The use of three investigators greatly reduces the
risk of losing the suspect. A third team member provides greater
variation in the position of the surveillants and allows a team
member, who thinks that he has been identified or “burned,” to
discontinue his surveillance without affecting or having to stop the
surveillance.
26-24.
During a foot surveillance, the suspect may be either tail conscious or
so suspicious of a surveillance that he takes action to prevent the surveillants
from following him. He may take such action during the entire time that he
moves from one place to another, or he may attempt to detect the surveillance
only periodically when he feels his actions have become highly suspected.
There is also the possibility that the suspect is following a normal route and
that he is not particularly tail conscious or suspicious of surveillance.
26-25. The surveillant should be alert to the methods a suspect uses to detect
and elude surveillance, but he must be careful not to interpret all actions by
the suspect as an indication that the surveillance has been compromised. Of
course, when the suspect takes such action, the surveillant is then alerted to
be even more cautious to avoid being recognized by the suspect. Common
methods used by a suspect to detect a foot surveillance include the following:
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Stopping abruptly and looking to the rear.
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Looking around casually.
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Reversing his course suddenly
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Stopping abruptly after turning a corner.
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Watching for reflections in shop windows.
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Entering a building and leaving immediately by another exit.
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Walking slowly and then rapidly at alternate intervals.
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Dropping a piece of paper to see if anyone retrieves it.
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Stopping to tie his shoestrings while looking around.
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Using an associate or friend in a business to watch for surveillance.
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Boarding a bus and riding a short distance or exiting just before it
starts.
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Circling the block in a taxi.
26-26. Once the suspect has detected surveillance, he may use any of the
following methods to elude the surveillance:
z
Exiting a bus or subway just as the doors are about to close.
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Leaving a building through a rear or side exit.
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Entering a large crowd.
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Entering a theater and leaving immediately through an exit.
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Using a decoy.
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Using a side street or alley.
Vehicle Surveillance
26-27. Although foot surveillance is used frequently when critical moments of
the investigation are at hand, vehicle surveillance is used more often as a
means of gathering general intelligence. Investigators must feel as confident
with the procedures of vehicle surveillance as they do with foot surveillance.
Vehicles are used in the surveillance of premises, but their primary use and
value is the surveillance of other vehicles. Foot surveillance can go with the
suspect only so far. When the suspect becomes mobile, as he often does, then
the surveillant must use vehicle surveillance. (See Appendix J.) The general
principles that assist in conducting a successful vehicle surveillance are as
follows:
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Vehicle appearance. The vehicle that is used on surveillance should
be particularly suited for the purpose, both in appearance and speed.
It should be inconspicuous in appearance with no noticeable features
that would draw attention to the vehicle. It is preferable that the
vehicle be a subdued, rather than bright, color. Experienced
investigators have found that tail-conscious suspects are more apt to
notice bright-colored surveillance vehicles. The color of the vehicle
may often be further subdued and made indistinguishable at a
distance by allowing road dirt and dust to accumulate on it. Official
papers, manuals, handcuffs, and clipboards should be removed from
the seats or the rear window shelf where they might be exposed to
view. The inside dome light should be made inoperative by taping or
disconnecting the doorpost switch to avoid accidentally illuminating
the vehicle's interior at night. Communications equipment should not
be visible.
z
Two surveillants per vehicle. As effective as vehicle surveillance is
in tailing a suspect from one location to another, normally some form
of foot surveillance is required. When this need arises, an observer or
second surveillant is an important adjunct to fill this void.
Additionally, the observer allows the driver to give his full attention to
driving while he operates the radio, makes notes of the suspect's
activities, and observes the suspect. If the suspect leaves his vehicle to
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complete some activity that the investigators need to observe, the
observer should leave his vehicle in order to continue watching the
suspect. His actions on foot must not be so unusual that he draws
attention to himself from other individuals. The driver remains in the
vehicle and maintains radio contact with the observer in order to give
immediate mobility to the surveillance when the suspect’s actions
require it.
z
Driving skill. An important factor contributing to a successful
vehicle surveillance is the ability to drive skillfully under all types of
traffic conditions. This is particularly true in heavy city traffic where a
moment’s hesitation could result in the loss of the subject. The driver
must constantly anticipate traffic conditions ahead, especially for left
turns, and keep his vehicle in the correct position behind the suspect.
The surveillant must make quick and correct decisions to counter the
suspect’s tactics.
z
Police intervention. During the course of any type of surveillance,
particularly vehicle surveillance, the surveillants may be stopped or
questioned by local police. The surveillants must identify themselves
and briefly explain their presence. Normally, it is not necessary for the
investigators to explain the nature of their investigation. Most
interventions can be prevented through the coordination step of
planning the surveillance.
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Violation of traffic laws. The safety of the surveillants, pedestrians,
and other road users is the first priority in surveillance operations.
Surveillants are required to operate vehicles in a safe and lawful
manner. Deliberate violation of traffic rules and regulations is
prohibited without prior consent of the installation commander. If
approval is given, investigators must use good judgment and due
caution. For example, when running a red light, the surveillants must
first stop and then proceed only when it is safe to do so.
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Nighttime surveillance. Nighttime surveillance presents unusual
problems to surveillance teams. One problem, because of darkness, is
that the suspect is able to view any vehicle following him due to the
presence of headlights. Another is that the suspect can use the
darkness to elude surveillants by turning off his lights and driving
onto a side road. Under medium traffic, the surveillants usually have
the advantage. The suspect’s field of vision is restricted to his
rearview mirror, and he is unable to distinguish objects clearly
because of the glare of the headlights. Surveillance vehicles that are
equipped with cut-off switches for the headlights, taillights, and brake
lights should be used because surveillants must be closer to the
subject at night. This equipment enables the surveillance vehicle to
alter its appearance by turning off or changing the brightness of the
lights. If the suspect turns the corner, the tailing vehicle may alter one
of its headlights before it turns the corner and appear to look like a
different vehicle to the suspect.
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SURVEILLANCE INITIATION
26-28. Surveillants must be aware that the tail conscious suspect routinely
makes a check for surveillance at the beginning of his trip no matter where
his start point is (home, work, or hangout). He may check for surveillance by
driving his vehicle around several blocks in the immediate area of his
departure point or by walking that same area. A surveillance team may have
to be on foot in a hidden location several blocks away with binoculars or use a
disguised vehicle such as a truck or van in order to initiate the surveillance.
26-29. When the suspect is near his destination, he may make routine checks
again by observing vehicles behind him. He may make several approaches to
his destination before he stops. With this in mind, surveillants must carefully
position their vehicles to observe the suspect, deploy strategically, and avoid
detection by the suspect.
SURVEILLANCE VEHICLES POSITIONS
26-30. Usually the surveillance will begin, if possible, in the area where the
suspect’s vehicle is parked. The team leader should be in a position where he
can view the suspect’s vehicle with the other surveillance vehicles deployed in
the area covering the anticipated routes of travel. When the suspect leaves,
the leader directs the appropriate car (possibly himself) to assume the lead
position behind the suspect. The other cars will take up positions to the rear
in a caravan style or on the paralleling streets.
DISTANCE FROM THE SUSPECT
26-31. The distance between the suspect and the lead surveillance vehicle is
important and will vary with traffic conditions. It is easy to see that a correct
distance between the subject and the surveillant is critical if observation is to
continue for an extended period of time. This distance becomes greater as the
suspect’s speed increases, such as on highways, and is less when the suspect's
speed decreases, such as in city traffic. Once behind the suspect, the lead
surveillance team must use every means possible to avoid any prolonged
viewing of their vehicle by the suspect in his rearview mirror. This can be
accomplished by keeping one to two unrelated vehicles, referred to as cover
vehicles, between the suspect and the lead surveillance vehicle. Cover vehicles
operate differently on the highway than they do in city traffic.
z
Highway. The decision when to have only one cover vehicle or at least
two cover vehicles between the suspect and the surveillant in the lead
vehicle is not easy. Some situations, such as an open highway with
fast moving traffic, allow for two cover vehicles with few problems.
Naturally, the more cover vehicles there are, the less chance there is
of the suspect becoming aware of the surveillance. Too many cover
vehicles, however, result in the loss of the suspect. When the number
of cover vehicles is reduced to only two and the surveillance is on an
open highway, there is usually little problem with the suspect being
alerted or the surveillants losing the suspect. The use of only one
vehicle as cover on the highway may not be enough if the suspect is
tail conscious. If no other cover vehicles are available, allowing more
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distance between the surveillants and the suspect can alleviate this
situation.
z
City traffic. City traffic presents problems that are different from
those found in highway traffic. The surveillants will frequently vary
the number of cover vehicles used depending on how heavy traffic is
and the type of streets. In city traffic, it is wise to have no more than
two cover vehicles between the surveillant’s vehicle and the suspect
and one cover vehicle is often better. As traffic becomes more
congested or traffic patterns are more difficult with extensive traffic
lights, the use of two vehicles for cover can cause serious problems.
COMMUNICATIONS
26-32. Radio use during surveillance operations is kept to a minimum. The
lead team has radio priority. It should give frequent locations of the suspect,
the directions of his travel, the street or highway on which he is traveling, his
approximate speed, and his lane of travel as the surveillance moves from one
point to another. In areas unfamiliar to the surveillance team, the suspect’s
locations are given by reference to area landmarks, such as businesses,
schools, manufacturing plants, and service stations.
26-33. The suspect’s location must be given often enough so that the trailing
surveillance vehicles feel comfortable about their positions. The frequent
transmissions provided by the lead vehicle enable the other vehicles to
determine how fast they should be traveling and whether they need to change
their direction of travel. The following vehicles should not have to request the
suspect's location. There is a tendency for team members, other than the lead
vehicle, to periodically transmit their locations as the surveillance progresses.
This is not necessary or helpful, unless a particular situation has developed
where the lead vehicle needs the information. Generally, there should only be
brief radio traffic, and it should be from the lead vehicle to the other
surveillance vehicles as the suspect’s location is given. Other radio traffic
should be kept to a minimum.
Surveillance Operations
26-11
Chapter 27
Undercover Operations
Going undercover is an investigative technique that is often used to gain
police information when other efforts have proved impractical or have
failed. An investigator goes undercover when he leaves his official identity
and takes on a role to gain needed information. He associates with a
person or becomes part of a group believed to have critical police
information. The investigator must have supporting information, obtained
by other means, such as police reports. The nature, habits, interests, and
routines of a suspect must be studied. If an organization is the target, the
purpose of the group and the names of members must be known.
Undercover is an ideal technique used to investigate selling crimes
involving drugs, stolen goods, frauds, contraband, and black marketing.
OVERVIEW
27-1. Undercover techniques may be used under the following circumstances:
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When information or evidence cannot be readily obtained in a
traditional overt investigation.
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When an overt investigation will likely prove unsuccessful.
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When it is indicated that an undercover operation will reduce time
and expenses involved in the completion of an investigation or produce
evidence that cannot otherwise be amassed.
27-2. The improper use of an undercover operation could prove to be too costly
in both resources and funding. Before making the decision to initiate this
technique, the investigator should consider the following:
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The extent of the criminal activity and the results that will be
achieved.
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The time factor.
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The complexity of the preparation involved. Complexity will likely
increase the risk to personnel without a substantial benefit.
z
The sophistication of the suspects as compared to the capabilities of
investigative personnel.
PLANNING
27-3. This section provides general guidelines for planning an undercover
operation. Each operation is different and must be planned in great detail.
27-4. Undercover operations are planned for a particular objective and with a
certain end state in mind. The data or result of these operations must be
specified before setting up the operation. The general objectives of an
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FM 3-19.13
undercover operation are to obtain information, observe criminal activity, and
collect evidence. These objectives must be clear and the degree of risk to the
investigator must be assessed. Undercover operations are dangerous and
should be used only when absolutely necessary and supported by a
surveillance team. Investigators do not go undercover in a command without
the knowledge of the installation PM and the appropriate USACIDC. The PM
or USACIDC is responsible for advising appropriate leaders within the
command of the operations. The advice of the SJA office is obtained for
extensive or “heavy” undercover operations.
27-5. If the operation is to be conducted off the military installation, it is
coordinated with civil authorities who may have an interest in the operation
or who may have other covert personnel conducting similar operations.
Coordination with local police is routine in all cases involving the civilian
community. However, coordination should make as few people as possible
aware of the operation. Only those individuals whose consent is needed and
those who can distinctly add to the investigation should be informed.
27-6. Information useful to the investigation is assembled and reviewed by
the undercover investigator and members of the surveillance team.
Equipment and communication systems should be carefully selected. There
should be a primary and alternate means to communicate. Normally, the
undercover person does not work alone or independent of other investigators.
A surveillance team should be planned. The primary focus of the surveillance
team is to protect the undercover investigator and to record his actions. The
surveillance team conducts its planning according to the procedures described
in Chapter 26.
MISSION CHECKLIST AND OPERATION PLAN TEMPLATE
27-7. When planning a controlled-buy or buy-bust operation, investigative
personnel should always complete an undercover mission checklist. (See
Appendix K.)
27-8. Before any buy-walk, buy-bust, or raid operation, an operation plan
should be completed. Investigators may use the fill-in-the-blank template at
Appendix L.
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
27-9. After completing the undercover mission checklist, the investigative
team should complete a formal risk assessment matrix to ensure that all
conceivable risks are identified. (See Appendix M.)
RISK MITIGATION WORK SHEET
27-10. A risk mitigation work sheet (see Appendix N.) is designed to aid
investigative personnel in developing measures that will reduce the risk
factors identified during the risk assessment process. These mitigating
measures should seek to reduce or eliminate risks using countermeasures
that will allow overall mission objectives to be achieved without unnecessary
risk. Once the risk assessment matrix and the mitigation work sheet have
been completed, a determination must be made as to whether or not identified
risks are worth the potential gain. Local or command policies and procedures
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should identify the approval authority for missions designated as low,
moderate, or high risk.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
27-11. The undercover investigator must have a thorough understanding of
the overall objective to be reached as a result of his assignment. In essence,
this is the time that he will be preparing for his role and planning to meet his
overall objectives. In preparing for the assignment, the investigator should—
z
Select his assumed identity.
z
Determine the background story.
z
Establish a means of communication.
z
Gain knowledge of the suspect.
z
Obtain information concerning local situations.
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Establish reporting procedures.
APPROACH SELECTION
27-12. The objective of the undercover investigation will generally dictate the
type of approach the investigator will use. If the objective is an individual, the
investigator will have to be accepted by the suspect. This can be accomplished
through the use of a source or by the investigator becoming acquainted in the
places the suspect frequents.
27-13. If the objective is a group of people, the investigator will have to
determine how he can join them. Once again, the use of a source will probably
be a necessity. However, the investigator may again consider frequenting
establishments used by the suspects and establishing himself with them. A
determination may also be made to gain the confidence of unwitting sources
that are familiar with members of the group and, subsequently, obtaining an
introduction.
27-14. Any one or a combination of these approaches may be used in most
undercover situations. Whether the suspect accepts the investigator or not is
depends on the investigator's ability in his role.
SUSPECT STUDY
27-15. Unless the undercover investigator has a thorough knowledge of the
suspect, he will find himself frequently at a disadvantage. He must study the
mannerisms, gestures, and speech of those that he deals with. Examining
small details like tastes in food and music are also necessary. The investigator
should, as a first step in his preparation, draw up a checklist of the details of
the suspect’s character and history. The following list is some of the
information about a suspect that an investigator should be familiar with
before entering an undercover role:
z
Name. This should include the full name and any aliases or
nicknames. This also includes any titles in relation to a job or public
office, which the suspect may hold.
z
Addresses. This should include past, present, residential, and
business addresses.
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Description. This should include the basic description of the
individual and any unusual traits and peculiarities. A photograph of
the suspect should also be obtained.
z
Family and relatives. This will assist the undercover investigator in
his overall knowledge of the suspect.
z
Associates. This knowledge is essential to an understanding of the
suspect's activities.
z
Character and temperament. The strength and weaknesses of the
subject should be known. Likes, dislikes, and prejudices are
particularly helpful.
z
Vices. This should include vices, such as drug addiction, alcohol, and
gambling.
z
Hobbies. This knowledge could help the undercover investigator a in
developing an acquaintance with the suspect. A common interest of
this nature can cause a strong bond between the investigator and the
suspect.
z
Occupation and specialty. These may allow the investigator to
establish a possible meeting ground with the suspect. These are also
indicative of the character of the suspect.
z
Propensity for violence. Information received from sources,
background information from past arrest records, and personal
observations made by the investigator will help identify a suspect's
possible violent nature. The investigator should make every attempt
to know a suspect’s propensity for violence.
UNDERCOVER OBJECTIVES
27-16. When the decision to conduct undercover operations has been made,
the investigator must be cognizant of the objectives of the operations. They
include the following:
z
Obtaining information and intelligence.
z
Obtaining evidence for the prosecution.
z
Determining if a crime is being planned or committed.
z
Identifying individuals involved in criminal activity.
z
Proving association between conspirators.
z
Identifying witnesses and informers.
z
Checking the reliability of informants.
z
Locating contraband and stolen property.
z
Determining the most advantageous time to make arrests or execute
search warrants.
27-17. The undercover approach, through proper planning and execution,
provides results as accurate and reliable as any other investigative technique.
However, if careful preparation is disregarded, it is likely that the objectives
of undercover operations will not be achieved.
27-4 Undercover Operations
FM 3-19.13
LIMITATION OF UNDERCOVER ROLES
27-18. When assuming a fictitious identity as an undercover investigator,
investigators may assume short-term or long-term roles as approved within
the operational plan; however, there are three occupations that may not be
assumed by investigative personnel. These three occupations are attorneys,
members of clergy, and medical personnel. Consequently, if an investigation is
initiated within a legal office, religious or chaplain’s office, or medical facility,
a role that will allow the covert team member access and credibility without
violating the aforementioned prohibitions must be developed.
ASSIGNMENTS TYPES
27-19. The nature of undercover work can vary widely. An assignment may
require the investigator to be in several different settings and situations that
will test his resourcefulness, adaptability, and endurance.
27-20. An impromptu assignment places the investigator who is conducting
an open investigation into an assumed role for the purpose of making
inquiries. An example would be an investigator posing as a salesperson when
calling on a third party or unwitting source.
27-21. A one-time assignment is one in which the investigator has received
information that illegal activity may be taking place at a given location. An
undercover visit to the suspect’s location will assist in determining if the
information is worthy of further investigation.
27-22. An extended assignment may last from a few days to several months.
The majority of assignments received by an undercover investigator will fall
within this category.
27-23. A penetration assignment is one that requires extensive planning and
preparation as it involves the use of an undercover investigator over a period
of several months to any extended length of time. This type of assignment is
geared to the eventual penetration of the higher echelon criminal element.
27-24. A sting operation is designed to record criminal activities through
direct observation and or participation. Most of these operations involve
selling crimes, such as prostitution, narcotics, black marketing, or the sale of
stolen property. In these operations, the investigator will generally act as a
purchaser of the illicit service or product.
27-25. A reverse-sting operation is also designed to document criminal
activities through direct observation and or participation. However, in these
operations, the covert member assumes the role of the person providing the
service or selling the illicit items. These operations require the approval of the
USACIDC commanding general or other designated officials.
27-26. A storefront operation is generally used to purchase items that are
likely stolen. Storefronts can take the form of a pawnshop or underground
fencing operation. These operations require the approval of the USACIDC
commanding general or other designated officials.
27-27. USACIDC and PM personnel are authorized to rent covert facilities
and vehicles on a case-by-case basis. Authorization must be obtained from the
Undercover Operations
27-5
FM 3-19.13
designated authority before effecting such transactions. Normally, these
operations are reevaluated for effectiveness every 30 days.
PERSONNEL SELECTION
27-28. Only the most experienced investigators should be selected for
undercover operations. Undercover assignments test the investigator's
adaptability, resourcefulness, and endurance. The investigator must be able
to adjust his personality to the role he plays and have a clear understanding of
the objective of the mission. He should be a skilled observer and a person of
sound judgment. No one set of qualifications or attributes will enable an
investigator to be successful in all types of undercover operations. Personnel
should be selected based on the type and circumstances of the operation.
PRECAUTIONS AND POSSIBLE PITFALLS
27-29. An investigator cannot assume that he can conduct an undercover
operation on his own, nor can he assume that all behavior is acceptable in
order to “fit in.” Undercover investigators should have a cover detail. They
should also be aware of how to interact with the opposite gender and know
when it is appropriate to consume alcoholic beverages. Failure to take note of
these precautions and possible pitfalls could expose the investigation and cost
the investigator his life.
USING A COVER DETAIL
27-30. Situations that require other investigators or law enforcement
personnel to observe the activities of the undercover investigator may occur
during the course of an undercover investigation. These actions would be
primarily for the investigator’s safety. They may also corroborate testimony
regarding the undercover activity and transactions. Using other investigators
in this manner is referred to as using a cover detail. The investigators
comprising the cover detail must be supplied with all available information so
that they may adequately perform their tasks and be of maximum help to the
undercover investigator. If employed too long or indiscreetly, the cover detail
may be discovered or suspected and seriously hinder the undercover
operation.
BEING FRIENDLY WITH OPPOSITE GENDER ASSOCIATES
27-31. The undercover investigator must be aware of the possible
consequences that could result from being overly friendly with opposite
gender associates of the suspect. The investigator’s relationship with opposite
gender relatives and friends of the suspect should be such that he has their
cooperation in obtaining the suspect’s confidence, but should never extend to
the point of provoking the suspect. The investigator should avoid situations,
which would lead to accusations of improper or intimate relationships.
USING ALCOHOL OR SIMULATING THE USE OF DRUGS OR NARCOTICS
27-32. Generally, local policy prohibits an investigator from consuming
alcoholic beverages while being armed and using or simulating the use of
27-6 Undercover Operations
FM 3-19.13
drugs unless he is in duress or as otherwise specified by the SOP or policy.
The battalion commander or the author of the policy may make exceptions for
undercover operations when prudent evidence exists to suggest that an
operation could be jeopardized as a result of the policy. When an exception to
the policy is approved, the investigator is held accountable for his actions and
is expected to exercise mature, responsible judgment and professional
behavior. The operational plan for undercover activity must address under
what conditions the investigator may consume alcohol or simulate the use
drugs.
CONTACT WITH THE SUSPECT
27-33. The manner in which an undercover investigator makes initial contact
with a suspect is varied. It may be through a source, through a direct rapport
developed by the investigator, through a deliberate means, or by chance.
Regardless of how the contact is made, the undercover investigator must gain
the suspect’s confidence in order to develop information for the crime he is
investigating.
APPROACHING THE SUSPECT
27-34. As the undercover assignment becomes operational, the investigator
will use a source wittingly or unwittingly to reach the suspect, or he will be
prepared to spend an extended period of time in establishing a relationship
between himself and the suspect of the investigation. The approach used in
the first contact with the suspect is, in most instances, the most critical point
of the investigation. If this is accomplished smoothly and naturally, it should
tend to offset any suspicion that the suspect may have and facilitate the
establishment of a continuous association with him.
USING SOURCES
27-35. A witting source is a source that furnishes information to an
investigator knowing full well his capacity as an investigator. The witting
source may agree to accompany the undercover investigator in an initial
contact with the suspect of an investigation using his association with the
subject to effect an entrée for the investigator. This approach is the quickest,
surest way to establish contact. The degree of success, however, is contingent
on the amount of confidence the suspect has in the source (see Chapter 28) and
the source’s reliability.
MEETING THE SUSPECT (CHANCE ENCOUNTER)
27-36. A chance encounter between the undercover investigator and the
suspect may occur on the spur of the moment or be a well-planned maneuver,
either of which should appear to the suspect as a natural chain of events.
Generally, this type of meeting causes little suspicion on the part of the
suspect and provides the initial contact that the undercover investigator
needs. The way the undercover investigator conducts himself during a chance
meeting with a suspect will determine his acceptance or rejection by the
suspect.
Undercover Operations
27-7
FM 3-19.13
GAINING THE SUSPECT’S CONFIDENCE
27-37. After the first contact, the undercover investigator is immediately
faced with the problem of avoiding suspicion. The investigator will have to
appear to be the suspect’s friend and may have to participate in some of the
suspect's activities, in which case, the investigator must depend almost
entirely upon his own judgment while ensuring that he does not violate the
law or other ethical restrictions.
27-38. Usually the suspect’s initial attitude will be suspicious and skeptical.
The suspect may attempt to throw the investigator off balance by suddenly
accusing him of being an investigator or belligerently calling him a source.
This does not necessarily mean that the suspect is aware of the investigator’s
true identity, but only that he is trying to read the investigator’s reaction or
flush out a betrayer. A well-prepared undercover investigator anticipates such
emergencies and immediately puts the suspect on the defensive, possibly by
using counteraccusations.
27-39. To dispel the suspect’s suspicions and gain his confidence, the
undercover investigator may use the following techniques:
z
Arrange to be arrested, questioned, or searched by other enforcement
officers where the suspect can observe the action.
z
Pretend disgust or anger with the suspect for questioning him.
z
Appear as though he does not trust the suspect anymore than the
suspect trusts him.
DEVELOPING INFORMATION FROM THE SUSPECT
27-40. The undercover investigator must listen. If he does all the talking or
takes the lead in conversations, the suspect will not have the opportunity to
talk. Occasionally, the investigator may have to initiate a conversation,
especially about criminal activity. In this instance, the investigator should
talk about activities other than those he is currently investigating, and
eventually guide the conversation toward his real interest.
27-41. The undercover investigator, by listening, should learn everything
possible about the suspect and his counterparts in the criminal activity with
whom he does business and from whom he receives instructions or orders. If
the suspect is in a position to have information about higher echelons in the
criminal organization, the investigator should attempt to have the suspect
introduce him to those individuals. This requires persistence and
resourcefulness on the part of the investigator.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
27-42. Fronting of funds is defined as providing the suspect with money
before the planned exchange of illicit items, such as narcotics or stolen
property. As a general rule, investigators should not front funds; however, this
may be done on a case-by-case basis. The fronting of funds should only be done
when the risk of loss is minimal and there is an investigative gain from this
action. Generally, a mid-level dealer may not have the money to obtain the
drugs or other items and may request the funds to be fronted. This should
27-8 Undercover Operations
FM 3-19.13
only be done when the person to whom the funds will be fronted is fully
identified and can be picked up at a later time should he simply steal the
money. If funds are fronted, the investigator should impose a reasonable time
limit that will require the suspect to go directly to his supplier to make the
purchase, and investigative personnel must be set up to follow the suspect to
his source. The gain in this situation would be identifying where the supply is
coming from; consequently, failing to follow the suspect would negate the
gain.
27-43. When making high-dollar purchases, the investigator may have to
show the suspect that he actually has the money to make the deal (flashing
funds). When it is determined that this is appropriate, there are several rules
that should be followed, which are designed to safeguard both the money and
the investigator. When a flash is warranted, the suspect should never know in
advance that the money is to be at a given location, as this would provide him
with the opportunity to try to steal the money. Such displays of good faith
should be done by surprise without the knowledge of the suspect. The suspect
should be taken away from other parties when showing him something (such
as money) and with a third party should be present to display the money and
then depart the area with the suspect watching. When the suspect sees the
money depart the area, he will not be inclined to come back and steal it
because he knows that it is no longer at that location.
27-44. An investigator must know the limits of his personal conduct when
attempting to gain the suspect’s trust. Sometimes an undercover investigator
may act unruly or be disrespectful toward a law enforcement officer in an
attempt to make the suspect more comfortable with them. However, if the
undercover investigator is requested to commit a crime to gain the suspect's
trust or prove that he is not a law enforcement officer, he must understand his
limitations. In some cases, such criminal acts can be faked to make the
suspect believe that the investigator committed a given crime without
actually doing it. However, in other cases, there may be no conceivable means
to be able to stage a crime. In these cases, the investigator may not commit
acts for which he can be criminally culpable.
27-45. The most common defense used subsequent to an undercover
operation is an entrapment defense. It is important for investigators to fully
understand and appreciate what constitutes entrapment. Entrapment exists
when an agent of the government entices someone to commit a crime that he
was not predisposed to commit. For instance, merely soliciting drugs from a
suspected drug dealer is not entrapment when he demonstrates that he could
readily produce such items. An example of entrapment is when a government
agent approaches an individual on the street who is not suspected of
trafficking drugs, offers him an inordinate amount of money to make a buy,
and tells him where to get it or offers sexual favors in exchange for the drugs
and the individual produces the drugs even though he was not predisposed to
commit such an offense.
Undercover Operations
27-9
Chapter 28
Sources
Anyone who provides information of an investigative nature to law
enforcement personnel is a source. A source may provide an investigator
with specific information about a particular case or background
information that is useful in a number of investigations. Military law
enforcement personnel should comply with all applicable laws and
regulations governing the collection of information and/or intelligence on
individuals to include common law, Section 1385, Title 18, USC (The Posse
Comitatus Act) (18 USC 1385 [The Posse Comitatus Act]); law of war; DOD
and DA directives and regulations; and SOFAs.
CATEGORIES
28-1. Sources generally fall into one of the following four groups:
z
US and HN citizens.
z
Police and security personnel.
z
Mentally or emotionally challenged individuals.
z
Criminals and their associates.
UNITED STATES AND HOST NATION CITIZENS
28-2. People within a community are often aware of criminal behavior. They
may live in a high-crime area or have recently been a victim of crime. Others
gain knowledge of criminal activity through their employment. A short list of
some potential sources in the community include the following:
z
Bartenders.
z
Cab drivers.
z
Barbers.
z
Beauty shop operators.
z
Hotel managers and employees.
z
Insurance and other private investigators.
z
Postmen.
z
Public utility employees.
z
Airport and railway personnel.
z
Rental agency clerks.
28-3. Normally, citizens do not seek out the police to report criminal activity;
however, they may confide in an officer they know and trust. Police officers
should cultivate these contacts at every opportunity. The importance of
citizens in fighting crime cannot be overstated.
Sources
28-1
FM 3-19.13
POLICE AND SECURITY PERSONNEL
28-4. Police and security officers usually exchange information with fellow
officers. Investigators should take every opportunity to meet as many federal,
state, local, and HN officers as possible and establish a professional
relationship with them. Sharing of police information and CRIMINT greatly
enhances the ability of an organization to identify threats and interdict
criminal activity.
MENTALLY OR EMOTIONALLY CHALLENGED INDIVIDUALS
28-5. Often, mentally and emotionally challenged individuals will try to
provide information to law enforcement personnel. Sometimes criminals will
say or do something incriminating in the presence of these individuals
because they do not consider them a threat to their criminal activity. With
experience, an investigator can identify these individuals whose information
can often be attributed to newspapers, gossip, or hallucinations. Information
from such individuals must be corroborated through an independent source.
CRIMINALS AND THEIR ASSOCIATES
28-6. The most valuable source is often the person who is a violator or has
been associated with the criminal element. This person is usually in a better
position to have substantive information regarding criminal activity.
28-7. A source that is closely associated with criminals is often difficult to
control. Dependability and reliability are usually not characteristic of the
criminal element. Therefore, it is critical that the investigator maintain firm
control and management of the source. The legal, moral, and safety
considerations of an investigation are the responsibility of the investigator,
not the source. Sources who disregard the investigator’s guidelines should be
severed from further association with the investigation before major problems
or violations occur.
SOURCE SELECTION
28-8. The most important consideration in selecting sources may be
reliability. The investigator must evaluate both the source and his
information to arrive at the facts. Source information must be tested for
consistency by checking it against data from other sources. To test a source’s
reliability, an investigator should ask the person being evaluated about data
known only to the law enforcement organization. This allows for a tentative
degree of reliability to each source.
28-9. Investigators must maintain a good liaison and a friendly working
relationship with investigators in their unit and in other law enforcement
agencies. This will help them in developing quality sources. Sometimes, newer
investigators will be referred sources by the more experienced investigators as
a result of their being transferred or because they have more sources and
investigations than they can effectively work.
28-10. Investigators should approach every individual that is arrested as a
potential source. Some investigators may work an entire career by developing
28-2 Sources
FM 3-19.13
sources only from individuals arrested in cases that they have investigated.
This technique is generally recommended for source development.
28-11. When considering an individual for selection, the investigator should
review the prospective source’s mental and physical health, age, education,
and personality traits. An individual’s experience, work record, financial
status, and presence or lack of a criminal background should all be checked.
Failing to look at the whole person can waste time and money.
28-12. A skillful investigator can develop a sense of gratitude in a potential
source. In return for providing some ethical assistance, the source may show
his thanks by giving information. Sometimes simple concern for the source's
welfare may create a sense of gratitude.
SOURCE MOTIVES
28-13. Most investigators readily accept the tenet that sources are
fundamental in law enforcement work. An investigator must understand what
motivates a person to become a source, especially criminals or their associates.
28-14. A source’s motivation is a key factor in determining his reliability. The
investigator should attempt to find out what motive a person has for
informing. A source gives information for any number of reasons.
CITIZENS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
28-15. Motivation for average citizens and law enforcement officers is usually
easily recognized. The average citizen source ordinarily supplies information
or performs a service because of his civic duty and a desire to see justice done.
Law enforcement officers are motivated by the same basic factors as the
average citizen plus their professional responsibility as sworn officers to
enforce the law and investigate violations.
MENTALLY OR EMOTIONALLY CHALLENGED INDIVIDUALS
28-16. What motivates a mentally or emotionally challenged person to
become a source is very complex and difficult to determine. In a majority of
instances, these individuals give useless information and should not be used
as sources. When mentally or emotionally challenged individuals possess
valuable information or are able to provide a necessary service, they are
usually inspired by one motive or a combination of motives associated with the
criminal or associate source.
CRIMINALS AND THEIR ASSOCIATES
28-17. The investigator often uses criminals and their associates as sources.
These sources present many legal, ethical, and moral problems for the
investigator that are not usually associated with the other three
classifications of sources. If an investigator is to properly instruct, control,
protect, and effectively use sources and evaluate their information, it is
Sources
28-3
FM 3-19.13
critical, in every instance, that he knows the source’s motivation. The
following include the most common motivations of sources:
z
Fear. It is said that self-preservation is the first law of nature.
Therefore, many individuals turn to law enforcement with a desire to
cooperate when they are afraid of something. Probably the most
typical of this situation is the person who has been arrested for an
offense and is afraid of going to jail. Since man is social by nature and
does not like to live alone, he will sometimes cooperate with law
enforcement in return for a consideration of leniency by the court
regarding pending charges. Telling a potential registered source that
his cooperation will be brought to the attention of the appropriate
authority is acceptable. However, any speculation of promises by the
investigator relative to the disposition of the charges pending against
the source is beyond the authority of the investigator and must be
avoided. Additional examples of individuals motivated by fear are
victims of rackets or swindles and those afraid of criminal associates
for a variety of reasons.
z
Revenge. The person who is motivated by revenge is usually
overwhelmed with a desire for retaliation and often has little concern
about openly testifying in court or his identity being publicly exposed.
The typical revenge-motivated source is a person who wishes to settle
a grudge because someone else informed on him, took advantage of
him or, in some manner, injured him. This type of source may
exaggerate or make a report that is completely erroneous in an effort
to accomplish his goal. A desire for revenge may arise from factors
other than criminal activities, such as jealousy and quarrels over
lovers, causing close friends to become bitter enemies.
z
Mercenariness. Some individuals provide information or render a
service to law enforcement strictly for a fee. They want to sell what
they know for the highest price. Their information is usually good but
may backfire when too much reliance is placed on the mercenary
motive or the reward payments. Investigators must be cautious not to
let financially motivated sources needlessly extend an investigation.
Some, especially those on a continuous pay status during an
investigation, will attempt this tactic by providing frivolous
information knowing that payment will stop when the investigation is
over.
z
Egotism or vanity. Within the average citizen category of sources,
these individuals usually subconsciously or consciously want to be law
enforcement officers but for various reasons cannot qualify for law
enforcement employment. The benefit of these individuals to law
enforcement should not be too quickly discounted. Since a willingness
to assist law enforcement is a positive characteristic of any source,
these individuals can often be of substantial benefit if directed and
motivated properly by a competent investigator.
z
Perverseness. Characteristic of this type of motivation is the source
that makes a disclosure hoping for some unusual advantage. This
motivation is prevalent in the areas of vice and/or contraband crimes
when the source is earning his living by questionable means and
informs with the desire to eliminate his competition. He provides
28-4 Sources
FM 3-19.13
trivial or worthless information while attempting to learn
investigative techniques, the identities of undercover agents, or to
direct attention away from himself. Law enforcement should not use
perversely motivated sources unless the source’s motivation is to
eliminate his competition.
z
Repentance or reform. Occasionally, a source will cooperate with
law enforcement because he wants to repent his wrongdoing, has a
desire to make restitution, or wants to break criminal alliances. This
source may decide to cooperate for money, but subconsciously
convinces himself that he is cooperating with law enforcement for
altruistic reasons. When this type of source is properly managed, he
can become an excellent continuing source of police information.
28-18. These motives are not necessarily all-inclusive. Many investigators
have allied sources for life, even after a source’s case has been adjudicated or
the revenge motive situation no longer exists. By treating a source honestly
and fairly, he will sometimes continue to provide information or service
because of his appreciation or gratitude.
28-19. Investigators must be careful not to misinterpret a source’s motivation.
There are many instances where individuals have supplied information to law
enforcement for purely unselfish reasons and then were completely “turned
off” when offered money by an investigator.
28-20. For whatever reason sources volunteer information, they should never
be cut short. Investigators should give them the chance to tell their story and
then ensure that it is checked out. There is always that one chance that the
information could be the missing link in an important case.
SOURCE INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES
28-21. One key to developing and gaining the cooperation of most sources is
proper interviewing techniques. Most criminals or their associates do not
readily offer information or agree to cooperate with law enforcement officials.
However, an investigator who is a good listener and can communicate clearly
and effectively can often gain their cooperation.
28-22. The criminal or his associate often has two principal concerns that
must be addressed before he will seriously consider cooperating. First, he is
concerned about his identity being registered. Secondly, he is concerned that
the investigator or organization will address his specific motivation, such as
monetary payments. Therefore, the investigator must be prepared to discuss
these concerns with the potential source to gain his cooperation. If most of the
following questions can be answered by a source or potential source, an
investigator should be able to objectively evaluate the source and the
information he has provided. The following are questions that an investigator
should attempt to find the answers to when interviewing a source or potential
source:
z
What is his motivation?
z
Has the source been reliable in the past?
z
How intelligent is the source?
z
How does he know about the violation?
Sources
28-5
FM 3-19.13
z
Does he have a personal interest?
z
Does he have direct knowledge relative to the information?
z
Does he have access to additional related information?
z
Does he have reason to be vengeful toward the violator?
z
Does he have enough experience to report the information accurately?
z
Is he withholding some of the information?
z
Has he fabricated information in the past?
z
Is he willing to testify in court?
SOURCE IDENTITY PROTECTION
28-23. Every CID agent and MPI has a professional and ethical obligation to
safeguard the identity of sources to the maximum extent provided by the law.
Failure to fulfill this obligation may result in the death, injury, or
intimidation of the source or his family. Reprisals against a source due to
improper investigator techniques weigh heavily on the investigator's
conscience and undermine the total law enforcement effort. As a general rule,
an investigator should not place a source in a situation where the source's
identity could be exposed unless the investigator has previously explained to
the source that this could happen as a result of his cooperation.
28-24. The names of sources are privileged information as supported by the
source privilege doctrine. This doctrine allows the government to withhold the
identity of the source under most circumstances. The rationale for this
privilege is twofold. It ensures a constant and continuing flow of information
regarding illegal activities to law enforcement authorities. It protects the
source of information from reprisals or revenge.
28-25. Confidentiality must be furnished to all sources that, regardless of
motive, have provided law enforcement personnel with information
concerning the criminal activities of others. Restricting the release of the
source’s identity, exercising appropriate security measures regarding
communications between the source and the handler, and using caution in
documenting the source’s activities can normally provide confidentiality.
Additional measures may include providing physical protection and
transferring an individual to another location.
SOURCE CONTROL AND HANDLING
28-26. The investigator, not the source, directs and controls the investigation.
This is not as basic as it may sound, especially for the inexperienced
investigator who wants to do a good job and establish his reputation. He could
fall prey to a perversely motivated source. There is nothing wrong in asking
the source for suggestions or showing appreciation for quality information. In
fact, these techniques are encouraged. However, the investigator must be the
controlling and decision-making authority.
28-27. Investigators must avoid promising inflated monetary payments or
making other promises to a source that cannot be kept or that are outside
their authority. Source payments are not within the sole discretion of a case
agent or investigator and are contingent upon factors, such as supervisory
28-6 Sources
FM 3-19.13
approval, budget, or unit and organization guidelines. Sources may be told
that monetary payments are available and general payment guidelines.
Inflated promises of payment or rewards may stimulate a source one time, but
a source is not likely to assist in future investigations once a promise has been
reneged upon. Advising a source of anticipated judicial disposition of a charge
pending against him or indicating that a source will receive probation or a
reduced sentence because of his cooperation are examples of commitments
that are beyond the authority of an investigator.
28-28. In order to maintain proper control of the source and the direction of
the investigation, the investigator must maintain frequent personal contact
with the source. When personal contact is not possible, telephonic contact
should be used. Personal meetings between the investigator and source are
the best atmosphere for debriefing the source, developing a rapport, and
issuing instructions. Prearranged, secure meeting places should be
established. Using government buildings, police departments, and other
official buildings to meet a source should be avoided to reduce the risk of
exposing the source.
28-29. It is generally recommended that a second witnessing investigator be
present at these meetings. The second investigator serves to corroborate
anything said or done at the meeting. This could become important at a later
time if the source makes incriminating accusations against the controlling
investigator. Exposure of a second investigator to the source will make the
transition of the source to another investigator easier, such as when the
controlling investigator transfers or retires. Although some organizations do
not make it mandatory for two investigators to meet with a source, they do
recognize that meetings between investigators and sources of the opposite sex
and meetings where sources are paid money are obvious situations that
dictate the presence of two investigators.
28-30. A good rapport and mutual trust between an investigator and a source
greatly enhance the likelihood of accomplishing the mission. Initially, creating
this type of atmosphere may be difficult especially when dealing with a fear-
motivated source that has recently been arrested. Generally, if the
investigator is truthful and fair with the source, a solid professional
relationship will eventually develop. An investigator should always conduct
personal and criminal background checks on a source and attempt to
corroborate the source's information through independent means.
SOURCE TESTIMONY
28-31. The confidentiality of a source’s identity is a limited privilege
recognized by military law. Rule 507, MCM 2000, provides that a source’s
identity is normally privileged against disclosure. Communications with these
individuals are also privileged to the extent necessary to prevent disclosure of
their identity. This privilege, however, is not absolute and is subject to various
exceptions. Legal considerations in this area are both complex and subject to
change.
28-32. At the trial, all disclosure orders made by a military judge will be
complied with fully. However, in an appropriate case, such as where
disclosure may jeopardize an important ongoing investigation, a recess to
Sources
28-7
FM 3-19.13
petition the convening authority to terminate the current judicial proceedings
may be requested through the TC by USACIDC personnel.
ENTRAPMENT
28-33. The defense of entrapment exists when the design or suggestion to
commit the offense originated in the government and the accused had no
predisposition to commit the offense. The “government” includes agents of the
government and individuals cooperating with the government, such as
informants. The fact that individuals acting for the government afford
opportunities or facilities for the commission of an offense does not constitute
entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct is the
product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials.
28-34. Therefore, one of the first things discussed with a source is the law
regarding entrapment. The investigator must ensure that the source
understands the difference between providing an opportunity for a suspect to
violate the law versus providing the inspiration.
28-8 Sources
Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart
This appendix complies with current Army directives which state that the
metric system will be incorporated into all new publications. Table A-1 is a
metric conversion chart.
Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart
US Units
Multiplied By
Metric Units
Cup
0.2366
Liter
Degrees Fahrenheit
Subtract 32, multiply by 5/9
Degrees Celsius
Feet
0.3048
Meters
Gallon
3.7854
Liter
Inches
2.5400
Centimeters
Inches
0.0254
Meters
Inches
25.4001
Millimeters
Mil
25.4000
Micrometer
Ounces
28.3490
Grams
Ounces
28,400,000
Micrograms
Pounds
0.4536
Kilograms
Yards
0.9144
Meters
Metric Units
Multiplied By
US Units
Centimeter
0.3937
Inches
Degrees Celsius
Multiply by 9/5, add 32
Degrees Fahrenheit
Grams
0.0353
Ounces
Kilograms
2.2046
Pounds
Liter
4.2268
Cup
Liter
0.2641
Gallon
Meters
3.2808
Feet
Meters
39.3701
Inches
Meters
1.0936
Yards
Microgram
.0000000353
Ounces
Micrometer
0.0393
Mil
Millimeters
0.0394
Inches
Metric Conversion Chart A-1
Appendix B
Crime Scene Predeployment Equipment List
Army law enforcement managers plan for short-notice deployments by
preparing crime scene predeployment kits (see Table B-1). This appendix
provides an equipment list that is intended to be a guide, not a standard.
In addition to this list, planners should also consider special tools and
equipment used for death scene investigations, arson and/or explosive
incidents, and electronic evidence collection (a list of those items is also
included). Every deployment will present different challenges. Many of the
items necessary for crime scene processing are not available in remote
locations. Supervisors and planners must consider their transportation
and lift capabilities. Predeployment kits are organized for a single lift.
Refer to military police support on the battlefield consolidated TOE update
(CTU) 2000-04 for details on mobility and lift capabilities.
Table B-1. Equipment List for a Crime Scene Deployment Kit
Photography Equipment
Camera and case
Cleaning equipment
Film and floppy disks (if digital)
Batteries
Light source
Tripod
Paperwork and Supplies
Crime scene sketch kits
Notebooks and folders
Envelopes (various sizes)
Tape
Necessary paperwork
Pens, pencils, paper, and erasers
Point of contact listing
Accordion files (preferably tabbed)
Fingerprint Kits
Fingerprint cards
Ink and rollers
Automation
Extension cords
Printers
Formatted floppy disks
Serial port cables and accessories
Laptop computers with backup software
Evidence Collection and Holding
Fingerprints
Portable fuming equipment
Fingerprint dusting kit
Hinge lifters
Palm print lifters
Casting Impressions
Casting kit
Dental stone
Shovels and trowels
Crime Scene Predeployment Equipment List B-1
FM 3-19.13
Table B-1. Equipment List for a Crime Scene Deployment Kit (Continued)
Firearms and Ammunition
Primer residue collection kit
Drugs
Detection kits
CID Form 36
General
Swabs
PPE
Questioned documents holders
Evidence collection bags (various sizes)
Paper bags
DA Form 4002
Shipping tape
Portable light source
Boxes
Death Scene Investigations
Gloves (universal precautions)
Writing implements (pens, pencils, and markers)
Body bags
Communication equipment (cell phone, pager, and
radio)
Flashlight
Body identification tags
35-mm and digital cameras (with extra batteries
Investigative notebook (for scene notes)
and film)
Measuring instruments (tape measure, ruler, and
Official ID (for yourself)
rolling measuring tape)
Watch
Paper bags (for hands and feet)
Specimen containers (for evidence items and
Disinfectant (universal precautions)
toxicology specimens)
Departmental scene forms
Inventory lists (clothes and drugs)
Blood collection tubes (syringes and needles)
Clean white linen sheet (stored in a plastic bag)
Paper envelopes
Business cards and office cards with phone
numbers
Evidence tape
Medical equipment kit (scissors, forceps, tweezers,
an exposure suit, scalpel handles, blades,
disposable syringe, large-gauge needles, and
cotton-tipped swabs)
Foul-weather gear (a raincoat and umbrella)
Tape or rubber bands
Phone listing (important phone numbers)
Evidence seal (use with body bags and locks)
Disposable (paper) jumpsuits, hair covers, and a
Shoe covers
face shield
Pocketknife
Waterless hand wash
Trace evidence kit (tape)
Crime scene tape
Thermometer
Latent print kit
First aid kit
Plastic trash bags
Local maps
Photo placards (signage to identify the case in
photos)
Gunshot residue analysis kits (SEM/EDS)
Hand lens (magnifying glass)
Boots (for wet conditions and construction sites)
Barrier sheeting (to shield body and area from
public view)
Portable electric lighting
Reflective vest
B-2 Crime Scene Predeployment Equipment List
FM 3-19.13
Table B-1. Equipment List for a Crime Scene Deployment Kit (Continued)
Purification mask (disposable)
Basic hand tools (bolt cutter, screwdrivers,
hammer, shovel, trowel, and paintbrushes)
Tape recorder
Video camera (with extra videotape and batteries)
Body bag locks (to secure body inside bag)
Presumptive blood test kit
Personal comfort supplies (insect spray,
sunscreen, and a hat)
Arson and Explosive Investigations
Barrier tape
Tape measure (100 ft)
Clean, unused evidence containers (cans, glass
Compass
jars, and nylon or polyester bags)
Decontamination equipment (buckets, pans, and
Evidence tags, labels, and tape
detergent)
Gloves (disposable and work gloves)
Hand tools (hammers, screwdrivers, knives, and
crowbars)
Lights (flashlights and spotlights)
Marker cones or flags
PPE
Photographic equipment
Rakes, brooms, and spades
Electronic Evidence Collection
Documentation tools
Stick-on labels
Cable tags
Indelible felt-tip markers
Disassembly and Removal Tools (in a Variety of Nonmagnetic Sizes and Types)
Standard pliers
Flat-blade and cross-slotted screwdrivers
Hex-nut drivers
Needle-nose pliers
Secure-bit drivers
Small tweezers
Specialized computer screwdrivers (manufacturer
Wire cutters
specific)
Star type nut drivers
Package and Transport Supplies
Antistatic bubble wrap
Cable ties
Evidence bags
Evidence tape
Packing materials (avoid materials that can
Packing tape
produce static electricity, such as polystyrene
peanuts)
Sturdy boxes of various sizes
Antistatic bags
Other Items
Forms (keystroke/mouse click log, photo log, and
Hand truck
DA Form 4137)
Seizure disk
List of contact telephone numbers for assistance
Crime Scene Predeployment Equipment List B-3
Appendix C
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
A checklist for evidence room inspection or inventory assists a supervisor
in conducting an inspection of an evidence room. This inspection checklist
(Table C-1) should be used as a guide and is not all encompassing.
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory
REQUEST FOR EXCEPTION
AR 195-5, paragraph 1-5
Yes
No
NA
USACIDC activities. Were requests for exceptions to AR 195-5 sent to
Commander, USACIDC, ATTN: CIOP-PP-PO, 6010 6th Street, Fort Belvoir, VA
22060?
Military police activities. Were requests for exceptions to AR 195-5 sent to the
installation commander with a copy furnished to the major Army commander
concerned?
Approved exceptions. Did the requesting agency keep a copy of the exception (if it
was granted) until the deficiency was corrected or the exception expired?
(Exceptions are usually for one year.)
PRIMARY EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN
AR 195-5, paragraph 1-6
Prerequisites for USACIDC. Is the custodian an accredited enlisted special agent or
warrant officer approved by USACIDC group commanders (group commander)?
Military police activities. Is the custodian a commissioned officer; an NCO, MOS
95B/C, grade E6 or above; or DA civilian employees with the grade determined by
the local civilian personnel office (CPO)?
Appointment.
z
USACIDC. Was the primary evidence custodian appointed in writing by one
of the following: a field office, district office, group commander or
commanding general (CG), or USACIDC?
z
Military police activities. Did the PM appoint the primary evidence custodian
in writing?
z
Was a copy of the appointing document kept in the evidence room under file
number 1e?
z
Was the appointing document brought forward for filing each year the
custodian retained the position?
NOTE: AR 195-5, paragraph 1-4b, is cited as the authority to appoint the primary evidence custodian.
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist C-1
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
ALTERNATE EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN
AR 195-5, paragraph 1-7
Yes
No
NA
Prerequisites for USACIDC. Is the alternate custodian an accredited enlisted
special agent or warrant officer approved by the USACIDC group commander?
Military police activities. Is the alternate evidence custodian a commissioned officer;
NCO, MOS 95B/C grade E5 or above; or a DA civilian employee with the grade
determined by the local CPO?
Appointment.
z
USACIDC. Was the alternate evidence custodian appointed in writing by
one of the following: a field office, district office, group commander or CG, or
USACIDC?
z
Military police activities. Did the PM appoint the alternate evidence
custodian in writing?
z
Was a copy of the appointing document kept in the evidence room under file
number 1e?
z
Was the appointing document brought forward for filing each year that the
alternate evidence custodian retained that position?
NOTE: AR 195-5, paragraph 1-4b, is cited as the authority to appoint the alternate evidence custodian.
Responsibilities. Did the alternate evidence custodian assume the duties of the
primary custodian during his temporary absence?
Temporary custodianship.
z
Did the alternate, on assuming duties of the primary evidence custodian,
enter and sign the required statement in the evidence ledger immediately
below the last entry?
z
Did the primary evidence custodian, on return from temporary absence,
ensure that all entries on records pertaining to evidence taken in, released,
and disposed of by the alternate custodian were correct and accurate?
z
Did the primary custodian enter and sign the required statement in the
evidence ledger immediately below the last entry after ensuring that the
records were correct and the evidence was accounted for and properly
documented?
z
Did the primary evidence custodian, on return from temporary absence, find
that the alternate had made an incorrect entry?
Did the primary custodian immediately inform the USACIDC district field
office commander, SAC, or PM?
Did the primary custodian prepare a memorandum outlining the error
and what was done to correct it?
Was the original memorandum filed with the proper DA Form 4137 or in
a file folder under number 195-5a if the error was not on a DA Form
4137?
Was a copy of the memorandum placed in the proper case file?
C-2 Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
IDENTIFICATION OF EVIDENCE
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-1
Yes
No
NA
Did the CID special agent or military policeman initially assuming custody of the
evidence permanently mark the evidence for future identification by marking his
initials and the date and time of acquisition directly on the item, to include major
interchangeable parts?
Was a DA Form 4002 typed or printed legibly in blue or black ink with the document
number, MPR and/or CID sequence number, item number, and remarks (the
common name of the item)?
z
Did the DA Form 4002 correspond with the DA Form 4137?
z
Was the DA Form 4002 attached to each item of evidence to identify and
control it?
SEALING EVIDENCE
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-2
Were the original DA Form 4137 and the original and one copy of DA Form 3655
put in a properly addressed, sealed envelope and attached to the outside (inner
wrapper) container when sealed evidence was sent to USACIL?
Were multiple items of fungible evidence sealed in separate containers and sent in
one shipping package?
NOTE: If nonfungible evidence is sent in the same package with fungible evidence from the same
investigation, all evidence must be double wrapped.
Fungible evidence.
z
Were wet or damp fungible items sealed in a container before sending them
to USACIL after they were visually examined, field tested, and dried?
z
Was fungible evidence sealed in paper or manila envelopes, cardboard
boxes, or wrapping paper?
z
Was fungible evidence sealed as early as possible in the chain of custody to
reduce the number of persons having access to it?
z
Were all openings, joined surfaces, and edges sealed with paper packaging
tape or the equivalent when fungible evidence was sealed in containers
other than heat seal bags?
NOTE: No cellophane or masking tape will be used.
z
Were the time and date of sealing, the initials or signature of the seizer, and
the USACIDC control number or MPR number placed so that they appeared
on both the tape and package?
z
Was a DA Form 4002 properly completed and attached to the package to
identify and control it?
When heat seal bags were used to seal fungible evidence—
z
Were the procedures provided with the equipment used to heat and seal the
bag?
z
Was a DA Form 4002 properly completed and attached to the package to
identify and control it?
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist C-3
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
Were items, such as small amounts of powders, hairs, fibers, small paint chips, or
flakes (that will adhere to the inside because of electricity), placed in plastic bags?
z
Were the items put in paper wrappings or cardboard containers?
z
Were the containers marked for future identification with the time and date
of sealing, the initials or signature of the seizer, and the USACIDC control
number or the MPR number on the seal and container?
z
Was a DA Form 4002 properly completed and attached to the containers to
identify and control them?
Was fungible evidence that was submitted to USACIL for serological testing sealed
in any type of plastic container?
Was fungible evidence packaged according to FM 3-19.13?
Nonfungible evidence.
NOTE: There is no requirement to seal nonfungible evidence; however, it may be sealed if desired.
z
Was nonfungible evidence handled the same as fungible evidence when
sealed?
z
Was nonfungible evidence that may have other evidence on it or may
contain other evidence (fibers, hairs, paint chips, and glass fragments)
sealed in a proper container just as fungible evidence was? (This avoids
loss or accidental contamination of evidence that could be present.)
PREPARATION OF DA FORM 4137
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-3
Was all physical evidence, regardless of how it was obtained, recorded on DA Form
4137?
Did the CID special agent or military policeman who first acquired the evidence
prepare the DA Forms 4137 and make three copies?
Were the initial entries in the “Chain-of-Custody” sections of all DA Forms 4137
accurately completed by the CID special agent or military policeman who first
acquired the evidence?
Was the last copy of the DA Form 4137 given to the person as a receipt when
evidence was taken from him?
Was any change in custody of fungible and nonfungible evidence, after USACIDC
or a military policeman acquired it, recorded in the “Chain-of-Custody” section of
the DA Form 4137?
Did each person handling or processing the physical evidence preserve the
integrity of the evidence while it was under his control and maintain the chain-of-
custody entries on the original DA Form 4137 and any other copies?
Was “Sealed container received, contents not inventoried” or was the acronym
“SCRCNI” noted in the “Purpose of Change of Custody” column of the DA Form
4137 when sealed fungible evidence changed custody?
Did the evidence custodian check the DA Form 4137?
Did the evidence custodian submit the DA Form 4137 with the evidence?
Did the evidence custodian correct errors on the DA Form 4137 when possible?
C-4 Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
Did the CID special agent or military policeman who first received evidence from the
non-Army law enforcement agency prepare a DA Form 4137?
Did the CID special agent or military policeman mark the evidence for future
identification if the releasing agency had not already done so and would not mark it
at the time of release?
Were receipts or chain-of-custody documents furnished by the releasing agency
attached to the DA Form 4137?
Did evidence custodians note in the “Purpose of Change of Custody” column
“Sealed container received, contents not inventoried” or the acronym “SCRCNI?”
Did evidence custodians breach or inventory the contents of sealed containers of
evidence if they were marked “Sealed container received, contents not inventoried”
or bore the acronym “SCRCNI?”
PROCESSING OF DA FORM 4137 BY THE EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-4
Was physical evidence released to the evidence custodian the first working day
after it was acquired?
Was evidence acquired during nonduty hours properly secured in an approved
temporary evidence container?
Was access to the temporary evidence container controlled by the duty special
agent or military policeman, as appropriate, pending release of the evidence to the
evidence custodian?
Did the evidence custodian and the CID special agent or military policeman
properly complete the chain-of-custody entry on the copies of and the original DA
Form 4137 received with the evidence?
Did the evidence custodian assign the correct document number to the original and
the copies of DA Forms 4002 and 4137?
Did the evidence custodian keep the original and the first copy of DA Form 4137
and give the second copy to the CID special agent or military policeman to be
placed in the appropriate case file after the chain of custody was completed and all
copies were assigned the correct document number?
Was the location of the evidence within the evidence room shown in pencil on the
bottom margin of DA Form 4137?
Were location changes kept current by the evidence custodian by erasing the
previous entries on DA Form 4137 and noting the new location?
Did DA Form 4137 files (kept by the evidence custodian) contain the original and
the first copy of the form?
Were DA Forms 4137 put in number sequence in a folder no thicker than 3/4 inch or
in a folder that contained no more than fifty documents per folder with the number
and year of the documents in the folder shown on the outside (for example, 1-50,
1989)?
Did the original DA Form 4137 go with the evidence when it was temporarily
released from the evidence room to USACIL, an Article 32 investigating officer, or
another agency for other official reasons?
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist C-5
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
Was the first copy of DA Form 4137 detached from the original and placed in the
proper suspense file?
Were at least three suspense folders kept in the evidence room: one labeled
“USACIL” for evidence sent to laboratories; one labeled “ADJUDICATION” for
evidence on temporary release to Article 32 investigation officers, courts, SJA
officers, or other persons for legal proceedings; and one labeled “PENDING
DISPOSITION APPROVAL” for the first copy of DA Form 4137 when it was sent to
the SJA for approval of disposition?
Did the evidence custodian use other suspense folders as management tools as
needed?
Did the evidence custodian place the original DA Form 4137, to include all attached
memorandum or associated documents (such as DD Forms 281 and 1131
pertaining to .0015 funds) in a separate evidence voucher file under number 195-5a
after all items of evidence listed on the form were properly disposed of?
z
Was a copy of the DA Form 4137 sent to USACRC as an exhibit to the final
report when the it pertained to an ROI or MPR?
z
Was a copy of the DA Form 4137 sent as an exhibit to the supplemental
report if the evidence was collected after the final report was submitted to
USACRC?
z
Was a copy of the DA Form 4137 attached to the office’s file copy of the
report?
z
Was a copy of DA Form 4137 made from the suspense copy and placed in
the evidence voucher file (noting the disposition of the original) if the original
DA Form 4137 was entered as a permanent part in the record of trial,
accompanied evidence released to an external agency, or was not available
for any other reason?
EVIDENCE LEDGER
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-5
Did the evidence ledger show accountability when cross-referenced with DA Form
4137?
Did the evidence ledger account for document numbers assigned to DA Form 4002
and 4137?
Is the evidence ledger a bound book and that follows a disposition schedule set by
AR 25-400-2 with a destruction date three years after final disposition is made of all
items entered in it?
Was the evidence ledger prepared with six columns that spanned two facing pages
when the book was opened? (See AR 195-5, Figure 2-2, for column headings.)
z
Did the first page of the ledger and the first page beginning a new calendar
year, as a minimum, show the proper column headings? (Each page does
not need to show the column headings.)
z
Were both vertical and horizontal lines used to separate the entries?
z
Was blue or black ink used to post entries?
NOTE: The lines separating the entries may be in a different color.
C-6 Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
The columns in the evidence ledger should be completed as follows:
z
Document number and date received. Did this column contain the document
number assigned to the evidence custody document and the date that the
DA Form 4137 was received in the evidence room?
z
CID control number or MPR number. Was the number assigned to the
investigation that the evidence pertains to entered in this column?
NOTE: CID units may use both the MPR and CID sequence number when the military police prepare an
MPR on the same investigation.
z
Description of the evidence.
Was a brief description of the evidence entered in this column to include
the item number from the DA Form 4137?
Was fungible evidence that was sealed in a container briefly described
from data on the DA Form 4137?
NOTE: This does not imply that the evidence custodian inventoried the items.
z
Date of final disposition.
Was the date the evidence was disposed of, as shown in the “Chain-of-
Custody” section of the DA Form 4137, entered in this column?
Was the date of disposition for each item shown opposite its description
when DA Form 4137 contained several items and they were not
disposed of on the same date?
Was only one date entered, followed by the words “all items” (for
example, 25 Jan 89—all items), when all the items in an entry were
disposed of on the same date?
z
Final disposition.
Was a brief note on the means of the final disposition entered in this
column opposite the item description?
Was the means of disposal listed once, preceded by the words “all
items” (for example, all items burned), when all items in the entry were
disposed of in the same manner?
Did this column include a cross-reference to another DA Form 4137 that
contained evidence from the same investigator; names of owners,
subjects, investigators; notations to show the presence of .0015 funds;
or the results of laboratory examinations?
Was the notation SCRNI made when fungible evidence was received in
a sealed container and was not inventoried?
Was the ledger book completely filled before starting a new one?
NOTE: If in large offices the number of entries made nearly fill a ledger, the remaining pages need not
be used for the next year. A new ledger may be opened. Conversely, a small office may use only a few
pages per year; therefore, the same ledger should be used for several years.
Was a statement that the ledger pertains to DA Forms 4137 (for example, 001-849
for calendar year 2002) entered after the last entry in the ledger for a calendar
year?
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist C-7
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
Did the cover of the ledger book identify the organization or activity responsible for
the evidence room and the dates spanned by the entries?
MAINTENANCE OF EVIDENCE
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-6
Was evidence stored so that the integrity and physical characteristics were
maintained?
Were items such as weapons kept in a clean, rust-free condition so their value as
evidence was not destroyed?
Were fingerprint cards that were obtained for comparison kept in the proper case
file?
Were fingerprint cards listed on DA Form 4137 when obtained for comparison and
sent to the laboratory with other evidence from the evidence room?
NOTE: The description of the laboratory request is enough to connect the card with the evidence.
Were fingerprint cards put back in the proper case file when they were returned
from the laboratory?
Were documents that could prove or disprove a point in question, such as
insufficient fund checks, forged or altered documents, and other questioned
documents (along with related standards or exemplars), kept in the evidence room?
Were statements, records, and other documents routinely associated with an
investigation kept in the evidence room?
Were large items of evidence (for example, vehicles) kept in an impoundment lot,
warehouse, or other reasonably secure place when it was necessary to retain
them?
TEMPORARY RELEASE OF EVIDENCE
AR 195-5, paragraph 2-7
Was evidence removed from the evidence room only for permanent disposal or for
temporary release for specific reasons? (The most common reasons for temporary
removal are transmittal to a crime laboratory for forensic examination and
presentation at a court-martial or hearing conducted under Article 32, UCMJ.)
Did the person that evidence was released to, either temporarily or for permanent
disposal, sign for it in the “Received By” column of the “Chain of Custody” section?
Did the person sign on the original and first copy of the DA Form 4137? (The
person receiving the evidence must safeguard it and maintain the chain of custody
until it is returned to the evidence custodian.)
Did the evidence custodian release the original DA Form 4137 to the person who
assumed temporary custody of the evidence or was it sent by first class registered
mail or another means along with the evidence?
Did the evidence custodian put the first copy of the DA Form 4137 in the proper
suspense folder after releasing the evidence?
Was the original DA Form 4137 properly annotated by the custodian and the person
returning the evidence and put in the evidence document file when the evidence
was returned?
C-8 Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
Was the first (suspense) copy, with the chain of custody properly annotated, refiled
with the original DA Form 4137?
Were copies used and processed as stated above when items on the same DA
Form 4137 were temporarily released to more than one agency or person at the
same time?
Was a note made on the original DA Form 4137 and the first copy stating that
copies of the original form were made?
Was the chain of custody for all evidence recorded on the first copy of the DA Form
4137?
Were personnel receiving evidence, either on a temporary or permanent basis,
required to present identification as necessary to ensure that evidence was only
handled by authorized persons?
Did packages contain evidence from only one investigation to ensure proper
maintenance of the chain of custody?
Was a laboratory report prepared in all cases and returned to the requestor with the
evidence submitted, unless cancelled by the contributor? (USACIL will not make
final disposition of any item submitted for examination.)
Was the sealed container opened except for official purposes or when disposed of
when fungible evidence was returned from the USACIL?
Did the person who opened the container sign the chain-of-custody document?
Did the person note in the “Purpose-of-Change” column that the seals were intact
and the reason for opening?
Did the person open the container by cutting it without damaging the seals?
Was the evidence, with all prior containers of its sealed parts, put in a new
container and resealed?
Did any person who accidentally breached the sealed container note how or why it
happened in the “Purpose of Change of Custody” column?
Was the container then sealed in a new container as stated above?
Were the remarks continued in the block immediately below the entry if the space in
the “Purpose of Change of Custody” column was too small?
Was a diagonal line drawn from the left side of the “Item Number” block through the
“Received By” block if remarks were continued in the block immediately below the
entry?
Did the original DA Form 3655 and one copy go with the evidence? The field office
commander, SAC, or PM does not need to sign as the requestor. The evidence
custodian, special agent, or military policeman may do this.
DA Form 3655.
z
Was the address of the USACIL serving as the contributing office in the “TO”
block?
z
Was the division that was making the examination shown on the
“ATTENTION LINE” (for example, photography, firearms and toolmarks,
questioned documents, latent prints, serological evidence, and trace
evidence)?
Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist C-9
FM 3-19.13
Table C-1. Checklist for an Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory (Continued)
Yes
No
NA
z
Was the contributor’s return address in the “FROM” block?
NOTE: If the evidence or report is to be returned to an office other than the one in the “FROM” block,
the address that the report or evidence is to be returned to is noted in item 11.
z
Were items 1 through 9 filled out correctly?
z
Were the items being submitted annotated in items 10a and b?
Was the exhibit number the same as the item number shown on DA
Form 4137 where practical?
Was the description column detailed enough so that each item submitted
could be identified and distinguished from any other item with the same
request for examination?
Were the document numbers listed on DA Form 4137 to ease
identification when more than one DA Form 4137 was involved with the
same laboratory request?
z
Did item 11 describe the examinations desired by the contributor and furnish
information required for processing and any other information that the
requestor felt would help the examiner?
NOTE: All serological, firearms, and trace evidence submissions must have background information in
this section.
Expeditious handling and examination of evidence is sometimes required.
z
Was expeditious handling necessary when—
The subject was being held in pretrial confinement?
A trial date was set?
Results were needed for an Article 32 investigation?
Results were needed for an Article 39a session?
The analysis of covertly acquired controlled substances was needed for
further investigation?
Other valid reasons existed?
z
Were most requirements made known to the USACIDC or military police
activity by the SJA?
z
Did USACIDC and military police activities request expeditious handling by
the USACIL by putting “EXPEDITE” on the DA Form 3655 after the subject’s
name?
z
Was the reason for the request for expeditious handling included?
z
Was a preference for telephone or electronic mail notification of the
laboratory results noted on DA Form 3655?
z
Did notification instructions include the name, telephone number, and e-mail
address of the person to notify?
z
Was USACIL notified by the quickest means possible if such notice was
required after the evidence had already been sent?
z
Did USACIL notify the requester via e-mail stating the reasons why it was
not possible for it to receive such requests and immediately process them?
Was a return receipt for registered mail used when evidence was mailed to the
owner for final disposal?
C-10 Evidence Room Inspection or Inventory Checklist
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