FM 3-07.31 PEACE OPS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (OCTOBER 2003) - page 3

 

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FM 3-07.31 PEACE OPS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (OCTOBER 2003) - page 3

 

 

(2) Population Movement
(a) A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur
without reason. Usually, indicators exist that individual rights are, or soon will be, in
jeopardy. They may request that the military provide intelligence support to assist in
determining the direction and magnitude of these movements.
(b) Stages. The five stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival,
asylum, repatriation, and reintegration.
Preflight and flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence
support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of the population movement.
Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call
on the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the
initial arrival of the refugees.
Asylum. Army forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in the
host country while at the same time assisting with stabilization of the refugees’ country
of origin.
Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the
displaced community returns to its native country, they may need military support to
secure repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit sites, and returnee
movement to local communities.
(3) Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase,
commanders may require military forces to assist with the security of returnees as they
are absorbed into their local communities. This support would be especially critical in
the absence of a capable host-nation public safety establishment or active resistance to
resettlement. International civilian police normally assume the primary responsibility
for community law and order.
(a) The UNHCR has established the following five conditions for
resettlement:
Security.
Shelter.
Adequate local infrastructure.
Functioning institutions.
Economic potential.
(b) Controlling Movement. Coordinate the following with UNHCR and the
NGO/international governmental organization community.
Selection of routes. CA personnel in coordination with MP and
transportation officer should coordinate routes with the international support
community.
Identification of routes. After the movement routes have been agreed
upon, CA personnel should coordinate the marking of the routes with UNHCR and the
HN. Mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, US forces, and allied forces can
understand. PSYOP units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark
the routes, CA, the international support community and HN authorities establish
control and assembly points at selected key intersections.
IV-40
Coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and
the G4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.
Emergency rest areas. UNHCR or ICRC may establish these points. CA
personnel should coordinate to see if water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical
services are available.
Local and national agencies. Use of local and national agencies is
essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian
authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own
people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or
translators.
13. Environmental Restoration
Effective environmental stewardship programs emphasize: compliance, restoration,
prevention, and conservation. Units engaged in PO should place particular emphasis on
the task of environmental restoration. The combined efforts of engineer, CBRN, CA,
and other specialized units may be required in order to effectively restore the
environment within the AO to acceptable levels.
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Chapter V
FORCE PROTECTION
1. Background
Force protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force, so the
commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. The political
dynamics of PO place enormous pressure on commanders to avoid casualties. Every
commander has the inherent responsibility to protect the force, but accomplishing the
mission must take precedence over taking casualties.
2. Definition
a. JP1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
defines force protection as, “Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions
against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources,
facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the
enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP.”
b. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and
fratricide avoidance.
(1) Force Protection.
(a) Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against PO forces, resources, and facilities. Often unable to challenge the
US’s forces in conventional combat, adversaries seek to frustrate military operations by
resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics. Force protection counters these
threats.
(b) Force protection at all levels minimizes losses to hostile action.
Aggressive counterintelligence activities, comprehensive threat assessments and
appropriate follow-on actions decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces. Effective
OPSEC keeps adversaries from exploiting friendly information. Proper dispersion and
standoff reduce losses from terrorist action. Camouflage discipline, local security, and
field fortifications do the same. At the operational level, rear area and base security
contributes to force protection.
(2) Field Discipline. Commanders should ensure that combat operational stress
control measures are in place and practiced by unit leaders. Field discipline guards
personnel from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. Oppressive
environments can sap troop strength and morale far more quickly than enemy action.
Commanders must take every measure and precaution to keep their forces healthy and
maintain their morale. Such actions include securing equipment and supplies from loss
or damage. Commanders should ensure systems are in place for adequate health
support (to include preventive medicine) and the quick return to duty of minor
casualties. They provide effective systems for maintenance, evacuation, and rapid
replacement or repair of equipment.
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(3) Safety. Operational conditions often impose significant risks to lives and
health and make equipment operation difficult. Trained crews and operators must
know the capabilities and limitations of their weapons systems and how to employ
them. In designing operations, commanders should consider the limits of human
endurance. They balance the possible benefits of sustained, high-tempo operations with
the risks involved.
(4) Fratricide Avoidance. The destructive power and range of modern weapons
increases the chance of fratricide. Good leadership resulting in positive weapons
control; control of troop movements; understanding of, and adherence to, well-conceived
ROE; and disciplined operational procedures contributes to achieving this goal.
3. Threat Assessment
a. Conduct a threat assessment. The first step in developing a force protection
program is to identify and characterize the potential threats to the force.
Understanding the threat enables US personnel to assess their vulnerability to attack
and to develop effective protective and response measures. The following is an overview
of the elements within a threat assessment. US forces should follow basic security
planning steps and principles when planning force protection. These steps and
principles apply whether planning at the individual, team, or unit level. They also
apply to teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. They are
focused on all threats the force may encounter.
b. Conduct a vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment addresses the
susceptibility of the force to the threats identified during the threat assessment. This
very essential step helps to identify and prioritize the resources required to defeat the
threat. It provides a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect
personnel and assets from terrorist attacks. The vulnerability assessment applies to
fixed sites as well as to mobile operations. It is an ongoing process that includes all
three dimensions: OPSEC, physical security (PHYSEC), and personnel security
(PERSEC).
(1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly
actions attendant to military operations and other activities, identifying actions that
can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
(2) PHYSEC is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed
to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations,
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage,
and theft.
(3) PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria to determine whether an
individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment to or
retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in the total US
forces consistent with national security interests.
c. Determine appropriate countermeasures. Countermeasures are those measures
taken by a unit or individual to counter a specific threat at a specific time and place.
Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal
equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require
reorganization of land use, reorientation of roadways, security improvements to
installation entries and existing structures and the surrounding site area, and
coordination with HN military and civilian police. They may also require the creation of
V-2
specialized elements that are task organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats, and
recover from the aftermath of threats. Some threats may require the identification of
multiple scenarios, or alternatives, for achieving the desired goal. All alternatives
should undergo a suitability analysis that takes into account factors that may limit the
feasibility of an action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resource, and
political constraints such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction
materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities.
d. Implement countermeasures. Implement countermeasures as soon as possible
after identifying a threat. The least costly and often the most effective protection
measures are those incorporated during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate
force protection measures at the planning stage can preclude the need for piecemeal and
costly security enhancements later in the mission.
e. Evaluate effectiveness of the countermeasures. Over time, threats change as
situations change. Countermeasures may have been effective yesterday and may no
longer be effective today.
4. Threat Countermeasures
a. When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce
measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined in JP
3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, and DOD O-
2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorist and
Political Turbulence.
b. FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity
exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
c. FPCON ALPHA applies when there is an increased general threat of possible
terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are
unpredictable. ALPHA measures must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
d. FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased or more predictable threat of
terrorist activity exists. Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect
operational capability and relations with local authorities.
e. FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received
indicating some form of terrorist action or targeting against personnel and facilities is
likely. Prolonged implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and
affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.
f. FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has
occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific
location or person is imminent. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized
condition. FPCON DELTA measures are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods.
5. Terrorist Tactics
a. When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses
on three components: the person, the weapons, and the tactics.
(1) The Person. Terrorists generally perform hostile acts against people,
facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include:
(a) Inflicting injury or death on people.
(b) Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
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(c) Stealing equipment, material, or information.
(d) Creating publicity for their cause.
(2) The Weapons. To achieve their objectives, terrorists use various tools,
weapons, and explosives, as follows:
(a) Forced entry, vehicles, and surveillance methods are terrorist tools.
(b) Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons,
manpads, and mortars.
(c) Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs.
(d) WMD
(3) Tactics. Tactics refer to the offensive techniques employed by adversaries,
reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include:
(a) Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). A device placed or
fabricated in an improvised manner on a vehicle incorporating destructive, lethal,
noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate,
harass, or distract. Otherwise known as a car bomb.
(b) Terrorists can detonate stationary VBIEDs by time delay or remote
control.
(c) Exterior attack at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using clubs,
rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs, the intent
is to inflict destruction and death.
(d) Standoff weapon attacks are executed using military or improvised direct-
and indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars.
(e) Covert entry. The attempt to enter the facility covertly using false
credentials. The adversary may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the
site/facility or attempt to remove items/information from the site.
(f) Mail bombs. Small bombs or incendiary devices are incorporated into
envelopes or packages that are delivered to the targeted individual for facility.
(g) High Explosive. Bombs or incendiary devices, larger than those found in
mail bombs, are incorporated into various containers, and delivered to facilities or
installations.
(h) Airborne contamination. The use of chemical or biological agents to
contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation.
(i) Waterborne contamination. The use of chemical, biological, or
radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation.
6. PSYOP in Force Protection
a. PSYOP units support force protection by assessing the psychological climate in
the AO and determining the most effective application of PSYOP to influence selected
target audiences. The PO commander uses PSYOP to project and define his intentions
to the HN government, military, and populace.
b. PSYOP elements can enhance the force protection efforts of a supported unit by a
variety of means, some of which are:
(1) Influencing foreign populations by expressing information subjectively in
order to influence attitudes and behavior to obtain compliance in support of the PO.
(2) Minimizing casualties.
(3) Emphasizing the legitimacy of the PO force’s mission and presence in the AO.
(4) Projecting a favorable image of the US government and US forces.
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(5) Enabling the commander to deliver the message directly to a specific target
audience through novelty, print, audio, radio, or television products and face-to-face
interaction with a target audience on a regular basis. The products should reflect the
target audience’s media consumption habits.
(6) Providing assistance in completing area assessments.
(7) Provide PSYOP support to displaced civilian and refugee operations, when
directed.
(8) Providing feedback to the commander on the effectiveness of IO activities.
(9) Amplifying the effect of IO efforts.
7. Intelligence
a. Each Service maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences
in perspective among Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Services, or combatant
commanders’ threat analysis may lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist
threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, the local
commander may decide it faces no threat or a greater threat of terrorism in the country
or locale in question.
b. Threat level. Force protection planning responds to the threat level. The threat
level for an area is determined after information on the threat factors is gathered and
analyzed. The greater the presence of threat factors, the higher the threat level. Five of
the six factors are used together to define the threat level; the sixth, security
considerations, is used separately as a modifying factor.
c. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to
provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the installations,
resources, and personnel. The DIA identifies threats and sets watch conditions outside
the continental US for DOD installations and provides recommendations to combatant
commanders for force protection levels. This information, coupled with the vulnerability
assessment discussed in the following section, will influence decisions as to which force
protection measures are applied to installation assets.
8. Medical Role in Force Protection
a. Medical Response and Consequence Management Program. Medical personnel
must play an active role in force protection. Commanders must integrate the medical
response and consequence management program into the force protection plan (FPP).
b. Preventive Medicine Threats. Commanders will ensure the preventive medicine
threats are addressed (i.e., protection from and education on insects/rodents which carry
diseases; weather related injuries heat/cold/wind/humidity; unsafe/contaminated
food/water, importance of good personnel hygiene) and include these threats in their
FPP.
c. Combat and operational stress control. Combat and operational stress control
must be part of the commander's overall force protection program. Previous and current
PKO have often been extended periods of boredom and inactivity for peacekeepers who
do have adequate morale support systems in place. Morale has suffered and incidents
of stress misconduct have risen without these morale support systems.
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(CH 1) V-5
9. Force Protection Checklist
The unit is participating in PKO where not all parties in conflict have consented to the
imposition of a PK force. The belligerents have military and paramilitary organizations
capable of employing all implements of war including high-performance aircraft and
CBRN weapons. The unit has guidance from the ROE and the SOFA that specify
limitations and constraints.
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Table V-1 Task Standards
TASK STANDARDS:
1. Unit conducts risk assessment to manage risks.
2. Unit defines threats, determines attack probability, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops effective
countermeasures.
3. Unit develops, disseminates, and updates force protection policy to mitigate the threat.
4. Unit leaders recognize force protection as the most importance element of the PK mission.
5. Unit adheres to the ROE.
SECONDARY STANDARDS
GO
NO GO
Unit develops a force protection policy that balances—
a. Attack probability
b. Cost of adequate protection.
c. Cost of inadequate protection.
2. Unit concentrations, compounds, sites, and facilities are evaluated.
Evaluations should include—
a. Protection against vehicle-delivered explosives.
b. Protection against exterior attack.
c. Protection from standoff weapons attack.
d. Protection from covert entry or insider compromise attack.
e. Electronic and acoustical eavesdropping denial.
f. Visual surveillance denial.
g. Prevention of mail- or supply-truck-delivered explosives.
3. Unit develops plans to react to belligerent demands to search vehicles.
4. Unit OPSEC measures (active and passive) are consistent with higher headquarters
policy.
5. Unit establishes and sustains a situational awareness program (for example, mine
awareness, regional political and military, and contingency force posture [TOR, SOFA,
ROE]).
6. Unit establishes and enforces requirements for local security.
7. Unit ensures that guards are prepared to perform their duties.
All guard posts have special instructions for that certain post. It may include special ROE
instructions.
8. Unit develops and enforces safety guidelines. It includes high-risk countermeasures.
a. Weapons handling and clearing procedures.
b. Use of stoves, fuels, and combustibles in personnel areas.
c. Driving.
d. Weather extremes.
9. Unit considers weapon effects and fratricide reduction measures in base defense
planning.
10. Unit provides adequate field hygiene and sanitation resources.
11. Commander determines arming posture for personnel in execution of duties and when
in compound.
a. Arms must be secured when not in possession of peacekeepers to prevent theft.
(1) Weighs effect of centralized security (arms room) versus decentralized
(squad hut weapon rack) on defense reaction time.
(2) Considers peacekeeper sense of vulnerability.
b. Unit develops procedures for ammunition storage and authority for issue.
12. Commander designates and assigns security and safety duties to specific individuals.
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(CH 1) V-7
Chapter VI
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
1. Background
PO contain an inherent civil component that military commanders must address early
and continuously. CMO include all activities that establish and maintain positive
relations between the PO force and the nonmilitary entities in the AO - e.g., civil
authorities and institutions, the general populace, NGOs/IOs, and nonmilitary
resources. As a central feature of PO, CMO help harmonize civilian and military
activities to maximize the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and
suffering of the people. CMO enhance the credibility of the friendly force, promote
consent legitimacy, and encourage the parties of the conflict to work toward a peaceful
settlement. Early in PO, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by
civilian organizations temporarily exceed their capabilities, the military may have to
perform those tasks or cooperate to ensure they are accomplished. In these situations,
the PO force provides immediate relief and helps to create a sustainable infrastructure.
Properly executed CMO provide an environment that enables military commanders at
all levels of command to achieve the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
objectives of the PO. This chapter will focus on only those aspects of CMO that are
usually associated with PO: FHA, civil administration, elections, rule of law, restraints,
police, judiciary, and penal. A complete discussion of CMO and related functions is
contained in JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations. Commanders and staffs should also use
the CA area assessment and study contained in Army FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs
Operations, as the basis for all planning analysis and mission execution.
2. Principles
a. Harmonization is the integration and synchronization of the civil and military
effort. It must occur across the various institutions and agencies at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. The following four conditions will enhance the prospect
of achieving this harmonization of effort:
(1) Political leadership must establish a framework so that the objectives of the
military and civilian components are coordinated and harmonized.
(2) Military and civilian agencies must develop an integrated interagency plan at
the strategic and operational level. Such a plan will facilitate coordination at the
various national capitals, the UN, and the various NGO/international organizations.
(3) If possible, use concurrent and integrated planning. The commander should
establish mechanisms to support harmonization. Examples are, using extensive liaison,
establishing joint commissions and CMOC, and using CA assets to avoid duplication of
effort and wasting of resources.
(4) Empowerment. CMO in a peace operation should focus on empowering
civilian agencies and organizations to assume full authority for implementing the civil
portion of the peace effort. As the operation progresses, civilian organizations should
assume greater responsibilities for civil functions and require a decreasing amount of
assistance from the military force. The relationships established in the initial stages
coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil-military implementation
are crucial to affecting a smooth transition of responsibility and the ultimate extraction
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of the force. Complete plans for transition and termination of the PO before deployment
or as soon as possible during the initial phase. The best way to understand the skills,
knowledge, and capabilities of international organizations and NGOs, as well as US
government agencies, is to establish relationships with them before entering a mission.
Accomplish this by including civilian agency personnel in selected field training
exercises to developing working relationships based on trust and understanding.
Commanders should press for such team building exercises with all entities before
deployment on a mission. Do not overlook the essential roles of indigenous leaders and
organizations. Appropriately involving local institutions and agencies with the
international effort is a challenging but essential task.
(5) Appropriate use of military assets. Commanders should use military assets
sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate in promoting the overall objectives
of the mission. For example, military assets can be used to repair roads quickly and
efficiently but providing work to unemployed civilians may be a better solution,
promoting support for the political settlement that the mission is seeking to implement.
3. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
a. FHA encompasses programs conducted to relieve or reduce conditions that
present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.
These conditions may be the results of natural or manmade disasters, including combat
operations, or they may be endemic to an area.
b. FHA programs are normally the responsibility of the HN civil authorities. In
addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN humanitarian assistance efforts, NGOs from the
local area and around the world respond to disasters to provide FHA in various forms
and for varied duration.
c. The PO force may find itself participating in FHA operations by mandate, as the
result of mission analysis, or as the result of a disaster in the AO. Military forces may
provide emergency services to the HN when the situation is beyond the capabilities of
civil government and the NGO community. The military can provide coordination,
supplement the efforts of the agencies that have primary responsibility, or provide
assistance directly under a special form of FHA, humanitarian and civic assistance
(HCA) that authorizes the expenditure of military resource. Assistance provided under
HCA is limited to:
(1) Medical civic action programs, dental civic action programs, and veterinary
civic action programs provided in rural areas of a country.
(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
d. HCA operations must fulfill valid unit training requirements. The fact that HCA
operations incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace is secondary.
Plan and program HCA as part of a centralized CMO campaign and conducted
according to the senior commander’s CMO guidance.
e. Legality of these programs is covered under various laws, title 10, United States
Code, Chapters 20 and 152; and title 22, Chapter 32, which are covered in detail in FM
3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.
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f. FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant
amount of interagency coordination. Unity of effort is facilitated through coordination
entities such as the CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination centers, and
humanitarian operations centers. The US Agency for International Development is the
lead agency for coordinating FHA. Command, control, and coordination of FHA are
covered in detail in JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance.
g. The following are general procedures for assessing and executing FHA tasks:
(1) Understand the command’s overall objectives and the end state for the
political military operation.
(2) Understand the legal and fiscal requirements.
(3) Determine and establish contact with local authorities and the NGO in the
region.
(4) Work through the coordination and communication means for synchronizing
the relief effort. This may by the UN Joint Logistical Center, an NGO Forum, UNHCR,
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan regional
office, or a lead NGO such as Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE,
USA). Use the military coordination mechanisms, CMOC, as described above.
(5) Plan and execute the operation in accordance with the internationally
recognized standards for FHA
(6) Consider purpose, short and long-term goals, consequences, and perceptions
(of local populace, HN authorities, international community, others). Depending on US
goals and objectives, it may be prudent to include HN civilian and military resources
(perhaps in the lead), as in military-civic action (MCA) projects, to promote the
legitimacy of the local government.
(7) Integrate IO into all projects.
4. Civil Administration
a. The Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) is the only force structure requisite in
DOD specifically designed to support the mission of civil administration. Support to
civil administration may be mandated in PO or may temporarily occur in the PO. In
most cases, the military will assist an established or interim government. See JP 3-57,
Civil-Military Operations, for additional information.
b. The CACOMs organic CA specialty teams are especially suited for the civil
administration mission. The teams are organized as follows with the listed functions:
(1) Government Team.
(a) Legal. Advise local judicial agencies of the legal system and assist them
in administering it.
(b) Administration. Implement government functions, policies, and
procedures for the conduct of the government.
(c) Education. Evaluate current education systems and provide guidance to
foreign nation agencies responsible for the administration of indigenous education
institutions.
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(d) Public Health. Develop and implement public health education programs
on issues such as sanitation, maternity and child health, nutrition, immunization, and
first aid.
(e) Public Safety. Advise, assist, or supervise local police, firefighters, rescue
agencies, and penal institutions. Supervise enforcement of laws and ordinances.
(2) Economic Team
(a) Economic Development. Recommend monetary and fiscal policies to
coincide with local laws and practices.
(b) Civilian Supply. Coordinate the movement of essential civilian supplies.
Establish policies and procedures concerning custody and administration of private and
public property.
(c) Food and Agriculture. Advise and assist in establishing and managing
crop improvement programs, agricultural training, use of fertilizers and irrigation,
livestock improvement, and food processing, storage, and marketing.
(3) Public Facilities Team
(a) Communications. Provide engineering and technical expertise in the
identification, assessment of capability, rehabilitation, development planning, and
operational oversight/supervision of indigenous public and private communications
assets and facilities during the conduct of CMO.
(b) Transportation. Advise and assist in establishing transportation
facilities. Direct civilian transport agencies and functions.
(c) Public Works and Facilities. Coordinate public works and utilities
operations.
(4) Special Functions Team
(a) Civil Information. Advise, assist, supervise, control, or operate civil
information agencies; assist in providing TV, radio, or newspaper services.
(b) Cultural Relations. Advise, assist, or direct the restoration of cultural
properties.
(c) Dislocated Civilians. Advise and assist HN and US agencies on camps
and relief measures for DCs.
(d) Emergency Services. Advise, assist, or supervise local officials in
emergency services, to include disaster relief.
(e) Environmental Management. Conduct environmental policy analysis.
Survey the capabilities of the HN to plan/administer environmental programs.
5. Elections
a. Background. Not all PO missions have an electoral dimension. However,
elections have become a critical part of POs. Elections are one of the most important
aspects of the mission. Conducting an election could be a fundamental element of the
overall political agreement and holding the election will be a milestone that marks a
step toward the successful conclusion of the mission and transition from military to full
civil control. Elections are demanding, requiring an efficient marshaling of the entire
resources of the mission, often supplemented by additional resources from outside the
command. They are part of a broader process of democratization in which the military
has a role. Successful elections are a prerequisite to establishing a stable and self-
VI-4
sustaining peace and positive step toward transition. There is a tendency for the
military to want to withdraw after the election is over. However, the post election
transition of power is one of the most vulnerable times for a nation and requires
military attention.
b. Principles.
(1) The HN is responsible for free and fair elections.
(2) The electorate must feel that these elections are under the control of their
own country.
(3) The HN populace should see the international community assisting the
process, not running it.
(4) The military is not responsible for conducting elections.
(5) To ensure free and fair elections, PO forces must ensure—
(a) A secure and stable environment.
(b) Freedom of movement.
(c) Freedom of assembly and association.
(d) Freedom of expression.
(6) The military should enable the HN and international agencies to conduct
successful elections. The extent of the support depends on the capacity of the agencies
to conduct elections and the authority of the military force to act.
(7) The election process is not over until power has transitioned to the newly
elected officials.
c. Considerations for military support to elections
(1) Provide a secure and stable environment. Deploy large numbers of auxiliary
electoral staff recruited on a volunteer basis from all occupations and countries to assist
during the most active phase of the electoral process. This will increase the security
and management challenge already existing in the HN.
(a) Area Security: Establish security areas based on the location of the
polling stations. The HN populace should not see the military within 100 meters of the
station. The security of the station is the responsibility of the local authorities and
CIVPOL.
(b) Route Security. Secure routes to the polling areas. This is a coordinated
action between the military and the local authorities and the CIVPOL.
(c) Security of the Ballots and Counting Houses. If support by the local
authorities is considered inadequate or untrustworthy, prepare the military to provide
this support.
(d) Focus on Hot Spots. Determine those areas that may cause significant
security problems and focus assets. In some cases, the voter desire to exercise suffrage
rights may draw threats to their homes, lives, and property. Secure radio and TV
transmitters and stations that may be key facilities.
(e) Provide protection for designated international personnel. Election
monitors from the international community may supervise the election. These may
consist of international VIPs who require military protection.
(f) Provide protection for designated HN candidates. Threats may exist
against members of campaigning political parties. The protection of the candidates and
VI-5
the political process may exceed the abilities of the local police and the UN civilian
police (UNCIVPOL). The military should analyze and prepare appropriate contingency
plans to assist local authority. This may include a close protection mission. At a
minimum, share intelligence information with local authorities and UNCIVPOL.
(2) Provide Intelligence Support.
(a) Electoral planners need to know or decide on electoral boundaries and
promulgate this information. The basic intelligence requirement may go beyond the
need for maps but include a basic understanding of the geographic and boundary issues.
(b) Use a computer database to support the organization, supervision, and
verification of the electoral process. The HN may ask the military to assist in
developing this database.
(3) Ensure distribution of election materiel.
(a) Beyond security, the enormity and complexity of the problem may exceed
the capacity of the international election supporting organization. Prepare the military
to provide logistical support.
(b) Establish control and coordination mechanisms.
(c) Establish an election cell that is a counterpart to the international
community and the HN’s joint election control center.
(d) Establish liaison and communication with the joint election control
center, local police, CIVPOL, election monitors, and key local election centers.
(4) Develop contingency plans.
(a) Emergency Evacuation. Anticipate the emergency evacuation of the
international personnel in the polling and counting stations.
(b) Establish QRF to respond to crisis. Prepare the QRF to be highly mobile
and handle urban unrest and disturbances.
(c) Establish Communications. It is possible that the central coordinating
agency for the elections will require the establishment of a means of communicating
that may exceed their capabilities. Ensure that key nodes have communication. Nodes
are the polling stations, counting stations, international joint elections operations
center, elections cells, CIVPOL, police, and the VIP elections monitors.
(5) Develop Supporting Information Campaign. Voter education is key to the
success of the election. The military contingent is likely to play a central role in
publicizing the elections, explaining who is eligible to vote, and how, where, and when
to vote. Leaflets, newspapers, local radio and TV, the Internet, personal meetings, or a
combination of all may do this. The international electoral commission will have the
lead but the military must closely coordinate. The military personnel involved must act
in an impartial manner.
(6) Coordinate Logistical Support. HN may also require the military to provide
logistical support, such as transport for civilian coordinators, voting slips and ballot
boxes as well as billets, rations and water for international elections support personnel.
In some cases, the supporting organization may need assistance in producing the
ballets. The following are some items to consider:
(a) Identify the locations of voter registration points or polling stations.
VI-6
(b) Identify the requirements for premises such as counting centers and
warehouses and liaison with those components of the international community and HN
officials responsible for obtaining and supporting such premises.
(c) Identify vehicle requirements.
(d) Delineate the military responsibility for planning and execution of the
distribution of forms and materials.
(e) Develop a contingency plan for the movement of forms and materials
during and after polling.
(f) Coordinate the planning of the movements and logistical support of the
international supporting staff.
d. Procedures.
(1) Pre-Election Coordination: Pre-election coordination meetings among all
organizations and factions involved in the elections are essential. The military should
request such meetings if the international supporting organizations do not. These
meetings should include all the key players in the process. The intent of these meetings
is to prepare the operational area and ensure full integration and coordination among
all parties involved in the elections. Answer the following issues during the early stages
of the election support:
(a) The lead international civil agency needs to define terms and descriptions
for the elections process. Publish a glossary of terms in an order and units should
conduct standardized leader seminars to ensure understanding and compliance.
(b) Establish the political and legal framework for the electoral process.
Specify the registration requirements, especially for the displaced people internal and
external to the country. Promulgate the electoral laws and procedures.
(c) All participants in the electoral process should establish administrative
structures to plan, supervise, and verify. The military should understand how to
interact with these structures.
(d) Select polling stations, counting houses, and routes to and from the
stations early in the process to allow the military to conduct appropriate supportive
planning.
(e) The responsible agencies need to consolidate and standardize the polling
station database. Decide on the location for polling station database early, with a GPS
grid and sketches or pictures provided to assist units in locating the actual polling
station.
(f) The agencies should determine the magnitude of the additional personnel
that will be arriving to conduct and monitor the election.
(g) Registration. This can be a sensitive time in the election process,
especially if there are numbers of displaced peoples and property disputes. Prepare the
military for unrest and confusion among the population concerning registration. The
military force must ensure that all of its members are fully briefed so that they can
consider the populations’ questions.
(h) Campaigning. During the actual campaigning, make sure the military
stays alert for incidents of intimidation and coercion. The military should coordinate
closely with the CIVPOL.
VI-7
(2) Post Election Installation of the Elected Officials. The post election transfer
of power can be a vulnerable time for a nation. Develop contingency plans to ensure
stability and security during the transition period.
(3) Establish liaison and communication with the joint election control center,
local police, CIVPOL, election monitors, and key election centers.
(4) Figure IV-1 is an example of an election support form.
MEMORANDUM FOR _________________
SUBJECT: Election Support
1. NOTE: The following format must be completed by the organization tasked for
election support. Election support forms are for discrete activities/missions and not to
compile multiple activities/missions.
2. Unit reporting: ____________________________________________
3. Date:______________________ Location:______________________
4. Description of support:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
5. Vehicles, Equipment, and Supplies Used:
ITEM
QUANTITY TOTAL MILES USED PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED HOURS OF USE
HMMWV
M925 FOV
HEMTT
PLS
M1
M2/M3
TENT, GP MED
LIGHTSET
GENERATOR
FUEL
AIRCRAFT
UH-60
KW-58D
6. Point of contact for this report is: (Name, Rank, MSE No.).
\\SIGNATURE BLOCK OF S3\\
Figure VI-1 Election Support Form
6. Rule of Law
a. Background. The rule of law is fundamental to peace and stability. There must
be a safe and secure environment maintained by a civilian law enforcement system
operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for
internationally recognized human rights and freedoms. Rule of law includes the three
related fields: police, judicial, and penal. Focus attention on all three areas to make
progress. Civilian organizations in concert with the HN are primarily responsible for
civil law and order. However, the military might need to provide limited support,
especially during the initial "emergency phase" when the military may be the only
organization that can ensure public security.
VI-8
b. Principles
(1) Public security is the responsibility of the HN. If HN institutions are
incapable or obstructive, employ an international police force, supported by a PO force,
to advise and train the local police force. The situation may be such that this police
force will be granted executive authority to carry weapons and arrest.
(2) The military complements the HN and international efforts to establish
effective police, judiciary, and penal systems.
(3) The military may have to fill the gap until the international community can
generate sufficient capacity to ensure public security.
c. Considerations for Military Support to Rule of Law. This task is primarily a
civilian function since it involves providing assistance to design new institutions, draft
new legislation that gives these institutions the authority to function effectively, train
professionals to work in these new institutions, and educate the public on what the rule
of law means. Upon request, however, and for a period, the military contingent could
provide significant targeted assistance. Once the environment is reformed to the point
where the new institutions are no longer obstructed from operating in a manner
consistent with the rule of law, then civilians will be able to assume the sole
responsibility to empower democratic institutions.
(1) The commander and staff should consider preparing a detailed assessment of
the law and order conditions in the country and region where the mission is launched.
The document should evaluate the power base of those who may obstruct the peace
process. In addition to traditional intelligence analysts, review of law and order
conditions should include specialists on transnational crime (e.g., drug trafficking,
money laundering, arms smuggling) and criminology in general, as well as political
specialists and sociologists who can analyze the strengths and weaknesses of existing
institutions. Conduct this staff preparation at an advanced stage in order to incorporate
required resources (Special Forces, CA, PSYOP, special police units, a multinational
specialized unit, technical intelligence means, and relevant analytical capabilities) into
the force flow and structure. The deployed peace operation force should use this
information and continue to update it as the situation dictates.
(2) Intelligence. Proper intelligence is essential. The commander must include
public security issues in his CCIR. The command must learn what to look for with
respect to crime. The advice of the SJA, MP, CID, and other national and international
experts must be obtained in reporting what could assist future criminal investigation
and can be turned into evidence in future criminal investigations. Establish the
following mechanisms to coordinate intelligence:
(a) Fusion Cell. Establish a fusion cell with links to the special advisor for
rule of law or the coordinating body established by the task force or the international
authority for coordinating public security. This cell would integrate intelligence from
deployed military units, Special Gendarmerie (French) units, special police units,
UNCIVPOL, DOJ trainers, and other public security organizations. It should have the
analytical capability to exploit innovation in information technology as it related to
crime mapping and link analysis.
(b) Information Sharing. Establish a mechanism to share actionable
intelligence among the military, policy, judiciary, and penal authorities. Such a
“council” may already exist and the commander should understand how it works. Pass
on relevant law enforcement information, collected by the military assets, UNCIVPOL
VI-9
station chiefs for their use. Likewise, check information collected by the police against
the military database, names, and pictures of individuals produced and collection efforts
refined. Military can establish a “Be on the Look Out” list for key individuals.
7. Restraints
a. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the military from training HN
civilian police. However, MP may provide initial assistance and training to foreign
military or civilian police forces or assist in the creation of these forces, where the local
national authority has broken down. This is an exception to Section 660 of the Foreign
Assistance Act. MP, when directed, can conduct training for foreign military police and
assist in reorganizing local constabulary forces during stability and support operations.
MP can provide short-term emergency law and order capabilities until the foreign
military or civilian police forces are functional.
b. US military training assistance to the rule of law normally includes the
following:
(1) Special Forces. These detachments teach basic skills needed to perform
security duties such as small arms training, unit security tactics, radio procedures, and
human rights observation and safeguard.
(2) Military police. MP can teach investigative techniques, law enforcement
skills, and penal operations. They may also assist and monitor.
(3) Civil affairs. CA coordinates with the HN to effectively integrate training
with the established political system. They also provide language interpreter support
and support to Judiciary and Penal system.
(4) Judge Advocate General. Provide advice to the commander as well as
assistance to Judicial and Prosecutorial Process.
(5) PSYOP personnel work to gain and maintain acceptance of the training effort
by the civilian population and encourage their acceptance of the new or reconstituted
civilian police force and judicial system.
8. Police
a. To assist in meeting police obligations, the HN may request that the UN
establish a UNCIVPOL and/or an IPTF to assist in community policing. When the
indigenous security and police forces are non-existent, incapable or obstructionist and
the CIVPOL cannot generate sufficient capacity quickly enough, the military may assist
in establishing general public security. However, the military does not have the
capability for community policing. The military force may have to work with
UNCIVPOL, International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),
other police assistance agencies, or special police units.
b. UNCIVPOL, CIVPOL Component. From the operational standpoint, the civilian
police are a separate component of the PO mission under the command of a police
commissioner, who reports directly to the special representative. The CIVPOL
component will complement and work closely with other components, e.g., military,
humanitarian, electoral, and administrative components in the mission. The CIVPOL
may or may not be granted “Executive Authority” to carry weapons and make arrests.
The military must understand the exact authority of the CIVPOL. The principal
function of the UNCIVPOL is the supervision and control of the local police and the
VI-10
protection of human rights. In several missions an additional function has been
training of local police or assistance in such training. In missions where an election is
scheduled during the mandate period, UNCIVPOL will perform tasks related to the
election and assist the electoral component. Other functions are: assisting
humanitarian agencies and observing the conduct and performance of the local police
and judicial investigative authorities in the arrest, detention, and interrogation of
persons charged with a crime, the general handling of prisoners, and the searching of
residences. Reference: United Nations Civilian Police Handbook
c. ICITAP. Through the ICITAP, the DOJ provides training to police forces and
judiciaries in the Western Hemisphere. ICITAP works in tandem with overseas
prosecutorial development assistance and training, a DOJ program offering
administration of justice assistance. ICITAP seeks to
(1) Enhance prosecutorial and judicial capabilities.
(2) Enhance investigative and forensic capabilities.
(3) Assist in development of training curricula for law enforcement personnel.
(4) Improve administrative capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
(5) Improve penal institutions and the rehabilitation process.
d. Gendarmerie Type Units. The military commander may require the addition of
such units to increase the military ability to care for public security. The Italian
Carabinieri, the Spanish Guaria Civil, the French Gendarmerie, and the Argentine
Gendarmerie are examples of such units. Their mission includes such tasks as deter
civil disturbances, riot control, collection, and analysis of criminal intelligence.
e. Special Police Units. Create these units to participate in high-risk arrest cases
or close protection of VIP or election candidates.
f. To work together successfully, the police and military must coordinate the ROE,
establish combined SOP, conduct combined supportive information operations, conduct
combined planning, and ensure C2 interoperability.
g. Following are guidelines for combined military and police operations:
(1) Understand ROE.
(2) Allow the HN authorities to handle situations involving local nationals as
much as possible. Military force can assist and provide backup and security but the
HN, or the UNCIVPOL if so authorized, must make the arrest. In a crisis, the military
unit can detain suspected criminals pending the arrival of the arrest authority.
(3) Ensure that the military member does not embarrass or demean HN agents,
especially in view of the populace. Negative behavior toward their HN counterparts
could seriously damage their authority and affect consent and legitimacy.
(4) Ensure that military members are aware of and sensitive to the cultural
traditions and standards of the HN. What may be acceptable in one culture may be, at
best, ill mannered and possibly a serious insult or even criminal behavior in another
culture.
(5) Ensure that military members are respectful of the agents and leadership
and be confident in the abilities of the HN officials and UNCIVPOL. Problems should
be addressed out of the public eye.
(6) Coordinate with the police authority in combined operations, especially as to
its purpose and what evidence is being sought.
14 April 2009
FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP 3-2.40
(CH 1) VI-11
h. Following is a list of the potential tasks that the military could perform in
support of the police function:
(1) Providing back up for high-risk arrests.
(2) Safeguarding institutions of governance and key officials.
(3) Providing advisors to police in accordance with US Law.
(4) Assisting in the arrest of war criminals.
(5) Conducting security patrols at times combined with police.
(6) Supporting police presence and search patrols.
(7) Controlling crowds, riots, and urban unrest.
(8) Detaining suspected felons.
(9) Deterring violent acts.
(10) Eliminating snipers.
(11) Enforcing curfews.
(12) Facilitating freedom of movement.
(13) Handling detainees.
(14) Providing intelligence.
(15) Performing local area security.
(16) Performing wide area security.
(17) Preventing looting.
(18) Preventing pilferage.
(19) Securing key facilities, culture properties.
(20) Providing limited logistical support.
9.
Judiciary
The military may assist in the establishment of a workable judicial system with SJA
and CA support. The legal standards, and their effect on SOFA and memorandum of
understanding, are important considerations. Engage the commander's legal and
political advisors in the development of the system to ensure that military concerns are
addressed. The DOJ and or the DOS ministerial advisory efforts along with the
international efforts will be in the lead in building judicial capacity.
10. Penal
Commanders may require forces establish and run temporary confinement facilities
until civilian agencies take the lead. Prepare the engineer and MP community to deal
with the temporary confinement of civilian prisoners accused of civil crimes.
Consideration should be given to deployment of the appropriate MP military
occupational specialty for confinement duties. The international community should
establish standards and rules of confinement during the planning phase to allow proper
preparation.
VI-12
Chapter VII
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. Introduction
The following discussion provides techniques to assist the military member in
concluding situations that require two or more parties to come to a mutual agreement.
Knowledge of these techniques does not qualify a military member to act as a hostage
negotiator or a trade negotiator for international, national, or regional trade
agreements. Those types of agreements require specific expertise and legal status that
is beyond the normal scope of PO activities. There are three basic methods to reach an
agreement: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Each method has its place in PO,
but mediation is normally the most effective, least divisive, and the preferred method of
reaching agreements.
a. Negotiation is conferring, discussing, or bargaining to reach an agreement. It is
a central technique in conflict resolution. Service members will rarely negotiate a major
agreement between belligerents, but they should have a basic understanding of the art
of negotiation. Under normal circumstances, the DOS conducts international
negotiations on behalf of the US. Once a US military representative is a party to a
negotiation, that member is now injected into the problem and is seen as a competitor
and not as a disinterested party and surrenders, the cloak of impartiality, and all
actions become suspect. It is very difficult to shake the ensuing suspicion and mistrust,
even by subsequent US actions or representatives.
b. Mediation is a conflict settlement, where decisions are made by the disputing
parties with the assistance of a neutral third party. During mediation, the military
member acts as a facilitator who aims to guide the local parties toward an agreement
that supports the goals of the US government. The mediator is not representing the
aspirations of any of the disputing parties, but acts to further the goals of lasting peace,
stability, and cooperation within the framework of the military commander's intent and
the international agreements.
(1) The mediator should assume some level of resistance from the involved
parties. Numerous groups or individuals may actively and/or passively hamper
attempts to establish peace. The US military member does not support the aims or
goals of the disputing parties, but should fully understand each side’s position. Keeping
an impartial position will help to reduce the likelihood of animosity/aggression directed
at the US forces or civilian organizations.
(2) The mediator should anticipate the participants’ behavior and outline all
possible outcomes should mediation fail. The mediation process does carry the risk of
upsetting a participant, but can prevent long-term friction through effective
communication.
c. Arbitration is the conflict resolution method where a neutral party makes the
final decision.
(1) Binding and non-binding are the two forms of arbitration:
(a) Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree
to comply with the arbitrator's decision before the proceedings.
(b) Non-binding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not
compelled to comply with the arbitrator's decision.
VII-1
(2) Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution where the military member acts
as judge, and as such, will make a decision that may adversely affect one or more
parties. Normally, the military member will conduct arbitration at a higher level than
the other forms of conflict resolution. The tangible advantage to arbitration is the
ability for the military member to end the conflict after impasse, but having the parties
adhere to the arbitrator’s decision may be extremely difficult. Without mutual support
for the decision, the local military commander may lose some influence with those
belligerents who feel slighted by the decision.
d. When resolving disagreements between parties, military members must display
a combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus. To succeed, they must show
tolerance, patience, innovation, flexibility, and resourcefulness. The military member
must take charge, expect change, and work toward a mutual agreement. Vigilance is
critical to long-term success. Some examples of conflict resolutions that may require
military personnel to broker include:
(1) Getting local leaders to implement a “stay put policy” to prevent displaced
civilian movement during combat operations.
(2) Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HN support contracts.
(3) Assisting former belligerents in working out relocation agreements during
post-hostilities operations.
(4) Deconfliction of military FHA activities with those of NGOs/IOs.
e. A successfully negotiated agreement has the following characteristics - it is fair,
efficient, wise, and enduring.
(1) Fairness implies that all sides are treated impartially.
(2) Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with minimum of effort.
(3) Wisdom pertains to following the soundest course of action.
(4) Endurance refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the
agreement to last.
2. Negotiations
Battalion commanders, company commanders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants,
and, often, squad leaders can find themselves in the role of a negotiator during PO.
Sometimes their role is similar to a mediator, but with a distinct difference - the
military leader has interests in the outcome, e.g., consistent with the unit’s missions
and objectives. In the role of quasi-mediator in these situations, the leader is helping to
manage the negotiation process. Leaders may negotiate for rights of passage; mediating
between hostile factions; bartering for use of facilities, buildings, roads, and services; or
seeking to get a group of people to comply with the curfew without having to resort to
the use of force.
a. Considerations. The following four considerations should guide the analysis and
preparation of negotiations: negotiations do not exist in a vacuum, negotiation is an
exercise in persuasion, study alternatives to negotiating an agreement, and be attuned
to cultural differences.
(1) Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. Leaders must understand the broader
issues of conflict and their changing nature. These include maintaining dialogue with
all parties, groups, organizations, and governments. Prevent any one incident from
VII-2
destroying dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating an atmosphere of hostility will
not lead to a resolution.
(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. Negotiation is a way to advance US
interests by jointly decided action. Both parties must cooperate.
(3) Study alternatives to negotiating an agreement. What are both parties’
alternatives to reaching a negotiated agreement?
(4) Be attuned to cultural differences. The use of language can be different.
Actions can have different connotations to members of other cultures. The negotiating
parties’ culture shapes how they reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles
they apply to decision making. Nonverbal behavior such as symbolic rituals or protocols
of the arrangement of a meeting also is important.
(5) Conduct negotiations at several levels: negotiations among US agencies and
departments; between multinational partners; between the military and UN agencies;
and between the military and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations in a joint,
combined, and interagency environment requires the following to build consensus: tact,
diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications,
cross cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.
b. Procedures. For success, base negotiations on the following nine steps.
(1) Establish communications.
(2) Identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue.
(3) Consider cultural aspects of negotiations.
(4) Set clear goals and objectives.
(5) Set clear and reasonable code of conduct for negotiation process.
(6) Develop a plan and diagram the results of the analysis.
(7) Determine composition of negotiating forum and decisionmaking
mechanisms.
(8) Establish the venue (keep it neutral).
(9) Implementation.
c. Negotiation training.
(1) Negotiation training is essential for military leaders in PO. Training should
include platoon sergeants and, often, squad leaders. CA personnel are instrumental in
this area, but the nature of PO means that all leaders will need this skill to accomplish
the mission.
(2) Leaders need a conceptual foundation of conflict management and resolution,
and conceptual skills to help them in analyzing and selecting approaches to deal with
the conflicts. Ideally, organizations that may participate in PO should include
negotiation education as part of the leader development before any alert for a possible
deployment. Staff officers at battalion, the battalion commander, company
commanders, and selected platoon leaders would greatly benefit from such training.
(3) The following institutions provide expertise in negotiation and conflict
resolution:
(a) The Foreign Service Institute at Arlington, Virginia, offers a one-week
Negotiation Art and Skills course several times a year. (Phone number for course
director is 703-301-7186.)
VII-3
(b) The US Institute of Peace at Washington, DC, is one of the foremost
institutions for its expertise and practical work with governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. (Phone number is (202) 429-3872.)
(c) John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, offers a one-week course once a year entitled “Strategic Public Sector
Negotiation.” (Phone number is 617-495-1142.)
(d) Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, offers several one week
courses under its Program of Instruction for Lawyers, which is open to all participants
and always has a significant number of non-lawyers in attendance. (Phone number is
617-495-3187.).
(e) Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a nonprofit
organization that tailors programs for organizations and has extensive international
experience
3. Mediation
a. During most mediation, the mediator will negotiate with one party of a dispute
at a time to find common ground among the belligerent parties. Mediators must remain
impartial.
(1) Facilitation. Mediators provide practical assistance to all parties by passing
messages, providing a hot line, or securing a safe, practical venue for a meeting and/or
further discussion. Mediators must ensure that the parties understand the meaning of
agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international
community and the parties in implementing the agreements.
(2) Identify incentives and disincentives. Support mediation with a
comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives to the parties, to encourage them
to take positive steps and dissuade them from taking action detrimental to the peace
effort. This “carrot and stick” approach will vary according to circumstances.
Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of
the mediation strategy.
(3) Languages. The mediator must place a premium on basic language skills for
effectiveness. For most tactical level mediation, the commander (going down to the
patrol leader) will usually work through interpreters; improve this skill through
training. The use of locally recruited interpreters may provide a short-term solution,
but do not rely on it indefinitely. There are various pitfalls to using local interpreters
(e.g., ethnic identifications, political orientation, social standing, etc.). All may have an
unintended consequence. The military member can never be 100 percent sure that the
hired interpreter is working in concert with the PO force. In the long term, the
demands of PO negotiations and mediation require the military commander to
emphasize language training.
(4) Location. The mediator should try to conduct meetings/negotiations at a site
that is viewed as neutral by both parties. The individual who is allowed to negotiate on
his “home turf” is normally considered to have the upper hand. The following locations
are commonly used:
(a) UN Locations.
(b) Embassies.
(c) Other neutral sites.
VII-4
(5) Site selectors should consider the following factors:
(a) Security. Can forces physically secure the venue with protection provided
by the host authorities or another appropriate agency?
(b) Accessibility. Do not waste time traveling to remote venues, unless this
promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.
(c) Communications. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide
communications facilities that parties can also use to liaise with their authorities.
(d) Comfort. During protracted negotiations, ensure a basic level of comfort
to facilitate a successful outcome.
(6) Techniques. Use the following factors to leverage the mediation process:
(a) Identify the decision makers at the negotiations.
(b) Use and exploit the media during and after the negotiations.
(c) Maintain secrecy and confidentiality.
(d) Recognize political and military parties to the negotiation.
(e) Use of interpreters and translators.
(7) To be effective mediators, military members must develop competencies in
conflict style management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and
cultural awareness.
4. Arbitration
a. Arbitration is a formalized process of dispute resolution, involving the
appointment or designation of a neutral party by an appointing authority (commander),
or representative, in a formalized dispute resolution procedure. Two or more parties
with opposing views meet to resolve their differences in a formal setting similar to the
less formal methods of negotiation and mediation. The central goal of arbitration is to
resolve controversy between parties after negotiation and/or mediation efforts failed or
are deemed inappropriate under the circumstances.
b. At the very outset of the dispute resolution process, the parties to the dispute
must agree formally (in writing) to the selection of the arbitration process as the chosen
means of dispute resolution. This includes, agreeing to the appointment of an
arbitrator, abiding by the rules and procedures of the arbitration proceeding, and
agreeing to respect and comply with the final decision of the arbitrator.
c. The arbitrator’s role is formal, convening sessions or hearings necessary to hear
the arguments of the opposing parties, listening to witness testimony, if any, reviewing
any available written (documentary) or real (tangible) evidence, and considering any
other relevant evidence. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator
renders a final decision based on the facts and circumstances presented by the parties.
The arbitrator also prepares a written decision, complete with supporting facts, and a
summary of the evidence supporting the decision. The arbitrator’s final decision is
provided to the appointing authority (commander) and to the parties in dispute. The
threshold proposition in the area of arbitration is that the decision of the arbitrator is
final.
d. The arbitration procedure is often a useful tool in reaching finality, resolving
rather complex issues, unusual factual questions, or matters in which the parties reach
an impasse, despite the application of less formal negotiation sessions. Some key
VII-5
considerations in arbitration are the structured nature of this method of dispute
resolution, the selection of an impartial, yet trained arbitrator, the willingness of the
parties to a dispute to be bound by the finality of arbitrator’s decisionmaking power, and
the rigid nature of the arbitration process (adherence to strict rules and procedures).
VII-6
Appendix A
SETTING UP AND CONDUCTING MEETINGS
1. Background
a. Meetings are negotiations. Successful outcomes of meetings are a function of a
conceptual framework of negotiations combined with solid preparation and meeting
management techniques.
b. Meetings can range from informal one-on-ones to large group gatherings. Some
examples in a PO context include:
(1) Periodic meetings - such as with the various international organizations and
military units that are working in the area to harmonize their efforts.
(2) Voice concerns - Local NGO representatives desiring to voice their concerns
to the commander regarding the nature of military operations in the area and to resolve
conflicting priorities.
(3) Discuss mutual concerns - The company or battalion commander meets with
the local mayor or faction military leader in a bilateral meeting to discuss topics of
mutual concern.
(4) Coordination - The PO mission needs to coordinate with local leaders or
facility managers to facilitate access to areas, structures, people, etc., in support of a
detailed assessment or survey.
(5) Introduction - The ranking military officer in the theater, region, or local area
introduces himself to prominent political leaders and discusses issues of significance to
all parties.
(6) Incidents - A serious incident occurred in which coalition or US forces are
implicated and military investigators must work with local authorities to investigate
the incident.
(7) Joint committees - Joint committees are often established in the peace
agreement to assist in its implementation.
2. Preparation
Always plan and use preparation time before a meeting, just as the military uses as
the axiom of publishing an order so two-thirds of the time available before its execution
is available to its subordinate units to prepare for its execution.
3. Meeting Management Techniques
a. Meeting Worksheet
(1) For each issue that may be discussed in the meeting, prepare a meeting
worksheet, an example is Figure A-1. This forces the organizer to explicitly think about
the participants’ likely positions on the issue as well as the underlying concerns and
values that are behind those positions. These concerns and values - called interests -
are the raw material to fashion agreements and are a much better guide to reaching
agreement than stated positions on what a party wants on a particular issue. Forces
may need to link issues to reach good agreements.
A-1
(2) Equally important is the desired outcome of meeting. The desired outcome
for example may be achieving a certain agreement or establishing rapport with the
other party, to convey specific information, or learn certain information. Clarity on your
desired outcome makes for more effective meetings, even if that outcome is not
achieved.
(3) Finally, the worksheet helps the meeting facilitator think explicitly about
conveying a certain demeanor on the particular issue (i.e., firmness and leadership, or
open and receptive).
b. Rehearsal
(1) When significant interests are at stake, conduct a full dress rehearsal, using
colleagues and staff to play other parties in a scrimmage of the meeting. Rehearsing
the logic and reasoning while others respond, as the real parties will, will sharpen the
meeting facilitator’s presentation, identify weaknesses, and potentially adjust the
agenda to better advance the interests. If there are several members in your party, this
rehearsal will also resolve how to communicate with each other during the meeting, who
speaks, and other procedures to ensure your party presents a coherent and unified
approach.
(2) Where time or resources prevent a full rehearsal, the meeting facilitator
should divide preparation time between thinking about the problem and thinking about
the perspective of the party(s) invited to the meeting. Insights here on the other party's
interests will help better achieve your desired outcome of the meeting.
c. Setting the Ground Rules
(1) Meetings can have well-established structures, agendas, and procedures. All
can change with the arrival of new agency members.
(2) Other meetings do not have established ground rules, making it easy for the
parties to come to a meeting with their own conception on how to run the meeting.
Making assumptions, like everyone has agreed on the ground rules, in these cases is
easily a cause for misunderstanding. In fact, one of the first items on which agreement
is needed is the ground rules of the meeting or negotiation. Often, these discussions on
ground rules are best started informally in meetings away from the table before the
actual meeting. The ground rules become more important as the meeting grows larger
and covers more critical topics.
d. Breaks
(1) Many meetings are straightforward and follow an agenda proposed and
accepted before the meeting. Time is often of the essence and the instinct is to stay at
the table throughout the meeting. Taking frequent breaks for informal discussions and
consultations can better advance your interests than remaining at the table repeating
the same points over and over.
(2) Plan for breaks, and how and when to use them, during preparation and
setting the ground rules.
e. Observer
(1) Conducting the meeting will demand the full faculties of the meeting
facilitator. Have someone from the staff observe the meeting to lend a second set of eyes
and ears to record what happened, what was agreed, and other aspects that may escape
the facilitator as the spokesperson. One party may understand and agree with a
A-2
particular point, but the observer may catch a nuance or other reaction that the
facilitator did not observe.
(2) If time or resources prevent the use of an observer in smaller meetings, one
useful technique to use is to summarize at the end of the meeting to ensure that
everything was understood and review what had taken place. Paraphrasing is an
excellent technique to check your understanding of a point made by others.
(3) For larger meetings, an observer is essential.
f. Promise to Recommend versus Promise to Act
(1) At certain meetings, parties will make decisions with actions that must
follow from them. Many meetings, however, reach agreements or approaches that the
superiors of the parties at the table must accept or ratified. It is important to have a
clear understanding of what the superiors want. Preparation with superiors on the
substance and procedures of the meeting is important.
(2) In these situations, it is wise to promise to recommend to superiors vice
agreeing - promising to act. This protects credibility and the trust built with other
parties if the superiors change guidance after the meeting. Moreover, promising to
recommend can give needed time to make sure nothing was forgotten or overlooked
certain other effects of agreeing to a particular proposal.
A-3
Meeting Worksheet
Issue:
Position (Party 1)
Position (Party 2)
Interests (Party 1)
Interests (Party 2)
Desired Outcome:
Demeanor:
Figure A-1 Meeting Worksheet
A-4
Appendix B
LIAISON OFFICER
1. Liaison Officer
a. The LNO is a special staff officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsible
for representing the commander at the headquarters of another unit to effect
coordination, integration, and cooperation between the two units. Liaison, with its
accompanying responsibilities of coordination and integration, is a particularly
important part of command, control, and coordination. Liaison is the most commonly
employed technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous physical
communication between commands, and reducing the “fog of war” through direct
communication.
b. Duties and Responsibilities. LNOs ensure that all levels of command remain
aware of the operational situation by providing urgent, priority, or routine information;
verification of information; and clarification of operational questions. Liaison activities
augment the commander’s ability to synchronize and focus critical assets, ensuring
precise understanding of the implied or inferred coordination measures needed to
achieve results.
(1) Be familiar with all references listed before linkup.
(2) Establish primary, alternate, and contingency communications plans before
linkup and report means to contact higher headquarters.
(3) Integrate directly into the supported unit’s operations staff and ensure
inclusion/integration.
(4) Report any problems with the supported unit to the main unit immediately.
c. Reporting and Handling of Message Traffic. Proper information distribution and
message handling are essential duties of an LNO. LNOs are responsible for keeping
both the supported and main units updated on all activities impacting applicable
operations. The following procedures outline the proper format for conducting this task:
(1) Maintain a daily staff journal/log.
(2) Log all message traffic.
(3) Log all actions taken.
(4) Log all reports submitted to higher units and maintain a paper and/or digital
file copy.
(5) Submit situation report (SITREP) to the operations staff twice daily at the
times directed by the operations director.
(6) Report action complete on all Urgent/Priority traffic to the message center
immediately and BDA if available.
2. LNO SITREP Form
a. Use the LNO SITREP in a standardized format, to convey information from one
location to another to avoid misinterpretations. Figures B-1 and B-2 are examples of
standardized formats when reporting to higher headquarters: When reporting the
SITREP verbally, use of the phonetic alphabet is recommended. Always remember that
a SITREP reported using non-secure means must contain NO classified information.
B-1
Limit these SITREPs to personnel status, sensitive items status, and a plan for
transmitting a full SITREP through secure channels.
A.
Unit or Task Organization
B.
Time Period Covered (in DTG form)
C.
General Situation - gives a general overview of the operational environment.
1. Summary of last 24 hours of operations conducted in the last day.
2. Planned operations for next 24 hours - operations to be conducted in the
next day.
3. Disseminates information impacting applicable operations
(chart/attachment), product numbers disseminated per city or location, by
product name.
4. Operational Impact indicators - recurring events or observations, major
events that seem to be part of a trend, or something out of the ordinary.
Evidence that a particular event, product, series, or program is or is not
having an effect on the intended audience or unintended audience.
5. Survey results from AO - summary of survey results; surveys being
conducted (attachment)
D.
Operational Issues - directives from the supported unit that affect your
mission.
1. Urgent and Priority actions complete during reporting period
2. Urgent and Priority actions ongoing as of report submission
E.
Personnel Issues - personnel status.
F.
Logistical Issues - any logistic issues, requests for equipment, parts, supplies,
etc (in Red/Yellow/Green form).
G.
Sensitive Items Report - initial report will be a complete by serial number
inventory; subsequent reports will give status only.
H.
Other Issues
Figure B-1 SITREP Format
B-2
A. FROKA LNO
B. 121730ZJUL00 through 130545ZJUL00
C. ROK/US FORCES HAVE ADVANCED FROM xxxxxx TO xxxxxx AND
HAVE DISPLACED xxx CIVILIANS. xxx EPW HAS BEEN TASKED
WITH ASSISTING THE REMOVAL OF THESE DCs. SITUATION HAS
IMPROVED.
2 NK COMPANIES HAVE SURRENDERED VIC GRID
xxxx.
1. SPOKE TO CA REP ABOUT EPW SITUATION. SENT MINI
SITREP TO C3 TO NOTIFY TAAD/TED.
2. KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CA REP. CONTACT FROKA S6 REP TO
TROUBLESHOOT LAN CONNECTION.
3. EPW’S STAYING OFF MSR, 2 NK COMPANIES SURRENDERED
4. SEE ATTACHED CHART
5. SEE ATTACHED CHART
D. FROKA WILL CONDUCT JUMPTOC OPERATION 20JUL00. WILL MOVE
WITH S2 ELEMENT
1.
REPLY TO URGENT MESSAGE: GCCS-K SENT 13 0218ZJUL00
2.
PRIORITY PIR’S ‘STILL NOT READY DUE TO FROKA S2
E. NONE
F. NEED PENS, BLACK, BALLPOINT TYPE 14 EACH, 2 REAMS OF
COPIER PAPER NLT 15JUL00
G. ALL ACCOUNTED FOR
H. NONE
Figure B-2 SITREP Example
B-3
Appendix C
INTERPRETERS
1. Background
During PO, there are occasions when peacekeepers will lack the linguistic ability to
communicate personally and effectively with the local populace in the AO. The use of
interpreters is often the best or only option. The proper use and supervision of
interpreters can play a decisive role in the mission.
2. Selecting an Interpreter
a. In some operational or training settings abroad, CA personnel will not face the
problem of selecting an interpreter; the chain of command or host government will
assign one. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the host
government. Finally, in many operational situations, hire interpreters from the general
HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines are critical to the success of
mission accomplishment. This is an opportunity for the peacekeeper to truly influence
the outcome of the mission.
b. Considerations for selecting an interpreter are as follows:
(1) Native Speaker. Find interpreters who are native speaker of the socially or
geographically determined dialect. The interpreter’s speech, background, and
mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that attention is
given only to what is said.
(2) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, if an interpreter is considered
in lower social standing than the audience, that interpreter is ineffective. This may
include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious
group. Regardless of the peacekeeper’s personal feelings on social status, the job is to
accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land.
Accept local prejudices as a fact.
(3) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the
interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the peacekeeper
and the peacekeeper understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of
English is satisfactory. Check the interpreter’s "understanding" by asking to
paraphrase a statement in English.
(4) Intellectual Intelligence. Find interpreters who are quick, alert, and
responsive to changing conditions and situations. An interpreter must be able to grasp
complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence.
Although education does not equate to intelligence, the better educated the interpreter,
the better the interpreter will be able to perform due to exposure to diverse concepts.
(5) Technical Ability. In certain situations, the peacekeeper may need an
interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. The
interpreter may need to translate the "meaning" as well as the "words."
(6) Reliability. Be aware of the candidate interpreter who arrives late for the
interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less
developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. Make sure that the interpreter
understands the military’s concern with punctuality.
C-1
(7) Loyalty. If the interpreter is a local national, it is safe to assume that the
interpreter’s first loyalty is to the HN, or sub-group, not the US military. The security
implications are clear. Be very cautious in explaining concepts to give the interpreter "a
greater depth of understanding."
(a) Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous
personnel as "field expedient" interpreters. Be aware of the increased security risk
involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain.
In addition, if uncleared interpreters are used, limit any sensitive information to a
minimum.
(8) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously
affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In
predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may affect the gender of the
interpreter used under given circumstance. Another example is the Balkans, where the
ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target
audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is
important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or
favorable characteristics.
(9) Compatibility. The peacekeeper and interpreter work as a team. The target
audience is quick to recognize personality conflicts between the team members that can
undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an
interpreter, the peacekeeper needs to look for compatible traits and strive for a
harmonious working relationship.
(10) Choose more than one interpreter. If several qualified interpreters are
available, select at least two. Interpreting is an exhausting job; four hours is about the
maximum active interpreting time for an interpreter’s peak efficiency. Whatever the
mission, with two or more interpreters, the peacekeeper can provide quality control and
assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique comes in useful when
conducting coordination or negotiation meetings as one interpreter is used in an active
role and the other can pay attention to the body language and side conversations of
others present. Many times, the peacekeeper will gain important side information that
aids negotiations from listening to what others are saying outside of the main
discussion.
c. Implied throughout the preceding points is the need for a careful analysis of the
target population. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as
individual human beings and a genuine concern for their receiving accurate information
will go a long way toward accomplishing the mission.
d. Hire only honest interpreters who are free from unfavorable notoriety among the
local inhabitants, and whose reputation or standing in the community is such that
persons of higher rank and standing will not intimidate them.
e. The interpreter is a vital link to the target audience. An uncooperative,
unsupportive interpreter could jeopardize the mission. Mutual respect and
understanding between the peacekeeper and interpreter are essential to effective
teamwork. Establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain it throughout the
joint effort. Most of the time, the difficulty of establishing rapport stems from the lack
of personal contact.
(1) Background. The peacekeeper begins establishing rapport even before
meeting the interpreter for the first time by obtaining basic facts about the HN. Basic
C-2
information may include population, geography, ethnic groups, political system,
prominent political figures, monetary system, business, agriculture, exports, etc.
Obtain a good general outline from recent almanacs or encyclopedias. More detailed
information is available in the area handbook for the country, current newspapers, and
magazines such as New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, and US News and
World Report.
(2) Interpreters' background. The peacekeeper should show a genuine concern
for the interpreter’s family, aspirations, career, education, etc. The investigation of the
interpreter’s home life should reveal the comparative emphasis based on family versus
career. Another potential area to research is cultural traditions, both to find out more
about the interpreter and the HN. Though the peacekeeper should gain as much
information on culture as possible before entering a HN, the interpreter can be a
valuable source to fill gaps.
(3) The peacekeeper should gain the interpreter’s trust and confidence before
embarking on sensitive issues such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices in
conversation. The peacekeeper should approach these areas carefully and tactfully.
Although very revealing and useful in the professional relationship, draw deeply
personal beliefs gently and tactfully out of the interpreter.
(4) Orientation. Early in the relationship with the interpreter, the peacekeeper
should ensure that they are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. Orient the
interpreters with the nature of their duties, standards of conduct expected, interview
techniques, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the
following:
(a) Current tactical situation.
(b) Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or target
audience.
(c) Specific objectives for interview, meeting, or interrogation.
(d) Method of interpretation to be used - simultaneous, alternate, etc.
Simultaneous - when the interpreter listens and translates at the same
time.
Alternate - when the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or
paragraph, then translates during natural pauses.
(e) Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.
(5) Interpreters must not inject personality, ideas, or questions into the
interview.
(6) Interpreters should inform the peacekeeper of inconsistencies in language
used by interviewees. Example - an interviewee who claims to be a college professor yet
speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews this information
will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.
(7) Physical arrangements of site - if applicable.
(8) Possible need for interpreter to assist in after action reports, assessments,
etc.
C-3
3. Training the Interpreter
a. As part of the initial training with the interpreter, tactfully convey that the
military member must always direct the interview. Put the interpreter’s role in proper
perspective. Stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between
the military member and the target audience. Appeal to the interpreter’s professional
pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and
received is directly dependent upon their interpreting skills. Also, mention how they
function solely as a conduit between the peacekeeper and the subject.
b. Some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to "save face" by
purposely concealing a lack of understanding. The interpreter may attempt to translate
what is said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this can
result in misinformation and confusion, and impact on credibility, the peacekeeper
should emphasize the need to ask questions when there is any doubt.
(1) Other points the peacekeeper should cover while orienting and training the
interpreter are:
(a) Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation.
(b) Specific objectives of the training, interview, or interrogation, if any.
(c) Outline of lesson or interview question, if applicable.
(d) Background information on the interviewee, or target audience.
(e) Briefing, training, or interview schedules. It may take two to three times
as much time using an interpreter to convey the same information. For that reason the
interpreter may be helpful in scheduling enough time.
(f) Copy the briefing, questions, or lesson plan if applicable. Give special
attention to develop language proficiency in expected technical fields. This will give the
interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything
confusing.
(g) Copies of handout material - if applicable.
(h) General background information on subject.
(i) Glossary of terms - if applicable.
4. The Interview
a. Preparing for an interview. Select an appropriate site for the interview. Position
and arrange physical setup of the area - this can be significant when conducting
interviews with VIPs, or individuals from different cultures. Instruct the interpreters to
mirror your tone and personality of speech.
b. Conducting the interview. Whether conducting an interview, or presenting a
lesson, avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both of peacekeeper and interpreter
talking at the same time. The peacekeeper should speak for a minute or less in a
neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should
watch the peacekeeper carefully and mimic your body language as well as interpret your
verbal meaning during the translation. Do not to force the interpreter into literal
translation by being too brief. Present one major thought in its entirety and allow the
interpreter to reconstruct it in their language and culture.
(1) Although your interpreter will be doing some "editing" as a function of the
interpreting process, it is imperative that the exact meaning without additions or
C-4
deletions is transmitted. A good interpreter, especially if they are local, can be
invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.
(2) During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should
immediately relay them to the peacekeeper for an answer. The interpreter should never
attempt to answer a question, even though the correct answer is known. Additionally,
neither of peacekeeper or interpreter should correct the other in front of an interviewee
or class; settle all differences away from the audience.
5. Communication Techniques
a. An important first step in communicating in a foreign language is to polish
personal English language skills. This is true even if no attempt is made to learn the
indigenous language. The clearer the peacekeeper’s English, including diction, the
easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include use of
profanity, slang, and colloquialisms or military jargon. In many cases, such expressions
cannot be translated. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the
desired meaning. Examples such as "Gee Whiz" or "Golly" are hard to translate. In
addition, if a using a technical term or expression, be sure the interpreter conveys the
proper meaning in the target language. Speak in low context, simple sentences. For
instance, the military member may want to add words usually left off such as “air”
plane. This ensures the meaning will be obvious, and not talking about the Great
Plains or a wood plane.
(1) When speaking extemporaneously, think about what to say, break it down
into logical bits, and give it out a small piece at a time. Use short, simple words and
sentences and low context, for quick and easy translation. As a rule of thumb, never say
more in one sentence than the interpreter can easily repeat word for word immediately
after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought.
(2) Transitional phrases and qualifiers tend to confuse and waste valuable time,
so use them sparingly. Examples are "for example," "in most cases," "maybe,"
"perhaps," etc. Be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language
differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners. The peacekeeper should
determine early on what the interpreter finds easiest to understand and translate
meaningfully. In summary:
(a) Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
(b) Use short sentences and simple words (low context).
(c) Avoid idiomatic English.
(d) Avoid flowery language.
(e) Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.
(3) Whenever possible, identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing,
instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it
proper to stand, sit, or cross one's legs? Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from
culture to culture. Have your interpreter relate a number of these cultural restrictions,
and observe them, whenever possible, in working with the particular group or
individual.
b. Working with an interpreter:
C-5
(1) Position the interpreter by the peacekeeper’s side (or even a step back). This
will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention, or fixating on the
interpreter.
(2) Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against
the tendency to talk to the interpreter.
(3) Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.
(4) Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the
interpreter. Avoid saying, "tell them I'm glad to be their instructor," rather say, "I'm
glad to be your instructor." Address the subject or audience directly.
(5) Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be
enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and inflections
that would normally be used before an English-speaking group.
(6) Side comments to the interpreter that are not for translation tend to create
the wrong atmosphere for communication and are a distraction.
(7) While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening,
avoid doing anything distracting. Do not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, teeter
on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the
interpreter is actually translating.
(8) Periodically check the interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Have
another American, fluent enough in the language sit in on a lesson or interview. This
should assure that the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally.
Another way to be sure, is to learn the target language, which will allow a check of the
interpreter’s loyalty and honesty as well. Check with your audience whenever
misunderstandings are suspected, and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, ask
questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If not clear,
rephrase the instruction differently and illustrate the point again. Use repetition and
examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the class asks few questions this
may mean the peacekeeper or the interpreter are talking "over the heads" of the
audience, or not getting the message across.
NOTE: Finally, when the military member has acquired an effective
interpreter, make them feel like a valuable member of the team. Give
the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of their
contribution.
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