FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Opposing Force Operations (DECEMBER 2004) - page 6

 

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FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Opposing Force Operations (DECEMBER 2004) - page 6

 

 

FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Method
4-114. Area defense inflicts losses on the enemy, retains ground, and protects
friendly forces. It does so by occupying battle positions in complex terrain and
dominating the surrounding battlespace with reconnaissance fire
(see
Chapter 7). These fires attack designated elements of the enemy’s combat
system to destroy components and subsystems that create an advantage for the
enemy. The operational design of an area defense is to begin disaggregating
the enemy’s combat system in the disruption zone. When enemy forces enter
the battle zone, they should be incapable of synchronizing combat operations.
4-115. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct
spoiling attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. In the
course of an area defense, the operational-level commander uses terrain that
exposes the enemy to continuing attack.
4-116. An area defense trades time for the opportunity to attack enemy forces
when and where they are vulnerable. The OPFOR might use an area defense
when
It is conducting access-control operations.
Enemy forces enjoy a significant RISTA and precision standoff advantage.
Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire and/or maneuver.
4-117. A skillfully conducted area defense can allow a significantly weaker force
to defeat a stronger enemy force. However, the area defense relies to a significant
degree on the availability of complex terrain and decentralized logistics. Units
conducting an area defense typically place small ambushing and raiding
forces in complex terrain throughout the AOR to force the enemy into
continuous operations and steadily drain his combat power and resolve.
4-118. Within an overall operational area defense, the OPFOR might use
maneuver defense on some portions of the AOR, especially on those where it
can afford to lose ground. This occurs most often during transition operations
as forces initially occupy the complex terrain positions necessary for the
execution of the area defense.
Disruption Force
4-119. In an area defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace surrounding
its battle zone(s) where the OPFOR may cause continuing harm to the enemy
without significantly exposing itself. For example, counterreconnaissance ac-
tivity may draw the attention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the
kill zone of a sophisticated ambush using long-range precision fires. RISTA
assets and counterreconnaissance forces occupy the disruption zone, along
with affiliated forces. Paramilitary forces may assist other disruption force
units by providing force protection, controlling the civilian population, and
executing deception operations as directed.
4-120. The disruption zone of an area defense is designed to be an area of un-
interrupted battle. OPFOR RISTA maintains contact with enemy forces, and
other parts of the disruption force attack them incessantly with ambush and
precision fires.
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4-121. The disruption force has many missions. The most important mission
at the operational level is the destruction of appropriate elements of the en-
emy’s combat system, to begin disaggregating it. The following list provides
examples of other tasks that the disruption force may perform:
Detect the enemy’s main groupings.
Force the enemy to reveal his intentions.
Deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of battle
positions.
Delay the enemy, allowing time for preparation of defenses and
counterattacks.
Force the enemy into premature deployment.
Attack lucrative targets (key systems, vulnerable troops).
Canalize the enemy into situations unfavorable to him.
The disruption force mission also includes maintaining contact with the
enemy and setting the conditions for successful reconnaissance fire and
strikes.
4-122. In an area defense, the disruption force often occupies and operates
out of battle positions in the disruption zone and seeks to inflict maximum
harm on selected enemy units and destroy enemy systems operating through-
out the AOR. An area defense disruption force permits the enemy no safe
haven and continues to inflict damage at all hours and in all weather
conditions.
4-123. Disruption force units break contact after conducting ambushes and
return to battle positions for refit and resupply. Long-range fires, ODs, and
ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist units in breaking contact
and withdrawing.
4-124. Even within the overall context of an operational area defense, the
disruption force might employ a maneuver defense. In this case, the distance
between positions in the disruption zone is such that the enemy is forced to
displace the majority of his supporting weapons to continue the attack on the
subsequent positions. This aids the force in breaking contact and permits
time to occupy subsequent positions.
4-125. The disruption zone often includes a significant obstacle effort.
Engineer effort in the disruption zone also provides mobility support to
disruption force units requiring maneuver to conduct their attacks or
ambushes.
4-126. Within the overall structure of the area defense, disruption force units
seek to conduct highly damaging local attacks. They deploy on likely enemy
avenues of approach. They choose the best terrain to inflict maximum dam-
age on the attacking enemy and use obstacles and barriers extensively. They
defend aggressively by fire and maneuver. When enemy pressure grows too
strong, these forces can conduct a maneuver defense, withdrawing from one
position to another in order to avoid envelopment or decisive engagement.
4-27
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
4-127. Since a part of the disruption force mission to attack the enemy’s
combat system, the following are typical targets for attack:
C2 systems.
RISTA assets.
Precision fire systems.
Aviation assets in the air and on the groundat attack helicopter
forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and airfields.
Logistics support areas.
LOCs.
Mobility and countermobility assets.
Casualty evacuation routes and means.
4-128. In some cases, the disruption force can have a single mission of detect-
ing and destroying a particular set of enemy capabilities. This does not mean
that no other targets will be engaged; it means that, given a choice between
targets, the disruption force will engage the targets that are the most damag-
ing to the enemy combat system.
Main Defense Force
4-129. The units of the main defense force conducting an area defense occupy
battle positions in complex terrain within the battle zone. That terrain is re-
inforced by engineer effort and C3D measures. These complex battle positions
are designed to prevent enemy forces from being able to employ precision
standoff attack means and force the enemy to choose costly methods in order
to affect forces in those positions. They are also arranged in such a manner as
to deny the enemy the ability to operate in covered and concealed areas himself.
4-130. The main defense force in an area defense conducts attacks and
employs reconnaissance fire against enemy forces in the disruption zone.
Disruption forces may also use the complex battle positions occupied by the
main defense force as refit and rearm points.
Reserves
4-131. An operational-level command in the area defense can employ a num-
ber of reserve forces of varying strengths. In addition to its other functions,
the maneuver reserve in an area defense may have the mission of winning
time for the preparation of positions. This reserve is a unit strong enough to
respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at the operational
level. It is normally strong enough to defeat the enemy’s exploitation force.
The commander positions his reserve in an assembly area within one or more
of the battle positions, based on the commander’s concept of the operation.
(See the Reserves section above for discussion of other types of reserves.)
4-28
Chapter 5
Information Warfare
Modern information technologies (ITs) have created conditions for the con-
frontation of states, combatants, and non-state actors in a fundamentally
new arenathe information sphere. Information, information processing,
and communications networks are at the core of every military activity.
The concepts of time, space, force, navigation, speed, precision, and lethality
have changed because of the capabilities of information-age technology
and the availability of information. These changes have a tremendous
effect on how military forces conduct activities. The OPFOR addresses this
issue through continued refinement of its information warfare (IW) doctrine.
The OPFOR defines information warfare as the specifically planned and
integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical
points and times. The ultimate goal of IW is to influence decision makers.
The OPFOR conducts IW at all levels of warfarestrategic, operational,
and tacticalbut without regard to strict definitional boundaries among
these levels. Opponents of the State are subject to IW regardless of the
level and degree of engagement in other types of operations. The State’s
leadership integrates all instruments of powerdiplomatic-political,
economic, military, and informationalto implement an information
strategy. One element of power may have primacy over the others at a
given time, but all work together.
In the OPFOR’s view, skillful application of IW can facilitate the defeat of
a technologically superior enemy. It can challenge or counter an enemy’s
goal of information dominance. The OPFOR can target key components
(such as technology providing situational awareness, and advanced com-
puting and communications technologies) that provide such dominance,
thus shaking the opponent’s confidence.
NEW CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE
5-1. The State envisions an operational environment (OE) in which the bat-
tlespace stretches from the depths of an opponent’s territory to the center of
the State’s political, economic, and military organizations. This OE is con-
ducive to the practice of IW. Combat cannot be confined to a single battle-
space, but instead will often expand globally to encompass attacks on an
adversary’s information and space systems or his entire information envi-
ronment.
5-2. Information is a powerful strategic, operational, and tactical multiplier.
It enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and
protection at decisive points. The OPFOR can use information as a component
of combat power to shape the OE and create the conditions for employing the
5-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
other components of its combat power. Information has become a vital strate-
gic and operational resource. The OPFOR clearly understands the power of
information and the revolution in IT and is actively developing doctrine and
tactics to supplement more traditional types of warfighting. The OPFOR can
use IW activities to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity for itself.
5-3. The importance of information, and its flow and control, to the conduct of
military operations is not a new concept. The OPFOR has for years employed an
integrated approach to attacking, disrupting, or manipulating information inside
the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Objectives have included not only the sys-
tems and information its enemies collect, process, and analyze, but also the leaders
and the decisions they make. What is new, however, is the speed and volume of
information available; networking, routing, and switching technologies; and the
global connectivity of information systems and infrastructures. This information
explosion, coupled with an integrated IW doctrine, provides the OPFOR a
greater opportunity to inflict damage, trigger chaos, weaken national will, or
permanently cripple an opponent. In effect, IW challenges traditional approaches
to warfare. The following are ways in which IW redefines operations.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
5-4. Most of today’s information environment is outside of military control,
making it harder to regulate, dominate, or protect. While neither the State
nor its opponents can control the global information environment or global
information infrastructure (GII), they must prepare to operate within it. The
GII is defined as the worldwide interconnection of communications networks,
computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. Within the GII, various countries have their
own national information infrastructures (NIIs) and defense information
infrastructures (DIIs).
5-5. The NII is the physical and virtual backbone of a nation. It is composed
of multiple critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures are those in-
formation and communication assets, systems, and functions so vital to a
nation that their disruption or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on national security, economy, governance, public health and safety, and morale.
5-6. The DII is defined as the shared or interconnected system of computers,
communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other sup-
port structures serving an actor’s defense needs. The DII connects computers
used for mission support, command and control (C2), and intelligence through
voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services.
5-7. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs introduces multiple actors into
the information environment. This increases vulnerabilities and dependen-
cies, and creates many legal issues.
BLURRED BOUNDARIES
5-8. The OPFOR understands that there is no clear-cut line of demarcation
between the military, economic, and diplomatic-political aspects of an opera-
tion or strategic campaign and that the informational element cuts across the
other three. Therefore, it uses all types of IW across all these dimensions.
5-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-9. In an information-based world, the boundaries between nations, individu-
als, and private-sector organizations can be undefined and nebulous. The tradi-
tional distinction between enemy and friendly forces becomes harder to observe,
define, and ultimately defend against. The OPFOR is keenly aware of this devel-
opment and can use it to its advantage when conducting IW actions. For exam-
ple, the OPFOR could employ third-party individuals or organizations (either
domestic or international) to conduct IW activities, making traceability difficult.
5-10. There may also be an inherent difficulty in isolating a specific OPFOR
IW activity. For example, the distinction between OPFOR-sponsored IW at-
tacks and other types of activities and events (such as espionage, accidents,
system failures, disgruntled employee actions, and hacker pranks) are hard
to distinguish. This period of confusion, and time spent trying to identify the
attacker, can benefit and be manipulated by the OPFOR.
5-11. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs compresses and blurs the dis-
tinction among tactics, operations, and strategy. For example, images of
tactical military actions, disseminated by the media, are likely to influence
strategic decision makers or the populace.
EXPANDED ROLE FOR PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
5-12. Thus, perception management is a critical piece of IW. The OPFOR
constantly attempts to “spin” any conflict or situation to its advantage. IW
planning and implementation emphasizes increased use of psychological
warfare (PSYWAR) and deception designed to manipulate public opinion,
coupled with attacks against an opponent’s centers of gravity.
5-13. New information-based techniques and tools can dramatically increase
the ability to conduct perception management and supporting deception op-
erations. Modern technologies allow the OPFOR to target a global audience
for support and sympathy. The OPFOR stresses the importance of perception
management from the strategic to the tactical level. (See the Perception
Management section of this chapter for further detail.)
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
5-14. Rapid advances in technology have produced an incredibly complex
global information environment. Information and communications technolo-
gies have grown exponentially in recent years. Satellite and cellular commu-
nications, direct-broadcast television (expanding the awareness of events, is-
sues, and military activities), personal computers, global positioning system
(GPS) technologies, wireless communication capabilities, and the Internet are
a few examples of the capabilities widely available to nations, as well as in-
dependent organizations and individuals. Given such advances, the capabili-
ties of both the OPFOR and its potential adversaries are increasing in both
sophistication and lethality. The OPFOR tries to exploit such technologies to
gain the operational advantage.
INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY
5-15. The State is committed to creating an IT research and development
base. However, until such a capability is developed, the State actively seeks
5-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
international sources (overt and covert) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
products to satisfy its civilian and military requirements.
5-16. The OPFOR focuses its investment strategy on the following areas:
Computers (including increasingly complex distributed information
systems).
Telecommunications (traditional and wireless communications).
Electronics (to included microelectronics).
Computer integrated manufacturing.
Nanotechnology.
Robotics.
Biotechnology.
Space-based communications.
Sophisticated sensing capabilities.
VULNERABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
5-17. The OPFOR can manipulate an enemy’s unresolved problems of inter-
operability and dependence on COTS systems to its advantage. COTS mate-
rials are usually not hardened against electronic spikes, remote collection ca-
pabilities, or extreme weather conditions. The OPFOR understands that se-
curity cannot be constructed or guaranteed when depending on COTS. For
example, if hackers (working independently or for a government or criminal
organization) disrupted Internet communications or links while a military
operation was in progress, information exchange between combat units could
be severely disrupted.
NEUTRALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
5-18. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing dependence of modern extrare-
gional forces on information systems and their desire to obtain information
superiority. However, the OPFOR also understands that information superi-
ority does not equate to perfect information, nor does it eliminate the “fog of
war.” Information systems, processors, and links add their own source of fric-
tion and vulnerability to the operational environment. Systems and sensors
can be tricked, destroyed, or overwhelmed with data, thus causing an enemy
to question the value and validity of his gathered intelligence. The OPFOR
seeks to exploit this uncertainty and friction at all times.
5-19. The OPFOR recognizes that it cannot stand toe-to-toe with most ex-
traregional enemies in a conventional war, and therefore seeks to target en-
emy weaknesses. IW will be the tool of choice to counter a technologically su-
perior opponent and to challenge his relative information dominance. In addi-
tion, IW actions designed to break the will of a conventionally more powerful
adversary will be common.
NEW TARGETS
5-20. Societies rely increasingly on a high-performance, networked informa-
tion infrastructure for everything from air travel to electric-power generation
and telecommunications to financial transactions. This means that a new set
5-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
of lucrative strategic and operational targets is now open to attack. The
OPFOR will focus all elements of its power, as well as the State’s, on the de-
struction of the adversary’s critical information infrastructures.
EASY OF OPERATION AND LOW COST
5-21. In contrast to other forms of warfare, IW actions might occur without
access to large financial resources or backing or without state sponsorship.
Information weapons could be software logic bombs or computer worms and
viruses. IW could be conducted with such easily accessible means such as cel-
lular telephones and the Internet.
ELEMENTS OF IW
5-22. OPFOR IW occurs through the combinations of seven elements:
Electronic warfare (EW).
Computer warfare.
Deception.
Physical destruction.
Protection and security measures.
Perception management.
Information attack (IA).
The seven elements of IW do not exist in isolation from one another and are
not mutually exclusive. Often they are mutually supporting. The overlapping
of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all be inte-
grated into a single, integrated IW plan. However, effective execution of IW
does not necessary involve the use of all elements concurrently. Although one
element might be all that is required to successfully execute a tactical IW ac-
tion, that would seldom be the case at the operational level. Likewise, using
one element or subelement, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily
constitute an operational application of IW.
5-23. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by
the operational situation and support to the overall strategic objective. The
size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which
the OPFOR employs the various elements of IW. The commander has the
freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his operational needs, within
the bounds of guidance from higher headquarters.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
5-24. EW consists of measures conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use
of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the State and the
OPFOR. EW capabilities allow the OPFOR to exploit, deceive, degrade,
disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, and C2 nodes. Spectrum
supremacy and delay, denial, or distortions of information in the adversary’s
information infrastructure are the objectives. At a minimum, the goal of
OPFOR EW is to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical
locations and times in the battlespace or to attack the enemy.
5-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-25. To accomplish these EW goals and objectives, the OPFOR employs both
lethal and nonlethal measures. Lethal EW activities include the physical de-
struction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making
processsuch as reconnaissance sensors, command posts, and communica-
tions systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppres-
sion measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate
high-technology C2 assets and associated links. Nonlethal means range from
signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner
reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. Sophisticated
camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of
enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems. Also, the OPFOR can employ low-cost GPS jammers to
disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and
navigation.
5-26. EW activities especially focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 systems de-
veloped to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational
awareness. The enemy relies on the availability of friendly and enemy force
composition and locations, digital mapping displays, and automated targeting
data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the OPFOR can disrupt
the enemy’s ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The
OPFOR enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy’s abil-
ity to mass fires with dispersed forces, while increasing enemy crew and staff
workloads and disrupting his fratricide-prevention measures.
5-27. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of OPFOR IW
elements. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures,
deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense,
artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for IW
purposes.
COMPUTER WARFARE
5-28. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the
computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of ac-
tivities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems
for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (vi-
ruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses) and deceptive information entry
into enemy computer systems. Such attacks concentrate on the denial, dis-
ruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. The OPFOR may
attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-
party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. It can also
continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications
links such as the Internet.
5-29. OPFOR computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or
during a military action. For example, by accessing databases related to an
enemy’s projected force deployments and troop movements, the OPFOR can
effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial
confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time”
logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can
produce delays in the arrival of critical materiel such as ammunition, fuel,
and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.
5-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-30. The OPFOR can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities
from the safety of its own territory, given the distributed ability to reach targeted
computers anywhere in the world (as long as they are connected to the Internet).
The OPFOR can continuously exploit the highly integrated information
systems of an adversary.
DECEPTION
5-31. OPFOR deception activities include measures designed to mislead ad-
versaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information. The aim
of deception is to influence opponents’ situational understanding and lead
them to act in a manner that favors the OPFOR or is prejudicial to their own
interests. Deception measures are a part of every military operation, and are
also used to achieve political and economic goals. The international media
may be a target for deceptive information at the operational level, being fed
false stories and video that portray tactical-level actions with the goal of in-
fluencing operational or even strategic decisions.
5-32. The OPFOR applies all forms of deception in support of IW. These
range from physical decoys and electronic devices to operational activities.
The OPFOR can even use its own information systems to pass misleading
or false information in support of deception activities. Such information
may cause the adversary to analyze incorrectly OPFOR capabilities and
intentions.
5-33. Because of the number and sophistication of sensors available to an ex-
traregional adversary, the OPFOR recognizes that a multispectral effort is
required to deceive him. This includes providing false or misleading thermal,
visual, and electronic signatures.
5-34. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and ex-
ploitation of enemy information systems and networks, as well as other
“conduits” for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the conduits
receive, process, analyze, and distribute information are priority intelligence
requirements for the OPFOR.
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
5-35. Physical destruction, as an element of IW, involves measures to destroy
critical components of the enemy’s information infrastructure. The OPFOR
integrates all types of conventional and precision weapon systems to conduct
the destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles. It can
also utilize other means of destruction, such explosives delivered by special-
purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or even co-opted civilians.
5-36. The OPFOR may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially ar-
tillery and aviation, with other IW activities. Physical destruction activities
are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific missions are
carefully timed and coordinated with the IW plan and the actions of the sup-
ported units.
5-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-37. Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of many IW targets, precision
weapons deliver the munitions of choice against many high-value targets.
The increased accuracy provided by such weapons allows the OPFOR to
attack specific IW-related targets rapidly and accurately. The OPFOR
continues to research and develop directed energy weapons, to include ra-
dio frequency weapons and high-power lasers.
PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES
5-38. The purpose of protection and security measures in IW is to protect
the OPFOR’s information infrastructure, maintain OPFOR capabilities for
effective C2, and deny protected information to other actors. The OPFOR con-
tinues to develop capabilities to effectively preserve OPFOR C2 at all levels of
command.
5-39. Protection and security measures conducted as part of IW include
Information collection, processing, and utilization.
Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.
Information and operations security.
Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
Force protection.
Secure use of information-collection and -processing systems.
Information and Operations Security
5-40. Information and operations security is used to protect the physical and
intellectual assets used to facilitate command and control. It must function
continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only operational intentions,
current locations and configurations, and actions but also the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures of information systems employment and operation.
5-41. The OPFOR clearly understands the importance of information security.
Commanders understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through
their own information systems and develop means to protect these systems.
In addition, the OPFOR must be capable of isolating attacks on its informa-
tion systems while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce the
vulnerability, the OPFOR emphasizes strong communications, computer, and
transmission security. It uses all State assets to support this process and sup-
ply the necessary resources and intelligence.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception
5-42. The OPFOR gives particular attention to protective measures aimed
at reducing the enemy’s ability to target and engage OPFOR systems with
precision munitions. Knowing that the enemy cannot attack what his
RISTA systems do not find, the OPFOR employs a variety of C3D tech-
niques. These range from the most simple and inexpensive methods to
hide from observation to the most modern multispectral signature-
reducing technology.
5-43. All OPFOR units can use one or more forms of technical camouflage.
The purpose of these techniques is to alter the appearance of personnel and
5-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
equipment and to blend them with the surrounding terrain. Capabilities
available include—
Natural concealment.
Camouflage paint.
Artificial camouflage (nets and screens).
Antiradar camouflage (radar-absorbing nets and paints).
Decoy equipment (mockups) and deception positions.
Light and thermal camouflage.
Smoke camouflage.
PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
5-44. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a percep-
tion of truth that furthers the OPFOR’s objectives. It integrates several
widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or
manipulated information. Enemy or foreign audiences, as well as the State’s
own public, may be targets. Perception management can include misinforma-
tion, media manipulation, and PSYWAR. Perception management is critically
important to all types of OPFOR operations.
5-45. PSYWAR is the capability and activities designed to influence selected
friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in
support of the OPFOR. PSYWAR can target either specific decision-making
systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influ-
encing key communicators and decision makers. The OPFOR attacks an en-
emy’s perceived centers of gravity. For example, prolonging an operation and
using all forms of media to show the devastation of conflict can sway public
opinion against the effort.
5-46. Statecraft (the art of conducting state affairs) and diplomacy (the art
and practice of conducting negotiations with other states) are aspects of
perception management conducted with foreign governments, and include
those countries’ populations as a target. The OPFOR skillfully employs
media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental and private
volunteer organizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. It
exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without in-
dependent and timely confirmation. Individuals such as agents of influence,
sympathizers, and antiwar protesters are also employed advantageously by the
State or OPFOR to influence the enemy’s media, politicians, and citizenry.
5-47. The State’s Ministry of Public Information controls its own population’s
access to information and perceptions of reality. Successful preparation of the
population significantly enhances public support for the OPFOR’s military actions.
INFORMATION ATTACK
5-48. An information attack (sometimes called cyber attack) focuses on the in-
tentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports a
comprehensive IW campaign. Unlike, computer warfare attacks that target the
information systems, IAs target the information itself. Attacks on the commer-
cial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber
5-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or
distortion techniques. OPFOR information attackers (cyber attackers) learn from
and expand upon these methods.
5-49. IA offers a powerful tool for the OPFOR. For example, an information
attacker may target an information system for sabotage (electronically or
physically) or manipulate and exploit information. This may involve altering
data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it was
not intended, such as spoofing the air traffic control grid.
5-50. Likely targets for an IA are information residing in the critical in-
frastructures of an opponent: telecommunications links and switches, com-
mercial infrastructures, and economic infrastructures. The OPFOR will at-
tempt to manipulate, control, or monitor data and information that are criti-
cal for the infrastructures.
TOOLS AND TARGETS
5-51. Tools for waging IW can include conventional physical and electronic
destruction means, malicious software, denial-of-service attacks, news agen-
cies, television, radio, the Internet, traditional print media, communication
networks, and diplomatic activities and well as various types of reconnaissance,
espionage, and eavesdropping technologies. The OPFOR can employ IW tools
from both civilian and military sources and assets of third-party sources.
5-52. The OPFOR sees the targets of IW as decision makers, weapons and
hardware, an opponent’s critical information infrastructure, C2 system, in-
formation and telecommunications systems, and C2 centers and nodes. An
adversary’s national communications media are also among the important
targets in an OPFOR IA. Information links, such as transmitters, communi-
cation devices, and protocols, will be targeted. These targets may be more
susceptible to precision fires and more traditional forms of attack based on
EW. However, the OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best op-
tion available to degrade or destroy an information link.
STRATEGIC IW
5-53. Strategic information warfare (SIW) is the synergistic effort of the
State to control or manipulate information events in the strategic environ-
ment, be they political, economic, military, or diplomatic in nature. Specifi-
cally, the State defines SIW as any attack (digital, physical, or cognitive)
against the information base of an adversarial nation’s critical infrastructures.
The ultimate goal of SIW is strategic disruption and damage to the overall
strength of the opponent. This disruption also focuses on the shaping of foreign
decision makers’ actions to support the State’s strategic objectives and goals.
5-54. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for determining
and articulating the State’s strategic goals. The Strategic Integration De-
partment (SID) then develops a strategic information warfare plan (SIWP) to
support the national security strategy. The SID has a special Strategic In-
formation Warfare Planning Office (SIWPO) dedicated to reviewing and
integrating information-related plans of all State ministries, both military
and civilian. The SIWPO can directly task information- or IW-related
5-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
elements of any ministry to support the SIWP. In time of war, the SIWPO
continues to coordinate with all government ministries for further develop-
ment and modification of the SIWP. However, it works most closely with the
Ministry of Defense, specifically the General Staff, to ensure the development
of the SIWP in concert with the military IW plan.
5-55. In the General Staff, the Chief of IW handles IW functions that tran-
scend service component boundaries. He reviews and approves the IW plans
of all operational-level commands as well as any separate theater headquar-
ters that might be established. He drafts the overall military IW plan that,
upon approval by the Intelligence Officer, is forwarded to the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff for inclusion in the military strategic
campaign plan (SCP). Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the
military IW plan and the rest of the military SCP are forwarded to the SID
for incorporation into the national-level SIWP and the national SCP, respec-
tively. During peacetime and preparation for war, the Chief of IW continues
to review and refine the military IW plan.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL IW
5-56. The OPFOR conducts IW actions at the operational level to support
strategic campaigns or operational objectives. The focus at this level is on
affecting an adversary’s lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, C2, and critical
decision-making processes. The OPFOR targets information or information sys-
tems in order to affect the information-based process, be it human or automated.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
5-57. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1), the OPFOR
often focuses on attacking the C2 and/or RISTA elements that are critical compo-
nents of the enemy’s combat system. It is often more feasible to attack these
types of targets, rather than directly engaging the combat power of the enemy’s
combat or combat support forces or even his logistics forces. Operational-level IW
can be a primary means of attacking C2 and RISTA assets, either on its own or in
conjunction with other elements of the OPFOR’s own combat system.
OFFENSIVE IW
5-58. Offensive IW involves the integrated use of subordinate and supporting ca-
pabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect an adversary’s
decision makers or to influence others in order to achieve or promote specific
OPFOR objectives. Using the elements of IW offensively, the OPFOR can either
prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2, challenge his quest for infor-
mation dominance, or leverage enemy information systems to its own advantage.
Purpose of Offensive IW
5-59. Simply put, offensive IW seeks to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, deceive,
and exploit an adversary’s information systems and capabilities. Offensive IW
helps the OPFOR seize and retain the initiative by degrading the enemy’s infor-
mation systems and forcing the enemy commander to be reactive. This can result
in slowing the enemy’s tempo, disrupting his decision cycle, and impacting his
overall ability to generate combat forces and execute and sustain operations.
5-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Possible Actions
5-60. Possible OPFOR offensive IW activities and actions can include
Denying the enemy the information necessary to conduct operations
(destroy, degrade, or distort).
Influencing the information (misinformation, manipulation, or “spinning”).
Disrupting the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and
obtain or maintain information dominance.
Degrading enemy information collection or destroying his collection means.
Deceiving the decision makers by manipulating perception and causing
disorientation within the decision cycle.
Neutralizing or destroying the opponents’ information capability by
physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
DEFENSIVE IW
5-61. Defensive IW is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures,
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly informa-
tion and information systems. Defensive IW also seeks to conceal the physical lo-
cations of critical information systems. IW activities, particularly defensive
measures, play a significant role in ensuring the viability and survivability of
the OPFOR C2 process. IW defensive actions are planned at the strategic, op-
erational, and tactical levels. IW measures, combined with the mobility and
redundancy of C2 systems, can provide a high degree of survivability, even if
the enemy is successful in disrupting or destroying some elements of the process.
Purpose of Defensive IW
5-62. The objectives of OPFOR defensive IW activities and actions are
Protecting the information environment.
Detecting attack.
Restoring capabilities.
Responding to attack.
Specific objectives of defensive IW include misleading the enemy concerning
the OPFOR’s force structure, location, and intent; protecting all critical in-
formation and communication links; and ensuring maximum survivability of
friendly high-value assets and combat power.
Possible Actions
5-63. To achieve these objectives, the OPFOR conducts a variety of activities
and actions that can
Provide for uninterrupted control of friendly forces.
Ensure survivability through extensive use of signature-reducing
measures.
Conceal the identities and locations of critical elements.
Portray false force dispositions and OPFOR unit strengths.
Portray false levels of preparation, readiness, and morale.
Portray false impressions of OPFOR operational intent.
5-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
IW Element
Objectives
Targets
Electronic Warfare
Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the en-
C2 and RISTA assets and
emy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
networks.
Computer Warfare
Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s
C2 and RISTA assets and
computer networks and information flow.
networks (both civilian and
military).
Deception
Mislead enemy decision makers.
Key decision makers from
political, military, economic,
Cause confusion and delays in decision-
and diplomatic elite.
making process.
Persuade adversary’s population and inter-
General population and in-
national community to support OPFOR ob-
ternational media sources
jectives.
and Internet sites.
Physical Destruction
Destroy enemy’s information infrastructures
C2 nodes and links, RISTA
(both civilian and military).
assets, telecommunications,
and power sources.
Protection and Security
Protect critical assets.
Enemy RISTA assets.
Measures
Perception Management
Distort reality or manipulate information to
RISTA assets, media
support OPFOR goals.
sources (international and
domestic).
Information Attack
Objectives vary based on situational needs
Information residing in net-
and objectives of the attack.
works, software, data re-
positories, databases, and
any other electronic source
or conduit of communication
or information.
Figure 5-1. IW Elements, Planning Objectives, and Targets
IW PLANNING AND EXECUTION
5-64. An effective IW action demands the coordination of activities and capa-
bilities into a single, focused plan. Any or all elements of IW may be effec-
tively used in any given plan. Figure 5-1 provides examples of objectives and
targets.
5-65. OPFOR IW planning occurs at all levels of conflict and before and after
conflict. At the strategic level, the initial focus is achieving State objectives
and supporting the strategic campaign plan. Perception management, protec-
tion and security measures, and computer warfare activities are critical at
this level.
5-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-66. As tensions escalate, IW at the operational level can be employed to
disrupt the enemy’s information systems, further demonstrating national re-
solve and military capability. The chief of IW formulates the IW plan as an
integral part of all ground, air, sea, and space operations.
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
5-67. Just as there is a Chief of IW in the General Staff, there is a chief of IW
under the intelligence officer in all military staffs down to brigade level.
Within those operational- and tactical-level staffs, the intelligence officer and
chief of IW are responsible for ensuring that all IW actions undertaken at
their levels are in concert with the overall military IW plan and the SIWP.
As necessary, the Chief of IW in the General Staff can directly task each
operational- or tactical-level chief of IW to support the SIW campaign. (See
the Strategic IW section of this chapter.)
5-68. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence and information section
of the primary staff of an operational-strategic command (OSC). He ensures
that all intelligence requirements are met and coordinates all necessary
national- or theater-level assets for the IW plan. He must effectively task or-
ganize his staff resources to plan, conduct, and execute IW. Traditional staff
functions and relationships may be expanded or even redefined. (See Chapter 2
for a more detailed discussion of staff responsibilities and organization.)
5-69. The chief of IW belongs to the secondary staff, heading a subsection
under the intelligence officer. The chief of IW supervises the execution of the
OSC’s IW plan. He is responsible for
Coordinating the employment of IW assets, including those subordi-
nate to the OSC or affiliated forces and any supporting assets available
at the national or theater level.
Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
Supervising the implementation of the deception plan and perception
management objectives.
Working with the operations section of the staff to ensure that targets
scheduled for destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving
conflicts between IW needs and operational needs.
Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
5-70. The chief of IW at each level of command submits his IW plan to the
chief of IW at the next-higher level. The senior chief of IW issues directives to
subordinate units’ chiefs of IW. These directives are part of the operation
plan or operational directive, and can be part of the SCP. What the subordi-
nates plan and execute must be in concert with the higher plan, and the
higher headquarters also needs to ensure that the IW plan of one subordinate
does not conflict with that of its adjacent units.
5-71. The chief of IW also plays a key role in coordinating IW activities with
other staff sections and subsections, particularly with members of the func-
tional staff. For instance, he coordinates with the chief of integrated fires to
5-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
ensure that deception and protection and security measures contribute to the
success of fire support to offensive and defensive operations. He will also
work directly with the chief of the RISTA and IW section of the OSC’s IFC
headquarters to coordinate all necessary IW support to the IFC. IW activities
can support the overall fire support plan or provide a feasible nonlethal
alternative to destroying key enemy formations or systems. The chief of
IW also coordinates with the chief of force protection to prevent or mitigate
the effects of hostile actions on critical information and information systems.
He works closely with the chief of population management and representa-
tives from the Ministry of Public Information regarding coordination of
PSYWAR and other perception management activities.
PLANNING
5-72. The components of an IW plan include, at a minimum, the following:
Statement of overall State and military objectives and goals.
Definition of the missions of IW (public, private, military, and nonmilitary).
IW objectives of the next-higher command.
Use of affiliated forces.
Use of civilians (individuals or organizations) on the battlefield.
Identification of all applicable State elements of power to assist in the
execution of the IW plan.
Potential targets and tools for destruction, degradation, or exploitation.
Specific unit responsibilities.
Specific plan elements include a review of the enemy’s IW capabilities, an
operational analysis of all relevant information infrastructures (location,
ownership and vulnerabilities), requirements of IW capabilities, an organ-
izational plan and staff responsibilities, a deception plan, and perception
management objectives.
EXECUTION
5-73. Throughout the implementation of the IW plan, activities and success
are monitored, and may result in a revision of the plan. The intelligence offi-
cer and the chief of IW are providing feedback to the planning process.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
5-74. The OPFOR uses IW activities during all four strategic-level courses of
action: strategic, regional, transition, and adaptive operations (see Chapter 1
or FM 7-100). While certain elements of IW may be highlighted for a particu-
lar strategic course of action, all elements can be applied as necessary. IW
can support the OPFOR against a regional peer or a technologically superior
enemy. IW can also be used to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity
across all types of operations.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
5-75. Strategic operations can occur before and after armed conflict and in
conjunction with any of the other three strategic courses of action during war.
The State recognizes the value of IW in peacetime actions as well as during
5-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
actual conflict. At this level, the State employs all the elements of IW to sup-
port its strategic objectives.
5-76. Perception management, deception, and protection and security meas-
ures are especially critical during strategic operations. The State attempts to
use all forms of international media to support State actions and objectives.
It uses all types of information dissemination to project its desired “spin” of
events, to gather international support, to weaken its enemy’s resolve, and to
force key decision makers to rethink any potentially damaging action against
the State. In addition, the State develops a strategic deception plan to conceal
its intentions from both the international audience and its own population.
Once extraregional intervention begins, the military aspects of strategic
operations become more aggressive, including use of physical destruction
accompanied by other IW efforts to exploit its effects on enemy confidence
and resolve.
5-77. Strategic operations involve the application of any or all of the four in-
struments of power (including the informational) to target enemy strategic
centers of gravity. Thus, IW targets during strategic operations might include
Key leaders and decision makers (military and civilian).
All relevant media outlets.
Diplomatic entities.
Relevant private institutions or influential organizations.
Public opinion (international and domestic).
National will (enemy and friendly).
Commitment of alliance and coalition members.
5-78. The Ministry of Public Information is responsible for the control and
appropriate dissemination of all political, diplomatic, economic, and military
information to the public and the international audience. That ministry is a
key player in the development and execution of all strategic IW campaigns.
At the operational level, the intelligence officer and chief of IW are responsi-
ble for ensuring that all IW actions are in concert with the national-level
SIWP.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
5-79. IW activities during regional operations focus on controlling foreign
perceptions of such operations and preventing the development of any inter-
national consensus to intervene. The State tries to keep foreign perceptions of
its actions below the threshold that could invite intervention by extraregional
forces. To this end, perception management and deception campaigns are
critical, for both domestic and international consumption.
5-80. During regional operations, the State also conducts an internal in-
formation campaign to help maintain and strengthen the national will.
The overall goal is to give the entire country a common focus and guarantee
internal support. All elements of IW are important in regional operations.
Depending on the specific conditions, EW, IAs, protection and security
measures, or perception management may dominate.
5-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
5-81. During transition operations, the OPFOR focuses IW activities on
access-control operations, perception management and deception campaigns,
and protection and security of its IW assets. Deception activities focus on
concealing the intentions of the OPFOR as well as the likely course of the
transitioneither into adaptive operations or back to regional operations.
5-82. Denying an adversary information dominance is critical during transi-
tion operations. The OPFOR attempts to take advantage of the enemy’s
reliance on advanced C2 and RISTA technology. Such technology and related
communications and data links are critical to the enemy’s maintaining
enhanced situational awareness and thus become the key targets of all IW
actions.
5-83. The protection and security of OPFOR IW assets and related communi-
cations is always a critical element. However, its importance increases during
transition operations, since the OPFOR’s paramount goal is to preserve all
instruments of power and prepare for a possible move to more adaptive
operations.
5-84. The State’s internal IW goal might be to convince its citizens that
transition operations are necessary in order to exploit the many gains it has
already made and to prevent the intervention of an extraregional force. The
State also conducts a ubiquitous information campaign to strengthen its
national will by portraying the State as a victim of impending antagonistic
actions, thus rallying support for State actions.
5-85. In perception management campaigns targeting the international
community, the State increases its emphasis on popularizing the State
and its actions. If it is obvious that the OPFOR will be overmatched by the
extraregional force that is about to intervene, the State may depict the
intervening force as an unwanted aggressor involving itself in regional af-
fairs in order to support its own selfish interests. This may lead to intense
international media pressure. During transition operations, the State may
implement a cleverly developed plan to fracture alliance or coalition support
to extraregional intervention.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
5-86. Against extraregional threats, the OPFOR begins to use more offensive
and adaptive forms of IW. These include not only more aggressive information
campaigns, but also IA, EW, and increased emphasis on physical destruction. As
extraregional forces continue to deploy into the region, the OPFOR can use IAs
on enemy C2 systems and to strip away the enemy’s RISTA capabilities.
5-87. The OPFOR uses perception management and other tools to attack the
enemy’s will to fight or otherwise continue its intervention, and to manipulate
international opinion. If it still occupies territory of a neighboring country, it also
tries to turn the populace there against the intervening extraregional force.
5-88. The State continues to leverage international media to influence world
perception and public opinion within the extraregional power’s own populace.
It also continues to censor and manipulate the media.
5-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-89. The specific focus of IW in adaptive operations may include
Control access. Use all means necessary, including IW, to delay or
disrupt entry into the region and ultimately defeat the intervening force.
Control tempo. Use IW to attack critical C2 and logistics links.
Exploit atrocities of conflict. Use IW to weaken the enemy’s resolve
to remain committed while promoting the OPFOR’s position as a victim.
Neutralize technological overmatch. Use IW to attack critical C2
and RISTA nodes and destroy supporting infrastructures.
Attack reach-back links. Use IW to detect, jam, disable, or degrade
critical nodes of communication.
Counter information dominance. (See the following paragraph.)
5-90. The very systems and links upon which technologically advanced ene-
mies rely for information dominance are also high-payoff targets for IAs or
physical destruction. Denial of these resources at critical times can deny
forces complete situational awareness. The OPFOR can also use the enemy’s
robust array of RISTA systems against him. His large numbers of sensors can
overwhelm his units’ ability to receive, process, and analyze raw intelligence
data and to provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis. The OPFOR
can add to this saturation problem by using deception to flood enemy sensors
with masses of conflicting information. Conflicting data from different sen-
sors at different levels (such as satellite imagery conflicting with data from
unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the enemy and degrade his situational
awareness.
5-18
Chapter 6
Reconnaissance
The OPFOR considers reconnaissance the most important element of
combat support. All commanders and staffs organize reconnaissance to
acquire information about the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets, precision weapons,
force disposition, intentions, and terrain and weather in the area of
responsibility (AOR). This information is crucial to the planning process
in OPFOR command and control (C2). Reconnaissance can decisively
influence the outcome of an operation or even the strategic campaign.
MISSION
6-1. For the OPFOR, reconnaissance is a mission, not a force or unit. OPFOR
reconnaissance is an integrated combined arms effort, not solely the business
of reconnaissance troops. Besides reconnaissance units, the OPFOR will
use other arms for reconnaissance missions, as necessary. It will also use para-
military forces, affiliated forces, and/or friendly civilians to collect information.
CONCEPT
6-2. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection are critical to OPFOR military
operations. Commanders and planners place significant emphasis on the de-
struction of enemy precision weapons and on conducting high-speed, continuous,
combined arms operations throughout the depth of the theater. Reconnaissance
and intelligence collection has three distinct levelsstrategic, operational, and
tactical. These three categories overlap, mutually support, and differ primar-
ily by the level of command and the commander’s AOR.
6-3. Commanders require continuous, timely, and accurate intelligence on the
enemy, terrain, and meteorological situation. Thus, the OPFOR devotes sub-
stantial effort to all forms of reconnaissance. Commanders prefer to confirm
their plan only after thorough reconnaissance.
PRINCIPLES
6-4. The OPFOR uses six principles to guide its reconnaissance activities:
focus; continuity; aggressiveness; timeliness; camouflage, concealment, cover
and deception (C3D); accuracy and reliability. For the greatest likelihood of a
successful operation, OPFOR reconnaissance must satisfy all of these princi-
ples simultaneously and continuously.
Focus
6-5. The actions of reconnaissance must serve the commander’s needs and
focus on elements and objectives critical to the execution of combat operations.
6-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Each level of command, from theater to battalion, develops a comprehensive
reconnaissance plan in accordance with the organization’s mission.
Reconnaissance resources are always scarce. The commander must care-
fully define and limit ground reconnaissance objectives and concentrate
reconnaissance assets on the critical areas of the battlefield.
6-6. To use reconnaissance assets effectively, the commander must be
flexible. If the situation changes, he must redirect the reconnaissance effort,
even altering the plan. The reconnaissance plan must coordinate all available
assets into an integrated plan.
Continuity
6-7. The modern, fluid battlefield demands continuous reconnaissance to pro-
vide an uninterrupted flow of information under all conditions. Reconnaissance
provides constant coverage of the enemy situation and helps prevent en-
emy operational surprise. To ensure continuity, the OPFOR employs a
wide variety of redundant assets with deep overlapping coverage ranging
from satellites to human agents to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
6-8. Reconnaissance attempts to maintain contact with the enemy at all
times. The OPFOR conducts reconnaissance in all directions and against all
key enemy formations. Reconnaissance collects information during all battle
phases, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in all weather conditions. Not only
must reconnaissance answer specific requests for information; it also must
continuously collect information on all aspects of the enemy, weather, and
terrain to fully meet future requirements.
6-9. Units conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection must main-
tain a high state of combat readiness. Reconnaissance is a critical responsibil-
ity for all commanders at all times. In the event that a specialized reconnais-
sance unit is destroyed or becomes combat ineffective, commanders reassign
the mission to appropriate forces.
Aggressiveness
6-10. Aggressiveness is the vigorous search for information, including the
willingness to fight for it if necessary. The OPFOR recognizes that reconnais-
sance is an offensive combat operation, requiring successful penetration or
avoidance of enemy security forces to be successful. Reconnaissance must
conduct intelligence collection creatively and make maximum use of assets on
the battlefield to ensure success. The OPFOR vigorously employs all avail-
able collection resources and adheres carefully to the reconnaissance plan.
However, it will alter the plan when its own initiatives or enemy actions
dictate.
6-11. The OPFOR stresses initiative, resourcefulness, and daring in the
conduct of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance attempts to penetrate enemy
defenses, ambush and raid enemy forces, and as a last resort, draw fire to
determine enemy positions. In short, it does what is necessary to fulfill the
commander’s intelligence needs.
6-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
6-12. Commanders use all available means to seek information. The informa-
tion requirement determines the techniques to use, such as clandestine infil-
tration by Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) or quick mechanized reconnaissance.
Ambushes and raids are fruitful means of gathering intelligence from prison-
ers of war, captured documents, and equipment. Such information-gathering
actions are generally more important than any associated damage, but there
are exceptions. Reconnaissance must sometimes destroy high-value targets
they find. Elements of enemy long-range fire systems, precision weapons,
multiple rocket launchers, and forward operating sites for attack helicopters
or ground-attack aviation are some high-priority targets.
Timeliness
6-13. Timely information is critical on the modern battlefield. Because of the
high mobility of modern armies, there are frequent and sharp changes in the
battlefield situation. As a result, information quickly becomes outdated.
Timely reporting enables the commander to exploit temporary enemy vulner-
abilities and windows of opportunity. He can adjust plans, using increased
data automation to fit a dynamic battlefield.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover and Deception
6-14. The OPFOR is aware that the enemy may learn a great deal about its in-
tentions by discovering its reconnaissance plan. Therefore, OPFOR commanders
try to conceal the scale, missions, targets, and nature of reconnaissance efforts.
They understand it is not possible to hide the fact that reconnaissance is
being conducted. However, they do strive to prevent the enemy from dis-
covering where they are concentrating their main strength in the defense or
where they are preparing to launch their main attack.
6-15. The OPFOR can also use C3D to “paint a picture” that confirms the en-
emy’s stereotyped views of how the OPFOR fights. By showing the enemy
what he wants to see, the reconnaissance effort can help to establish the con-
ditions for success during ensuing operations.
Accuracy and Reliability
6-16. The OPFOR uses every available means to verify the accuracy and
reliability of reported information. A commander must base his decisions on
accurate and timely reconnaissance information. Reconnaissance must reliably
clarify the true enemy situation in spite of enemy C3D and counterreconnais-
sance activities. Multiple means of acquisition help defeat enemy counterre-
connaissance. To maximize results, the commander’s plan requires accurate
information on the enemy’s size, location, equipment, and combat readiness.
Accuracy is crucial to destroying high-value targets such as enemy precision
weapons, C2, and communications.
CHARACTERISTICS
6-17. OPFOR reconnaissance operations are characterized by—
Flexibility. The OPFOR must be able to switch priorities from one
target to another without degrading the overall mission.
6-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Sustainability. Reconnaissance forces must be able to sustain them-
selves wherever they are operating, without relying on others for
transport or subsistence.
Security. A reconnaissance asset should be as secure as possible dur-
ing operations. This means operating in a manner that conceals activi-
ties and areas of interest at all times. Reconnaissance activity should
not reveal the parent unit’s plan of action.
Communications. Reconnaissance forces must have reliable communi-
cations. An intelligence organization may successfully gather all necessary
information, but if it cannot transmit this information to the user (such as
the maneuver commander or an artillery unit), the entire effort is useless.
Reserves. All levels should maintain a reconnaissance reserve to take
on unforeseen tasks or redeem failure on key missions.
PRIORITIES
6-18. Reconnaissance activities must support the information requirements
of the commander. Therefore, priorities vary at different levels of command:
strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic
6-19. The highest priority of strategic reconnaissance is to provide indications and
warning of impending hostilities, as well as targeting information for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). However, strategic intelligence can also gather informa-
tion useful to operational and even tactical commanders. In this case, the informa-
tion must pass down through reconnaissance staff channels to the potential user.
Operational
6-20. The operational commander conducts reconnaissance to locate the most
critical enemy targets, including the following:
Precision weapons.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems.
Air defenses.
Intelligence-collection assets.
Higher headquarters and communications centers.
General support artillery.
Operational maneuver formations and their movements.
Contents of airfields and army aviation forward operating bases.
Major concentration areas of reserves.
Unit boundaries.
Location and extent of defended areas.
The enemy’s combat capabilities and intentions.
Tactical
6-21. Tactical groups also address more local threats, including the following:
Location of direct support artillery and mortars and attack helicopters.
6-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
Disposition of tanks and medium- and long-range antitank systems.
Deployment of air defense weapons.
Location of brigade and battalion command posts.
Nature and extent of natural and manmade obstacles.
Locations of field defenses.
STRATEGIC ASSETS
6-22. Strategic reconnaissance acquires and analyzes information about the
military-political situation in individual countries and coalitions of probable
or actual enemy nations; their armed forces; and their military, industrial,
and economic potential. Strategic reconnaissance provides the information
required by the highest military-political leadership. Needed information
concerning a potential enemy includes the following:
Intentions and capabilities.
Preparation and disposition of forces in various theaters.
NBC capability.
Diplomatic initiatives.
Strength and weaknesses of alliances and coalitions.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-23. The General Staff normally reserves some units of the SPF Command
under its own control for reconnaissance missions supporting national-level
intelligence requirements. It may control these units either through the SPF
Command or by placing them directly under the control of its own Intelligence
Directorate. SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Internal Security Forces
could temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General
Staff when they become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level
requirements. If the General Staff creates a theater headquarters, it may dedi-
cate one or more SPF units to it. Even SPF units allocated to an operational-
strategic command (OSC) may conduct strategic missions, if required.
6-24. The SPF represent an important element in the total integrated recon-
naissance network planners try to achieve. These elite troops are a major
source of human intelligence (HUMINT). They provide reconnaissance and
combat capabilities for strategic and operational employment. They gather in-
formation to satisfy strategic and operational requirements at extended dis-
tances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical reconnaissance, in
nonlinear situations. For more information on SPF, see Chapter 13.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
6-25. Signals reconnaissance is an integral part of information warfare (IW).
The overall scope of signals reconnaissance includes the interception, analy-
sis, and exploitation of electromagnetic (radio and radar) emissions, coupled
with measures to disrupt or destroy the enemy’s radio and radar assets. Sig-
nals reconnaissance assets are found in two types of organizations. The ma-
jority are organic to signals reconnaissance units at all echelons and provide
significant support to the chief of reconnaissance. Additional assets are or-
ganic to jamming units, where they provide targeting support.
6-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
AIR ASSETS
6-26. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAV
reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance. Since most reconnaissance air-
craft must penetrate enemy airspace, many of these missions are possible for
manned aircraft only when the OPFOR has established air superiority. How-
ever, UAVs do not necessarily require air superiority. They are generally
harder to detect because they are smaller and fly at lower altitudes than manned
aircraft. Also, they are relatively low-cost and may be considered expendable.
Fixed-Wing
6-27. The Air Force has varying reconnaissance assets to meet specific needs.
These units use high-performance aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance,
including visual, photographic, radar, and signals reconnaissance missions.
Aircraft on photographic reconnaissance missions normally fly at high speed
and may fly at high or low altitudes. They fly in pairs or singly, out to about
600 km from their operating base. Aircraft with side-looking airborne radar
(SLAR) normally work at high altitude and may not need to cross the battle
line to achieve their objectives. Similarly, signals reconnaissance aircraft may
not need to cross the battle line to identify and locate enemy radar emissions.
Rotary-Wing
6-28. Helicopters are a primary means to transport and insert reconnais-
sance units behind enemy lines. They can emplace observation posts or
reconnaissance patrols rather than perform air reconnaissance, especially
when the OPFOR does not have air superiority.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
6-29.There are two types of UAV: drones and remotely-piloted vehicles
(RPVs). A drone flies a set course programmed into its onboard flight control
system prior to launch. An RPV, on the other hand, can be flown by remote
control from a ground station, over a flight path of the controller’s choosing.
Flight patterns can vary according to the mission. For surveillance missions, the
UAV typically uses a figure-eight or racetrack pattern to maintain it over the
assigned surveillance area. For reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target
acquisition, and battle damage assessment missions, a loop or zigzag pattern
allows thorough coverage over a specific target area. RPV operators can vary
these basic flight patterns by taking control of the RPV and changing its altitude,
speed, or direction of flight. This allows RPVs to search for high-priority targets
or to collect more detailed information on such targets once it locates them.
While the radio command link gives an RPV greater flexibility, it also limits the
range of the RPV to the line-of-sight transmission range from its control station.
However, many RPVs can also operate in a preprogrammed mode at longer
ranges. UAV operations are also described in greater detail in FM 7-100.2.
SATELLITES
6-30. The Intelligence Directorate controls satellite reconnaissance to support the
OPFOR. These satellites provide unique capabilities of noninvasive reconnaissance
(not violating enemy airspace), “free” access, and continuous communications or
6-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
surveillance from their orbits. The OPFOR can use three basic types of reconnais-
sance satellites: photographic, early warning, and signals reconnaissance.
Photographic
6-31. Satellite reconnaissance is not as flexible as other types of reconnais-
sance, because a satellite only reconnoiters an area when its orbit takes it
into range. As a result, the OPFOR uses specialized photographic reconnais-
sance satellites to record designated enemy activity. Satellites may photo-
graph an area 40 to 50 km wide from an altitude of 200 to 250 km.
Early Warning
6-32. Early warning satellite orbits cross over foreign countries and the
oceans. The satellites might be used to detect infrared signatures from inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches or the deployment of enemy troops.
Signals Reconnaissance
6-33. The OPFOR could use several classes of signals reconnaissance satel-
lites to gather information on the electronic order of battle. Signals recon-
naissance satellites locate C2 nodes, battlefield radars, and forward units.
Some might also monitor transoceanic shipping and air traffic. Another func-
tion could be to detect unknown electronic signatures that might indicate the
presence of new equipment.
Distance in Kilometers
10
20
40
60
100
200
400
800
1. Satellite
No Limit
2. Air
a. Photographic Reconnaissance
600
b. UAV (RPV and Drone)
300+
3. Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding Against
a. Artillery and Air Defense Radars
25
50
b. VHF/UHF (low / high power)
30
80
c. HF Ground Wave
80+
d. HF Sky Wave
No Limit
(Visual Limits)
e. Airborne Radar and Communications
4. Special Reconnaissance
a. Theater SPF Assets
100-500+
b. OSC SPF Assets
100-500
c. From Division Long-Range
100
Reconnaissance Company
5. Mechanized Reconnaissance
a. Patrols from Division
50+
Reconnaissance Battalion
b. Patrols from Brigade
50
Reconnaissance Company
6. Artillery Observation
a. Surveillance and Countermortar/
20+
Counterbattery Radars
b. Sound Ranging
25
c. Flash Spotting
(Visual Limits)
d. RPV
60
Figure 6-1. Effective Ranges of Reconnaissance Assets
6-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL ASSETS
6-34. Operational reconnaissance forces support OSC commanders. They
acquire and analyze information about an actual or probable enemy, to
prepare for the successful conduct of combat operations. Operational recon-
naissance forces usually collect information throughout the entire depth of an
enemy corps area (300 to 600 km). Operational reconnaissance collection as-
sets include signals reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, and SPF. OSCs
conduct operational reconnaissance using their own resources, plus those of
their subordinate tactical groups. Figure 6-1 illustrates the effective ranges of
various reconnaissance means that may support OSC operations.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-35. The General Staff often allocates SPF units to support the operations of
an OSC or to become part of the OSC in a constituent or dedicated command
relationship. Such units have SPF troops specially trained to insert by
parachute, helicopter, light aircraft, or infiltration to conduct reconnaissance.
Of course, commanders do not insert all of the assets at the outset to operate
simultaneously; they might retain some in the reconnaissance reserve to be
inserted against new targets or original ones left uncovered by the compro-
mise or destruction of a team inserting in the first group.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
6-36. The OPFOR typically allocates radio and radar intercept and direction
finding units to OSC level. These assets report gathered information to
higher and lower levels.
AIR ASSETS
6-37. The theater commander normally controls aerial reconnaissance but
may allocate aircraft to lower headquarters to support a particular operation
or battle. The number and composition of units, and the types of fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft can vary greatly. The OPFOR also employs UAVs to con-
duct aerial reconnaissance.
ARTILLERY ASSETS
6-38. OSCs often have constituent target acquisition units to obtain and transmit
meteorological, topographic, and targeting information. This can include sound-
ranging systems, battlefield surveillance and countermortar/counterbattery radars.
NBC ASSETS
6-39. OSCs operating in potential NBC environments typically have chemical
defense units and chemical reconnaissance units allocated to them.1 These units
perform decontamination and detect, report, and mark all contaminated areas.
ENGINEER ASSETS
6-40. Engineer units have reconnaissance specialists to accompany maneuver
unit reconnaissance forces. There are specialized engineer reconnaissance
1 Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually
encompass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance. (See Chapter 11.)
6-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
patrols that assess routes, reporting on obstacles, road conditions, and the
general nature of the terrain. These engineer assets help units maintain a
rapid rate of advance or prepare for effective defense.
AIRBORNE FORCES
6-41. Airborne forces are elite troops whose primary purpose is to conduct active
combat operations in the enemy’s rear area. Airborne forces might conduct recon-
naissance operations and relay information directly to the main command post or
headquarters as they operate against targets in the enemy’s rear. See Chapter 13.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
6-42. At OSC level, UAVs provide aerial reconnaissance support. An OSC of-
ten is assigned one or more UAV units.
GROUND FORCES TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE
6-43. Reconnaissance is a combined arms responsibility. Thus, ordinary mecha-
nized infantry and tank units perform two functions: they perform their own close
reconnaissance tasks with organic resources, and they provide reconnaissance de-
tachments of up to battalion strength. Leading units may also conduct reconnais-
sance attacks (see FM 7-100.2). OSCs and tactical groups may also form task-
oriented reconnaissance detachments based on a combat arms battalion,
augmented by engineer and chemical reconnaissance and, often, by mecha-
nized infantry and tank units. Generally, these groups try to avoid combat in
fulfilling their tasks, although they may direct artillery fire or air attacks.
Typical missions might include
Locating, identifying, and reporting enemy precision weapons and nu-
clear delivery means, headquarters, communications centers, troop
concentrations, and movements of enemy units.
Determining the strength and disposition of the enemy’s defenses and
locating his boundaries.
Providing topographical information concerning routes to, or bypasses
around, enemy positions as well as concerning lateral routes.
Identifying the extent and depth of minefields and the types of mines
employed (assessing obstacles and possible crossing points).
Establishing the extent of zones of NBC contamination.
Identifying potential communications facilities and other sites for use
by their own forces.
6-44. The chief of reconnaissance, with input from other staff elements, must
prepare a detailed reconnaissance plan, specifying—
The organization of reconnaissance activities for a specific time.
Goals and mission for each reconnaissance activity.
Completion times.
Reporting procedures.
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