FM 3-0 OPERATIONS (FEBRUARY 2008) - page 3

 

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FM 3-0 OPERATIONS (FEBRUARY 2008) - page 3

 

 

The Commander and Mission Command
UNDERSTAND, VISUALIZE, DESCRIBE, DIRECT, LEAD, AND ASSESS OPERATIONS
5-14. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. They understand the
problem. Commanders visualize the end state and the nature and design of the operation. They describe the
time, space, resources, purpose, and action. They direct the warfighting functions. Commanders also
continually lead and assess.
*Figure 5-1. Driving the operations process
5-15. *This process is the Army’s model for the exercise of mission command. Commanders apply the
methodology of design to gain and maintain a greater understanding of the operational environment and
support the operations process. They seek to visualize the end state and operational approach. They
describe the visualization to promote a shared understanding. Commanders direct action based on
situational understanding. They lead Soldiers and partners during execution. They continuously assess
progress of operations and adapt (reframe) as required.
5-16. Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations. They plan to understand a
situation, envision a desired future, and, with assistance of their staffs, lay out effective ways of bringing
that future about. Commanders guide preparation to help the force and Soldiers improve their ability to
execute an operation, and establish conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success.
Throughout execution, commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative. Finally, commanders
continuously assess the current situation and progress of an operation, and adjust or reframe as needed to
ensure objectives are accomplished and success is achieved. Commanders make timely and effective
decisions based on applying judgment to available information. It requires knowing both when and what to
decide. It also requires commanders to evaluate the quality of information and knowledge. Commanders
identify important information requirements and focus subordinates and staff on answering them. They face
a thinking, adaptive enemy. Commanders estimate, but cannot predict, the enemy’s actions and the course
of future events. Once executed, the effects of their decisions are frequently irreversible. Therefore, they
anticipate actions that follow their decisions.
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Chapter 5
5-17. Commanders continuously combine analytic and intuitive approaches to decisionmaking. Analytic
decisionmaking approaches a problem systematically. The analytic approach aims to produce the optimal
solution to a problem from among the solutions identified. The Army’s analytic approach is the MDMP. In
contrast, intuitive decisionmaking is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition
based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character.
This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options (FM 6-0). It
relies on the experienced commander’s and staff member’s intuitive ability to recognize the key elements
and implications of a particular problem or situation, reject the impractical, and select an adequate solution.
(FM 5-0 discusses the MDMP. FM 6-0 discusses analytic and intuitive decisionmaking.)
5-18. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Commanders may make an intuitive decision based
on situational understanding gained during the MDMP. If time permits, the staff may use a specific MDMP
step, such as war gaming, to validate or refine the commander’s intuitive decision. In a time-constrained
environment, many techniques—such as selecting a single course of action—rely heavily on intuitive
decisions. Even in the most rigorous, analytic decisionmaking processes, intuition sets boundaries for analysis.
5-19. *Commanders conduct design to help them with the conceptual aspects of planning to include
understanding, visualizing, and describing. After receipt of or in anticipation of a mission, commanders
may begin design to understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an
operational approach to solve the problem. Using the elements of operational art, commanders visualize the
desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape the current conditions into the end state.
Commanders describe their visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and concept
of operations, clarifying an uncertain situation.
5-20. Commanders continuously lead and assess. Guided by professional judgment gained from
experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition, commanders lead by force of example and
personal presence. Leadership inspires Soldiers (and sometimes civilians) to accomplish things that they
would otherwise avoid. This often requires risk. Commanders anticipate and accept prudent risk to create
opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Assessment helps
commanders better understand current conditions and broadly describe future conditions that define
success. They identify the difference between the two and visualize a sequence of actions to link them.
5-21. *Commanders encourage the leadership and initiative of subordinates through mission command.
Commanders accept setbacks that stem from the initiative of subordinates. They understand that land
warfare is chaotic and unpredictable and that action is preferable to passivity. They encourage subordinates
to accept prudent risks to create opportunities, while providing intent and control that allow for latitude and
discretion. They also express gaps in relevant information as commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs). Direction is implicit in command; commanders direct actions to achieve results and
lead forces to mission accomplishment.
Understand
5-22. Understanding is fundamental to the role of the commander. It is essential to the commander’s ability
to establish the situation’s context. Understanding involves analyzing and understanding the operational or
mission variables in a given operational environment. It is derived from applying judgment to the common
operational picture through the filter of the commander’s knowledge and experience. Understanding
includes physical factors (such as location of forces or population centers), human factors (such as religion
or morale), and the relationships among friendly and enemy forces, the local populace and other aspects of
the operational environment that potentially represent opportunities and threats to friendly forces.
5-23. To develop a truer understanding of the operational environment, commanders, subordinate
commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning
information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions. Competent
commanders circulate throughout their areas of operations as often as possible, talking to subordinate
commanders and Soldiers conducting operations, while observing for themselves. These individuals have a
more finely attuned sense of the local situation, and their intuition may detect trouble or opportunity long
before the staff might. Intuition deepens commanders’ understanding. It allows them to anticipate potential
opportunities and threats, information gaps, and capability shortfalls. Understanding becomes the basis of
the commander’s visualization.
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5-24. Numerous factors determine the commander’s depth of understanding. Surveillance and
reconnaissance prove indispensable as do actual observation and listening to subordinates. Formulating
CCIRs, keeping them current, determining where to place key personnel, and arranging for liaisons also
contribute to understanding. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability; a commander’s situational
understanding changes as an operation progresses. Additionally, commanders and their staffs must
continually assess the level of confidence they have in their understanding of the situation, and strive to
improve upon the degree of understanding. Relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative.
Knowledge management helps commanders make informed, timely decisions. It brings the relevant
information commanders require closer to that which they have. Information management helps
commanders develop situational understanding to better frame the problem and assess the situation. It
makes relevant information available to the right person at the right time. Greater understanding enables
commanders to make better decisions. It allows them to focus their intuition on visualizing the current and
future conditions of the environment and describing them to subordinates.
Visualize
5-25. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding,
determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will
achieve that end state. During planning, commander’s visualization provides the basis for developing
plans and orders. During execution, it helps commanders determine if, when, and what to decide as they
adapt to changing conditions. Commanders and staffs continuously assess the progress of operations
toward the desired end state. They plan to adjust operations as required to accomplish the mission.
5-26. Assignment of a mission focuses the commander’s visualization. Because military operations are
fundamentally dynamic, this visualization must be continuous. Visualizing the desired end state requires
commanders to clearly understand the operational environment and analyze the situation. Commanders
consider the current situation and perform a mission analysis that assists in their initial visualization. They
continually validate their visualization throughout the operation. To develop their visualization,
commanders draw on several sources of knowledge and relevant information. These include—
z
Elements of operational art appropriate to their echelon.
z
Input from the staff and other commanders.
z
Principles of war. (See appendix A.)
z
Operational themes and related doctrine.
z
Running estimates.
z
The common operational picture.
z
Their experience and judgment.
z
Subject matter experts.
Visualization allows commanders to develop their intent and planning guidance for the entire operation, not
just the initial onset of action.
5-27. Subordinate, supporting, adjacent, and higher commanders communicate with one another to
compare perspectives and visualize their environments. Commanders increase the breadth and depth of
their visualizations by collaborating with other commanders. Staff input, as running estimates, focuses
analysis and detects potential effects on operations. Commanders direct staffs to provide the information
necessary to shape their visualization. Commanders (and staff, if available) translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected
results.
5-28. Commanders consider the elements of operational art as they frame the problem and describe their
visualization. (See chapter 7.) However, the utility and application of some elements are often limited at the
tactical level. Commanders use the elements that apply to their echelon and situation.
Describe
5-29. After commanders visualize an operation, they communicate their vision to their staffs and
subordinates. They describe their shared understanding of the mission and commander’s intent. Through
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Chapter 5
collaboration and dialog, commanders ensure subordinates understand the visualization well enough to
begin planning. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as
circumstances require. Commanders express their initial visualization in terms of—
z
Initial commander’s intent.
z
Planning guidance, including an initial concept of operations.
z
Information required for further planning (CCIRs).
z
Essential elements of friendly information to protect.
Initial Commander’s Intent
5-30. Commanders summarize their visualization in their initial intent statement. The initial commander’s
intent aims to facilitate planning while focusing the overall operations process. Commanders develop this
statement. It succinctly describes the commander’s visualization of the entire operation listing what the
commander wants to accomplish. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with the
conditions that define the desired end state. Usually the intent statement evolves as planning progresses and
more information becomes available.
5-31. The initial commander’s intent statement focuses the staff during the operations process. The staff
uses this statement to develop and refine courses of action. These courses of action help establish
conditions that define the end state. Planning involves developing lines of effort that link the execution of
tactical tasks to end state conditions. A clear initial commander’s intent drives this effort.
Planning Guidance
5-32. Commanders provide planning guidance with their initial intent statement. Planning guidance
conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. Effective planning guidance is essentially an initial
concept of operations that prioritizes each warfighting function. It reflects how the commander sees the
operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat
power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives
the staff and subordinate leaders’ maximum latitude; it lets proficient staffs develop flexible and effective
options.
5-33. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance.
They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing them the latitude
necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations
without dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning
guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
5-34. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force
information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0). A CCIR directly influences
decisionmaking and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide
whether to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their
visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning,
staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation
and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—
z
Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
z
Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
z
Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
z
Focused on predictable events or activities.
z
Time-sensitive—planners report the answer to a CCIR to the commander immediately by any
means available.
5-35. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts
of limited collection assets. Typically, commanders identify ten or fewer CCIRs. The fewer the CCIRs, the
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The Commander and Mission Command
easier staffs can remember, recognize, and act on each one. This helps staffs and subordinates identify
information the commander needs immediately. While most staffs provide relevant information, a good
staff expertly distills that information. It identifies answers to CCIRs and gets them to the commander
immediately. It also identifies vital information that does not answer a CCIR but that the commander
nonetheless needs to know. A good staff develops this acumen through training and experience.
Designating too many CCIRs limits the staff’s ability to immediately recognize and react to them.
Excessive critical items reduce the focus of collection efforts.
5-36. The list of CCIRs constantly changes. Commanders add and delete individual requirements
throughout an operation as they need information for specific decisions. Commanders determine their own
CCIRs but may select some from staff nominations. Staff sections recommend the most important
intelligence and information requirements for the commander to consider as CCIRs. Once approved, a
CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs) and friendly force
information requirements (FFIRs).
5-37. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence
support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment
(JP 2-0). PIRs identify the information about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that
the commander considers most important. Lessons from recent operations show that intelligence about civil
considerations may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. Thus, all staff sections may recommend
information about civil considerations as PIRs. The intelligence officer manages PIRs for the commander.
5-38. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify the information about the
mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers
most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander.
Essential Elements of Friendly Information
5-39. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if
known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the
operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs,
they have the same priority. An EEFI establishes an element of information to protect rather than one to
collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize
mission success. EEFIs help commanders protect vital friendly information. Their identification is the first
step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information. (FM 3-13 addresses the
operations security process.) EEFIs are also key factors in formulating military deception operations.
Direct
5-40. Commanders direct all aspects of operations. This direction takes different forms during planning,
preparation, and execution. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based on their situational
understanding, which they maintain by continuous assessment. They use control measures to focus the
operation on the desired end state. Commanders direct operations by—
z
Preparing and approving plans and orders.
z
Assigning and adjusting missions, tasks, task organization, and control measures based on
changing conditions.
z
Positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve maneuver
options.
z
Positioning key leaders to ensure observation and supervision at critical times and places.
z
Adjusting support priorities and allocating resources based on opportunities and threats.
z
Accepting risk to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
z
Establishing themes (and sometimes messages) for inform and influence activities.
z
Committing reserves.
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Chapter 5
Plans and Orders
5-41. Plans and orders are key tools used by commanders in directing operations. Under mission
command, commanders direct with mission orders. Mission orders is a technique for developing orders
that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. It
provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions.
Mission orders synchronize subordinates’ actions only as required for mission success. Constraints are
appropriate when mission success requires closely synchronized action by multiple units. Even then,
commanders establish constraints in a manner that least limits individual initiative. Commanders ensure
that orders prepared by the staff follow the precepts of mission orders to facilitate decentralized execution
and maximum flexibility of subordinates.
5-42. Generally, subordinate commanders exercise full freedom of action within the concept of operations
and commander’s intent. Higher commanders may impose additional control over subordinates during a
particular phase or mission. As soon as conditions allow, subordinates regain their freedom of action.
Effective mission orders communicate to subordinates the situation, their commander’s intent and mission,
and the important tasks of each unit. The commander’s intent and concept of operations set guidelines that
ensure unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise initiative.
5-43. Mission orders stress not only the tasks required of subordinates but also understanding their context
and purpose. While clear direction is essential to accomplishing the mission, commanders strike a balance
between necessary but minimum direction and overly detailed direction. Subordinates who act first (within
the commander’s intent) and report later often achieve far more than those who delay action to wait for the
commander’s confirmation.
Commander’s Intent
5-44. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the
conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that
represent the desired end state. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success in
an operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and only the most important conditions that define the end
state. It links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent
facilitates a shared understanding and focus on the overall conditions that represent mission
accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs individual initiative.
5-45. Soldiers two echelons down must easily remember and clearly understand the commander’s intent.
The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent
consists of three to five sentences. Commanders formulate and communicate their commander’s intent to
describe the boundaries within which subordinates may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort.
To avoid limiting subordinates’ freedom of action, commanders place only minimum constraints for
coordination on them.
5-46. Commanders develop their intent statement. The commander’s intent, coupled with mission, directs
subordinates toward mission accomplishment, especially when current orders no longer fit the situation and
subordinates must decide how to deviate from them. Subordinate leaders, empowered with authority and a
clear understanding of the commander’s intent and concept, develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively
under fluid, dynamic conditions.
Concept of Operations
5-47. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units
cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to
achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations. The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible
subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. The concept of operations
promotes general understanding by stating the task (such as attack) that directly accomplishes the mission
(the decisive operation) and the units that will execute it. The concept of operations clearly describes the
other units’ tasks in terms of shaping and sustaining operations. It may include, for example, the type of
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The Commander and Mission Command
support or specific location for providing support. Normally, the concept of operations projects the status of
the force at the end of the operation. If the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during the
operation, the commander may phase the operation. Small-unit commanders and leaders usually do not
describe their concept of operations in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; they simply
assign tasks to subordinates using main effort as required. (FM 5-0 discusses the concept of operations in
detail.)
5-48. The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the
outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around
which commanders design the entire operation. Multiple units may be engaged in the same decisive
operation. For example, one task force may follow another on an axis of advance, prepared to assume the
attack. Units operating in noncontiguous areas of operations may execute the tasks composing the higher
headquarters’ decisive operation simultaneously in different locations. Commanders visualize the decisive
operation and then design shaping and sustaining operations around it.
5-49. Changing the mission normally changes the decisive operation. This can occur because of a change
of phase but is more typical in the conduct of branches and sequels. When Army forces transition to a new
operation, through either mission accomplishment or a significant change in the situation requiring
reframing, the commander identifies a new decisive operation. Any element of full spectrum operations can
be the decisive operation, as can a specific task, such as movement to contact or civil security. The
commander determines the decisive operation. In a protracted stability operation, for example, the
commander may identify a stability task in a particular area as the decisive operation: “The decisive
operation is to provide civil security in Tal Afar. Task Force Roper provides civil security in Tal Afar
commencing D+2.”
5-50. A shaping operation is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the
success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation
through effects on the enemy, population (including local leaders), and terrain. Inform and influence
activities, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader engagement tasks into the operation to reduce
tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups through direct contact between Army leaders and
local leaders. Shaping operations may occur throughout the operational area and involve any combination
of forces and capabilities.
5-51. Shaping operations may occur before, during, or after the decisive operation begins. Some shaping
operations, especially those executed simultaneously with the decisive operation, may be economy of force
actions. However, if the force available does not permit simultaneous decisive and shaping operations, the
commander sequences shaping operations around the decisive operation. The concept of operations
describes how shaping operations contribute to the decisive operation’s success, often in terms of the
purpose. For example, “Task Force Hammer conducts search and attack operations in area of operations
Anvil to neutralize insurgents that threaten Tal Afar. Task Force Rapier secures area of operations Sparrow
as a support area for brigade operations.”
5-52. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or
shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from
decisive and shaping operations in that they are focused internally
(on friendly forces) rather than
externally (on the enemy or environment). They typically address important sustainment and protection
actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. However, sustaining operations cannot
be decisive themselves. Note that logistic and medical support provided to the civilian population relate to
stability and civil support operations (provide essential services); they are not sustaining operations. At the
operational level, sustaining operations focus on preparing the force for the operation’s next phase. They
determine the limit of operational reach. At the tactical level, sustaining operations determine the tempo of
the overall operation; they ensure the force can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
5-53. Sustaining operations are continuous; commanders do not reiterate routine sustainment requirements
in the concept of operations. Rather, the concept of operations emphasizes important changes in
sustainment required by the operation. For example, “Brigade support battalion moves to area of operations
Sparrow as soon as it is secure and establishes the brigade support area. On order, brigade special troops
battalion assumes control of area of operations Sparrow.” If there are no significant changes to sustainment,
the sustainment paragraph or annexes discuss it.
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Chapter 5
5-54. The concept of operations identifies a main effort unit if required; otherwise, the priorities of support
go to the unit conducting the decisive operation. The main effort is the designated subordinate unit
whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted
with the preponderance of combat power. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource
allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and
resources. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the
commander’s intent require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation.
Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive
operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation becomes
the main effort upon execution of the decisive operation. For example, “Task Force Hammer is the main
effort until D+2.”
Lead
5-55. After commanders make decisions, they lead their forces throughout execution. During execution,
commanders provide the strength of character, moral courage, and will to follow through with their
decisions. When changing decisions, they must know when and what to decide, and when to make other
decisions that address changes in the situation. (FM 6-22 discusses leadership actions during execution.
Chapter 4 discusses leadership and combat power.)
5-56. Effective leaders have physical presence. Commanders carefully consider where they need to be,
balancing the need to inspire Soldiers with that of maintaining an overall perspective of the entire
operation. The commander’s forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger. It also allows
them to appraise for themselves the subordinate unit’s condition, including leader and Soldier morale.
Forward presence allows commanders to sense the human dimension of conflict, particularly when fear and
fatigue reduce effectiveness. Then commanders need to lead by example, side-by-side with Soldiers.
Commanders cannot let the perceived advantages of improved information technology compromise their
obligation to lead by example.
5-57. The commander’s will is the one constant that propels the force through the shock and friction of
battle. Friction is inherent in all operations. Inevitably, things can and will go wrong. The ability of leaders
and Soldiers to concentrate erodes as they reach the limit of their endurance. Against a skilled and resolute
enemy, Soldiers may approach that point when fear, uncertainty, and physical exhaustion dominate their
thinking. At this point, the commander’s strength of will and personal presence provides the moral impetus
for actions that lead to victory.
*Assess
5-58. Assessment helps commanders to better understand current conditions and determine how the
operation is progressing. The commander maintains overall perspective, comparing the current situation to
the one originally envisioned. This requires critical thinking, inspired when possible, by the commander’s
participation in design. The information that commanders receive from subordinates often shapes how
commanders identify, frame, and seek to solve a problem. Commanders use this information to develop
indicators to determine progress toward a successful outcome. These indicators may take the form of
intermediate objectives that units must accomplish to achieve a desired end state.
5-59. The commander assesses the overall progress against the conditions extant, always asking whether
the mission and commander’s intent still apply. When assessment reveals a significant variance from the
commander’s original visualization, commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as
required. The staff assessment guides how to exercise control and regulate subordinate activities. Mission
command requires that staff officers balance their judgment with the subordinate commanders’ perspective;
assessing progress against their commander’s intent first, and then existing control measures.
*DEVELOP TEAMS AMONG MODULAR FORMATIONS AND JOINT, INTERAGENCY,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS
5-60. Developing teams within organizations begins early in the operations process. This key activity
begins in preparation and continues throughout execution. As part of unified action, the Army conducts
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The Commander and Mission Command
operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, as well as
nongovernmental organizations. Commanders integrate all their capabilities. Developing teams enables
commanders to shape operations before, during, and after operations. Army and joint, interagency,
intergovernmental and multinational leaders study and understand the capabilities and limits of each team
member. This effort ensures unity of effort. Leaders develop this understanding by training and
continuously planning with joint, intergovernmental, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental
partners. Sustained engagement with host-nation governments and security forces enhances the developed
understanding. Integrating capabilities during full spectrum operations requires interaction and preparation
before commanders commit forces. Integration occurs through training exercises, exchange programs, and
training events. Greater collaboration in developing systems and equipment results for all the forces
involved.
5-61. The Army transformed from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force with brigades
organized by function. The brigade building blocks of the division make it a modular force task organized
to the needs of the mission while creating options to use forces less than full divisions. However, this
modular construct creates a challenge for commanders trying to build trust and confidence within
subordinate organizations. These organizations are task-organized to meet specific mission requirements
and often not habitually associated with a higher headquarters. Often they have not trained with the higher
headquarters that employs them. Collaboration and dialog with subordinate organizations can mitigate
these potential obstacles to team building. Through collaboration and dialog, commanders gain insight into
the needs of subordinate leaders while also sharing their own clear vision and commander’s intent.
5-62. By circulating among subordinate units, commanders can assess subordinates’ preparation and
execution, get to know new units in the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. By personally
briefing subordinates, commanders gain firsthand appreciation for the situation as well as ensuring
subordinate leaders and Soldiers understand the commander’s intent. Commanders lead, coach, and mentor
subordinate leaders. This assists in establishing close relationships that foster trust and mutual confidence.
A subordinate’s understanding of the commander’s intent, provided through clear and succinct mission
orders, drives successful mission command.
5-63. Commanders also visit with other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and the local populace in their areas of operations. With their presence,
commanders build personal relationships with civilian leaders. Knowledge gained during these visits
enables commanders to maintain situational understanding and continuously update their commander’s
visualization prior to and during execution. Civilian organizations, including those of the host nation,
frequently arrive before and remain after forces depart. Commanders and staffs identify and make contact
with those various organizations.
5-64. A challenge in building teams among civilian and military efforts stems from differing capabilities
and cultures in the civilian and host-nation organizations compared to those of the headquarters. To help
build partnerships, commanders strive to have partners—
z
Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
z
Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
z
Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.
z
Work for unity of effort toward achieving common goals.
5-65. As Army forces conduct operations with various joint and other U.S. government agencies, leaders
integrate Army and interagency capabilities to accomplish specific operational objectives. Interagency
cooperation seeks to balance and combine the capabilities that the Army and those agencies bring to the
operation. To effectively integrate complementary interagency capabilities, commanders follow policy
guidance and the higher commander’s concept of operations. Army leaders apply their understanding of
different cultures and agencies involved to place military efforts in context and to serve on civil-military
teams.
5-66. Partnering, especially with multinational partners, helps direct efforts toward mission
accomplishment. It exceeds an opportunity for exchanging ideas and information. Partnering, and the need
to partner, enables successful military operations. Even when no command authority exists, collaboration
between commanders and partners affords commanders opportunities to revise their understanding or
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Chapter 5
operational approach so together they can achieve the desired end state. Commanders seek unity of effort
through coordination and cooperation even if participants come from different commands or organizations.
Achieving unity of effort depends on leaders working with partners. They develop a mutual understanding
of the environment and a common commitment to solutions. They address causes of conflict and sources of
enemy strength. Achieving unity of effort requires Army leaders to have a high degree of cultural
understanding and social skills. Without such understanding and skills, leaders will fail to mediate and
collaborate with diverse partners.
5-67. Commanders continuously engage and emphasize strengthening existing relationships with modular
formations and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Such action remains
essential to developing mutual trust and common understanding. To build and strengthen bonds of trust and
understanding, commanders sustain efforts to conduct combined training, education, and cultural
exchanges. Successful joint and multinational operations often depend on close coordination, constant
communication, and addressing issues concerning strategy and operations openly and directly.
*LEAD INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
5-68. Effective full spectrum operations require commanders to establish, synchronize, and integrate
actions with information themes and messages to achieve a desired end state. The integration of actions,
themes, and messages aids the commander to provide consistent messages to diverse audiences. In an
information-saturated environment, actions, themes, and messages are inextricably linked requiring careful
coordination and integration. Information, as an element of combat power, is a critical and sometimes
decisive factor in full spectrum operations. Effectively employed, information can shape the operational
environment and multiply the effects of friendly successes while countering adversary or enemy
information efforts. Commanders establish themes and messages. They personally engage key players,
ensuring that the themes and messages are transmitted and received as the commander intends.
5-69. Information theme means a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purposes for an
action. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports an information theme
focused on an audience. It supports a specific action or objective. Accurate, timely, and synchronized
themes and messages—delivered to the right audiences and integrated with effective actions—increase the
pressure on the enemy. When dealing with friendly and neutral audiences, synchronized and integrated
actions, information themes, and messages create significant opportunities to gain support for operations.
Influencing behavior among varied and diverse groups enables commanders to deny the enemy safe havens
and support bases necessary to mobilize resources and prepare for operations. Influence is as much a
product of public perception as a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of friendly forces to
operate within the cultural and societal norms of the local populace while accomplishing the mission.
Influence requires legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative
efforts across the operational area. (Chapter 6 has a detailed discussion of inform and influence activities.)
SUMMARY
5-70. Commanders execute mission command to achieve success in full spectrum operations. The role of
the commander in mission command is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout
execution, and continually assess. The commander is the central figure in mission command. Design
permeates all aspects of mission command. Commanders drive the operations process. They understand,
visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations in complex, dynamic environments. Commanders
lead the development of teams with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners as
well as nongovernmental organizations. Commanders establish and synchronize information themes and
messages to inform and influences specific audiences. Throughout operations, commanders, subordinate
commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning
information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions. Commanders
encourage individual initiative through mission orders and a climate of mutual trust and understanding.
Guided by their experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition, commanders apply
leadership to translate decisions into action. Commanders synchronize forces and capabilities in time,
space, and purpose to accomplish missions.
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Chapter 6
The Science of Control
This chapter describes how commanders and staffs apply the science of control to
support the commander’s tasks. It discusses the staff tasks. This chapter details how
staffs conduct the operations process, conduct knowledge management and
information management, and conduct inform and influence and cyber/
electromagnetic activities.
*SECTION I - CONTROL
6-1. While command is a personal function, control involves the entire force. In the context of mission
command, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in
accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders require control to direct operations. Aided by
staffs, commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of operations. Staffs coordinate,
synchronize, and integrate actions, inform the commander, and exercise control for the commander.
6-2. The control aspect of mission command applies more science than art because it relies on objectivity,
facts, empirical methods, and analysis. The science of control includes the detailed systems and procedures
to improve the commander’s understanding and support execution of missions. Commanders and staffs use
the science of control to overcome the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate.
Control demands commanders and staffs understand those aspects of operations that they can analyze and
measure. These include the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations and
systems. Control also requires a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors and the time required to
initiate certain actions. The science of control supports the art of command.
6-3. When dealing with complex problems, commanders use design to assist them in understanding the
operational environment, framing the problem, and developing a broad general approach to its solution.
Design pervades all systems and procedures, enabling commanders to better understand complex problems.
The commander’s visualization and description of what to do to achieve desired conditions must flow
logically from what commanders understand and how they have framed complex problems.
SECTION II - THE STAFF TASKS
6-4.
*Three key staff tasks apply to the science of control:
z
Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
z
Conduct knowledge management and information management.
z
Conduct inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
These three tasks support the commander’s tasks and, although discussed in this chapter on control,
complement the commander’s tasks.
CONDUCT THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
6-5. The operations process consists of the major mission command activities performed during
operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The
commander drives the operations process through leadership. Commanders may perform the activities
of the operations process sequentially or simultaneously. These activities are usually not discrete; they
overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Commanders use the operations process to help them decide
when and where to make decisions, control operations, and provide command presence. (See FM 5-0 for a
detailed discussion on the operations process.)
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Chapter 6
6-6.
*Planning, to include design, is synchronized. Throughout the operations process, commanders
synchronize forces and warfighting functions to accomplish missions. Synchronization enables units to
achieve synergic effects. For example, units must synchronize delivery of fires with target acquisition to
produce the desired effects. However, synchronization is not an end in itself. It is useful only as it
contributes to the greater effectiveness of the force. Unnecessary synchronization or synchronization for
limited gains degrades tempo, impedes initiative, and allows the enemy to act within the friendly force
decision process. Excessive synchronization undermines mission command.
6-7. Both design and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) assist commanders and staffs with the
conceptual aspects of planning. Commanders and staffs use design with the MDMP and troop leading
procedures to integrate activities during planning. They also develop additional procedures and processes
for executing control. Paragraphs 6-32 through 6-73 discuss this support in detail.
PLAN
6-8.
*Planning is the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the
commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on
the expected results. Planning begins with analysis and assessment of the conditions in the operational
environment, with particular emphasis on the enemy, to determine the relationships among the mission
variables. It involves understanding and framing the problem and envisioning the set of conditions that
represent the desired end state. Design and the MDMP assist commanders and staffs with the conceptual
aspects of planning. Based on the commander’s guidance, planning includes formulating one or more
supportable courses of action to accomplish the mission. Good plans foster initiative, account for
uncertainty and friction, and mitigate risks.
6-9. Commanders and staffs consider the consequences and implications of each course of action. Once
the commander selects a course of action, the staff formulates specified tasks to subordinates, required staff
actions, and an assessment framework. Planning develops the detailed information required during
execution. Examples include setting initial conditions, assigning command relationships, and establishing
priorities. Planning does not cease with production of a plan or order. It continues throughout an operation
as the order is refined based on changes in the situation. In addition, staffs refine plans for branches and
sequels during an operation.
6-10. Whenever possible, commanders employ red teams to examine plans from an opponent’s
perspective. Red teams provide insight into possible flaws in the plan as well as potential reactions by the
enemy and other people in the area of operations. This insight helps the staff improve the plan and develop
more effective branches and sequels.
6-11. The scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons differ at the operational and tactical levels.
At the operational level, campaign planning coordinates major actions across significant periods. Planners
integrate Service capabilities with those of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
organizations. (JP 5-0 contains doctrine for joint operation planning.) Tactical planning has the same clarity
of purpose but typically reflects a shorter planning horizon. Comprehensive, continuous, and adaptive
planning characterizes successful operations at both levels.
6-12. The Army uses three doctrinal planning procedures to integrate activities during planning: design, the
MDMP, and troop leading procedures. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders may begin design to
understand the operational environment, frame the problem, and develop an operational approach to solve
the problem. The design concept serves as the foundation for more detailed planning, including the
production of plans and orders using the MDMP. In units with a formally organized staff, the MDMP
provides structure to help commanders and staffs develop running estimates, plans, and orders. It provides
a logical sequence for decisionmaking and interaction between the commander and staff, and it provides a
common framework for parallel planning. At the lowest tactical echelons, commanders and leaders follow
troop leading procedures. Design, the MDMP, and troop leading procedures hinge on the commander’s
ability to visualize and describe the operation. They are means to an end; their inherent value lies in the
results achieved, not the process. (FM 5-0 discusses design, the MDMP, and troop leading procedures.)
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The Science of Control
6-13. Planning continues as necessary during preparation and execution. When circumstances are not
suited for the MDMP or troop leading procedures, commanders rely on design, intuitive decisionmaking,
and direct contact with subordinate commanders to integrate activities.
PREPARE
6-14. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an
operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. Preparation establishes
conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions,
including those to branches and sequels.
6-15. Preparation requires staff, unit, and Soldier actions. Mission success depends on preparation as much
as on planning. Rehearsals help staffs, units, and Soldiers to better understand their roles in upcoming
operations, practice complicated tasks, and ensure equipment and weapons function properly. Activities
specific to preparation include—
z
Revision and refinement of the plan.
z
Rehearsals.
z
Force tailoring and task-organizing.
z
Surveillance and reconnaissance.
z
Training.
z
Troop movements.
z
Precombat checks and inspections.
z
Sustainment preparations.
z
Integration of new Soldiers and units.
z
Subordinate confirmation briefs and backbriefs.
6-16. Several preparation activities begin during planning and continue throughout execution. For
example, uncommitted forces prepare for contingencies identified in branches and subsequent events
detailed in sequels. Committed units revert to preparation when they accomplish their objectives, occupy
defensive positions, or pass into reserve.
EXECUTE
6-17. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission
and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.
It focuses on concerted action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army forces seize the initiative
immediately and dictate tempo throughout all operations.
6-18. Commanders use mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative.
Subordinates exercising their initiative can significantly increase the tempo of operations; however, this
may desynchronize the overall operation. Desynchronization may reduce commanders’ abilities to mass the
effects of combat power. Executing even relatively minor, planned actions produces second- and third-
order effects throughout the force; these affect the operation’s overall synchronization. Nonetheless, under
mission command, commanders accept some risk of desynchronization as the price of seizing, retaining,
and exploiting the initiative.
6-19. The commander’s intent and mission orders focus every echelon on executing the concept of
operations. Mission command enables and prompts collaborative synchronization among subordinates.
When subordinates exploit opportunities, individual initiative resynchronizes the overall operation
continuously. Subordinates’ success may offer opportunities anticipated in the concept of operations or
develop advantages that make a new concept practical. In either case, the commander’s intent keeps the
force focused and synchronized. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization. The climate
fostered by mission command encourages subordinates to act on information about the enemy, adversaries,
events, and trends without detailed direction.
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Chapter 6
6-20. As commanders assess the operation, they determine when to make decisions. Orders usually
identify some decision points; however, unanticipated enemy actions or conditions often present situations
that require unanticipated decisions. Commanders act when decisions are required. They do not wait for a
set time in the battle rhythm.
6-21. During execution, commanders draw on experience, intellect, creativity, intuition, and education to
make rapid decisions. They learn deliberately as the situation develops and make changes based on that
learning. Staffs synchronize or resynchronize forces and warfighting functions more quickly during
execution than during planning and preparation. They must do this while forces are moving and processes
are ongoing.
6-22. During execution, commanders incorporate considerations for the operation’s next phase or sequel.
They begin to visualize how to transition from the current operation to the next one. Based on their
visualization, commanders direct actions to posture the force for the transition. As they visualize the
implications of events and their solutions, commanders describe their conclusions to staff and subordinates
through updated commander’s critical information requirements and planning guidance. The guidance may
be to develop a branch or change the main effort to exploit success. Commanders direct adjustments when
necessary, primarily through fragmentary orders.
ASSESS
6-23. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation,
particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and guides every operations
process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. It involves a comparison of
forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment entails three tasks:
z
Continuously assess the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
z
Continuously monitor the situation and progress of the operation towards the commander’s
desired end state.
z
Evaluate the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.
6-24. Staffs monitor the current situation for unanticipated successes, failures, or enemy actions. As
commanders and staffs assess the operation, they look for opportunities, threats, and acceptable progress.
They accept risks, seize opportunities, and mitigate threats. Throughout the operation, commanders
visualize, describe, and direct changes to the operation.
6-25. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0). Measures of performance answer the question, “Was the task or action performed
as the commander intended?” A measure of performance confirms or denies that a unit has performed a
task properly.
6-26. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences
of actions taken. They answer the question, “Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or
alternative actions required?” A measure of effectiveness provides a benchmark against which the
commander assesses progress toward accomplishing the mission.
6-27. Staffs analyze the current situation using mission variables and prepare their running estimates. A
running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are
supportable
(FM 5-0). Staffs continuously assess how new information might impact conducting
operations. They update running estimates and determine if adjustments to the operation are required.
Commanders empower their staffs to make adjustments within their areas of expertise. This requires staffs
to understand the aspects of operations that require the commander’s attention as opposed to those
delegated to their control.
6-28. Commanders integrate their own assessments and those of subordinate commanders into all aspects
of the operations process. Assessment helps commanders refine their situational understanding. It allows
them to make informed, rational decisions throughout the entire operation. During planning, assessment
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The Science of Control
focuses on understanding the current conditions in the operational environment and developing relevant
courses of action. During preparation and execution, it emphasizes evaluating progress toward the desired
end state, determining variances from expectations, and determining the significance (threat or opportunity)
of those variances.
6-29. Planners primarily use the common operational picture, observations of commanders, and running
estimates for assessing the operation against the concept of operations, mission, and commander’s intent.
The commander’s visualization forms the basis of the commander’s personal decisionmaking methodology
throughout the operation. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from
the perspective of each staff section. They help to refine the common operational picture and supplement it
with information not readily displayed.
6-30. During assessment, commanders may decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have
changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained through the current operational approach. Reframing
provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions change during
execution. Commanders and staff expect such change because forces interact within the operational
environment. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to design and essential to an
organization’s ability to learn.
6-31. Commanders avoid excessive analysis when assessing operations. Committing valuable time and
energy to developing elaborate and time-consuming assessments squanders resources better devoted to
other operations process activities. Effective commanders avoid burdening subordinates and staffs with
overly detailed assessment and collection tasks. Generally, the echelon at which a specific operation, task,
or action is conducted should be the echelon at which it is assessed. This provides a focus for assessment at
each echelon. It enhances the efficiency of the overall operations process.
SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
6-32. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staff develop additional procedures and
processes for executing control. They may execute these simultaneously. Commanders and staff also
produce products that provide enough control to ensure subordinates execute within the commander’s
intent.
Integrating Processes
6-33. Certain integrating processes occur during all operations process activities (see figure 6-1, page 6-6).
Commanders synchronize these processes with each other and integrate them into the overall operation:
z
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (For joint and functional component commanders, this
is intelligence preparation of the operational environment. See JP 2-0.)
z
Targeting. (See FM 3-60.)
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization.
z
Composite risk management. (See FM 5-19.)
z
Knowledge management.
Continuing Activities
6-34. The following activities continue during all operations process activities. Commanders synchronize
these activities with one another and integrate them into the overall operation:
z
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
z
Security operations.
z
Protection.
z
Liaison and coordination.
z
Terrain management.
z
Information management.
z
Airspace command and control.
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Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Operations process expanded
*Mission Command Networks and Systems
6-35. Commanders cannot exercise mission command alone except in the smallest organizations. Thus,
commanders perform these functions through mission command networks and systems. (Chapter 4 defines
mission command networks and systems.) An effective mission command system enables commanders to
conduct operations that accomplish the mission decisively.
6-36. A commander’s mission command system begins with people. No amount of technology can reduce
the importance of the human dimension.
(FM 6-22 discusses the human dimension.) Therefore,
commanders base their mission command systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and
procedures. Effective mission command systems required trained personnel; the best technology cannot
support mission command without them.
6-37. Networks are key enablers to successful operations. Commanders capitalize on networks to extend
the connectivity of higher levels to staff and subordinates. This connectivity supports operational
adaptability without sacrificing coordination or unity of effort. Commanders ensure that all units have
access to, understand, and communicate information across friendly networks. Electronic long-distance
sensor, collector, and transmitter networks provide actionable information across the battlefield. To enable
mission command, leaders and Soldiers access networks to create, process, and integrate information.
Network systems provide synthesized information so leaders can make informed decisions without being
overburdened. Commanders use these systems to communicate with joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational partners on multiple networks.
6-38. Procedures govern actions within a mission command system to make it more effective and efficient.
Procedures are standard, detailed steps that describe how to perform specific tasks. Adhering to procedures
minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to
meet operational requirements.
6-39. Equipment and facilities provide sustainment and a work environment for the other elements of a
mission command system. Facilities vary in size and complexity. At the lowest echelon, commanders may
use their command post or vehicle as the facility. At the highest echelons, facilities consist of large and
complex buildings. Units equip facilities with current and emerging technologies that provide timely,
accurate, and reliable information to commanders.
6-40. To respond to a rapidly changing operational environment and develop creativity, innovation, and
adaptation, information must become knowledge. Knowledge must permeate the Army. This requires both
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The Science of Control
art and science. Knowledge management generates knowledge products and services among commanders
and staffs. It supports collaboration and the conduct of operations while improving organizational
performance. Information management combines information systems and information processes to
distribute, store, display, and protect knowledge products and services.
(Paragraph
6-81 discusses
information management.)
6-41. Agile and adaptive Soldiers are the single most important element of any mission command system.
Their actions and responses—everything from fire and maneuver techniques to the disciplined observation
of rules of engagement—control operations. Soldiers also assist commanders and exercise control on their
behalf. Staffs perform many functions that help commanders exercise mission command:
z
Provide relevant information and analysis.
z
Maintain running estimates and make recommendations.
z
Prepare plans and orders.
z
Monitor operations.
z
Control operations.
z
Assess the progress of operations.
FORMS OF CONTROL
6-42. Control allows commanders to adjust operations to conform to their commander’s intent as
conditions change. Staffs provide their greatest support in assisting the commander with control.
Commanders use two forms of control—procedural and positive. Commanders balance the two forms
based on the situation.
6-43. Army procedural control is a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of
orders, regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures). Army
procedural control requires no intervention by the higher headquarters once it is established.
6-44. Army positive control is a technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders
actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. It may restrict Soldiers since commanders directly
monitor operations and intervene, directing specific actions to better synchronize subordinates’ operations.
Excessive use of Army positive control can rapidly become detailed command.
6-45. The definitions of individual control measures provide Army procedural control without requiring
detailed explanations. For example, boundaries, the most important control measure, designate the area of
operations assigned to or by a commander. Commanders know they have full freedom of action within their
area of operations.
6-46. Army positive control may best apply when units require detailed directions to sequence actions or
coordinate the activities with nearby forces. A river crossing illustrates this situation. In exercising Army
positive control, commanders may use digital information systems to assess without requesting information
explicitly or continuously from subordinates. Positive control supplements mission command when
necessary.
CONTROL MEASURES
6-47. Commanders exercise Army procedural and Army positive controls through control measures. A
control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures are
established under a commander’s authority; however, commanders may authorize staff officers and
subordinate leaders to establish them. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, require
synchronization between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action.
Commanders use control measures to coordinate subordinates’ actions. The control measures can be
permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures allow specific actions to occur; restrictive control
measures limit the conduct of certain actions.
6-48. Control measures help commanders direct by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent
subordinate units’ actions from impeding one another. They foster coordination and cooperation between
forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action, decisionmaking, and individual initiative.
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Chapter 6
6-49. Control measures may be detailed (such as a division operation order) or simple
(such as a
checkpoint). Control measures include, but are not limited to—
z
Laws and regulations.
z
Planning guidance.
z
Delegation of authority.
z
Specific instructions to plans and orders and their elements, including—
„ Commander’s intent.
„ Unit missions and tasks.
„ Commander’s critical information requirements.
„ Essential elements of friendly information.
„ Task organization.
„ Concept of operations.
„ Target lists.
„ Rules of engagement.
„ Service support plans.
„ Graphic control measures.
„ Unit standing operating procedures that control actions as reporting and battle rhythm.
z
Information requirements.
6-50. Certain control measures belong to the commander alone—the commander’s intent, unit mission
statement, planning guidance, commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs), and essential
elements of friendly information (EEFIs). Commanders cannot delegate these control measures. Unit
standard operating procedures specify many control measures. An operation plan or order modifies and
adds additional measures for a specific operation. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, modify control
measures to account for the dynamic conditions of operations.
6-51. Some control measures are graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and
displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Graphic control measures are always prescriptive.
They include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures,
air defense areas, and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace
use, fires, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures relate to easily
identifiable natural or manmade terrain features. (FM 1-02 portrays and defines graphic control measures
and discusses rules for selecting and applying them.)
MISSION VARIABLES: THE FACTORS OF METT-TC
6-52. METT-TC is a memory aid that identifies the mission variables: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and
weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. It is used in information
management (the major categories of relevant information) and in tactics (the major variables considered
during mission analysis). Mission analysis describes characteristics of the area of operations in terms of
METT-TC, focusing on how they might affect the mission. (FM 6-0 discusses METT-TC in more detail.)
6-53. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (JP 3-0). Commanders analyze a mission in terms of specified tasks, implied tasks, and the
commander’s intent two echelons up. They also consider the missions of adjacent units to understand their
relative contributions to the decisive operation. Results of that analysis yield the essential tasks that—with
the purpose of the operation—clearly specify the actions required. This analysis also produces the unit’s
mission statement—a short description of the task and purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. Mission
command requires that commanders clearly communicate—and subordinates understand—the purpose for
conducting an operation or a task.
6-54. When assigning missions, commanders ensure each subordinate’s mission supports the decisive
operation and the higher commander’s intent. They identify the purpose for each task assigned, nesting unit
missions with one another and with the decisive operation. (FM 5-0 discusses the nested concept.) Under
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The Science of Control
mission command, commanders articulate each subordinate’s mission in words that foster individual
initiative.
6-55. The second variable to consider is the enemy. Relevant information regarding the enemy may include
the following:
z
Dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and mobility).
z
Doctrine (or known execution patterns).
z
Personal habits and idiosyncrasies.
z
Equipment, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
z
Probable courses of action.
Analysis of the enemy includes not only the known enemy but also other threats to mission success. Such
threats might include multiple adversaries posing with a wide array of political, economic, religious, and
personal motivations.
6-56. To understand threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, commanders and staffs require detailed, timely,
and accurate intelligence. Of all relevant information, intelligence is the most uncertain. Commanders use
surveillance and reconnaissance to collect the most important threat-related information and process it into
intelligence.
6-57. Terrain and weather are natural conditions that profoundly influence operations. Terrain and weather
are neutral; they favor neither side unless one is more familiar with—or better prepared to operate in—the
physical environment. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade
features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Terrain directly affects how commanders select objectives
and locate, move, and control forces. It also influences protective measures and the effectiveness of
weapons and other systems. Effective use of terrain reduces the effects of enemy fires, increases the effects
of friendly fires, and facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation—the ability to predict its impact on
operations—is an important skill for every leader. For tactical operations, commanders analyze terrain
using the five military aspects of terrain, expressed in the memory aid, OAKOC: Observation and fields of
fire, Avenues of approach, Key and decisive terrain, Obstacles, Cover and concealment.
6-58. Climate and weather affect all operations. Climate means the prevailing pattern of temperature, wind
velocity, and precipitation in a specific area measured over a period of years. Climate is a more predictable
phenomenon than weather and better suited to operational-level analysis. Planners typically focus analysis
on how climate affects large-scale operations over a geographically diverse area. In contrast, weather
describes the conditions of temperature, wind velocity, precipitation, and visibility at a specific place and
time. It applies better to tactical analysis, where its effect on operations is limited in scale and duration.
Climate and weather affect conditions and capabilities of Soldiers and weapons systems, including
mobility, obstacle emplacement times, and munitions performance. Effective commanders use climate and
weather to their advantage.
6-59. The fourth mission variable is troops and support available. This refers to the number, type,
capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support from joint, interagency, multinational,
host-nation, commercial (via contracting), and private organizations. It also includes support provided by
civilians. Commanders and staffs maintain information on friendly forces two echelons down. They track
subordinate readiness—including training, maintenance, logistics, and morale. Commanders provide
subordinates with the mix of troops and support needed to accomplish their missions. When assigning or
allocating troops to subordinates, commanders and staffs consider differences in mobility, protection,
firepower, equipment, morale, experience, leadership, and training.
6-60. Commanders and staffs consider available troops and support when determining the resources
required to accomplish a mission—a troop-to-task analysis. If commanders determine they lack sufficient
resources, they request additional support. When they lack the resources needed to execute simultaneous
operations, commanders execute sequential operations.
6-61. The next mission variable is time available. Controlling and exploiting time drives initiative, tempo,
and momentum. By exploiting time, commanders can exert constant pressure, control the relative speed of
decisions and actions, and exhaust enemy forces. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders assess the time
available for planning, preparing, and executing it. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and
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maneuver units to where they can best mass the effects of combat power. Commanders also consider how
much time they can give subordinates to plan and prepare their own operations. Parallel and collaborative
planning helps optimize available time. (FM 5-0 discusses parallel and collaborative planning.)
6-62. Commanders relate time to the enemy and conditions. As part of this analysis, commanders consider
time in two contexts: First, they estimate how much time friendly forces have to accomplish the mission
relative to enemy efforts to defeat them. Second, they consider the time needed to accomplish their
objectives or to change current conditions into those of the desired end state. Analyzing the time available
helps commanders determine how quickly and how far in advance to plan operations. The more time the
commander and staff take, the more time the enemy has. The time spent perfecting a plan may work to the
enemy’s advantage; the additional time provided to enemy forces often offsets the minor gains a slightly
improved plan gives friendly forces.
6-63. Commanders consider the time available relative to the situation. Success depends on preventing the
situation from deteriorating further. Ultimately, good plans executed sooner produce better results than
perfect plans executed later.
6-64. Finally, understanding the operational environment requires understanding civil considerations. Civil
considerations reflect the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and
activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct
of military operations (FM 6-0). Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of the
categories expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People,
and Events.
6-65. Civil considerations help commanders understand the social, political, and cultural variables within
the area of operations and their affect on the mission. Understanding the relationship between military
operations and civilians, culture, and society is critical to conducting full spectrum operations. (FM 3-05.40
contains additional information on civil considerations.) These considerations relate directly to the effects
of the other instruments of national power. They provide a vital link between actions of forces interacting
with the local populace and the desired end state.
6-66. Civil considerations are essential to developing effective plans for all operations—not just those
dominated by stability or civil support. Full spectrum operations often involve stabilizing the situation,
securing the peace, building host-nation capacity, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat
operations directly affect the populace, infrastructure, and the force’s ability to transition to host-nation
authority. The degree to which the populace is expected to support or resist Army forces also affects the
design of offensive and defensive operations.
6-67. Commanders and staffs use personal knowledge, area studies, and the intelligence and civil affairs
running estimates to assess social, economic, and political factors. Commanders consider how these factors
may relate to potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. Their goal is to develop their understanding
to the level of cultural awareness. At this level, they can estimate the effects of friendly actions and direct
their subordinates with confidence. Cultural awareness improves how Soldiers interact with the populace
and deters their false or unrealistic expectations. They have more knowledge of the society’s common
practices, perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values, giving better insight into the intent of individuals
and groups.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
6-68. One of the most important control measures is the area of operations. The Army or land force
commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the joint force
commander for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize
maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders have the
authority to designate targeting priorities and timing of fires.
6-69. Commanders consider a unit’s area of influence when assigning it an area of operations. An area of
influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by
maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-16). The area
of influence normally surrounds and includes the area of operations. Understanding the area of influence
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helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities
outside the area of operations. An area of operations should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area
of influence.
6-70. Ideally, the entire area of influence encompasses the area of operations. An area of operations that is
too large for a unit to control can allow sanctuaries for enemy forces and may limit joint flexibility.
Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by
empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command authorizes commanders to create
any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas
of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without
permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur. Further,
commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates. Assignment of
an area of operations includes authority to perform the following:
z
Terrain management.
z
Intelligence collection.
z
Civil affairs activities.
z
Air and ground movement control.
z
Clearance of fires.
z
Security.
6-71. Subordinate unit areas of operations may be contiguous or noncontiguous. (See figure 6-2.) A
common boundary separates contiguous areas of operations. Noncontiguous areas of operations do not
share a common boundary; the concept of operations provides procedural control of elements of the force.
An unassigned area is the area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous
areas of operations. The higher headquarters is responsible for controlling unassigned areas within
its area of operations. Designating an unassigned area only indicates that the area is not assigned to a
subordinate. Unassigned areas remain the responsibility of the controlling headquarters.
Figure 6-2. Contiguous, noncontiguous, and unassigned areas
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COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE
6-72. The common operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a
commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and
information shared by more than one command. An area of interest is area of concern to the
commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to
the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces
who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 2-03). The area of interest for stability or civil
support operations may be much larger than that associated with offensive and defensive operations.
6-73. The availability of a common operational picture facilitates mission command. The common
operational picture lets subordinates see the overall operation and their contributions to it as the operation
progresses. This knowledge reduces the level of control higher commanders need to exercise over
subordinates. The common operational picture features a scale and level of detail that meets the
information needs of that commander and staff. It varies among staff sections and echelons. Separate
echelons create a common operational picture by collaborating, sharing, and refining relevant information.
To the extent permitted by technology, the common operational picture incorporates as much information
from running estimates as possible.
*CONDUCT KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
6-74. Staffs apply the science of control to support the commander’s tasks by conducting knowledge
management and information management.
*KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
6-75. Knowledge management is the art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge
to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking. Knowledge management supports
improving organizational learning, innovation, and performance. Its processes ensure that knowledge
products and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and useable to commanders and decisionmakers.
Knowledge management has three major components:
z
People—those inside and outside the organization who create, organize, share, and use
knowledge, and the leaders who foster an adaptive, learning environment.
z
Processes—the methods to create, capture, organize, and apply knowledge.
z
Technology—information systems that help collect, process, store, and display knowledge.
Technology helps put knowledge products and services into organized frameworks.
6-76. Knowledge management enables commanders make informed, timely decisions despite the
uncertainty of operations. It enables effective collaboration by linking organizations with Soldiers requiring
knowledge. Knowledge management enhances rapid adaptation in dynamic operations. Analyzing and
evaluating information creates knowledge. Since a wide range of knowledge might affect operations, the
commander’s information requirements may extend beyond military matters. Defining these requirements
is an important aspect of knowledge management. Commanders define their information requirements with
their CCIRs. The CCIRs focus development of knowledge products. (See FM 6-01.1 for a discussion on
knowledge management.)
6-77. Commanders and staffs assess knowledge management effectiveness by considering whether it
lessens the fog of war. Knowledge management narrows the gap between relevant information
commanders require and that which they have. Developing a knowledge management plan enables leaders
to—
z
Address knowledge and information flow.
z
Develop criteria for displaying the common operational picture.
z
Access and filter information from sources normally found outside the military or the
organization.
z
Support developing situational awareness and situational understanding.
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z
Enable rapid, accurate retrieval of previously developed knowledge to satisfy new requirements.
z
Route products to the right individuals in a readily understood format.
z
Keep information from overwhelming commanders and staffs.
6-78. Staff responsibility for knowledge management begins with the chief of staff. Depending on the
complexity of the situation, it may require dedicated personnel.
*SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
6-79. Commanders begin their visualization with situational awareness. Situational awareness means
immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time.
More simply, it is Soldiers knowing what is currently happening around them. Situational awareness occurs
in Soldiers’ minds. It is not a display or the common operational picture; it is the interpretation of displays
or the actual observation of a situation. On receipt of mission, commanders develop their situational
awareness. They base it on information and knowledge products, such as the common operational picture
and running estimates.
*SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
6-80. During mission analysis, commanders apply judgment to their situational awareness to arrive at
situational understanding. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment
to relevant information to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate
decisionmaking. It enables commanders to determine the implications of what is happening and forecast
what may happen. Situational understanding enhances decisionmaking by identifying opportunities, threats
to the force or mission accomplishment, and information gaps. It helps commanders identify enemy options
and likely future actions, the probable consequences of proposed friendly actions, and the effect of the
operational environment on both. Situational understanding based on a continuously updated common
operational picture fosters individual initiative by reducing, although not eliminating, uncertainty.
*INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
6-81. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect,
process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information.
Information management disseminates timely and protected relevant information to commanders and staffs.
Information management helps commanders develop situational understanding. It also helps them make
and disseminate effective decisions faster than the enemy can. Among other aspects, information
management includes lower-level mechanical methods, such as organizing, collating, plotting, and
arranging. However, information management goes beyond technical control of data flowing across
networks. It employs both staff management and automatic processes to provide relevant information to the
right person at the right time. Information management centers on commanders and the information they
need to exercise mission command. It has two components: information systems and relevant information.
*INFORMATION SYSTEMS
6-82. An information system consists of equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well
as policies and procedures for their use. Information systems are the physical dimension of information
management. They automatically sort, filter, store, and disseminate information according to the
commander’s priorities. These capabilities relieve the staff of handling routine data. Information systems—
especially when merged into a single, integrated network—enable extensive information sharing.
Commanders best use information systems when they determine their information requirements and focus
their staffs and organizations on meeting them.
6-83. LandWarNet is the Army’s portion of the Global Information Grid. LandWarNet encompasses all
Army information management systems and information systems that collect, process, store, display,
disseminate, and protect information worldwide. It enables execution of Army command and control
processes and supports operations by widely disseminating relevant information. LandWarNet facilitates
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rapidly converting relevant information into decisions and actions. It allows commanders to exercise
mission command from anywhere in their area of operations. (JP 6-0 describes the Global Information
Grid.)
*RELEVANT INFORMATION
6-84. Relevant information is all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise
of mission command. To be relevant, information must be accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise,
reliable, and secure. Relevant information provides answers commanders and staffs need to conduct
operations successfully. The mission variables are the categories of relevant information. (FM 6-0 contains
doctrine on relevant information and the cognitive hierarchy. The cognitive hierarchy describes how data
become information, knowledge, and understanding.)
6-85. Effective information management identifies relevant information and processes data into
information for development into and use as knowledge. Information management then quickly routes
information and knowledge products to those who need them. All information given to commanders should
be relevant information. That is, commanders should only receive information or knowledge products that
they need for exercising mission command. The information commanders receive drives how they visualize
the operation. How relevant information fits into the commander’s visualization determines its value. In
turn, their visualization guides what information commanders seek. Commanders emphasize the most
important relevant information they need by establishing CCIRs. Providing the information commanders
need to make decisions and maintain an accurate situational understanding requires staffs who understand
the commander’s intent and know the CCIRs.
INFORMATION CATEGORIES
6-86. Information management places information into one of four categories: specified requirements,
implied requirements, gaps, and distractions. Specified requirements are requirements commanders
specifically identify. CCIRs, priority intelligence requirements, and friendly force information requirements
are categories of specified requirements. Implied requirements are important pieces of information that
commanders need but have not requested. Effective staffs develop implied requirements and recommend
them for specified requirements. These often become priority intelligence requirements or friendly force
information requirements. Gaps are elements of information commanders need to achieve situational
understanding but do not have. Ideally, analysis identifies gaps and translates them into specified
requirements. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) synchronization and integration focus on
collecting information to fill gaps. Until a gap is filled, commanders and staffs make assumptions, clearly
identifying them as such. This practice is most common during planning. Staffs continually review
assumptions and replace them with facts as information becomes available. Distractions include
information commanders do not need to know but continue to receive. Distractions contribute to
information overload.
6-87. Effective information management keeps commanders and staffs aware of the quality of their
information as they use it to build situational understanding. Soldiers processing information use these
criteria to evaluate the quality of an element of information:
z
Relevance—applies to the current mission, situation, or task.
z
Accuracy—conveys the true situation.
z
Timeliness—is available in time to make decisions.
z
Usability—is portrayed in common, easily understood formats and displays.
z
Completeness—provides all necessary data.
z
Precision—has the required level of detail.
z
Security—affords required protection.
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*CONDUCT INFORM AND INFLUENCE AND
CYBER/ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
6-88. Under mission command, staffs apply the science of control to support the commander’s tasks by
conducting inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities. This information task supports and
enhances current joint information operations doctrine. It not only focuses on the adversary, but it expands
to focus on all audiences within the information environment—friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy.
Information systems are everywhere with pervasive news and opinion media. Such systems expose
individual actions that can have immediate strategic implications. Staffs integrate the task—conduct inform
and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities—into the staff process.
6-89. Commanders and staff fully integrate the task into all operations. Commanders, with advice from the
staff, guide the integration of the information task with other actions in their concept of operations. Staffs
include the information task in the operations process from inception. Mismanagement of the information
task increases likelihood chance of information fratricide, where friendly force use of information
adversely affects friendly forces.
6-90. Cyber/electromagnetic activities seek to seize, retain, and exploit advantages in and through
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. These activities deny and degrade adversary and enemy use
of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyber/electromagnetic activities protect friendly mission
command networks and systems. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02).
Cyberspace is essential for mission command of Army forces and for effective inform and influence
activities. It is also a venue to attack enemy networks and systems. The electromagnetic spectrum is
defined as the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26
alphabetically designated bands (JP 3-13.1). Modern wireless communications and networks, and hence
mission command, depend on the electromagnetic spectrum. The spectrum is also necessary for sensors,
self-protection, and precision weapons. Commanders use the electromagnetic spectrum to attack enemy
networks and systems.
*INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
6-91. Inform and influence activities is defined as the integrating activities within the mission
command warfighting function which ensures themes and messages designed to inform domestic
audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations are
synchronized with actions to support full spectrum operations. Inform and influence activities
incorporate components and enablers expanding the commander’s ability to use other resources to
inform and influence. When conducting inform and influence activities, commanders determine how these
activities affect the populace and their perceptions.
(See figure
6-3, page 6-16.) Often commanders
influence disparate people to resolve differences peacefully. To do so, commanders understand human
behavior and other cultures. Inform and influence activities may involve attacking an enemy’s will to fight
through defeat mechanisms or to gain support from various partners for friendly actions.
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*Figure 6-3. Two lines of effort for inform and influence activities
6-92. Inform and influence activities have into two lines of effort: the inform line of effort and the
influence line of effort. These two lines of effort help the commander to accomplish objectives and meet
statutory requirements. Each line of effort has a different task, purpose, and effect. These lines of effort
may rely on the same capabilities and enablers to accomplish these effects. The dashed line in figure 6-3
indicates that while both lines of effort have different tasks and purposes, they are closely integrated and
synchronized for maximum effect. The staff officer for inform and influence activities synchronizes and
integrates these lines of effort to ensure unity of effort in words, images, and actions. The element for
inform and influence activities, led by the G-7 or S-7, resides in the mission command warfighting
function. This element is responsible for integrating the two lines of effort.
6-93. The commander and staff officer for inform and influence activities ensure transparency in themes
and messages to the American people. Commanders communicate openly to maintain the Army’s trust
relationship with the American people. They align themes and messages to inform domestic audiences and
influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations. Integrating inform and influence
activities synchronizes the activities with Army actions to support operations. This integration shapes the
operational environment by synchronizing inform and influence activities of higher, adjacent, and lower
units as well as of partners. Integrated activities avoid contradictory themes and messages. Contradicting
themes and messages may lead to information fratricide and undermine the force’s efforts. Poorly defined
or ill-timed actions may negatively affect other actions. Thus, commanders aim not to constrain or dictate
actions to each line of effort but rather to ensure they synchronize and integrate their efforts with the
overall operation.
*Inform Line of Effort
6-94. The inform line of effort provides information to domestic and foreign audiences with accurately
described operations. This ensures a thorough understanding of Army, joint, and partner intentions and
operations so all participants can make informed judgments about them. Informing does not force or make
a decision for the actors but provides them with facts. Providing factual and accurate information counters
false information (misinformation or disinformation) disseminated by others. Maintaining transparency and
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The Science of Control
credibility is critical within the inform line of effort. The inform line of effort includes public affairs (at
home and abroad), military information support operations (abroad), and Soldier and leader engagements.
The inform line of effort enables partners to make their own informed decisions.
*Influence Line of Effort
6-95. The influence line of effort effectively changes attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately behavior of foreign
friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations to support operations. Influence guides actors to make
decisions that support the commander’s objectives. This guidance includes misleading enemy
decisionmakers or convincing enemy forces to surrender or cease their efforts. It also includes those actions
designed to extend influence to foreign partners and the local populace in an area where Army forces may
or may not have a physical presence. Such influence creates and strengthens relationships when Army
forces do not have command over partner forces. Successful commanders build relationships on trust and
mutual confidence demonstrating how the Army adds value to host-nation objectives. The influence line of
effort includes military deception, military information support operations, and Soldier and leader
engagement.
*COMPONENTS OF INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
6-96. A component of inform and influence activities is a military capability or activity specifically
designed to influence, inform, or inform and influence select leaders, decisionmakers, and audiences whose
behaviors and perceptions are deemed integral to mission success. Commanders are not restricted to just
these components when conducting inform and influence activities and may add or subtract enablers as the
situation dictates. Enablers that can support inform and influence activities include combat camera, civil
affairs activities, cyber/electromagnetic activities, operations security, and other military actions as
designated by the commander.
*Public Affairs
6-97. The public affairs officer factually and accurately informs various populations (foreign and domestic)
without intent to misinform or change behaviors. As the principal advisor to the commander for media
engagement, the public affairs officer conducts media operations and Soldier and community outreach
(foreign and domestic). This officer also plans and executes support to public diplomacy by developing
information strategies and media facilitation.
6-98. The public affairs officer enables the commander to inform Americans, U.S. Government
decisionmakers, and foreign partners. Effective information exchange protects the credibility of the
commanders and the Army. This requires care and consideration when synchronizing public affairs with
other inform and influence activities. The public affairs officer synchronizes components of public affairs
with other inform and influence activities to ensure consistency, command credibility, and operations
security.
6-99. The public affairs staff prepare for the following:
z
Advising and counseling the commander concerning public affairs.
z
Public affairs planning.
z
Media engagement.
z
Media facilitation.
z
Public affairs training.
z
Community outreach.
z
Communication strategies.
(FM 46-1 and FM 3-61.1 discuss public affairs.)
*Military Information Support Operations
6-100. Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences. These operations intend to inform, direct, and influence the emotions,
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motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals. Commanders focus efforts of military information support operations toward foreign
friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences. Ultimately, commanders want to change each audience’s
behavior to support friendly operations. Forces for military information support operations are modular and
attached to maneuver forces based on mission requirements. Commanders use military information support
operations with other inform and influence activities, such as public affairs and military deception.
6-101. Commanders use forces for military information support operations for face-to-face
communications or communications in denied areas with the local populace. These forces help
commanders solve problems of armed resistance and local interference to military operations while
encouraging dialog and cooperation with noncombatants. Effective commanders understand the
psychological effects and potential implications of military actions and operations on populations. Knowing
the potential impact of military operations facilitates the commander’s decisionmaking process.
Commanders also use forces for military information support operations to give advice on targeting to
maximize effects and minimize adverse impacts and unintended consequences.
6-102. Commanders employ military information support operations even when not in direct contact with
specific audiences. They use forces for military information support operations—
z
To support combat operations.
z
To support special operations.
z
For military information support to Department of Defense and other government agencies
during peacetime.
z
For civil authority information support to lead Federal agencies during domestic disaster relief
operations.
6-103. Forces for military information support operations disseminate messages via their resources. These
resources consist of other government agencies, contracted media sources, multinational partners, and
airborne and seaborne platforms supporting military information support operations. These forces attempt
to use as many different dissemination assets as possible to ensure access to the desired and relevant
audiences. (See FM 3-05.30.)
*Soldier and Leader Engagement
6-104. Soldier and leader engagement broadly describes interactions that take place among Soldiers,
leaders, and audiences in the area of operations. Soldier and leader engagements can occur as impromptu
face-to-face encounters on the street or as deliberate as a scheduled meeting. Such engagements can
employ other means, such as phone calls or a video-teleconference. These engagements build relationships,
inform an audience by providing relevant information, or influence an audience to support objectives.
These interactions should be as deliberate as possible; however, not all engagements are planned. Soldiers
and leaders cannot account for every situation encountered and should remain flexible and communicate
within the bounds of the commander’s themes and messages.
6-105. Face-to-face interaction by Soldiers and leaders strongly influences the perceptions of the local
populace. Carried out with discipline, professionalism, and cultural sensitivity, day-to-day interactions of
Soldiers with the local populace has positive effects. Such interaction amplifies positive actions, counters
adversary information, and increases goodwill and support for the friendly mission. Actions in keeping
with the commander’s themes and messages also reinforce the trust in commander’s messages, creating
consistency between actions and words.
6-106. Likewise, meetings and other engagements conducted by leaders can be critical to mission success.
These leaders work with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose perceptions, decisions, and
actions affect mission accomplishment. Planned engagements provide the best venue for conveying
positive information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation. Conducted with
detailed preparation and planning, meetings and other engagements garner local support for Army
operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust.
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6-107. Commanders who gain influence with host-nation forces build partner capacity and competence in
security force assistance. Gaining influence, even when no command authority exists, depends on
collaboration, a mutual understanding of the environment, and a common commitment to solving problems.
By developing host-nation relationships, Army forces can widely influence even while creating a small
footprint in the area of operations.
*Military Deception
6-108. Military deception is those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decisionmakers as to
friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4).
Military deception influences desired behaviors intending to cause adversary decisionmakers to form
inaccurate impressions about strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.
Military deception planners target adversary information systems, sensors, and decisionmaking processes
so to affect information that reaches the adversary decisionmaker.
6-109. At its most successful, military deception provokes an enemy commander to commit a serious
mistake that friendly forces can exploit. However, effective military deception also introduces uncertainty
into the enemy’s estimate of the situation, and that doubt can lead to hesitation. Military deception is a
good means to dislocate an enemy force in time and space.
6-110. Military deception can contribute significantly to the influence line of effort; however, it requires
integration into the overall operation beginning with receipt of mission. To achieve maximum effects,
military deception requires good operations security, significant preparation, and resources. If added as an
afterthought, military deception often proves ineffective. Successful military deception requires a
reasonably accurate assessment of the enemy’s expectations. While retained as a component of inform and
influence activities in this version of FM 3-0, military deception will migrate to another functional area in
future editions of FM 3-0. (JP 3-13.4 discusses military deception.)
*ENABLERS OF INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
6-111. An enabler of inform and influence activities refers to a military capability or activity whose
primary purpose, if other than inform and influence activities, can be used for conducting or supporting
inform and influence activities. Common enablers include operations security, civil affairs activities,
combat camera, and cyber/electromagnetic activities. When properly integrated, enablers enhance inform
and influence activities. Commanders consider other activities in addition to this list based on the mission
and operational environment.
6-112. Operations security enables commanders to deny adversaries and enemies information that in turn
influences their decisionmaking process. Civil affairs activities enhance the relationship between military
forces and civil authorities in areas with military forces. Cyber/electromagnetic activities enable and
facilitate Army operations by undertaking deliberate actions designed to gain and maintain informational
advantages in the information environment. Typically, but not solely, these actions occur through
cyberspace operations and electronic warfare. (Paragraphs 6-115 through 6-128 discuss cyber/electro-
magnetic activities.)
6-113. Combat camera is the acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of
operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during joint exercises
(JP 3-61). Combat camera generates imagery to support full spectrum operations. Combat camera units
provide powerful documentary tools that support public affairs, military information support operations,
and Soldier and leader engagement. For example, combat camera units prepare products documenting
Army tactical successes that counter enemy propaganda claiming the opposite. (FM 6-02.40 discusses
combat camera.)
6-114. The operations process aids the commander and staff in determining if other enablers, not specified
above, can support inform and influence activities. For example, commanders can use the positioning of
maneuver forces to influence or reinforce a message. Such synchronized military action integrated with
associated themes and messages can have a powerful effect. Commanders can destroy certain key targets
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via fires and maneuver. They also consider constructive means to inform or influence. These could include
medical assistance or the use of engineers to restore key civilian infrastructure.
*CYBER/ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
6-115. The impact of modern electronic and information technologies on human society and military
operations increases daily. The electromagnetic spectrum is essential for communication, lethality, sensors,
and self-protection. Army forces increasingly depend on cyberspace. Within cyberspace, units use
electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems.
Given the Army’s dependence on cyberspace as well as the electromagnetic spectrum, commanders fully
integrate cyber/electromagnetic activities within the overall operation (see figure 6-4). These activities
employ a combined arms approach to operations in a contested cyberspace domain and a congested
electromagnetic spectrum. Cyber/electromagnetic activities seize, retain, and exploit advantages in
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The result enables Army forces to retain freedom of action
while denying freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, thereby enabling the overall operation.
*Figure 6-4. Two lines of effort for cyber/electromagnetic activities
6-116. Cyber/electromagnetic activities are divided into two lines of effort: the cyberspace operations line
of effort and the electronic warfare line of effort. These lines of effort may rely on the same capabilities and
enablers to accomplish these effects and must be synchronized and integrated closely to ensure unity of
effort in words, images, and actions. The components of the cyberspace operations line of effort integrate
with the components of the electronic warfare line of effort and electromagnetic spectrum operations.
*Cyberspace Operations
6-117. The cyberspace operations line of effort aims to accomplish objectives in and through cyberspace.
The components of the cyberspace line of effort include cyber situational awareness, network operations,
cyber warfare, and cyber support.
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*Electronic Warfare
6-118. Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy
to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three
divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support (JP 3-13.1). The electronic
warfare line of effort aims to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The components
of the electronic warfare line of effort consist of electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic
support.
*COMPONENTS OF CYBER/ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
6-119. Cyber/electromagnetic activities consist of seven components: cyber situational awareness,
networks operations, cyber warfare, electronic attack, electronic protection, electronic support, and
electromagnetic spectrum operations.
*Cyber Situational Awareness
6-120. Cyber situational awareness is the knowledge of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy relevant
information regarding activities in and through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Soldiers gain
this awareness by combining intelligence and operational activity in cyberspace, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and the other domains, both unilaterally and through collaboration with our joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental organizational partners. Cyber situational
awareness enables the commander to collect, process, store, display, and disseminates an appropriate level
view of networks and systems. This enables an assessment of any changes to the network risk mitigation
steps needed due to network degradation. Commanders use cyber situational awareness to—
z
Assess enemy and adversary cyber capabilities and intentions.
z
Assess friendly, enemy, and adversary cyber vulnerabilities.
z
Monitor, protect, and prioritize their networks.
z
Assess the operational impact of network disruptions.
z
Respond to network outages or attacks.
z
Dynamically reallocate network traffic.
*Network Operations
6-121. Network operations install, operate, maintain, and protect LandWarNet, critical infrastructure, key
resources, and other specified cyberspace. Units need network operations to ensure operation of mission
command networks and systems. (See FM 6-02.71 for details on network operations.)
*Cyber Warfare
6-122. Cyber warfare extends combat power beyond the defensive boundaries of the Global Information
Grid to detect, deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and exploit enemies. Cyber warfare capabilities target
computer networks, telecommunication networks, and embedded processors and controllers in equipment,
systems, and infrastructure. Cyber warfare uses cyber exploitation, cyber attack, and cyber defense in a
mutually supporting and supported relationship with network operations and cyber support. Cyber warfare
accomplishes the following tasks:
z
Studies and characterizes the cyber threat.
z
Identifies, characterizes, and exploits enemies.
z
Contributes to cyber situational awareness.
z
Conducts cyber exploitation, attack, and defense.
z
Assists attack investigations to determine attribution.
*Electronic Attack
6-123. Electronic attack is a division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy,
directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of
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degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires
(JP 3-13.1). Electronic attack has both defensive and offensive capabilities. For example, defensive
electronic attack includes efforts to defeat radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. Offensive
electronic attack includes—
z
Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
such as jamming and electromagnetic deception.
z
Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary
destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).
z
Offensive and defensive activities, including countermeasures.
*Electronic Protection
6-124. Electronic protection is a division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic
spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-13.1). Electronic protection
includes actions, such as frequency agility in a radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in radar.
Electronic protection should not be confused with self-protection. Both defensive electronic attack and
electronic protection protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. However, electronic
protection protects forces from the effects of electronic attack (friendly and enemy). Defensive electronic
attack primarily protects forces against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the electromagnetic
spectrum to guide or trigger weapons. To protect friendly capabilities, units—
z
Regularly brief force personnel on the electronic warfare threat.
z
Ensure that electronic system capabilities are safeguarded during exercises and training.
z
Coordinate and deconflict electromagnetic spectrum usage.
z
Train on electronic protection active and passive measures.
z
Minimize the vulnerability of friendly receivers to enemy jamming (such as reduced power,
brevity of transmissions, and directional antennas).
*Electronic Support
6-125. Electronic support is a division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under the
direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources
of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat
recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. Electronic support systems supply
information regarding electronic attack, electronic protection, avoidance, targeting, and other tactical
employments of forces. Commanders make immediate decisions involving this information. Electronic
support systems collect data and produce information or intelligence to—
z
Corroborate other sources of information or intelligence.
z
Conduct or direct electronic attack operations.
z
Initiate self-protection measures.
z
Task weapon systems.
z
Support electronic protection efforts.
z
Create or update electronic warfare databases.
z
Support information activities.
FM 3-36 provides Army doctrine for electronic warfare.
*Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
6-126. Electromagnetic spectrum operations are the conduct of spectrum management, frequency
assignments, policy implementation, and host-nation coordination that enables the commander’s effective
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
(See FM 6-02.70 for detailed information on electromagnetic
spectrum operations.)
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The Science of Control
*ENABLERS OF CYBER/ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
6-127. An enabler of cyber/electromagnetic activities is called cyber support. Cyber support is supporting
activities to enable both network operations and cyber warfare. Cyber support differs from cyber warfare
and network operations. Those activities are carried out by multiple organizations and do not require a
separate cyber support proponent or lead. Cyber support entails varying intents, conditions, authorities, and
levels of effort. Cyber support conducts the following tasks:
z
Conduct vulnerability assessment.
z
Conduct threat-based security assessment.
z
Conduct vulnerability and security remediation.
z
Reverse engineering malware.
z
Explore cyber aspects of site exploitation.
z
Counter intelligence.
z
Conduct cyber forensics.
z
Coordinate with law enforcement.
z
Conduct cyber research, development, test, and evaluation.
z
Develop and acquire cyber combat.
*INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF CYBER/ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
6-128. Responsibility for integration and synchronization of cyber/electromagnetic activities resides in the
electronic warfare element of the fires warfighting function. Unlike the inform and influence activities,
cyber/electromagnetic activities do not exist within a distinct staff element. Rather, the cyber/electro-
magnetic components operate within an existing electronic warfare workgroup.
SECTION III - SUMMARY
6-129. Commanders and staffs apply the science of control to accomplish the staff tasks and integrate the
warfighting functions. Control permits commanders to counter negative effects during operations. Design
pervades all systems and procedures. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, exercise control through the
operations process and mission command networks and systems. Commanders turn decisions into effective
actions through Army procedural and positive control. Knowledge management and information
management support control by transforming information into knowledge to support situational
understanding and decisionmaking. Commanders and staffs conduct inform and influence and
cyber/electromagnetic activities.
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Chapter 7
Operational Art
This chapter discusses operational art, the levels of war, and how commanders and
staffs apply operational art to understand, visualize, and describe how to establish
conditions to achieve a desired end state. Operational art represents a creative
approach to dealing with the direction of military forces. It expresses informed vision
across the levels of war.
*UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL ART
7-1. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by
their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize
and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war
(JP 3-0).
7-2. Operational art reflects a holistic understanding of the operational environment and the problem. This
understanding enables commanders to develop end state conditions and an operational approach to guide
the force in establishing those conditions for lasting success. The operational approach is a broad
conceptualization of the general actions that will produce the conditions that define the desired end state
(FM 5-0). Design
(see chapter
5) assists commanders in developing their operational approach.
Commanders use a common language to visualize and describe their operational approach.
7-3. In visualizing an operation, commanders determine which conditions satisfy policy, orders, guidance,
and directives. Taken together, these conditions become the end state. Commanders devise and execute
plans that complement the actions of the other instruments of national power in a focused, unified effort. To
this end, commanders draw on experience, knowledge, education, intellect, intuition, and creativity.
7-4. Mission command focuses on empowering subordinate leaders and sharing information to facilitate
decentralized execution. Effective mission command requires Army leaders at lower levels of command to
assume greater responsibility for accomplishing higher headquarters’ objectives during operations. (See
Chapter 5 for more discussion on mission command.) The ability to exercise operational art provides
Soldiers with freedom of action to ensure their efforts contribute to accomplishing those objectives. This
ability also allows Army forces to develop the situation as well as adapt and act decisively in dynamic
conditions.
THE LEVELS OF WAR
7-5. The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategy and tactical actions. (See
figure 7-1, page 7-2.) The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of
responsibility and planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. The levels
distinguish between headquarters and the specific responsibilities and actions performed at each echelon.
Despite advances in technology, digital information sharing, and the increased visibility of tactical actions,
the levels of war remain useful. Decisions at one level always affect other levels.
7-6. A natural tension exists between the levels of war and echelons of command. This tension stems
from different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with command at each level of war.
Between the levels of war, the horizons for planning, preparation, and execution differ greatly.
Operational-level commanders typically synchronize the activities of military and civilian organizations
and agencies across large areas. Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing combined arms within
an area of operations. They sometimes work with civilian agencies on political, informational, and
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Chapter 7
economic issues. Often, tactical commanders receive missions that divert combat power from tasks that
seem more urgent at lower levels. It is a commander’s responsibility to recognize and resolve this tension.
Figure 7-1. Levels of war
7-7. A string of tactical victories does not guarantee success at the operational and strategic levels.
Tactical success, while required to set operational conditions, must be tied to achieving the strategic end
state. Wars are won at the operational and strategic levels; yet without tactical success, a major operation
cannot achieve the desired end state. Commanders overcome this tension through open and continuous
dialog, a thorough understanding of the situation across the levels of war, and a shared vision that integrates
and synchronizes actions among the echelons.
7-8. Small units, crews, and individuals act at the tactical level. At times, their actions may produce
strategic or operational effects. However, this does not mean these elements act at the strategic or
operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they contribute directly to achieving the strategic end
state. Similarly, actions are considered operational only if directly related to operational movement or the
sequencing of battles and engagements. The level at which an action occurs is determined by the
perspective of the echelon in terms of planning, preparation, and execution.
STRATEGIC
7-9. The strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
nations, determines national or multinational
(alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and
guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level
establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks
for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to
achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic
plans (JP 3-0).
7-10. Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (JP 3-0).
The President translates national interests and policy into a national strategic end state. Combatant
commanders base their theater strategic planning on this end state. To ensure their military strategy aligns
with national interests and policy, combatant commanders participate in strategic discourse with the
President, Secretary of Defense (through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and multinational
partners. Peacetime military engagement is vital to U.S. strategy and integral to theater security cooperation
plans. Strategy involves more than campaigns and major operations. When successful, these plans promote
national or multinational goals through peaceful processes. Peacetime military engagement contributes to
the ability of multinational forces to operate together.
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Operational Art
7-11. National interests and policy define and inform military strategy with a broad framework for
conducting operations. A combatant commander’s military strategy is thus an instrument that implements
national policy and strategy. Successful commanders understand the relationship and links between policy
and strategy. They also appreciate the distinctions and interrelationships among the levels of war. This
appreciation is fundamental to an informed understanding of the decisions and actions at each level.
Without it, commanders cannot sequence and synchronize military and nonmilitary actions toward an end
state consistent with national strategy and policy.
OPERATIONAL
7-12. The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the
operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define
that end state. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and
operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical
actions
(battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services,
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These
actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled
by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military
operation (JP 3-0). Major operations are not solely the purview of combat forces. They are typically
conducted with the other instruments of national power. Major operations often bring together the
capabilities of other agencies, nations, and organizations.
7-13. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose commanders employ major forces.
Operational commanders position and maneuver forces to shape conditions in their area of operations for
their decisive operation. Commanders exploit tactical victories to gain strategic advantage or reverse the
strategic effects of tactical losses.
7-14. Actions at the operational level usually involve broader dimensions of time and space than tactical
actions do. Operational commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational environment,
look beyond the immediate situation, and consider the consequences of their approach and subordinates’
actions. Operational commanders seek to establish the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate
commanders by shaping future events.
7-15. Experienced operational commanders understand tactical realities and can establish conditions that
favor tactical success. Likewise, good tactical commanders understand the operational and strategic context
within which they execute their assigned tasks. This understanding helps them seize opportunities (both
foreseen and unforeseen) that contribute to achieving the end state or defeating enemy initiatives that
threaten its achievement. Operational commanders require experience at both the operational and tactical
levels. This experience gives them the knowledge and intuition needed to understand how tactical and
operational possibilities interrelate.
TACTICAL
7-16. Tactics uses and orders the arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics,
commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power
in battles, engagements, and small-unit and crew actions. A battle consists of a set of related engagements
that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a
campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower
echelons maneuver forces (JP 1-02). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They
are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days.
7-17. Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations.
For any tactical-level operation, the surest measure of success is its contribution to achieving end state
conditions. Commanders avoid battles and engagements that do not contribute to achieving the operational
end state conditions.
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Chapter 7
APPLYING OPERATIONAL ART
7-18. Commanders use operational art to envision how to establish conditions that define the desired end
state. Actions and interactions across the levels of war influence these conditions. These conditions are
fundamentally dynamic and linked together by the human dimension, the most unpredictable and uncertain
element of conflict. The operational environment is complex, adaptive, and interactive. Through
operational art, commanders apply a comprehensive understanding of it to determine the most effective and
efficient methods to influence conditions in various locations across multiple echelons. (See figure 7-2.)
Figure 7-2. Operational art
7-19. Operational art spans a continuum—from comprehensive strategic direction to concrete tactical
actions. Bridging this continuum requires creative vision coupled with broad experience and knowledge.
Operational art provides a means for commanders to derive the essence of an operation. Without it, tactical
actions devolve into a series of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of
success. Through operational art, commanders translate their concept of operations into an operational
design and ultimately into tactical tasks. They do this by integrating ends, ways, and means and by
envisioning dynamic combinations of the elements of full spectrum operations across the levels of war.
They then apply operational art to array forces and maneuver them to achieve the desired end state.
7-20. Every operation begins with a commander’s intent that guides its conduct. In almost all cases, a
commander’s intent and concept of operations envision all the instruments of national power working
toward a common end state. Using operational art, commanders frame their concept by answering several
fundamental questions:
z
What is the force trying to accomplish (ends)?
z
What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
z
How will the force achieve the end state (ways)?
z
What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)?
z
What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions
(means)?
z
What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risk)?
7-21. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess all aspects of operations. Based
on a comprehensive analysis of the operational environment, commanders determine the centers of gravity
around which to frame the plan.
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Operational Art
7-22. When applying operational art, collaboration informs situational understanding. This collaboration
involves an open, continuous dialog between commanders that spans the levels of war and echelons of
command. This dialog is vital in establishing a common perspective on the problem and a shared
understanding of the operational environment’s conditions. Effective collaboration enables assessment,
fosters critical analysis, and anticipates opportunities and risk. Collaboration allows commanders to
recognize and react to changes in the situation.
7-23. Practicing operational art requires a broad understanding of the operational environment at all levels.
It also requires practical creativity and the ability to visualize changes in the operational environment.
Commanders project their visualization beyond the realm of physical combat. They anticipate the
operational environment’s evolving military and nonmilitary conditions. Operational art encompasses
visualizing the synchronized arrangement and employment of military forces and capabilities to achieve the
desired end state. This creative process requires the ability to discern the conditions required for victory
before committing forces to action.
7-24. Conflict is fundamentally a human endeavor characterized by violence, uncertainty, chance, and
friction. Land operations are inherently tied to the human dimension; they cannot be reduced to a simple
formula or checklist. Operational art helps commanders integrate functions and capabilities. It also helps
synchronize military actions with actions of other government and civilian organizations. Operational art
supports design by providing a conceptual framework for ordering thought when planning operations.
Operational art supports the commanders’ ability to seize, retain, and exploit initiative and achieve decisive
results.
*THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART
7-25. Through operational art supported by design, commanders and staffs develop a broad operational
approach and translate it into a coherent, feasible plan for employing forces. This operational approach
provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and
focus to all operations. In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual
tools to help them think through understanding the operational environment as well as visualizing and
describing the operational approach (see figure 7-3). Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements
of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe complex combinations
of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. Commanders selectively use these
tools in any operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of long-term operations.
Figure 7-3. Elements of operational art
7-26. The elements of operational art support the commander in identifying tasks and objectives that link
tactical mission to the desired end state. They help refine and focus the operational approach that forms the
basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the
elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans
as the operation unfolds.
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Chapter 7
END STATE AND CONDITIONS
7-27. The end state is a desired future condition represented by the expressed conditions that the
commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Clearly describing the end state requires understanding
the operational environment and assessing the friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral populations.
Commanders include end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent. A clearly defined end
state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization, and helps mitigate risk.
7-28. Army operations typically focus on achieving the military end state. However, Army operations also
contribute to establishing nonmilitary conditions. Sometimes that is their focus. Commanders explicitly
describe the end state and its defining conditions for every operation. Otherwise, missions become vague
and operations lose focus. Commanders should direct every operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,
and attainable end state.
7-29. The end state may evolve as an operation progresses. Commanders may refine guidance, the
operational environment’s conditions might change, and situational understanding may increase. Therefore,
all commanders continuously monitor operations and evaluate their progress. Commanders use formal and
informal assessment methods to assess progress in achieving the desired end state and determine whether
reframing is required.
CENTERS OF GRAVITY
7-30. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of
action, or will to act (JP 3-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by
Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”3 The loss of a center of
gravity ultimately results in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for planning operations. It
provides a focal point, identifying sources of strength and weakness.
7-31. Understanding the center of gravity has evolved beyond the term’s preindustrial definition. Centers
of gravity are now part of a more complex perspective of the operational environment. Today they are not
limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital
city or military force, are typically easier to identify, assess, and target. They can often be influenced solely
by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and complex. Dynamic and related to
human factors, they can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal
influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral
centers of gravity. Eliminating them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national
power.
7-32. Center of gravity analysis is thorough and detailed. Faulty conclusions drawn from hasty or
abbreviated analyses can adversely affect operations, waste critical resources, and incur undue risk.
Thoroughly understanding the operational environment helps commanders identify and target enemy
centers of gravity. This understanding encompasses how enemies organize, fight, and make decisions. It
also includes their physical and moral strengths and weaknesses. In addition, commanders should
understand how military forces interact with other government and civilian agencies. This understanding
helps planners identify centers of gravity, their associated decisive points, and the best approach for
achieving the desired end state.
DIRECT OR INDIRECT APPROACH
7-33. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. The
direct approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or
principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, centers of gravity are
generally well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an
indirect approach. The indirect approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy’s
center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points while avoiding enemy
3 © 1984. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press.
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Operational Art
strength. Both approaches use specific combinations of defeat or stability mechanisms depending on the
mission. Whether direct or indirect, an effective operational approach achieves decisive results through
combinations of defeat and stability mechanisms. As commanders and staffs frame the problem, they
determine the appropriate combination of defeat or stability mechanisms to solve it. This begins the process
that ends with the plan for an operation that achieves the desired end state.
Defeat Mechanisms
7-34. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission
against enemy opposition. A defeat mechanism is described in terms of the physical or psychological
effects it produces. Defeat mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, they describe broad operational
and tactical effects. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks. Operational art formulates the
most effective, efficient way to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to
achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Army forces have the most
success when applying focused combinations of defeat mechanisms. This produces complementary and
reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves
results proportional to the effort expended. Used in combination, the effects are likely to be both synergistic
and lasting. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms:
z
Destroy.
z
Dislocate.
z
Disintegrate.
z
Isolate.
7-35. In the context of defeat mechanisms, destroy means to apply lethal combat power on an enemy
capability so that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition
without being entirely rebuilt. To most effectively destroy enemy capabilities, units use a single, decisive
attack. When units cannot mass the necessary combat power simultaneously, commanders apply it
sequentially. This approach is called attrition. It defeats the enemy by maintaining the highest possible rate
of destruction over time.
7-36. Destruction may not force the enemy to surrender; well-disciplined forces and those able to
reconstitute can often endure heavy losses without giving up. Defeat cannot be accurately measured solely
in terms of destruction, particularly when criteria focus on narrow metrics, such as casualties, equipment
destroyed, or perceived enemy strength. Destruction is especially difficult to assess if friendly forces apply
force indiscriminately. The effects of destruction often fade unless combined with isolation and dislocation.
7-37. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It aims to make the enemy expose forces by
reacting to the dislocating action. Dislocation requires enemy commanders to make a choice: accept
neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning. Turning movements and
envelopments produce dislocation. When combined with destruction, dislocation can contribute to rapid
success.
7-38. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability
to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. It
exploits the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. Typically,
disintegration—coupled with destruction and dislocation—follows the loss of capabilities that enemy
commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding. Simultaneous operations produce the
strongest disintegrative effects. Disintegration is difficult to achieve; however, prolonged isolation,
destruction, and dislocation can produce it.
7-39. In the context of defeat mechanisms, isolate means to deny an enemy or adversary access to
capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of
action. Isolation limits the enemy’s ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing one or more
of these capabilities. It exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of the other
defeat mechanisms. There are two types of isolation:
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