Главная Manuals FM 3-11.4 MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTION (June 2003)
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d.
Miosis.
(1)
Impact. Although MOPP gear may be the most common source of
performance problems during NBC operations, some chemical agents, (primarily the nerve
agents) can produce performance decrements at exposure levels below that which would
cause casualties. The tissues of the eye react to levels of nerve agent vapor that will not
affect other bodily systems. Minute amounts of nerve agent in direct contact with the eyes,
can affect the eyes, causing constriction of the pupil (miosis). Miosis can be expected to
negate or reduce the efficiency of task performance at night, tasks which depend on unaided
night vision. Some examples are aircraft crews, operation of surveillance devices, etc.
Identification of miosis-sensitive critical tasks and protection of critical specialist personnel
should be considered in unit SOPs for operations in a chemical environment.
(2)
Mitigation Measures. The following precautions can be adopted to minimize
the incidence of miosis:
• Performing miosis-sensitive tasks before there is a risk of encountering
miosis-producing hazards.
• Masking when in proximity to ground, equipment, or personnel known
to have been recently contaminated with liquid nerve agent.
• Decontaminating and/or changing protective clothing as soon as possible
for units or individuals known to have been contaminated by liquid nerve agent.
• Allowing contaminated personnel to remain masked as long as possible.
If short unmasking periods are permitted, personnel should be widely dispersed in the open
air, and those known to have been contaminated should be segregated.
• Avoiding bare-hands contact with contaminated surfaces. Protective
gloves should be worn when there is suspicion of contamination and replaced when they
become contaminated. Do not rub eyes.
3.
Psychological Factors
a.
Psychological Impact. NBC warfare threat adds to an already stressful situation,
because it creates unique fears in personnel and isolates them from their environment.
MOPP4 reduces the ability to see and hear clearly and makes it more difficult to recognize
and communicate with others. This creates or increases feelings of isolation and confusion.
The awkwardness of wearing bulky, impermeable garments, gloves, and boots over BDUs
causes frustration and/or claustrophobia in many personnel. Long periods of reduced
mobility and sensory awareness degrade attention and alertness and create or increase
feelings of alienation. Chemical filters in the protective mask make breathing more
difficult. This, too, may create feelings of claustrophobia or panic. Combat stress can cause
significant numbers of psychiatric casualties. Estimates range from 10 to 30 percent,
depending on the duration and intensity of battle. Psychological stress stems not only from
the death and destruction that characterize combat but also from the challenging
C-4
operational conditions—noise, confusion, and loss of sleep. Challenging operational
conditions that create fatigue and cause changes in diet and personal hygiene cause
physiological stress as well.
b.
Mitigation Measures. The adverse impact of psychological stress during MOPP
operations can be minimized by the experience and confidence that realistic training in
MOPP gear with protective mask provides. Use of short rest breaks to provide relief from
MOPP, combined with adequate sleep, food, and drink can sustain performance at optimal
levels (six or more hours of uninterrupted sleep per 24-hour period is optimum; 4 hours is
the minimum for a few days of sustained operations). During the period of 0100 to 0700,
leaders must be aware that the body experiences reduced mental concentration, confusion,
nervousness, and lack of clear thinking. Leaders should plan activities to reduce boredom,
fatigue, inattention, and discomfort. These are major contributors to ineffective
performance.
c.
Other Mitigation Measures. Leaders can minimize the effects of combat stress by
attaining and maintaining a high level of unit cohesion and individual identity. Units must
train together frequently under demanding conditions. If personnel know that they can
overcome adversity together, unit cohesion will be high. Leaders must take a true interest
in the welfare of their personnel and build the confidence necessary to withstand the effects
of stress. Leaders must keep personnel informed about the tactical situation so that the
adverse effects of ambiguity and uncertainty are minimized. Personnel who become
ineffective as a result of combat stress should be given a period of rest and given
reassurance and support by all members of their unit.
4.
Chemical Protective Overgarment Work/Rest Cycles and Water Replacement
Guidelines
Note: The term CPO is used inclusively to refer to all CPOs, such as the JSLIST, BDO, and
saratoga.
a.
The incidence of heat casualties can be reduced if personnel are allowed to lower
their work intensity and/or take more frequent rest breaks. Table C-2 (page C-6) provides
the information necessary to estimate recommended work/rest and water replacement
cycles for various environmental conditions, clothing levels, and work intensities (Table C-1
[page C-1]] provides examples of work intensities for particular missions/tasks). The
work/rest cycle estimates in Table C-2 (page C-6) are based on keeping the risk of heat
casualties below 5 percent.
b.
In minimizing heat stress, work/rest schedules may be supplemented by
microclimate cooling (MCC) systems in which an air-or liquid-cooled vest could be worn
under the overgarment to draw body heat away from the skin. MCC systems are available
with STEPO and inside certain combat vehicles, but MCC options are not usually available
for dismounted personnel. Even when work/rest schedules and MCC are used, an increased
risk of performance degradation and heat casualties is inevitable when wearing MOPP in
hot weather.
C-5
Table C-2. Work/Rest Cycles and Water Replacement Guidelines
WBGT 1, 2
Light (Easy) Work
Moderate Work
Hard (Heavy) Work
Heat
Index
Work/Rest4, 5
Water 3
Work/Rest 4, 5
Water 3
Work/Rest
Water
Category
(°F)
Intake
Intake
Intake
(Qt/hr)
(Qt/hr)
(Qt/hr)
1
78-81.9
No limit
½
No limit
¾
40/20 min
¾
2
82-84.9
No limit
½
50/10 min
¾
30/30 min
1
(Green)
3
85-87.9
No limit
¾
40/20 min
¾
30/30 min
1
(Yellow)
4
88-89.9
No limit
¾
30/30 min
¾
20/40 min
1
(Red)
5
More than
50/10 min
1
20/40 min
1
10/50 min
1
(Black)
90
1 Wearing all MOPP overgarments (MOPP4) adds 10° F to WBGT index.
2 If wearing body armor, add 5° F to WBGT in humid climates.
3 Hourly fluid intake should not exceed 1 ¼ quart, and daily fluid intake should not exceed 12 liters.
4 Rest means minimal physical activity (sitting or standing), accomplished in the shade if possible. The information
pertains to acclimated service personnel.
5 The work/rest time and fluid replacement volumes will sustain performance and hydration for at least 4 hours of
work in the specified heat category. Individual water needs will vary ±¼ qt/hr.
c.
Because of higher body temperatures, personnel in MOPP gear sweat
considerably more than usual. Personnel are aware that they need to remain hydrated,
especially following deployment. Leaders ensure that subordinates maintain proper
hydration, especially in areas of climatic extreme (e.g., desert environments) and they
remain alert to any person showing potential heat stress, stroke, or exhaustion symptoms.
Water must be consumed to replace lost fluids, or dehydration will follow.
d.
The difficulty of drinking in MOPP increases the likelihood of dehydration.
Thirst is not an adequate indicator of dehydration. Personnel will not sense when they are
dehydrated and will fail to replace body water losses, even when drinking water is readily
available. Furthermore, water can be consumed only through the mask drinking tube (no
additives such as electrolyte replacement can be used). The unit chain of command must
take responsibility for enforcing regular and timely fluid replacement in their personnel.
e.
Individuals should go into MOPP at full hydration and drink frequently while
working. That is more effective in maintaining hydration than waiting until rest periods to
drink.
f.
All water (and ice cubes) consumed must be from a medically approved source to
prevent waterborne illnesses. Individuals should carry as much water as possible when
separated from medically approved water sources. Plain water is the beverage of choice,
and personnel will be more likely to drink sufficient water if it is palatable. Whenever
possible, provide cool (60 to 70 degrees F) water. It is much better to drink small amounts
of water frequently than to drink large amounts occasionally.
C-6
Appendix D
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
1.
Background
Radiological protection involves using OEG as a critical factor in protecting the force.
Radiation exposure can create casualties and must be monitored as another critical element
of the commander’s force health protection program. Commanders must ensure that
accurate records are kept for their personnel and that previous exposure is considered when
selecting individuals and units for missions. Total dose exposure is critical from two
different standpoints. Based on radiation exposure, commanders assess unit capabilities
and the ability of that asset to perform its mission. Additionally, the individual cumulative
dose of each individual service member represents, on a composite basis, the unit’s
radiation exposure status (RES) category. Additionally, paragraphs 3 and 4 of this appendix
address LLR exposure and DU considerations.
2.
Operational Exposure Guidance
a.
Background.
(1)
OEG gives the commander a flexible system of radiation exposure control.
OEG procedures aid in the successful employment of a unit while keeping the exposure of
personnel to a minimum. Radiation exposure must be controlled to the maximum extent
possible consistent with the mission. If exposure control is ignored, unwarranted risks to
units and personnel will occur. Establishing and using OEG helps the commander keep
radiation exposures to a minimum and still accomplish the mission. OEG is the key for
reducing casualties in a radiological environment.
(2)
All radiation, even in small doses, may have some harmful effect on the
body. Therefore, it is best to avoid all radiation exposures. Exposure should be as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) to minimize exposures that would exceed established OEG
levels.
(3)
Establishing OEG must be based on a unit’s prior exposure because of the
cumulative effect of radiation exposure. The commander establishes an OEG for each
tactical operation. Maintaining accurate historical OEG records is crucial in tracking
previous exposure levels.
(4)
An OEG must be established for each unit and each operation. It must be
based upon the RES of the unit at that time and on the current and projected operational
situation.
(5)
The effective use of radiation exposure records permits rapid determination
of a unit’s potential to operate in a radiologically contaminated area. Dose criteria have
been established in four categories: RES-0, RES-1, RES-2, and RES-3. Dose criteria are
D-1
shown in Table D-1, for each category. This information is based on the best available
estimates on predicting the effects of radiation exposure based on the RES of the unit at
that time and on the operational situation. The commander can decide which unit to select
for a given mission based on the OEG. Each level of command can use the OEG system to
select the best unit to conduct a mission. The commander is assured that personnel will
receive the least exposure possible. Commanders include OEG guidance in OPORDs and
units use OEG and RES guidance to accomplish the mission while minimizing radiation
exposure. Based on the OEG, a unit can determine the turnback dose (Dtb) and turnback
dose rate (Rtb) for a military operation (such as a radiological survey) by using the
following formula
(OEG) - Previous Exposure
Dtb =
2
2 X (OEG - Previous Exposure) X Speed
Rtb =
Distance
Table D-1. Operational Radiation Exposure Status and Risk Criteria
Exposure Criteria for a Single
Radiation Exposure
Total Past Cumulative Dose in Centigray
Operation Which Will Not Result in
Status
Exceeding the Dose Criteria for the
Stated Risk
RES-0 Units
This unit has not had radiation exposure.
Negligible risk, less than 75 cGy
Moderate risk, less than 100 cGy
Emergency risk, greater than 125
cGy
RES-1 Units
The unit has been exposed to more than 0
Negligible risk, less than 35 cGy
and less than or equal to 75 cGy of
Moderate risk, less than 60 cGy
radiation.
Emergency risk, less than 85 cGy
RES-2 Units
The unit has been exposed to more than 75
Further exposure exceeds negligible
and less than or equal to 125 cGy of
or moderate risk.
radiation.
RES-3 Units
The unit has been exposed to more than
Further exposure exceeds
125 cGy of radiation.
emergency risk.
Note: Nuclear RES guidelines specify units in cGy; however, the US Navy is required by the CFR to conduct
radiation monitoring in classic radiation units, such as R, rad, or rem. 1 cGy = 1 rad.
(6)
If the dosimeter reading indicates a Dtb and the dose rate is still
increasing, the unit should leave the contaminated area immediately by the same route it
used to enter the area. If the dose rate is decreasing, the commander must decide whether
to continue through the contaminated area (then return to the unit by a clean route) or
leave immediately by the same route used to enter the area.
b.
Risk Criteria. The degree-of-risk concept helps the commander establish an OEG
for a single operation and minimize the number of radiation casualties. By using the RES
categories (Table D-1) of subordinate units and the acceptable degree of risk, the
commander establishes an OEG based on the degree of risk. There are three degrees of risk:
negligible, moderate, and emergency (See Table D-1). Each risk can be applied to radiation
D-2
hazards from enemy weapons, friendly weapons, or both. Degrees of risk are defined in
percentages of casualties or performance degradation. A casualty is defined as an
individual whose performance effectiveness has dropped by 25 percent from normal.
Specific measures of performance depend on the task. Degradation (nuisance) effects can
include vomiting, skin burns, eardrum rupture, and nausea. These symptoms, at low
radiation levels, may take hours to develop. Individuals thus exposed should be able to
function in the important hours after a nuclear attack and after the first set of symptoms
abate. The casualty data presented in this section is based on a 50 percent confidence level
that the unit is at a 75 percent performance decrement.
(1)
Negligible Risk. Negligible risk is the lowest risk category. The dose is less
than 75 cGy for personnel in RES-0 (with no previous exposure); this dose will not cause
any casualties. Personnel receiving a negligible-risk dose should experience no more than
2.5 percent degradation (nuisance) effects. Negligible risk is acceptable when the mission
requires units to operate in a contaminated area. Negligible risk should not be exceeded
unless a significant advantage will be gained.
(2)
Moderate Risk. Moderate risk is the second risk category. The dose is less
than 100 cGy for personnel in RES-0 (with no previous exposure). This dose generally will
not cause casualties. Troops receiving a moderate-risk dose should experience no more than
5 percent nuisance effects. Moderate risk may be acceptable in close support operations.
Moderate risk must not be exceeded if personnel are expected to operate at full efficiency.
(3)
Emergency Risk. Emergency risk is the final risk category. The dose is any
exposure greater than 125 cGy for personnel in RES-0 with no previous exposure. In this
category, not more than 5 percent casualties are expected. Nuisance effects may exceed the
5 percent level. The emergency-risk dose is only acceptable in rare situations, termed
disaster situations. Only the commander can decide when the risk of the disaster situation
outweighs the radiation emergency risk. The risk criteria for RES-1 and RES-2 categories
are based on assumed average exposures for units in RES-1 and RES-2; this should be used
only when the numerical value of the total past cumulative dose of a unit is unknown.
When the cumulative dose within a category is known, subtract the known dose from the
RES-0 criteria for the degree of use of concern. For example, if a unit in RES-1 received a
dose of 30 cGy, it may receive an additional exposure of 30 cGy before exceeding the
moderate risk.
c.
Low-Level Radiation Guidance. In operational environments such as MOOTW
situations, units are aware of possible LLR exposure (see Table D-2 [page D-4] for LLR
guidance). Commander’s actions follow the same previous guidance: eliminate or minimize
exposure and monitor unit and personnel radiation exposure. (See Table D-3 [page D-6] for
contamination control guidance for missions of 7 or 90 days.)
D-3
Table D-2. Low-Level Radiation Guidance for MOOTW
Total Cumulative
RES Category
Recommended Actions
Dose (See Notes 1, 2)
0 to 0.05 cGy
0
None
0.05 to 0.5 cGy
1A
Record individual dose readings. Initiate
periodic monitoring.
0.5 to 5 cGy
1B
Record individual dose readings. Continue
monitoring.
Initiate rad survey.
Prioritize tasks.
Establish dose control measures as part of
operations.
5 to 10 cGy
1C
Record individual dose readings.
Continue monitoring.
Update survey.
Continue dose control measures.
10 to 25 cGy
1D
Record individual dose readings.
Continue monitoring.
Continue dose control measures.
Update survey.
Execute priority tasks only. 3
25 to 75 cGy
1E
Record individual dose readings.
Continue monitoring.
Continue dose control measures.
Update survey.
Execute critical tasks only. 4
1 The use of the measurement millisieverts (mSv) is preferred in all cases. However, military organizations
normally only have the capability to measure cGy. If the ability to obtain measurements in mSv is not
possible, US forces will use cGy. The USN is required by the code of Federal Regulations to conduct
radiation monitoring in classic radiation units such as R, Rad, or REM. 1cGy = 1 rad.
2 All doses should be kept as low as reasonably achievable. This will reduce individual risk as well as retain
maximum operational flexability for future employment of exposed persons.
3 Examples of priority tasks are those that avert danger to persons and prevent damage from spreading.
4 Examples of critical tasks are those that save lives.
d.
Radiation Exposure Records.
(1)
The OEG concept requires that all units maintain radiation exposure
records. Radiation exposure records are maintained at wing, shipboard, brigade, and
regimental levels of command.
(2)
The NBC staff maintains RES records for all assigned and attached units.
The records are based on exposure data received daily or following a mission in a
radiologically contaminated area. The unit SOP indicates specific reporting procedures.
Monthly records are maintained according to the unit SOP.
e.
Processing Data.
(1)
The data from flight/section/platoon elements is passed to the applicable
NBC control center (NBCCC). Readings from tactical dosimeters (AN/UDR-13, IM93, or
DT236) are averaged on a daily basis, and an informal record is maintained at
D-4
flight/section/platoon level. The IM93, which works on the principle of electrical collection of
ions, is recharged after each report is submitted or every three days, whichever occurs first.
The AN/UDR-13 can record the total dose for a specific period of time. Prior to nuclear
operations, each unit will read 10 percent of the total DT236s weekly to ensure that no
leakage has occurred. After nuclear operations have commenced in the theater of
operations, one third of the DT236s will be read daily. The DT236s have a response time of
24 hours and ±30 percent accuracy. This is due to the process that the DT236 uses to record
radiation levels (Note: The DT236 is part of the AN/PDR-75.)
(2)
The preferred method of recording individual exposure is based on analysis
of each person’s dosimeter; however, situations may occur in which LLR individual
dosimeters are not available for all potentially exposed personnel. In such situations and
when dosimeters become lost or damaged, special advisors should be consulted for
acceptable, alternative methods of assessing and recording individual exposures.
(3)
Wing, ship, brigade, and battalion elements record and maintain the status
on each assigned or attached element. An overall RES status is reported to the commander
and his staff.
3.
Low-Level Radiation
a.
Background.
(1)
Prior procedures for the management of radiation exposure basically
assume that nuclear hazards will arise following a nuclear exchange; both procedures and
equipment reflect this. There must be concern, however, for the immediate employment of
personnel (survive to operate), their combat capability, and the health effects on
individuals.
(2)
Radiation hazards could emanate from sources other than a nuclear-
weapon burst and in circumstances other than strategic attack (general war), including
MOOTW situations. Although in some circumstances, the radiation exposures could be high
(e.g., greater than 75cGy) and result in short-term medical effects among the exposed
personnel, it is expected that much lower dose levels are more likely to be encountered in
future operations.
(3)
The purpose of this section is to provide guidelines to the commander for
the protection of personnel during military operation in LLR environments, while
maintaining the operational capability of the deployed force.
D-5
Table D-3. Contamination Control Guidance
(For up to a 7-day mission or within a 90-day mission)
Radiation
Contamination Level Below Which RES Will Not Be Exceeded Bq/cm 2, 5
Exposure Status
Equipment and Protective Clothing 1 or Skin 3
High-Toxic Alpha
Beta And Low-toxic
Beta Only
Emitters²
Alpha Emitters
Category 1A
5 (7 days)⁵
50 (7 days)
10 (up to one event⁴)
0.05 to 0.5 cGy
0.5 (90 days)
5 (90 days)
Category 1B
50 (7 days)⁵
500 (7 days)
10 (10 events⁴)
0.5 to 5 cGy
5 (90 days)
50 (90 days)
Category 1C
100 (7 days)⁵
1,000 (7 days)
10 (50 events⁴)
5 to 10 cGy
10 (90 days)
100 (90 days)
Category 1D
250 (7 days)⁵
2,500 (7 days)
10 (50 events⁴)
10 to 25 cGy
25 (90 days)
250 (90 days)
Category 1E
700 (7 days)⁵
7,000 (7 days)
10 (50 events⁴)
25 to 75 cGy
70 (90 days)
700 (90 days)
1 Calculations assume that contamination is removed by decontamination.
2 All alpha-emitting isotopes, except uranium, are assumed to be highly toxic.
3 The handling of contaminated equipment without wearing protective clothing is allowed only when the contamination
levels do not exceed those of Category 1A.
4 The parentheses refer to the maximum allowable number of contamination events that can occur, regardless of
where each contamination appears on the body. Decontamination must be performed as soon as possible after each
event. Each event may involve multiple sites.
5 A becquerel (Bq) is an international system unit of activity that is equal to one nuclear transformation (disintegration)
per second. 1 Bq = 2.7x10-11 Curies (Ci) =27.03 picocuries (pCi)
b.
Definitions. LLR is radiation resulting from any cause other than the immediate
nuclear radiation and subsequent direct radioactive fallout from the detonation of a nuclear
weapon.
c.
LLR Characteristics.
(1)
LLR is always present as background radiation; LLR varies considerably
throughout the world and can even vary considerably within a small locality. It complicates
detection quantification and, hence, interpretation of an LLR hazard.
(2)
LLR may be comprised of dispersed radioactive material (in solid, liquid,
gaseous, or vapor form), or it may be in the form of discrete sources. Alpha, beta, gamma,
and neutron radiation may present LLR hazards:
(a) Alpha radiation has a very limited range in air (centimeters) and is
not able to penetrate clothing or intact skin. Alpha radiation-emitting material represents
no hazard while outside the body; but in sufficient quantity, it can deliver large radiation
doses to individual organs and may become a serious health hazard if ingested or inhaled.
(b) Beta radiation has a short range in air (meters), is attenuated by
clothing, and can be stopped by relatively thin layers of most solid materials. Beta
radiation-emitting material represents a hazard if inhaled or ingested and may result in
D-6
high skin doses from external exposures that can manifest into beta burns. Most
radioactive materials emit both beta radiation and gamma radiation.
(c)
Gamma radiation is easy to detect, but it may be absorbed and
diminished in intensity by dense materials (shielding). Gamma radiation-emitting material
is able to deliver radiation doses to the whole body while remaining outside the body.
(d) Neutron radiation is penetrating but may be diminished by
interacting with low, atomic number materials. Such interactions may result in the
production of gamma radiation, thus producing multiple types of radiation hazards.
Neutron radiation-emitting material is able to deliver radiation doses to the whole body
while remaining outside the body.
d.
LLR Sources.
(1)
Civil Nuclear Facilities. These facilities may include those for power
generation; research; and for the processing, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste.
(2)
Industrial and Medical Materials. Wide-scale use of radioactive sources
includes the testing of industrial products, medical or diagnostic treatment, equipment
sterilization, and food processing.
(3)
Radiological Dispersal Devices. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are
designed to release radioactive materials into the environment. This can be achieved by
combining nuclear materials with conventional explosives or combustion to produce
radioactive particles or smoke.
(4)
Radioisotopes. LLR exposure may be caused by radioisotopes in highly
occupied positions, such as aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), seaports of debarkation
(SPODs), or personnel staging areas.
(5)
Nuclear-Weapon Release. A nuclear-weapon release is the spread of fallout
or rainout resulting from the distant (outside the AO) or earlier use (within the AO) of
nuclear weapons.
(6)
Military Commodities. Some military munitions (e.g., DU) and equipment
contain radioactive material, which may present a radiation hazard if disrupted.
e.
Risk Management.
(1)
Radiation exposure control measures will reflect the need to balance the
duty of care for individuals (recognizing immediate potential hazards, and the risks of long-
term health effects) against the achievement of a military task that might involve life-
threatening activities. Consequently, when planning or implementing operations where
LLR may be or become a factor for consideration, commanders must be capable of making
informed and balanced judgments between their operational obligations at the time and
their duty-of-care responsibilities. Furthermore, the over-riding principal governing all
exposure to radiation is keeping such exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
D-7
(2)
Tables D-2 and D-3 (pages D-4 and D-6) provide LLR exposure guidance
and contamination control guidance for commanders. They show radiation exposure
categories and associated doses and recommends actions appropriate to mitigating the risk
to individuals. Although the dose contributed by ingestion or inhalation of radioactive
material (known as internal dose), by partial body irradiations from gamma rays, and by
skin irradiations from beta particles cannot be accurately measured in the field, it can be
estimated for operational purposes. Depending on the type of radioactive material and its
dispersed form, the radiation dose to the tissues and organs can be much larger than the
external dose recorded on a dosimeter. Consequently, respiratory and skin protection must
be considered whenever the hazard analysis establishes that there is a potential risk for
exceeding exposure guidance standards.
(3)
Military operations may require that national peacetime regulations
governing exposure be exceeded. This may be the case particularly in humanitarian, life-
saving and/or emergency situations. All exposure to radiation must be justified by necessity
and subject to controls that maintain ALARA doses. Some of the controls are as follows:
• Inform the local civil authorities.
• Call for a special monitoring team.
• Make an estimate and plan of the control measures necessary to contain
the LLR hazard. This should include adherence to the commander’s OEG limit, further
evacuation of the hazard area (if required), and controlled access.
• Conduct a survey, and confirm the extent of the LLR hazard if LLR
detection equipment and trained personnel are available.
• Monitor the exposure of personnel who must remain within the hazard
area for operational reasons. These measures will be the responsibility of the commander.
• Ensure that dosimeters are issued if available. Forces should adopt
respiratory and skin protection measures until analysis establishes that no potential risk
for exceeding internal or skin exposure guidance standards exist.
• Prevent further access into the defined hazard area and consider OEG
guidance and/or decontamination sites as necessary.
• Ensure that food and water from the area is uncontaminated if it is to
be used.
• Review procedures for limiting the resuspension of ground
contamination if appropriate.
f.
Contamination Control Considerations. Planning for contamination control can
include the following considerations:
• Confirmation of the authorized dose limits and the adequacy of exposure
control measures for forces remaining within the hazard area for operational reasons.
D-8
Where dosimeters have not been issued, the level of dose and exposure time will have to be
estimated and recorded.
• Decontamination in order to render the personnel and equipment leaving the
hazard area safe (specialist advice and monitoring equipment may be required depending
on the nature of the contamination).
• Reconnaissance and survey to confirm and mark the area, nature, and
intensity of the hazard. Monitoring should continue until operations in that area are
concluded.
g.
LLR Planning. After assessment, LLR planning addresses the following
considerations:
• The nature and potential extent of any identified risks including a
description of the possible accident or incident scenarios.
• Identification of what RADIAC detection equipment is immediately available
in the area of operation and, therefore, what LLR hazard can be detected.
• The immediate and control actions (including advisory dose limits and the
circumstances and authority required to exceed each incremental dose limit) appropriate to
current local conditions.
• The issue of available equipment (including dosimeters, spectrometer,
decontamination, and medical measures).
• The means of assessing national technical advice and support to extend the
detection/monitoring capabilities in the AO.
• Arrangements for obtaining specialist personnel and equipment, such as
coordinating for teams that are prepared to sample and identify radiological agents.
• The informing and training of personnel.
h.
LLR Hazard Avoidance Considerations. When in the AO, commanders should
avoid exposing their personnel to LLR hazards by taking the following measures:
• Obtain information regarding potential hazard areas.
• Be aware of HN nuclear facilities and other possible radioactive sources and
respect their installation control measures.
• Restrict and closely control entry to areas marked by radiological warning
signs.
• Ensure troops do not tamper with containers marked with radiological
warning signs.
D-9
• Treat all suspect waste dumps and potential hazard sites with care until
proven clear.
i.
LLR Protection Considerations (Initial Actions). When a hazard is identified, the
following actions should be taken:
• Evacuate military personnel (if the situation permits) from the area of
release if it is confined (e.g., inside a hospital). Otherwise, evacuate the area to a radius as
determined by on-scene personnel, taking into account the current military situation. As an
immediate guide, evacuation can be to distances where operationally significant radiation
levels (10 times the natural background readings at 1 meter above the ground) no longer
exist. In the absence of any specific guidance or when under unusual or unforseen
constraints, evacuation to a radial distance of 1 kilometer from the suspected radiation
release point may be employed.
• Report the hazard verbally and by using NBC reports.
• Identify the need and the means to report the hazard, including the warning
of other forces and the HN.
• Provide specialists to establish the exact nature of the LLR hazard, the
extent of the contamination, and the long-term plan of action.
j.
LLR Force Health Protection Considerations. Force health protection
considerations include the following actions:
• Record LLR exposure on personal medical records for long-term health
monitoring. This will involve the medical chain.
• Continue to accurately monitor LLR dose rates.
• Contain and secure the hazard. Obtain samples for detailed analysis and
identification.
• Conduct long-term health monitoring for those personnel who have been
exposed to radiation on completion of the operation. Postoperation assessment of internal
doses may also be required.
k.
LLR Psychological Casualties.
(1)
Psychological casualties would seem to be insignificant compared to the
casualties from physical trauma, but they can dramatically alter the outcome of an
operation. The neuropsychiatric casualties of World War II were the largest single cause of
lost military strength in that war. Complicating matters further, psychological stress can
mimic the early symptoms and signs of acute radiation injury. Gastrointestinal symptoms
(nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea), fatigue, and headaches were frequent symptoms during
episodes of battle fatigue in World War II. In an RDD or a nuclear incident scenario,
psychological stress is also a factor. Even if neuropsychiatric trauma does not produce a
casualty, it can degrade the performance of normal duties. Slightly altered reaction times,
inattention, or motivation have important consequences across the entire spectrum of
D-10
military operations. Regardless of the situation, it must be emphasized that the most
extreme psychological damage occurs when physiological symptoms from an unknown toxic
exposure become manifest.
(2)
An RDD or a nuclear incident would likely produce acute anxiety effects,
including psychosomatic effects such as nausea and vomiting. Symptoms of acute radiation
sickness in just a few personnel might trigger an outbreak of similar symptoms in the unit
and/or in the civilian populace.
(3)
Exposure or perceived exposure to radiation can be expected to increase the
number of psychological stress casualties. The number of casualties will also depend on the
level of leadership, cohesiveness, and morale in the unit. Long-term chronic psychological
stress patterns could be expected to arise from the uncertainty about the effects of exposure
to radiation. Some of the potential effects include phobias, depression, and posttraumatic
stress disorder.
(4)
The most frequent psychological effect after disasters is a temporary
emotional disruption where people are stunned or dazed; this transient response may last
minutes or days. Typically, such individuals will be able to respond to strong leadership
and direction. Another psychological response is to become more efficient in the face of
danger; this is more likely in well-trained units with high morale. A third type of response
is that of a psychological casualty, where the transient emotional disruption continues and
is more severe. Reactions include stunned, mute behavior; tearful helplessness; apathy;
inappropriate activity; and preoccupation with somatic symptoms (often of emotional
origin).
(5)
The most stressful effects of a fallout field or contaminated area are likely
to be the uncertainties of the levels of radiation present, the lack of defined boundaries of
the area, and the perceived acute and chronic effects of radiation.
(6)
Even in the absence of actual exposure, thoughts that one has been exposed
to radiation may cause fear and anxiety.
(7)
The treatment of psychological stress resulting from actual or perceived
exposure to radiation is the same as that for battle fatigue. The principles of proximity,
immediacy, expectancy, and simplicity are the cornerstones of treatment.
(8)
Prevention, when possible, is always preferred to treatment. Prior to
deployment to an area where nuclear and radiological hazards are present, medical
personnel can implement programs on behalf of line commanders that instruct their units
about radiation and its effects. In general, personnel who are psychologically prepared for
specific stresses are better able to endure them and will suffer fewer and less severe
adverse reactions. This same principle is widely used in preparing troops to cope with
MOPP gear, chemical agent exposure, and other adverse environments. Postexposure
training will be much less effective.
D-11
4.
Depleted Uranium
a.
Background. DU is an extremely dense metal used in munitions to penetrate
heavy armor or as protective shielding (armor packages).
b.
Exposure. DU exposure and incidents may occur anytime there is damage to the
DU armor package—a vehicle is hit with DU munitions, DU munitions are damaged, or
equipment components containing DU are damaged. The DU armor can be damaged during
vehicle maneuvers, on-board fires, maintenance activities, or ballistic impacts. DU
munition problems may occur as an occupational exposure during storage, transportation,
combat, testing, or manufacturing. DU contamination may be present on the ground in
areas where equipment was destroyed or damaged.
c.
Contamination. DU contamination may include DU oxides (dust), contaminated
shrapnel, munitions components, or armor components. DU primarily emits alpha
particles; however, beta, gamma, and X-ray ionizing radiation are also emitted. DU
contamination can be inhaled, ingested, injected, or absorbed through open cuts or wounds.
DU contamination does not pose an immediate health risk. Consequently, contamination
should be removed from personnel or vehicle surfaces when directed by the unit commander
based on METT-T. See Table D-4 for information on recommended maximum-permissible
contamination levels.
d.
Presence of DU. Visual signs that DU contamination is present immediately
after a high-heat event (impact and/or fire) include heavy, dull black dust or small round
holes. DU fragments or residues that have weathered in the environment may exhibit a
green or yellow appearance. DU contamination can only be verified with a radiac meter. An
AN/VDR-2 or AN/PDR-77 with an alpha probe or beta (flat pancake) probe is used to detect
and measure DU contamination. Care should be taken when surveying with the alpha
probe to prevent puncturing the probe window, which renders the probe useless.
e.
Protection. When working on or within DU-contaminated equipment, personnel
must wear gloves, use respiratory protection (e.g., painter mask, bandana, surgical mask),
and wear coveralls or roll down their sleeves and blouse their trousers as directed by unit
chemical or medical personnel.
f.
Procedures. General procedures to follow when working around DU include the
following:
• Use a radiac meter to determine if DU-contamination is present.
• Provide protection, including appropriate clothing, for workers as directed by
unit NBC or medical personnel.
• Identify what is to be decontaminated.
• Obtain necessary equipment and materials.
• Brush, wash, or wipe off contamination with a damp cloth. Use a high-
efficiency, particulate air (HEPA) vacuum cleaner if available.
D-12
• Work from the outside to the inside of the contaminated area.
• Cover fixed contamination with tape, paint, paper, plastic, or other disposable
material.
• Use the standard, double-bag and-tag process for hazardous waste. The only
contaminated waste generated by DU will be the vacuum cleaner bags after use on multiple
vehicles.
Table D-4. Recommended Maximum-Permissible Contamination Levels
Contaminated Item
Corrective
Maximum Alpha Levels
Maximum Beta Levels
Action
Fixed¹
Removable²
Fixed¹
Removable²
(dpm/100
(dpm/100
(mrad/hr at
(dpm/100 cm2)
cm2)
cm2)
2.5 cm)
1. Personal clothing,
See note 1
200
None
0.05
None
including shoes
2. Personal:
a. General
See note 1
1,000
200
0.02
1,000
b. Respirators
See note 1
200
None
0.06
None
c. Laundry
See note 2
--
--
--
--
3. Work area and
See note 1
5,000
500
0.05
500
equipment
(unrestricted use)
4. Vehicles
See note 3
1,000
500
0.05
500
(unrestricted use)
5. Skin
a. Body
See note 4
200
None
0.06
None
b. Hands
See note 4
400
None
0.06
None
¹ Measured with a calibrated radiation measurement instrument.
² Determined using smears analyzed with a calibrated counting system.
Notes:
1. Replace or dispose of radioactive waste if above limits.
2. Launder, wash or dispose of radioactively contaminated equipment with careful contamination control.
3. Decontaminate if above limits.
4. Continue decontamination if above limits.
5. DPM: Disintegrations per minute.
D-13
Appendix E
TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS-
AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL
FILTER PERFORMANCE
1.
Background
This appendix provides information and data on the assessment of NBC filter
performance as they relate to protection against selected TICs. The filter performance data
only provides supporting technical information for NBC planners. The TIC protection
actions described in Chapter II remain as the primary basis for a response to an incident or
accident. The most important action in case of massive TIM release is immediate
evacuation outside the path of the hazard. The greatest risk from a large-scale, toxic-
chemical release occurs when personnel receive little or no warning, are unable to escape
the immediate area, and are overcome by vapors. Military respirators and protective
clothing may provide only limited protection against TIC. Units use the US Department of
Transportation, Emergency Response Guidebook, and FM 8-500, Hazardous Materials
Injuries; a Handbook for Prehospital Care, to identify protection requirements for specific
material. The protective mask and ensemble and military standard COLPRO filters will
likely provide only limited protection.
Important considerations are required when assessing potential TIM releases and
protection, detection, and documentation capabilities and limitations available to forces
using military NBC defense equipment. During TIM releases, the local military response
should be local area evacuation (directly out of the downwind hazard plume,
perpendicularly to the downwind direction, and uphill if possible). Individual military
protective equipment use in unknown TIM release areas is only appropriate as an
emergency escape means. Fixed TIM sites allow for friendly force preplanning to avoid
positioning resources in potential TIM release hazard areas. Mobile TIM transport means
could cause TIM release events (with little notice) that could occur unexpectedly with
dangerous, unknown combinations of substances that may be toxic, flammable, and/or
water-reactive.
2.
Filter System Operations
a.
This assessment applies to multiple sets of NBC filters (e.g., C2A1 canister,
M12A2 gas filter, M18 gas filter, M49 gas filter, M48 gas filter, M23 Filter. 200 CFM filter,
and Advanced, Integrated Collective Protection System [AICPS] filter). The fact that US
NBC filters are designed to process equivalent amounts of chemicals per quantity of
activated carbon enables the performance of specific filters to be estimated from a single
filter configuration.
b.
NBC filtration systems consist of a particulate filter to remove liquid and solid
phase toxic particulate materials followed by a vapor filter to remove vapor phase toxic
chemicals. The vapor filter consists of activated carbon, which has been impregnated with
E-1
reactive materials. This impregnated and activated carbon filters vapors by two
mechanisms—physical adsorption in the pores of the activated carbon and chemical
reaction with the impregnants. Low-vapor pressure chemicals, such as nerve and mustard
agents, are removed very effectively by physical adsorption alone in the microporous
structure of the carbon. Relatively high-vapor pressure agents, such as the blood agents
(cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide), are not strongly, physically adsorbed and will
quickly penetrate a nonreactive activated carbon. Thus, specific reactive chemicals have
been identified which chemically decompose those high-vapor pressure agents. These
reactive chemicals are impregnated on the activated carbon so as to provide effective
filtration of all chemical warfare agents.
c.
CW agent vapor filters contain the reactive adsorbent ASC carbon (ASC is not an
acronym; but it is a specific designator for activated carbon that has been impregnated with
type ASC solution, which is a mixture of copper, chromium and silver) or they contain
ASZM-TEDA (copper-silver-zinc-molybdenum-triethylenediamine) carbon (a chromium-free
carbon). The protection provided by these two sorbents against CW agents is nearly
equivalent. Both ASC carbon and ASZM-TEDA carbon were developed specifically to filter
CW agent vapors. However, the adsorbents are also effective in filtering a wide variety of
industrial chemical vapors, particularly those that are strongly adsorbed.
3.
Filter Assessment
a.
Historically, CW agents have consisted primarily of analogs of nerve, mustard,
cyanide, and arsine—as well as a number of industrial-type chemicals, such as chlorine,
phosgene, and chloropicrin. Of the tens of thousands of TIC produced worldwide, there are
many that present an aerosol hazard and are produced in large quantities. A trinational
group (the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom) researched the broad issue of industrial-
based chemicals, and the study effort resulted in the identification of selected TIC that are
widely produced, stored, and transported; easily vaporized; and highly toxic (see Table E-1).
The selected chemicals were prioritized into three hazard index rankings as provided by an
international task force: 21 high, 41 medium, and 36 low-hazard vapors and gases.
E-2
Table E-1. Protection Afforded by NBC Filters for Selected TIC
High Hazard
Medium Hazard
Low Hazard
ammonia - P
acetone cyanohydrin - M
allyl isothiocyanate - E
arsine - E
acrolein - P
arsenic trichloride - M
boron trichloride - E
acrylonitrile - P
bromine - P
boron trifluoride - E
allyl alcohol - M
bromine chloride - M
carbon disulfide - P
allyl amine - P
bromine pentafluoride - M
chlorine - E
allyl chlorocarbonate - M
bromine trifluoride - M
diborane - E
boron tribromide - M
carbonyl fluoride - P
ethylene oxide - P
carbon monoxide - P
chlorine pentafluoride - M
fluorine - E
carbonyl sulfide - P
chlorine trifluoride - M
formaldehyde - P
chloroacetone - M
chloroacetaldehyde - M
hydrogen bromide - E
chloroacetonitrile - M
chloroacetyl chloride - M
hydrogen chloride - E
chlorosulfonic acid - E
cyanogen - E
hydrogen cyanide - E
crotonaldehyde - M
diphenylmethane-4 diisocyanate - E
hydrogen fluoride - E
diketene - M
ethyl chloroformate - M
hydrogen sulfide - E
1,2-dimethyl hydrazine - P
ethyl chlorothioformate - E
nitric acid, fuming - P
dimethyl sulfate - E
ethylene imine - P
phosgene - E
ethylene dibromide - M
ethylphosphonothioicdichloride - E
phosphorus trichloride - E
hydrogen selenide - P
ethyl phosphonous dichloride - M
sulfur dioxide - E
iron pentacarbonyl - M
hexachlorocyclopentadiene - E
sulfuric acid - E
methanesulfonyl chloride - E
hydrogen iodide - P
tungsten hexafluoride - E
methyl bromide - P
isobutyl chloroformate - M
methyl chloroformate - P
isopropyl chloroformite - M
methyl chlorosilane - P
n-butyl chloroformate - M
methyl hydrazine - M
nitric oxide - P
methyl isocyanate - P
n-propyl chloroformate - M
methyl mercaptan - P
isopropyl - P
n-butyl isocyanate - M
parathion - E
nitrogen dioxide - P
perchloromethyl mercaptan - E
phosphine - M
sec-butyl chloroformate - M
trichloroacetyl chloride - M
sulfuryl fluoride - P
phosphorus oxychloride - M
tert-butyl isocyanate - M
phosphorus pentafluoride - P
tetraethyl lead - E
selenium hexafluoride - E
tetraethyl pyrophosphate - E
silicon tetrafluoride - P
tetramethyl lead - M
stibine - P
toluene 2,4-diisocyanate - E
sulfur trioxide - M
toluene 2,6-diisocyanate - E
sulfuryl chloride - P
tellurium hexafluoride - P
tert-octyl mercaptan - E
titanium tetrachloride - E
trifluoroacetyl chloride - P
Legend: Filter Effective (E); Marginally (M); Poor (P).
b. The listing of the TIC (Table E-1) represents a broad range of physical and chemical
properties. Chemical families consist of halides (fluoride, chloride, bromide, and iodide), cyanides,
cyanates, amines, oxides of carbon and nitrogen, ketones, aldehydes, esters, phosphates, thiols, and heavy
metals (lead and titanium). This information shows that about 75 percent of the chemicals have a vapor
pressure above 10 mm mercury, a state at which the strength of physical adsorption is reduced more
rapidly on activated carbon and is a greater concern with respect to desorption.
c. Table E-1 provides, in summary form, assessment results of the protection afforded by
NBC filters to the selected TICs. The filter assessment indicated that many of the TIC could be effectively
removed by the filter (effective), minimally removed by the filter (poor), or partially removed by the filter
31 December 2009
FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, C1
E-3
(marginal). However, variables, such as being near the explosive and meteorological conditions, could
affect the assessment. Several of the TICs were effectively removed by NBC filters; however, almost
equal numbers were assessed as performing poorly (P) or marginally (M).
d. Table E-1 provides data to only support unit planning. For example, this data could be
used to support risk assessments based on IPB evaluations (e.g., types of TIC found in an AOI) furnished
by the intelligence officer or the staff surgeon. However, military units (except for special-purpose units
like EOD or HAZMAT response teams) lack the capability to detect most TIC; the unit response to TIC
incidents/accidents remains as described in Chapter II.
Note: This summary only addresses several of the TIC that represent an aerosol hazard and are produced
in large quantities. There are many other TIC that present other hazards such as flammability and oxygen
depletion, etc. Consult the technical references for specific information on TIC hazards, safety
considerations, and other applicable emergency response guidelines.
E-4
FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, C1
31 December 2009
Appendix F
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
1.
Background
This appendix provides an overview of NEOs and provides information that could be
used to support military unit planning and noncombatant evacuees (NCEs). The primary
focus of an NEO is to move NCEs safely and quickly away from danger.
(Note: The information provided in this appendix is very general. Specific details will vary
depending on individual situations, and detailed prior planning by commanders will help
support successful mission execution.)
2.
Planning
Military planners recognize the importance of NEO and its direct link to successful
mission accomplishment. Military planners involved in the NEO planning and execution
consider several aspects affecting its potential implementation:
• All American citizens should be treated equally.
• US citizens have evacuation priority, but NEO execution may also involve support
to NCE who are not US citizens. Other nations are expected to request evacuation support
from the US Department of State (DOS). Upon DOS approval, third-country nationals
(TCNs) from countries who have been authorized assistance will be included in the NEO
processing.
• NEO support planning covers the response to any crisis that could lead to a
decision to direct an ordered evacuation.
3.
Stages of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
There are five stages of an NEO—alert, assembly, relocation, evacuation, and repatriation.
a.
Alert. NCEs will be notified of an impending crisis that may require relocation or
evacuation and be provided appropriate instructions from commanders through their
installation NEO representatives.
b.
Assembly. Following instructions to assemble, NCEs will move to an evacuation
control center (ECC). Some NCEs may be instructed to remain in their quarters or existing
shelters to minimize the risk and ensure a manageable flow into the evacuation system.
c.
Relocation. The movement of NCEs to another location is called relocation.
Relocation will be conducted to move NCEs from ECCs to sites of greater relative safety
called relocation centers (RCs) or APODs where they will board transportation.
F-1
d.
Evacuation. The movement of NCEs from an area to a safe haven is called
evacuation.
e.
Repatriation. Upon arrival in CONUS, NCEs are repatriated.
4.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Environment
This paragraph outlines some of the hazards that could face NEO personnel in a
contaminated environment and describes individual survivability methods (with and
without specialized equipment).
a.
Planning Considerations. The following planning considerations may apply; however,
each NEO situation will be different:
(1)
Most airlift NEO evacuations may take place during retrograde time-
phased, force and deployment operations (e.g., military forces and equipment brought to the
APOD will be downloaded from the aircraft, the NEO passengers and equipment will be
loaded as necessary, and the aircraft will depart for a location outside of the immediate
threat area).
(2)
Some NEO personnel may be present at APODs during attack situations.
(3)
Most NEO personnel will probably not have respiratory protection and/or
protective overgarments.
b.
Transforming Living Quarters or Other Facilities into NBC Collective Protective
Shelters. Certain key things must be understood about the nature of NBC agents and their
interaction with the environment when planning the transformation of facilities into
protective shelters for NEO personnel. In most cases, hazardous CB agent vapors will
remain relatively low to the ground. Consequently, shelters established on the second or
third floors of buildings will typically be safer from CB agents than locations on the ground
floor.
(1)
When transforming areas into CPSs, consider the following factors and
select the area based on—
• Size requirements (the number of people expected to use the shelter and
the expected duration of stay).
• Access to a telephone.
• Access to running water, cooking facilities, etc.
• The distance above ground level (the higher the better).
• The distance from nearest vegetation (the farther the better).
F-2
• The realistic number of VBs that can be constructed between the shelter
area and ground level.
• The number and location of agent access points to the inside of the
facility (e.g., doors, windows, fireplaces, external air vents).
(2)
Additionally, consider taking the following actions when preparing the CPS.
(a) Cover and seal with tape all direct access points to the inside of the
facility (fireplaces, external air vents, etc.).
(b) Select one entry/exit point for the facility. If possible, use the
entry/exit point that has the most concrete or asphalt (minimum soil or vegetation)
immediately around it. Lock all other doors. Leave the keys in the doors in case an
emergency escape is necessary.
(c)
Create a decontamination station just inside the entry/exit door. This
station may include bleach in containers (troughs) (for personnel to step into) and hand
buckets (for glove and/or hand decontamination). The entry/exit door should also have a
container for contaminated-item disposal and a sharp knife or pair of scissors for cutting off
contaminated clothing.
(d) Minimize splintering by taping windows and boarding them with
plywood, cardboard, or some other suitable material.
(e) Use a substance, such as duct tape, to seal all potential agent access
areas (doors, windows, openings around window air conditioners, etc.).
(f)
Create artificial VBs by taping large, plastic sheets to the walls inside
hallways, the top and bottom of stairwells, etc.
(g) Construct a personnel safety zone in the center of the living area
(location where personnel will remain during attack situations). Accomplish this by—
• Creating a physical barrier between the personnel safety zone and
the outside building wall by moving furniture (dressers, chairs, bookcases, etc.) around the
safety zone.
• Erecting a tent or similar structure in the safety zone. This
structure will serve as the final protective layer during an attack situation. The object is to
prevent physical contact with contamination if an explosion breaches the outer wall.
(h) Turn off the air conditioners/heating systems, or ensure that they can
be turned off within seconds if an attack warning is received.
(i)
Determine the suitability of air supply in the living area (amount and
staleness). When the shelter is known to be in an uncontaminated area, unseal an access
point, let fresh air in, and reseal the access point if necessary.
(j)
Ensure that the following items are accessible:
F-3
• Decontamination buckets and materials (to include knife/scissors
and containers for contaminated-waste disposal.
• Food and water supplies. Personnel should have enough food and
water to last at least 72 hours without requiring electric or gas cooking facilities.
• Fire extinguisher.
• Light sources (preferably flashlights with a supply of batteries).
• Clothing.
c.
Protection Afforded by Various Clothing Items. It is important to realize that
clothing items other than specialized protective equipment will provide a degree of
protection against agent contamination and exposure. The following are recommended
clothing items to include levels and layers to aid in protection:
(1)
During Attack. In order to maximize protection, NEO personnel should
have at least two layers of clothing (in addition to underwear) on at the time of attack. This
configuration would allow the removal of contaminated outer garments while still retaining
a degree of protection from contact with the agent or its vapors. Specifically, NEO personnel
should adhere to the following concepts:
• The acquisition of respiratory protection is the utmost priority.
• Military issue protective masks should be used. If they are not
available, personnel should acquire commercially available carbon filter, vapor protection
masks (e.g., paint or pesticide delivery masks). Dust or surgical masks are not appropriate.
If commercial masks are not available, personnel should fashion a close-knit material
around their noses and mouths. The material should be wetted with water.
• The inner clothing layer should cover as much of the body as possible
(e.g., long pants and shirts versus shorts and T-shirts).
• The inner clothing layer should consist of dense, tightly-woven fabrics
(e.g., denim versus cotton-knitted materials).
• The outer clothing layer should be water-resistant (e.g., poncho or
raincoat).
• The outer clothing layer should have minimal seams, zippers, and
buttons. Each of these areas represents a weak spot compared to the rest of the garment.
• A hood or hat should be worn to provide protection for the head area.
The same concepts (dense, tightly-woven fabric) used for clothing also apply to the best
choice of material for a hood or hat.
• Gloves should be worn.
F-4
• Heavy boots (covering the ankle) are the best choice. If available, outer,
heavy rubber, rain boots should be worn over inner shoes. The inner shoes should have
rubber or hard-leather soles.
• Garment openings (in between buttons or snaps, sleeve openings, etc.)
should be taped shut. The garments should be taped over the top (cuff) of the gloves and the
top of the boots.
(4)
During Transport from Shelter to Passenger Waiting Area/Aircraft. The
same concepts expressed in paragraph c (1) apply here. The exception is that personnel
should wear three layers of clothing over their underwear versus two. Two layers should be
water-resistant (poncho or rain suit count as a layer) and worn over an inner layer of dense
fabric because personnel may be contaminated during the transportation process (either
contact or vapor absorption) from their shelter to the passenger waiting area.
(5)
Recommended Clothing Preparation Activities. During the preattack stage,
NEO personnel should double-bag each set of clothing that offers protective capabilities but
is not being worn and seal the closure with tape or a knot. This will prevent the inadvertent
loss of clothing as a result of contamination breaching the shelter area.
d.
Decontamination Operations.
(1)
Given the possibility that NEO personnel may not have access to
specialized decontamination kits or equipment, they must be able to use readily obtainable
items to accomplish required decontamination operations. Further, it is important that
NEO personnel understand the basic tenants associated with contamination control
operations. Specifically—
• Know that contamination avoidance is the best defense. Protecting
personnel or materials by providing cover (layers of clothing, double bagging, etc.) that
prevents direct contact with the agent is the single most important factor.
• Recognize and understand the hazard. Personnel must be able to
distinguish what chemical contamination looks like and where it is likely to be.
• Decontaminate exposed skin areas immediately (within seconds).
Rapidly (within minutes) decontaminate clothing items, remembering that removal is an
effective decontamination method.
• Keep as much distance between themselves and the contamination as
possible. Use standoff decontamination systems, such as a mop, whenever possible. Never
directly touch the contamination with exposed skin.
• Clean gloves routinely by dipping them in decontamination buckets
containing a 5 percent solution of chlorine (undiluted household bleach) and rinsing them
with clear water (just a couple of seconds in each).
F-5
• Use military detectors, if available, to assess the effectiveness of
decontamination operations. Recognize that a vapor hazard, however small, may still exist
even though M8 or M9 detection paper readings are negative.
• Remove the hazard, if possible. For example, if a chair was the only
thing contaminated in a room (due to a breach through a broken window for instance), the
best option might be to remove the chair.
(2)
Decontamination Methods. NEO personnel may use the following items to
achieve reasonable decontamination results:
(a)
Chlorine Solutions. A 5 percent chlorine solution (bleach) is an
exceptionally effective decontaminating agent for material. Directly apply the chlorine
solutions (undiluted household bleach) to the surface and rinse it with clear water.
Scrubbing the area is generally not necessary. Use a chlorine solution in buckets and
troughs for glove/boot decontamination operations.
(b)
Miscellaneous Items. Personnel can use rags, paper towels,
dirt, sawdust, or any other absorbent material to remove chemical contamination.
e.
Attack Response Actions for NEO Personnel.
(1)
Preattack.
• Seek shelter by moving to the designated shelters.
• Protect unused food, clothing, and water supplies. Accomplish this by
sealing the items in appropriate containers, double-bagging, etc.
• Remain prepared according to the guidelines contained in paragraph c
(1).
(2)
During Attack.
• Take cover in the central shelter area.
• Decontaminate clothing and/or skin immediately if contamination
enters the shelter area.
(3)
Postattack.
• Remain calm. Check individuals for contamination, and decontaminate,
as necessary.
• Check the shelter area for contamination. Assess the situation and
decontaminate or relocate as necessary.
• Seek medical attention as required.
F-6
• Verify the integrity and contamination status of the entire shelter
system. Do not venture outside. Reseal and/or repair items as necessary.
F-7
Appendix G
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
DATA
The information in this appendix provides national stock numbers (NSNs) for
selected items of NBC defense equipment (see Table G-1 [page G-2]). The information in the
table is extracted from the Federal Logistics (FED LOG) data dated 1 October 2001. The
basis of issue (BOI) will depend on service-specific authorization documents. FED LOG
data changes periodically; therefore, NSNs and item descriptions must be checked
according to applicable service logistics directives. Table G-1 (page G-2) serves only as a
guide.
G-1
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (continued)
Cape, Air Crew Member
8415-01-040-9018
Apron, Toxicological Agents Protective
8415-00-281-7812 (XS)
8415-00-281-7813 (S)
8415-00-281-7814 (M)
8415-00-281-7815 (L)
8415-00-281-7816 (XL)
Bag, Chemical Protective Clothing
8465-01-216-6259
Boots, Toxicological Agents Protective
8430-00-820-6304 (Size 5)
8430-00-820-6303 (Size 6)
8430-00-820-6306 (Size 7)
8430-00-820-6302 (Size 8)
8430-00-820-6301 (Size 9)
8430-00-820-6300 (Size 10)
8430-00-820-6299 (Size 11)
8430-00-820-6298 (Size 12)
8430-00-820-6297 (Size 13)
8430-00-820-6296 (Size 14)
8430-00-820-6295 (Size 15
8430-01-470-9526
(Size 16)
8430-01-470-9528 (Size 17)
Cover, Helmet, Chemical Protective
8415-01-111-9028
Coveralls, Toxicological Agents Protective
8415-00-099-6962 (S)
8415-00-099-6968 (M)
8415-00-099-6970 (L)
8415-01-105-2535 (XL)
Footwear Covers, Chemical Protective
8430-01-118-8172 (S)
8430-01-021-5978 (L)
Footwear Covers, Toxicological Agents Protective
8430-00-262-5295 (S)
8430-00-262-5297 (M)
8430-00-262-5296 (L)
Footwear Covers, Liquid Contamination
8415-01-333-0990 (S)
8415-01-333-0991 (M)
8415-01-333-0992 (L)
8415-00-820-6294
(S)
Gloves, Toxicological Agents Protective
8415-00-820-6305 (M)
8415-00-820-6293 (L)
8415-00-820-6292 (XL)
8415-00-753-6550 (XS)
Gloves, Toxicological Agents Protective
8415-00-753-6551 (S)
8415-00-753-6552 (M)
8415-00-753-6553 (L)
8415-00-753-6554 (XL)
G-2
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (continued)
8415-01-144-1862 (XS)
Glove Set, Chemical Protective (Material: Rubber Butyl) (0.014 inch thickness)
8415-01-138-2497 (S)
8415-01-138-2498 (M)
8415-01-138-2499 (L)
8415-01-138-2500 (XL)
8415-01-138-2501 (S)
Gloves, Chemical Protective
8415-01-138-2502 (M)
8415-01-138-2503 (L)
8415-01-138-2504 (XL)
Gloves, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
8415-01-452-9642 (S)
8415-01-452-9647 (M)
8415-01-452-9646 (L)
8415-00-268-8353 (M)
Gloves, Men's
8415-00-268-8354 (S)
8415-01-029-0109 (7)
Gloves, Flyer’s, Summer, Type GS/FRP-2
8415-01-029-0111 (8)
8415-01-029-0112 (9)
8415-01-029-0113 (10)
8415-01-029-0116 (11)
8415-01-138-2494 (S)
Glove Inserts, Chemical Protective
8415-01-138-2495 (M)
8415-
01-138-2496 (L)
8415-01-444-1163 (S/XSHT)
Coat, Chemical Protective
8415-01-444-1169 (S/SHT)
(Woodland Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-444-1200 (M/SHT)
8415-01-444-1238 (M/REG)
8415-01-444-1249 (M/LNG)
8415-01-444-1265 (L/REG)
8415-01-444-1270 (L/LNG)
G-3
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (continued)
8415-01-444-5902 (SXSHT)
Coat, Chemical Protective
8415-01-444-5905 (S/SHT)
(Desert Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-444-5913 (M/SHT)
8415-01-444-5926 (M/REG)
8415-01-444-6116 (M/LNG)
8415-01-444-6138 (L/REG)
8415-01-444-6131 (L/LNG)
Trousers, Chemical Protective
8415-01-444-1435
(S/XSHT)
8415-01-444-1439
(S/SHT)
(Woodland Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-444-1613 (M/SHT)
8415-01-444-2310 (M/REG)
8415-01-444-2308
(M/LNG)
8415-01-444-2325 (L/REG)
8415-01-444-5417 (S/XSHT)
Trousers, Chemical Protective
8415-01-444-5504 (S/SHT)
(Desert Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-444-5506 (M/SHT)
8415-01-444-5893 (M/REG)
8415-01-444-5892 (M/LNG)
8415-01-444-5898 (L/REG)
8415-01-444-5900 (L/LNG)
Overboot, Multipurpose
8430-01-464-9453 (3)
8430-01-464-9458 (4)
(Black)
8430-01-464-9459 (5)
8430-01-464-9461 (6)
8430-01-464-9462 (7)
8430-01-464-9464 (8)
8430-01-464-9474 (9)
8430-01-464-9475 (10)
8430-01-464-9477 (11)
8430-01-464-9480 (12)
8430-01-464-9479 (13)
8430-01-464-9484 (14)
G-4
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (continued)
8430-01-317-3374 (3)
Overshoes, Men’s
8430-01-317-3375 (4)
(Black Vinyl Upper)
8430-01-317-3376 (5)
8430-01-317-3377 (6)
8430-01-317-3378 (7)
8430-01-317-3379 (8)
8430-01-317-3380 (9)
8430-01-317-3381 (10)
8430-01-317-3382 (11)
8430-01-317-3383 (12)
8430-01-317-3384 (13)
8430-01-317-3385 (14)
8430-01-048-6305 (3)
Overshoes, Men's
8430-01-048-6306 (4)
8430-01-049-0878 (5)
(Olive Green Vinyl Upper)
8430-01-049-0879 (6)
8430-01-049-0880 (7)
8430-01-049-0881 (8)
8430-01-049-0882 (9)
8430-01-049-0883 (10)
8430-01-049-0884 (11)
8430-01-049-0885 (12)
8430-01-049-0886 (13)
8430-01-049-0887 (14)
G-5
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (Continued)
Coveralls, Chemical Protective
8475-01-328-3454 (32/SHT)
(Sage Green)
8475-01-328-3455 (32/REG)
8475-01-328-3456 (34/SHT
(Designed for Aircrew Member)
8475-01-328-3457 (34/REG)
8475-01-328-3458 (36/SHT)
8475-01-328-3459 (36/REG)
8475-01-328-3460 (36/LNG)
8475-01-328-3461 (38/SHT)
8475-01-328-3462 (38/REG)
8475-01-283-3463 (38/LNG)
8475-01-283-3464 (40/SHT)
8475-01-283-3465 (40/REG)
8475-01-283-3466 (40/LNG)
8475-01-283-8249 (42/SHT)
8475-01-283-3467 (42/REG)
8475-01-283-3468 (42/LNG)
8475-01-283-3469 (44/SHT)
8475-01-283-3470 (44/REG)
8475-01-283-8250 (44/LNG)
8475-01-283-3471 (46/SHT)
8475-01-283-3472 (46/REG)
8475-01-283-3473 (46/LNG)
8475-01-283-3474 (48/REG)
8475-01-283-3475 (48/LNG)
G-6
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (Continued)
8475-01-283-3434 (36/SHT)
Coveralls, Chemical Protective
8475-01-283-3435 (36/REG)
(Sand Brown)
8475-01-283-3437 (38/SHT)
8475-01-283-3438 (38/REG)
(Designed for Ground Crew Members)
8475-01-283-3439 (38/LNG)
8475-01-283-3440 (40/SHT)
8475-01-283-3441 (40/REG)
8475-01-283-3442 (40/LNG)
8475-01-283-3443 (42/SHT)
8475-01-283-3444 (42/REG)
8475-01-283-3445 (42/LNG)
8475-01-283-3446 (44/SHT)
8475-01-283-3447 (44/REG)
8475-01-283-3448 (44/LNG)
8475-01-283-3450 (46/REG)
8475-01-283-3451 (46/LNG)
8475-01-283-3452 (48/REG)
8430-01-364-3458 (S)
Footwear Covers, Liquid Contamination,
8430-01-364-3459 (M/L)
8430-01-364-3460 (XL/XXL)
(Green Latex, Slip-On)
8415-01-364-3320 (S)
Clothing Outfit, Liquid Contamination
8415-01-364-3321 (M/L)
(Green Poncho, Attached Hood)
8415-01-364-3322 (XL/XXL)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-452-6772 (S)
8415-01-452-8631 (M)
8415-01-452-8629 (L)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-137-1700 (XXXS)
8415-01-137-1701 (XXS)
(Woodland Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-137-1702 (XS)
8415-01-137-1703 (S)
8415-01-137-1704 (M)
8415-01-137-1705 (L)
8415-01-137-1706 (XL)
8415-01-137-1707 (XXL)
G-7
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (Continued)
8415-01-327-5346 (XXXS)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-327-5347 (XXS)
(Coat and Trousers)
8415-01-327-5348 (XS)
(Three-Color, Desert Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-327-5349 (S)
8415-01-327-5350 (M)
8415-01-327-5351 (L)
8415-01-327-5352 (XL)
8415-01-327-5353 (XXL)
8415-01-324-3084 (XXXS)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-324-3085 (XXS)
(Coat and Trousers)
8415-01-324-3086 (XS)
(Six-Color, Desert Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-324-3087 (S)
8415-01-324-3088 (M)
8415-01-324-3089 (L)
8415-01-324-3090 (XL)
8415-01-324-3091 (XXL)
8415-01-333-7577 (S)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-333-7578 (M)
(Coat and Trousers)
8415-01-333-7579 (L)
8415-01-333-7580 (XL)
(Desert Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-333-7573 (S)
Suit, Chemical Protective
8415-01-333-7574 (M)
(Coat and Trousers
8415-01-333-7575 (L)
8415-01-333-7576 (XL)
(Woodland Camouflage Pattern)
8415-01-333-0987 (S)
Clothing Outfit, Liquid Contamination
8415-01-333-0988 (M/L)
(Tan Trousers and Poncho With Hood)
8415-01-333-0989 (XL/XXL)
8415-01-214-8290 (M)
Suit, Chemical Protective
(Coat and Trousers, Olive Drab Nylon)
(Fire-and Oil-Resistant)
G-8
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
CP Clothing Items (Continued)
Drawers, Chemical Protective
8415-01-363-8683 (Size 26)
8415-01-363-8684 (Size 28)
8415-01-363-8685 (Size 30)
8415-01-363-8686 (Size 32)
8415-01-363-8687 (Size 34)
8415-01-363-8688 (Size 36)
8415-01-363-8689 (Size 38)
8415-01-363-8690 (Size 40)
8415-01-363-8691 (Size 42)
8415-01-488-5719 (Size 44)
8415-01-488-5722 (Size 46)
8415-01-488-5720 (Size 48)
8415-01-363-8692 (Size 32)
8415-01-363-8693 (Size 34)
Undershirt, Chemical Protective
8415-01-363-8694 (Size 36)
8415-01-363-8695 (Size 38)
8415-01-363-8696 (Size 40)
8415-01-363-8697 (Size 42)
8415-01-363-8698 (Size 44)
8415-01-363-8699 (Size 46)
8415-01-363-8700 (Size 48)
8415-01-488-5715 (Size 50)
8415-01-488-5717 (Size 52)
8415-01-488-5716 (Size 54)
Protective Masks
4240-01-143-2017 (1)
4240-01-143-2018 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-143-2019 (M)
4240-01-143-2020 (L)
4240-01-258-0061 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-258-0062
4240-01-258-0063
4240-01-370-3821 (S)
4240-01-370-3822 (M)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-370-3823 (L)
4240-01-258-0064
4240-01-258-0065
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-258-0066
4240-01-369-7854 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-370-2622 (M)
(M42E1)
4240-01-369-7855 (L)
4240-01-413-4100 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-413-4101 (M)
4240-01-413-4102 (L)
(M42A2)
G-9
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
Protective Masks (Continued)
4240-01-208-6966 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-208-6967 (M)
4240-01-208-6968 (L)
4240-01-208-6969 (XL)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-265-2677 (S)
4240-01-265-2678 (L)
4240-01-265-2679 (M)
4240-01-265-2680 (XL)
4240-01-319-5365 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-320-8949 (M)
4240-01-319-5364 (L)
4240-01-319-5366 (XL)
4240-01-319-5367 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-319-5368 (M)
4240-01-319-5369 (L)
4240-01-319-5370 (XL)
4240-01-414-4034 (XS)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-414-4035 (S)
(M45)
4240-01-414-4051 (M)
4240-01-414-4052 (L)
4240-01-386-0198 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-386-4686 (M)
(M48) (Apache Aviator)
4240-01-386-0201 (L)
4240-01-386-0207 (XL)
4240-01-413-4099 (S)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-413-4095 (L)
(M49) (General Aviator)
4240-01-413-4096 (M)
4240-01-413-4097 (XL)
Mask, Chemical-Biological (Includes Hood)
4240-01-175-3443 (S)
4240-01-175-3444 (M)
4240-01-175-3445 (L)
Mask, Chemical-Biological
4240-01-284-3615 (S)
4240-01-284-3616 (M)
4240-01-284-3617 (L)
Tester Kit, Protective Mask
G-10
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
Protective Mask Associated Parts & Items
Carrier, Field, Chemical-Biological
4240-00-933-2533
Chemical Agent Detectors
Alarm, Chemical Agent, Automatic (M43E1)
6665-01-105-5623
Alarm, Chemical Agent, Automatic (M22)
6665-01-438-6963
Monitor, Chemical Agent (AACZ 16) (216)
6665-01-199-4153
Monitor , Chemical Agent (AACZ 16) (247)
6665-01-357-8502
Detector Kit, Chemical Agent (M256A1)
6665-01-133-4964
Detector Kit, Chemical Agent (6665-94-CL-E14)
6665-00-903-4767
Detector Paper, Chemical Agent (M8)
6665-00-050-8529
Detector Paper, Chemical Agent (M9)
6665-01-226-5589
Water Testing Kit, Chemical Agent
6665-01-134-0885
Miscellaneous Items
Sign Kit, Contamination (M274)
9905-01-346-4716
Sign Kit, Contamination
9905-12-124-5955
Decontamination Items
Decontaminating Kit, DKIE, M280 (20Kit/Box) 3 packets/kit
Decontaminating Kit, Skin (M291) (6 packets)
6850-01-276-1905
Decontaminating Kit, Individual Equipment (M295)
6850-01-357-8456
Decontaminating Apparatus (1-1/2 quart) (mounting bracket)
4230-00-720-1618
Decontaminating Agent (DS2) (1-1/3 quart)
6850-00-753-4827
Decontaminating Apparatus (M13)
4230-01-133-4124
4230-01-136-8888
Decontaminating Agent (DS2)
Decontaminating Agent (DS2) ( 5 gallon)
6850-00-753-4870
Decontaminating Agent (STB) (50-gallon drum)
6850-00-297-6653
Decontaminating Apparatus (M17) (1500-gallon collapsible water tank)
4230-01-251-8702
Decontaminating Apparatus (M17) (3000-gallon collapsible water tank kit)
4230-01-303-5225
4230-01-346-1778
Decontaminating Apparatus (M17) (collapsible water tank)
4230-01-346-3122
Decontaminating Apparatus (M17) (collapsible water tank)
4230-00-926-9488
Decontaminating Apparatus (Skid-Mounted) (M12A1)
Pump Unit, Centrifugal (65 gallons per minute)
4320-00-752-9466
Pump Unit, Centrifugal
4320-01-338-8010
G-11
Table G-1. NBC Defense Equipment (Continued)
Item Nomenclature
NSN
Collective Protection
Collective Protective Equipment
4240-01-166-2254
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized
4240-01-202-0467
Room Liner, Package
4240-01-200-4326
Collective Protection Equipment (M20A1)
4240-01-330-7806
Collective Protective Equipment (M28)
4240-01-330-7807
Collective Protective Equipment (M28) (2 liners)
4240-01-330-7808
Collective Protective Equipment (M28) (Airlock)
4240-01-330-7809
Collective Protective Equipment (M28) (Hub Configuration)
4240-01-395-5179
Maintenance Kit, CBR Equipment (for M28 System)
5180-01-331-2921
Collective Protective Equipment: (M28)
4240-01-331-2922
Collective Protective Equipment (M28)
4240-01-331-2923
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized (for M28 System)
4240-01-331-2938
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized (M10)
4240-00-229-2610
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized
4240-01-048-2923
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized (M13)
4240-01-155-9971
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized (M14)
4240-01-105-5521
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized (M15)
4240-01-185-6786
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized
4240-01-240-4367
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized Exterior (M18)
4240-01-283-0193
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized Interior (M19)
4240-01-283-0192
Entrance, Protective, Pressurized Exterior(M20)
4240-01-283-0194
Filter, Particulate (Glass Fiber Filter)
4240-01-066-3266
Filter Set, Gas-Particulate (Chromium-Free, Carbon Filter)
4240-01-369-6533 (New)
Filter Set, Gas-Particulate
4240-01-067-5605 (Old)
Filter, Particulate (Glass Fiber Filter) (200 cfm)
4240-01-066-3266
Filter, Gas (Charcoal Filter) (150 cfm)
4240-00-256-9094
Filter, Gas (12 cfm)
4240-01-365-0981 (New)
Filter, Gas (12 cfm) (Charcoal Filter)
4240-00-289-7978 (Old)
Filter, Particulate (Asbestos Filter)
4240-00-368-6291
Filter, Gas (10 cfm)
4240-01-365-0982 (New)
Filter, Gas (Charcoal Filter) (10 cfm)
4240-00-828-3952 (Old)
Filter, Particulate (Asbestos Filter) (20 cfm)
4240-00-866-1825
Filter, Gas (Chromium-free Carbon Filter) (150 cfm)
4240-01-363-1310 (New)
Filter, Gas (Charcoal Filter) (150 cfm)
4240-00-802-5170 (Old)
Filter, Particulate (150 cfm)
4240-00-802-5169
Filter Unit, Gas Particulate (12 cfm) (Built-In transformer)
4240-00-203-3999
Filter Unit, Gas Particulate (12 cfm)
4240-00-853-3201
Filter Unit, Gas Particulate (12 cfm)
4240-00-788-5310
Filter Unit, Gas Particulate(12 cfm)
4240-00-010-5267
Filter Unit, Gas Particulate (200 cfm)
4240-00-237-0227
G-12
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