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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
from targeting forces in the disruption zone or the battle zone. This is a key
part of the OPFOR’s aggressive and creative counterreconnaissance effort.
Battle Zone
9-157. In maneuver or area defense, air defense units provide protection for
the battle positions of DTGs or BTGs of the main defense force. In a maneuver
defense, they especially cover units maneuvering from line to line. Especially in
an area defense, they help preserve key components of OPFOR combat power or
assist units in the stubborn holding of tactically favorable defensive positions
that the OPFOR would prefer to retain. A typical battle position incorporates
air defense systems, in conjunction with extensive use of C3D. In any type of
defense, air defense units conduct air defense ambushes to provide opportunities
for other forces to conduct counterattacks or reconnaissance fires.
9-158. An OSC in the defense usually employs a strong reserve positioned in
an assembly area with good C3D measures and strong air defense protection.
The reserve must have sufficient air defense coverage to allow it to maneuver
from the assembly area in order to conduct a variety of contingency missions
the OSC commander might give it as the operation develops.
Support Zone
9-159. The OPFOR usually deploys some air defense units in the support zone
to protect key logistics units and administrative support elements. However, it
also relies heavily on passive air defense measures, including C3D and dispersal.
ANTILANDING DEFENSE
9-160. Air defense units have a significant role in defending ground forces
against attacks by enemy airborne and air assault troops. When the OPFOR
detects an enemy airborne operation, Air Force units (if available) attempt to
intercept and destroy enemy transport aircraft. They try to do this while the
enemy is at marshalling airfields or en route to drop zones.
9-161. Operational- and tactical-level SAM units engage transport aircraft
entering their respective air defense zones of responsibility. Short-range air
defense assets near the drop zones also engage transport aircraft. These air
defense forces typically act in the form of either air defense ambushes or roving
air defense units. Self-propelled AA guns, vehicle-mounted machineguns, and
small arms all fire on descending paratroops and equipment.
SANCTUARY AREAS
9-162. A sanctuary area may exist because of natural or manmade features.
However, it only remains a sanctuary if the OPFOR can prevent the enemy
from striking it with standoff weapons, including air power. Thus, OPFOR
units in a sanctuary area use all available C3D techniques to reduce likeli-
hood of detection or identification. They may also exploit political restrictions
placed on the enemy force.
9-163. The air defense of the sanctuary area is integrated into the overall air
defense scheme at the tactical, operational, and strategic (national) levels. The
net result is the requirement for enemy aviation to pass through overlapping
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
coverage to attack the sanctuary area. Attacking enemy aircraft must first
penetrate the strategic (national), operational, and tactical engagement
envelopes. Then they must face the air defenses within the sanctuary itself.
9-164. Within the sanctuary area, the air defense unit commander and the
supported maneuver commander work closely together to integrate their
weapons into an effective air defense plan. The maneuver commander
provides guidance for the placement of all air defense systems, while the air
defense commander supervises the details of the placement of his weapons
and ensures that they remain within mutually supporting distance. As a
rule, one crew in each pair of air defense systems remains alert, except when
they have received warning of an air attack. Any available shoulder-fired
SAMs supplement the defense, and the supporting air defense commander
may exercise some degree of control over the SAM gunners. Air defense units
observe radio silence and light discipline and dig in, as time allows.
9-165. A 360-degree surveillance of the surrounding airspace increases the air
defense engagement envelope to the maximum extent possible. Air observation
posts and air defense firing positions are positioned to provide comprehensive
observation and interlocking fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. All other weapons, including vehicle-mounted
machineguns and ATGMs, are further integrated. Even planning for the use and
integration of massed small-arms fire is essential to an effective air defense.
MOUNTAINS AND WATER OBSTACLES
9-166. Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain have unique
problems. The rugged terrain makes it difficult to maintain the integrity of
maneuver and air defense units. This, in turn, makes maintaining compre-
hensive air surveillance and air defense fire support more difficult, resulting
in a greater degree of decentralization than normal.
9-167. Air defense forces play a major role in water obstacle crossings. They
protect crossing sites and forces from air attack by creating envelopes of
protected airspace above and around crossing sites. Major problems in air
defense of water obstacle crossings include
• Providing comprehensive radar and visual observation.
• Handling simultaneous threats on multiple approach axes.
• Maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage.
• Supplying ammunition to firing units on the far shore.
AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS
9-168. The OPFOR recognizes the disproportionate effects that sudden, un-
expected destruction of an aircraft or small group of aircraft can have can on
enemy tactics and morale. For example, the surprise destruction of one or
two lead aircraft, on what the enemy perceived to be a clear avenue of ap-
proach, could cause an enemy air assault to be called off or seriously disrupted.
Air defense ambushes may set up at temporary firing positions to surprise and
destroy enemy aircraft and disorganize enemy fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-
wing operations. Ambushes and roving air defense units can cause the enemy to
believe that significant air defense assets are located in areas where actually
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
there are only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of enemy recon-
naissance and the likelihood of enemy air attack in the area concerned.
AMBUSHES
9-169. Air defense ambushes usually comprise a single AA gun or SAM
weapon, section, platoon, or battery with the mission of engaging enemy air-
craft from a hidden or unexpected position. However, the OPFOR may also
employ antihelicopter mines.
Placement
9-170. By their very nature, the placement of air defense ambushes is unpre-
dictable. They might be placed on the most likely air avenues of approach or along
secondary and tertiary avenues. They can be along flanks, forward, behind, and
in gaps between maneuver units. Their purpose can possibly be to fill apparent
gaps in air defense coverage or to defend key units or sites. Typical missions in-
clude defending maneuver units, CPs, reserves, artillery and missile units, other
air defense units in firing positions, and water obstacle-crossing sites.
9-171. Ambushes can be placed
• In valleys or defiles likely to be used as ingress or egress routes by
infiltrating aircraft.
• On adjacent heights to shoot down into valleys or defiles.
• Just behind a crest to catch aircraft from behind as they clear a ridge.
Single-launcher shoulder-fired SAM ambushes may be set up on wooden plat-
forms built in treetops to catch aircraft flying over a forest. In urban areas,
AA guns could be set up within the top or middle floors of buildings to fire
laterally or even down on low-flying aircraft while remaining unseen from
almost every angle. Often, air defense ambushes are placed in complex ter-
rain that offers poor fields of observation but allows them to fire “window shots.”
Planning and Preparation
9-172. Air defense ambushes may be planned and executed on short notice
with little preparation. In other cases, they may involve elaborate prepa-
ration and camouflage, and tracking enemy aircraft over several days to
discern operational patterns and possible weaknesses, or optimum weather
patterns for a specific ambush site.
9-173. Weather conditions may facilitate the use of an air defense ambush.
For example, low cloud bases may force enemy aircraft down into the enve-
lope of a particular weapon. Ambushing units may work in concert with
smoke- or aerosol-dispensing units or ground-based jammers that jam a low-
flying aircraft’s terrain-following radar, forcing it up into the ambush
weapon’s optimum engagement envelope. The OPFOR may create a deception
position using decoys or derelict weapons and vehicles, to draw the attention
of enemy aircrews and cause them to enter the ambush zone of an air defense
ambushing unit positioned nearby.
9-174. The unit or weapon assigned to an air defense ambush usually occu-
pies a temporary firing position in hours of darkness or under the cover of
poor visibility conditions. It may assume a hide position near the firing position
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and establish local ground security and air observers. The unit or weapon is
carefully camouflaged and keeps all its emitters off or in “dummy load” until
ordered to engage a target. While in this mode, it can receive automated sur-
veillance and target tracking data from its parent air defense unit or be
alerted by air observers posted nearby. All this can allow the ambushing unit
to delay using its own radars and other emitters until the last possible mo-
ment, in order to achieve surprise.
9-175. Occasionally, AA guns may choose not to employ their radars, using
strictly electro-optical sights. This tactic takes into account the capability of
modern aircraft, including attack helicopters, to detect radar and IR systems.
9-176. More than one air defense ambush, involving more than one weapon
type may be established along the same air avenue of approach. These may
work independently or in concert depending on the situation. Target en-
gagement decisions may be left up to the ambushing unit commander.
Execution and Redeployment
9-177. When an air target is detected, the ambushing weapon or unit prepares to
engage. This may involve removal of some camouflage or a short movement from
its hide position to its firing position. It then fires on the target until the target
is destroyed or moves out of the firing zone. Then the ambushing unit or weapon
immediately displaces to a new ambush site or returns to its parent unit.
ROVING UNITS
9-178. Employment of roving units is similar to that of air defense ambushes.
The primary difference is that, while an ambushing unit lies in wait in one
position for approaching enemy aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most
likely areas of enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated
positions in the supported unit’s AOR. The commander of the roving unit
identifies these positions during his terrain reconnaissance and coordinates
them with the air defense and maneuver unit commanders. The roving unit
occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of
the air defense unit commander. Roving units terminate their missions and
return to previously designated primary firing positions upon direction of the
commander of the parent air defense unit.
AIR DEFENSE AGAINST UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
9-179. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing importance of UAVs on the battle-
field, to both its own forces and those of the enemy. They can perform high- and
low-altitude missions, collect the full spectrum of intelligence, and immediately
downlink the data to a ground station. They have the capability to loiter or to fly
deep. They can collect against a predetermined target or look for targets of opportu-
nity. Their construction can make them difficult or easy to detect. Since UAVs can
support targeting for enemy long-range fires, their priority for destruction increases.
9-180. Typically the enemy conducts reconnaissance missions using UAVs
operating in the “window” between low-flying helicopters and higher-altitude
fixed-wing aircraft. This altitude window is between 300 and 4,000 m. The most
common technique is to approach the target area at high altitude and, once at
the target area, drop down to a lower altitude that optimizes the capabilities
9-31
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of the sensor package on board. Once the mission in the target area is com-
plete, the UAV climbs to higher altitude and departs the mission area.
TARGETED SUBSYSTEMS
9-181. Countering UAVs should not be viewed as just a defense against the aerial
vehicle, although that is important. Most UAV systems consist of three basic
subsystems: the air vehicle, the ground station, and the launcher. (In some
cases, the latter two may be one vehicle.) There are also a variety of communica-
tion data links between the ground station and the air vehicle. Some systems
also include satellite links. The air defense commander must coordinate with
other arms to ensure that UAVs are being attacked not just in the air, but that
their related subsystems are also addressed. The successful destruction of a UAV
ground station has a far greater impact than the destruction of a single air vehicle.
9-182. Thus, air defense against UAVs requires not only an IADS but also an
integrated all-arms approach. Air defense commanders and planners should
view the three UAV subsystems as three separate targets that can be coun-
tered through a variety of means. These means are both active and passive.
ACTIVE MEASURES
9-183. A wide variety and large number of active measures are available to
the OPFOR to counter UAVs. The effectiveness of air defense radars can vary
dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) and altitude of the vehicle. Of
course, this does not preclude the use of radar, since these factors are consid-
erations in detecting any aircraft. The relatively small size of many UAVs
obviously reduces their RCS.
9-184. A variety of sound-ranging systems are available that can provide
early warning and azimuth of an approaching UAV. This in turn provides air
defense weapons and maneuver unit weapons an opportunity to prepare for the
vehicle’s approach and to put up a large volume of fire, provided the UAV can
subsequently be visually detected. The early warning provided by sound ranging
increases the probability that visual observers will be able to spot the vehicle.
9-185. The location of UAV ground stations and launchers is typically a high
priority for reconnaissance. The OPFOR will use all available means (from
the civilian population to commercially available satellite imagery) to locate
these key targets. Reconnaissance assets for locating these targets can be
tied to artillery, MRLs, or aircraft that can quickly engage the targets once
the information is received. SPF operating in the enemy rear can also be a
valuable asset in locating launchers and ground stations. They can either
take direct action to destroy the targets or relay location information to allow
the OPFOR to employ other means against them.
9-186. The OPFOR can also use jamming techniques to counter UAV system
data links. In some cases, data links cannot be jammed but they can be
monitored. The effectiveness of these procedures varies according to the UAV
system being attacked. High-power spot or barrage noise jammers can be
effectively used to mask ground targets from side-looking airborne radars.
Many satellite up- and downlinks employed are through the use of the
commercial telecommunication infrastructure. This infrastructure and
supporting satellites can be jammed or monitored to some degree.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
PASSIVE MEASURES
9-187. Since the mission the UAV is executing may not be apparent, actions
should be taken to counter all possibilities. The integrated use of the passive
air defense measures described earlier in this chapter can reduce the ef-
fectiveness of UAVs. The use of a variety of decoys provides a false picture of
the mission area to the enemy and, to a large extent, can deny information or
distort the information collected by the UAV.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
9-188. The OPFOR accepts that, while it has a full range of capabilities to
deal with its neighbors, air defense against a technologically superior force is
problematic. It believes that comprehensive planning and the creative use of
all capabilities, including some normally not associated with air defense, can
serve to mitigate many disadvantages.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
9-189. Within the context of regional operations, the OPFOR views its air de-
fense system as fully capable of protecting ground forces and infrastructure
from air attack by any of its neighbors. To accomplish this, it believes that its
aircraft will be capable of conducting successful counterair operations, thus
denying any major encroachment into its territory or significant attacks by
fixed-wing aircraft against its military forces operating in enemy territory.
The ability to use ground-based systems to defeat any “leakers” and rotary-
wing attacks serves to reinforce this belief. This confidence does not preclude
the OPFOR from using a wide variety of other options, to include TBMs or SPF.
9-190. While desiring to attack its regional opponent with overwhelming
force, the OPFOR plans for the possibility of extraregional intervention. In
doing so, it may choose to husband certain assets that may not be essential to
accomplishing its air defense objectives against its neighbor.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
9-191. The first OPFOR combat actions against extraregional forces may be
against the enemy air threat. Past operations have shown that one of a major
power’s first steps in support of intervention is the deployment of aircraft to
third countries within range of the battlespace. Deployment could also in-
clude movement of aircraft to the territory of the regional neighbor with
which the State is already at war. Attacking sites within these countries, espe-
cially third countries or the extraregional enemy’s homeland, is a decision made
at the highest political levels. Once the State leadership has assessed this as a
viable option, however, the OPFOR will use every means available to preclude
deployment or, more realistically, limit access and delay deployment timelines.
9-192. Taking early action against the air threat is essential to forces
transitioning to adaptive operations. It provides time for ground forces to
reposition. It also allows the use of OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft against
targets they can range. Waiting too long to employ fixed-wing aircraft could
result in an effective loss of the capability.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
9-193. OPFOR air defense actions during transition and adaptive operations
are based on the premise that it is essential to attack aircraft while they are
on the ground. While defensive in nature, OPFOR air defense has an impor-
tant offensive component to it. Therefore, it must use every means available
to attack enemy air capability. TBMs provide the OPFOR with the means to
continue to attack after the effective loss or degradation of its fixed-wing ca-
pability. The key to the use of TBMs is that they are systems that have been
held in reserve during regional operations and positioned in hides. These
hides are dispersed and not tied to any operational pattern of the ground forces.
Armed with a mix of high-explosive and persistent chemical warheads, they can
destroy aircraft and make airfields unusable for extended periods of time.
9-194. Augmenting early OPFOR air employment and the continuous use of
TBMs is the employment of SPF, insurgents, and terrorist groups. These
forces can be a means of providing depth to the battlefield. SPF pre-
positioned in anticipation of intervention can operate in third countries or
within the theater. Typical SPF missions include air defense ambushes of
aircraft along routes of ingress or egress from airfields. Shoulder-fired SAMs
equipped with night-vision devices serve as the weapon of choice for these
ambushes. In some cases, the ambushing forces could be instructed to fire only
at certain types of aircraft. These may include Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), reconnaissance aircraft, and fuel tankers. SPF can also con-
duct raids to destroy maintenance facilities and fuel storage sites. Insurgent
forces, advised by SPF, can conduct similar missions. They can ambush
cargo trucks en route to airfields or aviation facilities. SPF or insurgents
can intimidate local contractors and force them to contaminate fuel supplies or
sabotage air traffic control facilities. Where plausible deniability is important,
terrorists may be more suitable for conducting some of these operations.
9-195. Air defense by ground-based systems still plays a key role in both
transition and adaptive operations. The OPFOR recognizes that strategically
and operationally it cannot maintain a fully integrated air defense system
over all areas all of the time. However, it does believe that, through niche
technologies and creative means, it can achieve integration in some sectors
while taking a degree of risk in others. Longer-range systems, normally posi-
tioned deep, can be moved forward to cause enemy aircraft to operate from
greater standoff distances. By investing in key technologies, the OPFOR has
some capability to provide early warning and target information to firing
units from remote locations. This protects the firing units from detection and
significantly lowers their radar transmission times. There is heavier reliance
on the use of passive systems. Air defense ambushes along likely routes of
ingress serve as effective means of augmenting ground force protection. In
key areas, these ambushes would be positioned forward and in depth.
9-196. The use of other arms is an effective means of augmenting air defense
capability. An in-depth analysis of the battlespace is conducted to identify
likely helicopter firing positions. These can be sowed with antihelicopter mines
and remote sensors. The sensors serve to key artillery fires to attack these sites
and render them unusable or prevent effective fires by attack helicopters.
9-34
Chapter 10
Engineer Support
The OPFOR believes success in battle requires extensive engineer support
at every level. Engineer plans at the operational level support the various
strategic-level courses of action involved in the State’s strategic campaign.
Engineers facilitate the mobility and high rate of movement of combined
arms forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the
OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the
tactical level, it also maximizes activities conducted at the operational
level to disaggregate, disrupt, delay, block, or canalize enemy forces. See
FM 7-100.2 for more information on tactical-level engineer actions.
ASSETS
10-1. Military engineers fall into two basic categories: combat engineers and
special-category engineers. Combat engineers are those whose tasks may
bring them in direct contact with the enemy. Special-category engineers (such
as bridge- and road-building units) do not normally engage the enemy and
generally use utility vehicles as their primary transportation rather than
engineer vehicles designed to survive close combat. Together, these two
categories of engineers are responsible for the more difficult and complex
engineering tasks. Their missions require specialized training and the use of
special equipment or munitions. Often the distinction of engineer categories is
blurred somewhat depending on task organizations and their mission-driven
employment.
10-2. At the operational level, the OPFOR plans the complete integration of
civilian and military engineer resources. For example, maneuver command-
ers may use civilian earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment
and personnel, especially in support zones. This allows constituent combat
engineer equipment and personnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle.
Civilian workers or maneuver units can perform many basic combat engineer
tasks, with engineers providing guidance and technical expertise.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
10-3. Engineer units allocated to an operational-strategic command (OSC) in
constituent or dedicated relationships may be directly under the command of
the OSC commander. The OSC commander or his subordinate commanders
can controlbut do not commandother engineer assets that are allocated to
them in a supporting relationship. Rather than keeping all allocated engineer
assets under his direct command and control (C2), the OSC commander may
suballocate some engineer units to his subordinate maneuver units or to his
integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC).
10-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
10-4. Various staff elements under the operations officer advise him on
engineer matters and allow him to advise the commander on the employment
of engineer assets. The chief of force protection and the chief of infrastructure
management receive liaison teams from each constituent, dedicated, or
supporting engineer unit. These teams provide the staff with detailed
expertise on engineer functions and provide a direct communications conduit
to the engineer units executing such functions. Based on the advice of the
liaison teams and coordination with the engineer units through the re-
spective liaison teams, these functional staff chiefs advise the commander on
engineer employment within their functional areas. Other liaison teams may
fall under the chief of current operations, to advise and assist in mobility and
countermobility functions. The engineer liaison teams also coordinate, as
necessary, with other staff elements, including the chief of information
warfare (IW). Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their
respective units.
TASK ORGANIZATION
10-5. At each level of command, the commander or his operations officer de-
cides on the task organization of subordinate engineer units. Operational
employment of engineer units does not follow strict organizational lines. The
OPFOR does not always employ engineer units as complete entities.
10-6. Engineer tasks are integral to all OPFOR organizations. Although
engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than brigade or brigade
tactical group (BTG) level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission
success at even lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate
that, instead of maintaining large engineer units, the commander may choose
to break them down and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much
smaller) multirole engineer support groupings. These engineer groupings
range in size from brigades down to multirole platoons and engineer squads.
An example of this flexible task organization would be the allocation more
minelaying assets on an exposed flank or a high-speed avenue of approach for
enemy armored vehicles. Another would be that an OSC that is task-
organized for operations in a desert environment would not receive water ob-
stacle-crossing units, but might add more mineclearing units.
10-7. There are no real doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission
success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is
restrained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission.
At the operational level, however, the primary responsibility of the engineers
is to support and ensure the mobility and survivability of operational
units while retaining a significant countermobility capability to impede
(or canalize) the enemy’s progress. The primary engineer reconnaissance
function at the operational level is route reconnaissance.
10-8. With advice from engineer experts on his functional staff, the operations
officer on the OSC staff uses the OSC’s engineer resources to form task-
oriented groupings according to the commander’s decision for the operation
and his instructions on engineer support. He forms groupings to
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Conduct engineer support (reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility,
and survivability) at any level.
• Augment maneuver units.
• Augment other operational-level units.
• Support IW.
10-9. The most frequent operational employment of constituent or dedicated en-
gineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road- and bridge-construction units generally
involves the formation of one or more functional groupings. Some of these are—
• Obstacle detachments (ODs) to create minefields and other obstacles.
• Movement support detachments (MSDs) to perform route reconnais-
sance, route preparation, mineclearing, and route marking.
• Obstacle-clearing detachments.
• Engineer reconnaissance patrols.
An OSC may form several of each, and each may be based on an engineer
unit as large as a battalion. The OSC may also create an engineer reserve.
MISSIONS
10-10. The primary engineer missions performed in combat are in the catego-
ries of reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The
OPFOR recognizes several basic combat tasks engineers perform in support
of combined arms operations. Some of these tasks are to
• Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
• Prepare fortifications.
• Prepare and maintain movement routes.
• Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
• Equip and maintain gap crossings.
• Establish engineer obstacles.
• Support IW.
• Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
• Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.
For more detail, see the sections later in this chapter dedicated to Engineer
Reconnaissance, Survivability, Countermobility, and Support to Information
Warfare. For more detail on mobility support, see FM 7-100.2.
SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-11. In the offense, the engineers’ primary mission is to support the
operation plan. Emphasis is on
• Clearing and maintaining routes for maneuver units.
• Clearing or removing mines and other obstacles.
• Crossing gaps.
• Creating obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against
counterattacks.
10-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Preparation
10-12. To prepare for offensive operations, engineer tasks include
• Performing engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy.
• Preparing assembly areas and movement routes for maneuver forces,
including reserves.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and command
posts (CPs).
• Establishing and improving road networks to support maneuver forces.
• Preparing alternative airfields and highway strips to support air assets.
• Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW.
Conduct
10-13. During the conduct of offensive operations, engineer support in-
cludes
• Providing tailored engineer support where it is needed, when it is needed.
• Continuing reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Maintaining airfields and roads.
• Improving road networks and other movement routes to support com-
mitment of reserves or follow-on forces.
• Providing support for the crossing of water obstacles and other gaps.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and CPs, as they
relocate.
• Helping to repel enemy counterattack.
• Supplying engineer equipment, materials, and technical assistance to
maneuver units and other OPFOR units.
• Facilitate maneuver despite enemy and natural obstacles and possibly
NBC-contaminated areas.
SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-14. OSC engineer forces are heavily engaged in the preparation and con-
duct of an operational defense. Comprehensive engineer preparation in the
entire area of responsibility (AOR) is an important precondition for holding
battle positions, as well as for troop maneuver.
10-15. Engineer support for defensive operations places emphasis on fortify-
ing battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, and adapting the terrain
for defense. The defense is also conducive to the extensive use of various ob-
stacles to interfere with the enemy’s advance.
10-16. The general aims of engineer support to defensive operations include
• Controlling access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canaliz-
ing enemy forces.
• Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
• Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional
direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC attacks.
10-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Building fortifications, battle positions, and assembly areas.
• Preparing and maintaining maneuver and supply routes.
• Creating or improving existing obstacles.
• Preparing decoys and deception positions.
• Ensuring the integration of engineer support to IW.
10-17. The type and scale of engineer support depends on the operational
situation, enemy forces, and the conditions under which an OPFOR transitions
to the defense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support
may have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and antitank
reserves (ATRs) and the route work needed for regrouping.
Preparation
10-18. Engineer support for preparing an AOR for defensive operations
consists of the following:
• Conducting engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Preparing fortifications for protecting weapons, personnel, and equip-
ment.
• Preparing routes for counterattack forces.
• Constructing obstacles (coordinated with the fire support plan and
natural obstacles).
• Preparing C3D measures in support of IW.
• Maintaining the water supply.
Conduct
10-19. During defensive operations, engineer support consists of improving
on and expanding the scope of all the above measures and undertaking new
tasks as situations develop. Such tasks include clearing obstacles, crossing
gaps, and eliminating the effects of NBC and precision weapons.
SUPPORT TO INFORMATION WARFARE
10-20. The OPFOR has responded at all organizational levels to the chal-
lenge posed by enemy advances in sensors and weapons. A wide variety of
engineer activities contribute to IW, particularly in support of C3D measures.
This support involves three interrelated areas:
• Deception (signature-enhancing measures).
• Camouflage and concealment (signature-reduction measures).
• Obscurants (measures used both to conceal real equipment and en-
hance the effectiveness of decoy equipment).
10-21. OPFOR combat engineer units are a high priority for deception efforts,
since their composition and disposition on the battlefield are indicators of
how and where the OPFOR expects to conduct its main offensive or defensive
effort. Therefore, the OPFOR establishes deception positions and engineer
obstacles, supported by decoy vehicles.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Offense
10-22. During the offense, engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Construction of decoys and deception positions.
• Preparation of false routes to provide misleading indicators.
Defense
10-23. The OPFOR uses various deception measures to mislead the enemy
about size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of
defensive engineer preparations. Engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Use of screening characteristics of terrain, darkness, and other con-
ditions of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive
positions and positioning of forces.
• False actions to draw attention from actual defensive preparations.
• Construction of artificial screens and concealment (such as horizontal
and vertical screens, or corner reflectors).
10-24. Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive
deception plan. Units in the main defense force receive the priority of effort.
However, engineers typically do not begin work supporting deception until they
have completed all measures required for camouflage, concealment, and cover.
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
10-25. The specific missions of engineer reconnaissance are to—
• Discover enemy engineer measures taken to fortify battle positions and
to lay and clear minefields and demolitions.
• Determine movement routes (by the conditions of roads, bridges, and
fording sites).
• Determine the characteristics of obstacles and locate bypass routes.
• Determine water availability (or add more robust capability).
• Observe enemy engineer activity.1
• Determine requirements for special engineer equipment, allocation of
engineer assets, and the subsequent task organizations of subordinate
and supporting engineer units.
• Report the locations of any enemy units encountered.
• Advise the commander and staff on locations the enemy is likely to
occupy, based on the presence of favorable conditions, such as accessi-
bility, concealment, and water supply.
1 The composition and disposition of enemy combat engineer units are important indicators of how and where the
enemy expects to conduct his main offensive or defensive effort. Positioning of bridging and mineclearing assets
may tip off planned enemy offensive action. When the enemy is preparing to defend, all obstacle-creating assets,
such as minelayers, are of particular interest.
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ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
10-26. A primary goal of engineer reconnaissance at the operational level is
to provide comprehensive information on the suitability of movement routes.
Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnais-
sance forces, plays a significant role in ensuring freedom of movement and
access to various areas of the battlefield. Units performing engineer recon-
naissance make the following determinations:
• The degree of trafficability of the entire route.
• The location and nature of obstacles and forces or assets needed to
overcome them.
• The condition of crossing sites over rivers, canals, streams, and ravines.
• The location and quantity of material potentially useful for improving
the movement route.
• The nature of the terrain and location of areas without natural
concealment.
10-27. The purpose of route reconnaissance is to select suitable routes along
the axis of movement and to identify suitable halt areas that provide con-
cealment. Engineer reconnaissance can also identify possible infiltration
routes. The reconnaissance patrol relays topographical and terrain informa-
tion back to the unit that sent it out. Route reconnaissance can occur
throughout the AOR, in offense or defense.
OFFENSE
10-28. During the offense, the primary engineer reconnaissance mission is to
obtain more precise information on
• Battle damage created both during offensive preparation and during
the execution of the offense.
• Troop movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain.
• Locations where the enemy established obstacles.
• Locations for establishing obstacles during enemy counterattacks.
• Water obstacles on friendly forces’ axes of advance.
10-29. Engineer reconnaissance during the offense seeks to obtain informa-
tion on the nature of enemy fortifications, defensive positions, and obstacles.
The basic methods for obtaining this information are observation and aerial
or ground photography.
DEFENSE
10-30. Engineers assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by
determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and by
helping select positions for CPs and unit battle positions. Engineers also de-
termine road and bridge conditions in the AOR, availability of local materials
for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply.
10-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
SURVIVABILITY
10-31. Preparing fortified positions is a task for engineers in both the offense
and defense. Fortified positions increase weapons effectiveness and protect
personnel, weapons, and materiel. Engineers give priority to digging in CPs
and key components of the OPFOR’s combat power. Fortification preparation
combines and uses to best advantage the terrain’s protective properties, local
construction materials, and engineer excavation equipment. The C3D meas-
ures discussed above, under Support to Information Warfare, also contribute
to survivability.
OFFENSE
10-32. In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortifi-
cation is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of
preparation typically exceed the capability of engineers in the limited time
available. Consequently, the preparation of assembly areas becomes a
shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment of
all branches.
10-33. Normally, the OPFOR locates assembly areas far enough from enemy
forces to deny the enemy ground observation and to lessen direct-fire effects.
It uses field fortification in a way that allows a smooth and protected move-
ment of troops and supplies in and out of the assembly areas.
DEFENSE
10-34. When the OPFOR is transitioning to the defense and preparing com-
plex battle positions or sanctuary areas, advance engineer deployment allows
better use of terrain features and constructed fortifications. Engineers also
have more time to construct or improve routes for movement of troops and
supplies and to conceal forces and caches or short-duration storage facilities.
In most cases, engineer units must concentrate their effort on only the most
important parts of the AOR.
10-35. The full preparation of defensive positions involving entrenchments,
communications trenches, positions for tanks and infantry vehicles, and pro-
tected CPs is a labor-intensive process. It often exceeds the capability of pure
engineer units. Consequently, the OPFOR’s approach is to use all available
personnel and equipment. Units of all arms and services receive training in
preparing field fortifications and emplacements.
COUNTERMOBILITY
10-36. Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are
significant engineer functions in all phases of combat. The obstacle plan is
tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan. Engineer obstacles in-
clude any actions taken to inflict losses and to delay and impede enemy
movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks, disrupt counterattacks,
and strengthen captured positions. In the defense, engineer obstacles may
strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations, and cover gaps.
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EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES
10-37. The widespread use of landmines on today’s battlefields results from a
combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved battlefield delivery
systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Remotely-delivered mines
have expanded capability for changing the tempo of combat.
Minefields
10-38. The five basic types of OPFOR minefields are antitank (AT), anti-
personnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the
primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable
armored and other vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consist-
ing of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for armored vehicles.
Wherever possible, minefield belts will be tied into natural terrain obstacles
to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP mine-
fields in support of friendly battle positions, in front of AT minefields, or
along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP
and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception used to
slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields
prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.
Minelaying
10-39. The methods and extent of minelaying depend on
• The OPFOR’s intentions.
• The operational and/or tactical situation.
• Terrain characteristics.
• The type of mine.
• Time available.
• Available engineer support.
10-40. Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual
emplacement is the most labor-intensive and time-consuming method and
may not always be possible in a fluid battlespace. The OPFOR not only will
use mechanical minelayers, but also will continue to develop methods of
remote minelaying, including delivery by minelaying helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, or cannon and rocket artillery. Rapidly laid and scatterable AT mines in
support of maneuver operations will predominate on most battlefields. The
same types of minefield may also support a situational defense. If the OPFOR
plans only a temporary halt or defensive action, it can mechanically surface-
lay small protective minefields. It may also use remotely-laid minefields
(probably with self-destruct options) and controlled minefields.
Remotely-Delivered Mines
10-41. The ability to remotely deliver mines provides the OPFOR with the
capability to respond rapidly with thousands of landmines at any point on the
battlefield. The OPFOR can employ remotely-delivered minefields against
choke points to delay and cause bunching that could create vulnerability to
air or artillery attack. Remotely-delivered minefields fill gaps created by enemy
10-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
minefield breaching efforts and can cause confusion and delay in assembly
areas. They can halt enemy attacks in areas not covered by an OD (or gain
time for an OD to do its work). Maneuver forces use remote mining to protect
their flanks or to attack targets deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the
AOR. Remote minelaying can be useful against enemy columns, areas of con-
centration, CPs, firing positions, and other targets. Such unpredictable mine-
fields increasingly dominate OPFOR countermobility operations.
10-42. Remotely-delivered (or scatterable) mines are laid without regard to
classical patterns. They are designed to be delivered by aircraft, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), or ground vehicles, or they can
be hand-thrown or emplaced by man-portable mine dispensers.
10-43. Artillery. Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering
both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote
minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to
quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing expo-
sure to enemy targeting and weapon systems.
10-44. Ground Vehicles. Within recent years, the trend has been to mount
scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can
be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to
re-seed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.
10-45. Infantry. OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote
mine dispensers. These man-portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds,
are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired
ground dispensers allow units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their
battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines
and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing
protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of
approach.
10-46. Aerial. Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelay-
ing systems. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered
minefields throughout the AOR.
10-47. Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small or large
minefields in the execution of offensive or defensive operations. This type of
aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territoryalong flanks
or in support zones. When supporting an airborne or heliborne landing, heli-
copters may lay mines on enemy-held territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a
tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a va-
riety of helicopters by low-echelon maintenance units.
OBSTACLE DETACHMENT
10-48. The OD is the basic building block of the OPFOR’s countermobility
effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can
vary in size depending on the operational situation and the needs of the
commander. An OSC may form several ODs based on its constituent or
dedicated engineer units. An OD formed at this level is typically based on an
engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC generally tries to create one
OD for each ATR formed from its AT assets.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
10-49. ODs formed by an OSC may be assigned in a supporting relationship
to the OSC’s subordinate maneuver units, or they can act independently at
the OSC level (for example, to protect an exposed flank). They are a standard
feature of tactical and operational task organizations. With their ability to
rapidly lay mines and construct obstacles, their mission is to deny the enemy
access to key terrain, particularly those avenues of approach most suitable
for armored vehicles.
10-50. Although the OD can operate independently, it usually operates with
an ATR to provide flank protection and to repel enemy counterattacks. ATRs
may provide covering fire over the minefields that the ODs emplace. The OD
sometimes operates with mechanical minelaying platoons.
Offense
10-51. In the offense, the OD usually moves with the ATR either on an open
flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any threatened axis. In the
latter case, it usually advances with maneuver units to ensure a prompt re-
sponse to any threat.
10-52. The OPFOR considers surprise a critical factor in mine warfare.
Enemy reconnaissance can discover minefields laid too long in advance and
can take measures to overcome them. Therefore, it is often more effective to
lay a minefield during the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute,
directly in the path of a developing threat. Using mines in this way is not
only tactically advantageous, but also economical. This may be an important
consideration when supplies are limited.
10-53. The OPFOR uses ODs aggressively, maintaining close contact with
the enemy and attempting to mine areas in which the enemy has already
committed himself. An OD may join an ATR to ward off enemy counterattack
threats.
Defense
10-54. In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other
forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to
mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense imple-
ment obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs
provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.
10-55. Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR
battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps
between battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier
systems in coordination with the overall fire support plan.
10-56. Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption
zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay
obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent
defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle
construction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equip-
ment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and
other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.
10-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE COUNTERMOBILITY
10-57. Engineer countermobility missions are not strictly an engineer function.
Rather, they are part of an overall, all-arms effort to deny the enemy freedom
of maneuver. For example, many remotely-delivered mines are emplaced by
means other than engineer assets. The OPFOR will also employ all means
available to attack the enemy’s mobility assets at every opportunity. The
elimination or degradation of key mobility assets (such as bridging and mine-
clearing assets) can severely limit the enemy’s progress, range, or sustain-
ability. This is part of the OPFOR’s systems warfare approach to combat.
10-58. Preemptive attacks against the enemy’s bridging and mineclearing
systems can occur at very early stages in the conflict, often well before the
foreseen usage of such mobility assets. The OPFOR might try to destroy all
mobility assets, thereby confining the enemy to his aerial or sea port of
debarkation (APOD or SPOD), or it might let the enemy commit his assets
and then destroy them piecemeal. Whichever method the OPFOR chooses, it
would attempt to mask the identity of the true target by also hitting what the
enemy may deem “higher-value targets,” such as maneuver troops and equip-
ment, during the same attack. Thus, the enemy may believe the destruction of
his mobility assets to be collateral damage rather than the intended target, and
he may not place a high priority on replacing these as critical items.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
10-59. Operational-level engineers support the State’s various strategic-level
courses of action and the OPFOR principles of operations versus an
extraregional power (discussed in Chapter 1 and in FM 7-100). Specific
engineer requirements are determined by the operational mission of the sup-
ported OSC within whichever strategic-level course of action is occurring in a given
AOR at a given time. That may be regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
Because of the requirement to transition rapidly from regional to adaptive
operations and perhaps back to regional operations, engineers assigned to
OSCs may be supporting more than one course of action simultaneously.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
10-60. Operational-level engineer units involved in regional operations facilitate
the mobility and high rate of advance of joint, combined arms, interagency,
and/or multinational forces while enhancing the survivability of forces.
Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities
at the tactical level, it tailors the obstacle plan to the overall operation and
integrates it into the operation plan. It uses obstacles to disaggregate, delay,
block, and canalize enemy forces.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
10-61. Since transition operations can overlap both regional and adaptive
operations, engineer actions can be various combinations of those occurring
during regional or adaptive operations. The need for rapid transition from
regional to adaptive operations (and vice versa) presents the engineers
several challenges. For example, engineers still supporting regional
operations may be involved in water-crossing activities, while engineers
10-12
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
supporting units transitioning to adaptive operations may be blowing up
bridges to preserve friendly forces. Engineers supporting joint, combined
arms, interagency, and/or multinational units transitioning to regional
operations may be laying minefields to fix an extraregional foe while other
engineers are providing mobility and survivability support to units launching
offensive operations against a regional foe. Therefore, some engineers in
transition operations may be involved in those tasks normally associated
with regional operations while other engineers units may be involved in tasks
normally associated with adaptive operations.
10-62. Several engineer missions become more critical during transition
operations when shifting to adaptive operations. For example, IW takes on a
more significant role with use of C3D measures to protect forces while they
are attempting to get into sanctuary and begin adaptive operations. Engineer
reconnaissance must locate clear, and preferably concealed, routes to expedite
units’ movement to sanctuary and limit their exposure to extraregional forces.
10-63. The State may have done some advance preparation of defensive
positions in peacetime or during regional operations. However, the OPFOR
takes advantage of any time required for the extraregional enemy to build up
combat power, using that time for additional engineer preparation involving
all means available. Engineer units or other forces supervised by engineers
provide fortified positions or repair or reinforce those positions already in
place. Caches and water sources, if not in place, will have to be prepared.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
10-64. During adaptive operations, several trends in engineer employment
may be at odds with one another. On the one hand, the dispersal of forces
may require task organization of engineer units into smaller groupings. With
dispersal and decentralization, however, the task organization of operational-
level engineer assets to support tactical-level missions becomes increasingly
difficult. As the OPFOR goes into a force-preservation mode, commanders
may tend to create larger engineer reserves and put into protected storage
some scarce engineer assets that will be critical to success in later operations.
Examples of such high-value assets could be bridging, route-clearing equip-
ment, mechanical minelayers, and other heavy engineer equipment. The
process begins during transition operations but has the largest impact during
adaptive operations. This equipment will be protected and might only be used
for high-priority missions or in areas shielded from the enemy. The shortage
of key equipment is further intensified by any combat losses.
10-65. Since requirements for engineer support do not change during the
absence of heavy equipment, the OPFOR has planned the complete integra-
tion of civilian and military engineer resources to help compensate for this
loss. The lack of engineer units and assets available to the lower levels is
compensated for by the sharing of engineer tasks and responsibilities
throughout the OPFOR branches and maximizing the use of manual labor
(military and civilian) and assets other than those of engineer units. Since
maneuver units or civilian workers may have to perform the majority of engineer
tasks, engineers are also responsible for supervising and providing guidance and
technical expertise to these groups. This allows the tasks to be performed with
the least amount of engineers and mitigates the loss of units and equipment.
10-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
10-66. The basic engineer missions during adaptive operations remain
reconnaissance, countermobility, survivability, and mobility, along with the
task of support to IW. These all occur at all levels of command all over the
battlefield, and priorities of engineer effort vary according to the specific
situation, which can be unpredictable. Examples of how these missions and
tasks support adaptive operations are listed below.
Reconnaissance
10-67. The focus of engineer reconnaissance during adaptive operations
will be on areas that support the creation of windows of opportunity or the
exploitation of opportunities that result from existing conditions in the AOR.
Engineers can help determine the most likely routes the enemy might take,
as well as identify routes for OPFOR units undertaking counterattacks or the
maneuver component of a strike.
Countermobility
10-68. The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to con-
trol access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy
forces. The obstacle plan is completely integrated with the maneuver, fire
support, and IW plans. Minefields and other obstacles used in support of
adaptive operations are extremely innovative, irregular-shaped, and thoroughly
merged with the terrain. Minefields also tend to be much smaller than those laid
in regional operations (especially linear operations). Many are nuisance mine-
fields, rather than being designed to destroy large numbers of enemy forces.
Survivability
10-69. The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive
process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported
units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues dur-
ing adaptive operations. Survivability activities during adaptive operations
have several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to—
• Take full advantage of the screening, protective, C3D techniques, along
with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the ability
to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
• Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work force.
• Protect CPs and logistics sites.
• Bury communications lines.
• Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of
communication.
• Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
• Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live
and from which they can fight.
Mobility
10-70. It is critical that the OPFOR maintain the ability to move unimpeded
during adaptive operations. This ability allows the OPFOR to control the ac-
cess and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete access to
10-14
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and determine the na-
ture of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for infiltration
of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to support IW.
10-71. Rarely during adaptive operations would the OPFOR attempt the
classic opposed water crossings it can use during regional operations.
However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in terri-
tory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would attempt an opposed crossing
only if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the OPFOR
would attempt the crossing. Such crossings would be integrated into the
overall operation plan and the IW plan.
10-72. More likely, however, is that the OPFOR would attempt to cross the
river surreptitiously at night or during inclement weather. This would allow
the OPFOR to infiltrate units—a few vehicles at a timeacross the river.
The units would regroup at a designated area and continue operations. Engi-
neer support for this may be only engineer reconnaissance of the river and
routes. The situation may also call for the engineers to build (undetected) an
underwater bridge out of sandbags, or to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.
10-73. The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields. Although it
may breach them in the more conventional manner described in FM 7-100.2,
the OPFOR can also devise innovative methods the cross the minefield. One such
method might be to manually clear a path through the minefield surreptitiously.
Several paths could be cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFOR’s
own choosing, dismounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and
rendezvous at a designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.
Support to Information Warfare
10-74. The complete integration of engineer support to IW continues to be
critical in adaptive operations. Deception is one of the basic elements of IW.
Engineer support of the deception plan is vital for the deception to succeed.
Engineers’ largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing
physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to
see what he expects to see. These decoys cover a wide spectrum of types and
must be introduced or allowed to be “discovered” in the same sequence in
which a “real or existing” unit would emplace them. The general priority of
engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary
fighting positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time
sequence in which these “appear” gives credibility to the deception.
10-75. However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For
example, engineers may support psychological warfare with activities to
lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy soldiers or to
undermine confidence of “enemy-friendly” populations. This can be achieved
simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines.
10-15
Chapter 11
NBC and Smoke Operations
The use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons can have an
enormous impact on all battlefield operations.1 Not only does the sheer
killing and destructive power of these weapons affect the battlefield, but
the strategic, operational, psychological, environmental, economic, and
political consequences of their use affect strategic campaign plans and
operational design.
In response to foreign developments, the OPFOR maintains a capability
to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological warfare. However, it
would prefer to avoid the use of NBC weapons by either sideespecially
nuclear and biological weapons. Both nuclear and biological weapons
characteristically have lethal effects over much larger areas than do
chemical weapons. The effects of biological weapons can be difficult to
localize and to employ in operations without affecting friendly forces;
their effects on the enemy can be difficult to predict. Unlike nuclear or
biological weapons, chemical agents can be used to affect limited areas of
the battlefield. The consequences of chemical weapons use are more pre-
dictable and thus more readily integrated into operation plans.
Because chemical employment is more likely than nuclear or biological,
this chapter begins by focusing on OPFOR chemical capabilities. Because
the OPFOR may also have some nuclear and biological capabilities, these
also deserve discussion, despite of the lower probability of their em-
ployment. The chapter concludes with discussions of NBC protection and
employment of smoke.
PREPAREDNESS
11-1. Due to the proliferation of NBC weapons, the OPFOR must anticipate
their use, particularly the employment of chemical weapons. OPFOR plan-
ners believe that the best solution is to locate and destroy enemy NBC weap-
ons and their supporting infrastructure before the enemy can use them
against OPFOR troops or the State. In case this fails and it is necessary to
1 NBC weapons are a subset of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although the latter exclude the delivery means
where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. WMD are weapons or devices intended for or
capable of causing a high order of physical destruction or mass casualties (death or serious bodily injury to a
significant number of people). The casualty-producing elements of WMD can continue inflicting casualties on the
enemy and exert powerful psychological effects on the enemy’s morale for some time after delivery. Existing types
of WMD include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. However, technological advances are making it possi-
ble to develop WMD based on qualitatively new principles, such as infrasonic (acoustic), radiological (enhanced-
radiation), or particle-beam weapons. In addition, conventional weapons, such as precision weapons or fuel-
air explosives, can also take on the properties of WMD.
11-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
continue combat operations despite the presence of contaminants, the
OPFOR has developed and fielded a wide range of NBC detection and
warning devices, individual and collective protection equipment, and decon-
tamination equipment.
MULTIPLE OPTIONS
11-2. Force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility previously
unavailable to combined arms commanders. It creates multiple options for
the employment of forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with or
without the use of NBC weapons. Many of the same delivery means available
for NBC weapons can also be used to deliver precision weapons that can often
achieve desired effects without the stigma associated with NBC weapons.
11-3. The OPFOR might use NBC weapons either to deter aggression or as a
response to an enemy attack on the State. It has surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Most
OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most sys-
tems 152-mm and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally,
the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an NBC
attack. The State has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as alternate
means of delivering NBC munitions packages. The threat of using any or all
of these means to deliver NBC weapons is an intimidating factor that the
State can use against potential regional and/or extraregional adversaries.
TARGETING
11-4. The OPFOR considers the following targets to be suitable for the em-
ployment of NBC weapons:
• NBC delivery means and their supply structure.
• Precision weapons.
• Prepared defensive positions.
• Reserves and troop concentrations.
• Command and control (C2); reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RISTA); and communications centers.
• Key air defense sites.
• Logistics installations, especially port facilities.
• Airfields the OPFOR does not intend to use immediately.
Enemy NBC delivery means (aircraft, artillery, missiles, and rockets) nor-
mally receive the highest priority. The suitability of other targets depends on
the OPFOR’s missions, the current military and political situation, and the
NBC weapons available for use.2
2 The same list of targets would apply for enemy use of NBC weapons against the OPFOR.
11-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
11-5. On the functional staff of an operational-level headquarters (such as an
OSC), the chief of WMD is responsible for planning the offensive use of
WMD, including NBC weapons. (See the subsections on Release under Chemical
Warfare, Nuclear Warfare, and Biological Warfare below.) The WMD staff element
advises the command group and the primary and secondary staff on issues per-
taining to NBC employment. The WMD element receives liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting units that contain WMD delivery means.
11-6. NBC defense comes under the chief of force protection. The force pro-
tection element of the functional staff may receive liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting chemical defense units.3 However, those units can
also send liaison teams to other parts of the staff, as necessary (including, for
example, the chief of reconnaissance).
CHEMICAL WARFARE
11-7. The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offen-
sive and defensive chemical warfare. It is continually striving to improve its
chemical warfare capabilities. It believes that an army using chemical weap-
ons must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates. Therefore, it views
chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capability. It
maintains a large inventory of individual and collective chemical protection and
decontamination equipment. (See the NBC Protection portion of this chapter.)
WEAPONS AND AGENTS
11-8. Chemical delivery means include aircraft, multiple rocket launchers
(MRLs), artillery, mines, rockets, and missiles. Virtually all OPFOR indirect fire
weapons can deliver chemical agents. Other possible delivery means could in-
clude SPF, affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations, or civilian sympathizers.
11-9. One way of classifying chemical agents according to the effect they
have on persons. Thus, there are two major types, each with subcategories.
Lethal agents, categorized by how they attack and kill personnel, include
nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Nonlethal agents include incapaci-
tants and irritants. (See FM 7-100.2 for more details on these agent types.)
11-10. Chemical agents are also categorized according to their persistency.
Generally, the OPFOR would use persistent agents on areas it does not plan
to enter and nonpersistent agents where it does.
11-11. Persistent agents can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics from
days to weeks, depending on environmental conditions. Aside from producing
mass casualties initially, persistent agents can produce a steady rate of attrition
and have a devastating effect on morale. They can seriously degrade the perform-
ance of personnel in protective clothing or impose delays for decontamination.
11-12. Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time than per-
sistent agents, depending on weather conditions. The use of a nonpersistent
3 Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually en-
compass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance.
11-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
agent at a critical moment in battle can produce casualties or force enemy
troops into a higher level of individual protective measures. With proper
timing and distance, the OPFOR can employ nonpersistent agents and then
have its maneuver units advance into or occupy an enemy position without
having to decontaminate the area or don protective gear.
OTHER TOXIC CHEMICALS
11-13. In addition to traditional chemical warfare agents, the OPFOR may
find creative and adaptive ways to cause chemical hazards using chemicals
commonly present in industry or in everyday households. In the right combi-
nation, or in and of themselves, the large-scale release of such chemicals can
present a health risk, whether caused by military operations, intentional use,
or accidental release.
Toxic Industrial Chemicals
11-14. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) are chemical substances with acute
toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes.
Exposure to some industrial chemicals can have a lethal or debilitating
effect on humans. The near-universal availability of large quantities of
highly toxic stored materials, their proximity to urban areas, their low
cost, and the low security associated with storage facilities, make them a
potentially attractive option for use as weapons of opportunity or weapons
of mass destruction. Employing a TIC against an opponent by means of a
weapon delivery system, whether conventional or unconventional, is consid-
ered a chemical warfare attack, with the TIC used as a chemical agent. The
target may be the enemy’s military forces or his civilian population.
11-15. In addition to the threat from intentional use as weapons, catastro-
phic accidental releases of stored industrial chemicals may result from collat-
eral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interrup-
tion, or improper facility maintenance or shutdown procedures. These events
are common in armed conflict and post-conflict urban environments.
11-16. The most important factors to consider when assessing the potential
for adverse human health impacts from a chemical release are acute toxicity,
physical properties (volatility, reactivity, flammability), and the likelihood
that large quantities will be accidentally released or available for exploitation.
Foremost among these factors is acute toxicity.
11-17. The following are examples of high- and moderate-risk TICs, based on
acute toxicity by inhalation, worldwide availability (number of producers and
number of countries where the substance is available), and physical state
(gas, liquid, or solid) at standard temperature and pressure:
• High-Risk. Ammonia, chlorine, fluorine, formaldehyde, hydrogen chlo-
ride, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, sulfuric acid.
• Moderate-Risk. Carbon monoxide, methyl bromide, nitrogen dioxide,
phosphine.
This list does not include all chemicals with high toxicity and availability.
Specifically, chemicals with low volatility are not included. Low-vapor
pressure chemicals include some of the most highly toxic chemicals widely
available, including most pesticides.
11-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
11-18. Some of the high-risk TICs are frequently present in an operational
environment. Chlorine (water treatment and cleaning materials), phosgene
(insecticides and fertilizers), and hydrogen cyanide are traditional chemical
warfare agents that are also considered TICs. Cyanide salts may be used to
contaminate food or water supplies. Hydrogen chloride is used in the produc-
tion of hydrochloric acid. Formaldehyde is a disinfectant and preservative.
Fluorine is a base element that is used to produce fluorocarbons. Fluorocar-
bons are any of various chemically inert compounds that contain both carbon
and fluorine. Fluorocarbons are present in common products are refrigerants,
lubricants, and nonstick coatings, and are used in the production of resins
and plastics.
Household Chemicals
11-19. The OPFOR understands that some everyday household chemicals
have incompatible properties that result in undesired chemical reaction when
mixed with other chemicals. This includes substances that can react to cause
an imminent threat to health and safety, such as explosion, fire, and/or the
formation of toxic materials. For example, chlorine bleach, when mixed with
ammonia, will generate the toxic gases chloramine and hydrazine that can
cause serious injury or death. Another example of such incompatibilities is
the reaction of alkali metals, such as sodium or potassium, with water.
Sodium is commonly used in the commercial manufacture of cyanide, azide,
and peroxide, and in photoelectric cells and sodium lamps. It has a very large
latent heat capacity and is used in molten form as a coolant in nuclear
breeder reactors. The mixture of sodium with water produces sodium hydrox-
ide, which can cause severe burns upon skin contact.
CHEMICAL RELEASE
11-20. Among NBC weapons, the State is most likely to use chemical weap-
ons against even an extraregional enemy, particularly if the enemy does not
have the capability to respond in kind. Since the State does not believe that
first use of chemical agents against units in the field would provoke a nuclear
response, it is less rigid than other nations in the control of chemical release.
11-21. Initially, the use of chemical weapons is subject to the same level of
decision as nuclear and biological weapons. At all levels of command, a
chemical weapons plan is part of the fire support plan. Once the National
Command Authority (NCA) has released initial authorization for the use of
chemical weapons, commanders can employ them freely, as the situation de-
mands. Then each commander at the operational-strategic command (OSC)
and lower levels who has systems capable of chemical delivery can imple-
ment the chemical portions of his fire support plan, as necessary.
11-22. After a decision for nuclear use, the OPFOR can employ chemical
weapons to complement nuclear weapons. However, the OPFOR perceives
that chemical weapons have a unique role, and their use does not depend on
initiation of nuclear warfare. It is possible that the OPFOR would use chemi-
cal weapons early in an operation or strategic campaign or from its outset.
11-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
11-23. The basic principle of chemical warfare is to achieve surprise. It is
common to mix chemical rounds with high-explosive (HE) rounds in order to
achieve chemical surprise. Chemical casualties inflicted and the necessity of
chemical protective gear degrade enemy defensive actions. The OPFOR also
may use chemical agents to restrict the use of terrain. For example, contami-
nation of key points along the enemy’s lines of communication can seriously
disrupt his resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those
points intact for subsequent use by the attacking OPFOR.
11-24. Nonpersistent agents are suitable for use against targets on axes the
OPFOR intends to exploit. While possibly used against deep targets, their
most likely role is to prepare the way for an assault by maneuver units,
especially when enemy positions are not known in detail. The OPFOR may
also use nonpersistent agents against civilian population centers in order to
create panic and a flood of refugees.
11-25. Persistent agents are suitable against targets the OPFOR cannot de-
stroy by conventional or precision weapons. This can be because a target is
too large or located with insufficient accuracy for attack by other than an area
weapon. Persistent agents can neutralize such targets without a pinpoint attack.
11-26. In the offense, likely chemical targets include—
• Troops occupying defensive positions, using nonpersistent agents delivered
by MRLs to neutralize these troops just before launching a ground attack.
Ideally, these nonpersistent agents would be dissipating just as the at-
tacking OPFOR units enter the area where the chemical attack occurred.
• NBC delivery systems, troop concentration areas, headquarters, and
artillery positions, using all types of chemical agents delivered by tube
artillery, MRLs, missiles, and aircraft.
• Bypassed pockets of resistance (especially that pose a threat to the
attacking forces), using persistent agents.
• Possible assembly areas for enemy counterattack forces, using persis-
tent agents.
11-27. The OPFOR could use chemical attacks against such targets simulta-
neously throughout the enemy defenses. These chemical attacks combine
with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability,
C2 systems, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks may target logistics
facilities. The OPFOR would use persistent agents deep within the enemy’s
rear and along troop flanks to protect advancing units.
DEFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
11-28. When the enemy is preparing to attack, the OPFOR can use chemical
attacks to disrupt activity in his assembly areas, limit his ability to maneuver
into axes favorable to the attack, or deny routes of advance for his reserves.
Once the enemy attack begins, the use of chemical agents can impede an attack-
ing force, destroying the momentum of the attack by causing casualties or caus-
ing attacking troops to adopt protective measures. Persistent chemical agents
can deny the enemy certain terrain and canalize attacking forces into kill zones.
11-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
NUCLEAR WARFARE
11-29. The OPFOR believes a war is most likely to begin with a phase of non-
nuclear combat that may include the use of chemical weapons. The OPFOR
emphasizes the destruction of as much as possible of enemy nuclear
capability during this nonnuclear phase. To do so, it would use air and missile
attacks; airborne, heliborne, and special-purpose forces; and rapid, deep
penetrations by ground forces. The OPFOR hopes these attacks can deny the
enemy a credible nuclear option.
DELIVERY MEANS
11-30. Nuclear delivery systems may include aircraft from both national- and
theater-level aviation, and SSMs. Most artillery 152-mm or larger is capable
of firing nuclear rounds, if such rounds are available. Other possible delivery
means could include SPF. The OPFOR is unlikely to use affiliated forces for
nuclear delivery.
TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR
11-31. Even when nuclear weapons are not used at the outset of a conflict,
OPFOR commanders deploy troops based on the assumption that a nuclear-
capable enemy might attack with nuclear weapons at any moment. The OPFOR
continuously updates its own plans for nuclear employment, although it pre-
fers to avoid nuclear warfare. As long as it achieves its objectives, and there
are no indications that the enemy is going to use nuclear weapons, the
OPFOR would likely not use them either. However, it could attempt to pre-
empt enemy nuclear use by conducting an initial nuclear attack. Otherwise,
any OPFOR decision to go nuclear would have to be made early in the con-
flict, so that sufficient nonnuclear power would remain to follow up and to
exploit the gains of nuclear employment.
11-32. If any opponent were to use nuclear weapons against the State, the
State would respond in kind, as long as it is still capable. The same would
be true of any nuclear-capable opponent, if the State were the first to use
nuclear means. While the State recognizes the advantage of its own first use,
it may risk first use only when the payoff appears to outweigh the potential
costs. Therefore, it would probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against
an extraregional power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at
stake.
11-33. The OPFOR is probably more likely to use its nuclear capability
against a regional opponent. The likelihood increases if that opponent uses or
threatens to use its own nuclear weapons against the State or does not have
the means to retaliate in kind. This could account for a nuclear or nuclear-
threatened environment existing at the time an outside force might choose to
intervene in the region.
11-7
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