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FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
expenditure and potential criminal or administrative sanctions. The prin-
ciples are complex; the answers cannot necessarily be derived by applying
common sense rules. Funds appropriated must be used for the purpose for
which they were appropriated. Additionally, funds may also have specific
limitations as to activities for which they can be used. After-the-fact audits
by the General Accounting Office and other agencies are common.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
B-22.
EO
12333 regulates the use of national intelligence assets.
DODD 5240.1 and DOD 5240.1-R implement for the DOD the provisions of
EO 12333 and set forth the conditions under which the DOD can collect infor-
mation on US persons. Under these provisions, the Department of Defense
may collect information on US persons reasonably believed to be engaged in
international illegal drug activities. The complexities of these provisions
require full legal review of all intelligence activities in addition to prescribed
intelligence oversight.
B-23.
Intelligence oversight regulations contained in AR 381-10 implements
EO 12333. This regulation also provides procedures on—
• Collecting, disseminating, or retaining information on US persons by
intelligence components.
• Assistance by intelligence components to law enforcement.
• Reporting violations, investigating violations, and taking corrective
action.
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
B-24.
The law of war applies to all cases of declared war or any other armed
conflicts that arise between the US and other nations, even if the state of war
is not recognized by one of them. It also applies to cases of partial or total
occupation. Common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions discusses such
occupations. Armed conflicts such as the Falklands War, the Iran-Iraq War,
and Operation DESERT STORM were clearly international armed conflicts
to which the law of war applied. While the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions has expanded the application to include certain wars of
“national liberation,” the US does not recognize this extension of the law of
war.
B-25.
In peace operations, such as those in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the
question arises whether the law of war applies. The issue hinges on whether
the peace operations forces undertake a combatant role. So far, the US, UN,
and NATO believe that their forces have not become combatants, despite
carrying out offensive-type operations, such as the use of Task Force Ranger
in Somalia and Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE in
Bosnia. Although the law of war does not apply to these operations, the US,
UN, and NATO have their forces apply the “principles and spirit” of the law
of war in these operations.
B-26. This approach is consistent with DOD policy to comply with the law of
war “in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized”
(DODD
5100.77,
paragraph 5.3.1). CJCSI 5810.01B, paragraph 4.a. states that the US forces
B-6
_________________________________________ The Law in Stability Operations and Support Operations
“will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such
conflicts are characterized, and, unless otherwise directed by competent
authorities.” In applying the DOD policy, however, allowance must be made
during these operations. US forces often lack the resources to comply with
the law of war to the letter. The US complies with the law of war to the
extent “practicable and feasible” (memorandum of W. Hays Parks to the
judge advocate general of the Army, 1 October 1990).
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
B-27.
Several international agreements affect stability operations and sup-
port operations. These include SOFAs, multilateral conventions, and
bilateral agreements. Agreements can also be prepared for specific operations
with appropriate delegated authority in accordance with DODD 5530.3 and
Army regulations. SOFAs establish the legal status of military personnel in
foreign countries. Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for
damages and injuries are a few of the topics usually covered. In the absence
of an agreement or some other arrangement with a nation, DOD personnel in
foreign countries have no special legal status. They become subject to all the
laws and judicial processes of the host nation unless other conventions or
agreements create exceptions to that rule.
ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF ACT
B-28.
The Stafford Act—Title 42 USC, section 121 (and following sections), as
amended—is the statutory authority for federal domestic disaster assistance.
It empowers the president to establish a program for disaster preparedness
and response, which he delegates to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. The Stafford Act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or
a major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance
available. The act authorizes the president to provide DOD assets for relief
once he formally declares an emergency or a major disaster. He may also
provide DOD assets for emergency work on a limited basis before the
declaration. DOD Directive 3025.1 contains the Department of Defense policy
for providing domestic disaster assistance. AR 500-60 has the Army policy.
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
B-29.
Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of November
1973 (also called the War Powers Act), requires the president to consult with
and report to Congress when introducing US armed forces—
• Into hostilities.
• Into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances.
• Into foreign territories when equipped for combat (except for supply,
repair, replacement, and training).
• In numbers that substantially increase the number of US forces
equipped for combat in a foreign country.
B-30. The resolution also applies to the “assignment of members of such
armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or
accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or
B-7
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an immi-
nent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.”
B-31.
Procedures have been established for the legal advisor to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to review all force deployment actions
routed through the JCS to which the WPR may apply. The chairman’s legal
advisor subsequently reports to the DOD general counsel concerning the
WPR’s applicability. If the DOD general counsel determines that the situation
merits further interagency discussion, he consults with the Department of
State’s legal advisor and, perhaps, with the attorney general. This process
should provide the president with advice concerning the congressional
consultation and reporting requirements mandated by the WPR.
B-32.
Commanders and military planners should be aware that the advisory
and training commitment of US forces might require review for applicability
of the WPR. Advisory duties, especially in an insurgency or a counterinsur-
gency, may fall in the category of actions requiring consultation and re-
porting.
B-33.
If found to be applicable, the WPR requires US forces to withdraw in 60
days of the reporting date or 90 days when the president deems it militarily
necessary, unless Congress legislates otherwise.
CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION
B-34.
Activities of US military personnel serving in foreign countries occa-
sionally result in personal injuries, deaths, and property damage. Also, mem-
bers of the armed forces may be injured and their property damaged, lost, or
destroyed. Claims against the United States that arise in foreign countries
are adjudicated under several statutes and international agreements. Claims
are not payable if the injury or damage occurs as a result of combat activities
of the armed forces. Planning for stability operations and support operations
should include efforts to have the DOD general counsel designate single-
service claims responsibility for the operation. This operation should take
place in a country not already assigned to a single service for claims pur-
poses. Additionally, every effort must be made to ensure that US personnel
do not leave the impression with potential claimants that their claims are
payable. Only properly constituted claims commissions may make these
determinations.
USE OF CHEMICAL HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
B-35. EO 11850 limits using chemical herbicides and riot control agents. The
secretary of defense is tasked with taking all necessary measures to ensure
that US forces use neither chemical herbicides nor riot control agents
without prior presidential approval. Detailed guidance is in the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan. Commanders should consult their SJA on imple-
menting this executive order on a case-by-case basis.
B-8
Appendix C
Rules of Engagement
These rules do not limit a commander’s inherent authority and obli-
gation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate
action in self-defense of the commander’s unit and other US forces in
the vicinity.
CJCSI 3121.01A
Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which
United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement
with other forces encountered
(JP
1-02). ROE specify when, where,
against whom, and how units can use force. They may be used to control
the use of force across the range of Army operations. The aggressiveness
that is important in wartime must be tempered with restraint in the am-
biguous environment of many stability operations and support operations.
ROE are the commander’s rules for the use of force. Commanders must
interpret, draft, disseminate, and train rules of engagement. The legal
advisor assists the commander to develop ROE, ensuring that the rules do
not improperly constrain actions and remain consistent with domestic
law, international law, and policies and orders of the chain of command.
Clearly stated ROE are published before Army forces are committed. The
highest military authority, with input from subordinate commanders, will
continually evaluate the ROE and modify them as appropriate.
In general, ROE in wartime differ from ROE in peacetime operations. War-
time ROE reflect the greater necessity to use force. They provide guidelines to
prevent civilian casualties and limit collateral damage; however, they permit
armed forces to engage all identified enemy targets, regardless of whether
those targets represent actual, immediate threats. By contrast, ROE used in
many stability operations and support operations merely permit engagement
in individual, unit, or national self-defense.
CONTENTS
Basis of ROE
C-2
Standing Rules of Engagement
C-3
Elements of Self Defense
C-2
Interpret, Draft, Disseminate, Train
Characteristics of Effective ROE
C-2
Method
C-3
C-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
BASIS OF ROE
C-1.
ROE provide guidance regarding the use of force by commanders and
individuals based on three types of considerations: operational requirements,
policy, and law.
C-2.
Operational requirements. Properly drafted ROE help accomplish the
mission by ensuring that the force is used consistently with the overall mili-
tary objective. They must support both mission accomplishment and force
protection. These rules can assist the commander by preventing the unin-
tended start of hostilities or by protecting infrastructure that may prove
logistically important. ROE should be distinguished from tactical control
measures, threat conditions, and arming orders. Arming orders are some-
times listed on the same cards as ROE for easy reference. Additionally, ROE
should be distinguished from other policies and directives, such as weapons
confiscation rules.
C-3.
Policy. ROE reflect the political will of the civilian leadership of the
armed forces. Additionally, developing and training ROE to multinational
allies is an inherently political process, which may require coordination with
the country team or other Department of State representatives.
C-4.
Law. ROE also reflect domestic and international law. See Appendix B
for a synopsis of legal restraints regarding the use of force.
ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE
C-5.
Nothing in the ROE can limit the inherent authority and obligation to
use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action in self-
defense of an individual or a member of Army forces. In all situations,
soldiers and commanders use force based on necessity and proportionality:
• Necessity. Imminent danger requires a resort to force when there is a
hostile act or hostile intent. A “hostile act” is the actual use of armed
force—attacking. “Hostile intent” is the threat or imminent use of
force.
• Proportionality. Force must be limited in intensity, duration, and
magnitude to that required to ensure the continued safety of armed
forces.
C-6.
Graduated response illustrates a technique that clearly incorporates the
elements of necessity and proportionality. This technique provides planned
responses to an array of hostile and nonhostile threats that the force may en-
counter. These responses are specifically tailored to the situation and empha-
size using minimal necessary force to diffuse the threat. However, graduated
response includes the ability to quickly escalate to the level of force required
to accomplish the mission.
CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE ROE
C-7. Effective ROE conform to the following characteristics:
• Tactically sound. ROE should be used to assist in course of action de-
velopment and selection, but care must be taken to ensure that the
mission drives the ROE and not vice-versa.
C-2
______________________________________________________________________ Rules of Engagement
• Understandable. ROE should be unambiguous and written in terms
that soldiers can understand.
• Legally sufficient. ROE comply with domestic and international laws
including the body of law pertaining to armed conflict. Thus, ROE
never justify illegal actions.
• Responsive. The development, distribution, training, and modification
of ROE must be timely and responsive to a changing mission and
threat.
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
C-8.
The joint chiefs of staff have provided the standing rules of engagement
(SROE) as baseline guidance for armed forces worldwide. This guidance
equally applies to all the combatant commands and can be easily and quickly
amended or clarified by mission-specific ROE. See CJCSI 3121.01A for ampli-
fication of SROE. SROE apply in the absence of specific guidance from higher
authority.
C-9.
The SROE provide a common template for developing and implementing
ROE across the range of military operations. They include lists of numbered
supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher
authority. The supplemental measures provided in the SROE are intended as
a planning tool to tailor ROE for a particular situation. Some examples are—
• Combatant commanders may augment the SROE to respond to the
mission and threat in their area of responsibility.
• Joint task force commanders distill SROE and the combatant com-
mander’s specific ROE into rules for the unit commander and soldier to
apply in the field.
• Commanders at all levels continually review the ROE to ensure their
effectiveness in light of current and projected conditions in their area
of operations.
C-10.
SROE apply to armed forces in support of operations under operational
or tactical control of a combatant commander or performing missions under
direct control of the president, military departments, or other US government
departments or agencies. SROE do not apply to multinational forces or in
domestic support operations. AR
190-14 addresses the use of force in
domestic support operations.
INTERPRET, DRAFT, DISSEMINATE, TRAIN METHOD
C-11.
Commanders and staffs at all echelons use the four facets of the inter-
pret, draft, disseminate, and train methodology to incorporate ROE into the
conduct of military operations. FM 1-04 provides doctrine on ROE. The
Operational Law Handbook and the ROE Handbook for Judge Advocates con-
tain additional information on ROE.
C-12. ROE methodology is conducted throughout the military decision
making process with the S3, the brigade staff judge advocate (SJA), and staff
officers engaged in targeting. The interpretation and drafting of ROE require
special attention from the SJA:
C-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
• Interpret. Operational lawyers are instrumental in interpreting ROE.
This may require constant situational understanding by the SJA made
possible through his presence at command posts as required.
• Draft. In some operations, ROE are top-driven, meaning that the
higher echelon commander establishes ROE that must be disseminated
verbatim to all lower echelons. In contrast, top-fed ROE are established
for the immediately subordinate echelon. This allows the ROE to be
tailored to the particular unit’s situation. When the rules are top-fed,
commanders and staffs down to brigade level draft ROE for their com-
mands. Figure C-1 contains some of the areas considered in drafting
ROE. Figure C-2 shows where ROE information is included in an
operation plan or order.
Rules of Engagement Considerations
•
International law
•
Operational concerns (mission requirements)
•
Commander’s intent
•
Threat
•
Tactics and weapons systems organic to the force
•
Legal requirements (host nation, domestic)
•
US policy (considering United Nations resolutions and international
agreements)
Figure C-1. Considerations in Drafting ROE
Where to Find ROE
Theater and joint task force (JTF) level
Appendix 8 (ROE) to Annex C (Operations) of the operations
plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD)
Corps, division, brigade level
Annex E (ROE) to the OPLAN or OPORD
Figure C-2. Where ROE Information is Included in an OPLAN or OPORD
• Disseminate. ROE are distributed through the chain of command via
a campaign plan, operation plan, or operation order. Additional
methods can be used, such as ROE matrices or “ROE conditions” in
tactical standing operating procedures. ROE cards are often used to
disseminate soldier-relevant rules to the lowest levels. (Figure C-3
beginning on page C-5 shows a ROE card used in operations in
Bosnia.) In multinational operations, ROE must be developed in a
format that can be promptly distributed to other nations. A coalition
support team, if present, can assist in translating, interpreting,
distributing, and teaching ROE to multinational forces. All forces must
have the same understanding of the ROE.
• Train. Soldiers execute in the manner they train; they carry out their
tasks in compliance with the ROE when trained to do so. The best
training on ROE is situational training. Situational training exercises
focus on one or a small group of tasks—within a particular mission
C-4
______________________________________________________________________ Rules of Engagement
scenario—and require that soldiers practice until the tasks can be
executed to the pre-established standard.
Bosnia—SFOR
20 December 1996
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SFOR—OPERATION CONSTANT GUARD
Commander’s Guidance on Use of Force
MISSION
Your mission is to stabilize and consolidate the peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
SELF-DEFENSE
1. You have the right to use force (including authorized
weapons as necessary) in self-defense.
2. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself.
GENERAL RULES
1. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your
mission.
2. Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not
be harmed. Disarm them and turn them over to your superiors.
3. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile
forces/belligerents, humanely.
4. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
5. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take “war
trophies”.
6. Prevent and report all suspect violations of the law of
Armed Conflict to superiors.
CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS
1. If the situation permits, issue a challenge:
In English:
“SFOR! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!”
or in Serbo-Croat:
“SFOR! STANI ILI PUCAM!”
Pronounced as:
“SFOR! STANI EEL LEE PUTSAM!”)
2. If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the on-
scene commander or by standing orders to fire a warning shot.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure C-3. Bosnia Operations ROE Card
C-5
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
OPENING FIRE
1. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces, or persons
or property under your protection are threatened with deadly
force. This means:
You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his
weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated
special status under your protection.
You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws,
or prepares to throw an explosive or incendiary device at you,
friendly forces, or persons with designated special status or
property with designated special status under your protection.
You may open fire against an individual who deliberately
drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, persons with a
designated special status or property with designated special
status under your protection.
2. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to
take possession of friendly forces weapons, ammunition, or
property with designated special status, and there is no other
way of avoiding this.
3. You may use minimum force, including opening fire,
against an individual who unlawfully commits, or is about to
commit, an act which endangers Life, or is likely to cause
serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no other
way to prevent the act.
MINIMUM FORCE
1. If you have to open fire, you must:
- Fire only aimed shots, and
- Fire no more rounds than necessary, and
- Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy
property, and
- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits.
2. You may not intentionally attack civilians or property that
is exclusively civilian or religious in character, except if the
property is being used for military purpose and engagement is
authorized by your commander.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure C-3. Bosnia Operations ROE Card (continued)
C-6
Appendix D
Characteristics of Insurgency
D-1.
This appendix follows the discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the nature
of insurgency. It provides a basis for analyzing an insurgency by discussing
common elements or characteristics. Analyzing these elements helps reveal
the insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses. This framework can be used
whether supporting or opposing the insurgency. Although military planners
examine these factors separately, they must understand how the factors in-
teract to fully understand the insurgency. This appendix is a conceptual tool
to aid in understanding insurgency; it should be used with the process de-
scribed in FM 2-91.1.
D-2.
Seven elements common to all insurgencies exist: leadership, ideology,
objectives, environment and geography, external support, phasing and
timing, and organizational and operational patterns. Although they can be
examined separately, one must understand how they interact to fully under-
stand the insurgency.
LEADERSHIP
D-3.
Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and
focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction,
guidance, coordination, and organized coherence. Leaders of the insurgency
must make their cause known to the people and the government to establish
their movement’s credibility. They must replace the government’s legitimacy
with that of their own. Their education, background, family, social connec-
tions, and experiences shape how they think and how they will fulfill their
goals. These factors also help shape their approach to problem solving.
D-4. Leadership is both a function of organization and personality. Some
organizations depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, moti-
vation, and a rallying point for the movement. Organizations led this way can
produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly but are vulnerable to dis-
ruptions if key personalities are removed or co-opted. Other organizations de-
emphasize individual personalities and provide for redundancy and replace-
ment in decision making. These mechanisms produce collective power and do
not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are easier
to penetrate but more resistant to change. The three types of leaders are—
CONTENTS
Leadership
D-1
Phase I: Preinsurgency
D-5
Ideology
D-2
Phase II: Organization
D-6
Objectives
D-3
Phase III: Guerilla Warfare
D-6
Environment and Geography
D-3
Phase IV: Conventional Warfare
D-6
External Support
D-5
Phase V: Postinsurgency
D-6
Phasing and Timing
D-5
Organizational and Operational Patterns .. D-6
D-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
• Single person. The leader may centralize power or decentralize deci-
sion making and execution, leaving decision making and execution to
subordinates.
• Single group or party. The group or party may be headed by a single
person or have a ruling council which makes and executes policy. The
group or party may also control other groups involved in the insur-
gency.
• Group of groups. Different groups that have different concepts of how
the country should be governed make up the leadership. Their single
unifying characteristic may be their opposition to the government.
They compete with each other as well as with the government.
IDEOLOGY
D-5. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains society’s ills
and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after
overthrowing the government. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a
goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus.
Future plans of the insurgency must be vague enough for broad appeal and
specific enough to address important issues.
D-6. The ideology of groups within the movement may indicate differing
views of strategic objectives. Groups may have ideological conflicts that they
need to resolve before an opponent can capitalize on them. Ideology may sug-
gest objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent’s perception of
his environment. This perception of the environment then shapes the move-
ment’s organization and operational methods. Some ideologies include—
• Communism. Communism advocates state ownership of the means of
production and common sharing of labor and products.
• Socialism. Socialism (in Marxist theory) is the partial implementation
of communism in which the state owns and controls some of the means
of production and distribution of capital, land, and other items.
• Capitalism. Capitalism is an economic system marked by open compe-
tition in a free market in which the means of production and distribu-
tion are privately or corporately owned.
• Religious government. This government is a system advocating that
government and society be structured around a particular set of reli-
gious beliefs. It may take many forms including Christianity, Judaism,
or Islam.
• Ethnic nationalism. This system advocates that the nation be struc-
tured around a particular ethnic group.
• Democracy. Democracy is a form of government where people exercise
control directly or through elected representatives.
• No clear ideology. This system has an ideology that is incongruent or
not identifiable. It may be purposely vague to allow maximum flexi-
bility. Real ideology may form after the insurgents gain power. In these
cases, their single goal may be to rid themselves of the existing govern-
ment.
D-2
________________________________________________________________Characteristics of Insurgency
OBJECTIVES
D-7.
Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent’s
desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has
it. Replacing the government in power is only one step along this path;
however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic
objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only
clearly defined goal the movement presents. The four examples of characteri-
zations of strategic objectives are—
• The revolutionary tries to overthrow the existing power structure.
• The secessionist tries to escape from existing system.
• The restorational tries to return to a “golden age,” restore a previous
system of rule, or resist change.
• The reformist tries to change the government policies without its over-
throw.
D-8.
Objectives can be either operational or tactical. Operational objectives
are those that insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying
government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state.
Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, such as dissemi-
nating psychological operations products or the attack and seizure of a key
facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational
goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature.
For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and
the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; conse-
quently, it can be the principle consideration in the selection and attainment
of tactical objectives.
ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
D-9.
Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic fac-
tors, affect all participants in a conflict. How insurgents and counterinsur-
gents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each.
The effects of the environment and geography are most visible at the tactical
level where the predominant influence on decisions regarding force structure;
doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures may exist.
D-10.
Civil affairs (CA) forces have a regional focus, coupled with specific cul-
tural awareness, that ensures relevant support to the commander. The G5/S5
and CA staff provide the commander with an area study and assessment (see
FM 3-57) that includes—
• Geography, to include physical features, climate, and political geo-
graphy.
• History.
• People, including demographics, religions, languages, and culture and
social structure.
• Host-nation support.
• Legal and administrative systems of the host nation.
D-11. Identifying the significant characteristics of the battlefield environment
helps establish the geographical limits of the area of interest and directs the
D-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
analytical efforts in steps 2 and 3 of the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) process. (See Figure D-1.) Defining the area of interest also
identifies gaps in the common understanding of the battlefield, serving as a
guide to the type of intelligence and information required in refining the IPB
process. In defining the area of interest, analysts may examine—
• Strategic location, to include neighboring countries’ boundaries.
• Lines of communications, to include railways, roadways, waterways,
pipelines, harbors and ports, and airports.
• Insurgent use of communication systems, to include television stations,
telephone systems, cellular phone systems, radio stations, and the
Internet.
• Areas and bases used by insurgents for logistics, training, operations,
refuge, or illicit drug activities.
• Insurgent operational activities in the area of interest, to include
locations for ambushes, roadblocks, kidnappings, sabotage, demonstra-
tions, crimes, meetings, linkup, and surveillance.
• Insurgent support functions in the area of interest, to include logistics
routes, cache sites, water sources, fuel storage, and production areas.
• Areas of pro-insurgent population, to include individual villages, cities,
and rural areas; areas of insurgent influence; areas of insurgent con-
trol; residences of insurgent leadership; and key sympathizers.
IPB Process
Framework for Analysis of an Insurgency
STEP 1: Define the
Causes and Preconditions
Indicators
Environment
Battlefield
of Insurgency
Early-Stage Indicators
Terrain
Define the
Environment
Rising Popular Expectations
Late-Stage Indicators
Weather
Area of
Sense of Relative Deprivation
Other Factors
Interest
STEP 2: Describe the
Catalyst
Battlefields Effects
Leadership
Ideology
Organization
Method
Objectives
Support
Single Person
Communist
Triangular
Mass
Strategic
Internal
Single Group
Socialist
Dual
Subversive
Operational
External
Group of Groups
Capitalist
Cellular
Focal Point
Tactical
Democratic
Politically Organized
Urban
Religious Gov.
Militarily Organized Rural
No Clear Ideology
Ethnic
Military Performance
Political Performance and
Phasing and Timing
STEP 3: Evaluate the
and Capabilities*
Capabilities*
Phase I: Preinsurgency
Leadership
Leadership
Threat
Phase II: Organization
Order of Battle
Success of the Ideological Appeal
Vulnerabilities
Phase III: Guerilla Warfare
Technological Sophistication
Recruitment/Training
Political
Phase IV: Conv. Warfare
Command and Control
Effectiveness of Domestic Support
Military
Phase V: Postinsurgency
Informational
Lines of Communication
Effectiveness of Foreign Support
Rural Administration
Economic
Combatant Proficiency
Protection/Security
Intelligence Capability
Reforms
Ability to Protect the Force
Justice
Scope and Operations
Corruption
Indiscriminate Use of Violence
STEP 4: Determine
Threat Courses of
Action
Courses of Action
*While these categories are not specifically addressed in this manual, many of the subcomponents are addressed.
Figure D-1. Integrating the Framework for Analysis During the IPB
D-4
________________________________________________________________Characteristics of Insurgency
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
D-12.
Historically, some insurgencies have done well without external sup-
port. However, recent examples, such as Vietnam and Nicaragua, show that
external support can accelerate events and influence the final outcome.
External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources
that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Four main types of external
support exist:
• Moral support is the acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and
admirable.
• Political support is the active promotion of insurgents’ strategic goals
in international forums.
• Resource support is the money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.
• Sanctuary support is the secure training plus operational and logistic
bases.
D-13.
Accepting external support can affect the legitimacy of both insurgents
and counterinsurgents. It implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition,
the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy along with the
insurgent or the counterinsurgent group it supports. The consequences can
affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent
situation.
PHASING AND TIMING
D-14.
Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development.
Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all
phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent move-
ment may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insur-
gencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming
development when favorable conditions return.
D-15.
Some insurgencies depend on proper timing for their success. Because
of their limited support, their success depends on weakening the govern-
ment’s legitimacy so that it becomes ineffective. Then, an opportunity to seize
power exists. When these insurgencies move to seize power, they expose their
organization and intentions. If they move too early or too late, the govern-
ment may discover their organization and destroy it. The five phases of insur-
gency are preinsurgency, organization, guerrilla warfare, conventional war-
fare, and postinsurgency.
PHASE I: PREINSURGENCY
D-16. The characteristics of preinsurgency are—
• Indicators of insurgency are present.
• Preconditions of insurgency are aggravated.
• Leadership emerges in response to domestic grievances or outside
influences.
• A catalyst triggers insurgency to organize.
D-5
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
PHASE II: ORGANIZATION
D-17.
The characteristics of organization are—
• The insurgency establishes and expands its organization and ideology.
• A popular front is established with other antigovernment groups.
• Antigovernment activity, such as strikes and demonstrations, is ini-
tiated.
• Taxation and theft are used to raise funds.
• Education begins of the populace in the insurgency’s ideology.
• Small, local guerilla bands are organized; small-scale guerilla activities
are begun.
• Terrorism begins to intimidate government officials and hostile mem-
bers of the population.
PHASE III: GUERRILLA WARFARE
D-18.
The characteristics of guerrilla warfare are—
• Increased scale of guerilla attacks.
• Increased use of sabotage and terrorism.
• Propaganda intensifies.
• Insurgents gain control of geographic areas and develop bases for
further operations.
• Government officials are driven out of local areas.
• Shadow governments may be established.
• International recognition and support are sought.
PHASE IV: CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
D-19.
The characteristics of conventional warfare are—
• Guerilla bands combine to form battalions, regiments, and higher eche-
lons of regular forces.
• More powerful and sophisticated weapons are acquired through foreign
assistance or battlefield capture.
• Government forces are challenged directly in battle.
• Areas of insurgent control expand; political activity increases.
PHASE V: POSTINSURGENCY
D-20.
The characteristics of postinsurgency are—
• Government is overthrown or it satisfies the insurgent’s demands.
• Struggle for political leadership exists between the competing groups.
• New governmental system is established in which the leadership of the
insurgency may or may not head.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
D-21. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the
interaction of many factors. As a result, each insurgency organization is
unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or
strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that
D-6
________________________________________________________________Characteristics of Insurgency
may be employed against the supported government. The types of organiza-
tion are—
• Triangular. This organization is composed of three elements: the poli-
tical party, the popular control mechanism, and the military organiza-
tion. Leadership of each element is distinct, with the political element
in authority.
• Dual. A legal overt political party controls the activity of an illegal
covert military organization.
• Cellular. Small, decentralized groups operate independently of each
other. A cellular organization may be combined with any of the other
organizational structures to enhance security.
• Political. Extensive complex political structure develops before mili-
tary actions are initiated.
• Military. Armed insurgents serve as a catalyst for mobilizing opposi-
tion against existing regime.
• Ethnic. This organization is organized along ethnic, tribal, or religious
lines. It has a perception that government has denied rights of their
group.
D-22. Five patterns, or strategies, of insurgency exist—
• Mass. This pattern involves a large popular movement, elements of
which operate outside the existing system. It involves active and
passive popular supporters. It establishes a rival government. Mass
uses well-devised ideology and propaganda. It employs regular and
guerrilla forces.
• Focal point. This pattern’s efforts are directed by a small group that
uses violence to overturn an existing regime.
• Subversive. This pattern uses the political process to place insurgents
in positions of authority by election or appointment. The overt element
influences public opinion and obstructs the government. The covert ele-
ment employs terrorism, coercion, and intimidation.
• Urban. Insurgents gain control of the cities and move outward. Its
efforts focus on disrupting utilities and services, planning mass demon-
strations, using overt and covert communication facilities, and discredi-
ting the government. It takes advantage of ease of movement. Urban-
based insurgency works best in a centralized society.
• Rural. This pattern mobilizes the population of the countryside. The
peasant army eventually surrounds the cities, isolates government
forces, and brings down the government. Rural-based insurgency works
best in a decentralized society.
D-7
Appendix E
Negotiations
There are many times when platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at
roadblocks, and company and battalion commanders working in cor-
don and search operations, must negotiate and communicate with
potential belligerents. Leaders need to know that they may be placed in
a position that requires them to mediate or negotiate on the battlefield.
Brigadier General L. Magruder, III, USA CG, Joint Readiness Training Center
Military leaders can find themselves in the role of a negotiator, mediator,
or even arbitrator during operations. Each role requires different attri-
butes; however, this section focuses on those common attributes and tech-
niques necessary for negotiations. Leaders at all levels may conduct
negotiations in stability operations and support operations. For example,
Army leaders may negotiate for rights of passage; mediate between hos-
tile factions; or barter for use of facilities, buildings, roads, and services.
For more information on negotiations, see Chapter 4 of the JTF Com-
mander’s Handbook for Peace Operations.
CONSIDERATIONS
E-1. Leaders may use the following considerations as a guide to prepare for
negotiations; however, there will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotia-
tions. This process must be addressed in your initial planning sessions. No
simple answers exist to negotiations and the broader context of conflict
management and resolution. The process is complex. What works in one
situation may not work in the next. This manual suggests discussing four
basic considerations: negotiations do not exist in a vacuum, negotiation is an
exercise in persuasion, study alternatives to negotiating an agreement, and
be attuned to cultural differences.
CONTENTS
Considerations
E-0
Consider Cultural Implications
E-2
Negotiations Do Not Exist in a Vacuum E-1
Set Clear Goals and Objectives
E-3
Negotiation is an Exercise in
Develop a Plan and Diagram the
Persuasion
E-1
Results of Analysis
E-3
Study Alternatives to Negotiating an
Determine Composition of Negotiating
Agreement
E-1
Team and Decision Making
Be Attuned to Cultural Differences
E-1
Mechanisms
E-3
Procedures
E-1
Establish the Venue
E-4
Establish Communications
E-2
Implementation
E-5
Identify Common Ground on Which to
Training
E-5
Build Dialogue
E-2
E-0
______________________________________________________________________________ Negotiations
NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT EXIST IN A VACUUM
E-2.
Leaders as negotiators must understand the broader issues of conflict
and their changing nature. These issues include
• Maintaining dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations, to in-
clude the government, if one exists, and the opposition, various fac-
tions, or militias.
• Preventing any incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied);
creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.
NEGOTIATION IS AN EXERCISE IN PERSUASION
E-3.
Negotiation is a way to advance interests by jointly decided action.
Leaders as negotiators need the cooperation of the other parties. Negotiators
must consider them partners in solving the problems.
E-4.
Negotiators must think carefully about the full range of interests and
prepare thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. They
must consider the underlying interests behind a position that a party has
taken on a particular issue. People negotiate for different reasons, such as
• Tasks (the lease of a compound).
• Relationships (to get to know the other party and find out more infor-
mation about that person).
• Status (legitimacy as participants as others perceive them).
STUDY ALTERNATIVES TO NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT
E-5.
Leaders as negotiators must consider alternative approaches to deter-
mine the most persuasive method to educate others. Negotiators want others
to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interests.
BE ATTUNED TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
E-6.
Actions can have different connotations to members of other cultures.
Culture shapes how people reason, what they accept as fact, and what princi-
ples they apply to decision making. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic
rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important.
E-7.
Negotiations can be conducted at several levels: negotiations among
United States (US) agencies and departments; between multinational part-
ners; between the military force and United Nations (UN) agencies; and
between the military and local leaders. In the joint, combined, and inter-
agency environment, negotiations can be complex. Nonetheless, all negotia-
tions require tact, diplomacy, honesty, patience, fairness, effective communi-
cations, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.
PROCEDURES
E-8. This manual suggests that successful negotiations should follow eight
steps. Negotiators should establish communications, identify common
ground, consider cultural implications, set goals, develop a plan, determine
the negotiating team’s composition, establish the venue, and then implement
the plan.
E-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS
E-9.
Negotiators must establish an effective means of communicating with
the political, faction leader, or both. They must not assume that a certain
leader or element is opposed to their efforts without careful investigation.
Instead, they must ensure that facts are correct before forming any opinions.
IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO BUILD DIALOGUE
E-10.
Negotiators will spend considerable time determining the exact prob-
lem. At this stage, they must focus on the problem rather than the solution.
Negotiators may consider certain guidelines:
• Have no expectations. Do not expect a party to negotiate to achieve an
agreement if that party perceives more benefits from an alternative to
negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce. The
negotiator needs to persuade the party that negotiations will produce
the most benefits.
• Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of
interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time
preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.
• Learn from the parties. Seek ways through collaboration to find pos-
sible alternatives to their present positions.
• When necessary, assume the role of conveyer, facilitator, or mediator.
Be patient.
CONSIDER CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS
E-11.
There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and de-
partments of the US government as well as the international organizations
that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cul-
tural differences. The negotiating team should include experienced interpre-
ters. Their understanding of the cultural context of terms used is invaluable.
Negotiators need more than literal translators.
E-12. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. Negotiators should
consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting their
approach. Adapting their techniques with indigenous ones may improve the
prospects for a settlement. Some implications to consider include—
• Differences. Differences exist in styles of reasoning, the manner in
which an individual who carries authority negotiates, and behavior in
such dimensions as protocol and time. For example, American culture
accepts that one may offer concessions early in a negotiation to reach
an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in
other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a posi-
tive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cul-
tures.
• Each side’s approach. Americans tend to be direct problem solvers with
a give-and-take approach; however, some cultures are indirect, most
concerned with the long-term relationships and historical context.
Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations.
For example, answers may not be direct and the negotiator will have to
look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand
E-2
______________________________________________________________________________ Negotiations
what the other party is communicating. In turn, he will need to select
his words and gestures with care to avoid communicating unintended
meanings.
• Alternate locations. Other cultures may prefer alternate locations for
negotiations. In 1993 in Kismayo, Somalia, several clans met to seek
political reconciliation in a traditional setting under a tree instead of
following the American custom of a meeting at a table.
E-13.
If negotiators cannot reach agreement, they must keep the dialogue
going. At a minimum, they must seek agreement on when the parties will
meet again. They should look for something to keep the momentum alive,
going back to earlier discussions on common ground, and seek to keep trust
alive in the process.
E-14.
From the negotiation team, negotiators often consider selecting one
person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look
at the process of the negotiations and give advice. This individual can watch
for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn,
this person may be able to coach more effective techniques to the negotiators.
SET CLEAR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
E-15.
Negotiators must know what they are trying to accomplish as well as
the limits of their authority. They examine how to approach the issues. They
settle the easy issues first, often settling issue-by-issue in a predetermined
order. Successful negotiators look to create links or to separate unrelated
issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistic issues.
They must consider having details worked out at later sessions with the right
people and understand that these sessions will also be negotiations.
DEVELOP A PLAN AND DIAGRAM THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
E-16.
Negotiators should develop a plan and diagram the results of their
analyses. Useful questions in this analysis are—
• What are the main issues?
• Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?
• What are these parties’ publicly stated positions? Privately stated posi-
tions?
• What are the underlying interests behind these positions?
• What are the important needs of each party?
• What are their concerns? Fears?
DETERMINE COMPOSITION OF NEGOTIATING TEAM AND DECISION MAKING
MECHANISMS
E-17. In some cases, the various, interested parties can form a committee or
council with appropriate representation. Negotiators should consider several
points:
• Identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include
ambassador and joint task force commander-level, mid-level, or
working-level personnel?
E-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
•
Consider the culture when deciding what constitutes the appropriate
construct for a meeting. For example, what role do women play in the
society? How is status defined in the culture?
•
Select the composition of the committee or council carefully. It may in-
clude legal advisors, political representatives (such as Department of
State, UN agencies, or others), military representatives (operations,
logistics, civil affairs), and other civilian representatives and non-
governmental organizations.
•
Ensure that members possess the status and ability to deal with the
leadership representing all involved parties.
•
For those members seen as part of the military force, ensure that they
understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a
prior negotiation within the negotiator’s own delegation. They must
understand policy and direction from his higher authority.
•
Have patience. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frus-
trating. Ensure that the people negotiating can effectively recommend
that their superiors ratify an agreement reached. Are all the decision
makers who will determine whether the agreement reached is imple-
mented represented in the committee or council?
•
Develop a supportive climate. A negotiator creates a supportive climate
for the decision makers to complete an agreement. He may find it use-
ful to talk to those who are not decision makers but with those from
whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they may
assist the negotiator in helping their decision makers reach agreement.
•
Determine the legitimate community leaders. In situations involving
severe conflict or state collapse, it may be difficult to determine the
legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must
be made.
•
Ensure that negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their
authority. If feasible, delegate authority to them for negotiation.
ESTABLISH THE VENUE
E-18. Negotiators should consider how meetings are called. Is neutral ground
available that is acceptable to all sides? Should US representatives go to the
factional leader’s location or will this improperly affect the negotiations? Con-
sider details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings tradi-
tionally used in the culture. Other concerns for the selection of a negotiating
venue may include
• Security, accessibility, and availability of communications facilities
and comfort for all involved parties.
• Sharing relevant information to the negotiations with all parties. The
timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances.
• Holding all information generated from the negotiations in confidence
until officially released, sharing of information not withstanding. That
decision will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publi-
city may help create support and empower negotiators to agree, release
of information may be constructive. Negotiators must be flexible.
E-4
______________________________________________________________________________ Negotiations
IMPLEMENTATION
E-19.
At the conclusion of negotiations, negotiators should prepare a report
to ensure that they record all accomplishments, agreements, and disagree-
ments for future use. They should also consider giving one person the task of
reporting and presenting what has taken place to all participants. This can
build trust in the process if each party can view it as an honest effort to
understand the other side’s position.
TRAINING
E-20.
Negotiation and mediation training is essential for military officers in
stability operations and many support operations. They need a conceptual
foundation in conflict management and resolution. Also necessary are con-
ceptual skills to help them analyze and select approaches to deal with
conflicts. Although many leaders develop this skill during the conduct of
operations, a predeployment training program is the preferred approach. A
course lasting three to five days introduces the basic concepts and then
applies the concepts in a series of exercises.
E-21.
Ideally, organizations that may participate in peace operations should
include education in negotiations as part of the leader professional develop-
ment. Selected leaders who would benefit from such training include staff
officers down to battalion level and company commanders. Such courses are
offered at—
• The US Army Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl-
vania. It offers a three and four-day exportable negotiations course.
• The Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia. It offers a one-
week negotiation art and skills course several times a year.
E-22. Other institutions are sources of expertise in negotiation and conflict
resolution. These institutions offer training in various formats:
• The US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, is one of the foremost
institutions for its expertise and practical work with governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
• The American Arbitration Association in Washington, DC, provides
extensive practical experience to negotiators, mediators, and trainers
for governmental agencies and international organizations.
• John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, annually offers a one-week course entitled
“Strategic Public-Sector Negotiation.”
• The Conflict Management Group in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a
nonprofit organization that tailors programs for organizations and has
extensive international experience.
E-5
Appendix F
Refugees and Displaced Persons
Refugees and displaced persons are a central feature of many stability
operations and support operations. Military forces do not have primary
responsibility for the international response that assists refugees and dis-
placed persons. However, they may support the activities of their civilian
partners. The military may provide security for civilian operations while
those operations care for the displaced community. Such security may
focus on safety in camps and settlements, the movements of displaced
people, the screening of returnees at check points, the protection of relief
convoys, and public safety in returnee communities that lack local law
and order establishments. The military may also be requested to provide
intelligence support to determine the location, timing, movement
patterns, and the magnitude of population movements.
ROLE OF THE UNHCR
F-1. The United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is the lead international organization responsible to protect and
assist these refugees and asylum seekers. This office’s responsibilities for the
protection of refugees include
• Working to ensure that government authorities identify and provide
legal treatment of, access to, and asylum for refugees.
• Assisting with solutions to refugee problems (such as repatriation, inte-
gration, and resettlement).
• Supporting returnees.
F-2. To execute its mandate, the UNHCR works with governments; other
members of the UN system, such as the World Health Organization and
World Food Program; other international organizations, such as the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration; and nongovernmental organizations, such
as elements of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement.
CONTENTS
Role of the UNHCR
F-0
Nongovernmental Organizations
F-3
US Army Internment and Resettlement
Population Movement
F-4
Operations
F-1
Special Considerations
F-4
Displaced Populations
F-1
Women
F-4
Refugees
F-1
Children and Adolescents
F-4
Internally Displaced Persons
F-2
Elderly
F-5
Responsibilities of States
F-3
F-0
____________________________________________________________ Refugees and Displaced Persons
F-3.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
and the Interagency Standing Committee (see Appendix A) must ensure that
the UN system provides emergency humanitarian assistance to those in
need, whether in support of UNHCR or another lead agency.
US ARMY INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS
F-4.
Both stability operations and support operations may require Army
forces to conduct internment and resettlement operations. If peace enforce-
ment operations require forcible separation of belligerent parties, then
internment/resettlement (I/R) operations must also be conducted as peace
enforcement (PE) forces capture or detain parties to the conflict or resettle
portions of the population. Depending on the type of conflict that results from
forcible separation, I/R operations may need to be conducted for enemy
prisoners of war, military detainees, civilian internees or refugees, and dislo-
cated civilians. Without a formal declaration of war, hostile military forces
that are captured are categorized as civilian internees and not enemy priso-
ners of war. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) executive
agent for all civilian internees operations.
F-5.
Within the Army, military police units coordinate shelter, protection,
accountability, and sustainment for civilian internees. Military police estab-
lish forward collection points to relieve other PE forces of the responsibility of
handling civilian internees. Working closely with civil affairs, psychological
operations units, and intelligence personnel, military police units then
evacuate civilian internees to camps where the units provide safe and
humane treatment of civilian internees required by international law. I/R
operations will become critical as PE forces transition from the PE phase to
the peacekeeping phase of peace operations. Civilian internee camps are
operated in the same manner as prisoner of war camps, with due regard to
the fundamental differences between these two categories. For example, due
consideration is given to the age, physical condition, and ability of civilians to
adjust to the conditions of internment. Family groups are provided separate
quarters when interning more than one member of a family.
DISPLACED POPULATIONS
REFUGEES
F-6. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees, a refugee is anyone
outside his country of origin “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion … and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.” Since then regional treaties expanded on the convention’s basic provi-
sions to include persons compelled to leave their country or persons who flee
their country due to civil war, civil unrest, or generalized human rights
abuses. These developments have led some countries to modify their laws or
practice regarding refugees and asylum, but the United States (US) does not
F-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
accept that there have been additions or amendments to the definition of
“refugee” spelled out in the convention.
F-7.
The most important right detailed in the 1951 convention and its 1967
protocol is that of protection and prohibition against forcible return to the
country from which the refugee has fled and to all territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened. Article 33 of the convention provides that no
state shall expel or return a refugee to territories where his life or freedom is
threatened. This prohibition against expelling or returning a refugee is
accepted as customary under international law. Such acceptance, in turn,
calls on all states to respect the prohibition whether or not the state is a
party to the 1951 convention and protocol.
F-8.
Paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declares that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum. However,
paragraph 2 of Article 14 declares that the right is not applicable in cases in-
volving nonpolitical crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the UN. Violations of the convention’s prohibition against forcible return
commonly occur when a prospective refugee is rejected at a frontier where
there is no possibility to secure asylum elsewhere. Similarly the convention is
violated when the country of asylum expels a refugee to a territory where his
security is jeopardized or when the refugee is sent to a country for deporta-
tion to his country of origin.
F-9.
In addition to the right against forcible return, persons determined to be
refugees are entitled to—
• The right to life, liberty, and personal security.
• Freedom from cruel, inhumane torture and punishment.
• Freedom from slavery.
• Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
• Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and recognition as a per-
son before the law.
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
F-10. An internally displaced person is any person who has left their resi-
dence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of
their own country (JP 3-07.6). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are fre-
quently confused with refugees or other displaced persons. The definitions of
the two categories of displaced elements of a population in a crisis can get
blurred in the area of operations. The distinction between the two categories
is essentially a matter of location. A refugee gains that status when he
crosses an international border. An IDP, on the other hand, remains within
the boundary of the country of origin. What is crucial is that this distinction
has less to do with reasons for movement and more to do with technical and
legal considerations associated with the individual’s ultimate destination.
Both the refugee and the IDP may be fleeing the same threat, and both may
experience the same requirements to alleviate the threat. Virtually every hu-
manitarian agency has the flexibility to respond to the needs of both refugees
and IDPs. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the organization
to respond to the needs of refugees, can serve the interests of IDPs on a case-
by-case basis. Moreover, OCHA must work to ensure that the UN system
F-2
____________________________________________________________ Refugees and Displaced Persons
protects and assists persons who are not covered by other UN mandates. This
office, as the title implies, coordinates the humanitarian response to emer-
gencies and advocates the interests of the internally displaced community.
F-11.
A special rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights has pub-
lished protection principles for IDPs that have gained widespread support.
The principles provide direction to the international and local relief communi-
ties on issues of internal displacement. The document focuses on IDP basic
rights, and the national authorities’ responsibilities for protection and assist-
ance. Additionally, the principles include the right of international agencies
to offer services to IDPs and the duty of national authorities to assist the
return of IDPs to their residences or internal resettlement.
F-12.
Military forces have been called on to secure displaced persons within
their country of origin. Support for IDPs can take several forms. Often, relief
convoys need military security. At times, military forces must insulate inter-
nally displaced groups from the population at large. Safe areas may be estab-
lished to ensure the safety of the targeted group. As with military support to
refugee operations, the military forces operate with their civilian partners.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES
F-13.
States parties to the 1951 convention or 1967 protocol are obligated to
respect the prohibition against forcible return and protect the refugees.
Moreover, contracting states may not penalize refugees for illegal entry to
the asylum countries since the turmoil surrounding the refugees’ departure
from the state of origin rarely allows time for proper entry formalities. The
convention requires refugees to identify themselves to asylum country
authorities as soon as possible and to show cause for the illegal entry.
F-14.
Although not required by law, states, especially asylum country neigh-
bors, are further encouraged to collaborate to confront and resolve the cause
of the refugee movement and to help protect the population needing asylum.
The asylum country bears the greatest refugee burden since moving many
people across its border often can produce disruption in the arrival areas.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
F-15. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are particularly organized and
positioned to support refugee operations. NGOs enjoy a greater degree of
independence than states and international organizations. They are often the
first agencies to provide assistance during an emergency. Additionally, local
NGOs are frequently the first to give warning to an emerging crisis. NGOs
can use their presence and involvement to protect refugees by reporting con-
cerns, alerting the public and media, promoting international standards,
offering advice, and monitoring human rights both within the asylum and
original countries. NGOs can provide these services regardless of the
agencies’ specialties. Those NGOs chartered to work with displaced
personswhether providing material assistance or helping to establish and
maintain camps and settlementsare particularly well positioned to monitor
and report on refugees, IDPs, and other conditions and treatment.
F-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
POPULATION MOVEMENT
F-16.
A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur
without reason. Usually, indicators exist that individual rights are, or soon
will be, in jeopardy. Military forces may be requested to provide intelligence
support to assist in determining the direction and magnitude of these move-
ments. Any social unrest may lead to detention and armed conflict between
individuals and groups.
F-17.
There are several stages of movement:
• Preflight and flight. Military forces can be called on to provide
intelligence support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction
of the population movement. These movements can be alone or en
masse.
• Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location,
military forces may be called on to assist international organizations,
NGOs, and the host nation during the initial arrival of the refugees.
This movement can be alone or in a group.
• Asylum. Military forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in
the host nation while assisting with stabilization of the refugees’
country of origin.
• Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve and
the displaced community returns to its native country, military
support may be needed to secure repatriation crossing points,
screening points, and transit sites as well as to secure returnee
movement to local communities.
• Reintegration. Finally, during the final, reintegration phase, military
forces may be required to assist with the security of returnees as they
are absorbed into their local communities. This support is especially
critical in the absence of a capable host-nation public safety establish-
ment. International civilian police normally assume the primary
responsibility for community law and order.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
WOMEN
F-18.
Several categories of displaced persons whether refugees or IDPs
deserve special consideration. Displaced women and girls have particular
protection needs. Effective protection measures require planning, common
sense, and specific programs to respond to the needs of this vulnerable group.
Special attention to this category is critical because women make up a large
number of the displaced community. Practical steps are necessary regarding
the security of women in camps and settlements. Among these steps are
involving the women in ways to improve their security, ensuring basic
services are accessible, and improving lighting.
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
F-19. Another category of displaced persons that warrants special attention
is children and adolescents. Life as a displaced person can be traumatic for
children. Displaced youths have many causes for their suffering. Children
F-4
____________________________________________________________ Refugees and Displaced Persons
often face a myriad of challenges including the persecution of family
members, the loss of home and comfortable surroundings, separation from
family, the need to assume adult responsibilities, and no time for recreation.
The most vulnerable, identified as unaccompanied minors, are the young
separated from their parents or caregivers. Refugee children share universal
rights with all people, additional rights as children, and particular rights as
displaced persons. The US has not ratified the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child although virtually all other countries have ratified it.
This convention contains provisions that cover refugees under the age of
eighteen. It addresses nondiscrimination, social participation, adolescence,
and children’s relationships with others. Additionally, the UNHCR’s policy
on refugee children calls for reunifying children with primary caregivers as
quickly as possible.
ELDERLY
F-20. The elderly also deserve special attention. Depending on the geography
of the crisis, the age of this category of refugee could vary from mid-forties to
late-seventies. Regardless of age, the elderly displaced persons share reduced
opportunity for training and employment, a lack of information on rights and
services to which they are entitled, and the risk of abandonment by families
unable to provide care. Typically, most elderly refugees become dependent on
others only during the final stages of disability and illness. The main problem
with the elderly in a refugee situation is that the forced displacement denies
them the chance to be provided for by others in the manner to which they are
accustomed. Significantly, just as with displaced children, the elderly become
most vulnerable when forcibly separated from their families. Separation can
occur during any stage of the displaced community experience. During
preflight and flight, the younger members of the community are frequently
killed. Their deaths leave the elderly behind or moving without support.
During asylum or resettlement, younger members often leave first in search
of greater security or employment. During repatriation, often after extended
asylum, the young are more apt to lose touch with, and interest in, the
country of origin, thus leaving the elderly to return alone. This abandonment
results in an older group of displaced persons with no source of assistance
leading to long-term dependency on the relief mission.
F-5
Glossary
AC-130
US Air Force gunship
admin
administration (graphics)
AF
Air Force
AMD
air and missile defense
antiterrorism
defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of indi-
viduals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response
and containment by local military forces (JP 1-02)
AO
area of operations
AOR
area of responsility
AOS
area of separation
AR
Army Regulation
ARNG
Army National Guard
area of operations
An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land
and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass
the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but
should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish
their missions and protect their forces. (JP 5-0)
area of separation
see buffer zone (JP 3-07.3)
arms control
a concept that denotes on some occasions those measures taken
for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environ-
ment (JP 1-02)
ARSOF
Army special operations forces
AT
antiterrorism
AUTL
Army Universal Task List
battle handover
A designated point (phase line) on the ground where responsi-
bility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force
and vice versa. It is within direct fire range and observed indirect
fire range of the stationary force. (FM 1-02)
buffer zone
A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which
disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone
is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or
belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.
(JP 3-07.3)
BZ
buffer zone
C2
command and control
Glossary-0
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
C4
command, control, communications, and computer (graphics)
CA
civil affairs
CAARNG
California Army National Guard
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explo-
sive
CBT
combatting terrorism
CD
counterdrug
CDRG
catastrophic disaster response group
CG
commanding general
CI
counterintelligence
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC
civil-military cooperation
civil administration
an administration established by a foreign government in (1)
friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of
the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the
function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied
by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises
executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous
civil government can be established (JP 3-57)
civil affairs
designated Active and Reserve component forces and units
organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil
affairs activities and to support civil-military operations (JP 3-57)
civil disturbance
group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and
order (JP 1-02)
civil-military operations
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence,
or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area
in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and
achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may
include performance by military forces of activities and functions
normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national
government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subse-
quent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed,
in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military opera-
tions may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other mili-
tary forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.
(JP 3-57)
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO
civil-military operations
CMOC
civil-military operations center
Glossary-1
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
COM
chief of mission
combat service support
The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks neces-
sary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all
levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it
includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service
forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transporta-
tion, health services, and other services required by aviation and
ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their
missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those
activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all
operating forces on the battlefield. (Army) - CSS also include
those activities in stability and support operations that sustain
all operating forces. The included branches and functions are:
Adjutant General Corps, Acquisition Corps, Chaplain Corps,
Finance Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, Medical Corps,
Ordnance Corps, Transportation Corps, and the Quartermaster
Corps. (FM 1-02)
combatant command
A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission
under a single commander established and so designated by the
President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice
and assistance of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. Combatant
commands typically have geographic or functional responsi-
bilities. (JP 5-0)
combatant commander
a commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant
commands established by the President (JP 0-2)
combatting terrorism
actions, including antiterrorism
(defensive measures taken to
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offen-
sive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),
taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum
(JP 1-02)
command and control
(Army) the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Commanders perform command
and control functions through a command and control system.
(FM 6-0)
commander’s critical information requirements elements of information required by com-
manders that directly affect decision making and dictate the
successful execution of military operations (FM 3-0)
common operational picture an operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements,
based on common data and information shared by more than one
command (FM 3-0)
complex contingency operations large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) con-
ducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary
organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace
operations which include one or more elements of other types of
operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation
Glossary-2
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsur-
gency (JP 3-57)
consequence management
Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to
governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the conse-
quences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explo-
sive situation. For domestic consequence management, the pri-
mary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal
Government to provide assistance required. (JP 3-0)
CONUS
continental United States
CONUSA
Continental United States army
Conv.
Conventional (graphics)
CORDS
Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support
counterdrug operations
civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug
trafficking (JP 3-07.4)
counterdrug
those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the
production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs (JP 3-05)
counterinsurgency
those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency
(JP 1-02)
counterintelligence
information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassina-
tions conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or ele-
ments thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or inter-
national terrorist activities (JP 1-02)
countermobility operations The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to
delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the
terrain. The primary purpose of countermobility operations is to
slow or divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition,
and to increase weapons effectiveness. (JP 1-02)
crisis management Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and
prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis
management will include a response to an incident involving a
weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device,
or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal
agency. (JP 3-07.6)
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CT counterterrorism
ctr
counter (graphics)
D&M detection and monitoring
DA Department of the Army
Glossary-3
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
DAO Defense Attaché Office
DART disaster assistance response team
DC District of Columbia
DCM deputy chief of mission
DCO defense coordinating officer
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
decisive operations Those operations that directly accomplish the task assigned by
the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively deter-
mine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements.
(FM 3-0)
decon decontamination (graphics)
defensive information operations (Army) The integration and coordination of policies and
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and
defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive
information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant
information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to
exploit friendly information and information systems for their
own purposes. (FM 3-0)
demobilization
the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military estab-
lishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime con-
figuration while maintaining national security and economic
vitality (JP 4-05)
deployment
(Army) those activities required to prepare and move a force and
its sustainment equipment and supplies to the area of operations
in response to a crisis or natural disaster (FM 3-35)
DHHS
Department of Health and Human Services
dir
director (graphics)
DMZ
demilitarized zone
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense Directive
domestic emergencies
emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the
50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision
thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil dis-
turbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or
equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt
the usual process of government (JP 1-02)
domestic support operations those activities and measures taken by the Department of
Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the
Department of Defense and any civil government agency in
planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources
Glossary-4
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks,
including national security emergencies (JP 3-57)
DOMS Director of Military Support
DOS Department of State
DSO domestic support operations
EAC emergency action committee
EAP Emergency Action Plan
ECC evacuation control center
electronic warfare any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to
attack the enemy (JP 3-51)
employment the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces (JP 5-0)
EO executive order
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ESF emergency support function
essential elements of friendly information
(Army) the critical aspects of a friendly opera-
tion that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compro-
mise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and there-
fore must be protected from enemy detection (FM 3-13)
EST
emergency support team (FEMA)
FAA
Foreign Assistance Act
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO
federal coordinating officer (USG)
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FID
foreign internal defense
FM
field manual
FMFP
foreign military financing program
force protection
Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against
Department of Defense personnel (to include family members),
resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions con-
serve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the deci-
sive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchro-
nized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective
employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for
the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the
enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 3-0)
force tailoring
the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for
a mission (FM 3-0)
Glossary-5
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
foreign disaster relief
Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign
disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and
transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and
bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medi-
cal materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making
repairs to essential services. (JP 3-07.6)
foreign humanitarian assistance Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of
natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such
as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a
serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss
of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by
US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance
provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of
the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the
primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are
those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and
possessions. (JP 3-07.6)
foreign internal defense
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in
any of the action programs taken by another government to free
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insur-
gency (JP 1-02)
FRP
Federal Response Plan
full spectrum operations
the range of operation Army forces conduct in war and military
operations other than war (FM 3-0)
FWF
former warring factions
FY
fiscal year
G2
intelligence staff officer
G5
assistant chief of staff
gov.
government (graphics)
guerilla warfare
military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or
hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces
(JP 1-02)
HCA
humanitarian and civic assistance
HDO
humanitarian demining operations
HN
host nation
HOC
humanitarian operations center
host nation
a nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations,
coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to
operate in, or to transit through its territory (JP 1-02)
human intelligence
a category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources (JP 1-02)
Glossary-6
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
humanitarian and civic assistance Assistance to the local populace provided by predomi-
nantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and
exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10,
United States Code, section
401, and funded under separate
authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited
to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas
of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transporta-
tion systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities; ad
(4) rudimentary construction and repair of public
facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that
incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.
(JP 3-05.3)
HUMINT
human intelligence
I/R
internment/resettlement
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD
internal defense and development
IDP
internally displaced person
IFOR
NATO Implementation Force (Bosnia)
information environment
the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that
collect, process, or disseminate information; also included is the
information itself (JP 3-13)
information management
The provision of relevant information to the right person at the
right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding
and decision making. It uses procedures and information systems
to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information.
(FM 3-0)
information operations
(Army) actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others’,
decision making processes, information and information systems
while protecting one’s own information and information systems
(FM 3-0)
information superiority
(Army) the operational advantage derived from the ability to
collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of infor-
mation while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do
the same (FM 3-0)
insurgency
an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through use of subversion and armed conflict
(JP 1-02)
integration
(1) In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an
operational commander’s force prior to mission execution. (2) The
arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force
that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 0-2)
intelligence
(1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integra-
tion, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available informa-
tion concerning foreign countries or areas. (2) Information and
Glossary-7
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation,
investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 2-0)
intermediate staging base a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the
forces into the host nation (JP 3-07.5)
internal defense and development the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote
its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political,
economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society
(JP 1-02)
internally displaced person any person who has left their residence by reason of real or
imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own
country (JP 3-07.6)
IO
information operations
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAG
judge advocate general
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF
joint task force
JTF-CS
Joint Task Force-Civil Support
JTF-KU
Joint Task Force-Kuwait
JTF-LA
Joint Task Force-Los Angeles
KFOR
Kosovo forces
L.A.
Los Angeles (California) (graphics)
law of war
that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
hostilities (JP 1-02)
LEA
law enforcement agency
lead agency
Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the
interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing
operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working
group established to coordinate policy related to a particular
operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures
cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing
decisions. (JP 3-08)
LFA
lead federal agency
line of communications
a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating
military force with a base of operations and along which supplies
and military forces move (JP 1-02)
LNO
liaison officer
LOC
line of communications
LOGCAP
logistics civilian augmentation program
Glossary-8
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
MCA military civic action
MDMP military decision making process
measures of effectiveness Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and
execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a
prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. (JP 3-60)
METL mission essential task list
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, civil considerations
MFO multinational force and observers (graphics)
military operations other than war Operations that encompass the use of military capabili-
ties across the range of military operations short of war. These
military actions can be applied to complement any combination of
the other instruments of national power and occur before, during,
and after war. (JP 3-07)
MILOB
military observer
mobility
a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to
move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their
primary mission (JP 1-02)
MOOTW
military operations other than war
MOU
memorandum of understanding
MP
military police
MSCA
military support to civil authorities
MSD
Mobile Security Division
MSG
Marine Security Guard
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC
nuclear, biological, and chemical
negotiations
a discussion between authorities and a barricaded offender or
terrorist to effect hostage release and terrorist surrender
(JP 3-07.2)
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operation
NG
National Guard
NGO
nongovernmental organization
NICI
National Interagency Civil-Military Institute
NMS
national military strategy
noncombatant evacuation operations Operations directed by the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby
noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their
lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to
safe havens or to the United States (JP 3-07)
Glossary-9
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
nongovernmental organizations Transnational organizations of private citizens that main-
tain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be
professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses,
or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assist-
ance activities
(development and relief).
“Nongovernmental
organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States
organizations. (JP 1-06)
NSC National Security Council
NSS national security strategy
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OES office of emergency services
offensive information operations
(Army) are the integrated use of assigned and supporting
capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to
affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or
promote specific objectives (FM 3-0)
OP
observation post
OPCON
operational control
operational control
Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational
control is inherent in combatant command (command authority)
and may be delegated within the command. When forces are
transferred between combatant commands, the command rela-
tionship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing com-
mander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the
Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to
perform those functions of command over subordinate forces
involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational con-
trol includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions
assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised
through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally
this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force com-
manders and Service and/or functional component commanders.
Operational control normally provides full authority to organize
commands and forces and to employ those forces as the
commander in operational control considers necessary to accom-
plish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include
authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration,
discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 0-2)
operations security
a process of identifying critical information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and
Glossary-10
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed
by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that
hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be inter-
preted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to
be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of
friendly actions to adversary exploitation (JP 3-07.2)
OPLAN
operation plan
OPNS
operations (graphics)
OPORD
operation order
OPSEC
operations security
OSOCC
on-site operations coordination center
PA
public affairs
PAM
pamphlet
PAO
public affairs officer
PDD
Presidential Decision Directive
PE
peace enforcement
peace building
post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic,
that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and
institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07)
peace enforcement
application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally
pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance
with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore
peace and order (JP 3-07)
peace operations
a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and
peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic
efforts to establish and maintain peace (JP 3-07)
peacekeeping
military operations undertaken with the consent of all major
parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implemen-
tation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)
and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political
settlement (JP 3-07)
peacemaking
the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of
peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and
resolves issues that led to it (JP 3-07)
peacetime military engagement encompasses all military activities that involve other
nations and are intended to shape the security environment in
peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US
military conducts with other nations to shape the international
environment, improve mutual understanding with other
countries, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or
potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement
Glossary-11
FM 3-07 __________________________________________________________________________________
activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s ob-
jectives as articulated in the theater engagement plan. (FM 3-0)
PEO
peace enforcement operations
PEP
personnel exchange program
PIR
priority intelligence requirements
PK
peacekeeping
PKO
peacekeeping operations
planning
the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome,
lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his
subordinates his vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on the
results he expects to achieve (FM 3-0)
PO
peace operations
POLAD
political advisor
Pol-Mil
political-military
preventive deployment
The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the inter-
face or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among
parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are
indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equip-
ment, force posture, and activities. (JP 3-07)
preventive diplomacy
diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to
prevent or limit violence (JP 3-07)
priority intelligence requirements those intelligence requirements for which a commander
has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and
decision making (JP 2-0)
propaganda any form of communication in support of national objectives
designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or
behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either
directly or indirectly (JP 1-02)
PSO post security officer
psychological operations Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators
to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objec-
tive reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign govern-
ments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes
and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
PSYOP psychological operations
reconnaissance a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, information about the activities and resources
of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a
particular area (JP 1-02)
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