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FM 6-0 COMMANDER AND STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS (MAY 2014) - page 3

 

 

Chapter 7
Military Briefings
This chapter describes the four types of military briefings presented to commanders,
staffs, or other audiences and describes the steps of these military briefings. It also
provides instructions for developing military briefings.
TYPES OF MILITARY BRIEFINGS
7-1. The Army uses four types of briefings: information, decision, mission, and staff.
INFORMATION BRIEFING
7-2. An information briefing presents facts in a form the audience can easily understand. It does not
include conclusions or recommendations, nor does it result in decisions. The main parts of an information
briefing are the introduction, main body, and conclusion. (See figure 7-1.)
1. Introduction
Greeting. Address the audience. Identify yourself and your organization.
Type and Classification of Briefing. Identify the type and classification of the briefing. For
example, “This is an information briefing. It is unclassified.”
Purpose and Scope. Describe complex subjects from general to specific.
Outline or Procedure. Briefly summarize the key points and general approach. Explain
any special procedures (such as demonstrations, displays, or tours). For example, “During my
briefing, I will discuss the six phases of our plan. I will refer to maps of our area of operations.
Then my assistant will bring out a sand table to show you the expected flow of battle.” The key
points may be placed on a chart that remains visible throughout the briefing.
2. Main Body
Arrange the main ideas in a logical sequence.
Use visual aids to emphasize main points.
Plan effective transitions from one main point to the next.
Be prepared to answer questions at any time.
3. Closing
Ask for questions.
Briefly recap main ideas and make a concluding statement.
Figure 7-1. Information briefing format example
7-3. Examples of appropriate topics for information briefings include, but are not limited to—
z
High-priority information requiring immediate attention.
z
Information such as complicated plans, systems, statistics or charts, or other items that require
detailed explanations.
z
Information requiring elaboration and explanation.
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Chapter 7
DECISION BRIEFING
7-4. A decision briefing obtains the answer to a question or a decision on a course of action. The briefer
presents recommended solutions from the analysis or study of a problem. Decision briefings vary in
formality and level of detail depending on the commander’s or decisionmaker’s knowledge of the subject.
7-5. If the decisionmaker is unfamiliar with the problem, the briefing format adheres to the decision
briefing format. (See figure 7-2.) Decision briefings include all facts and assumptions relevant to the
problem, a discussion of alternatives, analysis-based conclusions, and any coordination required.
7-6. When the decisionmaker is familiar with the subject or problem, the briefing format often resembles
that of a decision paper: problem statement, essential background information, impacts, and recommended
solution. In addition to this format, briefers must be prepared to present assumptions, facts, alternative
solutions, reasons for recommendations, and any additional coordination required.
1. Introduction
Greeting. Address the decisionmaker. Identify yourself and your organization. “This is a
decision briefing.”
Type and Classification of Briefing. Identify the type and classification of the briefing. For
example, “This is a decision briefing. It is unclassified.”
Problem Statement. State the problem.
Recommendation. State the recommendation.
2. Main Body
Facts. Provide an objective presentation of both positive and negative facts bearing upon
the problem.
Assumptions. Identify necessary assumptions made to bridge any gaps in factual data.
Solutions. Discuss the various options that can solve the problem.
Analysis. List the screening and evaluation criteria by which the briefer will evaluate how
to solve the problem. Discuss relative advantages and disadvantages for each course of
action.
Comparison. Show how the courses of action compare against each other.
Conclusion. Describe why the recommended solution is best.
3. Closing
Ask for questions.
Briefly recap main ideas and restate the recommendation.
If no decision is provided upon conclusion of the decision briefing, request a decision.
“Sir/Ma’am, what is your decision?” The briefer ensures all participants clearly understand the
decision and asks for clarification if necessary.
Figure 7-2. +Decision briefing format example
7-7. The briefer clearly states and precisely words a recommendation presented during decision briefings
to prevent ambiguity and to translate it easily into a decision statement. If the decision requires an
implementation document, briefers present that document at the time of the briefing for the decisionmaker
to sign. If the chief of staff or executive officer is absent, the briefer informs the secretary of the general
staff or designated authority of the decision upon conclusion of the briefing.
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Military Briefings
MISSION BRIEFING
7-8. Mission briefings are information briefings that occur during operations or training. Briefers may be
commanders, staffs, or special representatives.
7-9. Mission briefings serve to convey critical mission information not provided in the plan or order to
individuals or small units. Mission briefings—
z
Issue or enforce an order.
z
Provide more detailed instructions or requirements.
z
Instill a general appreciation for the mission.
z
Review key points for an operation.
z
Ensure participants know the mission objective, their contribution to the operation, problems
they may confront, and ways to overcome them.
7-10. The nature and content of the information provided determines the mission briefing format. Typically
a briefer will use the operation plan or order as a format for a mission briefing.
STAFF BRIEFING
7-11. Staff briefings inform the commander and staff of the current situation in order to coordinate and
synchronize efforts within the unit. The individual convening the staff briefing sets the briefing agenda.
Each staff element presents relevant information from its functional area. Staff briefings facilitate
information exchange, announce decisions, issue directives, or provide guidance. The staff briefing format
may include characteristics of the information briefing, decision briefing, and mission briefing. (See figure
7-1 [on page 7-1] and figure 7-2 for briefing formats.)
7-12. The commander, deputies or assistants, chiefs of staff or executive officers, coordinating personnel,
and special staff officers often attend staff briefings. Representatives from other commands may also
attend. The chief of staff or executive officer often presides over the briefing. The commander may take an
active role during the briefing and normally concludes the briefing.
STEPS OF MILITARY BRIEFINGS
7-13. Staffs normally follow four steps when preparing an effective briefing:
z
Plan—analyze the situation and prepare a briefing outline.
z
Prepare—collect information and construct the briefing.
z
Execute—deliver the briefing.
z
Assess—follow up as required.
PLAN
7-14. Upon receipt of the task to conduct a briefing, the briefer analyzes the situation and determines the—
z
Audience.
z
Purpose and type of briefing.
z
Subject.
z
Classification.
z
Physical facilities and support needed.
z
Preparation timeline and schedule.
7-15. Based on the analysis, the briefer assembles a briefing outline and timeline. The briefing outline is
the plan for the preparation, execution, and follow-up for the briefing. The timeline is a time management
tool to manage briefing preparations and budget time if there is a need to refine the briefing as new
information becomes available.
7-16. Briefers consider many factors while planning a briefing (see figure 7-3 on page 7-4). This planning
includes, but is not limited to—
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Chapter 7
z
Audience preferences for information delivery, such as how the decisionmaker prefers to see
information presented.
z
Time available.
z
Facilities and briefing aids available.
1. Audience.
What is the size and composition? Single Service or joint? Civilians? Foreign nationals?
Who are the ranking members and their official duty positions?
How well do they know the subject?
Are they generalists or specialists?
What are their interests?
What is the anticipated reaction?
2. Purpose and Type.
Information briefing (to inform)?
Decision briefing (to obtain decision)?
Mission briefing (to review important details)?
Staff briefing (to exchange information)?
3. Subject.
What is the specific subject?
What is the desired depth of coverage?
How much time is allocated?
4. Classification.
What is the security classification?
Do all attendees meet this classification?
5. Physical Facilities and Support Needed.
Where is the briefing to be presented?
What support is needed?
What are the security requirements, if needed?
What are the equipment requirements? Computer? Projector? Screen?
6. Preparation Timeline and Schedule.
Prepare preliminary outline.
Determine requirements for training aids, assistants, and recorders.
Schedule rehearsals, facilities, and critiques.
Arrange for final review by responsible authority.
Figure 7-3. Planning considerations for military briefings
7-17. The briefer then estimates deadlines for each task and schedules the preparation effort accordingly.
The briefer alerts support personnel and any assistants as soon as possible.
PREPARE
7-18. The briefing construction varies with type and purpose. (See figure 7-4.) The analysis of the briefing
determines the basis for this. Briefers follow these key steps to prepare a briefing:
z
Collect materials needed.
z
Prepare first draft.
z
Revise first draft and edit.
z
Plan use of visual aids.
z
Check audiovisual delivery systems (computer and other technical aids) to ensure availability
and functionality.
z
Practice.
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FM 6-0
5 May 2014
Military Briefings
1. Collect Materials Needed.
Use the seven-step Army problem-solving process. (See chapter 4.)
Research.
Become familiar with the subject.
Collect authoritative opinions and facts.
2. Prepare First Draft.
Prepare draft outline.
Include visual aids.
Review with appropriate authority.
3. Revise First Draft and Edit.
Verify facts, including those that are important and necessary.
Include answers to anticipated questions.
Refine materials.
4. Plan Use of Visual Aids.
Check for simplicity.
Check for readability.
5. Check Audiovisual delivery systems.
Ensure availability and functionality.
6. Practice.
Rehearse (with assistants and visual aids).
Refine.
Isolate key points.
Memorize outline.
Develop transitions.
Anticipate and prepare for possible questions.
Figure 7-4. Preparation considerations for military briefings
EXECUTE
7-19. The success of a briefing depends on a concise, objective, accurate, clearly enunciated, and forceful
delivery. The briefer must also be confident and relaxed. The briefer should consider the following:
z
The basic purpose is to present the subject as directed and ensure the audience understands it.
z
Brevity precludes a lengthy introduction or summary.
z
Conclusions and recommendations must flow logically from facts and assumptions.
7-20. Interruptions and questions may occur at any point. If they occur, briefers answer each question
before continuing, or they indicate that they will answer the question later in the briefing. When briefers
answer questions later in the briefing, they specifically reference the earlier question when they introduce
material. They anticipate possible questions and are prepared to answer them.
ASSESS
7-21. When the briefing is over, the briefer conducts a follow-up, as required. To ensure understanding, the
briefer prepares a memorandum for record. This memorandum records the subject, date, time, and location
of the briefing as well as the ranks, names, and positions of audience members. The briefer concisely
records the briefing’s content to help ensure understanding. The briefer records recommendations and their
approval, disapproval, or approval with modification as well as instructions or directed actions.
Recommendations can include who is to take action. The briefer records the decision. When a decision is
involved and any ambiguity exists about the commander’s intent, the briefer submits a draft of the
memorandum for record for correction before preparing the final document. Lastly, the briefer informs
proper authorities. The briefer distributes the final memorandum for record to staff elements and agencies
required to act on the decisions or instructions or whose plans or operations may be affected.
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Chapter 8
Running Estimates
This chapter defines running estimate and describes how the commander and staff
build and maintain their running estimates throughout the operations process. This
chapter provides a generic running estimate format that the commander and each staff
element may modify to fit their functional area. (See JP 5-0 for information on joint
estimates.)
TYPES OF RUNNING ESTIMATES
8-1. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the
current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are
supportable (ADP 5-0). The commander and each staff element maintain a running estimate. In their
running estimates, the commander and each staff element continuously consider the effects of new
information and update the following:
z
Facts.
z
Assumptions.
z
Friendly force status.
z
Enemy activities and capabilities.
z
Civil considerations.
z
Conclusions and recommendations.
8-2. Commanders maintain their running estimates to consolidate their understanding and visualization of
an operation. The commander’s running estimate summarizes the problem and integrates information and
knowledge of the staff’s and subordinate commanders’ running estimates.
8-3. Each staff element builds and maintains running estimates. The running estimate helps the staff to
track and record pertinent information and provide recommendations to commanders. Running estimates
represent the analysis and expert opinion of each staff element by functional area. Staffs maintain running
estimates throughout the operations process to assist commanders in the exercise of mission command.
8-4. Each staff element and command post functional cell maintains a running estimate focused on how
its specific areas of expertise are postured to support future operations. Because an estimate may be needed
at any time, running estimates must be developed, revised, updated, and maintained continuously while in
garrison and during operations. While in garrison, staffs must maintain a running estimate on friendly
capabilities. Running estimates can be presented verbally or in writing.
ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF RUNNING ESTIMATES
8-5. A comprehensive running estimate addresses all aspects of operations and contains both facts and
assumptions based on the staff’s experience within a specific area of expertise. Each staff element modifies
it to account for its specific functional areas. All running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions,
including a summary of the current situation by the mission variables, conclusions, and recommendations.
(See appendix A for information on the mission variables.) Once they complete the plan, commanders and
staff elements continuously update their estimates. (See figure 8-1 on page 8-2 for the base format for a
running estimate that parallels the planning process.)
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Chapter 8
1.
SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Area of Interest. Identify and describe those factors of the area of interest that affect
functional area considerations.
b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations.
(1) Terrain. State how terrain affects a functional area’s capabilities.
(2) Weather. State how weather affects a functional area’s capabilities.
(3) Enemy Forces. Describe enemy disposition, composition, strength, and systems
within a functional area. Describe enemy capabilities and possible courses of action
(COAs) and their effects on a functional area.
(4) Friendly Forces. List current functional area resources in terms of equipment,
personnel, and systems. Identify additional resources available for the functional area
located at higher, adjacent, or other units. List those capabilities from other military and
civilian partners that may be available to provide support within the functional area.
Compare requirements to current capabilities and suggest solutions for satisfying
discrepancies.
(5) Civilian Considerations. Describe civil considerations that may affect the functional
area, including possible support needed by civil authorities from the functional area as
well as possible interference from civil aspects.
c. Facts/Assumptions. List all facts and assumptions that affect the functional area.
2.
MISSION. Show the restated mission resulting from mission analysis.
3.
COURSES OF ACTION.
a. List friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
b. List enemy actions or COAs that were templated that impact the functional area.
c. List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staffs use the same criteria.
4.
ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria from COA analysis. Review
enemy actions that impact the functional area as they relate to COAs. Identify issues, risks,
and deficiencies these enemy actions may create with respect to the functional area.
5.
COMPARISON. Compare COAs. Rank order COAs for each key consideration. Use a
decision matrix to aid the comparison process.
6.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.
a. Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of the functional area.
b. Prioritize and list issues, deficiencies, and risks and make recommendations on how to
mitigate them.
Figure 8-1. Generic base running estimate format
8-6. The base running estimate addresses information unique to each functional area. It serves as the staff
element’s initial assessment of the current readiness of equipment and personnel and of how the factors
considered in the running estimate affect the staff’s ability to accomplish the mission. Each staff element
identifies functional area friendly and enemy strengths, systems, training, morale, leadership, and weather
and terrain effects, and how all these factors impact the operational environment, including the area of
operations. Because the running estimate is a picture relative to time, facts, and assumptions, each staff
element constantly updates the estimate as new information arises, as assumptions become facts or are
invalidated, when the mission changes, or when the commander requires additional input.
RUNNING ESTIMATES IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
8-7. Commanders and staff elements immediately begin updating their running estimates upon receipt of
a mission. They continue to build and maintain their running estimates throughout the operations process in
planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.
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Running Estimates
RUNNING ESTIMATES IN PLANNING
8-8. During planning, running estimates are key sources of information during mission analysis.
Following mission analysis, commanders and staff elements update their running estimates throughout the
rest of the military decisionmaking process. Based on the mission and the initial commander’s intent, the
staff develops one or more proposed courses of action (COAs) and continually refines its running estimates
to account for the mission variables. The updated running estimates then support COA analysis
(war-gaming) in which the staff identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each COA. The staff relies on its
updated running estimate to provide input to the war game. Following COA analysis, the staff compares the
proposed COAs against each other and recommends one of them to the commander for approval. During all
these activities, each staff element continues to update and refine its running estimate to give commanders
the best possible information available at the time to support their decisions. The selected COA provides
each staff element an additional focus for its estimates and the key information it will need during orders
production. Key information recorded in the running estimate may be included in orders, particularly in the
functional annexes.
RUNNING ESTIMATES IN PREPARATION
8-9. The commander and staff transition from planning to execution. As they transition, they use running
estimates to identify the current readiness of the unit in relationship to its mission. The commander and
staff also use running estimates to develop, then track, mission readiness goals and additional requirements.
RUNNING ESTIMATES IN EXECUTION
8-10. During execution, the commander and staff incorporate information included in running estimates
into the common operational picture. This enables the commander and staff to depict key information from
each functional area or warfighting function as it impacts current and future operations. This information
directly supports the commander’s visualization and rapid decisionmaking during operations.
RUNNING ESTIMATES IN ASSESSMENT
8-11. Each staff element continuously analyzes new information during operations to create knowledge
and to understand if operations are progressing according to plan. During planning, staffs develop measures
of effectiveness and measures of performance to support assessment, including analysis of anticipated
decisions during preparation and execution. The assessment of current operations also supports validation
or rejection of additional information that will help update the estimates and support further planning. At a
minimum, a staff element’s running estimate assesses the following:
z
Friendly force capabilities with respect to ongoing and planned operations.
z
Enemy capabilities as they affect the staff element’s area of expertise for current operations and
plans for future operations.
z
Civil considerations as they affect the staff element’s area of expertise for current operations and
plans for future operations.
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Chapter 9
The Military Decisionmaking Process
The military decisionmaking process is one of the Army’s three planning
methodologies. Before beginning an iteration of the military decisionmaking process,
readers should review chapter 2 of ADRP 5-0 to understand the fundamentals of
planning. This chapter defines and describes the characteristics of the military
decisionmaking process. Next, it provides a detailed discussion of each step of the
military decisionmaking process. The chapter concludes by providing guidance for
conducting the military decisionmaking process in a time-constrained environment.
Effectively conducting the military decisionmaking process requires leaders who
understand the fundamentals of planning.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS
9-1. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The military
decisionmaking process (MDMP) helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and
professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions.
This process helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.
9-2. The MDMP facilitates collaborative planning. The higher headquarters solicits input and
continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, warning orders,
and other means. It shares information with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units,
and unified action partners. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected
by pending operations to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in course of action
development and decisionmaking, and resolve conflicts before publishing the plan or order.
9-3. During planning, assessment focuses on developing an understanding of the current situation and
determining what to assess and how to assess progress using measures of effectiveness and measures of
performance. Developing the unit’s assessment plan occurs during the MDMP—not after developing the
plan or order. (See chapter 15 for details on assessment plans.)
9-4. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs
conduct a time analysis early in the planning process. This analysis helps them determine when to begin
certain actions to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution. This may require the
commander to direct subordinates to start necessary movements, conduct task organization changes, begin
information collection, and execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. As the
commander and staff conduct the MDMP, they direct preparation tasks in a series of warning orders
(WARNORDs).
9-5. Depending on the situation’s complexity, commanders can initiate the Army design methodology
before or in parallel with the MDMP. If the problem is hard to identify or the operation’s end state is
unclear, commanders may initiate Army design methodology before engaging in detailed planning. Army
design methodology can assist the commander and staff in understanding the operational environment,
framing the problem, and considering an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The
understanding and products resulting from Army design methodology guide more detailed planning during
the MDMP. When used in parallel, the commander may direct some staff members to conduct mission
analysis while engaging others in Army design methodology activities prior to course of action
development. Results of both mission analysis and Army design methodology inform commanders in
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Chapter 9
development of their commander’s intent and planning guidance. In time-constrained conditions, or when
the problem is not complex, commanders may conduct the MDMP without incorporating formal Army
design methodology efforts. During execution, the commander can use Army design methodology to help
refine understanding and visualization as well as assessing and adjusting the plan as required.
THE SEVEN STEPS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
9-6. The MDMP consists of seven steps, as shown in figure 9-1. Each step of the MDMP has various
inputs, a step to conduct, and outputs. Each step also has a series of processes that commanders and staffs
conduct to produce the outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation, facilitating
the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however,
they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion as they learn more about the situation before producing
the plan or order.
9-7. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt of, or in anticipation of, a mission. Commanders and
staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters’ operation plan
(OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). In these instances, the headquarters begins a new planning effort
based on a WARNORD and other directives, such as a planning order or an alert order from its higher
headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among
echelons as the plan or order is developed.
THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS AND STAFFS IN THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
9-8. The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decisionmakers
in this process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts.
While unable to devote all their time to the MDMP, commanders follow the status of the planning effort,
participate during critical periods of the process, and make decisions based on the detailed work of the
staff. During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing.
9-9. The MDMP stipulates several formal meetings and briefings between the commander and staff to
discuss, assess, and approve or disapprove planning efforts as they progress. However, experience has
shown that optimal planning results when the commander meets informally at frequent intervals with the
staff throughout the MDMP. Such informal interaction between the commander and staff can improve the
staff’s understanding of the situation and ensure their planning efforts adequately reflect the commander’s
visualization of the operation.
9-10. The chief of staff (COS) (executive officer [XO]) is a key participant in the MDMP. The COS (XO)
manages and coordinates the staff’s work and provides quality control during the MDMP. To effectively
supervise the entire process, this officer has to clearly understand the commander’s intent and guidance.
The COS (XO) provides timelines to the staff, establishes briefing times and locations, and provides any
instructions necessary to complete the plan.
9-11. The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation,
make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during
planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products the staff develops during mission analysis help
commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s visualization. During course of action
(COA) development and COA comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander
in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects
the commander’s intent, coordinating all necessary details. (See figure 9-1.)
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
Figure 9-1. The seven steps of the military decisionmaking process
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Chapter 9
MODIFYING THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
9-12. The MDMP can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the situation permit. Performing
all steps of the MDMP is detailed, deliberate, and time-consuming. Commanders use the full MDMP when
they have enough planning time and staff support to thoroughly examine two or more COAs and develop a
fully synchronized plan or order. This typically occurs when planning for an entirely new mission.
9-13. Commanders may alter the steps of the MDMP to fit time-constrained circumstances and produce a
satisfactory plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation, update the commander’s
visualization, and direct the staff to perform the MDMP activities that support the required decisions. In
extremely compressed situations, commanders rely on more intuitive decisionmaking techniques, such as
the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process.
(See paragraphs
9-205 through
9-210 for
information on planning in a time-constrained environment.)
STEPS OF THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
9-14. The remainder of this chapter describes the methods for conducting each step of the MDMP. It
describes the key inputs and expected key outputs for each step. It also describes how the staff integrates
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), targeting, risk management, and information collection
throughout the MDMP.
STEP 1-RECEIPT OF MISSION
9-15. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission. This step alerts all
participants of the pending planning requirements, enabling them to determine the amount of time available
for planning and preparation and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on using Army design
methodology and how to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When commanders identify a new mission,
commanders and staffs perform the actions and produce the expected key outputs. (See figure 9-2.)
Figure 9-2. Step 1-receipt of the mission
Alert the Staff and Other Key Participants
9-16. As soon as a unit receives a new mission (or when the commander directs), the current operations
integration cell alerts the staff of the pending planning requirement. Unit standard operating procedures
(SOPs) should identify members of the planning staff who participate in mission analysis. In addition, the
current operations integration cell also notifies other military, civilian, and host-nation organizations of
pending planning events as required.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
Gather the Tools
9-17. Once notified of the new planning requirement, the staff prepares for mission analysis by gathering
the needed tools. These tools include, but are not limited to—
z
Appropriate publications, including ADRP 1-02.
z
All documents related to the mission and area of operations, including the higher headquarters’
OPLAN and OPORD, maps and terrain products, and operational graphics.
z
Higher headquarters’ and other organizations’ intelligence and assessment products.
z
Estimates and products of other military and civilian agencies and organizations.
z
Both their own and the higher headquarters’ SOPs.
z
Current running estimates.
z
Any Army design methodology products.
9-18. The gathering of knowledge products continues throughout the MDMP. Staff officers carefully
review the reference sections (located before paragraph 1. Situation) of the higher headquarters’ OPLANs
and OPORDs to identify documents (such as theater policies and memoranda) related to the upcoming
operation. If the MDMP occurs while in the process of replacing another unit, the staff begins collecting
relevant documents—such as the current OPORD, branch plans, current assessments, operations and
intelligence summaries, and SOPs—from that unit.
Update Running Estimates
9-19. While gathering the necessary tools for planning, each staff section begins updating its running
estimate—especially the status of friendly units and resources and key civil considerations that affect each
functional area. Running estimates not only compile critical facts and assumptions from the perspective of
each staff section, but also include information from other staff sections and other military and civilian
organizations. While listed at the beginning of the MDMP, this task of developing and updating running
estimates continues throughout the MDMP and the operations process. (See chapter 8 for more information
on running estimates.)
Conduct Initial Assessment
9-20. During receipt of mission, the commander and staff conduct an initial assessment of time and
resources available to plan, prepare, and begin execution of an operation. This initial assessment helps
commanders determine—
z
The time needed to plan and prepare for the mission for both headquarters and subordinate units.
z
Guidance on conducting the Army design methodology and abbreviating the MDMP, if
required.
z
Which outside agencies and organizations to contact and incorporate into the planning process.
z
The staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.
9-21. This assessment primarily identifies an initial allocation of available time. The commander and staff
balance the desire for detailed planning against the need for immediate action. The commander provides
guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to allow subordinates the maximum time for their own
planning and preparation of operations. As a rule, commanders allocate a minimum of two-thirds of
available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation. This leaves one-third of the
time for commanders and their staffs to do their planning. They use the other two-thirds for their own
preparation. Time, more than any other factor, determines the detail to which the commander and staff can
plan.
9-22. Based on the commander’s initial allocation of time, the COS (XO) develops a staff planning
timeline that outlines how long the headquarters can spend on each step of the MDMP. The staff planning
timeline indicates what products are due, who is responsible for them, and who receives them. It includes
times and locations for meetings and briefings. It serves as a benchmark for the commander and staff
throughout the MDMP.
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9-5
Chapter 9
Issue the Commander’s Initial Guidance
9-23. Once time is allocated, the commander determines whether to initiate Army design methodology,
perform Army design methodology in parallel with the MDMP, or proceed directly into the MDMP
without the benefits of formal Army design methodology activities. In time-sensitive situations where
commanders decide to proceed directly into the MDMP, they may also issue guidance on how to abbreviate
the process. Having determined the time available together with the scope and scale of the planning effort,
commanders issue initial planning guidance. Although brief, the initial guidance includes, but is not limited
to—
z
Initial time allocations.
z
A decision to initiate Army design methodology or go straight into the MDMP.
z
How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required.
z
Necessary coordination to exchange liaison officers.
z
Authorized movements and initiation of information collection.
z
Collaborative planning times and locations.
z
Initial information requirements.
z
Additional staff tasks.
Issue the Initial Warning Order
9-24. The last task in receipt of mission is to issue a WARNORD to subordinate and supporting units. This
order includes at a minimum the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial timeline,
and any movement or information collection to initiate.
STEP 2-MISSION ANALYSIS
9-25. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation called mission analysis. Commanders
(supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other partners)
gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the
operational environment. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the
situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done,
and most importantly why—the purpose of the operation.
9-26. Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve an insufficiently understood problem, mission
analysis is the most important step in the MDMP. This understanding of the situation and the problem
allows commanders to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold in their initial commander’s
intent and planning guidance. During mission analysis, the commander and staff perform the process
actions and produce the outputs shown in figure 9-3.
9-27. Commanders and staffs also begin the development of evaluation criteria during this step. These
evaluation criteria are continually developed and refined throughout the MDMP and become a key input
during Step 5—Course of Action Comparison.
Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Plan or Order
9-28. Commanders and staffs thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or order. They determine
how their unit—by task and purpose—contributes to the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of
operations of the higher headquarters. The commander and staff seek to completely understand—
z
The higher headquarters’—
„ Commander’s intent.
„ Mission.
„ Concept of operations.
„ Available assets.
„ Timeline.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
z
The missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their relationships to the higher
headquarters’ plan.
z
The missions or goals of unified action partners that work in the operational areas.
z
Their assigned area of operations.
Figure 9-3. Step 2-mission analysis
9-29. If the commander misinterprets the higher headquarters’ plan, time is wasted. Additionally, when
analyzing the higher order, the commander and staff may identify difficulties and contradictions in the
higher order. Therefore, if confused by the higher headquarters’ order or guidance, commanders must seek
immediate clarification. Liaison officers familiar with the higher headquarters’ plan can help clarify issues.
Collaborative planning with the higher headquarters also facilitates this task. Staffs use requests for
information to clarify or obtain additional information from the higher headquarters.
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Chapter 9
Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
9-30. IPB is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. The IPB process identifies
critical gaps in the commander’s knowledge of an operational environment. As a part of the initial planning
guidance, commanders use these gaps as a guide to establish their initial intelligence requirements. IPB
products enable the commander to assess facts about the operational environment and make assumptions
about how friendly and threat forces will interact in the operational environment. The description of the
operational environment’s effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs. It also identifies key
aspects of the operational environment, such as avenues of approach, engagement areas, and landing zones,
which the staff integrates into potential friendly COAs and their running estimates. For mission analysis,
the intelligence staff, along with the other staff elements, will use IPB to develop detailed threat COA
models, which depict a COA available to the threat. The threat COA models provide a basis for formulating
friendly COAs and completing the intelligence estimate.
9-31. The intelligence staff, in collaboration with other staffs, develops other IPB products during mission
analysis. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements (PIRs),
the production of a complete modified combined obstacles overlay, a list of high value targets, and
unrefined event templates and matrices. IPB should provide an understanding of the threat’s center of
gravity, which then can be exploited by friendly forces.
Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
9-32. The staff analyzes the higher headquarters’ order and the higher commander’s guidance to determine
their specified and implied tasks. In the context of operations, a task is a clearly defined and measurable
activity accomplished by Soldiers, units, and organizations that may support or be supported by other tasks.
The “what” of a mission statement is always a task. From the list of specified and implied tasks, the staff
determines essential tasks for inclusion in the recommended mission statement.
9-33. A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Paragraphs 2
and 3 of the higher headquarters’ order or plan state specified tasks. Some tasks may be in paragraphs 4
and 5. Specified tasks may be listed in annexes and overlays. They may also be assigned verbally during
collaborative planning sessions or in directives from the higher commander.
9-34. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but
is not stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the
higher headquarters’ order, the enemy situation, the terrain, and civil considerations. Additionally, analysis
of doctrinal requirements for each specified task might disclose implied tasks.
9-35. When analyzing the higher order for specified and implied tasks, the staff also identifies any
be-prepared or on-order missions. A be-prepared mission is a mission assigned to a unit that might be
executed. Generally a contingency mission, commanders execute it because something planned has or has
not been successful. In planning priorities, commanders plan a be-prepared mission after any on-order
mission. An on-order mission is a mission to be executed at an unspecified time. A unit with an on-order
mission is a committed force. Commanders envision task execution in the concept of operations; however,
they may not know the exact time or place of execution. Subordinate commanders develop plans and orders
and allocate resources, task-organize, and position forces for execution.
9-36. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each
task’s requirements and purpose. The staff then identifies essential tasks. An essential task is a specified
or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in
the unit’s mission statement.
Review Available Assets and Identify Resource Shortfalls
9-37. The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization,
command and support relationships, and status (current capabilities and limitations) of all units. This
analysis also includes capabilities of civilian and military organizations (joint, special operations, and
multinational) that operate within their unit’s area of operations. They consider relationships among
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
specified, implied, and essential tasks, and between them and available assets. From this analysis, staffs
determine if they have the assets needed to complete all tasks. If shortages occur, they identify additional
resources needed for mission success to the higher headquarters. Staffs also identify any deviations from
the normal task organization and provide them to the commander to consider when developing the planning
guidance. A more detailed analysis of available assets occurs during COA development.
Determine Constraints
9-38. The commander and staff identify any constraints placed on their command. A constraint is a
restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction,
thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander. Constraints are found in
paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes to the order may also include constraints. The operation
overlay, for example, may contain a restrictive fire line or a no fire area. Constraints may also be issued
verbally, in WARNORDs, or in policy memoranda.
9-39. Constraints may also be based on resource limitations within the command, such as organic fuel
transport capacity, or physical characteristics of the operational environment, such as the number of
vehicles that can cross a bridge in a specified time.
9-40. The commander and staff should coordinate with the staff judge advocate for a legal review of
perceived or obvious constraints, restraints, or limitations in the OPLAN, OPORD, or related documents.
Identify Critical Facts and Develop Assumptions
9-41. Plans and orders are based on facts and assumptions. Commanders and staffs gather facts and
develop assumptions as they build their plan. A fact is a statement of truth or a statement thought to be true
at the time. Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis for developing
situational understanding, for continued planning, and when assessing progress during preparation and
execution.
9-42. An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of
events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the
commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the
course of action. In the absence of facts, the commander and staff consider assumptions from their higher
headquarters. They then develop their own assumptions necessary for continued planning.
9-43. Having assumptions requires commanders and staffs to continually attempt to replace those
assumptions with facts. The commander and staff should list and review the key assumptions on which
fundamental judgments rest throughout the MDMP. Rechecking assumptions is valuable at any time during
the operations process prior to rendering judgments and making decisions.
Begin Risk Management
9-44. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from
operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). During
mission analysis, the commander and staff focus on identifying and assessing hazards. Developing specific
control measures to mitigate those hazards occurs during course of action development.
9-45. The chief of protection (or operations staff officer
[S-3] in units without a protection cell) in
coordination with the safety officer integrates risk management into the MDMP. All staff sections integrate
risk management for hazards within their functional areas. Units conduct the first four steps of risk
management in the MDMP. ATP 5-19 addresses the details for conducting risk management, including
products of each step.
Develop Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Essential Elements of
Friendly Information
9-46. The mission analysis process identifies gaps in information required for further planning and
decisionmaking during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information
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Chapter 9
requirements. Some information requirements are of such importance to the commander that staffs
nominate them to the commander to become a commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR).
9-47. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force
information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. A CCIR directly influences
decisionmaking and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. A CCIR is—
z
Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
z
Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
z
Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
z
Time-sensitive.
9-48. Commanders consider staff input when determining their CCIRs. CCIRs are situation-dependent and
specified by the commander for each operation. Commanders continuously review CCIRs during the
planning process and adjust them as situations change. The initial CCIRs developed during mission
analysis normally focus on decisions the commander needs to make to focus planning. Once the
commander selects a COA, the CCIRs shift to information the commander needs in order to make decisions
during preparation and execution. Commanders designate CCIRs to inform the staff and subordinates what
they deem essential for making decisions. Typically, commanders identify ten or fewer CCIRs; minimizing
the number of CCIRs assists in prioritizing the allocation of limited resources. CCIR fall into one of two
categories: PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).
9-49. A PIR is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander
and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. PIRs identify the information
about the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment that the commander considers most
important. Lessons from recent operations show that intelligence about civil considerations may be as
critical as intelligence about the enemy. Thus, all staff sections may recommend information about civil
considerations as PIRs. The intelligence officer manages PIRs for the commander through planning
requirements and assessing collection.
9-50. An FFIR is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and
supporting capabilities. FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and
time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the
staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander.
9-51. In addition to nominating CCIRs to the commander, the staff also identifies and nominates essential
elements of friendly information (EEFIs). An EEFI establishes an element of information to protect rather
than one to collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised,
would jeopardize mission success. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority as CCIRs
and require approval by the commander. Like CCIRs, EEFIs change as an operation progresses.
9-52. Depending on the situation, the commander and selected staff members meet prior to the mission
analysis brief to approve the initial CCIRs and EEFIs. This is especially important if the commander
intends to conduct information collection early in the planning process. The approval of the initial CCIRs
early during planning assists the staff in developing the initial information collection plan. Approval of an
EEFI allows the staff to begin planning and implementing measures to protect friendly force information,
such as military deception and operations security.
Develop the Initial Information Collection Plan
9-53. The initial information collection plan is crucial to begin or adjust the information collection effort to
help answer information requirements necessary in developing effective plans. The initial information
collection plan sets reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations in motion. It may be issued as
part of a WARNORD, a fragmentary order (FRAGORD), or an OPORD. As more information becomes
available, it is incorporated into a complete information collection plan (Annex L) to the OPORD.
9-54. The intelligence staff creates the requirements management tools for the information collection plan.
The operations staff is responsible for the information collection plan. During this step, the operations and
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
intelligence staff work closely to ensure they fully synchronize and integrate information collection
activities into the overall plan.
9-55. The operations officer considers several factors when developing the initial information collection
plan, including:
x Requirements for collection assets in subsequent missions.
x The time available to develop and refine the initial information collection plan.
x The risk the commander is willing to accept if information collection missions are begun before
the information collection plan is fully integrated into the scheme of maneuver.
x Insertion and extraction methods for reconnaissance, security, surveillance, and intelligence
collection assets.
x Contingencies for inclement weather to ensure coverage of key named areas of interest or target
areas of interest.
x The communications plan for transmission of reports from assets to command posts.
x The inclusion of collection asset locations and movements into the fire support plan.
x The reconnaissance handover with higher or subordinate echelons.
x The sustainment support.
x Legal support requirements.
FM 3-55 contains additional information on information collection, planning requirements, and assessing
collection.
Update Plan for the Use of Available Time
9-56. As more information becomes available, the commander and staff refine their initial plan for the use
of available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish tasks to the higher headquarters’ timeline to
ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. They compare the timeline to the assumed
enemy timeline with how they anticipate conditions will unfold. From this, they determine windows of
opportunity for exploitation, times when the unit will be at risk for enemy activity, or when action to arrest
deterioration in the local civilian population may be required.
9-57. The commander and COS (XO) also refine the staff planning timeline. The refined timeline includes
the—
z
Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires.
z
Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which they will take place.
z
Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals.
Develop Initial Themes and Messages
9-58. Gaining and maintaining the trust of key actors is an important aspect of operations. Faced with the
many different actors
(individuals, organizations, and the public) connected with the operation,
commanders identify and engage those actors who matter to operational success. These actors’ behaviors
can help solve or complicate the friendly forces’ challenges as commanders strive to accomplish missions.
9-59. Themes and messages support operations and military actions. Commanders and their units
coordinate what they do, say, and portray through themes and messages. A theme is a unifying or dominant
idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. Themes tie to objectives, lines of effort, and
end state conditions. They are overarching and apply to capabilities of public affairs, military information
support operations, and Soldier and leader engagements. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic
communication that supports a theme focused on a specific actor or the public and in support of a specific
action (task). Units transmit themes and messages to those actors or the public whose perceptions, attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors matter to the success of an operation.
9-60. The public affairs officer adjusts and refines themes and messages received from higher headquarters
for use by the command. These themes and messages are designed to inform specific domestic and foreign
audiences about current or planned military operations. The military information support operations
element receives approved themes and messages. This element adjusts or refines depending on the
situation. It employs themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific
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Chapter 9
foreign audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations. The commander and the
chief of staff approve all themes and messages used to support operations. The information operations
officer assists the G-3
(S-3) and the commander to de-conflict and synchronize the use of
information-related capabilities used specifically to disseminate approved themes and messages during
operations.
Develop a Proposed Problem Statement
9-61. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. The
problem statement is the description of the primary issue or issues that may impede commanders from
achieving their desired end states.
Note: The commander, staff, and other partners develop the problem statement as part of Army
design methodology. During mission analysis, the commander and staff review the problem
statement and revise it as necessary based on the increased understanding of the situation. If
Army design methodology activities do not precede mission analysis, then the commander and
staff develop a problem statement prior to moving to Step 3—COA Development.
9-62. How the problem is formulated leads to particular solutions. It is important that commanders
dedicate the time to identify the right problem to solve and describe it clearly in a problem statement.
Ideally, the commander and staff meet to share their analysis of the situation. They talk with each other,
synthesize the results of the current mission analysis, and determine the problem. If the commander is not
available, the staff members talk among themselves.
9-63. As part of the discussion to help identify and understand the problem, the staff—
z
Compares the current situation to the desired end state.
z
Brainstorms and lists issues that impede the commander from achieving the desired end state.
9-64. Based on this analysis, the staff develops a proposed problem statement—a statement of the problem
or set of problems to be solved—for the commander’s approval.
Develop a Proposed Mission Statement
9-65. The COS (XO) or operations officer prepares a proposed mission statement for the unit based on the
mission analysis. The commander receives and approves the unit’s mission statement normally during the
mission analysis brief. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the
organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where,
and why (JP 5-0). The five elements of a mission statement answer these questions:
z
Who will execute the operation (unit or organization)?
z
What is the unit’s essential task (tactical mission task)?
z
When will the operation begin (by time or event) or what is the duration of the operation?
z
Where will the operation occur (area of operations, objective, grid coordinates)?
z
Why will the force conduct the operations (for what purpose)?
Example 1. Not later than 220400 Aug 09 (when), 1st Brigade (who) secures ROUTE SOUTH
DAKOTA (what/task) in AREA OF OPERATIONS JACKRABBIT (where) to enable the
movement of humanitarian assistance materials (why/purpose).
Example
2.
1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
(who) seizes
(what/task) JACKSON
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on
forces to air-land into AREA OF OPERATIONS SPARTAN (why/purpose).
9-66. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a
mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
Example.
1-509th Parachute Infantry Regiment
(who) seizes
(what/task) JACKSON
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on
forces to air-land into AREA OF OPERATIONS SPARTAN (why/purpose). On order (when),
secures (what/task) OBJECTIVE GOLD (where) to prevent the 2nd Pandor Guards Brigade
from crossing the BLUE RIVER and disrupting operations in AREA OF OPERATIONS
SPARTAN (why/purpose).
9-67. The who, where, and when of a mission statement are straightforward. The what and why are more
challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The what is a task and is expressed
in terms of action verbs. These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or
“effects on enemy forces.” The why puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it.
The why provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is extremely
important to mission command and mission orders.
9-68. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in
combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in mission statements. These tasks have specific
military definitions that differ from standard dictionary definitions. A tactical mission task is a specific
activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be
expressed as either an action by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (ADRP 1-03). FM 3-90-1
describes each tactical task. FM 3-07 provides a list of primary stability tasks which military forces must be
prepared to execute. Commanders and planners should carefully choose the task that best describes the
commander’s intent and planning guidance.
Present the Mission Analysis Briefing
9-69. The mission analysis briefing informs the commander of the results of the staff’s analysis of the
situation. It helps the commander understand, visualize, and describe the operation. Throughout the mission
analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other partners discuss the various facts and assumptions about
the situation. Staff officers present a summary of their running estimates from their specific functional area
and how their findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander and staff as a
whole to focus on the interrelationships among the mission variables and to develop a deeper understanding
of the situation. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on situational
understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing.
9-70. Ideally, the commander holds several informal meetings with key staff members before the mission
analysis briefing, including meetings to assist the commander in developing CCIRs, the mission statement,
and themes and messages. These meetings enable commanders to issue guidance for activities (such as
reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations) and develop their initial commander’s
intent and planning guidance.
9-71. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing helps the commander, staff, subordinates, and other
partners develop a shared understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation. Time permitting,
the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline:
z
Mission and commander’s intent of the headquarters two echelons up.
z
Mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the headquarters one echelon up.
z
A proposed problem statement.
z
A proposed mission statement.
z
Review of the commander’s initial guidance.
z
Initial IPB products, including civil considerations that impact the conduct of operations.
z
Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
z
Pertinent facts and assumptions.
z
Constraints.
z
Forces available and resource shortfalls.
z
Initial risk assessment.
z
Proposed themes and messages.
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Chapter 9
z
Proposed CCIRs and EEFIs.
z
Initial information collection plan.
z
Recommended timeline.
z
Recommended collaborative planning sessions.
z
Proposed evaluation criteria.
9-72. During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders approve the mission
statement and CCIRs. They then develop and issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.
Develop and Issue Initial Commander’s Intent
9-73. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even
when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The initial commander’s intent describes the
purpose of the operation, initial key tasks, and the desired end state (See ADRP 5-0 for more details on
commander’s intent).
9-74. The higher commander’s intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each
commander’s intent nests within the higher commander’s intent. The commander’s intent explains the
broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. This explanation allows subordinate
commanders and Soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most
importantly, why the mission is being conducted.
9-75. Based on their situational understanding, commanders summarize their visualization in their initial
commander’s intent statement. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with conditions
that define the desired end state. Commanders may change their intent statement as planning progresses
and more information becomes available. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly
understood by leaders two echelons lower in the chain of command. The shorter the commander’s intent,
the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent statement is three to five sentences
long and contains the purpose, key tasks, and end state.
Develop and Issue Initial Planning Guidance
9-76. Commanders provide planning guidance along with their initial commander’s intent. Planning
guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. This guidance may be broad or detailed,
depending on the situation. The initial planning guidance outlines an operational approach—a description
of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state
(JP 5-0). The initial planning guidance outlines specific COAs the commander desires the staff to look at as
well as rules out any COAs the commander will not accept. That clear guidance allows the staff to develop
several COAs without wasting effort on things that the commander will not consider. It reflects how the
commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander
intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent.
9-77. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance.
They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing the latitude necessary
to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations without
dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance
based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.
9-78. Commanders issue planning guidance initially after mission analysis. They continue to consider
additional guidance throughout the MDMP including, but not limited, to the following:
z
Upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission (initial planning guidance).
z
Following mission analysis (planning guidance for COA development).
z
Following COA development (revised planning guidance for COA improvements).
z
COA approval (revised planning guidance to complete the plan).
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9-79. Table 9-1 lists commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function. This list is not intended to
meet the needs of all situations nor be all-inclusive, and providing guidance by warfighting function is not
the only method. Commanders tailor planning guidance to meet specific needs based on the situation rather
than address each item. Each item does not always fit neatly in a particular warfighting function, as it may
be shared by more than one warfighting function. For example, although rules of engagement fall under the
protection warfighting function, each other warfighting function chief has a vested interest in gaining
guidance on rules of engagement. (See table 9-1.)
Table 9-1. Examples of commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function
Commander’s critical information
Liaison officer guidance
requirements
Planning and operational guidance timeline
Rules of engagement
Type of order and rehearsal
Command post positioning
Communications guidance
Commander’s location
Civil affairs operations
Initial themes and messages
Cyber electromagnetic considerations
Succession of command
Information collection guidance
Most critical local environment and civil
Information gaps
considerations
Most likely and most dangerous enemy
Intelligence requests for information
courses of action
Intelligence focus during phased operations
Priority intelligence requirements
Desired enemy perception of friendly forces
Most critical terrain and weather factors
Commander’s intent
Security and counterreconnaissance
Course of action development guidance
Friendly decision points
Number of courses of action to consider
Branches and sequels
or not consider
Task and direct collection
Critical events
Military deception
Task organization
Risk to friendly forces
Task and purpose of subordinate units
Collateral damage or civilian casualties
Forms of maneuver
Any condition that affects achievement of
Reserve composition, mission, priorities,
end state
and control measures
Information operations
Synchronization and focus of fires with
Task and purpose of fires
maneuver
Scheme of fires
Priority of fires
Suppression of enemy air defenses
High priority targets
Fire support coordination measures
Special munitions
Attack guidance
Target acquisition zones
Branches and sequels
Observer plan
No strike list
Air and missile defense positioning
Restricted target list
High-value targets
Protection priorities
Vehicle and equipment safety or security
Priorities for survivability assets
constraints
Terrain and weather factors
Environmental considerations
Intelligence focus and limitations for
Unexploded ordnance
security
Operations security risk tolerance
Acceptable risk
Rules of engagement
Protected targets and areas
Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons
Counterintelligence
Sustainment priorities—manning, fueling,
Construction and provision of facilities and
fixing, arming, moving the force, and
installations
sustaining Soldiers and systems
Detainee movement
Health system support
Anticipated requirements of Classes III, IV,
Sustainment of detainee and
and V
resettlement operations
Controlled supply rates
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Chapter 9
◄ Develop Course of Action Evaluation Criteria
9-80. Evaluation criteria are standards the commander and staff will later use to measure the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission
analysis helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. Evaluation criteria
address factors that affect success and those that can cause failure. Criteria change from mission to mission
and must be clearly defined and understood by all staff members before starting the war game to test the
proposed COAs. Normally, the COS (XO) initially determines each proposed criterion with weights based
on the assessment of its relative importance and the commander’s guidance. Commanders adjust criteria
selection and weighting according to their own experience and vision. Higher weights are assigned to more
important criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area ranks each COA using those criteria.
The staff presents the proposed evaluation criteria to the commander at the mission analysis brief for
approval.
Issue a Warning Order
9-81. Immediately after the commander gives the planning guidance, the staff sends subordinate and
supporting units a WARNORD. (See appendix C for sample WARNORD.) It contains, at a minimum—
z
The approved mission statement.
z
The commander’s intent.
z
Changes to task organization.
z
The unit area of operations (sketch, overlay, or some other description).
z
CCIRs and EEFIs.
z
Risk guidance.
z
Priorities by warfighting functions.
z
Military deception guidance.
z
Essential stability tasks.
z
Initial information collection plan.
z
Specific priorities.
z
Updated operational timeline.
z
Movements.
STEP 3-COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
9-82. A COA is a broad potential solution to an identified problem. The COA development step generates
options for subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander’s intent and planning guidance.
During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, commander’s intent,
planning guidance, and various knowledge products developed during mission analysis. (See figure 9-4.)
Figure 9-4. Step 3-course of action development
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
9-83. Embedded in COA development is the application of operational and tactical art. Planners develop
different COAs by varying combinations of the elements of operational art, such as phasing, lines of effort,
and tempo. (See ADRP 3-0 for more information on operational art.) Planners convert the approved COA
into the concept of operations.
9-84. The commander’s direct involvement in COA development greatly aids in producing comprehensive
and flexible COAs within the time available. To save time, the commander may also limit the number of
COAs staffs develop or specify particular COAs not to explore. Planners examine each prospective COA
for validity using the following screening criteria:
z
Feasible. The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource
limitations.
z
Acceptable. The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
z
Suitable. The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent and planning
guidance.
z
Distinguishable. Each COA must differ significantly from the others
(such as scheme of
maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of the reserve, and task organization).
z
Complete. A COA must incorporate—
„ How the decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment.
„ How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation
or effort.
„ How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations or efforts.
„ How to account for offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities
tasks.
„ Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.
9-85. It is important in COA development that commanders and staffs appreciate the unpredictable and
uncertain nature of the operational environment, and understand how to cope with ambiguity. Some
problems that commanders face are straightforward, as when clearly defined guidance is provided from
higher headquarters, or when resources required for a mission are available and can easily be allocated. In
such cases, the COA is often self-evident. However, for problems that are unfamiliar or ambiguous, Army
design methodology may assist commanders in better understanding the nature of the problem, and afford
both the commander and staff a level of comfort necessary to effectively advance through COA
development. Commanders and staffs that are comfortable with ambiguity will often find that the Army
design methodology provides flexibility in developing COAs that contain multiple options for dealing with
changing circumstances. Staffs tend to focus on specific COAs for specific sets of circumstances, when it is
usually best to focus on flexible COAs that provide the greatest options to account for the widest range of
circumstances.
9-86. Commanders and staffs must be cautious not to attempt to identify and resolve every possible
outcome to military operations. The interaction of multiple variables within an operational environment can
lead to countless possible options and outcomes. Commanders and staffs should focus their efforts around
known variables and analyze COAs that provide flexible options to the commander during execution. If
commanders and staffs focus on what is known about a situation, it often becomes clear that the known
information provides sufficient guidance to develop flexible COAs. It is important to clearly identify which
variables the unit can control, which it does not control, and the implications of those that it does not
control. Even when there are few facts available, it is often possible to reduce key issues to either an ability
to do “X”, or an inability to do “X” as a starting point. Such a reduction is preferred over trying to derive a
wide range of possibilities. It is just as important not to see facts as constraining flexibility, but seek to use
them to generate flexibility. Staffs work to confirm or deny facts before developing options. Staffs must
also determine what risks are associated with various COAs.
9-87. As an example, a commander may know with reasonable certainty that an enemy force is positioned
on the outskirts of a town. The commander may not be certain of the exact size of the enemy force, all the
resources available to the enemy force, or actions the enemy may take over time. Such unknowns are a
reality in an ambiguous operational environment. But, by focusing on the known information, that is, the
position of the enemy at a point in time, the staff can develop COAs that provide maximum flexibility for
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the commander. Known information can also apply to friendly actions, such as an established time for
crossing a line of departure, or transition to a subsequent phase of an operation. COAs should allow for
variances in timelines and resources as additional information on the enemy, as well as friendly forces,
becomes available. Variances may also occur as changes in guidance from high headquarters arrives, or
significant national policy decisions are made. Staffs identify risks associated with both friendly and enemy
actions, as well as who is accepting the risk, and what resources should be allocated to mitigate the risks.
9-88. COA development should also identify decision points, the person responsible for making the
decision, and what measures may be taken to provide the commander with additional time before making a
decision. (See paragraph 9-127 for a discussion of decision points.) Good COAs provide commanders with
options they can take based on anticipated and unanticipated changes in the situation. (See Chapter 14 for
further discussion on decisionmaking in execution.) Staffs should highlight to the commander options that
may be critical to mission success. Staffs should also identify points in time when options may no longer be
viable, while working to keep options open to the commander as long as possible. In all cases, staffs
provide commanders with options that are flexible, while clearly identifying risks associated with
committing to options. Staffs also assess how possible options may impact on a commander’s options at a
higher echelon.
9-89. The unpredictable and uncertain nature of the operational environment should not in itself result in
paralysis or hesitancy in military operations. By focusing COA development around information that is
known to the staff, staffs can better steer their efforts toward developing COAs that provide maximum
flexibility and viable options for the commander in the execution of military operations.
Assess Relative Combat Power
9-90. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Combat power is the effect created by
combining the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, mission
command, information, and leadership. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish
the mission at minimal cost.
9-91. To assess relative combat power, planners initially make a rough estimate of force ratios of maneuver
units two levels below their echelon. For example, at division level, planners compare all types of
maneuver battalions with enemy maneuver battalion equivalents. Planners then compare friendly strengths
against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of combat power. From these comparisons,
they may deduce particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need protection.
These comparisons provide planners insight into effective force employment.
9-92. In troop-to-task analysis for stability and defense support of civil authorities, staffs determine relative
combat power by comparing available resources to specified or implied stability or defense support of civil
authorities tasks. This analysis provides insight as available options and needed resources. In such
operations, the elements of sustainment, movement and maneuver, nonlethal effects, and information may
dominate.
9-93. By analyzing force ratios and determining and comparing each force’s strengths and weaknesses as a
function of combat power, planners can gain insight into—
z
Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation.
z
The types of operations possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives.
z
How and where the enemy may be vulnerable.
z
How and where friendly forces are vulnerable.
z
Additional resources needed to execute the mission.
z
How to allocate existing resources.
9-94. Planners must not develop and recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force
ratios. Although the process uses some numerical relationships, the estimate is largely subjective.
Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible and intangible factors, such as morale and levels
of training. A relative combat power assessment identifies exploitable enemy weaknesses, identifies
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
unprotected friendly weaknesses, and determines the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability
or defense support of civil authorities tasks.
Generate Options
9-95. Based on the commander’s guidance and the initial results of the relative combat power assessment,
the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential
stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs.
Depending on available time, commanders may limit the options in the commander’s guidance. Options
focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most
essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.
9-96. Brainstorming can be used for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it
produces the widest range of choices. The staff (and members of organizations outside the headquarters)
remains unbiased and open-minded when developing proposed options.
9-97. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal requirements for each proposed
operation, including doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a
breach force, a support force, and an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a
level of civil security, civil control, and certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the
potential capabilities of attachments and other organizations and agencies outside military channels.
9-98. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space,
purpose, and resources in order to generate options. ADRP 3-0 describes in detail three established
operational frameworks. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework in organizing operations,
but three operational frameworks, mentioned below, have proven valuable in the past. The higher
headquarters will direct the specific framework or frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters; the
frameworks should be consistent throughout all echelons. The three operational frameworks are—
z
Deep-close-security.
z
Main and supporting effort.
z
Decisive-shaping-sustaining.
9-99. For example, when generating options for a decisive-shaping-sustaining operation, the staff starts
with the decisive operation identified in the commander’s planning guidance. The staff checks that the
decisive operation nests within the higher headquarters’ concept of operations. The staff clarifies the
decisive operation’s purpose and considers ways to mass the effects (lethal and nonlethal) of overwhelming
combat power to achieve it.
9-100. Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose for each shaping
operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations
may occur before, concurrently with, or after the decisive operation. A shaping operation may be
designated as the main effort if executed before or after the decisive operation.
9-101. The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create and maintain the combat power
required for the decisive operation and shaping operation. After developing the basic operational
organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operation.
9-102. Once staff members have explored possibilities for each COA, they examine each COA to
determine if it satisfies the screening criteria stated in paragraph 9-81. In doing so, they change, add, or
eliminate COAs as appropriate. During this process, staffs avoid focusing on the development of one good
COA among several throwaway COAs.
Array Forces
9-103. After determining the decisive and shaping operations and their related tasks and purposes,
planners determine the relative combat power required to accomplish each task. Often, planners use
minimum historical planning ratios as a starting point. For example, historically, defenders have over a 50
percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength.
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Chapter 9
Therefore, as a starting point, commanders may defend on each avenue of approach with roughly a 1:3
force ratio. (See table 9-2.)
Table 9-2. Historical minimum planning ratios
Friendly Mission
Position
Friendly : Enemy
Delay
1:6
Defend
Prepared or fortified
1:3
Defend
Hasty
1:2.5
Attack
Prepared or fortified
3:1
Attack
Hasty
2.5:1
Counterattack
Flank
1:1
9-104. Planners determine whether these and other intangibles increase the relative combat power of the
unit assigned the task to the point that it exceeds the historical planning ratio for that task. If it does not,
planners determine how to reinforce the unit. Combat power comparisons are provisional at best. Arraying
forces is tricky, inexact work, affected by factors that are difficult to gauge, such as impact of past
engagements, quality of leaders, morale, maintenance of equipment, and time in position. Levels of
electronic warfare support, fire support, close air support, civilian support, and many other factors also
affect arraying forces.
9-105. In counterinsurgency operations, planners can develop force requirements by gauging troop
density—the ratio of security forces (including host-nation military and police forces as well as foreign
counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of
20 to
25
counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an area of operations. A ratio of twenty counterinsurgents per
1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency
operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations strongly depend on the situation. (See
FM 3-24 for more information on counterinsurgency planning.)
9-106. Planners also determine relative combat power with regard to civilian requirements and conditions
that require attention, and then they array forces and capabilities for stability tasks. For example, a COA
may require a follow-on force to establish civil security, maintain civil control, and restore essential
services in a densely populated urban area over an extended period. Planners conduct a troop-to-task
analysis to determine the type of units and capabilities needed to accomplish these tasks.
9-107. Planners then proceed to initially array friendly forces starting with the decisive operation and
continuing with all shaping and sustaining operations. Planners normally array ground forces two levels
below their echelon. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific
type or task organization and then considers all appropriate intangible factors. For example, at corps level,
planners array generic brigades. During this step, planners do not assign missions to specific units; they
only consider which forces are necessary to accomplish their task. In this step, planners also array assets to
accomplish essential stability tasks.
9-108. The initial array identifies the total number of units needed and identifies possible methods of
dealing with the enemy and stability tasks. If the number arrayed is less than the number available, planners
place additional units in a pool for use when they develop the initial concept of the operation. (See
paragraph 9-106.) If the number of units arrayed exceeds the number available and the difference cannot be
compensated for with intangible factors, the staff determines whether the COA is feasible. Ways to make
up the shortfall include requesting additional resources, accepting risk in that portion of the area of
operations, or executing tasks required for the COA sequentially rather than simultaneously. Commanders
should also consider requirements to minimize and relieve civilian suffering. Establishing civil security and
providing essential services such as medical care, water, food, and shelter are implied tasks for
commanders during any combat operation. (See FM 3-07 for a full discussion on stability tasks.)
Develop a Broad Concept
9-109. In developing the broad concept of the operation, the commander describes how arrayed forces
will accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. The broad concept concisely expresses the how
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
of the commander’s visualization and will eventually provide the framework for the concept of operations
and summarizes the contributions of all warfighting functions. The staff develops the initial concept of the
operation for each COA expressed in both narrative and graphic forms. A sound COA is more than the
arraying of forces. It presents an overall combined arms idea that will accomplish the mission. The initial
concept of the operation includes, but is not limited to, the following:
z
The purpose of the operation.
z
A statement of where the commander will accept risk.
z
Identification of critical friendly events and transitions between phases (if the operation is
phased).
z
Designation of the reserve, including its location and composition.
z
Information collection activities.
z
Essential stability tasks.
z
Identification of maneuver options that may develop during an operation.
z
Assignment of subordinate areas of operations.
z
Scheme of fires.
z
Themes, messages, and means of delivery.
z
Military deception operations (on a need to know basis).
z
Key control measures.
z
Designate the operational framework for this operation: deep-close-security, main and
supporting effort, or decisive-shaping-sustaining.
z
Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose, linked to how it supports
the higher headquarters’ concept.
NOTE: For the purpose of this section, the decisive-shaping-sustaining operational framework is
an example. Planners use the same process when analyzing the other two operational
frameworks—deep-close-security and main and supporting effort—to develop initial concepts of
the operation.
9-110. Planners select control measures, including graphics, to control subordinate units during an
operation. These establish responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate units’ actions from impeding
one another. These measures also foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily
restricting freedom of action. Good control measures foster decisionmaking and individual initiative. (See
FM 3-90-1 for a discussion of control measures associated with offensive and defensive tasks. See
ADRP 1-02 for doctrinally correct unit symbols, control measures, and rules for drawing control measures
on overlays and maps.)
9-111. Planners may use both lines of operations and lines of effort to build their broad concept. Lines of
operations portray the more traditional links among objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. A
line of effort, however, helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end state conditions.
Combining lines of operations with lines of effort allows planners to include nonmilitary activities in their
broad concept. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability or defense support of civil
authorities tasks that, when accomplished, help set end state conditions of an operation.
9-112. Based on the commander’s planning guidance (informed by the Army design methodology
concept if this preceded the MDMP), planners develop lines of effort by—
z
Confirming end state conditions from the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance.
z
Determining and describing each line of effort.
z
Identifying objectives (intermediate goals) and determining tasks along each line of effort.
9-113. During COA development, lines of effort are general and lack specifics, such as tasks to
subordinate units associated to objectives along each line of effort. Units develop and refine lines of effort,
including specific tasks to subordinate units, during war-gaming.
(See ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-07 for
examples of operations depicted along lines of effort.)
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Chapter 9
9-114. As planning progresses, commanders may modify lines of effort and add details while
war-gaming. Operations with other instruments of national power support a broader, comprehensive
approach to stability tasks. Each operation, however, differs. Commanders develop and modify lines of
effort to focus operations on achieving an end state, even as the situation evolves.
Assign Headquarters
9-115. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning headquarters
to groupings of forces. They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and the ability of
that headquarters to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate
maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive or defensive tasks. The number and type
of units assigned to a headquarters for stability tasks vary based on factors of the mission variables:
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC). If planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task
organization takes into account the entire operational organization. It also accounts for the special
command requirements for operations, such as a passage of lines, or air assault.
Develop Course of Action Statements and Sketches
9-116. The G-3 (S-3) prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch for each COA. The COA
statement clearly portrays how the unit will accomplish the mission. The COA statement briefly expresses
how the unit will conduct the combined arms concept. The sketch provides a picture of the movement and
maneuver aspects of the concept, including the positioning of forces. Together, the statement and sketch
cover the who (generic task organization), what
(tasks), when, where, and why
(purpose) for each
subordinate unit.
9-117. The COA sketch includes the array of generic forces and control measures, such as—
z
The unit and subordinate unit boundaries.
z
Unit movement formations (but not subordinate unit formations).
z
The line of departure or line of contact and phase lines, if used.
z
Information collection graphics.
z
Ground and air axes of advance.
z
Assembly areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, and objectives.
z
Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics.
z
Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures.
z
Main effort.
z
Location of command posts and critical communications nodes.
z
Known or templated enemy locations.
z
Population concentrations.
9-118. Planners can include identifying features (such as cities, rivers, and roads) to help orient users. The
sketch may be on any medium. What it portrays is more important than its form. (See figure 9-5 on page
9-24 for a sample COA sketch and COA statement for a brigade combat team using the operational
framework of decisive-shaping-sustaining.)
◄ Conduct a Course of Action Briefing
9-119. After developing COAs, the staff briefs them to the commander. A collaborative session may
facilitate subordinate planning. The COA briefing includes—
z
An updated IPB (if there are significant changes).
z
As many threat COAs as necessary (or specified by the commander). At a minimum the most
likely and most dangerous threat COAs must be developed.
z
The approved problem statement and mission statement.
z
The commander’s and higher commander’s intents.
z
COA statements and sketches, including lines of effort if used.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
z
The rationale for each COA, including—
„ Considerations that might affect enemy COAs.
„ Critical events for each COA.
„ Deductions resulting from the relative combat power analysis.
„ The reason units are arrayed as shown on the sketch. (See ADRP 1-02 for doctrine on COA
sketches.)
„ The reason the staff used the selected control measures.
„ The impact on civilians.
„ How the COA accounts for minimum essential stability tasks.
„ New facts and new or updated assumptions.
„ Refined COA evaluation criteria.
Select or Modify Courses of Action for Continued Analysis
9-120. After the COA briefing, the commander selects or modifies those COAs for continued analysis.
The commander also issues planning guidance. If commanders reject all COAs, the staff begins again. If
commanders accept one or more of the COAs, staff members begin COA analysis. The commander may
create a new COA by incorporating elements of one or more COAs developed by the staff. The staff then
prepares to war-game this new COA. The staff incorporates those modifications and ensures all staff
members understand the changed COA.
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Chapter 9
Figure 9-5. +Sample brigade course of action sketch
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Chapter 9
STEP 4-COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WAR-GAMING
9-121. COA analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties or coordination problems as
well as probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered. It helps them think
through the tentative plan. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit parts of a COA as
discrepancies arise. COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA, but it also uncovers
potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. In addition, COA analysis influences how
commanders and staffs understand a problem and may require the planning process to restart. (See
figure 9-6.)
Figure 9-6. Step 4-course of action analysis and war-gaming
9-122. War-gaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the
operation, given the force’s strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities, and possible COAs; the
impact and requirements of civilians in the area of operations; and other aspects of the situation. The
simplest form of war-gaming is the manual method, often using a tabletop approach with blowups of
matrixes and templates. The most sophisticated form of war-gaming is computer-aided modeling and
simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed
using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction. This basic
war-gaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to offensive, defensive,
and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. When conducting COA analysis,
commanders and staffs perform the process actions and produce the outputs shown in figure 9-6.
9-123. War-gaming results in refined COAs, a completed synchronization matrix, and decision support
templates and matrixes for each COA. A synchronization matrix records the results of a war game. It
depicts how friendly forces for a particular COA are synchronized in time, space, and purpose in relation to
an enemy COA or other events in stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. The decision
support template and matrix portray key decisions and potential actions that are likely to arise during the
execution of each COA.
9-124. COA analysis allows the staff to synchronize the six warfighting functions for each COA. It also
helps the commander and staff to—
z
Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and
minimizing collateral damage.
z
Further develop a visualization of the operation.
z
Anticipate operational events.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process
z
Determine conditions and resources required for success.
z
Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.
z
Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.
z
Determine the most flexible COA.
9-125. During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop a detailed plan while
determining its strengths or weaknesses. War-gaming tests and improves COAs. The commander, staff, and
other available partners
(and subordinate commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted
collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen events,
tasks, requirements, or problems.
Gather the Tools
9-126. The first task for COA analysis is to gather the necessary tools to conduct the war game. The COS
(XO) directs the staff to gather tools, materials, and data for the war game. Units war-game with maps,
sand tables, computer simulations, or other tools that accurately reflect the terrain. The staff posts the COA
on a map displaying the area of operations. Tools required include, but are not limited to—
z
Running estimates.
z
Threat templates and models.
z
Civil considerations overlays, databases, and data files.
z
Modified combined obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrices.
z
A recording method.
z
Completed COAs, including graphics.
z
A means to post or display enemy and friendly unit symbols and other organizations.
z
A map of the area of operations.
List All Friendly Forces
9-127. The commander and staff consider all units that can be committed to the operation, paying special
attention to support relationships and constraints. This list includes assets from all participants operating in
the area of operations. The friendly forces list remains constant for all COAs.
List Assumptions
9-128. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued validity and necessity. Any
changes resulting from this review are noted for record.
List Known Critical Events and Decision Points
9-129. A critical event is an event that directly influences mission accomplishment. Critical events
include events that trigger significant actions or decisions (such as commitment of an enemy reserve),
complicated actions requiring detailed study (such as a passage of lines), and essential tasks. The list of
critical events includes major events from the unit’s current position through mission accomplishment. It
includes reactions by civilians that potentially affect operations or require allocation of significant assets to
account for essential stability tasks.
9-130. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a
key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). Decision points may be associated with the
friendly force, the status of ongoing operations, and with CCIRs that describe what information the
commander needs to make the anticipated decision. A decision point requires a decision by the commander.
It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander must make one, and when and where it
should be made to maximally impact friendly or enemy COAs or the accomplishment of stability tasks.
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Select the War-Gaming Method
9-131. Three recommended war-gaming methods exist: belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each considers
the area of interest and all enemy forces that can affect the outcome of the operation. Planners can use the
methods separately or in combination and modified for long-term operations dominated by stability.
9-132. The belt method divides the area of operations into belts (areas) running the width of the area of
operations. The shape of each belt is based on the factors of METT-TC. The belt method works best when
conducting offensive and defensive tasks on terrain divided into well-defined cross-compartments, during
phased operations (such as gap crossings, air assaults, or airborne operations), or when the enemy is
deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons. Belts can be adjacent to or overlap each other.
9-133. This war-gaming method is based on a sequential analysis of events in each belt. Commanders
prefer it because it focuses simultaneously on all forces affecting a particular event. A belt might include
more than one critical event. Under time-constrained conditions, the commander can use a modified belt
method. The modified belt method divides the area of operations into not more than three sequential belts.
These belts are not necessarily adjacent or overlapping but focus on the critical actions throughout the
depth of the area of operations. (See figure 9-7.)
Figure 9-7. Sample belt method
9-134. In stability tasks, the belt method can divide the COA by events, objectives (goals not geographic
locations), or events and objectives in a selected slice across all lines of effort. The belt method consists of
war-gaming relationships among events or objectives on all lines of effort in the belt. (See figure 9-8 on
page 9-29.)
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Figure 9-8. Sample modified belt method using lines of effort
9-135. The avenue-in-depth method focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the
decisive operation. This method is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain
inhibits mutual support. (See figure 9-9.)
Figure 9-9. Sample avenue-in-depth method
9-136. In stability tasks, planners can modify the avenue-in-depth method. Instead of focusing on a
geographic avenue, the staff war-games a line of effort. This method focuses on one line of effort at a time,
beginning with the decisive line. The avenue-in-depth method includes not only war-gaming events and
objectives in the selected line, but also war-gaming relationships among events or objectives on all lines of
effort with respect to events in the selected line. (See figure 9-10 on page 9-30.)
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Figure 9-10. Sample modified avenue-in-depth method using lines of effort
9-137. The box method is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an engagement area, a wet gap
crossing site, or a landing zone. It works best in a time-constrained environment, such as a hasty attack.
The box method is particularly useful when planning operations in noncontiguous areas of operation. When
using this method, the staff isolates the area and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that
friendly units can handle most situations in the area of operations and focus their attention on essential
tasks. (See figure 9-11.)
Figure 9-11. Sample box method
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9-138. In stability tasks, the box method may focus analysis on a specific objective along a line of effort,
such as development of local security forces as part of improving civil security. (See figure 9-12.)
Figure 9-12. Sample modified box method using lines of effort
Select a Technique to Record and Display Results
9-139. The war-game results provide a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize
activities, develop decision support templates, confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders,
and compare COAs. Two techniques are commonly used to record and display results: the synchronization
matrix technique and the sketch note technique. In both techniques, staff members record any remarks
regarding the strengths and weaknesses they discover. The amount of detail depends on the time available.
Unit SOPs address details and methods of recording and displaying war-gaming results.
9-140. The synchronization matrix is a tool the staff uses to record the results of war-gaming that helps
them synchronize a course of action across time, space, and purpose in relationship to potential enemy and
civil actions. The first entry in the left column is the time, event, or phase of the operation. The second
entry is the most likely enemy action. The third entry is the most likely civilian action. The fourth entry is
the decision points for the friendly COA. The remainder of the matrix focuses on selected warfighting
functions, their subordinate tasks, and the unit’s major subordinate commands. (See table 9-3 on page
9-32.)
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