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*FM 3-0, C1
Field Manual
Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-0
Washington, DC, 27 February 2008
OPERATIONS
Contents
Page
PREFACE
v
*INTRODUCTION TO CHANGE 1, FM 3-0
vii
INTRODUCTION
ix
Chapter 1
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1
Instability and Persistent Conflict
1-1
Influences on the Operational Environment
1-3
The Changing Nature of the Threat
1-3
*The Emergence of Hybrid Threats
1-5
Operational and Mission Variables
1-5
Unified Action
1-9
The Nature of Land Operations
1-15
Soldiers
1-18
Summary
1-20
Chapter 2
THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS
2-1
The Spectrum of Conflict
2-1
Operational Themes
2-3
Summary
2-13
Chapter 3
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
3-1
The Operational Concept
3-1
The Elements of Full Spectrum Operations
3-6
Combining the Elements of Full Spectrum Operations
3-19
Summary
3-21
Chapter 4
COMBAT POWER
4-1
The Elements of Combat Power
4-1
Leadership
4-2
Information
4-3
Warfighting Functions
4-3
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-0, 14 June 2001.
22 February 2011
i
Contents
Combined Arms
4-12
Summary
4-15
Chapter 5
THE COMMANDER AND MISSION COMMAND
5-1
*Art of Command
5-1
Design
5-1
The Role of the Commander in Mission Command
5-2
Summary
5-12
Chapter 6
THE SCIENCE OF CONTROL
6-1
*Section I - Control
6-1
Section II - The Staff Tasks
6-1
Conduct the Operations Process
6-1
*Conduct Knowledge Management and Information Management
6-12
*Conduct Inform and Influence and Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities
6-15
Section III - Summary
6-23
Chapter 7
OPERATIONAL ART
7-1
*Understanding Operational Art
7-1
The Levels of War
7-1
Applying Operational Art
7-4
*The Elements of Operational Art
7-5
Summary
7-16
Chapter 8
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REACH
8-1
Strategic Reach
8-1
Operational Reach
8-5
Basing
8-5
Summary
8-7
Appendix A
PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONS
A-1
Appendix B
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
B-1
Appendix C
THE ARMY MODULAR FORCE
C-1
Appendix D
THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE AND SUMMARY OF CHANGES
D-1
SOURCE NOTES
Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY
Glossary-1
REFERENCES
References-1
INDEX
Index-1
Figures
Figure 3-1. Full spectrum operations—the Army’s operational concept
3-1
*Figure 3-2. The elements of full spectrum operations
3-6
Figure 3-3. Stability tasks and Department of State technical sectors
3-14
Figure 3-4. Example of combining the elements of full spectrum operations in a
notional campaign
3-20
ii
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Contents
Figure 4-1. The elements of combat power
4-1
*Figure 4-2. Why mission command?
4-4
*Figure 4-3. Mission command
4-5
Figure 4-4. Examples of supporting range and supporting distance
4-14
*Figure 5-1. Driving the operations process
5-3
Figure 6-1. Operations process expanded
6-6
Figure 6-2. Contiguous, noncontiguous, and unassigned areas
6-11
*Figure 6-3. Two lines of effort for inform and influence activities
6-16
*Figure 6-4. Two lines of effort for cyber/electromagnetic activities
6-20
Figure 7-1. Levels of war
7-2
Figure 7-2. Operational art
7-4
Figure 7-3. Elements of operational art
7-5
Figure 7-4. Example of a line of operations
7-10
Figure 7-5. Example of lines of effort (stability)
7-11
Figure 8-1. Operational maneuver from strategic distance
8-2
Figure B-1. Chain of command branches
B-2
Figure B-2. Joint task force organization options
B-4
Figure B-3. Example of a joint task force showing an Army corps as joint force land
component commander with ARFOR responsibilities
B-5
Figure B-4. Normal distribution of Army administrative control responsibilities
B-8
Figure C-1. Example of theater army acting as a land component command while
continuing Army support
C-3
Figure C-2. Corps as an intermediate land force headquarters
C-4
Figure C-3. Example of tailored divisions in offensive operations
C-5
Figure C-4. Example of tailored divisions in defensive operations
C-6
Figure C-5. Heavy brigade combat team
C-7
Figure C-6. Infantry brigade combat team
C-7
Figure C-7. Stryker brigade combat team
C-7
Figure C-8. Battlefield surveillance brigade
C-9
Figure C-9. Fires brigade
C-9
Figure C-10. Combat aviation brigade
C-10
Figure C-11. Sustainment brigade
C-11
Figure C-12. Maneuver enhancement brigade
C-11
Figure C-13. Maneuver enhancement brigade OPCON to a Marine expeditionary
force
C-13
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
iii
Contents
Tables
Table 1-1. Areas of joint interdependence
1-10
Table 1-2. Army capabilities that complement other Services
1-11
Table 1-3. Definitions and examples of civilian organizations
1-13
Table 1-4. The Soldier’s Rules
1-19
Table 2-1. Examples of joint military operations conducted within operational themes
2-4
Table B-1. Joint support categories
B-6
Table B-2. Command relationships
B-10
Table B-3. Army support relationships
B-11
Table B-4. Other relationships
B-12
Table D-1. New Army terms
D-5
Table D-2. Modified Army definitions
D-5
Table D-3. Rescinded Army definitions
D-6
*Table D-4. Army terms for change 1
D-9
This publication is available at
and the Reimer Digital Library (RDL) at
iv
FM 3-0, C1
23 February 2011
Preface
FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army. FM 3-0
presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The seven updated
chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and
sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics,
techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational
guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System
curricula:
z
Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of
persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s
expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who
remain the Army’s most important advantage. Change 1 adds a brief discussion of hybrid
threats and implications for Army operations.
z
Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that
spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This
chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse
joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for
each operational theme. Change 1 eliminates some graphics used to illustrate the continuum of
operations. It also expands and clarifies the discussion of major combat operations.
z
Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational
concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense,
and stability or civil support. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of
exercising battle command. Change 1 moves the discussion of mission command from the
section within the operational concept to chapters 4, 5, and 6 to consolidate and emphasize
mission command. The discussion of stability operations now includes security force assistance.
Change 1 also modifies the discussion of civil support tasks from three tasks to four to conform
to the newly published Army field manual on civil support operations, FM 3-28.
z
Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum
operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems (“BOS”) with six warfighting
functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power.
Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff. Change 1 replaces the command and control
element of combat power and warfighting function with mission command. The discussion of the
intelligence warfighting function now includes sections moved from the old chapter 7. This
chapter defines mission command warfighting function. The mission command warfighting
function now includes a discussion of inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
These activities and others replace the previously discussed “information tasks” deleted from
the old “information superiority” chapter.
z
Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and their affects on the operations
process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central
role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead,
and continually assess. Change 1 provides a rewritten chapter 5 that discusses the commander
and defines mission command. Chapter 5 discusses the four commander’s tasks under mission
command. It discusses how the commander drives the operations process and how the
commander understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads, and assesses operations.
Chapter 5 describes how the commander builds teams, and how the commander leads inform
and influence activities.
z
Chapter
6 discusses operational art, including operational design and the levels of war.
Operational art represents the creative aspect of operational-level command. It is the expression
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
v
Preface
of informed vision across the levels of war. Change 1 provides a new chapter 6 on the science of
control. It discusses the three staff tasks under mission command, which are conducting the
operations process, conducting knowledge management and information management, and
conducting inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
z
Chapter
7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks,
purpose, and staff responsibility. Change 1 eliminates the chapter on information superiority. It
is now an updated discussion of the previous chapter 6. It provides an updated discussion of
operational art to emphasize design (as discussed in FM 5-0).
z
Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across
intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in
terms of strategic and operational reach. Change 1 retains chapter 8 without other substantial
change.
Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix
A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in
appendix C. A discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D. This appendix includes a
chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes, including those made in change 1, to FM 3-0. It
also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent.
Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint
operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations. FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization
partners.
The principal audience for FM 3-0 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of
major and above who command Army forces in major operations and campaigns or serve on the staffs that
support those commanders. It is also applicable to the civilian leadership of the Army.
FM 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the
glossary and the text. Glossary references: Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent publication (the
authority) have an asterisk in the glossary. Text references: Definitions for which FM 3-0 is the proponent
publication are in boldfaced text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02.
For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows
the definition.
“Adversaries” refers to both enemies and adversaries when used in joint definitions.
“Opponents” refers to enemies and adversaries.
FM 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
This manual contains copyrighted material.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The
preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send
written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-
MCK-D (FM 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to leav-cadd-
web-cadd@conus.army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Acknowledgments
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. Other
sources of quotations are listed in the source notes.
On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Reproduced
with permission of Princeton University Press. Copyright © 1984.
vi
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
*Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0
This is change 1 to the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. FM 3-0, Operations,
initiated a comprehensive change in Army doctrine by capturing the experience of Soldiers over 7 years of
combat and using it to change the way the Army conceptualized operations. It established full spectrum
operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations—as the central tenet of
how the Army applies its capabilities. The Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations remains
valid.
As in 2008, the Army continues to operate in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in other operations
worldwide. The Army’s experience illustrates that the United States cannot accurately predict the nature,
location, or duration of the next conflict. The operational environment remains extremely fluid, with
continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors. It is unforgiving of leaders who are
overly dependent on technology or are incapable of acting independently amid uncertainty and complexity.
Change 1 to FM 3-0 reflects an evolving understanding of the impact of what is now 9 years of persistent
conflict on how the Army operates. FM 3-0 emphasizes people over technology, focusing on initiative and
responsibility at lower levels of command. Understanding the operational environment, as well as the
problem to be solved, requires a methodology that expands beyond the military decisionmaking process.
The emergence of hybrid threats has added to the uncertainty of the operational environment. Additionally,
creating teams among modular forces to work closely with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational assets is critical to mission success. When working with host-nation partners, teamwork
requires more personal cooperation than military command. Finally, the ability to convey clear and succinct
messages to target audiences is often as important as the ability to deliver lethal combat power.
As a result, the traditional framework of command and control that the Army relied on for many years is no
longer adequate to ensure success in full spectrum operations. The traditional framework assumed—
z
Only higher echelons would work with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
agencies and assets.
z
A high level of understanding of the operational environment and the problems to be solved.
z
Relatively stable organizations with fixed structures that ensured teamwork and cohesion.
z
Informing and influencing various audiences were primarily a government, not a military,
function.
z
Technological solutions were needed to solve complex problems.
z
Smaller, more capable forces would know enough about the enemy to apply combat power
precisely and effectively.
z
The higher the echelon, the greater the understanding of the operational environment.
More importantly, the traditional framework failed to stress that the commander is the most important actor
in operations. Commanders, in their relationships with the population or with joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners, drive mission accomplishment.
Commanders must be capable of acting independently amid uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The
operational environment will place a premium on decentralization of authority and on the distribution of
combined arms capabilities that enable leaders to develop the situation through action, consistent with their
commander’s intent. It also requires commanders who are comfortable with risk and who can command
effectively when their networks are degraded. To assist commanders and leaders, the Army recognizes that
doctrine requires a change that better defines the art of command and the science of control in full spectrum
operations.
Change 1 to FM 3-0 recognizes the primacy of commanders and leaders in military operations. Thus,
mission command replaces the command and control warfighting function as the means for leaders to
integrate the other warfighting functions, while focusing on the command of people in operations instead of
processes and technological solutions. Concurrently, mission command provides a methodology to create a
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
vii
*Introduction to Change 1, FM 3-0
more thorough understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. Within
mission command, commanders build teams and establish themes and messages to drive processes and
procedures. Mission command enables an operationally adaptive force that anticipates transitions; accepts
risks to create opportunities; informs friendly and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
partners; and influences neutrals, adversaries, and enemies. The ultimate outcome results in successful full
spectrum operations.
In addition to replacing the command and control warfighting function with mission command, change 1 of
FM 3-0 also accounts for changes in the operational environment. These changes include—
z
Updating the operational environment to address hybrid threats.
z
Adding security force assistance to the discussion of civil security under stability operations.
z
Restructuring the civil support tasks by adding chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management as the fourth civil support task.
z
Revising chapter 7, Operational Art, to match the discussion of design in FM 5-0.
z
Updating the continuum of operations to eliminate the intermediate points, adding the role and
nature of deterrence, and eliminating figure 2-2, the spectrum of conflict and operational themes
(known as the Tennessee chart), and figure 3-4, examples of combining the elements of full
spectrum operations within operational themes.
z
Replacing the five information tasks with inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic
activities.
The demands placed on leaders have expanded dramatically in an era of persistent conflict among
populations. The need to empower them with skills, knowledge, resources, and freedom of action is critical
to success. Mission command provides a means for both senior and junior leaders to create a more
thorough understanding of the operational environment and of the problems to be addressed. It highlights
the initiative necessary for success in today’s operational environment. Mission command emphasizes the
commander in operations. It encourages collaboration and dialog among commanders and leaders as a
means of developing an environment of mutual trust and understanding that enables agile and adaptive
organizations to succeed in full spectrum operations.
viii
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Introduction
This is the fifteenth edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual. Its lineage goes back to the first
doctrine written for the new American Army, Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and
Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Today, as with each previous version of Operations, FM 3-0
shapes all of Army doctrine, while influencing the Army’s organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, and Soldier concerns. But its contents are not truly capstone doctrine until Army forces
internalize it. This requires education and individual study by all Army leaders. And it requires more: Army
leaders must examine and debate the doctrine, measuring it against their experience and strategic,
operational, and tactical realities. They must also recognize that while FM 3-0 can inform them of how to
think about operations, it cannot provide a recipe for what to do on the battlefield.
Always dynamic, Army doctrine balances between the Army’s current capabilities and situation with its
projected requirements for future operations. At the same time, Army doctrine forecasts the immediate
future in terms of organizational, intellectual, and technological developments. This requirement is
particularly challenging for this edition of FM
3-0. The Army is heavily committed in conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq and to countering terrorism worldwide. How long this will remain the case remains
unknown. Therefore, this edition promulgates doctrine for Army operations in those conflicts. However,
America’s strategic requirements remain global. FM 3-0 does not focus exclusively on current operations,
regardless of how pressing their requirements. The Army’s experience makes it clear that no one can
accurately predict the nature, location, or duration of the next conflict. So this doctrine also addresses the
needs of an Army responsible for deploying forces promptly at any time, in any environment, against any
adversary. This is its expeditionary capability. Once deployed, the Army operates for extended periods
across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war. This is its campaign capability.
This edition of FM
3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of prolonged conflicts and
opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that
landpower, while critical, is only part of each campaign. Success in future conflicts will require the
protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability
or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it
recognizes that
21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While
defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the
broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace.
Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among
noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts. Killing or capturing the
enemy in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and
engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to
success. Informing the public and influencing specific audiences are central to mission accomplishment.
Within the context of current operations worldwide, stability operations are often as important as—or more
important than—offensive and defensive operations. Department of Defense policy states:
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall
be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The
Department of Defense shall be prepared to: (1) Conduct stability operations activities
throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in
combat and non-combat environments.
DODI 3000.05
Because of this, full spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support
operations—is the primary theme of this manual. This continues a major shift in Army doctrine that began
with FM 3-0 (2001) and now is embedded in joint doctrine as well. Stability and civil support operations
cannot be something that the Army conducts in “other than war” operations. Army forces must address the
civil situation directly and continuously, combining tactical tasks directed at noncombatants with tactical
tasks directed against the enemy. These tasks have evolved from specialized ancillary activities—civil-
military operations—into a central element of operations equal in importance to the offense and
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
ix
Introduction
defense—stability and civil support. The nature of the mission determines the appropriate weighting and
combination of tasks.
The emergence of full spectrum operations drives key changes in capstone doctrine. The Army established
full spectrum operations in FM 3-0 (2001), shifting sharply from an “either-or” view of combat and other
operations to an inclusive doctrine that emphasized the essentiality of nonlethal actions with combat
actions. This edition of FM 3-0 continues that development. In FM 3-0 (2001), stability operations were
“other” joint missions stated in an Army context. The current edition describes stability operations as
tactical tasks applicable at all echelons of Army forces deployed outside the United States. In addition, civil
support operations are also defined as tactical-level tasks, similar to stability tasks but conducted in the very
different operational environment of the United States and its territories.
The impact of the information environment on operations continues to increase. What Army forces do to
achieve advantages across it—information superiority—significantly affects the outcome of operations.
Consequently, FM 3-0 revises how the Army views information operations and staff responsibility for
associated Army information tasks. Other changes include replacing the battlefield operating systems with
the warfighting functions and adding the spectrum of conflict with related operational themes.
Chaos, chance, and friction dominate land operations as much today as when Clausewitz wrote about them
after the Napoleonic wars. In this environment, an offensive mindset—the predisposition to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative to positively change the situation—makes combat power decisive. The high
quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to
exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0
prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to accomplish the mission successfully. This requires a
climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to
think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. Subordinates’ actions are guided by the higher
commander’s intent, but not circumscribed by excessive control. This is a continuing tension across the
Army, aggravated by advanced information systems that can provide higher commanders with the details of
lower echelon operations. The temptation for senior leaders to micromanage subordinates is great, but it
must be resisted.
Despite the vital importance of nonlethal action to change the civil situation, FM 3-0 recognizes that the
Army’s primary purpose is deterrence, and should deterrence fail, decisively winning the Nation’s wars by
fighting within an interdependent joint team. America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged
for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation
and eradication as a society. This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex,
multidimensional, and rooted in the human dimension. This conflict cannot be won by military forces
alone; it requires close cooperation and coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, landpower will remain important to the military
effort and essential to victory. FM 3-0 considers the nature of today’s enemies as well as a wide range of
other potential threats. It contains doctrine that seeks nothing less than victory for the United States—now
and in the future.
As with all previous Army capstone doctrine, this doctrine provides direction for the Army and reflects its
progress through the years. Like the manual that emerged from Valley Forge, it reflects the lessons learned
from combat experience and addresses strategic, operational, and tactical realities. Baron von Steuben’s
doctrine allowed for the creation of forces capable of standing against the British Army, the world’s best,
by giving the Continental Army the skills necessary to win. Then, as now, success depended on the
determination of well-trained Soldiers, the quality of their small-unit leadership, and the abilities of their
commanders.
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FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
Chapter 1
The Operational Environment
Military operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors that
shape their nature and affect their outcomes. These operations require commanders
who understand the strategic and operational environments and their relevance to
each mission. This understanding includes specific traits of the particular operational
environment to each mission and how essential elements of the environment shape
how Army forces conduct operations. This chapter discusses the operational
environment as the basis for understanding the Army’s doctrine for the conduct of
land operations. It addresses these operations, emphasizing the Army’s expeditionary
and campaign qualities and the integral role of Army forces in unified actions—joint,
interagency, and multinational undertakings that execute campaigns and major
operations.
INSTABILITY AND PERSISTENT CONFLICT
1-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that
affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). While they
include all enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, they also
include an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources,
and the culture of the local population. This doctrine pertains in an era of complex global, regional, and
local change leading to both opportunities and risks. The risk component of this change manifests in certain
trends that drive instability and a continuing state of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the
protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to
use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Some important trends that affect ground
force operations in an era of persistent conflict include—
z
Globalization.
z
Technology.
z
Demographic changes.
z
Urbanization.
z
Resource demands.
z
Climate change and natural disasters.
z
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their effects.
z
Failed or failing states.
1-2. Experts predict globalization will continue to support the exportation of terrorism worldwide.
Interdependent economies have enabled great wealth. The benefits of this wealth remain concentrated in
the hands of a few while many bear the risks of failure. This unequal distribution of wealth often creates
have and have-not conditions that can spawn conflict. This dichotomy appears between developed nations
in the northern hemisphere and developing nations to their south and in the southern hemisphere. By 2015,
experts project that up to 2.8 billion people—almost exclusively in economic have-not areas in developing
nations—will live below the poverty level. These people are more vulnerable to recruitment by extremist
groups. Globalization has also contributed to the rise of nonstate actors to economic, informational, and
even military and diplomatic positions rivaling or exceeding those of states. The decline in state power and
influence makes diplomatic interaction more difficult and complex. Globalization has already left several
states behind, and more nations will lag in the increasing tempo of globalization. As a result, their
populations will both suffer and become more apt to embrace radical ideologies to express their frustration
and increase their desire, if not ability, to share in global prosperity.
22 February 2011
FM 3-0, C1
1-1
Chapter 1
1-3. Globalization has enabled a greater diffusion of technology. Often, adversaries use innovations—that
improve the quality of life and livelihood—to destroy lives. It would seem that technology evolved with an
asymmetric advantage of developed nations. They have greater access to research facilities to develop and
innovate. Technology also gives nations access to the industrial base. These nations can then mass-produce
advanced products and widely distribute them at relatively low costs. The low cost of products, their
user-friendly design, and their availability in a global economy makes advanced technology accessible to
unstable states as well as extremist organizations. The revolution and proliferation of benefits derived from
integrating multidisciplinary nano- and bio-technologies and smart materials potentially promises to
improve living conditions. However, nations will not always have these products available at the pace and
in the quantities necessary to make them and their benefits as universally available as desired. Such
disparity can create another source of friction between the haves and have-nots. Moreover, the
proliferation, falling costs, and availability of technologically advanced products—especially expanded
information technologies using mobile, wireless, and global fiber-optic networks—enable nonstate
adversaries to acquire them.
1-4. Population growth in the developing world will increase opportunities for instability, radicalism, and
extremism. Populations of some less-developed countries will almost double by 2020, most notably in
Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. The youth bulge created by this growth will be
vulnerable to antigovernment and radical ideologies, worsening governance challenges. Middle class
populations will grow as well. They will demand improved quality-of-life benefits and more resources to
go with their increased wealth. Inability or inequity to distribute wealth will intensify tensions between
haves and have-nots. It will likely escalate calls for changes in how to share wealth globally.
1-5. By 2015, well over half the world’s population will live in urban centers, and by 2030, up to 60
percent will live in cities. Many cities are already huge; 15 have populations in excess of 10 million. Eight
of these megacities lie near known geological fault lines that threaten natural disaster. These megacities
increasingly assume the significance of nation-states, posing similar governance and security concerns.
Their urban growth appears more pronounced in developing regions in which states are already more prone
to failure. Organized crime and extremist ideological and cultural enclaves flourish in urban terrain,
overwhelming and supplanting local governance apparatus. Chronic unemployment, overcrowding,
pollution, uneven resource distribution, and poor basic services such as sanitation and health care add to
population dissatisfaction and increase the destructive allure of radical ideologies.
1-6. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and,
potentially, conflict. Resources—especially water, gas, and oil—are finite. By 2030, energy consumption
will probably exceed production. Current sources, investment, and development of alternatives likely will
not bridge the gap. A shift to cleaner fuels such as natural gas will find about 60 percent of known reserves
concentrated in Russia, Iran, and Qatar. Demand for water doubles every 20 years. By 2015, 40 percent of
the world’s population will live in water-stressed countries, increasing the potential for competition over a
resource that has already led to conflict in the past. The demand for food will increase in direct proportion
to the growth in population, but increases in food production will depend upon adequate energy and water
resources.
1-7. Natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries. They will cause
humanitarian crises, driving regionally destabilizing population migrations and raising potential for
epidemic diseases. Desertification occurs at nearly
50-70 thousand square miles per year. Increased
consumption of resources, especially in densely populated areas, will increase air, water, and land
pollution. Depletion reduces natural replenishment sources as well as intensifies the effects of natural
disasters, having increasingly greater impacts on more densely populated areas. Over 15 million people die
each year from communicable diseases; these numbers may grow exponentially as urban densities increase.
1-8. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their effects will increase the potential for
catastrophic attacks. These attacks will destabilize and undercut the confidence that spurs global economic
development. The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction is as real as it is deadly. Over 1,100
identified terrorist organizations exist. Some of them, most notably Al Qaeda, actively seek weapons of
mass destruction. Since 1993, 662 reported incidents of unauthorized activities surrounding nuclear and
radioactive materials occurred. These incidents involved quantities of enriched uranium from military and
civilian reactors exceeding 3,700 tons, enough to produce thousands of nuclear weapons. Additionally,
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The Operational Environment
some nuclear nations now share technology as a means to earn money and secure influence. For small
countries and terrorist organizations, biological weapons convey a similar status as nuclear weapons.
Laboratories can easily and cheaply produce many biological and chemical agents. Wider Internet access
has made the technologies and processes of developing weapons of mass destruction and their effects
readily available to potential adversaries. Further, some states may pursue these programs to ensure their
security and prevent forced regime change.
1-9. Governments of nation-states face increasingly greater challenges in providing effective support to
their growing populations. Security, economic prosperity, basic services, and access to resources strain
systems designed in an industrial age. Additionally, these governments are unprepared to increase openness
intellectually or culturally to address an information age. Compounding this inability to adapt, nation-state
governments find themselves pitted against who have made the shift and are already exploiting it to gain
support of local populaces. These adversaries can include criminal organizations, extremist networks,
private corporate enterprises, and increasingly powerful megacities. Stability, not the form of governance,
will be paramount. The problem of failed or failing states can result in new safe havens in which
adversaries can thrive.
INFLUENCES ON THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-10. The operational environment of the future will be complicated by globalization, population growth,
inadequate resources, climate change, inadequate governance, and the spread of lethal weapons. The
driving trends discussed in paragraphs 1-1 through 1-9 create a useable forecast of persistent conflict. The
international nature of commercial and academic efforts could also have dramatic impacts. The complexity
of the operational environment will push future operations to occur across the spectrum of conflict.
1-11. The operational environment of the future will be an arena in which operational goals are attained or
lost by not only the use of highly lethal force but also by how quickly units can establish and maintain a
state of stability. The operational environment will remain a dirty, frightening, physically and emotionally
draining one. Death and destruction will result from environmental conditions creating humanitarian crisis
as well as conflict itself. The high lethality and range of advanced weapons systems and tendency of
enemies to operate among the population will increase the risk to combatants and noncombatants
dramatically. All enemies, state or nonstate, regardless of technological or military capability, will likely
use every political, economic, informational, and military measure at their disposal. In addition, the
operational environment will expand to areas historically immune to battle, including the continental
United States and the territory of multinational partners, especially urban areas. In fact, the operational
environment will probably include areas not defined by geography, such as cyberspace. Computer network
attacks will span borders, enabling antagonists to hit anywhere, anytime. With the exception of cyberspace,
units will conduct all operations among the people and will measure outcomes in terms of effects on
populations.
1-12. The operational environment will become extremely fluid. With continually changing coalitions,
alliances, partnerships, and actors, interagency and joint operations will have to adjust to the intricate range
of players occupying the environment. International news organizations using new information and
communications technologies will no longer depend on states to access the area of operations and will more
greatly sway how the public views operations. News organizations will have satellites or their own
unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms from which to monitor the scene. Secrecy will be difficult to
maintain, making operations security more vital than ever. Finally, complex cultural, demographic, and
physical environmental factors will be present, adding to the fog of war. Such factors include humanitarian
crises, ethnic and religious differences, and complex and urban terrain, which often become major centers
of gravity and a haven for potential threats. The operational environment will remain interconnected,
dynamic, and extremely volatile.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT
1-13. Threats are nation-states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life,
vital resources, or institutions. States, nations, transnational actors, and nonstate entities will continue to
challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of
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Chapter 1
warfare. Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instruments of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Threats fit a range of four major categories: traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. While helpful in describing threats the Army will most likely face,
these categories or challenges do not define the nature of the adversary. In fact, adversaries may combine
any and all of these challenges to achieve a desired effect against the United States.
1-14. Traditional threats emerge from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in
understood forms of military competition and conflict. In the past, the United States optimized its forces for
this challenge. Currently the United States possesses the world’s preeminent conventional and nuclear
forces, but this status is not guaranteed. Many nations maintain powerful conventional forces, and not all
are friendly to the United States. Some potentially hostile adversaries possess weapons of mass destruction.
Although these adversaries may not actively seek armed confrontation and will actively avoid U.S. military
strength, their activities can provoke regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Deterrence therefore
remains the first aim of the joint force. Should deterrence fail, and some evidence shows that deterrence is
less able to accomplish this goal, the United States strives to maintain capabilities to overmatch any
combination of enemy conventional and unconventional forces.
1-15. Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric methods
and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses irregular warfare to exhaust
the U.S. collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism,
insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually
accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on U.S. influence.
1-16. Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons, also called weapons of mass destruction, and their effects. Possession of these
weapons gives an enemy the potential to inflict sudden and catastrophic effects. The proliferation of related
technology has made this threat more likely than in the past.
1-17. Disruptive threats involve an enemy using new technologies that reduce U.S. advantages in key
operational domains. For example, U.S. forces depend on battlefield networks to generate combined arms
effects. An advanced cybernetic attack may degrade or usurp automated systems, leaving no means of
identifying the problem and making countermeasures ineffective. Disruptive threats can employ such
different methods and technology that the target fails to understand the nature of the threat. The allied
exploitation of the German ENIGMA code machines provides an example. Because the Germans could not
conceive that human intellect and computer technology could break their top codes, they enacted
countermeasures to every possible threat except the one that occurred.
1-18. Adversaries seek to create an advantage over U.S. forces by combining traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities. These combined threats change the nature of the conflict, enabling
adversaries to use capabilities for which the United States is least prepared. Adversaries seek to interdict
U.S. forces attempting to enter any area of crisis. If U.S. forces successfully gain entry, adversaries often
engage them in complex terrain and urban environments to offset U.S. advantages. Methods used by
adversaries include dispersing their forces into small, mobile combat teams—combined only when required
to strike a common objective—and becoming invisible by blending in with the local population.
1-19. U.S. forces expect threats to use the environment and rapidly adapt. Extremist organizations adopt
state-like qualities using the media, technology, and their position within a state’s political, military, and
social infrastructures to their advantage. Their operations grow more sophisticated, combining
conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal tactics. They focus on creating conditions of
instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, and employ global networks to expand
local operations. Threats employ advanced information operations and use violence indiscriminately.
1-20. Future conflicts will much more likely to be fought among the people instead of around the people.
This fundamentally alters how Soldiers can apply force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies will
increasingly seek populations within which to hide for protection, preparation, and refuge. They use
populations as protection against the proven attack and detection means of U.S. forces, in preparation for
attacks against communities, and as refuge from U.S. strikes against their bases. War remains a battle of
wills—a contest for dominance over people. The essential struggle of the future conflict will occur where
people live and will require U.S. security dominance to extend across the population.
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The Operational Environment
*THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID THREATS
1-21. The term hybrid threat has recently evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity of
operations and the multiplicity of actors involved. While the existence of innovative enemies is not new,
today’s hybrid threats demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of possible threats simultaneously. The
conditions associated with persistent conflict can form a very capable hybrid threat. In either case, close
combat is as violent as major combat operations, even when the opponent is an irregular force.
1-22. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces,
criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually
benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law, military tradition,
and custom with unregulated irregular forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their targets. These
forces could include militias, terrorists, guerillas, and criminals. Such forces combine their abilities to use
and transition between regular and irregular tactics and weapons. These abilities enable hybrid threats to
capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities making them particularly effective.
1-23. These forces may cooperate in the context of pursuing their own organizational objectives. For
example, criminal elements may steal parts for a profit while at the same time compromising the readiness
of an adversary’s combat systems. Militia forces may defend their town with exceptional vigor as a part of
a complex defensive network. Hybrid threats may use the media, technology, and their position within a
state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. Hybrid threats creatively adapt,
combining sophisticated weapons, command and control, cyber activities, and combined arms tactics to
engage U.S. forces when conditions are favorable. Their tactics will often shift. By using insurgent,
criminal, and cyber activities, they create instability and hamper U.S. forces and allies. Additionally, hybrid
threats use global networks to influence perceptions of the conflict and shape global opinion.
OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
1-24. The operational environment includes physical areas—the air, land, maritime, and space domains. It
also includes the information that shapes the operational environment as well as enemy, adversary, friendly,
and neutral systems relevant to that joint operation. The operational environment for each campaign or
major operation differs and evolves as each campaign or operation progresses. Army forces use operational
variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations. They
use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of the environment that apply to their mission.
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
1-25. Military planners describe the operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational
variables are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from
one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Operational variables describe
not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population’s influence on it. Joint
planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables, Army doctrine adds two
more: physical environment and time. As a set, Soldiers often abbreviate these operational variables as
PMESII-PT.
1-26. The variables humanize the operational environment. Since land forces operate among populations,
understanding human variables is crucial. They help describe each operation’s context for commanders and
other leaders. Understanding these variables helps commanders appreciate how the military instrument
complements the other instruments of national power. Comprehensive analysis of the variables usually
occurs at the joint level; Army commanders continue analysis to improve their understanding of their
environment. The utility of the operational variables improves with flexible application; complicated
human societies defy precise categorization. Whenever possible, commanders and staffs employ specialists
in each variable to improve analysis.
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1-5
Chapter 1
Political
1-27. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of
governance. Political structures and processes enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with populations from
local through international levels. Formally constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers
strongly influence events. Political leaders can use ideas, beliefs, actions, and violence to enhance their
power and control over people, territory, and resources. Many sources of political motivation exist. These
may include charismatic leadership; indigenous security institutions; and religious, ethnic, or economic
communities. Political opposition groups or parties also affect the situation. Each may cooperate differently
with U.S. or multinational forces. Understanding the political circumstances helps commanders and staffs
recognize key organizations and determine their aims and capabilities.
1-28. Understanding political implications requires analyzing all relevant partnerships—political,
economic, military, religious, and cultural. This analysis captures the presence and significance of external
organizations and other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include private
security organizations, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations that provide
humanitarian assistance.
1-29. A political analysis also addresses the effect of will. Will is the primary intangible factor; it
motivates participants to sacrifice to persevere against obstacles. Understanding what motivates key groups
(for example, political, military, and insurgent) helps commanders understand the groups’ goals and
willingness to sacrifice to achieve their ends.
1-30. The political variable includes the U.S. domestic political environment. Therefore, mission analysis
and monitoring the situation includes an awareness of national policy and strategy.
Military
1-31. The military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces in a given operational
environment. For many states, an army is the military force primarily responsible for maintaining internal
and external security. Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces may influence friendly and hostile
military forces. Militaries of other states not directly involved in a conflict may also affect them. Therefore,
analysis should include the relationship of regional land forces to the other variables. Military analysis
examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, host-nation, and multinational military organizations. Such
capabilities include—
z
Equipment.
z
Manpower.
z
Doctrine.
z
Training levels.
z
Resource constraints.
z
Leadership.
z
Organizational culture.
z
History.
z
Nature of civil-military relations.
Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate actual capabilities of each armed force. Analysis
focuses on each organization’s ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally.
Economic
1-32. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing,
distributing, and consuming resources. Specific factors may include the influence of—
z
Industrial organizations.
z
Trade.
z
Development (including foreign aid).
z
Finance.
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22 February 2011
The Operational Environment
z
Monetary policy and conditions.
z
Institutional capabilities.
z
Geography.
z
Legal constraints (or the lack of them) on the economy.
1-33. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies differ. These
differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals’ decisions to support or subvert
the existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups to change the
economic status quo. These may include—
z
Technical knowledge.
z
Decentralized capital flows.
z
Investment.
z
Price fluctuations.
z
Debt.
z
Financial instruments.
z
Protection of property rights.
z
Existence of black market or underground economies.
Thus, indicators measuring potential benefits or costs of changing the political-economic order may
enhance how commanders understand the social and behavioral dynamics of friendly, adversary, and
neutral entities.
Social
1-34. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a population
whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common
culture, and share a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. They include diverse social structures.
Social structure refers to the relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. It includes
institutions, organizations, networks, and similar groups. (FM 3-24 discusses socio-cultural factors analysis
and social network analysis.)
1-35. Culture comprises shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that society members use
to cope with their world and with one another. Societies usually have a dominant culture but may have
many secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, but societal attributes change over
time. Changes may occur in any of the following areas:
z
Demographics.
z
Religion.
z
Migration trends.
z
Urbanization.
z
Standards of living.
z
Literacy and nature of education.
z
Cohesiveness and activity of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups.
Social networks, social status and related norms, and roles that support and enable individuals and leaders
require analysis. This analysis should also address societies outside the operational area whose actions,
opinions, or political influence can affect the mission.
1-36. People base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values. Cultural awareness helps
identify points of friction within populations, build rapport, and reduce misunderstandings. It can improve
the commander’s insight into individual and group intentions and enhance the unit’s effectiveness.
However, U.S. forces require training in cultural awareness before deploying to an unfamiliar operational
environment and continuous updating while deployed. Commanders develop their knowledge of the
societal aspects within their areas of operations to a higher level of cultural awareness. This level allows
them to understand how their operations affect the population and prepares them to meet local leaders
face-to-face.
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Chapter 1
Information
1-37. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The environment shaped by
information includes leaders, decisionmakers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s
access and use of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the operational
environment. Commanders use information activities to shape the operational environment as part of their
operations.
1-38. Media representatives significantly influence the information that shapes the operational
environment. Broadcast and Internet media sources can rapidly disseminate competing views of military
operations worldwide. Media coverage influences U.S. political decisionmaking, U.S. popular opinion, and
multinational sensitivities. Adversaries often use media coverage to further their aims by controlling and
manipulating how audiences perceive a situation’s content and context.
1-39. Global telecommunications networks now provide immense amounts of information. Observers and
adversaries have unprecedented access to multiple information sources, as the public disclosure of
thousands of classified U.S. documents in 2010 demonstrated. They often attempt to influence and counter
opinion by providing their own interpretation of events. Televised news and propaganda reach many
people. However, in developing countries, information still flows by less sophisticated means such as
messengers and graffiti. Commanders need to understand the nature of information flow within their area
of operations and apply the best available methods to communicate with the local populace.
Infrastructure
1-40. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a society to
function. Degrading infrastructure affects the entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes
technological sophistication—the ability to conduct research and development and apply the results to civil
and military purposes.
1-41. Not all segments of society view infrastructure in the same way. Improvements viewed by some as
beneficial may be perceived as a threat by others. For example, introducing cellular networks can help a
local economy but may offend influential and conservative local leaders who view it as permitting access to
licentious material. Actions affecting infrastructure require a thorough analysis of possible effects.
Physical Environment
1-42. The physical environment includes the geography and manmade structures in the operational area.
The following factors affect the physical environment:
z
Manmade structures, particularly urban areas.
z
Climate and weather.
z
Topography.
z
Hydrology.
z
Natural resources.
z
Biological features and hazards.
z
Other environmental conditions.
Enemies understand that less complex and open terrain often exposes their military weaknesses. Therefore,
they may try to counteract U.S. military advantages by operating in urban or other complex terrain and
during adverse weather conditions.
Time
1-43. Time proves a significant consideration in military operations. Analyzing it as an operational variable
focuses on how an operation’s duration might help or hinder each side. This has implications at every
planning level. Enemies with a limited military capability usually view protracted conflict as advantageous
to them. They avoid battles and only engage when conditions work overwhelmingly to their favor. This is a
strategy of exhaustion. Such a strategy dominated the American Revolution and remains effective today.
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The Operational Environment
The enemy concentrates on surviving and inflicting friendly and civilian casualties over time. Although the
military balance may not change, this creates opportunities to affect how domestic and international
audiences view the conflict. Conversely, the enemy may attempt to mass effects and achieve decisive
results in a short period.
MISSION VARIABLES
1-44. The operational variables directly relate to campaign planning. That does not mean that they are not
valuable at the tactical level; they are fundamental to understanding the operational environment to plan at
any level, in any situation. The degree to which each operational variable provides useful information
depends on the situation and echelon. For example, social and economic variables often receive close
analysis as part of enemy and civil considerations at brigade and higher levels. They may affect the training
and preparation of small units. However, they may not be relevant to a small-unit leader’s mission analysis.
That leader may only be concerned with such questions as “Who is the tribal leader for this village?” “Is
the electrical generator working?” “Does the enemy have antitank missiles?”
1-45. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army tactical leaders narrow their focus to six mission
variables. Mission variables are those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission.
They outline the situation as it applies a specific Army unit. The mission variables consist of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC). Army leaders use these categories of relevant information for mission analysis to synthesize
operational variables and tactical-level information with local knowledge about conditions relevant to their
mission. (Chapter 5 expands the discussion of the mission variables.)
1-46. Army forces interact with people at many levels. In general, anyone in any operational area can
qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a supporter, or a neutral. One reason land operations are complex is that
all four categories intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another:
z
An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An
enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.
z
An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which
the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries include members of the local populace
who sympathize with the enemy.
z
A supporter is a party who sympathizes with friendly forces and who may or may not
provide material assistance to them.
z
A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces.
1-47. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into METT-TC emphasizes the operational
environment’s human aspects. This emphasis is most obvious in civil considerations, but it affects the other
METT-TC variables as well. Incorporating human factors into mission analysis requires critical thinking,
collaboration, continuous learning, and adaptation. It also requires analyzing local and regional perceptions.
Many factors influence perceptions of the enemy, adversaries, supporters, and neutrals. These include—
z
Language.
z
Culture.
z
Geography.
z
History.
z
Education.
z
Beliefs.
z
Perceived objectives and motivation.
z
Media reporting and analysis.
z
Personal experience.
UNIFIED ACTION
1-48. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). It
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Chapter 1
involves the application of all instruments of national power, including actions of other government
agencies and multinational military and nonmilitary organizations. Combatant commanders play a pivotal
role in unified actions; however, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations
directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in their
area of operations. Department of Defense and other government agencies may refer to unified action as
being joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, or a combination of these parts.
1-49. Unified action includes joint integration. Joint integration extends the principle of combined arms to
operations conducted by two or more Service components. The combination of diverse joint force
capabilities generates combat power more potent than the sum of its parts. Joint integration does not require
joint command at all echelons. It does, however, require joint interoperability at all levels. Army mission
accomplishment links to the national strategic end state through campaigns and major operations.
CAMPAIGNS AND JOINT OPERATIONS
1-50. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve the
desired military end state. (The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the
commander’s objectives [JP 3-0].) This planning connects the strategic end state to campaign design and
ultimately to tactical missions. Joint force commanders use campaigns and joint operations to translate their
operational-level actions into strategic results. Campaigns are always joint operations. (See paragraph 7-12
for more on campaign.)
1-51. Campaigns exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action. U.S.
forces need coordinated, synchronized, and integrated action to reestablish civil authority after joint
operations end, even when combat is not required. Effective joint and Army operations require all echelons
to perform extensive collaborative planning and understand joint interdependence.
JOINT INTERDEPENDENCE
1-52. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service’s forces on another Service’s
capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. Army forces operate as part of
an interdependent joint force. Joint capabilities make Army forces more effective than if they operated
alone. Combinations of joint capabilities defeat enemy forces by shattering their ability to operate as a
coherent, effective whole. Acting with other instruments of national power, joint forces also work to reduce
the level of violence and establish security. (Table 1-1 lists areas of joint interdependence that directly
enhance Army operations.)
Table 1-1. Areas of joint interdependence
Area
Characteristic
Joint command and
Integrated capabilities that—
control
• Gain information superiority through improved, fully synchronized,
integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; knowledge
management; and information management.
• Share a common operational picture.
• Improve the ability of joint force and Service component commanders
to conduct operations.
Joint intelligence
Integrated processes that—
• Reduce unnecessary redundancies in collection asset tasking
through integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
• Increase processing and analytic capability.
• Facilitate collaborative analysis.
• Provide global intelligence production and dissemination.
• Provide intelligence products that enhance situational understanding
by describing and assessing the operational environment.
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The Operational Environment
Area
Characteristic
Joint information
Integrated capabilities, including—
operations capabilities
• Special technical operations.
• Electronic warfare platforms and personnel.
• Reachback to strategic assets.
Joint fires
Integrated fire control networks that allow joint forces to deliver coordinated
fires from two or more Service components.
Joint air operations
Air and Naval forces able to—
• Maneuver aircraft to positions of advantage over the enemy beyond
the reach of land forces.
• Gain and maintain air superiority that extends the joint force’s area of
influence by providing freedom from attack as well as freedom to
attack.
• Support operational and tactical maneuver with lethal and nonlethal
fires.
Joint air and missile
A comprehensive joint protection umbrella that—
defense
• Begins with security of ports of debarkation.
• Enables uninterrupted force flow against diverse antiaccess threats.
• Extends air and missile defense to multinational partners.
Joint force projection
Strategic and operational lift capabilities and automated planning
processes that facilitate strategic responsiveness and operational agility.
Joint sustainment
Deliberate, mutual reliance by each Service component on the
sustainment capabilities of two or more Service components. It can reduce
redundancies or increase the robustness of operations without sacrificing
effectiveness.
Joint space operations
Access to national imagery, communications, satellite, and navigation
capabilities that enhance situational awareness and support understanding
of the operational environment.
1-53. The other Services rely on Army forces to complement their capabilities. (Table 1-2 lists Army
capabilities that enhance other Service component operations.)
Table 1-2. Army capabilities that complement other Services
Security and control of terrain, people, and resources, including—
• Governance over an area or region.
• Protection of key infrastructure and facilities from ground threats.
Land-based ballistic missile defense, including defense against cruise missiles and
counterrocket, counterartillery, and countermortar capabilities.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
Support to interagency reconstruction efforts, including provision of essential services to an
affected population.
Denial of sanctuary through ground maneuver, enabling attack from the air.
Discriminate force application within populated areas.
Inland sustainment of bases and of forces operating from those bases.
Land operations against enemy air and sea bases.
Detainee and enemy prisoner of war operations.
Intelligence support.
1-54. Joint forces also rely on Army forces for support and services as designated in—
z
Title 10, United States Code.
z
Other applicable U.S. laws.
z
Department of Defense directives and instructions.
z
Inter-Service agreements.
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Chapter 1
z
Multinational agreements.
z
Other applicable authorities and Federal regulations.
This support and other support directed by combatant commanders are broadly defined as “Army support to
other Services.”
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
1-55. Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of Department of Defense
involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of
Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). In
addition, unified action involves synchronizing joint or multinational military operations with activities of
other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
contractors. During civil support operations, unified action includes state and local government agencies. It
occurs at every level—tactical, operational, and strategic.
Civilian Organizations
1-56. Commanders must understand the respective roles and capabilities of civilian organizations in
unified action. Other agencies of the Federal government work with the military and are part of a national
chain of command under the President of the United States. While this does not guarantee seamless
integration, it does provide a legal basis for cooperation. Although experience and professional cultures
differ widely, organizations need to recognize and capitalize on the inherent professionalism of each other
to develop the teamwork necessary for the campaign.
1-57. Most civilian organizations are not under military control. Nor does the U.S. ambassador or a United
Nations commissioner control them. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and
norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Thus, personal contact and trust
building are essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective
cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as
much as possible with joint and Army operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison.
1-58. Civilian organizations bring resources and capabilities that can help establish host-nation civil
authority and capabilities. However, civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have
begun. Therefore, joint and Army forces prepare to establish and maintain order if host-nation authorities
cannot do so. Successfully performing these tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely
withdrawal of U.S. military forces.
1-59. Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations when directed, since many
of these organizations lack these capabilities. Army forces often provide this support to state and local
agencies during civil support operations. (Table 1-3 lists examples of civilian organizations.)
Contractors
1-60. A contractor is a person or business that provides products or services for monetary compensation. A
contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on the terms of a
contract (FM 3-100.21). Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but may also
include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. In military operations,
contractors often provide—
z
Life support.
z
Construction and engineering support.
z
Weapons systems support.
z
Security.
z
Other technical services.
(FM 3-100.21 contains doctrine for contractors accompanying deployed forces.)
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Table 1-3. Definitions and examples of civilian organizations
Category
Definition
Examples
Other government
Within the context of interagency coordi-
• Department of State
agency
nation, a non Department of Defense
• Central Intelligence Agency
agency of the United States Government
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
(JP 1).
• National Security Agency
• U.S. Agency for International
Development
Intergovernmental
An organization created by a formal
• United Nations
organization
agreement (for example, a treaty) between
• European Union
two or more governments. It may be
• North Atlantic Treaty
established on a global, regional, or
Organization
functional basis for wide-ranging or
• Organization for Security and
narrowly defined purposes. Formed to
Cooperation in Europe
protect and promote national interests
shared by member states (JP 3-08).
• African Union
Nongovernmental
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit
See the United Nations Web site
organization
organization dedicated to alleviating human
suffering; and/or promoting education,
accredited nongovernmental
health care, economic development,
organizations.
environmental protection, human rights, and
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the
establishment of democratic institutions and
civil society (JP 3-08).
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
1-61. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two
or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance
(JP
3-16). In
multinational operations, all parties agree to the commitment of forces, even if the resources each invests
differ. While each nation has its own interests, all nations bring value to the operation. Each national force
has distinct capabilities, and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international
or local acceptability.
1-62. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement (for example, treaty) between
two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members
(JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allow partners to
establish formal, standard agreements. For example, U.S. forces operate within a highly developed
multinational command structure to maintain the armistice on the Korean peninsula. Alliance members
strive for interoperability. They field compatible military systems, establish common procedures, and
develop contingency plans to meet potential threats.
1-63. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 5-0).
Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. A coalition action is a multinational
action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a
narrow sector of common interest (JP 5-0). Coalition actions may be conducted under the authority of a
United Nations resolution. Since coalition actions are not structured around formal treaties, a preliminary
understanding of the requirements for operating with a specific foreign military may occur through
peacetime military engagement. (Paragraph 2-16 defines peacetime military engagement.)
1-64. Agreement among the multinational partners establishes the level of command authority vested in a
multinational force commander. The President retains command authority over U.S. forces. Most nations
have similar restrictions. However, in certain circumstances, it may be prudent or advantageous to place
Army forces under the operational control of a multinational commander. Often, multinational forces have
complex lines of command. To compensate for limited unity of command, multinational partners
concentrate on achieving unity of effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often
the key element of successful multinational operations.
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1-65. An Army officer assigned to command a multinational force faces many complex demands. These
include dealing with cultural issues, different languages, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the
use of respective forces, and sometimes underdeveloped command and control. Multinational force
commanders must address different national procedures, restrictions, intelligence sharing, and theater
sustainment functions. Another command challenge is the multinational commander’s limited ability to
choose or replace subordinates. Nations assign their contingent leaders. They answer to their national
chains of command as well as to the multinational force commander. Every multinational operation differs.
Commanders analyze the mission’s peculiar requirements to exploit the multinational force’s advantages
and compensate for its limitations.
(FM 6-22 discusses leadership considerations for multinational
operations.)
1-66. Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Each nation normally
provides a national support element to sustain its deployed forces. However, integrated multinational
sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When directed, an Army theater sustainment
command can provide logistic and other support to a multinational force. Integrating the support
requirements of several national forces, often spread over considerable distances and across international
boundaries, is challenging. Nonetheless, multinational partners can provide additional resources to address
the sustainment challenges. For example, a multinational partner may provide a secure intermediate staging
base near the operational area. Commanders prefer deploying and employing forces from an intermediate
staging base over making a forcible entry from a distant base. This is especially true when the staging base
offers a mature infrastructure.
1-67. During multinational operations, U.S. forces establish liaison with assigned multinational forces as
soon as possible. Army forces exchange specialized liaison personnel based on mission requirements.
Fields requiring specialized liaison may include aviation, fire support, engineer, intelligence, and civil
affairs. Exchanging liaison fosters a common understanding of missions and tactics, facilitates a transfer of
information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence.
1-68. Missions assigned to multinational units should reflect the capabilities and limitations of each
national contingent. Some significant factors include—
z
Relative size and mobility.
z
Intelligence collection assets.
z
Long-range fires capabilities.
z
Special operations forces capabilities.
z
Organic sustainment capabilities.
z
Ability to contribute to theater air and missile defense.
z
Training for operations in special environments.
z
Willingness and ability to cooperate directly with troops of other nationalities.
z
Preparation for defensive operations involving weapons of mass destruction.
1-69. When assigning missions, commanders consider the special skills, language, and rapport forces have
with the local population as well as multinational partners’ national sensitivities. Multinational
commanders may assign host-nation forces home defense or police missions, such as sustainment area and
base security. They may entrust air defense, coastal defense, or a special operation to a single member of
the multinational force based on that force’s capabilities. Commanders consider multinational force
capabilities, such as mine clearance, that may exceed U.S. capabilities. (JP 3-16 and FM 3-16 contain
doctrine for multinational operations.)
1-70. Since persistent conflict affects a diverse range of international interests, it requires coalitions of
nations joined in common cause to defeat a universal foe. All leaders use their patience, understanding, and
a willingness to subordinate self to the common good when working within a coalition. Each nation will
bring distinct capabilities, strengths, and limitations to future coalitions, and Army forces must be able to
operate within them. These coalitions will not always have the same partners, and even when they do, the
relative commitments of the partners will vary—sometimes even over time within the same conflict.
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The Operational Environment
THE NATURE OF LAND OPERATIONS
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War1
1-71. Modern conflict occurs in many domains; however, landpower normally solidifies the outcome, even
when it is not the decisive instrument. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to
gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. Landpower includes the ability to—
z
Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
z
Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic
development.
z
Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and manmade—to restore
infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.
z
Support and provide a base from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air and
maritime domains of an operational environment.
1-72. Several attributes of the land environment affect the application of landpower. These include—
z
The requirement to deploy and employ Army forces rapidly.
z
The requirement for Army forces to operate for protracted periods.
z
The nature of close combat.
z
Uncertainty, chance, friction, and complexity.
ARMY FORCES—EXPEDITIONARY AND CAMPAIGN CAPABILITIES
1-73. The initial operations in Afghanistan and Iraq modeled rapid, effective combat operations. U.S.
forces rapidly destroyed or dispersed large enemy forces with little friendly loss. However, these operations
also demonstrated that the duration and character of military campaigns is unpredictable. Future conflicts
will include incomplete planning information, rapid deployments with little or no notice, and sustained
operations in austere theaters. Joint, expeditionary warfare focuses on achieving decisive effects. It places a
premium on promptly deploying landpower and constantly adapting to each campaign’s distinct
circumstances as it changes. But swift campaigns, however desirable, are the exception. Whenever
objectives involve controlling populations or dominating terrain, campaign success usually requires
employing landpower for protracted periods. Therefore, the Army combines expeditionary and campaign
qualities to contribute decisive, sustained landpower to unified actions.
1-74. Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces worldwide into any
operational environment and operate effectively upon arrival. Expeditionary operations require the ability
to deploy quickly with little notice, shape conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on
arrival. Uncertainty as to the operational area, the possibility of an austere environment, and the need to
match forces to available lift drive expeditionary capabilities.
1-75. Expeditionary capabilities assure friends, allies, and foes that the Nation can and will deploy
necessary Army forces to the right place at the right time. Forward deployed units, forward positioned
capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection—from anywhere in the world—all
contribute to expeditionary capabilities. Expeditionary capabilities enable the Army to respond rapidly
under unknown conditions to areas with complex and austere operational environments prepared to fight
not only on arrival but also through successive operations. Fast deploying and expandable Army forces
introduce operationally significant land forces into a crisis on short notice, providing preemptive options to
deter, shape, fight, and win if deterrence fails, and to sustain these options for the duration necessary to
achieve success. Forces with expeditionary capability are organized and equipped to be modular, versatile,
and rapidly deployable with agile institutions capable of supporting them. Rapidly deployed expeditionary
force packages provide immediate options for seizing or retaining the operational initiative. With their
1 © 1984. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press.
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modular capabilities, these forces can be swiftly deployed, employed, and sustained for extended
operations without an unwieldy footprint. These forces are tailored for the initial phase of operations, easily
task-organized, and highly self-sufficient. Army installations worldwide serve as support platforms for
force projection, providing capabilities and information on demand.
1-76. Expeditionary capabilities are more than physical attributes; they begin with a mindset that pervades
the force. Soldiers with an expeditionary mindset stand ready to deploy on short notice. They have
confidence that they can accomplish any mission. They are mentally and physically prepared to deploy
anywhere in the world at any time in any environment against any adversary. Leaders with an
expeditionary mindset adapt. They possess the individual initiative needed to accomplish missions through
improvisation and collaboration. They prepare mentally to operate within different cultures in any
environment. An expeditionary mindset requires developing and empowering adaptive thinkers at all
levels, from tactical to strategic.
1-77. Campaign capability is the ability to sustain operations as long as necessary to conclude operations
successfully. Forces resolve many conflicts only by altering the conditions that prompted the conflict. This
requires combat power and time. The Army’s campaign capability extends its expeditionary capability well
beyond deploying combined arms forces that are effective upon arrival. This capability enables forces to
conduct sustained operations for as long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often profound
changes in the operational environment as the campaign unfolds. Army forces are organized, trained, and
equipped for endurance. Their endurance stems from the ability to create, protect, and sustain landpower—
regardless of how far away they deploy, how austere the environment, or how long the combatant
commander requires it. It includes taking care not only of Soldiers but also of their families throughout the
complete cycle of deployment, employment, and redeployment. Campaign capability involves anticipating
requirements across the entire Army and effectively using all available resources—deployed or not. Finally,
campaign capability draws on iterative and continuous learning based on operational experience. This
requirement extends to training at all echelons, from individual Soldier skills to operational-level collective
tasks.
1-78. Campaigning requires a mindset and vision that complements expeditionary requirements. Soldiers
understand that no matter how long they are deployed, the Army will take care of them and their families.
They are confident that the loyalty they pledge to their units will be returned to them, no matter what
happens on the battlefield or in what condition they return home. Tactical leaders understand the effects of
protracted land operations on Soldiers and adjust the tempo of operations whenever circumstances allow.
Senior commanders plan effective campaigns and major operations. They provide the resources needed to
sustain operations, often through the imaginative use of joint capabilities.
1-79. The Army’s preeminent challenge is to balance expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the
endurance and operational adaptability needed to complete a campaign successfully, no matter what form it
eventually takes. Landpower is a powerful complement to the global reach of American airpower and sea
power. Prompt deployment of landpower gives joint force commanders options—for either deterrence or
decisive action. Once deployed, landpower may be required for months or years. The initially deployed
Army force will evolve constantly as the operational environment changes. Operational success depends on
flexible employment of Army capabilities together with varying combinations of joint and interagency
capabilities.
CLOSE COMBAT
1-80. Only on land do combatants come face-to-face with one another. Thus, the capability to prevail in
close combat is indispensable and unique to land operations. It underlies most Army efforts in peace and
war. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct, indirect,
and air-delivered fires. Distances between combatants may vary from several thousand meters to
hand-to-hand fighting. Close combat is required when other means fail to drive enemy forces from their
positions. In that case, Army forces close with them and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles
and engagements depends on Army forces’ ability to prevail in close combat. No other form of combat
requires as much of Soldiers as it does.
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1-81. In urban operations, close combat is frequent. An urban operation is a military operation
conducted where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features. The
complexity of urban terrain and density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and
long-range and air-delivered weapons. Thus, a weaker enemy often attempts to negate Army advantages by
engaging Army forces in urban environments. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special
considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and
dynamic entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure. (JP 3-06 and FM 3-06
address these and other aspects of urban operations.)
UNCERTAINTY, CHANCE, AND FRICTION
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has
experienced war…. This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced
to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that
cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance.
Carl von Clausewitz
On War2
1-82. Uncertainty, chance, and friction have always characterized warfare. On land, they are commonplace.
Many factors inherent in land combat combine to complicate the situation. These include—
z
Adverse weather.
z
Chaos and confusion of battle.
z
Complexity.
z
Lack of accurate intelligence.
z
Errors in understanding or planning.
z
Fatigue.
z
Misunderstanding among multinational partners.
z
An adaptive and lethal enemy.
z
Difficult terrain.
z
Personality clashes.
z
Civilian population.
1-83. Chance further complicates land operations. Things such as weather and other unforeseen events are
beyond the control of a commander. For example, in December 1989, an ice storm at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, delayed deployment of some elements of the force invading Panama in Operation Just Cause. In
addition to chance occurrences, enemy commanders have their own objectives and time schedules. These
often lead to unforeseen encounters. Both enemy and friendly actions often produce unintended
consequences. Resulting consequences can further complicate a situation or lead to opportunities.
1-84. Several factors can reduce the effects of uncertainty, chance, and friction. Good leadership, flexible
organizations, and dependable technology can lessen uncertainty. Timely, accurate intelligence may reduce
the factors affected by chance. And a simple plan combined with continuous coordination might moderate
the effects of friction. However, even when operations are going well, commanders make decisions based
on incomplete, inaccurate, and contradictory information under adverse conditions. Determination is one
means of overcoming friction; experience is another. High morale, sound organization, effective mission
command networks and systems, and well-practiced drills all help forces overcome adversity. Uncertainty,
chance, and friction also affect the enemy, so commanders should look forward and exploit all
opportunities. To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders understand the
operational environment, effective decisions, and flexibility in spite of adversity.
2 © 1984. Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press.
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COMPLEXITY
1-85. Future operational environments will be complex. While this does not necessarily equal a more
dangerous environment, Soldiers can expect to encounter more complicated situations than ever before.
The nature of land operations has expanded from a nearly exclusive focus on lethal combat with other
armies to a complicated mixture of lethal and nonlethal actions directed at enemies, adversaries, and the
local population, itself often a complicated mix. The enemy often follows no rules, while Army forces
apply U.S. laws and international conventions to every conflict. The operational environment is saturated
with information, with almost universal access to telecommunications and the Internet. The media will be
ubiquitous. Action and message can no longer remain separate parts of operations because perception is so
important to success. False reports, propaganda, rumors, lies, and inaccuracies spread globally faster than
military authorities can correct or counter them, forcing Soldiers to cope with the consequences. Senior
commanders and political leaders share tactical information in real time. Army forces work with and
around various agencies and organizations—governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and
commercial—and usually within a multinational military framework. U.S. forces are the most advanced in
the world. They have access to joint capabilities from the lowest echelons equaling unmatched combat
power but at a cost in simplicity. Army forces will fight and operate in complex terrain and in cyberspace.
These and many other factors increase the complexity of operations and stress every dimension of the
Army’s capabilities, especially the strength and depth of Army leaders.
SOLDIERS
1-86. Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, it really comes down to Soldiers who
accomplish the mission. Today’s dangerous and complex security environment requires Soldiers—men and
women of character. Their character and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained,
and ready Army. Soldiers train to perform tasks while operating alone or in groups. Soldiers and leaders
develop the ability to exercise mature judgment and initiative under stress. The Army requires agile and
adaptive leaders able to handle the challenges of full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict.
Army leaders must remain—
z
Competent in their core proficiencies.
z
Broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict.
z
Able to operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments and use
other capabilities in accomplishing their objectives.
z
Culturally astute and able to use this awareness and understanding to conduct operations
innovatively.
z
Courageous enough to see and exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of the
operational environment.
z
Grounded in Army Values and the Warrior Ethos.
THE LAW OF WAR AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1-87. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war. The law of
war—also called the law of armed conflict—is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of
armed hostilities (JP 1-02). It is the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land
and to relationships between belligerents and neutral states. The law of war includes treaties and
international agreements to which the United States is a party, as well as applicable customary international
law. The purposes of the law of war are to—
z
Protect both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.
z
Safeguard certain fundamental human rights of persons who become prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, and civilians.
z
Make the transition to peace easier.
(FM 27-10 contains doctrine on the law of war.)
1-88. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
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The Operational Environment
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Rules of engagement always recognize a Soldier’s
inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed rules of engagement fit the situation and are clear,
reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. The joint staff and combatant commanders develop
rules of engagement. The President and Secretary of Defense review and approve them. Rules of
engagement vary between operations and may change during an operation. Adherence to them ensures
Soldiers act consistently with international law, national policy, and military regulations.
1-89. The disciplined and informed application of lethal and nonlethal action is a critical contributor to
successful Army operations and strategic success. All warfare, but especially irregular warfare, challenges
the morals and ethics of Soldiers. An enemy may feel no compulsion to respect international conventions
and indeed may commit atrocities with the aim of provoking retaliation in kind. Their propaganda will
distort then exploit any loss of discipline on the part of Soldiers and their media will then magnify it. The
ethical challenge rests heavily on small-unit leaders who maintain discipline and ensure that the conduct of
Soldiers remains within ethical and moral boundaries. There are compelling reasons for this. First, humane
treatment of detainees encourages enemy surrender and thereby reduces friendly losses. Conversely,
nothing emboldens enemy resistance like the belief that U.S. forces will kill or torture prisoners. Second,
humane treatment of noncombatants reduces their antagonism toward U.S. forces and may lead to valuable
intelligence. Third, leaders make decisions in action fraught with consequences. If they lack an ethical
foundation, those decisions become much, much harder. Finally, Soldiers must live with the consequences
of their conduct. Every leader shoulders the responsibility that their subordinates return from a campaign
not only as good Soldiers, but also as good citizens with pride in their service to the Nation.
1-90. The Soldier’s Rules in AR 350-1 distill the essence of the law of war. They outline the ethical and
lawful conduct required of Soldiers in operations. (Table 1-4 lists the Soldier’s Rules.)
Table 1-4. The Soldier’s Rules
• Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
• Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn
them over to their superior.
• Soldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.
• Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
• Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
• Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
• Soldiers treat civilians humanely.
• Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
• Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
• Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1-91. Contemporary operations challenge the Army in many ways. The U.S. Army has always depended
upon its ability to learn and adapt. Today’s complex environment requires organizations and Soldiers that
can adapt equally quickly and well. To adapt, organizations constantly learn from experience (their own
and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexibility and innovation are at a premium,
as are creative and adaptive leaders. As knowledge increases, the Army will continuously adapt its
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.
1-92. The Army must be effective across the entire spectrum of conflict, from stable peace, through
insurgency, to general war. Units need to adapt quickly and to shift with little effort from a focus on one
portion of the spectrum of conflict to focus on another. The Service must recognize and implement changes
that once required years within unit deployment cycles. Technology, having vastly increased the lethality of
the industrial age battlefield, assumes even more importance and requires greater and more rapid
innovation in tomorrow’s conflicts. Response to enemy developments cannot consume months and
Soldiers’ lives. Leaders now field solutions across the force in weeks. They carefully analyze the enemy’s
counteraction in order to negate it and retain the initiative.
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Chapter 1
1-93. Army forces prepare by learning about the country in which they plan to operate. Forces must
understand the culture, security forces, government, and, as necessary, tribal leaders of that country. This
includes understanding the order of the relevant hierarchies and structures of the local society. Such
understanding can assist forces in addressing factors that may lead to instability. Army forces can then
establish conditions to empower those members of society who have been marginalized and marginalize
those members of society who have been wrongly empowered.
1-94. Leaders prepare by maintaining proficiency in their core competencies, staying broad-minded
enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict, and adapting whenever necessary. Such leaders operate
in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments leveraging political, economic,
and informational efforts to accomplish military objectives. And most importantly, leaders require an
offensive mindset that focuses on the enemy and is opportunistic; they can see opportunities in challenges
and act on them.
1-95. Effective training builds the cornerstone of operational success. Through training, Soldiers, leaders,
and units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct
successful operations across the spectrum of conflict. The Army trains its forces using training doctrine that
sustains its expeditionary and campaign excellence. Focused training prepares Soldiers, leaders, and units
to deploy, fight, and win. This same training prepares Soldiers to create stable environments. Achieving
this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support
tasks. The Army trains Soldiers and units daily in individual and collective tasks under challenging,
realistic conditions. Training continues in deployed units to sustain skills and to adapt to changes in the
operational environment.
1-96. The United States’ responsibilities envelop the globe; therefore, Army forces train to operate in any
environment. Army training develops confident, competent, and agile leaders and units. Training
management, including mission-essential task list development, links training with missions. Commanders
focus their training time and other resources on tasks linked to their mission. Because Army forces face
diverse threats and mission requirements, senior commanders adjust their training priorities based on the
likely operational environment. As units prepare for deployment, commanders adapt training priorities to
address tasks required by actual or anticipated operations. (FM 7-0 describes training management.)
1-97. Army training includes a system of techniques and standards that allow Soldiers and units to
determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. Candid assessments, after action reviews, and applying
lessons learned and best practices produce quality Soldiers and versatile units ready for all aspects of the
situation. The Army’s training system prepares Soldiers and leaders to employ Army capabilities
adaptively and effectively in today’s varied and challenging conditions.
1-98. Through training, the Army prepares Soldiers to win. Training builds teamwork and cohesion within
units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline.
It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of war and rules of engagement. Training prepares unit
leaders for the harsh reality of land combat. It emphasizes the fluid and disorderly conditions inherent in
land operations.
1-99. Within these training situations, commanders emphasize mission command. To employ mission
command successfully during operations, units must understand, foster, and frequently practice its
principles during training. (Chapter 5 discusses mission command.)
SUMMARY
1-100. Successful mission accomplishment requires understanding the operational environment, the role
of the Army in unified action, and how Soldiers, leaders, and units accomplish missions through full
spectrum operations. Army forces conduct prompt and sustained operations as part of a joint force to
conclude hostilities and establish conditions favorable to the host nation, the United States, and their
multinational partners. Today’s operational environments are complex and require continuous learning and
adaptation. Commanders use experience, applied judgment, and various analytic tools to gain the
situational understanding necessary to make timely decisions to maintain the initiative and achieve decisive
results. The more commanders understand their operational environment, the more effectively they can
employ forces.
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Chapter 2
The Continuum of Operations
The continuum of operations frames the application of landpower. It includes the
spectrum of conflict and operational themes. The spectrum of conflict is an ascending
scale of violence ranging from stable peace to general war. Operational themes give
commanders a way to characterize the dominant major operation underway in an area
of operations. The themes also provide overlapping categories for grouping types of
operations from the land force perspective. The continuum of operations thus links
the operational environment, discussed in chapter 1, with the Army’s operational
concept—full spectrum operations—discussed in chapter 3.
THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
2-1. The spectrum of conflict is the backdrop for Army operations. The spectrum of conflict uses violence
as a discriminator on an ascending scale that ranges from stable peace to general war. On the left hand of
the spectrum, stable peace represents an operational environment characterized by the absence of militarily
significant violence (see paragraph 2-3). On the right hand of the spectrum, general war describes an
environment dominated by interstate and intrastate violence (see paragraph 2-6).
2-2. Military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global,
regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic,
informational, and economic—to exert their full influence. For example, the Nation’s air, land, and sea
power deter threats posed by hostile powers by holding their homeland and vital interests at risk. This
creates avenues for diplomacy to resolve disputes. Multinational forces may separate warring factions to
stop a civil war that threatens regional peace. Their actions allow international aid organizations to reach
masses of refugees and an international commission to seek some sort of equitable settlement. On a local
level, an Army task force suppresses terrorism and lawlessness so other government agencies can work
freely with host-nation officials to restore self-sustaining governance. In each case, achieving stable peace
requires expertise and capabilities beyond those developed in the military force. Every use of military force
to restore stable peace requires the other three instruments of national power. Conversely, diplomatic,
informational, and economic efforts to restore a stable peace usually do not work unless backed by
effective military power—military power with global reach and endurance. In every campaign and major
operation, success (as characterized by a stable peace) depends on unified action involving concerted
efforts by multinational military and civilian partners.
STABLE PEACE
2-3. Stable peace is characterized by the absence of militarily significant violence. International actors
(such as states, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations) limit their activities to peaceful
interaction in politics, economics, and other areas of interest. Peaceful interaction may include intense
competition as well as cooperation and assistance. While tensions do exist, all recognize that they can best
achieve their interests by means other than violence.
UNSTABLE PEACE
2-4. When one or more parties threaten or use violence to accomplish their objectives, stable peace
degenerates into unstable peace. Unstable peace may also result when violence levels decrease after violent
conflict. In some cases, outside powers may apply force to limit conflict. Preventing a return to violent
conflict may require peace operations. (See paragraphs 2-33 through 2-43.) Sometimes stable peace is not
immediately achievable. At those times, the goal of conflict termination aims to establish conditions in
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Chapter 2
which peace operations can prevent conflict from recurring. Doing this allows the instruments of national
power to work toward stable peace.
INSURGENCY
2-5. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as the organized movement of subversion and violence by a
group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also
refer to the group itself (JP 3-24). This condition of politically motivated conflict involves significant
intrastate or interstate violence but usually stays short of large-scale operations by opposing conventional
forces. Insurgencies often include widespread use of irregular forces and terrorist tactics. An insurgency
may develop in the aftermath of general war or through degeneration of unstable peace. Insurgencies may
also emerge on their own from chronic social or economic conditions. In addition, some conflicts, such as
the Chinese Revolution, have escalated from protracted insurgencies into general wars. Intervention by a
foreign power in an insurgency may increase the threat to regional stability.
GENERAL WAR
2-6. General war is armed conflict between major powers in which the belligerents have used all their
resources, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. Diplomatic and economic
channels have broken down. Violence has reached a level that will only end by the exhaustion, defeat, or
destruction of the military capabilities of one or more antagonists. At its extreme, general war includes the
unlimited use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, possibly leading to the destruction of entire
societies. Any conflict may escalate or decline depending upon a host of factors. General war usually
involves nation-states and coalitions; however, civil wars may reach this level of violence. In general war,
large and heavily armed conventional forces fight for military supremacy by conducting major combat
operations. These operations aim to defeat the enemy’s armed forces and eliminate the enemy’s military
capability. Although dominated by large-scale conventional operations, these conflicts often include
guerrilla and unconventional warfare. To illustrate, Soviet partisans waged unconventional warfare against
German lines of communications during World War II. The Vietcong conducted guerrilla warfare
throughout the Vietnam War, even as the North Vietnamese Army fought conventional battles against U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces.
ARMY FORCES AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
2-7. Army forces operate anywhere on the spectrum of conflict. In each case, achieving the end state
requires reducing the violence level and establishing conditions that advance U.S. national strategic goals.
Commanders conduct a series of operations intended to establish conditions conducive to a stable peace.
Some situations require applying massive force in major combat operations to eliminate a threat; others
involve applying military power to reduce an insurgency to a size that host-nation forces can defeat.
Regardless, the goal aims to move conditions to a lower level of violence; however, avoiding intermediate
levels is desirable. When impossible, commanders seek to move the situation through them to stable peace
as quickly as time permits.
2-8. Today’s operational environment requires Army forces to continuously evaluate and adapt their
tactics to ensure that they have the desired results. Recent experience demonstrates the difficulty and cost
of fighting terrorists and insurgents while supporting reconstruction efforts. These experiences and a study
of other conflicts have revealed insights guiding the Army’s effort to prepare for future operations:
z
All major operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability elements executed
simultaneously at multiple echelons.
z
The operational environment evolves over time and changes due to military operations.
z
Operations conducted during one phase of a campaign or major operation directly affect
subsequent phases. Commanders should conduct current operations in a manner that establishes
the conditions necessary for future operations—and ultimately allows the other instruments of
national power to secure a stable peace.
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The Continuum of Operations
z
Major operations are conducted not only to defeat the enemy but also to restore a stable peace.
The military plays a large role in this effort, even after major combat operations have ended.
Restoring a stable peace after a violent conflict may take longer and be more difficult than
defeating enemy forces.
z
In any campaign or major operation, changing conditions require Army forces to adapt their
tactics, techniques, and procedures to the operational environment. To be successful, leaders
must develop learning organizations that collect and share best practices and lessons learned.
OPERATIONAL THEMES
2-9. Army forces conduct major operations to defeat an enemy and to establish conditions necessary to
achieve the national strategic end state. (Paragraph 7-12 defines major operations.) Examples of major
operations include Operation Cobra (the breakout from the Normandy beachhead during World War II) and
Operation Chromite (the amphibious landing at Inchon during the Korean War).
2-10. Conflict intensity varies over time and among locations; therefore, it is difficult to precisely describe
a major operation’s character. In fact, the character of most major operations will likely evolve. All major
operations comprise many smaller operations conducted simultaneously. These also may vary with time.
Nevertheless, leaders can establish a theme for each major operation, one that distinguishes it from other
operations with different characteristics. Major combat operations, for instance, differ distinctly from
counterinsurgency operations; both differ from peace operations. Different themes usually demand
different approaches and force packages, although some activities apply to all.
2-11. An operational theme describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted
at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey
the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the
commander broadly intends to operate. Operational themes have implications for task-organization,
resource allocation, protection, and tactical task assignment. They establish a taxonomy for understanding
the joint and Army major operations and relationships among them.
2-12. Grouping military operations with common characteristics under operational themes allows Army
forces to develop doctrine for each theme rather than for a multitude of joint operations. (See table 2-1,
page 2-4.) However, this taxonomy does not limit when commanders may use a type of operation. Forces
routinely conduct some operations listed under one operational theme within major operations
characterized by another. For example, units can conduct noncombatant evacuation operations during
counterinsurgency, or a unit can support an insurgency during major combat operations. Such situations do
not change the broader character of the major operation. The operational themes emphasize the differences
among the various types of joint operations. These differences are usually greater for land forces (including
special operations forces) than for the other Services.
2-13. Each operational theme corresponds broadly to a range along the spectrum of conflict. Commanders
describe their desired end state as how they envision the conditions of the operational environment when
the operation ends. Often, this envisions either a condition of stable peace or at least a condition in which
civilian organizations can build toward a stable peace with a sustainable military commitment. A stable
peace may include any or all of the following: a safe and secure populace, a legitimate central government,
a viable market economy, and an effective rule of law. Lacking involvement by civilian organizations, none
of these goals is sustainable. To ensure progress toward the end state, higher level commanders
continuously assess the overall campaign and their subordinates’ operations. They adjust the type of
operation as each campaign phase unfolds. This adjustment affects their focus, resource allocation, and
directed tasks. Commanders visualize how they prepare to transition between operational themes as the
operation progresses. They pursue avenues for increased cooperation with civilian agencies, handing over
activities to civilian direction as soon as conditions permit.
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Chapter 2
Table 2-1. Examples of joint military operations conducted within operational themes
Peacetime military
Limited intervention
Peace operations
Irregular warfare
engagement
• Multinational training
• Noncombatant
• Peacekeeping
• Foreign internal
events and exercises
evacuation operations
• Peace enforcement
defense
• Security assistance
• Strike
• Peacemaking
• Support to insurgency
• Joint combined
• Raid
• Peace building
• Counterinsurgency
exchange training
• Show of force
• Conflict prevention
• Combating terrorism
• Recovery operations
• Foreign humanitarian
• Unconventional
• Arms control
assistance
warfare
• Counterdrug activities
• Consequence
management
• Sanction enforcement
• Elimination of
weapons of mass
destruction
Note: Major combat operations usually involve a series of named major operations, such as Operation Desert
Storm, each involving significant offensive and defensive operations and supporting air, land, sea, and special
operations.
2-14. The transition between operational themes requires careful planning and continuous assessment. For
example, at the conclusion of major combat operations, the campaign may evolve to irregular warfare or
peace operations. While the scope of their defeat may induce an enemy to accept occupation and peace
enforcement without a period of irregular warfare, commanders plan for a potential insurgency and prepare
accordingly. Shifting from one operational theme to another often requires adjustments to the composition
of the force. These adjustments apply not only to task-organizing the force but also to deploying and
redeploying units, establishing new bases, and dismantling bases no longer needed. In particular, a change
in operational theme may require modification to the mission-essential task lists and additional training for
both deploying units and units in theater. Responsibilities between military commanders and other
government officials may also change. For example, the ambassador may become the senior U.S.
Government official as opposed to the joint force commander.
2-15. Soldiers should not confuse operational themes with tactical tasks or activities. Operational themes
are too general to be assigned as missions. Rather, they describe the major operation’s general
characteristics, not the details of its execution. The theme of a major operation may change for various
reasons such as—
z
Planned phases.
z
Changes caused by friendly, enemy, or neutral activity.
z
Revised political guidance.
z
Unexpected opportunities.
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
2-16. Peacetime military engagement comprises all military activities that involve other nations and
are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that
the United States military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment,
improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential
coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant
commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. Peacetime military engagement
encourages regional stability. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors
assisting land forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. Combat is not envisioned, although
terrorist attacks against deployed forces are always possible. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation
plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern peacetime military engagement activities. Units usually
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The Continuum of Operations
conduct bilaterally but can involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall
under peacetime military engagement include the following:
z
Multinational training events and exercises.
z
Security assistance.
z
Joint combined exchange training.
z
Recovery operations.
z
Arms control.
z
Counterdrug activities.
Multinational Training Events and Exercises
2-17. Combatant commanders support many multinational training events and exercises. These exercises
have many purposes, including—
z
Demonstrating military capabilities to potential aggressors.
z
Improving interoperability.
z
Establishing or improving military-to-military ties with another nation.
Security Assistance
2-18. The security assistance program is an important instrument of U.S. foreign and national security
policy. It contributes to—
z
Deterrence.
z
Promoting regional stability.
z
Guaranteeing the United States access to vital overseas military facilities.
z
Increasing host-nation military capabilities, thus reducing unilateral U.S. military requirements.
z
Enhancing weapons standardization and interoperability to support multinational force
compatibility. (AR 34-1 governs multinational force compatibility.)
z
Supporting the U.S. defense industrial base.
2-19. Security assistance includes various supporting programs for foreign military logistic, financial, and
military education assistance. For example, the international military education and training program is part
of security assistance. It also includes U.S. military teams sent to multinational partners to assist in training.
(AR 12-1 governs security assistance. Also, see FM 3-07.1 for a discussion on security force assistance.)
Joint Combined Exchange Training
2-20. Joint combined exchange training is a program conducted overseas to fulfill US forces training
requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between US forces and host nation
counterparts. Training activities are designed to improve US and host nation capabilities (JP 3-05). Army
forces routinely participate in exchange programs, often at the small-unit level. Special operations forces
use this program to improve their regional expertise while contributing to a combatant commander’s theater
security cooperation plan. (JP 3-05 addresses joint combined exchange training.)
Recovery Operations
2-21. Recovery operations are operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return
isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security (JP 3-50).
(JP 3-50 and FM 3-50.1 contain doctrine on personnel recovery.)
Arms Control
2-22. Combatant commanders support multinational arms control agreements concerning prohibited
weapons and illegal arms trafficking. They also provide forces and control means to block the sale or
transfer of arms to terrorists or other criminals as the Secretary of Defense directs. Such actions may be
unilateral or multinational.
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Chapter 2
Counterdrug Activities
2-23. Counterdrug activities are those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity
that is reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to
detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, materiel, weapons, or resources used to
finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs
(JP 3-07.4). (See JP 3-07.4 for
doctrine on counterdrug activities.)
LIMITED INTERVENTION
2-24. Units execute a limited intervention to achieve an end state that is clearly defined and limited in
scope. Units impose corresponding limitations on the supporting operations and size of the forces involved.
These operations may be phased but are not intended to become campaigns. Although limited interventions
are confined in terms of end state and forces, their execution may be lengthy. Joint task forces usually
conduct limited interventions. The most common types of limited interventions include—
z
Noncombatant evacuation operations.
z
Strikes.
z
Raids.
z
Shows of force.
z
Foreign humanitarian assistance.
z
Consequence management.
z
Sanction enforcement.
z
Elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
2-25. Noncombatant evacuation operations are operations directed by the Department of State or other
appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are
evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to
safe havens or to the United States (JP 3-0). (JP 3-68 contains doctrine for noncombatant evacuation
operations.)
Strike
2-26. A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). While units conduct
strikes as part of tactical operations, in limited interventions, a joint force (apart from a campaign or major
operation) conducts them. An example of a strike conducted as a limited intervention is Operation El
Dorado Canyon, executed in 1986. It consisted of a series of air strikes on targets inside Libya.
Raid
2-27. A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an
adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal
upon completion of the assigned mission (JP 3-0). Units routinely conduct raids as part of tactical
operations but sometimes as separate joint operations. The latter is characterized as a limited intervention.
(FM 3-90 contains doctrine on tactical-level raids.)
Show of Force
2-28. A show of force is an operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility
of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be
detrimental to US interests or national objectives (JP 3-0). Deployed forces back up U.S. promises and
commitments and increase its regional influence. Although military in nature, show of force operations
often serve both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments to
respect U.S. interests.
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The Continuum of Operations
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
2-29. Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of Department of Defense activities, normally in support
of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the
United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or
privation (JP 3-29). This list includes hostile activities waged against noncombatants. Activities such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes constitute examples of manmade suffering in which the
population need U.S. intervention. Non-Department of Defense agencies may refer to such intervention as
mass atrocity response operations. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in
scope and duration. It supplements or complements the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or
agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. The
multinational relief operation sent to Indonesia after the December 2004 tsunami illustrates a natural
disaster response. (JP 3-29 contains doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance.) The U.S. response to
Serbian actions against Kosovar Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999 illustrates a
manmade disaster response.
Consequence Management
2-30. Consequence management involves actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and
manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or
terrorist incidents (JP 3-28). (JP 3-41 contains doctrine on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosives consequence management.)
Sanction Enforcement
2-31. Sanction enforcement comprises operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement
of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area (JP 3-0). Depending on the
geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. The
enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq prohibited cargo originating from Iraq without an
authorization letter from the United Nations.
Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction
2-32. Operations to eliminate weapons of mass destruction systematically locate, characterize, secure,
disable, or destroy a state or nonstate actor’s weapons of mass destruction and related capabilities.
Elimination operations are one of eight joint mission areas—offensive operations, elimination operations,
interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, weapons of mass destruction consequence
management, security cooperation, and threat reduction. These areas make up the three pillars
(nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management) of combating weapons of mass
destruction. (JP 3-40 contains doctrine on combating weapons of mass destruction.)
PEACE OPERATIONS
2-33. Peace operations is a broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response
and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to
contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and
facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts
(JP
3-07.3). Army forces
conduct the following types of peace operations:
z
Peacekeeping.
z
Peace enforcement.
z
Peacemaking.
z
Peace building.
z
Conflict prevention.
2-34. Peace operations aim to keep violence from spreading, contain violence that has occurred, and reduce
tension among factions. Accomplishing these objectives creates an environment in which forces use other
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Chapter 2
instruments of national power to reduce the level of violence to stable peace. Peace operations are usually
interagency efforts. They require a balance of military and diplomatic resources. (JP 3-07.3 and FM 3-07
contain doctrine for peace operations.)
Peacekeeping
2-35. Peacekeeping consists of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a
dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such
agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement
(JP
3-07.3).
Peacekeeping operations follow a truce or cease fire. They seek to interpose a peaceful third party between
belligerents, allowing diplomacy an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Units only use force for
self-defense in a peacekeeping operation.
Peace Enforcement
2-36. Peace enforcement involves the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally
pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to
maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07.3). They may include the enforcement of sanctions and
restoration of order. These operations try not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force or threat of
force to establish a safe and secure environment so that peace building can succeed.
Peacemaking
2-37. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful
settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it (JP 3-07.3). The military does
not have the lead, but military leaders normally provide military expertise in negotiating the military
aspects of a peace agreement.
Peace Building
2-38. Peace building involves stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen
and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07.3).
Peace building provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation after a conflict thereby offering hope
to the host-nation populace. Stability operations promote reconciliation, strengthen and rebuild civil
infrastructures and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return
to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in peace building is political, not military.
Conflict Prevention
2-39. Conflict prevention consists of actions taken before a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence,
deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities begin. Conflict prevention often involves
diplomatic initiatives. It also includes efforts designed to reform a country’s security area of operations and
make it more accountable to civilian control. Conflict prevention may require deploying forces to contain a
dispute or prevent it from escalating into hostilities. (JP 3-07.3 contains doctrine on conflict prevention.)
Considerations for Peace Operations
2-40. In a war-torn nation or region, peace operations ease the transition to a stable peace by supporting
reconciliation and rebuilding. Units often conducted peace operations under international supervision. U.S.
forces may conduct peace operations under the sponsorship of the United Nations, another
intergovernmental organization, as part of a coalition, or unilaterally.
2-41. Units often conduct peace operations in complex, ambiguous, and uncertain environments. The
operational environment for a peace operation may include any or all of the following characteristics:
z
Hybrid threats.
z
Failing or failed states.
z
Absence of the rule of law.
z
Terrorism and terrorist organizations.
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The Continuum of Operations
z
Gross violations of human rights.
z
Collapse of civil infrastructure.
z
Presence of dislocated civilians.
2-42. Army forces in peace operations strive to create a safe and secure environment, primarily through
stability operations. Army forces use their offensive and defensive capabilities to deter external and internal
adversaries from overt actions against each other. Establishing security and control enables civilian
agencies to address the underlying causes of the conflict and create a self-sustaining peace. Army forces
provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary.
2-43. Peace operations require opposing parties to cooperate with the international community. In most
peace operations, this comes voluntarily. However, peace enforcement involves the threat or use of military
force to compel cooperation. Successful peace operations also require support from the local populace and
host-nation leaders. The likelihood of combat declines, and, when it occurs, it is usually at the small-unit
level. Units involved in peace operations prepare for sudden engagements, even while executing operations
to prevent them. Commanders emphasize the use of information activities, particularly information used to
inform and influence various opposing audiences in the area of operations. Peace operations require
perseverance to achieve the desired end state.
IRREGULAR WARFARE
2-44. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and
influence over a population. This broad form of conflict has insurgency, counterinsurgency, and
unconventional warfare as the principal activities. Irregular forces are normally active in these conflicts.
However, conventional forces may also be heavily involved, particularly in counterinsurgencies.
2-45. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare
among and within the people. Actors wage the conflict not for military supremacy but for political power.
Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. Effectively
applying military forces can establish the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert
their influence. Secondly, irregular warfare also differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the
indirect approach. (Chapter 6 discusses indirect approach.) Irregular warfare avoids a direct military
confrontation. Instead, it combines irregular forces and indirect, unconventional methods
(such as
terrorism) to subvert and exhaust the opponent. Often irregular warfare offers the only practical means for a
weaker opponent to engage a powerful military force. Irregular warfare seeks to defeat the opponent’s will
through steady attrition and constant low-level pressure. In some instances, it targets the population and
avoids conventional forces. This approach creates instability. It severely challenges civil authority to fulfill
its first responsibility—providing security.
2-46. Special operations forces conduct most irregular warfare operations. Sometimes conventional forces
support them; other times special operations forces operate alone. However, if special operations forces and
host-nation forces cannot defeat unconventional and irregular threats, conventional Army forces may
assume the lead role. The joint operations grouped under irregular warfare include the following:
z
Foreign internal defense.
z
Support to insurgency.
z
Counterinsurgency.
z
Combating terrorism.
z
Unconventional warfare.
Foreign Internal Defense
2-47. Foreign internal defense is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any
of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). The
categories of foreign internal defense operations are indirect support and direct support.
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Indirect Support
2-48. Indirect support emphasizes host-nation self-sufficiency. It builds strong national infrastructures
through economic and military capabilities. Examples include security assistance programs, multinational
exercises, and exchange programs. Indirect support reinforces host-nation legitimacy and primacy in
addressing internal problems by keeping U.S. military assistance inconspicuous.
Direct Support
2-49. Direct support uses U.S. forces to assist the host-nation population or military forces directly. Direct
support includes operational planning assistance, civil affairs activities, intelligence and communications
sharing, logistics, and training of local military forces. It may also involve limited combat operations,
usually in self-defense.
Considerations for Foreign Internal Defense
2-50. Foreign internal defense involves all instruments of national power. Primarily a series of programs, it
supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. Foreign internal defense
promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population’s needs while maintaining
security. Participating Army forces normally advise and assist host-nation forces while refraining from
combat operations.
2-51. Foreign internal defense is a significant mission for selected Army special operations forces.
However, it requires joint planning, preparation, and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all
Service and functional components. These missions are approved by the President, limited in scope and
duration, and accomplished to support legitimate host-nation forces.
2-52. Foreign internal defense operations often respond to growing insurgencies. Most of these activities
help a host nation prevent an active insurgency from developing further. If an insurgency already exists or
preventive measures fail, foreign internal defense focuses on using host-nation security forces and other
resources to eliminate, marginalize, or assimilate insurgent elements. The United States provides military
support to host-nation counterinsurgency efforts, recognizing that military power alone cannot achieve
lasting success. Host-nation and U.S. actions promote a secure environment with programs that eliminate
causes of insurgencies. Military support to a threatened government balances security with economic
development to enhance or reestablish stability. (JP 3-22 and FM 3-05.202 contain doctrine for foreign
internal defense.)
Support to Insurgency
2-53. Army forces may support insurgencies against regimes that threaten U.S. interests. Normally, Army
special operations forces provide the primary U.S. land forces. These forces’ training, organization, and
regional focus make them well suited for these operations. Conventional Army forces that support
insurgencies provide logistic and training support but normally do not conduct offensive or defensive
operations.
Counterinsurgency
2-54. Counterinsurgency consists of comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an
insurgency and to address any core grievances (JP 3-24). In counterinsurgency, host-nation forces and their
partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the
host-nation government’s legitimacy. Counterinsurgency is the dominant joint operation in Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom. (FM 3-24 discusses counterinsurgency.)
2-55. Insurgents try to persuade the populace to accept the insurgents’ goals or force political change.
When persuasion does not work, insurgents use other methods to achieve their goals. These may include
intimidation, sabotage and subversion, propaganda, terror, and military pressure. Sometimes insurgents
attempt to organize the populace into a mass movement. At a minimum, they aim to make effective
host-nation governance impossible. Some insurgencies are transnational. Other situations involve multiple
2-10
FM 3-0, C1
22 February 2011
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