FM 2-0 INTELLIGENCE (MAY 2004) - page 4

 

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FM 2-0 INTELLIGENCE (MAY 2004) - page 4

 

 

FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is
collected, processed, and reported.
8-20. SIGINT operational tasking is the authoritative operational direction of
and direct levying of SIGINT information needs by a military commander on
designated SIGINT resources. These requirements are directive, regardless of
other priorities, and are conditioned only by the capability of those resources
to produce such information. Operational tasking includes authority to deploy
all or part of the SIGINT resources for which SIGINT operational tasking
authority (SOTA) has been delegated.
8-21. SOTA is the military commander’s authority to operationally direct and
levy SIGINT requirements on designated SIGINT resources; it includes
authority to deploy and redeploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for
which SOTA has been delegated.
COLLECT
8-22. SIGINT performs two major collection activities: signals intercept and
direction finding (DF).
Signals Intercept
8-23. Signals intercept are those SIGINT actions used to search for,
intercept, and identify threat electromagnetic signals for the purpose of
immediate threat recognition. Signals intercept provides information
required to answer PIRs, and other intelligence requirements in support of
the ISR effort.
Direction Finding
8-24. Even when threat radio operators use COMSEC procedures, SIGINT
teams can often intercept and approximate the location of the threat’s
signals. Specifically, SIGINT teams can use DF to determine—
Movement of threat personnel or equipment.
Locations of emitters associated with weapon systems and units.
New emitter locations and confirm known emitter locations.
Possible friendly targets the enemy intends to attack (lethal and non-
lethal).
8-25. In addition to finding threat forces, DF operations can assist the (radio-
equipped) friendly force by
Locating and vectoring assets or units during limited visibility.
Locating downed aircraft and personnel radio beacons.
Conducting signal security assessments.
Locating sources of communication interference and jamming.
PROCESS
8-26. SIGINT processing involves converting intercepts of SIGINT into
written and verbal reports, automated message, graphic displays, recordings,
and other forms suitable for analysis and intelligence production. Since US
forces routinely conduct operations against adversaries who speak languages
other than English, SIGINT processing often also includes translation of
these intercepts.
8-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
8-27. Due to the complexity of many SIGINT systems, automated processing
may occur several times before SIGINT data or information receives any
human interaction.
PRODUCE
8-28. The SIGINT producer must ensure the SIGINT product satisfies the
associated intelligence requirements and that the product is in the required
format. The quality, fidelity, and timeliness of SIGINT products are highly
dependent upon the type of intercept, the collection system, the system’s
position in relation to the threat emitter, the weather (including space-based
weather), as well as the SIGINT operator’s ability to identify the appropriate
threat signal activity.
8-29. SIGINT production results in some of the reports and formats
mentioned in the process section above; however, the objective for SIGINT is
to be used in an all-source analytical approach.
ANALYZE
8-30. The intelligence staff analyzes intelligence and information about the
enemy’s communications capabilities to determine appropriate SIGINT
collection strategies. Conversely, a corresponding analysis of the friendly
forces’ SIGINT capabilities must be conducted to ensure the continued
effectiveness of, or to improve upon, SIGINT collection.
8-31. SIGINT analysts also sort through large amounts of SIGINT and
information and intelligence to identify and use only that which is pertinent
to the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs).
DISSEMINATE
8-32. SIGINT of critical importance to the force, including answers to the
CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs), is disseminated via the most expeditious means
possible. Due to the usually highly perishable nature of SIGINT, the most
expeditious reporting means is often immediately augmented with a follow-
up report or augmented by a report transmitted through additional means,
enhancing the probability of receipt. Sometimes the most expeditious means
of reporting critical SIGINT information to the commander is face to face.
8-33. For intelligence reach operations, SIGINT products are available and
disseminated in a variety of forms: hardcopy, softcopy, direct viewing, or
listening (television or radio). It is incumbent on the requestor to ensure that
the SIGINT product can be transmitted over the available communications
systems. This includes verifying the appropriate security level of the
communications system.
ASSESS
8-34. The primary goal of the assess function when applied to SIGINT is to
determine whether the results of SIGINT collection meet the requirements of
the unit’s ISR effort. SIGINT producers must assess all facets of SIGINT
operations, from receipt of the ISR task to the dissemination of SIGINT, in an
effort to determine their effectiveness. This assessment is not only directed at
each SIGINT asset individually but also throughout the supporting SIGINT
architecture and the unit’s entire ISR effort.
8-5
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
8-35. The G2/S2 immediately assesses SIGINT products upon receipt for
accuracy and relevance. He must inform the SIGINT producer of the extent
to which the product answered the PIR or intelligence requirement.
Providing feedback to the SIGINT producerand collectorhelps improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of SIGINT.
8-6
Chapter 9
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
DEFINITION
9-1. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks,
identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic
target objects and sources. It also includes the additional advanced
processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT
collection.
9-2. MASINT collection systems include but are not limited to radar,
spectroradiometric, E-O, acoustic, RF, nuclear detection, and seismic sensors,
as well as techniques for gathering NBC and other material samples.
9-3. It requires the translation of technical data into recognizable and useful
target features and performance characteristics. Computer, communication,
data, and display processing technologies now provide MASINT in support of
commanders throughout the full spectrum of operations.
9-4. The subdisciplines within MASINT include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Radar Intelligence
(RADINT). The active or passive collection of
energy reflected from a target or object by LOS, bistatic, or over-the-
horizon radar systems. RADINT collection provides information on
radar cross-sections, tracking, precise spatial measurements of
components, motion and radar reflectance, and absorption
characteristics for dynamic targets and objectives. A SAR system,
coupled with advanced MASINT processing techniques
ƒ Provides a high resolution, day and night collection capability.
ƒ Can produce a variety of intelligence products that identify or
provide change detection, terrain mapping, underwater obstacles,
dynamic sensing of targets in clutter, and radar cross-section
signature measurements.
Frequency Intelligence. The collection, processing, and exploitation of
electromagnetic emissions from a radio frequency weapon (RFW), an
RFW precursor, or an RFW simulator; collateral signals from other
weapons, weapon precursors, or weapon simulators
(for example,
electromagnetic pulse signals associated with nuclear bursts); and
spurious or unintentional signals.
ƒ Electromagnetic Pulses. Measurable bursts of energy that result
from a rapid change in a material or medium, resulting in an
explosive force, produces RF emissions. The RF pulse emissions
associated with nuclear testing, advanced technology devices, power
and propulsion systems, or other impulsive events can be used to
detect, locate, identify, characterize, and target threats.
9-1
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
ƒ Unintentional Radiation Intelligence (RINT). The integration and
specialized application of MASINT techniques against unintentional
radiation sources that are incidental to the RF propagation and
operating characteristics of military and civil engines, power sources,
weapons systems, electronic systems, machinery, equipment, or
instruments. These techniques may be valuable in detecting,
tracking, and monitoring a variety of activities of interest.
E-O Intelligence. The collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis
of emitted or reflected energy across the optical portion (ultraviolet,
visible, and infrared) of the EMS. MASINT E-O provides detailed
information on the radiant intensities, dynamic motion, spectral and
spatial characteristics, and the materials composition of a target. E-O
data collection has broad application to a variety of military, civil,
economic, and environmental targets. E-O sensor devices include
radiometers, spectrometers, non-literal imaging systems, lasers, or
laser radar (LIDAR).
ƒ Infr
ared Intelligence
(IRINT). A subcategory of E-O that includes
data collection across the infrared portion of the EMS where spectral
and thermal properties are measured.
ƒ LASER Intelligence (LASINT). Integration and specialized appli-
cation of MASINT E-O and other collection to gather data on laser
systems. The focus of the collection is on laser detection, laser threat
warning, and precise measurement of the frequencies, power levels,
wave propagation, determination of power source, and other
technical and operating characteristics associated with laser
systemsstrategic and tactical weapons, range finders, and
illuminators.
ƒ Hyperspectral Imagery (HSI). A subcategory of E-O intelligence
produced from reflected or emitted energy in the visible and near
infrared spectrum used to improve target detection, discrimination,
and recognition. HSI can detect specific types of foliagesupporting
drug-crop identification; disturbed soilsupporting the identification
of mass graves, minefields, caches, underground facilities or cut
foliage; and variances in soil, foliage, and hydrologic featuresoften
supporting NBC contaminant detection.
Spectroradiometric Products. Include E-O spectral (frequency) and
radiometric (energy) measurements. A spectral plot represents radiant
intensity versus wavelength at an instant in time. The number of
spectral bands in a sensor system determines the amount of detail that
can be obtained about the source of the object being viewed. Sensor
systems range from multispectral (2 to 100 bands) to hyperspectral
(100 to 1,000 bands) to ultraspectral (1,000+ bands). More bands
provide more discrete information, or greater resolution.
The
characteristic emission and absorption spectra serve to fingerprint or
define the makeup of the feature that was observed. A radiometric plot
represents the radiant intensity versus time. An example is the
radiant intensity plot of a missile exhaust plume as the missile is in
flight. The intensity or brightness of the object is a function of several
conditions including its temperature, surface properties or material,
and how fast it is moving. For each point along a time-intensity
9-2
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
radiometric plot, a spectral plot can be generated based on the number
of spectral bands in the collector.
Geophysical Intelligence. Geophysical MASINT involves phenomena
transmitted through the earth
(ground, water, atmosphere) and
manmade structures including emitted or reflected sounds, pressure
waves, vibrations, and magnetic field or ionosphere disturbances.
ƒ Seismic Intelligence. The passive collection and measurement of
seismic waves or vibrations in the earth surface.
ƒ Acoustic Intelligence. The collection of passive or active emitted or
reflected sounds, pressure waves or vibrations in the atmosphere
(ACOUSTINT) or in the water (ACINT). ACINT systems detect,
identify, and track ships and submarines operating in the ocean.
ƒ Magnetic
Intelligence. The collection of detectable magnetic field
anomalies in the earth’s magnetic field
(land and sea). An
example is a Remotely Emplaced Battlefield Surveillance System
(REMBASS) sensor detection indicating the presence and direction
of travel of a ferrous object.
Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT). The information derived from nuclear
radiation and other physical phenomena associated with nuclear
weapons, reactors, processes, materials, devices, and facilities. Nuclear
monitoring can be done remotely or during onsite inspections of
nuclear facilities. Data exploitation results in characterization of
nuclear weapons, reactors, and materials. A number of systems detect
and monitor the world for nuclear explosions, as well as nuclear
materials production.
Materials Intelligence. The collection, processing, and analysis of gas,
liquid, or solid samples. Materials intelligence is critical to collection
against NBC warfare threats. It is also important to analyzing
military and civil manufacturing activities, public health concerns, and
environmental problems. Samples are both collected by automatic
equipment, such as air samplers, and directly by humans. Samples,
once collected, may be rapidly characterized or undergo extensive
forensic laboratory analysis to determine the identity and
characteristics of the sources of the samples.
ROLE
9-5. MASINT provides intelligence to the commander throughout the full
spectrum of operations to facilitate situational understanding. MASINT can
thwart many of the camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques
currently used to deceive ISR systems.
9-6. MASINT is perceived as a “strategic” discipline with limited “tactical”
support capabilities. But, by application of real-time analysis and dissem-
ination, MASINT has a potential ability to provide real-time situation
awareness and targeting not necessarily available to the classic disciplines.
Specifically, MASINT “sensors” have unique capabilities to detect missile
launch, detect and track aircraft, ships, and vehicles; do non-cooperative
target identification (NCTI), combat assessment, and BDA; and detect and
track fallout from nuclear detonations. Often, these contributions are the
first indicators of hostile activities. For example, two EXOCET-equipped
9-3
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
Mirage F-1s were shot down during the Operation DESERT STORM due to
MASINT collection and analysis. As evidenced by Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM (OIF), MASINT will play a decisive role in the targeting of smart
munitions with the signatures (fingerprint) of the targets they are seeking
(for example, infrared signatures).
9-7. The MASINT systems most familiar on today’s battlefield are employed
by ground surveillance and NBC reconnaissance elements.
9-8. MASINT spans the entire EMS and its capabilities complement, rather
than compete with, the other intelligence disciplines. MASINT provides, to
varying degrees, the capability to
Use automatic target recognition (ATR) and aided target recognition
(AiTR).
Penetrate manmade and/or natural camouflage.
Penetrate manmade and/or natural cover, including the ability to de-
tect subterranean anomalies or targets.
Counter stealth technology.
Detect recently placed mines.
Detect natural or manmade environmental disturbances in the earth’s
surface not discernible through other intelligence means.
Provide signatures (target identification) to munitions and sensors.
Enhance passive identification of friend or foe.
Detect the presence of NBC agents to include prior to, during, or after
employment.
Detect signature anomalies that may affect target-sensing systems.
FUNDAMENTALS
9-9. Before discussing the functions of the intelligence process within a
MASINT, the following paragraph provides an overview of organizational
structure of MASINT.
9-10. Within DOD, the DIA provides central coordination for MASINT
collection efforts through the Central MASINT Office. Each service, in turn,
has a primary command or staff activity to develop requirements and
coordinate MASINT effort. Army responsibility currently resides with
INSCOM. Army weapons systems programs that require MASINT
information to support system design or operations submit requests through
the Army Reprogramming Analysis Team (ARAT) or INSCOM channels for
data collection and processing. The S&TI community also performs MASINT
collection and processing primarily to support R&D programs and signature
development. Every S&TI center has some involvement in MASINT
collection or production that reflects that center's overall mission
(for
example, NGIC does work on armored vehicles and artillery). Service R&D
centers such as the Communications-Electronics Command
(CECOM)
Research, Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC), and Night Vision
and Electronic Systems Laboratory are also involved in developing sensor
systems for collecting and processing MASINT.
9-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
9-11. In addition to supporting the S&TI mission, INSCOM units also
execute limited ground-based operational collection to support Theater and
ASCC PIRs. This capability will expand upon the standup of INSCOM TIBs
and TIGs.
PLAN
9-12. Some MASINT sensors can provide extremely specific information
about detected targets, whereas other sensors may only be capable of
providing an indication that an entity was detected. Additionally, there are
varying capabilities of detection, identification, and classification among
MASINT sensors. It is these varying capabilities that require synchronizing
the employment of MASINT sensors both within the MASINT discipline and
within the ISR effort as a whole. See FM 2-01 for more specific information
on ISR synchronization.
9-13. As previously mentioned, there are many types of MASINT sensors.
Depending on the type of sensor employed, a given MASINT collection target
or NAI may not necessarily receive continuous coverage due to the possible
conflict between the number and priority of targets and the number and
availability of MASINT assets. However, a commander may decide to have
continuous surveillance of certain targets by using his own MASINT assets
(for example, REMBASS or Improved-REMBASS).
9-14. Another consideration when planning MASINT missions is whether to
use active, passive, or a combination of both when planning MASINT
coverage.
PREPARE
9-15. The G2/S2 MASINT related actions during the prepare function of the
intelligence process include properly establishing or verifying the MASINT
portion of the intelligence communications architecture functions. Addi-
tionally, the G2/S2 must ensure that required MASINT analytical assets and
resources are prepared to provide support or are available through
intelligence reach. Since the products of MASINT are not as well known as
products from other intelligence disciplines, the G2/S2 must be aware of the
types of MASINT products available to support the operation, and then
educate the rest of his unit’s staff on the use of these MASINT products.
Lastly, the G2/S2 must also ensure MASINT reporting and dissemination
channels and procedures are in place and rehearsals are conducted with all
pertinent MASINT elements to ensure interoperability.
COLLECT
9-16. MASINT provides information required to answer PIRs and other
intelligence requirements in support of the ISR effort. As stated earlier in
this chapter, MASINT collection must not only be synchronized within its
own discipline but also be synchronized and integrated into the unit’s overall
ISR effort in order to be effective.
9-17. MASINT sensors are employed throughout the full spectrum of
operations from a variety of platformssub-surface, ground, marine, and
aerospace.
9-5
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
PROCESS
9-18. Just as in the other intelligence disciplines, MASINT involves dealing
with huge volumes of data that have to be processed before beginning
analysis and production. The process function regarding MASINT involves
converting esoteric data into a form that is suitable for performing analysis
and producing intelligence. MASINT processing can include relatively simple
actions such as converting a REMBASS sensor activation into a report, to a
complex task such as processing HSI into a report identifying the composition
and concentrations of carcinogenic chemicals present in the emissions from a
factory upwind from a US forces encampment.
PRODUCE
9-19. Effective and timely MASINT requires personnel with diverse skill
sets. The MASINT producer must ensure the MASINT product satisfies the
associated intelligence requirements and that the product is in the required
format. The quality, fidelity, and timeliness of MASINT products are highly
dependent upon the type of target, the collection system, the system’s
position in relation to the target or NAI, and the weather, as well as the
MASINT system operator’s ability to identify the appropriate threat activity.
9-20. The objective of MASINT production is to be used in an all-source
analytical approach.
ANALYZE
9-21. The intelligence staff analyzes intelligence and information about the
enemy’s equipment, doctrine, and TTP to determine appropriate MASINT
collection strategies. Conversely, a corresponding analysis of the friendly
force’s MASINT capabilities must be conducted to ensure the continued
effectiveness of, or to improve upon, MASINT collection.
DISSEMINATE
9-22. MASINT of critical importance to the force, including answers to the
PIRs, is disseminated via the most expeditious means possible.
9-23. For intelligence reach operations, MASINT products are available and
disseminated in a variety of forms. The requestor must ensure that the
MASINT product can be transmitted over the available communications
systems. This includes verifying the appropriate security level of the
communications system.
ASSESS
9-24. The primary goal of the MASINT assess function is to determine
whether the results of MASINT collection and production meet the
requirements of the unit’s ISR effort. MASINT producers must assess all
facets of MASINT operations, from receipt of the ISR task to the
dissemination of MASINT, in an effort to determine the effectiveness of
MASINT. This assessment is not only directed at each MASINT asset
individually but also throughout the supporting intelligence communications
architecture, to include intelligence reach and the unit’s entire ISR effort.
9-6
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
9-25. Also, the G2/S2 immediately assesses MASINT products upon receipt
for accuracy and relevance. He must inform the MASINT producer of the
extent to which the product answered the PIR or intelligence requirement.
Providing feedback to the MASINT producerand collectorhelps improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of MASINT.
9-7
Chapter 10
Technical Intelligence
DEFINITION
10-1. TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of
threat and foreign military equipment and associated materiel.
ROLE
10-2. The strength of the US military lies, in part, to the diversity and extent
of its technology base. While the US aspires to be the leader in integrating
technology, the threat can achieve temporary technological advantage in
certain areas by acquiring modern systems or capabilities. The world arms
market is willing to provide these advanced systems to countries or
individuals with the resources to pay for them. A concerted TECHINT
program is vital to providing precise direction and purpose within the US
R&D process to ensure quick and efficient neutralization of this advantage.
10-3. The role of TECHINT is to ensure that the warfighter understands the
full technological capabilities of the threat. With this understanding, the
warfighter can adopt appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics.
10-4. TECHINT has two goals within its role:
To ensure the US armed forces maintain technological advantage
against any adversary.
To provide tailored, timely, and accurate TECHINT support to the
warfighter throughout the entire range of military operations. This
includes providing US forces intelligence, information, and training on
foreign weapons systems to an extent that allows their use of CEE.
FUNDAMENTALS
10-5. The G2/S2 must understand how TECHINT assets are organized in
order to properly apply the intelligence process, as the majority of TECHINT
assets are located at EAC.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10-6. DIA manages and reviews overall TECHINT activities. The S&TI
Directorate within DIA is the action element for TECHINT. This directorate
coordinates with external TECHINT agencies on non-policy matters
concerning the production of S&TI. The following organizations provide
TECHINT support under the control of DIA:
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC). AFMIC, based at
Fort Detrick, MD, is a DOD intelligence production center under DIA
control. AFMIC is responsible for exploiting foreign medical materiel.
The director supports the Army Foreign Materiel Exploi-tation
10-1
FM 2-0 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Program (FMEP) and Army medical R&D requirements. The director
coordinates planning, programming, and budgeting with the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCS, G2).
Missile and Space Intelligence Center
(MSIC). MSIC, based at
Redstone Arsenal, AL, is a DOD intelligence production center under
DIA control and supports the FMEP. The MSIC acquires, produces,
maintains, and disseminates S&TI pertaining to missile and space
weapons systems, subsystems, components, and activities. The S&TI
produced at MSIC also covers foreign state-of-the-art technology and
research applicable to missiles.
Defense HUMINT Service. DHS conducts worldwide HUMINT op-
erations in support of foreign materiel acquisition (FMA) and foreign
materiel exploitation (FME).
10-7. The organizations and agencies discussed below constitute the Army
TECHINT structure.
ARMY DCS, G2
10-8. The Army DCS, G2 exercises general staff responsibility for all Army
TECHINT activities. The Army DCS, G2 forms policies and procedures for
S&TI activities, supervises and carries out the Army S&TI program,
coordinates DA staff and MSC requirements for TECHINT, and is
responsible for the Army Foreign Materiel Program (FMP).
INSCOM
10-9. Under the direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA),
INSCOM is responsible for peacetime TECHINT operations. HQ, INSCOM,
fulfills its responsibilities through its TECHINT oversight function and
manages the Army’s Foreign Materiel for Training (FMT) Program and
FMEP. It provides the interface with strategic S&TI agencies in support of
FME and organizes, trains, and equips EAC TECHINT organizations during
peacetime. TECHINT exploitation within INSCOM is performed by the
following elements:
National Ground Intelligence Center. HQ, INSCOM, exercises direct
OPCON over the NGIC. NGIC produces and maintains intelligence on
foreign scientific developments, ground force weapons systems, and
associated technologies. NGIC analysis includes but is not limited to
military communications electronics systems, types of aircraft used by
foreign ground forces, NBC systems, and basic research in civilian
technologies with possible military applications.
203d Military Intelligence Battalion. The 203d MI Battalion is a multi-
component unit headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and
is the Army’s sole TECHINT battalion. It performs the following
functions:
ƒ Conducts TECHINT collection and reporting in support of validated
S&TI objectives.
ƒ Acts as the HQDA executive agent for foreign materiel used for
training purposes.
10-2
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
ƒ Conducts TECHINT training for DOD analysts and RC TECHINT
personnel.
ƒ Supports INSCOM’s FMA and FME operations as directed.
ƒ Analyzes and exploits foreign captured enemy documents (CEDs),
equipment, weapon systems, and other war materiel.
ƒ Reports on the capabilities and limitations of enemy combat
materiel.
ƒ Provides reports alerting the command to the tactical threat posed
by technical advances in new or recently discovered foreign or enemy
materiel.
ƒ Provides countermeasures to any enemy technical advantage.
ƒ Provides foreign or enemy equipment for troop familiarization and
training.
ƒ Provides recommendations on the reuse of CEM.
ƒ Supervises evacuating items of TECHINT interest.
ƒ Provides task-organized battlefield TECHINT teams to support a
subordinate command's TECHINT effort.
US ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND (AMC)
10-10. AMC plays a significant support role in TECHINT. Among AMC
elements are a series of RDECs, the Army Research Laboratory System, and
the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM). Each conducts highly technical
evaluations of foreign equipment. In peacetime, the AMC conducts FME on
equipment purchased by each laboratory and RDEC for the intelligence
community and for DOD as part of the International Materiel Evaluation
Program (IMEP). AMC elements include
The Foreign Ordnance Exploitation Team, which is located at the Fire
Support Armaments Center (FSAC) in the Picatinny Arsenal. This
team exploits foreign ground ordnance and develops render safe
procedures
(RSPs) for foreign ordnance. It also prepares detailed
intelligence reports to support explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), MI,
and US munitions developers.
The Science and Technology Center Europe and the Science and
Technology Center Far East, which have the responsibility of collecting
information on foreign technical developments by attending arms
shows and technology exhibitions.
The Soldier Biological Chemical Defense Command, which is the
headquarters for the US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU). The
mission of the TEU is to collect and escort
(transport) chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) samples for testing and
evaluation.
10-11. There are many other agencies with TECHINT responsibilities within
the DOD. Refer to FM 34-54 for more information on TECHINT.
PLAN
10-12. TECHINT collection usually begins when an organization or
individual reports the recovery or acquisition of unusual, new, or newly
10-3
FM 2-0 ___________________________________________________________________________________
employed threat materiel. However, there are often indications that the
threat may be using materiel not yet associated with the threat among the
myriad intelligence products available. Conversely, it may be known that the
threat is using a particular item, the capabilities of which are unknown to US
forces. It is in these cases that a unit may receive a TECHINT related ISR
task. It is conceivable that such a task may be reflected in the PIR. An
example of such a task is the identification or verification of suspected
external modifications on a particular model of an enemy’s main battle tank;
the results of which are linked to a commander’s decision.
10-13. TECHINT related ISR tasks should include a mission or target folder.
At a minimum, this folder should include a description of the item, with its
associated major combat systems, as well as handling instructions, reporting
instructions, and a photograph or sketch of the item if available.
10-14. Additionally, the G2/S2 is responsible for ensuring the staff
coordinates and establishes a plan for evacuating the desired materiel.
PREPARE
10-15. The G2/S2 must ensure that required TECHINT analytical assets,
resources, and evacuation means are prepared to provide support. This
includes verifying coordination effected with the task-organized battlefield
TECHINT teams from the 203d MI Battalion. The G2/S2 must also ensure
the means to report and disseminate TECHINT results to the unit and its
soldiers are in place so that they can immediately adopt appropriate
countermeasures, operations, or tactics in order to enhance their survival and
mission accomplishment.
COLLECT
10-16. TECHINT collection includes capturing, reporting, and evacuating
CEM. TECHINT collection begins when an organization or individual reports
the recovery or acquisition of threat materiel. An item of materiel is exploited
at each level, and continues on through succeeding higher levels until an
appropriate countermeasure to neutralize the item’s capabilities is identified
or developed.
10-17. Army personnel
(soldiers and civilian) and units will normally
safeguard CEM and report it through intelligence channels to the first
TECHINT element in the reporting chain. The location of this TECHINT
element will be in accordance with the METT-TC factors; however, there will
usually be TECHINT representation at the Corps G2 or the COCOM J2. The
TECHINT representative or element will verify if the type of materiel is of
intelligence value and determine its further disposition in conjunction with
the unit’s staff.
PROCESS
10-18. TECHINT processing starts (simultaneously with collection) with the
capture of a piece of equipment of TECHINT value. This confirms that the
enemy is indeed employing this materiel. In accordance with METT-TC
factors, a TECHINT team may move to the location of the item at the capture
site or wait until the item is evacuated before conducting a hasty
exploitation. After hasty exploitation, the team decides if further processing
10-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
is required. If it is, the items are sent to the first (or nearest) Captured
Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC). If the item is deemed to yield no
immediate tactical intelligence value, it may still be evacuated to the S&TI
centers in CONUS for further analysis if the systems represent a change in
the technological posture of an enemy.
PRODUCE
10-19. Battlefield TECHINT teams normally report initial and secondary
examinations of CEM using either a preliminary technical report or a
complementary technical report.
A preliminary technical report
ƒ Includes a general description of the item reported and
recommended RSP.
ƒ Alerts others to information that can be used immediately by tactical
units.
A complementary technical report is more in-depth and
ƒ Follows a secondary or an in-depth initial examination.
ƒ Allows the CMEC to compare new information with intelligence
holdings.
10-20. At each successive echelon of exploitation, TECHINT analysts add to
the overall body of information on an item by either adding to previous
reports or by preparing new reports. The CMEC or other national level S&TI
activities prepare more advanced technical reports and analyses. These
reports include
Detailed technical reports.
Translation reports.
Special technical reports.
10-21. Other TECHINT products include
CMEC publications such as operator manuals, maintenance manuals,
TECHINT bulletins, and tactical user bulletins.
S&TI analysis bulletins.
Foreign materiel exploitation reports.
ANALYZE
10-22. TECHINT analysts use checklists established by S&TI agencies and
the CMECs to analyze each type of the adversary’s equipment for which
requirements exist. Analysis always begins with what is, and what is not,
known about the piece of equipment. TECHINT units maintain procedures
and plans for sampling, analyzing, and handling materiel.
DISSEMINATE
10-23. TECHINT of critical importance to the force, including answers to the
PIR, is disseminated via the most expeditious means possible.
10-24. Routine TECHINT reports and products are usually transmitted
through the unit’s existing intelligence communications architecture in the
format of an intelligence information report (IIR) format. For intelligence
10-5
FM 2-0 ___________________________________________________________________________________
reach operations, TECHINT products are available and disseminated in a
variety of forms. The requestor must ensure that the TECHINT product can
be transmitted over the available communications systems. This includes
verifying the appropriate security level of the communications systems.
ASSESS
10-25. The primary goal of the TECHINT assess function is to determine
whether the results of TECHINT production meet the unit’s PIR or
intelligence requirements. The G2/S2 immediately assesses TECHINT
products upon receipt for accuracy and relevance. He must inform the
TECHINT producer of the extent to which the product answered the PIR or
intelligence requirement. Providing feedback to TECHINT analysts helps
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of TECHINT.
10-26. The G2/S2 also assesses the success of the unit’s ISR effort in
accomplishing any TECHINT associated ISR task and shares his assessment
with the staff and the pertinent units or personnel.
10-6
Chapter 11
Counterintelligence
DEFINITION
11-1. CI counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through
collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis and production, and
functional and technical services. CI includes all actions taken to detect,
identify, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of
friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the key
intelligence community contributor to protect US interests and equities.
Figure 11-1 shows the CI overview.
Counterintelligence
Target
Adversary
Intelligence
Activities
Roles
Functions
Detect
Identify
Investigations
Analysis
Exploit
Incident
Intelligence Threat
Neutralized
Subject
CI Estimates
Collection
Analytical Tools
Collection Activities and
Functional Services
Source Operations (CASO)
Red Team Evaluations
Screening
TVAs
Elicitation
Technical Services
Intent
Liaison
TSCM
Degrade Red’s Visualization of Blue
Operations
Intelligence Polygraph
CI Projects
Counter-SIGINT
CE
Surveillance
Figure 11-1. Counterintelligence Overview.
ROLE
11-2. The role of CI is to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize all adversary
intelligence entities targeting US and multinational interests. CI will focus
on countering adversary intelligence collection activities targeting
information or material concerning US personnel, activities, operations,
plans, equipment, facilities, publications, technology, or documentseither
classified or unclassifiedwithout official consent of designated US release
11-1
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
authorities, for any purpose that could cause damage or otherwise adversely
impact the interests of national security of the US ability to fulfill national
policy and objectives. Adversary intelligence threats include but are not
limited to any (US, multinational, friendly, competitor, opponent, adversary,
or recognized enemy) government or NGOs, companies, businesses,
corporations, consortiums, groups, agencies, cells or persons, terrorists,
insurgents, guerrilla entities, and persons whose demonstrated actions,
views, or opinions are inimical to US interests.
11-3. CI elements are instrumental in contributing to situational awareness
in the AOI. CI elements may corroborate other intelligence discipline
information as well as cue other intelligence assets through the CI core
competencies and through CI technical services. The CI core competencies
are collection, investigations of national security crimes within the purview of
CI, operations, and analysis and production. CI technical services include
computer network operations, technical surveillance countermeasures
(TSCM), and polygraph. CI focuses on combating adversary intelligence
activities targeting Army personnel, plans, operations, activities, tech-
nologies, and other critical information and infrastructure.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
11-4. CI functions are interrelated, mutually supporting, and can be derived
from one another. No single function or technical capability can defeat
adversary intelligence efforts to target US interests. CI functions are
discussed below.
CI INVESTIGATIONS
11-5. Investigative activity is essential to countering the adversary
intelligence threat to Army interests. CI places emphasis on investigative
activity to support force, infrastructure and technology protection, homeland
defense, information assurance, and security programs. CI investigations
focus on resolving allegations of known or suspected acts that may constitute
National Security Crimes under US law. The primary objective in any CI
investigation is the detection, identification, exploitation, and/or neutra-
lization of adversary intelligence threats directed against the US Army. CI
investigations are also conducted to identify systemic security problems that
may have damaging repercussions to Army operations and national security
interests. All CI investigations are conducted within guidelines established in
AR 381-10, AR 381-12, AR 381-20, applicable DOD policy and directives, and
US laws.
CI OPERATIONS
11-6. CI operations are characterized as those activities that are not solely
associated with investigative, collection, analysis, or production functions. CI
operations can be either offensive or defensive in nature; they are derived
from or transition to a collection or investigative activity depending on the
scope, objective, or continued possibility for operational exploitation. CI
operations fall into two categories: CI support operations and CI sensitive
operations.
11-2
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
CI Support Operations. These are defensive operations used to support
ARFOR and technology protection, security projects, and programs.
They include technical services support, support to acquisition, FP,
special access, international security, foreign visitor or contact, treaty
verification, information assurance, homeland defense, and other
approved projects and programs.
CI Sensitive Operations. These operations are generally offensive in
nature and involve direct or indirect operations against a known
adversary intelligence threat. These operations include counter-
espionage (CE) and CI projects and are conducted by designated units.
CI COLLECTION
11-7. Collection Activities. CI elements conduct collection activities focused
on adversary intelligence threats that target US and multinational interests.
CI collection is conducted through the use of sources, assets, official contacts,
and other human or multimedia sources to obtain information that impacts
the supported unit. CI will not be used as a substitute for Army HUMINT
collection. These activities are designed to collect specific information or
develop leads concerning adversary intelligence collection requirements,
capabilities, efforts, operations, structure, personalities, and methods of
operation targeting US and multinational interests. CI collection can result
from ongoing CI investigations or operations or serve to initiate CI
investigations and/or operations.
11-8. Liaison. CI elements conduct liaison with US, multinational, and HN
military and civilian agencies, to include NGO, for the purpose of obtaining
information of CI interest and coordinating or deconflicting CI activities.
Liaison activities are designed to ensure a cooperative operating environment
for CI elements and to develop CI leads for further exploitation.
11-9. CI Collection Activities and Source Operations (CASO). CASO is used
to collect information on direct threats to US Army installations,
organizations, activities, and personnel. The CASO program is not intended
to be used as a substitute for tactical HUMINT contact operations. CASO can
be used to initiate CI investigations, identify potential leads for offensive
operations, or develop additional CASO leads. Only designated units, in
accordance with applicable policy, will be authorized to pursue investigative
and offensive operational leads from ongoing CASO operations.
11-10. Screening. CI Special Agents work jointly with HUMINT Collectors
during screening operations to identify civilians on the battlefield, EPWs,
detainees, and other noncombatants who may have information of CI interest
or to develop CI leads. CI screening is also conducted during the process of
hiring HN citizens for Army and DOD employment. Information obtained
during screening operations may be used to initiate CI investigations and
operations or to cue other intelligence collection disciplines such as HUMINT,
IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT.
11-3
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
11-11. Debriefing. CI Special Agents conduct debriefings of friendly force,
HN, or the local population who may have information of CI interest
regarding adversary intelligence collection or targeting efforts focused on US
and multinational interests.
11-12. Functional Services. CI elements conduct functional services to assist
traditional CI activities of investigations, collection, operations, analysis, and
production; they also provide tailored support to US, DOD, and Army
protection and security programs for commanders at all echelons. CI
elements may use one or several of the functional services simultaneously to
provide tailored support to a particular CI mission or supported program. CI
functional services consist of
CI threat vulnerability assessments (TVAs).
Adversary intelligence simulation (Red Team Evaluation).
Covering agent support.
11-13. CI Technical Services. CI technical services are used to assist the CI
functions of investigations, collections, and operations or to support
functional services conducted by CI elements. For additional information on
CI technical services, refer to AR 381-20 (SECRET/NOFORN) and FM 34-5.
CI technical services consist of
Surveillance.
Intelligence polygraphs.
TSCM.
Computer Network Operations (CNO).
IO.
Counter-Signals Intelligence (C-SIGINT).
ANALYSIS
11-14. IPB, all-source, and single-source analysis are used to template
adversary intelligence activities. Analysis is also used to make
recommendations to the commander on how to counter adversary intelligence
efforts and to refine CI activities to potentially neutralize and/or exploit those
efforts and to continually focus the efforts of CI teams. CI analysis focuses on
the multidiscipline adversary intelligence collection threat targeting infor-
mation on US multinational personnel, operations, activities, technology, and
intentions. Raw information, open-source material, and finished intelligence
products are analyzed in response to local and national requirements.
Analysis occurs at all levels from tactical to strategic.
At the tactical level, CI teams focus their efforts on supporting mission
requirements and contributing to the all-source COP.
Operational analysis is used to assess how adversary intelligence views
and targets US interests; identify US vulnerabilities that could be
exploited or targeted; and to determine adversary intelligence
targeting methods of operation (MOs).
CI collection priorities; assessing adversary intelligence technical
options for countering US weapons and intelligence systems; and
11-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
assessing the impact of technology transfer activities on the US
military’s technological overmatch.
PRODUCTION
11-15. CI products consist of, but are not limited to, target nomination, CI
input to TVAs, CI estimates, and investigative and intelligence information
reports. Finalized intelligence derived from CI activities are incorporated into
joint and national intelligence databases, assessments, and analysis
products. CI products are also incorporated into the COP to support
battlefield situational awareness. CI production takes place at all levels.
Operational and tactical production includes tactical alerts, spot
reports, and current intelligence; CI threat and/or vulnerability
assessments tailored to specific activities, units, installations,
programs, or geographic areas; CI studies to support contingency
planning and major exercises; studies of adversary intelligence
organization, MO, personnel, activities, and intentions that pose a
current or potential threat to the supported command.
Strategic products include assessments supporting national and Army
programs including SAPs and acquisition programs; worldwide
assessments of the organization, location, funding, training, operations
capabilities, and intentions of terrorist organizations; global trends in
adversary intelligence MO; after-action studies of individual espionage
cases; analyses of the intelligence collection capabilities of
international narcotics trafficking organizations; and multimedia
threat products to support Army CI awareness programs.
TECHNICAL SERVICES
11-16. CI organizations with technically trained CI Special Agents are
chartered with providing unique technical capabilities to augment CI
investigations, collection, and operations. These technical capabilities are not
used as substitutes for CI activities, but support traditional CI techniques
employed to counter and neutralize adversary intelligence activities targeting
US interests.
11-17. Selected CI Special Agents are trained to identify human deception
indicators during the course of investigations, operations, and collection
missions. Required training and skills include the use of polygraph and
emerging biometric technologies that can recognize indications of deception
by human sources, contacts, and subjects of investigations, as well as
analysis and reporting of results.
11-18. TSCM CI Special Agents are trained in sophisticated electronic and
sensing equipment to identify technical collection activities carried out by
adversary intelligence entities. The use of TSCM is critical to ensuring that
sensitive and/or restricted areas are clear of any adversary intelligence-
placed active or passive electronic sensing, or eavesdropping or collection
devices. These areas include SCIF, secure working and planning areas, and
C2 facilities.
11-19. CNO consist of computer network attack (CNA), computer network
defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE). CI Special Agents
11-5
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
are specially trained in the areas of computer operation, network theory and
administration, and forensics, along with IO in order to ensure US
information dominance. The reliance on networked systems will result in
greater emphasis being placed on information assurance. Specially selected
CI agents will be trained in CNO in order to assist in protecting US
information and information systems while exploiting and/or attacking
adversary information and information systems.
11-20. For more information on technical services, refer AR
381-20 and
FM 34-5.
OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
11-21. Army CI supports the full spectrum of military operations. The Army
requires a well-trained CI force consisting of AC, RC, civilian government
employee, and contractor personnel. CI elements are focused on and
dedicated to detecting, identifying, neutralizing, and/or exploiting adversary
intelligence elements attempting to collect information on US forces.
Effective employment of Army CI elements in all phases of operations and at
all levels from tactical to strategic is paramount to countering any adversary
intelligence threat to US interests and resources. Moreover, Army CI protects
special programs that provide R&D, acquisition, and integration of
technologies leading to future technological overmatch. CI elements have the
capability and authority to conduct complex, nontraditional operations in this
Information Age to CE, to both protect critical technologies and satisfy Army,
DOD, and national level CI objectives.
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT
Strategic and Departmental
11-22. Strategic and departmental operations will be conducted by CI
elements supporting national, DOD, and DA required missions (for example,
support to NATO and special operations and missions). Strategic and
departmental CI will conduct compartmented investigations and operations
to affect the knowledge of adversary intelligence regarding CONOPS and
defense information. Army CI will execute the full range of CI functions and
missions at the strategic and departmental level including CI investigations
and operations, CE, technology protection, SAP support, treaty verification,
and technical CI services
(polygraph, TSCM, and computer forensics).
Strategic and departmental CI will also support SOF and special mission
units (SMUs) within the scope of applicable national, DOD, and DA security
policies and regulations.
Operational
11-23. Operational missions of CI elements will support combatant
commanders, generally in geographic AOIR. Operational CI elements will
focus on threat identification and countering regional adversary intelligence
threats. Operational level CI activities and functions include CI
investigations and operations, CE, technology protection, SAP support, treaty
verification, and technical CI services
(polygraph, TSCM, and computer
11-6
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
forensics). CI elements must be capable of quickly transitioning from a
peacetime mission to crisis operations to support combatant commander
requirements. Theater CI assets will conduct unilateral to multinational
operations in designated theaters. Operational elements may also be
deployed to support or reinforce tactical forces in CONOPS.
Tactical
11-24. CI teams will conduct operations throughout the battlespace during
CONOPS. CONOPS support activities include conduct of CASO, limited CI
investigative capability, personnel security investigations, screenings, and
debriefings. CI activities in CONOPS focus on countering the adversary
intelligence threat and assisting in conducting TVAs. TVAs will be conducted
in conjunction with MPs, Engineers, and Medical Service personnel to
provide the commander with a comprehensive FP assessment. During
peacetime, organic tactical CI teams conduct activities in accordance with
approved regulations and command guidance.
SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
11-25. The initial phase of operations from PME to MTW lays the foundation
of future team operations. In general, the priority of effort focuses inward on
security of operating bases, areas of troop concentration, and C2 nodes to
identify the collection threat to US forces that could be used by adversary
elements to plan hostile acts against US activities and locations.
11-26. Once security of the operating bases has been established, the
operational focus of CI teams shifts outside the operating base to continue to
detect, identify, and neutralize the collection threat to US forces as well as to
provide I&W of hostile acts targeting US activities. The CI team uses several
collection methods, to include CASO, elicitation, and liaison, to answer the
supported commander’s requirements. This is referred to as the continuation
phase. The CI team conducts CI investigations to identify, neutralize, and
exploit reported threat intelligence collection efforts.
11-27. A key element to the CI team’s success is the opportunity to spot,
assess, and develop relationships with potential sources of information.
Operating as independent teams, without being tied to ISR or combat assets,
enables the CI team’s maximum interaction with the local population,
thereby maximizing the pool of potential sources of information. Along with
the opportunity to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of
information, a second key element of a CI team’s success is its approach-
ability to the local population. A soft posture enables a CI team to appear as
non-threatening as possible. Experience has shown that the local population
in general is apprehensive of fully and openly armed patrols and soldiers
moving around population centers.
11-28. During some operations, civilian attire or nontactical vehicles may be
used to lower the CI team profile. In some special situations, these measures
are taken to make the operation less visible to the casual observer. Also, in
some cultures, sharing food and beverages among friends is expected;
exceptions to restrictions or general orders should be considered to facilitate
11-7
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
successful CI team operations, many of which are geared towards developing
relationships with potential sources of information.
SUPPORT TO INSTALLATIONS AND OPERATING BASES
11-29. CI teams, as part of a multi-agency team consisting of MPs, CA,
medical, and EOD, support the conduct of TVAs of installations and
operating bases to identify the intelligence threat to the operating locations.
Detailed TVAs identify weaknesses in operational and physical security
procedures and recommend countermeasures to mitigate intelligence
collection on friendly forces limiting the ability to plan hostile acts on US
activities and locations. CI activities supporting installations and operating
bases include
Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
Screening local national (LN) hires. Commanders, staff planners, and
SIOs should always provide input to personnel assigned to establish
and negotiate contracts using local national
(LN) hires. This
requirement ensures that LN hires can be screened, interviewed, and
in some instances used as CI sources or assets in order to provide
intelligence information that impacts the security of the base camp.
Debriefing friendly force personnel who are in contact with the local
population, such as
ƒ ISR patrols.
ƒ MP patrols.
ƒ Combat patrols.
ƒ Liaison personnel.
ƒ CA and PSYOP teams.
Conducting limited local open-source information collection.
Providing support to TVAs of the base camp.
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
11-30. At the CI team level, team members conduct mission analysis and
planning specific to their AO. Backwards planning and source profiling are
used extensively to choose CI targets. To verify adequate area coverage, the
CI team may periodically develop and use CI target overlays and other CI
analytical tools that illustrate the CI situation, identify CI gaps, and help
refocus the collection effort.
11-31. The CI team is also in constant contact with the supported S2 and the
other ISR assets (Scouts, PSYOP, CA, and MP) in order to coordinate and
deconflict operations and to cross-check collected information. The supported
unit S2, with the help of the CI team, regularly and systematically debriefs
all ISR assets.
11-32. The CI team must be integrated into the supported unit’s ISR plan.
The CI OMT chief will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities
and requirements of the team to maximize mission success.
11-8
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
OPERATIONAL RISK MITIGATION
11-33. The employment of CI teams includes varying degrees of contact with
the local population. As the degree of contact with the population increases,
both the quantity and quality of CI collection increases. In many instances,
however, there is a risk to the CI team inherent with increased exposure to
the local population. The decision at what level to employ a CI team is
METT-TC dependent. The risk to the CI assets must be balanced with the
need to collect priority information and to protect the force as a whole. ROE,
SOFA, direction from higher headquarters, and the overall threat level may
also restrict the deployment and use of CI teams. The commander should
consider exceptions to the ROE to facilitate CI collection.
11-34. Risks are minimized through the situational awareness of CI team
members. They plan and rehearse to readily react to any situation and carry
the necessary firepower to disengage from difficult situations. If it becomes
necessary to call for assistance, adequate and redundant communications
equipment is critical. These scenarios and actions should be trained prior to
deployment into a contingency area and rehearsed continuously throughout
the deployment.
11-35. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the CI team
“inside the wire” when the THREATCON level increases. The supported
commander must weigh the risk versus potential information gain when
establishing operational parameters of supporting CI teams. This is
necessary especially during high THREATCON levels when the supported
unit commander needs as complete a picture as possible of the threat arrayed
against US and multinational forces.
11-36. When it is not expedient to deploy the CI team independently due to
threat levels or other restrictions, the team can be integrated into other
ongoing operations. The CI team may be employed as part of a combat, ISR,
or MP patrol or used to support CA, PSYOP, engineer, or other operations.
This method reduces the risk to the team while allowing a limited ability to
collect information. It has the advantage of placing the team in contact with
the local population and allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with
potential sources of information. However, this deployment method restricts
collection by subordinating the team’s efforts to the requirements, locations,
and timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated and does
not allow for the conduct of sensitive source operations. This method of
employment should be considered a last resort.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT
11-37. Basic C2, transportation, and weapons requirements do not differ
significantly from most soldier requirements and are available as unit issue
items. However, CI teams have unique communications, collection, process-
ing, and mission-specific requirements.
11-9
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
COMMUNICATIONS
11-38. Dedicated and Secure Long-Range Communications. These are keys to
the success of the CI team mission. CI team operations require a secure,
three-tiered communications architecture consisting of inter/intra-team
radios, vehicle-based communications, and a CI and HUMINT base station.
11-39. Communications Network. The CI team must have access to existing
communications networks such as the tactical LAN. The CI team must also
be equipped with its own COMSEC devices. It is imperative that the CI team
acquire access to the public communication system of the HN. This can be in
the form of either landlines or cellular telephones. Such access enables the CI
team to develop leads which can provide early indicators to US forces.
11-40. Interoperability. Communications systems must be equipped with an
open-ended architecture to allow for expansion and compatibility with other
service elements, government organizations, NGOs, and multinational
elements to effectively communicate during CONOPS. All ISR systems must
be vertically and horizontally integrated to be compatible across all BOSs and
with Legacy and Interim Force elements.
11-41. SOTM. To provide real-time and NRT information reporting, CI
elements must have the capability to transmit voice, data, imagery, and video
while on the move. CI teams must be able to transmit while geographically
separated from their parent unit while operating remotely. This broadband
requirement can only be achieved through a SATCOM capability and must be
achievable while mobile.
CI COLLECTION AND PROCESSING SYSTEMS
11-42. The CI team must rely on automation to achieve and maintain
information dominance in a given operation. With time, effective collection
planning and management at all echelons, the CI team can collect a wealth of
information. The sorting and analysis of this information in a timely and
efficient manner is crucial to operations. Automation helps the CI team to
report, database, analyze, and evaluate the collected information quickly and
to provide the supported unit with accurate data in the form of timely,
relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.
11-43. Automation hardware and software must be user friendly as well as
interoperable among different echelons and services. They must interface
with the communications equipment of the CI team as well as facilitate the
interface of audiovisual devices. Technical support for hardware and software
must be available and responsive.
11-44. The demand for accurate and timely CI reporting, DOCEX, and open-
source information has grown tremendously. Biometric (physiological, neuro-
logical, thermal analysis, facial and fingerprint recognition) technologies will
allow rapid identification, coding, and tracking of adversaries and human
sources; as well as cataloging of information concerning EPWs, detainees,
and civilians of CI interest on the battlefield. Biometrics will also provide
secure authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access.
11-10
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
11-45. CI teams work with multinational forces and other foreign nationals
and require the ability to communicate in their respective languages. Often
CI personnel have little or no training in the target language, and lack of
skilled interpreters can hinder CI activities. CI teams require textual and
voice translation devices, source verification, and deception detection
machines (biometrics) to improve collection capability and accuracy.
11-46. CI teams require dynamic MLT tools that provide both non-linguists
and those with limited linguist skills a comprehensive, accurate means to
conduct initial CI screenings and basic interviews in a variety of situations.
CI elements will focus on in-depth interviews and communications with
persons of higher priority. MLT tools minimize reliance on contract linguists
and allow soldiers to concentrate on mission accomplishment.
MISSION SPECIFIC
11-47. The CI team may conduct night operations and must be equipped with
NVDs for its members, and photographic and weapons systems. The CI team
also may operate in urban and rural areas, where the threat level can vary
from semi-hostile to hostile. The safety of the CI team can be enhanced with
equipment that can detect, locate, suppress, illuminate, and designate hostile
optical and E-O devices. In addition, high power, gyro-stabilized binoculars,
which can be used from a moving vehicle, increases the survivability of the CI
team and also gives the team another surveillance and collection device.
11-48. Some of the CI team missions may require the documentation of
incidents. The CI teams can use the following equipment in their open-source
collection efforts.
Small, rugged, battery-operated digital camcorders and cameras which
are able to interface with the collection and processing systems as well
as communication devices.
GPSs that can be mounted and dismounted to move in the AO
efficiently.
Short-range multichannel RF scanning devices that can also identify
frequencies which enhance their security.
In some cases CI teams require a stand-off, high resolution optical
surveillance and recording capability that can provide target iden-
tification at extended ranges to protect the intelligence collector while
avoiding detection by the adversary target. An advanced optical cap-
ability provides intelligence collectors the ability to locate and track
adversary targets (passive and hostile) for identification, collection, and
target exploitations.
INTEGRATION OF LINGUISTS
11-49. Integrating linguists into the CI team should take place as soon as
possible. Security clearances and contractual agreements will help the team
determine the level of integration.
11-50. Along with the basic briefing of what is expected of the civilian
linguists as interpreters, CI teams should be informed about the civilians’
chain of command and the scope of their duties beyond interpreting. The CI
11-11
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
team leader must ensure that linguists are trained and capable of completing
all tasks expected of them.
BATTLE HAND-OFF
11-51. CI teams are always engaged. A good battle hand-off is critical to
smooth transition and mission success. The battle hand-off can directly
contribute to mission success or failure of the outgoing team, but especially of
the incoming team. The battle hand-off begins the first day the CI team
begins to operate in an AO. Regardless of how long the team believes it will
operate within the AO, it must ensure there is a seamless transition to an
incoming team, other US unit, or agency. The CI team accomplishes this
transition by establishing procedures for source administration, database
maintenance, and report files.
11-52. Teams must plan and implement a logical and systematic sequence of
tasks that enables an incoming team to assume the operations in the AO.
Adequate time must be allotted for an effective battle hand-off. In some
environments, a few weeks may be necessary to accomplish an effective battle
hand-off. Introductions to sources of information, especially CASO sources,
are critical, and teams must prioritize their time. During this time the
outgoing CI team must familiarize the new CI team with all aspects of the
operation, which include past, present, and planned activities within the AO.
Area orientation is critical. These include major routes, population centers,
potential hot spots, and other points of interest (such as police stations,
political centers, and social centers).
ORGANIZATION
11-53. CI activities require a complex C2 relationship to ensure that the
requirements of the supported commander are fulfilled while balancing the
need for strict integrity and legality of CI operations. This complex
relationship balances the role of the SIO as the requirements manager and
the
2X as the mission manager with the MI commander as the asset
manager.
COMMAND VERSUS CONTROL
11-54. ARFOR will normally deploy as part of a joint, multinational, and/or
combined operation. In all cases, commanders at each echelon will exercise
command over the forces assigned to their organization. Command includes
the authority and responsibility for effectively using resources, planning for
and employment of forces, and ensuring that forces accomplish assigned
missions. Leaders and staffs exercise control to facilitate mission
accomplishment.
11-55. While the MI commander supervises subordinates and produces
reports, the
*2X synchronizes activities between intelligence units and
provides single-source processing and limited analysis. (*2X ” indicates 2X
functions at all levels.) While the MI commander takes care of the operators
executing missions, the
*2X obtains the data and reports from higher
echelons required to execute the missions.
11-12
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS
11-56. The *2X staff is responsible for the integration, correlation, and
fusion of all Human Sensor information into the Intelligence BOS within the
*2X AOIR. The *2X is also responsible for analyzing adversary intelligence
collection, terrorist and sabotage activities, developing countermeasures to
defeat threat collection activities, identifying and submitting collection
requirements to fill CI collection gaps, and providing input to the all-source
picture regarding adversary intelligence activities.
11-57. The *2X Staff Officer provides CI and HUMINT collection expertise.
The *2X
Is the single focal point for all matters associated with CI and
HUMINT in the AOIR.
Is the CI and HUMINT advisor to the G2 and commander.
Is an extension of the collection manager and ensures that the best
asset or combinations of assets are used to satisfy information
requirements.
Along with his subordinate elementsCICA, HOC, OSC, CIAC, and
HACexercises technical control over his assigned Army CI and
HUMINT elements in the designated AOIR.
Is the principal representative of the G2 and the commander when
coordinating and deconflicting CI and HUMINT activities with
national or theater agencies operating in the AOIR.
Supports specific RM efforts in conjunction with the requirements
manager through the planning and coordination of CI and HUMINT
operations; the review and validation of CI requirements; the
recommendation for assignment of tasks to specific collectors; and the
conduct of liaison with non-organic HUMINT collection. This liaison
includes national level and multinational force assets for source
deconfliction and special activities outside the *2X AOIR.
Will provide OMTs with capability to reach back to current database
information, technical information and guidance, and source
deconfliction necessary to monitor the collection activities of the CI
teams.
ƒ CICA. The CICA is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing
all CI activities in the designated AOIR. The CICA exercises
technical control over all CI entities in the designated AOIR and
deconflicts CI activities with higher, lower, and adjacent CI
elements. The CICA accomplishes all responsibilities through
coordination with the operational units and other *2X staff elements.
ƒ OSC. The OSC in the *2X staff maintains the source registry for all
CI activities in the designated AOIR. The OSC provides manage-
ment of intelligence property book operations, source incentive
programs, and ICFs.
ƒ CIAC. The CIAC analyzes adversary intelligence collection
capabilities. The CIAC leverages all intelligence discipline reporting
and analysis to counter threat collection capabilities against the
deployed force. CIAC analysis provides information and analysis to
the COP.
11-13
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
11-58. The ACE and JISE CI analysis team analyzes threat intelligence
collection and the intelligence collection efforts of foreign organizations
involved in terrorism and sabotage in order to develop countermeasures
against them. CI analysis cross-cues IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and
TECHINT resources in addition to CI-related HUMINT reporting and
analysis to counter threat collection capabilities against the deployed force.
While the HAC supports the positive collection efforts of the force, the CI
analysis team supports the “defend” aspects of the commander’s FP program.
11-59. CI analysis is the analysis of the adversary’s HUMINT, IMINT,
SIGINT, and MASINT capabilities in support of intelligence collection,
terrorism, and sabotage in order to develop countermeasures against them. It
involves a reverse IPB process in which the analyst looks at US forces and
operations from the threat’s perspective. CI analytical products are an
important tool in the COA development in the MDMP. This analytical tool
supports the commander’s FP program and facilitates the nomination of CI
targets for neutralization or exploitation. (See FM 2-01.2 (FM 34-60) for more
information on CI analysis.) Specifically, CI analysis—
Produces and disseminates CI products and provides input to
INTSUMs.
Provides collection requirements input to the CICA.
Analyzes source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and
communicating that analysis to the collector.
Nominates CI targets for neutralization or exploitation.
Identifies and submits CI-related requirements to fill collection gaps.
Assists HAC personnel in focusing the CI aspects of the HUMINT
collection program.
Presents CI analysis products such as CI estimates, target lists,
reports, and graphics that support the commander.
11-60. For intelligence reach operations, CI products are available and
disseminated in a variety of forms. It is incumbent on the requestor to ensure
the CI product can be transmitted over the available communications
systems. This includes verifying the appropriate security level of the
communications systems.
CI TEAM STRUCTURE
11-61. OMT. The OMT is a four-person team consisting of a WO, two NCOs,
and a junior enlisted soldier. (Civilians may be inserted into this structure as
appropriate.) Rank structure and standards of grade for OMTs will vary
depending upon the skill sets required and mission focus. CI OMTs will
provide operational guidance for 1 to 4 CI teams, depending on mission focus
and operational tempo. When two or more CI teams are deployed in a DS
role, an OMT is also deployed to provide technical control. The OMT works
closely with the supported S2 and ACT to furnish current threat information
and to answer the supported commander’s PIRs and IRs. OMTs coordinate
with the supported 2X and manage subordinate CI teams to
Provide guidance and technical control of operational activity.
Provide the collection and operational focus for CI teams.
11-14
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
Provide quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate CI
teams.
Conduct single-discipline CI analysis and assist in mission analysis for
the supported commander.
Act as a conduit between subordinate CI teams, the CICA, and
supported unit headquarters.
Provide administrative support for subordinate CI teams to include
reporting mission and equipment status to the CICA and the supported
unit headquarters.
Educate the supported commander on the capabilities of the CI teams.
Integrate the CI teams directly into the maneuver commander’s ISR
planning.
11-62. CI Team. The CI team is a four-person team consisting of two NCOs
and two junior enlisted personnel. Rank structure and standards of grade for
CI teams will vary depending upon the skill sets required and mission focus.
CI teams are trained to execute the full range of CI functions; however, they
may be assigned to mission-focused elements (for example, CE, CI projects).
Assignment to a TSCM, polygraph, or information warfare team requires
additional, specialized technical training.
11-15
Appendix A
Intelligence and Information Operations
THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
A-1. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate information; also included is the information itself. (FM 3-0) The
information environment, it should be noted, is not an exclusively military
one; in fact, the military applications of information are almost obscured in
today’s universal usage of the information spectrum by national, inter-
national, and non-state players.
THE COMMANDER AND INFORMATION
A-2. Information is facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form; the
meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions
used in their representation. (JP 1-02) Information provides the key to
battlefield success in the
21st century. Commanders must have detailed
information to command. Information is the medium that allows the
commander’s decisionmaking and execution cycle to function. Information
gives direction to actions by the force, identifies the enemy’s centers of
gravity, provides COAs for force activity, and enables the force to accomplish
its operational mission.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
A-3. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the
ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
(FM 3-0) Relevant information drawn from intelligence supports the creation
and development of situational understanding that contributes directly to
information superiority during decisive operations. The requirement for
information superiority is not new; what is new is that today’s information
technologies are creating a base of knowledge for military planning and
execution that is unprecedented in scope, volume, accuracy, and timeliness.
This means commanders receive accurate, timely information that enables
them to make better decisions and act faster than their adversaries.
A-4. Information superiority, however, is neither a staple in today’s
battlespace nor is it necessary in military operations as a constant condition;
rather, at specific times during operations, information superiority becomes a
key enabler for assuring military success. At the operational level of
predominant interest to the land component commander (LCC), information
superiority is realized through the integration of operational level,
interdependent ISR, information management, and IO to gain and maintain
operational initiative and to achieve an operational advantage.
A-1
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
A-5. IO are the employment of core capabilities of electronic warfare, com-
puter network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and operations
security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to affect
or defend information and information systems, and to influence
decisionmaking…. Information systems are…the equipment and facilities
that collect, process, store, display, disseminate information. These include
computers, hardware, software, and communications, as well as policies and
procedures for their use. (FM 3-0). Offensive IO are capable of degrading an
adversary’s will to resist and ability to fight. Defensive IO measures
passively and actively protect friendly information and C2 systems and limit
their vulnerability.
A-6. Offensive and defensive IO are conducted as a fully coordinated effort to
ensure the complementary, asymmetric, and reinforcing effects to attack
enemy forces, influence others, and protect friendly forces. Relevant
information assures that the right person has the right information at the
right time for decisionmaking and execution.
THE ELEMENTS OF IO
A-7. Full-spectrum IO incorporates, integrates, and synchronizes tradition-
ally independent capabilities and activities in support of the commander’s
mission. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-13.) The Army’s doctrinal view of full-
spectrum IO as evolving core capabilities are
PSYOP.
OPSEC.
EW.
Military deception.
CNO.
ƒ CNA.
ƒ CND.
ƒ CNE.
A-8. Supporting IO capabilities are
Physical destruction.
Physical security.
Information assurance.
Counterpropaganda.
Counterdeception.
Counterintelligence.
IO-RELATED ELEMENTS
A-9. The IO-related activities of PA and CMO are closely associated and
integrated with the elements of IO as key contributors to information
superiority.
A-2
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO IO
A-10. All-source intelligence support, encompassing all of its forms, is the
principal enabler for successful IO. The commander’s capability to
synchronize military operations can be heavily influenced by the ability to
identify the threat and understand the adversary’s capabilities and
intentions in the information environment.
A-11. It is essential that the elements of the command’s IO capabilities and
vulnerabilities are integrated into the command intelligence plan. This leads
to COAs that synchronize the elements of IO and IO-related activities into
the commander’s warfighting plans. Integration of the full-spectrum aspects
of IO ensures that the relative importance of information is recognized in the
development of a synchronized OPLAN. Further, integration of IO into the
planning process provides a methodology for analyzing the threat from a
knowledge base that enhances protection of friendly systems and assets while
exposing windows of opportunity for attack or exploitation. IPB is the best
process we have for understanding the battlefield and the options it presents
to friendly and threat forces.
A-12. Provide Intelligence support to IO includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
Provide Intelligence Support to Offensive IO. The Intelligence BOS
supports offensive IO by providing information to identify critical
enemy C2 nodes. Intelligence also helps to identify enemy systems and
procedures that may be vulnerable for offensive IO. Additionally,
intelligence plays a key role in evaluating and assessing the
effectiveness of offensive IO.
ƒ Provide Intelligence Support to PSYOP. This task identifies the
cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AO. It
identifies target groups and subgroups and their location, conditions,
vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, cultures, attitudes, and behaviors.
PSYOP influence foreign target audiences in the AO to support
achieving the commander’s goals in the AO.
Identify the cultural, social, economic, and political environment
of the AOI; for example, adversary mechanisms for political
control, adversary communication and broadcast systems used to
elicit support from the populace, and current and past adversary
propaganda activities and their effectiveness.
Identify target groups and subgroups and their location,
conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, cultures, attitudes,
and behaviors. This includes determining the audience demo-
graphics of popular radio and television programs and
periodicals; groups influenced by media personalities and
political cartoons.
Identify impact of planned PSYOP on individuals outside the
targeted group (for example, multinational partners, neighboring
populations).
ƒ Provide
Intelligence Support to Military Deception. This task
identifies the capabilities and limitations of the adversary’s
A-3
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
intelligence-gathering systems and identifies adversary biases and
perceptions.
Profiles of key adversary leaders.
Cultural, religious, social, and political characteristics of the
country and region.
Sources of military, economic, or political support.
Adversary decisionmaking processes, patterns, and biases.
Adversary perceptions of the military situation in the AO.
Capabilities and limitations of adversary CI and security ser-
vices.
ƒ Provide Intelligence Support to Electronic Attack. This task supports
electronic attack employing jamming, electromagnetic energy, or
directed energy against personnel, facilities, or equipment. It
identifies critical adversary information systems and C2 nodes. It
includes determining and presenting the adversary’s electronic OB
and their information system infrastructure. The enemy’s C2 system
vulnerabilities and the means they use to protect their C2 systems is
part of the electronic OB.
Provide Intelligence Support to Defensive IO. The Intelligence BOS
supports defensive IO by providing information to identify threat IO
capabilities and tactics. Intelligence provides information relating to
CND, physical security, OPSEC, counterdeception, and counterpro-
paganda. The Intelligence BOS supports defensive IO by providing
information to identify threat IO capabilities and tactics. Intelligence
provides information relating to CND. Provide Intelligence Support to
OPSECidentify capabilities and limitations of the adversary’s
intelligence system to include adversary intelligence objectives and the
means, methods, and facilities used by the threat to collect, process,
and analyze informationsupports the identification of indicators that
could be interpreted or pieced together to penetrate EEFI in time to be
useful to adversaries.
Provide Intelligence Support to Activities Related to IO. The
Intelligence BOS when operating outside US territories supports
activities related to IO under some circumstances.
ƒ Pr
ovide Intelligence Support to CMO. This task allows military
intelligence organizations to collect and provide information and
intelligence products concerning foreign cultural, social, economic,
and political elements within an IO in support of CMO. Identify
cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AOI,
including
Population demographics.
Civilian populace attitudes, alliances, and behavior.
Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter,
medical care) and the ability of the populace to care for itself.
Access to medical care.
Locations and potential routes, destinations, and assembly areas
or sites of displaced persons.
Local government type, status, organization, and capabilities.
A-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
Availability of local material and personnel to support military
operations.
NGOs in the AOI, their agenda, resources, and capabilities.
ƒ Provide Intelligence Support to Public Affairs. This task identifies
the multinational and foreign public physical and social
environment, as well as world, HN national, and HN local public
opinion, in addition to the propaganda and misinformation
capabilities, activities, targets, themes, and dissemination means of
the adversary. Identify world, national, and local public opinion
(location, biases or predispositions, and agenda of national and
international media representatives in the AOI, and trends reflected
by the national and international media).
A-5
Appendix B
Linguist Support
ROLE OF LINGUISTS
B-1. Military operations are highly dependent on foreign language support.
The requirement to communicate with and serve on multinational staffs,
communicate with local populations, and exploit enemy forces necessitates
the use of linguists. The growing focus on multinational operations increases
the competition for limited linguist resources that are vital for mission
success. This appendix establishes the framework and process to access,
prioritize, and employ the Army’s limited organic linguist resources.
LINGUISTIC SUPPORT CATEGORIES
B-2. Foreign language support requirements of US Armed Forces typically
fall into one of four broad categories:
Intelligence and Information Gathering. This category includes the
traditional SIGINT and HUMINT disciplines, as well as foreign
language support to FP and exploitation of open-source information.
CMO. This category encompasses all functions relating to military
interaction with the civilian population. Foreign language support is
critical to CMO in areas such as government liaison, legal agreements,
medical support and operations, law enforcement, engineering projects,
public safety, security and population control, CA, and PSYOP.
Logistics. This category consists of foreign language support to
sustainment or transportation functions. These include logistical con-
tracting, port, railhead, airhead, or transshipment operations and
convoy operations.
Multinational Operations and Liaison. This category includes the
coordination of military operations and liaison with multinational
partners, previously unaffiliated nations, and at times adversary or
former adversary nations. Multinational operations are becoming more
common and increasingly important.
DETERMINING LINGUIST REQUIREMENTS
B-3. To identify linguist requirements, the staff conducts mission analysis
and identifies specified or implied tasks requiring foreign language support.
Other critical factors are the organization or echelon of command and the
location of the mission. The staff uses these criteria to determine the
allocation of linguists, such as one linguist team per echelon of command, one
linguist per piece of equipment, or one linguist team per location where the
function is to be performed. The staff then applies task organization and
scheme of maneuver to determine the number of linguists needed for an
operation.
B-1
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
B-4. The staff must analyze each linguist assignment to determine the
minimum level of foreign language proficiency needed. While interpretation
for a peace negotiation requires not only outstanding linguistic capability but
also cultural acumen, the translation of routine documents (with the aid of a
dictionary) requires a much different skill set. Poor identification of linguist
proficiency requirements can tie up the best linguists in less effective roles,
creating linguist shortfalls in other areas.
B-5. The relative importance of each of the four linguist support categories is
mission dependent. For example, during a NEO civil and military coordi-
nation would probably not be as critical as intelligence and information
gathering. However, the situation is reversed for a humanitarian assistance
mission in which CMOs have a significant impact on mission success. Identi-
fying these “dynamics” helps the commander and staff prioritize linguist
requirements.
B-6. Determining linguist requirements for any operation can be difficult
because each operation is unique. However, commanders and staffs with a
basic knowledge of organic Army linguistic assets, foreign language resource
alternatives, and MI skills can successfully assess, prioritize, and employ
linguists in support of their military operations.
PLANNING AND MANAGING LINGUIST SUPPORT
B-7. Commanders must consider the linguist requirements as part of their
MDMP for every CONPLAN and OPLAN assigned to their commands. Prior
staff planning and identification of linguist requirements should prompt
commanders to initiate linguist support requests and identify command
relationships prior to actual operations. If the mission analysis reveals
requirements for linguistic support, the commander must identify what
foreign languages are needed, the foreign language proficiency levels needed
for each assignment, and the best source of linguists. In addition, if the
mission includes intelligence and information collection, the commander
must identify MI collection skills required. During mission analysis, the
commander should consider linguist requirements for every CONPLAN and
OPLAN assigned to his command.
LINGUIST CATEGORIES
B-8. The commander and staff must identify linguist requirements by cate-
gory:
Category I - Have native proficiency in the target language (level 4-5)
and an advanced working proficiency (Interagency Language Round
Table [ILRT] level 2+) in English. They may be locally hired or from a
region outside the AO. They do not require a security clearance. They
must be screened by the Army CI support team.
Category II - Are US citizens screened by Army CI personnel and are
granted access to SECRET by the designated US government person-
nel security authority. Have native proficiency in the target language
(level 4-5) and an advanced working proficiency (ILRT 2+) in English.
Category III - Are US citizens screened by Army CI personnel and are
granted either TS/SCI clearance or an interim TS/SCI clearance by the
B-2
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
designated US government personnel security authority. Meet a
minimum requirement of ILRT level
3. They are capable of
understanding the essentials of all speech in a standard dialect. They
must be able to follow accurately the essentials of conversation, make
and answer phone calls, understand radio broadcasts and news stories,
and oral reports (both of a technical and non-technical nature).
PRIMARY STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
B-9. Primary staff at each echelon has responsibilities for evaluating
requirements and managing linguist support. The responsibilities include but
are not limited to those discussed below. In addition, each staff section is
responsible for determining its linguist support required to meet its opera-
tional missions.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (S1):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G1/S1 functions in all
contingency areas. G1/S1 requirements for linguist support include but
are not limited to the following:
ƒ Coordinate with local authorities on matters of civilian hire, finance,
and recordkeeping.
ƒ Contract for local hire personnel.
ƒ Coordinate for local morale support and community activities.
ƒ Coordinate with local authorities for postal operations.
ƒ Support for administration, counseling, personal affairs, and leave
for LN and third-country national (TCN) personnel.
ƒ Coordinate for local medical support.
ƒ Liaison with multinational counterparts.
Linguist staffing and linguist replacement management.
Identify foreign language skill identifiers for all assigned, attached, or
OPCON Army linguists.
Identify all Army foreign language skilled soldiers not identified on
electronic Military Personnel Office System (eMILPO) and Defense
Integrated Management Human Resource System (DIMHRS). The
Standard Installation Division Personnel System
(SIDPERS) was
replaced by eMILPO.
Deploy and provide administrative support of DA and DOD civilian
linguists.
Hire, contract for, and provide administrative support of LN linguists.
Procure Army foreign language support personnel for screening local
labor resources.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (S2):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G2/S2 functions in all
contingency areas. G2/S2 requirements for linguist support include but
are not limited to
ƒ Evaluate and/or use local maps and terrain products in operations.
ƒ Process for MI purposes material taken from EPWs or civilian inter-
nees.
B-3
FM 2-0 ____________________________________________________________________________________
ƒ At lower echelons, conduct tactical questioning of refugees, detain-
ees, and EPWs.
ƒ Assess local open-source information for intelligence value.
ƒ Coordinate intelligence and liaison with multinational and HN coun-
terpart.
Determine, during the initial IPB, all foreign languages (spoken and
written) and dialects needed for mission accomplishment.
Collect, process, produce, and disseminate information derived from
linguist sources.
Provide intelligence training for MI linguists employed in AOs.
Coordinate for security investigations, as necessary, for local hire lin-
guists.
Provide support to CI screening of contracted linguists and LN labor
force.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (S3):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G3/S3 functions in all
contingency areas. G3/S3 requirements for linguist support include but
are not limited to
ƒ Operational coordination and liaison with multinational and HN
counterparts.
ƒ Translate OPORDs and OPLANs for use by multinational coun-
terparts.
Consolidate unit linguistic requirements and establish priorities.
Develop linguist deployment and employment plans.
Develop plans to train linguists and to use linguists for training the
force in AO’s foreign language survival skills. In addition to global
language skills, linguists must have training in specific vocabulary
used in the AO; for example, terms used for military, paramilitary,
civilian or terrorist organizations, and ethnic groups within the area,
nomenclatures of equipment used, and other military or technical
vocabulary. Training in the specific dialect used in the AO would also
be beneficial.
Assign, attach, and detach linguists and linguist teams.
Integrate additional or replacement linguists through operational
channels.
Recommend modernization and development of linguist systems and
methods.
Coordinate mobilization and demobilization of RC linguist support.
Plan linguist usage for deception operations.
Plan linguist support for movement of EPWs, detainees, and refugees.
Coordinate evaluation of linguist support by all staff elements.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (S4):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G4/S4 functions in all
contingency areas. G4/S4 linguist requirements for linguist support
include but are not limited to
B-4
___________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-0
ƒ Procure local supply, maintenance, transportation, and services.
ƒ Coordinate logistics at air and seaports of debarkation.
ƒ Contract with local governments, agencies, and individuals for sites
and storage.
Provide logistical, supply, maintenance, and transportation support to
attached linguists.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (S5):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G5/S5 functions in all
contingency areas. G5/S5 linguist requirements for linguist support
include but are not limited to
ƒ Determine civilian impact on military operations.
ƒ Minimize civilian interference with combat operations.
ƒ Inform civilians of curfews, movement restrictions, and relocations.
ƒ Provide assistance to liaison with HN and multinational agencies,
dignitaries, and authorities.
ƒ Promote positive community programs to win over support.
ƒ Determine if multinational operations PSYOP efforts are mutually
planned and synchronized.
ƒ Interpret support to assist resolution of civilian claims against the
US Government.
ƒ Solicit linguistic and cultural knowledge support to protect culturally
significant sites.
ƒ Use linguistic and cultural support to identify cultural and religious
customs.
Assist the G1 in the contracting of local hire linguists.
Identify foreign language requirements for CMOs.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G6 (S6):
Identify linguist requirements needed to support G6/S6 functions in all
contingency areas. G6/S6 linguist requirements for linguist support
include but are not limited to
ƒ Coordinate suitable commercial information systems and services.
ƒ Coordinate with multinational forces on command frequency lists.
ƒ Coordinate signal support interfaces with HN and multinational
forces.
Manage RF assignments for supporting SIGINT linguist elements.
Support linguist operations with internal document reproduction, dis-
tribution, and message services.
Integrate automation management systems of linguist units.
SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES
B-10. If no special staff officer is assigned the duties below, the corresponding
coordinating staff officer should assume those responsibilities. Linguist
requirements for special staff officers include but are not limited to the
following staff officers.
B-5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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