Главная Manuals FM 3-07.31 PEACE OPS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (OCTOBER 2003)
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Appendix D
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
1. Information Operations
Information Operations is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic
warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to
influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making
while protecting our own. (JP 1-02)
2. Nature of Information Operations in Peace Operations
a. In PO, the fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand that the military
commander engage openly within a complex environment.
b. Normally, The PO forces are latecomers to a situation that has a long, complex, and
convoluted history. The various factions will use information as a weapon through
censorship, propaganda, and disinformation. The local, as well as the international, media
are usually operating before the forces arrive and may be one of the causative factors in the
military’s engagement.
c. Additionally, allies and partner countries participating as a multinational force may
have troops engaged before US military involvement. The operational area will not be a
blank tablet. Information superiority will be transitory in this environment, making
absolute and sustained superiority impossible.
d. The commander must carefully consider the effects of IO before taking action. For
example, destroying a belligerent’s radio/TV broadcast capability in order to diminish his
means of propaganda making may bring favorable tactical results, but it may also have a
destabilizing effect on the peace process. By permitting belligerents to monitor activities of
each other, and the PO force, may provide the transparency that eases tension and increases
trust.
e. The information environment will extend down to the average person and the
peacekeeper at the CP. Individuals, by interacting directly with the media or on-line, can
become a powerful source of information that can challenge the more traditional sources.
Local events and the immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have
international significance as the global media broadcasts them. The aim of IO in PO is to
reassure, persuade, and influence the local community or communities within the
operational area and local region to consent to the PO and to work with the force for peace.
If the population was subject to propaganda by the belligerent parties, the population may
urgently need objective factual, truthful, and credible information. IO need to propagate the
core message, explaining the objectives and role of the forces, in advance of the arrival of the
force and update the message in a consistent manner. Be mindful the belligerent parties
will exploit any gaps in the message with propaganda. IO should emphasize that the
belligerents must resolve their own problems by highlighting the responsibility of various
local groups.
f. Additionally, IO may undertake the more specific function of disseminating
warnings, the future intentions of the controlling authorities, and the details of any
agreements reached between opposing parties. US PSYOP units will disseminate
information using various means to include: leaflets, posters, handbills, interviews, as well
as loudspeaker, radio, and TV broadcasts. Public affairs officials will conduct regular
information sharing sessions with local, national, and international media. The
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PO commander will also conduct regular briefings to media and government officials.
IO may also require electronic warfare assets to locate and counter the radio/TV
transmitters of belligerents, secure our own use of the electronic spectrum, and reduce
the usage of any party who may oppose the operation. Start IO planning early and form
an integral element of the overall operation.
3. Fundamentals
a. The commander takes the lead. Although supported by a staff and IO cell,
commanders set the tone and drive the operation. Commanders must involve
themselves to make IO succeed. They must make this their personal focus so that the
entire force can speak with one voice. Only commanders can provide the vision and the
guidance that will unify the effort.
b. In PO, commanders will often be the chief negotiators in sensitive situations, as
well as the focus of the media. Some actions they can take to unify the effort include:
(1) Establish critical information requirements.
(2) Develop a media policy.
(3) Provide daily IO guidance.
(4) Implement an IO decision cycle that allows commanders to obtain situational
awareness (SA), conduct decisionmaking, and issue appropriate guidance before
entering into negotiations and before the media exploits a situation.
(5) Incorporate relevant multinational participants into the IO cells and ensure
that IO fully integrates into the joint and combined targeting process. Integration and
synchronization should extend down to individual personnel.
(6) Support IO with intelligence. Without detailed intelligence that encompasses
the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological issues,
the military member cannot properly plan or execute IO. The IO planner will require
such products as nodal and link analysis based on accurate and up-to-date intelligence.
(7) Establish and sustain an integrated team approach. Successful IO requires
synchronizing all participants involved in the peace process. The combined effort must
include nonmilitary agencies. Additionally, the public affairs office and the PSYOP staff
must continuously coordinate with each other and have access to current and proposed
military actions.
(8) Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth. Journalists provide
immediate impressions and judgments, while the military relies on verified information.
For the military, accuracy overrides immediacy. However, belligerents can base
perceptions and decisions on initial impressions. Timing is essential in shaping
perceptions. Allow the public affairs officer to know operations as they unfold and
release information as quickly as possible.
(9) Involve every military member. The most powerful way to influence
populations is for every member of the force to be an information transmitter. Ensure
that all members of the force understand the information operations plan and can
articulate its themes to others. Under these circumstances, disseminate relevant
information, including bad news and mistakes, as quickly as possible to gain and
maintain credibility with the international media and the HN.
(10) Gain and maintain access to the information environment. The military force
must actively participate in the information environment. The outside media will be
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present outside the military headquarters and interested parties will be visiting the
force’s web site.
(11) Prepare for IO before deployment. The belligerent parties will have been
waging an information campaign long before the US. US forces should not wait until
they receive deployment orders to build an awareness of the informational aspects of a
pending operation. Commanders should consider pre-deployment preparation,
anticipating future involvement in PO.
4. Information Support Agencies
a. Several agencies are established and structured to support the IO process. Each
of the Services has an IO unit to directly support the Service needs. Request assistance
and representatives from these organizations to plan and conduct IO in support of PO at
the tactical level.
b. Below are examples of agencies that can support the tactical PO commander.
(1) The First Information Operations Command (formerly Land Information
Warfare Activity) is under the command of the US Army Intelligence and Security
Command and is located at Fort Belvoir, VA. The 1st IO Command’s mission is to
provide full-spectrum IO support to Army commands, specifically tailored to support the
land component commander. The First Information Operations Command—
(a) Deploys tailored Field Support Teams (FSTs) to help operational and
tactical battle staffs integrate IO with plans, and operations within PO.
(b) Provides access to DOD intelligence as well as IO-related intelligence
from other government agencies.
(c) Coordinates multidisciplined intelligence and other support for PO
planning and execution. Its mission areas include IO database support, HUMINT, and
counterintelligence.
(2) Air Force information operations support is provided by ACC, 8 AF and 67th
Network Warfare Wing (67 NWW). Assets include Electronic Systems Security
Assessment Centrals, Network Operations Support Centers, an Information Aggressor
flight, and the Air Force Information Operations Center. These organizations provide
reachback support to IO teams and other entities in support of Air Force, combatant
command and national taskings.
5. Media
a. Background. The journalist in an operational area has a tough, highly
competitive, and, sometimes, dangerous job. Apply the following basic principles in
dealing with the media:
(1) Freedom of the media. Do not offer any unnecessary hindrance to a
journalist’s freedom to operate. It is in the interests of law and order that the press
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should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence, and the intimidation of
civilians.
(2) Rights of the media. A journalist, like any civilian, has the right to speak to
anyone, visit anywhere, and photograph anything, provided this does not conflict with
the law, does not involve any entry into prohibited areas, and does not impair
operations or endanger life. However, coordinate all media activity with public affairs
to set media ground rules.
(3) Access of the media to military personnel. Any entry into military premises
and any contact with military personnel should be in accordance with the prevailing
instructions issued by the appropriate formation HQ.
(4) Accreditation. Normally media representatives are accredited before they are
eligible for official media operations support. The accreditation should require the
representatives to abide by a clear set of rules that protect the operational security of
the PO force. If the rules are violated, give consideration to excluding those
representatives from access to further official public information services.
(5) Transparency. Open and independent reporting is the norm. Allow
accredited media representatives unrestricted access in most situations. Give specific
warnings of dangers in certain areas without precluding media access. Threats to
personal security are an occupational hazard for media representatives. They are
ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.
(6) Liaison. Given the potential for political repercussions, keep commanders
informed of all significant developments of potential media interest. Make the media
operations available for detachment to incidents on short notice when necessary.
(7) Quality of Service. Make media operations support prompt, accurate,
balanced, and consistent. High quality officers with a proper understanding of the
operation and the military capabilities involved should assist media personnel where
necessary.
b. In practice, this means that members of the media may conduct their business
subject to the following:
(1) They have no right to enter military property without the permission of the
officer responsible for that property.
(2) The final coordination as to whether or not to give an interview rests with the
media operations staff. Politely remind the journalist to contact the unit press officer or
the appropriate media operations staff before conducting an interview.
(3) Journalists may not photograph personnel, equipment, or property within
military premises without permission. If there is a security reason why the security
forces do not wish a photograph to be published, e.g., an EOD team at work, this should
be clearly explained to the photographer, together with the consequences of
noncompliance.
(4) If the commander on the spot believes that members of the media are
prejudicing security, the matter should be dealt with by persuasion, admonition, or, as a
last resort, and only if a criminal offence is suspected, call the police to assist.
(5) It is possible that a reporter will deliberately wish to expose himself to
danger against the advice of the security forces. If persuasion does not work, give
warnings in front of witnesses as to the possible consequences of their actions and tell
them that they must accept total responsibility.
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c. The media may ask for priority at a CP. They have no right to this but their
livelihood depends upon deadlines and news is highly perishable. Where possible the
local commander should grant this priority after satisfying that the request is bona fide
and the operational situation permits.
d. Information for the Media. The media operations staff or those authorized by the
media staff should be the only ones to give operational information to the media.
e. Commanders, or those authorized by them, may communicate directly with the
media when the information given is strictly factual, where it relates solely to the
commander’s particular unit, and when the information requested is not politically
controversial or operationally sensitive.
f. Media operations staff approval is required before any member of the forces
agrees to give a statement or interview for TV or radio. Before considering any request,
the staff must know who will do the interview, which program it is for, and the agreed
scope and line of questioning of the statement or interview. Whenever possible, use the
best spokesperson, irrespective of rank, particularly if that person can speak with
firsthand knowledge of the subject in question. The chief media operations officer or his
representative should be present during any interview with the media.
g. Identification of the Media. Any person claiming to be a member of the media
should produce a press card of which there are many versions. Unless the military are
satisfied that a journalist is bona fide, do not grant access. In certain particular
circumstances, accredit members of the media and authenticate credentials with the
MP.
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Appendix E
CIVIL INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE AND
TEMPLATING
1. Civil IPB
a. IPB is the process commanders and their staffs follow to analyze the enemy
(threat) situation and its effect on military operations. Civil IPB is the process by which
commanders and their staffs analyze the civil component of an AO to determine how it
can help, hinder, or affect military operations. During some PO, the military has major
civil-military components, such as during FHA operations, MCA, and support to civil
administration operations.
b. IPB is a function of all staff members, with the staff intelligence officer normally
taking the lead in guiding the staff through the process. Civil IPB is also a function of
all staff members, but the civil IPB process is most effective when guided by the staff
CMO staff officer.
c. The basic civil IPB process is as follows:
(1) Identify civil information requirements.
(2) Identify current conditions (e.g., conduct a preliminary assessment) in the
civil component of the AO. See analyzing the civilian component of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops available, time available and civil considerations (the US
Army uses METT-TC, the USMC uses METT-T) below.
(3) Review civil information requirements and identify information shortfalls.
(4) Task appropriate elements (sensors) to obtain civil information shortfalls
during on-the-ground deliberate assessments.
(5) Task-organized elements gather information, using deliberate
assessments/surveys, and report results to a central location (e.g., the CMOC).
(6) Analyze results and share information with appropriate lateral and vertical
agencies.
d. Analyzing the civilian component
(1) Guided through the process by CA-trained personnel, the commander and
staff conduct a preliminary assessment using all available sources. The initial
assessment is continuously updated on reports of first hand observation of events,
personal reconnaissance of the AO, interaction with civilians, and research of applicable
data sources.
(2) Civil considerations are a factor in every PO. At both the operational and
tactical levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians
during the operation being considered. An appreciation of civil considerations enhances
the commander's selection of objectives, location, movement, control of forces, use of
weapons, and force protection measures. It also helps him avoid a phenomenon known
as “mission creep.” Mission creep occurs when commanders choose to use, or are forced
to use, their resources to address (allegedly) unforeseen civilian factors after they have
begun an operation.
(3) Civil considerations also affect larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and
informational issues. Discounting these issues can tax military or government
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resources and can hinder the transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the
military mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.
e. A simple technique for analyzing civil considerations, used by untrained analysts
or when time is too short for in-depth research, is for the commander or planner to ask
the following questions:
(1) Who are the civilians we might encounter in the AO?
(2) What activities are those civilians engaged in that might affect our
operations?
(3) How might our operations affect civilian activities?
2. Civil Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events
The following paragraphs describe a more appropriate and enlightened technique used
by professional civil affairs personnel. The mnemonic for Areas, Structures,
Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events, ASCOPE, is used to analyze civil
considerations.
a. Civil areas:
(1) In tactical operations, key terrain is any locality or area whose seizure or
retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant. The leader considers key
terrain in his selection of objectives, support positions, and routes in the offense, and on
the positioning of his unit in the defense.
(2) Civil areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s
battlespace that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to
consider key civilian areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military
mission.
(3) The commander must analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do
these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations affect civilian
activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically
influence major portions of the COAs being considered.
(4) Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should closely analyze are:
(a) Locations of government centers. These areas are often richer, more
populated, better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than
outlying areas. They are often the center of influence over the populace in outlying
areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider aggressively
engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.
(b) Areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city,
municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are often well defined and
respected not just by political leaders but also by the area’s population. Commanders
might consider overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for practical control
purposes during long-term operations.
(c) Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. These are sources of
potential problems and may threaten force protection.
(d) Agricultural and mining regions and trade routes. Routine economic
activities may hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Likewise,
interfering with operations related to the economy of an area may bring an unnecessary
burden on military units or logistical resources in the area.
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(e) Possible sites for the temporary settlement of DPs or other civil functions.
Often, the same considerations that make a site ideal for positioning a military unit will
also make it ideal for a DC camp or other such settlement. Commanders must consider
the long-term practical and environmental consequences of occupying certain civil
areas.
b. Structures. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Some, such
as bridges, communication towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional high pay-off
targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are
cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements.
Still, others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools,
television stations, radio stations, and print plants that may be useful for military
purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, function, capability,
and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the
consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic,
religious, social, informational implications, the reaction of the populace, replacement
costs, etc.
c. View civil capabilities from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer
to—
(1) Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public
administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.
(2) Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works
and utilities, public health, economic, and commerce.
(3) Contract resources and services to support the military mission, such as
interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors,
the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory,
military forces can take and use civil capabilities and resources, consistent with
international law.
(4) CA uses sixteen specialties to identify existing capabilities of the HN to
address various issues. They also identify the capabilities of partner countries and
organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, they consider how to address
shortfalls as well as how to capitalize on strengths and capabilities.
d. Organizations. Civil organizations are organized groups that may have
affiliations with government agencies. They can be church groups; fraternal, patriotic,
or service organizations; or community watch groups. They might be international
organizations of the NGO community. Organizations can assist the commander in
keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing
the actions of civilians. They can also form the nucleus of self-help programs, interim-
governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.
e. People. Individually or collectively, nonmilitary personnel can affect a military
operation positively, negatively, or in a neutral manner. The term “people” includes all
the civilians one can expect to encounter in or around an AO whose actions, opinions, or
political influence can affect the military mission. In stability and support operations,
US forces must prepare to work closely with civilians of all types. At this point in
analyzing civil considerations, the analyst answers the questions that were asked
earlier:
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(1) Who are the civilians we might encounter in our AO? Since there can be
many different kinds of civilians living and operating in and around a given AO, it is
useful to separate the term into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these
categories might include local nationals, HN civil authorities, expatriates, foreign
employees of multinational corporations (MNC), international relief organizations
(IRO), US Government and third nation government agency representatives, UN
representatives, contractors, morale welfare, and recreation personnel, DOD civilians,
and the media. In domestic support operations (DSO), they might include local disaster
victims, emergency service agencies, NGO, industry, media, and local, regional, or
national domestic civil authorities.
(2) What activities are those civilians engaged in that might affect operations?
Civilian activities are dictated primarily by the type of environment in which they
occur. Consider each category of civilian activity separately, as these activities will
have different effects, both positively and negatively, on planning factors (Battlefield
Operating Systems/Warfighting Function). The following are examples of the types of
questions CA personnel and supported unit staff planners must carefully consider for
the BOS activities in foreign operations. Similar questions apply in DSO. The answers
should, at a minimum, provide awareness of what units can expect to encounter in their
AO.
(a) Local nationals - these include town and city dwellers, farmers and other
rural dwellers, and nomads in the AO.
• Are the local nationals peacefully going about their daily life activities, or
have their daily lives been disrupted to the point that they require outside assistance?
• Are they evacuating their homes for safer rear areas, clogging the MSR,
and placing a burden on our limited resources to sustain them?
• Are they staying put in basements and other temporary shelters?
• Are they supportive or non-supportive of our presence?
• What resources do they have that we can purchase or obtain by contract
to augment our logistics needs?
(b) HN civil authorities - these include elected and traditional leaders at all
levels of government.
• How much influence do the leaders have over their constituents?
• Are they supportive of our presence or are they inciting the local nationals
against us?
• Do they have viable civil defense plans and the capabilities to put them in
effect?
• Are they seeking our direct assistance to alleviate their plight?
• Can they provide useful information about our AO?
(c) UN representatives - these include high-level UN representatives and
lower-level employees.
• What UN agencies are present and what are their charters?
• What is the relationship between our operations and UN operations?
• Can we expect VIPs in our AO?
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(d) US government and third nation government representatives - these
include members of the country team, the US agency for international development, and
similar agencies of foreign nations involved in the operation.
• What US and third nation government agencies are in the AO and how do
their operations relate to ours?
• What useful information might they have?
• Do LNOs need to be furnished?
(e) Contractors - these include US citizens, local nationals, and third nation
citizens providing contract services to our operation.
• What contractors are present and what support activities are they
providing?
• Do they need resources from us such as security, subsistence, real estate,
etc.?
(f) DOD civilians - these are not contractors; they are members of table of
organization and equipment and table of distribution and allowances units. DOD
civilians are playing an increasingly greater role in combat support and combat service
support. They will be there even in the absence of the categories of civilians listed thus
far.
• How many DOD civilians are in the AO and what roles do they play in the
organization?
(g) The media - this includes journalists from print, radio, and visual media.
• Are they self-sufficient, or do they require support such as transportation
and security?
• Can we expect their coverage of military activities to help or hinder the
overall mission?
• What aspects of the area are the media focused on?
(3) How might our operations affect civilian activities? Military operations affect
civilian activities in various ways throughout the spectrum of conflict. In war, conflict,
or stability and support operations, commanders should consider the political, economic,
psychological, environmental, and legal impact of their operations on the categories of
civilians they have identified in their AO. What follows are examples of the types of
questions CA personnel and staff planners must carefully consider for the BOS
activities in foreign operations.
(a) Political - at the local, regional, national, or international level.
• Do our operations support the overall political objective of the military
mission?
• Do our actions tend to improperly or inappropriately favor one group,
faction, or leader over another?
• Can opposing political groups, factions, or leaders exploit our actions?
(b) Economic - this pertains to local economic activities as well as the
activities of MNC and IRO.
• Is military seaport, airport, or highway traffic interfering with
commercial or developmental traffic in the AO?
• Are military operations attracting large numbers of vendors to our AO?
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• Is the local community truly benefiting from our presence or are the
actual beneficiaries inappropriate or criminal elements?
(c) Psychological - needless to say, military operations can have a
tremendous psychological impact on noncombatants. What we do to mitigate hardship
will influence the amount of cooperation we receive from the populace.
• Are we ignoring the innocent victims of our actions or are we doing
everything possible to ensure they are cared for?
Note: Negative public sentiment directed towards US forces often creates
force protection issues from asymmetric threats. Commanders must
consider this in the operations security plans.
(d) Environmental - Military operations affect the civilian environment in
various ways.
• What effect are our operations having on shelters, infrastructure, and
subsistence mechanisms in the AO?
• At some point, US forces must begin to consider what its role will be to
help civilians recover from the effects of our operations. With respect to contractors and
DOD civilians, how are do military operations affect their ability to support the
mission?
• Will contractors be allowed freedom of movement throughout the AO in
order to be effective?
(e) Legal - During all overseas operations, US forces are bound by customary
international law (CIL) to protect fundamental human rights, and minimize harm to
noncombatants and their property. The commander’s primary responsibilities are to
the mission and to the PO forces under his or her command. Pursuant to the law of war
(e.g., Geneva Conventions and CIL), US forces are under no affirmative legal obligation
to provide food, water, or shelter to noncombatants, detainees, or refugees, unless there
has been a declaration of occupation ordered by higher headquarters, as part of a PO
mission. In all other cases, the responsibility is with local civil authorities and/or
international relief agencies.
f. Events. Many categories of civilian events may affect the military mission.
Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations, both
voluntary and involuntary, that create DPs. Likewise, there are military events that
affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including
indirect fires, deployments and redeployments, and payday. Once the analyst
determines what events are occurring, it is useful to analyze the events for their
political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. An example of
the types of seasonal events, from “Seasonal Civilian Events” of the KFOR 2 OPLAN
that should be considered during analysis is in Figure E.
E-6
Months
Season
Civilian Events
December - February
Winter
Period of establishing policies and
prepositioning stocks for spring
(periods of reconstruction) Winter
Holidays
March - April
Spring
Harvest winter wheat, planting
(Transition Period) Continue to
preposition stocks; initiate
reconstruction; seasonal floods;
high birth rate from summer
weddings; get organized for
children back on the streets in
summer
May - September
Summer
Period of reconstruction; summer
holidays; prepare for winte wheat
planting; weddins; seasonal labor
migration by young adults; foreign
tourist season
September - November
Fall
School starts, children are off the
streets, young adults back in
school; harvest; plant winter wheat
(transition period); prepare for
winter and establish contingency
plans; elections and installation of
govenrment; first frosts (follows
elevation)
Figure E-1 Seasonal Civilian Events
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Appendix F
CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS
1. General.
Cities and towns are the focus of economic and political power. Because of large
populations, this makes them vulnerable to street violence and other disturbances that
can adversely affect the peace process. Urban operations are an important feature of
almost any PO.
2. Controlling Urban Areas
a. The intensity of operations. The intensity of operations may vary from a
relatively passive policy, designed to curtail hostile activities so that community life can
continue to a more active policy, involving military forces, moving against activists and
their supporters. The appropriate authorities should carefully consider the level of
intensity at which operations are conducted.
b. Belligerent Tactics. The adversary could adopt a wide range of potential tactics
in an urban area, including:
(1) Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and sabotage.
(2) Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the resources of the
security forces.
(3) Attacking resupply routes by damaging roads, bridges, rail links, or air bases.
(4) Provoking military forces in the hope that they may overreact and provide
material for hostile propaganda.
(5) Sniping at roadblocks, static posts, and sentries.
(6) Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.
(7) Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets, or indiscriminately
to cause confusion, destruction, and a lowering of public morale.
(8) Ambushing patrols and/or firing on helicopters.
(9) Attacking sympathetic members of the civilian population or employees.
c. Need for alertness. PO forces in an urban area have to be constantly alert, both
to avoid exposing themselves as a target and to protect those with them. Sentries,
observers in OPs, foot and mobile patrols, and administrative vehicles can all present
attractive targets. Support all movement with available fire support. Make troops
aware of the danger of discussing anything of a military nature, whether it is names,
locations, or movements of themselves, their friends, or their units, with casual civilian
acquaintances.
d. Deployment. The two broad alternatives are to base troops outside the locality in
which they are to operate or to base them within their operational area. The
advantages and disadvantages of the two are the following:
(1) Bases outside the area.
(a) Advantages. Commanders can set up a secure base where off-duty forces
can relax, rest, and possibly enjoy some recreational facilities. They can assure the
protection of such a with fewer sentries and less defenses. It is reasonably accessible to
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administrative transport, thus resupply and the repair and maintenance of equipment
and transport could well be carried out on the spot.
(b) Disadvantages. Reaction time is much longer and, therefore,
commanders may have to keep reserves at short notice and possibly deployed them in
anticipation of their being needed. If unable to return to base between patrols, etc.,
consider sending some administrative transport forward into the operational area,
which will require an escort and possibly provides a target. The journey time to and
from the base decreases the period available for rest and personal administration.
(2) Bases in the area.
(a) Advantages. Commanders can speedily and readily deploy reserves in
response to anticipated events, thus reducing the need to hold a large QRF of forces at
relatively short notice. Troops become more closely identified with the area in which
they live, improving their chances of getting to know the local population, the detailed
geography, and the habits of adversary groups. The ability to dominate the area is
probably made easier.
(b) Disadvantages. Troops can rest but not relax, they are constantly
exposed to the danger of attack, and as more forces are needed for local protection, their
duty hours will extend. Escort all administrative traffic, but understand that this will
put a strain on servicemembers.
e. Inter-Unit Boundaries. An operational area is usually allocated to units and
further allocated to sub-units. Clearly define the boundaries between areas. When a
boundary runs down a street, make that street the responsibility of one unit only.
Additionally, when establishing boundaries for units, keep in mind the boundaries of
police districts, either local or UN civilian police. If possible, these boundaries should
correspond.
f. Tactics. Make troops, employed in urban operations,well rehearsed and
practiced in the following tactical procedures:
(1) Guarding bases and installations.
(2) Roadblocks and CPs.
(3) Control points.
(4) Curfews.
(5) Search operations.
(6) Crowd dispersal and riot control.
(7) Some elementary aspects of covert surveillance.
g. Snipers. Immediate action drills should be devised for such circumstances as a
patrol coming under fire from a sniper. This is always a particularly difficult situation
as the source of the firing is seldom obvious. Depending on the situation, it may be
more suitable and appropriate to improve force protection procedures to prevent this
from occurring or mount a quick cordon and search operation if locations can be
identified. In certain circumstances, deploy friendly snipers reduce the risk of this type
of action.
h. Control of movement. Banning vehicle movement and parking in shopping and
other public amenity areas where activists are using explosives to terrorize and disrupt
the public may be necessary. It may also be necessary to require that all pedestrians
entering such areas be searched. While this may control movement and help to canalize
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hostile activity, it is expensive in labor and increases public resentment at the
curtailment of unimpeded movement.
i. Night operations. Night patrolling may be conducted on foot because vehicle
movement may be too obvious in quiet streets. However, many built up areas are noisy
and busy at night and mobile support could be a vital back up to foot patrol activity at
any time. Street lighting may be an advantage but it does make unobtrusive patrolling
difficult.
j.
Helicopters. Helicopters must hover if they are to see into narrow streets and
enclosed areas, makeing them vulnerable to missiles and sniper fire. However, these,
and certain fixed wing assets, are useful for observing crowds as they form and move.
They can act as airborne command posts and rebroadcast stations; resupply and
reinforce standing, rooftop patrols; and evacuate casualties. It is routine now for
helicopters to be fitted with surveillance devices, such as optical and terminal imaging
sights, video cameras, and night vision goggles; all have many applications in any role.
However, note that the prolonged use of helicopters over localized areas, particularly at
night, would normally produce a large number of protests from the population.
Reference the ALSA Center’s Multi-Service Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations
publication.
3. Controlling Underground Areas
a. Operations below ground. Movement below ground is usually feasible in main
towns and cities; it may also be possible in smaller urban and suburban areas and even
in some country districts. Underground passages provide additional approaches and
escape routes, which commanders must take into account when planning the defense of
installations. Most underground tunnels have a circular cross section so, if they carry
any sort of roadway or rails, there is flat decking with a space beneath it. This space
may be big enough for movement, but it will certainly provide hiding places for persons
and their weapons and equipment. Tunnels have access points, usually at both ends
and at intervals throughout, allowing fresh air to circulate. Access points or fresh
airshafts may, however, be sealed up in disused tunnels. There is always a danger from
an accumulation of gases and foul air in any tunnel; because respirators may not give
protection, provide servicemembers working in the area with breathing apparatus. The
underground systems include the following:
(1) Sewers. These are the most common underground systems that exist in
every large urban area. They may be as much as six meters in diameter and they
always have frequent access points. Where they incorporate a roadway, speedy
movement by large parties is possible.
(2) Railway tunnels. Underground railways are found in large cities and under
high ground in the country. Passage of trains and the presence of maintenance gangs
make such tunnels more hazardous to anybody attempting to pass through the area.
They are the most attractive as a means of access, at night or at weekends when activity
will be less frequent.
(3) Pipeline subways. Tunnels designed to carry gas; water and electricity
services will often be too small to admit the passage of a man. They do have frequent
access points and may be as much as four feet in diameter, thus allowing for slow
movement along them, and the opportunity to hide weapons and other stores.
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(4) Cellars and connection passages. Cellars are commonly found in urban
areas, and even where connection doors and passages do not exist, they can easily be
constructed to make an extensive underground system. This of course requires the
connivance or coercion of the occupants.
(5) Mineral mining operations. Coal or other mineral mining operations are
common and can occur anywhere. Access will depend on what type of mining operation
it is and the pattern in which the shafts are connected.
(6) Subterranean rivers. Any large town built in a valley will almost certainly
include streams and perhaps small rivers within its boundaries. If enclosed, usually to
carry off storm water or other like purposes, they will have frequent access points.
(7) Road tunnels. Because they are usually open to the public, they do not offer a
covered approach for clandestine movement. However, road tunnels below key or
vulnerable points may be used for surprise attacks.
(8) Natural caves and catacombs. In some areas, there are extensive handmade
and natural caves under most towns and villages.
b. Intelligence. Maps of all underground systems, including details of accessibility,
are typically held in the surveyors or public works departments of the local government.
The officials responsible for the services using the tunnels, and for their maintenance,
can give valuable additional information on physical characteristics such as the
following: fresh air supplies; volume, rate, and time of flow (if an underground
waterway); useful control, blocking points, etc. Supplement the information gained
from civil sources with reconnaissance. Check for subterranean access and
underground systems by other individuals or groups.
c. Denial of access. Deny access either by sealing entry points or making the
system unusable. The methods will vary considerably with the type of underground
tunneling, and success may depend on the ability of the military forces to maintain a
degree of observation. Some methods are:
(1) Spot welding access points; but where only occasional access is needed, as
any other form of seal is relatively ineffective.
(2) Installing remote sensors or intruder alarms; however, these will need
maintenance and communications, and employees using the tunnel system will know of
their existence.
(3) Sealing off parts of the system by erecting internal barriers; forces will have
to weld these into place.
(4) Flushing out the system with crowd suppressor (CS) smoke at low
concentration or by flooding with water. Forces can permanently neutralize parts of a
tunnel system in this way.
d. Patrolling underground passages. This is always necessary in any system, for
example, sewers or an underground railway, which forces cannot seal. It has the dual
advantage of discouraging unauthorized use and of enabling the security forces to
become familiar with the tunnel system.
e. Clearance operations. If hostile groups use an underground system in spite of
the precautions listed above, then forces may have to mount operations to clear the
tunnels. The main points to be noted are the following:
(1) Locating unauthorized users. Comprehensive maps are essential. If there is
no indication of where to look, then search the tunnel systems systematically. Gauard
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each part after it is cleared. Coordinated surface patrolling must support every
subterranean patrol.
(2) Flushing out. Use water or CS smoke, at low concentration, to selectively in
different parts of a tunnel system; the aim is to force those escaping into the open rather
than into other tunnels. Exercise strict control over the use of riot control agents in
confined spaces.
(3) Siege. It may be possible to block all escape routes and then wait for cold and
hunger to take effect.
(4) Physical assault. This is a matter of applying ordinary tactical principles in a
cramped and unusual environment.
f. C2. It will be more difficult to maintain close C2 of operations underground.
The following points should be noted and simple solutions considered:
(1) Communications. Radio may not work well and line may have to be laid.
Maintain good communication between troops working underground and those on the
surface.
(2) Orientation. It is easy to lose all sense of direction when underground. The
need for good maps has already been stressed; supplement maps with gyrocompasses
and overt signposting.
(3) Combat identification. Good communication and strict control of badges,
insignia, or special items of clothing will help avoid clashes between different parties of
the security forces.
4. Controlling Rural Areas
a. The characteristics of rural operations are that--
(1) The adversary has to rely more on force of arms, stealth, or field craft for
protection.
(2) Rural operations resemble conventional operations.
(3) Forces may find it difficult to distinguish between neutral and hostile
members of the population, but once hostile groups have been identified by some
aggressive act, forces can engage them with less chance of involving innocent people.
(4) The relatively open nature of countryside, in comparison to a town, provides
more scope for mobile operations and the use, where justified, of heavier weapons and
aviation.
(5) Rural communities are often small, isolated, more vulnerable to local
intimidation, and difficult to protect. This makes it easier to impose hostile control over
a scattered rural community than over a neighboring town. Also, even in areas where
the authority of the elected government is recognized, hostile groups may operate with
relative freedom because local people go in fear of intimidation and reprisal. This gives
rise to the following two broad types of rural operations:
(a) Control by the authorities still exists, but, in this case, force can use
relatively minor operations effectively to control, if not eliminate, the threat of hostile
activity.
(b) Authority has been so eroded that officials can no longer move freely
about their business, and effective control of an area may even lie in hostile hands. This
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calls for a wider scale of operation with, possibly, the need for measures falling not far
short of those employed in full-scale military operations.
(6) Minor operations. Tactics for rural operations usually involve relatively
small bodies of troops, although large numbers may be required if several mutually
supporting operations are mounted concurrently. The following techniques and
procedures are particularly applicable to describe a rural setting:
(a) Protection of personnel and guarding installations.
(b) Protection of VIPs, small convoys, large convoys, rail movement, and
picketing a route.
(c) Movement planning, roadblocks, CPs, and curfews.
(d) Patrols and covert surveillance.
(e) Search operations.
(7) Operations to regain control of an area. This section also describes the
tactical operations that units can conduct with the aim of imposing control in a rural
area, which is cultivated and has some small villages and isolated farmsteads. In
heavily forested, sparsely populated, or generally underdeveloped terrain, the inevitably
long distances, and poor communications could require the deployment of several units.
(8) Controlled areas. A controlled area is one in which the civil administration
and local police are able to work effectively. Hostile elements may still be able to
infiltrate, and isolated security incidents may occur, but the forces in the area should be
capable of limiting such acts.
5. Gaining Control of an Area
a. General. In an area where hostile forces prevent the civil administration and the
local police to go about their duties, operations may have to be mounted to reintroduce
control. The establishing of any secure base within a new area could have severe
operational risk and complicated logistic support arrangements. This would imply that
there is a need for artillery units, air resupply, CASEVAC and some degree of
fortification and dumping of supplies. The following will directly influence the conduct
of these operations:
(1) The strength and organization of the hostile activity.
(2) The support accorded to hostile forces, whether this comes from outside the
country or is self-supporting and dependent on internal assistance.
(3) The nature of the countryside, its accessibility, and density of population.
(4) The forces available.
(5) The operating mandate.
6. Land Borders
a. Concept of Operations. The aim of rural operations is to create stable conditions
where the law will be respected and observed, the civil administration can function
without the backing of enlarged security forces, and the civil community can move and
live freely without fear. This requires a dual approach, with the overall objective of
separating the hostile element from the population. These tasks are normally
complementary and require a careful assessment of priorities and allocation of
resources, but their combined purpose is:
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(1) To achieve and maintain the neutralization of the hostile forces.
(2) To protect the population by denying free movement for hostile forces
anywhere in the operational area.
b. Attrition. The basis of successful attrition is the contact intelligence provided by
constant close surveillance of suspected persons and their supporters. The surveillance
plan should be coordinated with every agency at the highest appropriate level, and full
use should be made of the entire range of techniques and equipment available
including: covert operations, covert patrols, and the use of attended and unattended
surveillance devices. Based on the information from the surveillance operations,
security forces can maintain a constant pressure on these persons by instituting specific
search operations, and by using selective personnel checks, head checks, house searches,
area searches, and screening. Effective surveillance will help gather information on
activists so they can be tracked down, neutralized, or prosecuted by law.
c. Denying free movement. This task is of equal importance to that of attrition,
and contributes to it by sealing off the activists from their support, forcing them to take
risks, and limiting their ability to concentrate for aggressive action. It is achieved by in-
depth road blocks and vehicle CPs, covering main lines of communications, and on
border patrols and special measures to combat specific tactics; for example train and
vehicle hijacking. Make towns secure using the normal techniques for urban
operations, and security force bases should themselves be employed as strong points
from which offensive operations can be mounted.
d. Approach to Tasks. The planning principles for rural operations are similar to
those applying elsewhere, but because of the necessarily greater dispersion of forces and
the larger distances place more emphasis on the following:
(1) Planning and intelligence. Carefully plan and control all operations to make
optimum use of resources, and base them on the best information and intelligence
gained of hostile tactics and habits.
(2) Strength and reserves. Mutual support is often difficult to achieve, and
security forces can easily become isolated. Therefore, mount operations with sufficient
strength to match the threat, and, in addition, maintain adequate reserves at all times.
(3) Use of air and space capabilities. Recent experience in land-based operations
has shown that air and space surveillance of a situation is useful. The increased
situational awareness for all involved forces has an overall positive effect on the
outcome of the operation.
7. Firm Base
a. Tactical Points. Mount all operations from a firm base, such as:
(1) Either the site of the local civil administration, or an area from which it can
operate initially.
(2) Accessible by land, over easily secured routes.
(3) Able to provide at least a helicopter landing point if not a suitable airstrip.
(4) Easily defensible with the minimum of force, preferably surrounded by
natural obstacles.
(5) Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic support and transport,
but not so large as to make local defense a problem.
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(6) Provided with physical protection commensurate with the prevailing threat.
b. Location. Locate such a base on the edge of an already controlled area so that its
rear is secure. If set up outside a controlled area, the requirements for local defense and
securing communications will almost certainly be too big for a single unit.
c. Establishing controlled areas. The methods employed to establish and expand
controlled areas are launched from the base area and forward operational bases.
Military forces are usually employed in the early stages of such operations with local
paramilitary forces being moved in to consolidate and eventually take over the areas,
which have been cleared. This frees the armed forces for further operations designed to
continue the expansion process. However, it is a great asset if the paramilitary forces
with their local knowledge are able to carry out or assist with the initial operations.
Although some activists will undoubtedly penetrate into and through controlled areas,
their opportunities for doing so in strength and for achieving surprise will lessen
progressively as the civilian population is won over to the local government’s side. As
the countryside is cleared and secured, the defense commitment for forward operational
bases will be reduced and more troops will be free for further operations.
8. Local Defense
a. Give the responsibility for local defense to a sub-unit because the commander
needs to concentrate on operations throughout the operational area.
b. Do not use troops assigned to base defense in pursuit of the main aim of re-
establishing control over the area
c. Hostile attacks on the base, even if they are unsuccessful, tend to undermine
public confidence in the security forces.
d. Intelligence. Closely-knit rural communities are difficult to penetrate, making
intelligence very hard to come by in the early stages of operations. The need to set up a
firm base on the edge of an already controlled area is helpful in this context because
information on the operational area may initially have to come from sources within the
controlled area. As soon as operations start achieving success, information should
become more plentiful, and therefore, take measures to provide means for those who
wish to get in touch with security forces to do so without undue risk.
e. Patrolling. In PO, patrolling is the primary combat activity in a hostile area.
For more in-depth information on patrolling, refer to Chapter IV, Section 1, “Patrolling”.
f. Extended Operations. It may be necessary to conduct concurrent operations
around controlled areas to relieve pressure, prevent reinforcement, or cut off an escape
route. Such operations will usually have a limited objective. Insert the committed force
to carry out its task, and then withdrawn within a comparatively short time. Accurate
intelligence of hostile activities is essential to ensure that the target is worthwhile, and
to give the maximum chance of success in an area that may be largely hostile. Holding
ground is not important, as forces must evacuate any position gained as they withdraw.
Usually, a separate unit or formation carries out extended operations, coordinating at
higher level. Communication between the units, which are establishing control and
conducting operations, is essential. Special Forces may be particularly suitable for this
type of operation. Helicopter and fixed wing assets may do extended operations. This
method of introducing the force saves time clearing a route and helps achieve surprise.
Aviation is also useful for reinforcing or resupplying such a force, evacuating casualties
F-8
and persons wanted for questioning, for extracting the force, and for local
reconnaissance.
g. Control Measures.
(1) Measures within an area that are under control should be designed to protect
the people and enable the authorities to function. Take account of the need to do the
following:
(a) Redress grievances and, where necessary, improve standards of living.
(b) Deter hostile activity, particularly subversion.
(c) Encourage the provision of information.
(d) Make the conduct of operations by the security forces easier.
(e) The decision to impose such control measures as the authorities allow will
be taken by the local operations committee, who should consider the possible
advantages and disadvantages of various measures.
(2) Explain the reasons for imposing control measures, but discontinue the
measures if they fail to produce the desired result. Some possible measures include:
(a) Banning all political activities.
(b) Registering civilians. Frequent inspection at irregular intervals of
identity cards, permits, and passes.
(c) Controlling food, crops, arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs, and
medicines.
(d) Restricting on civilian movement.
(e) Establishing curfews.
(3) In this context, a commander should not rule out the use of infantry support
weapons, artillery, air power, and possibly the availability of Naval capabilities. The
ROE for the use of these weapons in a PO situation is provided by the force commander
and cleared by each nation contributing troops for the operation. The tactical
deployment and use of the troops concerned would be like that utilized in general war.
For instance, deploy artillery to support patrolling activity, OP, and in larger scale
operations.
h. Safe Area.
(1) The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise
when any community is at risk from persistent attack. Proceed with caution, because,
unless those within the safe area are disarmed, they may use this as a base from which
to conduct raids. Give clear guidance on what is demanded of any force tasked with
establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably, efforts are needed to
counter the accusations from those within and beyond the safe area that the operation
is designed to assist the other side. Having received guidance on the required nature of
the operation, resolve other tactical questions, such as the protection of area and the
nature of the threat. Whether the threat is from small arms, artillery, or other indirect
weapons, including air or sea launched weapons, it has a significant effect on the force
profile.
(2) Protected or safe areas may contain residents, refugees, DPs, and substantial
numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with
the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance
to other organizations within the safe area. The first stage, in any PO designed to
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protect or make an area safe, is to demilitarize that area. This may require
enforcement actions. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to
defend the area, other specific military tasks may include:
(a) Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
(b) Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding
areas and sites.
(c) Occupying the ground.
(d) Dominating avenues of approach.
(e) Conducting patrols and searches.
(f) Manning CPs and other control measures.
(g) Developing of reinforcement and extraction plans.
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Appendix G
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS/INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
1. Background
a. For purposes of this publication, NGOs are defined as transnational
organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic
and Social Council of the UN. NGO is a term normally used by non-US organizations.
b. International organizations are defined as organizations with global influence,
such as the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
c. The list of nongovernmental organizations (NGO)/international organizations
found in a peace operation could be very large. Approximately 350 agencies capable of
conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with the USAID.
USAID publishes a yearly report, entitled “Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs” that
describes the aims and objectives of the registered organization. Make this part of the
commander’s library. This appendix gives a brief description of various humanitarian
NGOs and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) that could be found working
alongside PO forces.
2. Organizations
a. UN Organizations. UN organizations primarily concerned with PO include the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Disaster Management Team
(UN-DMT), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA).
b. The UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and
DPs. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted
through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the
UN system, NGOs, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is
critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with UNHCR before
and during the operation, or failure to meet UNHCR standards, may preclude the
UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military
disengages. To preclude this, establish a working relationship with UNHCR
immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR. Make a copy of the UNHCR
text that outlines specifications for refugee camp construction.
c. The UN-DMT is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to
persons compelled to leave their homes because of disasters, natural and otherwise.
d. The UNOCHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It
mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation
(through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes
awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related
matters. UNOCHA is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management
entities and emergency services worldwide, and is able to mobilize specialized resources.
The appointed UNOCHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership
to the UN team at the country level and coordinates locally represented NGOs. The
resident coordinator convenes the UN-DMT at country level, seeking unity of effort
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among all the various NGOs and agencies. The following UN programs help form the
UN-DMT when the UN system is mobilized to assist in the emergency and is expected
in the AO:
(1) UN Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP promotes the incorporation
of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all
aspects of disaster management. Work is long range. The UNDP senior member may
be appointed as a regional coordinator and may also serve as the UNOCHA in-country
coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance support to the resident
coordinator and to the UN-DMT.
(2) World Food Programme (UN) (WFP). The WFP is an operational, relief-
oriented organization. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation,
reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special
subsistence aligned to a special segment of the population. This organization mobilizes
and coordinates the delivery of complementary emergency and program food aid from
bilateral and other sources.
(3) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF is a relief-oriented
organization. It attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health
and nutrition. The activities of this organization may include social programs; food, in
collaboration with WFP; water supplies; sanitation and direct health intervention, in
coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO). UNICEF provides related
management and logistical support.
(4) The WHO is an organization involved more in long-range programs. It
provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care.
This assistance includes the preparedness of health services for rapid response to
disasters.
(5) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAO is an organization also
involved in long-range programs. It provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability
and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization
emphasizes local food production. It also monitors food production, exports, and
imports, and forecasts any requirements for exceptional food assistance.
e. Other International Organizations. Other international organizations include
the American Council for Voluntary International Action and NGOs.
(1) American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim (AIFC). AIFC
promotes development efforts and provides emergency assistance in Africa, Asia, and
the Caribbean. It focuses on primary health care, potable water, environmental
sanitation, and agriculture-based income generation. The most basic commitment is to
enhance local capacities at both the community and central levels.
(2) Catholic Relief Services. Catholic Relief Services operate relief, welfare, and
self-help programs in 74 countries to assist refugees, war victims, and other needy
people. They emphasize the distribution of food and clothing and the provision of
primary health care. Their capability to provide technical assistance and social services
has steadily increased in recent years.
(3) CARE. CARE conducts relief and development programs in over 40 countries
in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Programs are carried out under
three-way partnership contracts among CARE, private or national government
agencies, and local communities in the areas of health, nutrition, AIDS, population
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management, natural resources management, agriculture, small economic activities,
and emergency assistance. CARE provides technical assistance, training, food, other
material resources, and management in combinations appropriate to local needs and
priorities. Their particular strength is in food distribution, emergency transport, and
general logistics.
(4) Doctors without Borders/Mèdicines Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF provides
medical assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. The US organization is
closely associated with its counterparts in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France.
Medical relief teams depart on over 700 yearly missions to areas of conflict, refugee
camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care facilities. Their
particular areas of expertise are emergency medicine, vaccinations, and basic hygiene
services.
(5) The International Medical Corps (IMC). IMC provides health care and
establishes health-training programs in undeveloped countries and distressed areas
worldwide. It specializes in areas where few other relief organizations operate. The
goal of IMC is to promote self-sufficiency through health education and training. Its
particular areas of expertise are immunizations and primary health care.
(6) The International Rescue Committee (IRC). IRC assists refugees and
internally displaced victims of war and civil strife. Services range from refugee
resettlement in the US to emergency relief and assistance programs. IRC monitors
human service delivery and refugee processing for US resettlement. IRC can provide
emergency medical support, public health, and small-scale water and sanitation
capabilities.
(7) Irish Concern (IC). IC is one of the foreign NGOs that receive funding from
USAID and US Aid Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. Its primary area of expertise
is supplementary and therapeutic feeding and sanitation.
(8) Lutheran World Relief (LWR). LWR provides financial, material, and
personnel support, usually through counterpart church-related agencies, in the areas of
disaster relief, refugee assistance, and social and economic development. LWR is also
competent in the provision of health care.
(9) Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom)(SCF-UK). SCF-UK programs are
guided by a set of principles that include identifying project goals, implementing
projects, transferring necessary skills, encouraging self-help, and using available
resources. This organization is more relief-oriented than its US counterpart. It
concentrates on supplementary feeding, seeds, tools, and general infrastructure.
(10) World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. (WVRD). WVRD or Vision
provides cash, gifts in-kind, services in-kind, and technical resources for large-scale
relief and rehabilitation and development projects in over 90 countries throughout the
world. Development programs include child survival, vitamin A, prosthetics and
handicap rehabilitation, child development, and AIDS prevention and education.
(11) The ICRC works for the faithful application of the provisions of international
humanitarian law that applies in armed conflicts and undertakes the tasks incumbent
upon it under this law. ICRC is an independent organization based in Geneva. It
derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols
of 1977. Although, at times, it may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, its
mandate is to function only during armed conflict. ICRC neutrality is a vital aspect of
its involvement in any relief operations. The ICRC protects its neutrality in terms of
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(CH 1) G-3
reality and perception because it operates on all sides of a dispute to protect victims of
armed conflict, to include internal disturbances and tension. ICRC neutrality is a key
consideration for military planners and operators.
(12) International Red Cross Movement. The International Committee of the Red
Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies form the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement. The statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement give the movement other tasks in situations not covered by the Geneva
Conventions.
(a) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The
member organizations are the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that normally
operate within the borders of their own country. Their mandate is to provide
humanitarian relief during disasters. Red Cross organizations may assist other
federation members through their international alliance provisions. The basic
considerations for planners are to remember that these organizations also go to great
length to preserve their neutrality. NGOs are normally categorized into four groups--
• Humanitarian organizations such as CARE and Mèdicines Sans
Frontières (“Doctors Without Borders”).
• Human Rights such as Amnesty International.
• Civil Society and Democracy Building such as National Endowment for
Democracy.
• Conflict Resolution such as American Friends Service Committee.
(b) For detailed information of specific NGOs, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency
Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II.
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Appendix H
JOINT COMMISSIONS
1. General
a. Joint commissions have been used recently during PO in Cambodia,
Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Bosnia. Historically,
commissions were used in other operations such as the withdrawal of the Nationalist
Chinese troops from Burma from 1953 to 1954.
b. Joint commissions may take place at various levels. In any case, they may
involve battalion units in the outcomes of joint commissions. Battalion commanders
may attend commission meetings held by their higher headquarters. The techniques
and procedures in this appendix are applicable for the informal mechanisms that the
battalion and subordinate elements establish in their area for working with the local
leaders and population.
c. In a broad sense, PO seek to create the opportunity for the parties to negotiate or
implement a peace settlement. The terms of settlement should provide mechanisms to
help initiate and sustain the peace process; commanders can use well-crafted peace
settlements as guidelines toward a deeper resolution of the conflict.
d. Commanders have used joint commissions to provide useful structure and
process in the implementation of the peace settlement. Joint commissions are one
aspect of a number of actions that are fundamentally about political decisions carried
out along political, military, and humanitarian lines.
e. Dependent on the terms in the peace agreement that establish the joint
commissions, and the tasks given to the military forces in the PO, the integration of
efforts by the military forces may take place in the staff section overseeing the joint
commission process. In contrast to the normal situation, the integration effort is not
located in the operations section, but rather the synchronization of efforts is
orchestrated through the joint commission system.
2. Objectives of Joint Commissions
a. Joint commissions serve three main functions: translate political agreements
into actions on the ground, act as a dispute resolution mechanism, and assist in peace
building.
(1) Translate political agreements into actions on the ground. Often, gaps in the
peace settlement document (e.g., treaty) aren’t sufficiently covered - often deliberately,
in order to gain agreement - that the political and military mission will have to resolve
with the parties in order to implement the treaty.
(a) This is a double-edged sword. It may allow for the filling of gaps at the
next level of decisionmaking, when the momentum and other aspects of closing the deal
on the treaty so dictate. On the other hand, it means that the negotiation that must
take place at the commission level needs to have the political and military mission
members well conversant with the context of the compromise forged at the peace treaty
level.
(b) In other cases, the commission must answer questions of interpretations
that the treaty does not answer.
H-1
• In Mozambique the commission had to negotiate what was meant by the
term “offensive military action.”
• In Bosnia, factions often had interpretations of the treaty that seemed
reasonable and plausible, but were incorrect. Implementation Force (IFOR)
commanders worked with the factions at the joint military commissions to develop a
joint interpretation of how to execute a clause in the treaty.
(c) Another aspect of translating agreement into action that will arise is
problems in implementation due to resources, events not predicted, and terrain
considerations. Solve these at the commission level.
• In Cambodia commissions spent four hours defining the term “troops” and
“forces” in relationship to the presence of Vietnamese troops; even afterwards it
remained a difficult area.
• In El Salvador the treaty called for a separation of forces. The
commission addressed questions including where the encampments would be, how the
personnel would be fed, their health and sanitation needs provided for, and their safety.
(2) Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.
(a) Joint commissions are a way for the parties to resolve disputes that come
up over the course of time. Commission concerns may well cut across the strictly
military aspects of the agreement, often involving a separation of forces:
• Facilitating delivery of FHA.
• Movement of DPs.
• Violations by civilians in the zone of separation.
• Human rights allegations (someone tries to detain a person as a human
rights offender).
(b) Do not use the joint military commission for purely civil matters, carefully
coordinate any decision to use that forum for nonmilitary issues with political
authorities at the highest level. Nonmilitary issues might surface through the joint
military commission channels if there is a lack of alternate institutions, refer these
issues to the long range plans staff and joint civil commission channels for action.
(c) Each peace operation is unique; so evaluate these guidelines to the
applicability of the military operation. The military commission will have to resolve
some issues that are not purely military.
(3) Assist in peace building.
(a) Often overlooked in the initial planning, are the contributions joint
commissions - including joint military commissions - can make as a vehicle to assist in
the reconciliation of the parties so they can build a sustainable peace.
(b) Peace building includes efforts to identify and support structures that will
tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among
people.
• It may include disarming, restoration of order, custody and possible
destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security
personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening
governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political
participation.
H-2
• Formulate how the joint commissions can use this process of working
together to build other mechanisms or institutions that promote a sustainable peace.
The “political” aspect of peace building needs to precede other actions.
• As an illustration, consider the ramifications a military member might
encounter when disarming individuals. Consider other nonmilitary aspects
(psychological, economic, etc.) of the rifle and other weapons.
(c) The other aspect of peace building is to understand that subsequent
agreements may give rise to other disputes and questions while implementing the
treaty. Even more reason to build in processes in those agreements that provide for how
to handle disputes.
H-3
Appendix I
KEY DOCUMENTS
1. Background
The following is a list of key documents for peace operations. Not all are applicable to
every operation nor are all necessarily as important at every level. Some examples have
been provided and in most cases references are provided where to find example
documents.
2. Mandate
a. Mandates are usually in the form of a UNSCR. The PO force conducts
operations based on a mandate that describes the scope of operations.
b. Generally, a mandate should address the following points.
(1) Role of the peace operation.
(2) Mission of the peace operation organization.
(3) Performed tasks or functions.
(4) Size and organization of the force or mission.
(5) Appointment of the commander and any special mediators and their terms of
reference (TOR).
(6) Nomination of the office responsible for the supervision of the operation.
(7) General arrangements for financial and logistic support.
(8) Division of sponsoring organization and national responsibilities.
(9) Time limit of the mandate.
(10) Terms or conditions the HN intends to impose on the presence of the force or
mission.
(11) Statements of the rights and immunities of force or mission members.
c. UN PKO’s mandates can be found at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm.
d. Examples of a United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)
authorizing member states unilaterally or as a multinational coalition or regional
organization to conduct PKO at http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
e. JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations, Appendix A, gives more detail on UN involvement in
peace operations.
f. The UN Charter is located at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html.
3. Status of Force Agreement
A status of forces agreement (SOFA) is an agreement that defines the legal position of a
visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements
delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. The
military member can consider agreements “CA agreements” if the agreements delineate
matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and
population. With the advice of the concerned military commander, the diplomatic
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elements establish these stationing agreements. These agreements between the HN,
sponsor, and contributors establish the detailed legal status of PO forces. (See JP 3-
07.3, Peace Operations, Appendix B).
4. Terms of Reference
Based on the mandate and the situation, Terms of Reference (TOR) are developed to
govern implementation of PO. TOR, which may be subject to approval by the parties to
the dispute, describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics,
accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military
units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. (See JP 3-07.3, Peace
Operations, Chapter I, paragraph 7.c.).
5. Rules of Engagement
ROE are directives issued by competent military authority, which delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered. (See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, Chapter I,
paragraph 7.e.).
6. CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement
a. The standing ROE (SROE) apply to US forces during all military operations and
contingencies, to include PO. Commanders may augment the SROE for specific
operations. Commanders must assess the capabilities and intent of other forces and
make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command. Clearly
state the ROE in simple language. (See CJCSI 3121.01A, 15 January 2000, Standing
Rules of Engagement for US Forces).
b. These SROE are intended for the following:
(1) Implementing the right of self-defense, this is applicable worldwide, to all
echelons of command.
(2) Providing guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission
accomplishment.
(3) Use in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from
peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of
superseding guidance.
7. Rules of Engagement Card
See Figure I-1 for an example of an ROE Card.
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AS OF Date
IFOR - OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR
Commander's Guidance on Use of Force
1. Mission
Your mission is to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
2. Self Defense
a. You have the right to use force (including authorized weapons as necessary) in self-defense.
b. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself.
3. General Rules
a. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission.
b. Do not harm hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender. Disarm them and turn them
over to your superiors.
c.
Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile forces/belligerents, humanely.
d. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
e. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war trophies.”
f.
Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed Conflict to superiors.
4. Challenging and Warning Shots
a. If the situation permits, issue a challenge:
(1) English: "IFOR! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!"
(2) Serbo-Croat:"IFOR! STANI ILI PUCAM!” (Pronounced as: "IFOR! STANI EEL LEE
PUTSAM!"
b. If the person fails to halt, the on-scene commander may authorize standing orders to fire a
warning shot.
5.
Opening Fire
a. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces, or persons or property under your protection is
threatened with deadly force. This means—
(1) You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his weapon at you, friendly
forces, or persons with designated special status under your protection.
(2) You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or prepares to throw an
explosive or incendiary device at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated special status or property
with designated special status under your protection.
(3) You may open fire against an individual who deliberately drives a vehicle at you, friendly
forces, and persons with a designated special status or property with designated special status under your
protection.
b. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take possession of friendly force
weapons, ammunition, or property with designated special status, and there is no other way of avoiding
this.
6. Minimum Force
a. If you have to open fire, you must—
(1) Fire only aimed shots
(2) Fire no more rounds than necessary,
(3) Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property, and - stop firing as soon
as the situation permits.
b. You may not intentionally attack civilians or property that is exclusively civilian or religious in
character, except if the property is being used for military purpose and your commander authorizes
engagement
Figure I-1 Example ROE Card
I-3
8. General Orders
Commanders may issue general orders for various reasons, including conduct of
personnel participating in PO.
9. NATO Documents
a. The following NATO documents comprise the orders and ROE implementation
process for operations.
b. The NATO orders process (See MC 133/3, NATO’s Operational Planning System,
2000) includes three NATO requests/orders and three responses by the nations. These
document formats are NATO classified, but definitions are provided below.
(1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN). A decision taken by NATO that brings the
organization to a new state of military preparedness by allowing nations to identify
military used if operations take place. Answered by the nations with informal force
offers.
(2) Activation Request. A decision taken by NATO to prepare for action those
military assets identified for use should operations occur. This decision generates a
formal force generation process through the issuance of a statement of requirements
(SOR). This will formalize the informal request for forces made in the ACTWARN
phase. This is not a political decision to use military force. This is answered by the
nations with a final FORCEPREP.
(3) FORCEPREP. Statements by the nations to a NATO strategic commander
(SC) of their commitment to provide forces to his control for a specific operation.
(4) Activation Order (ACTORD). A NATO order authorizing the execution of a
military operation and requesting that nations transfer authority of forces committed
via the final FORCEPREP. Approval of this order is the final political decision by the
North Atlantic Council that is required before executing a military operation.
(5) Transfer of Authority. Statement by the nations transferring authority of
units committed via the FORCEPREP to a NATO SC for execution of a specific
operation.
c. The NATO ROE process (See MC 362, NATO Rules of Engagement) includes
three requests/orders.
(1) ROE Request. Request by a NATO SC to the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
for authorization to implement ROE measures as previously approved in an operation
plan (OPLAN). Not all measures in the OPLAN need be requested.
(2) ROE Authorization. Approval by the NAC to a NATO SC authorizing
implementation of the requested ROE measures.
(3) ROE Implementation. Order by a NATO SC to his forces implementing ROE
measures previously authorized by the NAC. The NATO SC need not implement all
ROE measures authorized. The ROE implementation includes any known national
caveats.
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Appendix J
TRAINING
Sources
a. PO forces must prepare to conduct operations across a wide range of missions.
The PO force may have to transition rapidly from PK techniques to combat with little
time to retrain. The following outlines sources of information for commander’s use in
developing pre-deployment training programs.
b. Universal Tasks and Operating Systems: CJCSM 3500.04C, Universal Joint
Task List (UJTL), lists the universal joint tasks at the tactical level as: develop
intelligence, develop/conduct maneuver, employ firepower, perform logistics and combat
service support, exercise C2, and protect the force.
(1) When planning training, commanders must consider the differences between
combat operations and PO and adapt the Universal Joint Tasks List (UJTL)
accordingly. The lack of air threat and a reduced requirement for indirect fire support,
can allow the responsible headquarters to relegate air defense and fire support
functions to a lesser priority, unless a substantial conventional threat arises. However,
intelligence, civil-military operations, and information operations take on added
significance. The following discusses the change in emphasis in each of the UJTL .
(a) Environmental. In addition to general environmental awareness
training, specialized training is required based on certain duties and responsibilities.
Address this specialized environmental training and much of the awareness training
through integrated instruction or supplemental material as part of ongoing unit
training programs. See Chapter 3, FM 3-100.4/MCRP 4-11B Environmental
Considerations in Military Operations, for further details.
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REFERENCES
Joint
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 01.
JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 Dec 03.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sep 06.
JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),
30 Apr 04.
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism (FOUO), 14 Apr 06.
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 07.
JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance, 15 Aug 01.
JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. II, 17 Mar 06.
JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Environments, 26 Aug 08.
JP 3-14, Space Operations, 6 Jan 08.
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 Mar 07.
JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, 8 Jul 08.
JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control, 9 Apr 02.
Army
FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 29 Sep 06.
FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 5 Jul 07.
FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 Mar 01.
FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations, 4 Sep 07.
FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 Jul 01.
FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations,
27 Oct 97.
FM 55-30, Army Motor Transport Units and Operations, 27 Jun 97.
FM 55-50, Army Water Transport Operations, 30 Sep 93.
Marine Corps
MCWP 3-35.4, Doctrine for Navy/Marine Corps Joint Riverine Operations, Apr 87.
Air Force
AFI 32-3001, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program, 10 Oct 07.
AFJI 32-3002, Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 14 Feb 92.
Multi-Service
FM 3-100.4/MCRP 4-11B, Environmental Considerations in Military Operations,
15 Jun 00.
FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37, Multiservice Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) Consequence Management Operations, 1 Apr 08.
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(CH 1) References-1
FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45, Multiservice Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons
(NLW), 24 Oct 07.
FM 3-100.38/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Procedures for
Unexploded Ordnance Operations, 16 Aug 05.
FM 3-55.12/MCRP 3-33.7A/NTTP 3-13.12/AFTTP 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations, 24 May 07.
Other
CJCSM 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task Manual, 25 Aug 08.
CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for
US Forces, 13 Jun 05.
Department of Defense (DOD) Handbook O-2000.12-H, DOD Antiterrorism Handbook
(FOUO), 1 Feb 04.
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GLOSSARY
PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A
ACTWARN
Activation Warning
AD
air defense
ADL
armistice demarcation line
AFI
Air Force instruction
AFOSI
Air Force Office of Special Investigation
AIDS
acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AIFC
American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim
ALSA
Air Land Sea Application (Center)
AO
area of operations
AOL
area of limitation
APC
armored personnel carrier
APOD
aerial port of debarkation
ASCOPE
Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events
ATP
allied tactical publication
B
BDA
battle damage assessment
BOS
battlefield operating system
BZ
buffer zone
C
C2
command and control
CA
civil affairs
CACOM
Civil Affairs command
CARE
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE USA)
CASEVAC
casualty evacuation
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR
commander’s critical information requirement
CID
criminal investigation division
*CIL
customary international law
CIVPOL
civilian police
CMO
civil-military operations
CMOC
civil-military operations center
CP
check point
CS
crowd suppressor
D
DC
dislocated civilian
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ
demilitarized zone
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DOD
Department of Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOS
Department of State
DP
displaced person
*DSO
domestic support operations
DTG
date-time group
E
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
F
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
*FORCEPREP
Force Preparation
FP
force protection
FPCON
force protection condition
FP Plan
force protection plan
G
GPS
global positioning system
H
HAZMAT
hazardous materials
HCA
humanitarian and civic assistance
HN
host nation
HUMINT
human intelligence
I
IC
Irish Concern
ICITAP
International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program
(DOJ)
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
*IDAM
isolate, dominate, awareness, and multi-dimensional/multi-
echeloned actions
IDP
internally displaced person
*IFOR
Implementation Force
IMC
International Medical Corps
IO
information operations
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlespace
*IPTF
international police training force
IRC
International Rescue Committee
IRO
international relief organization
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMC
joint movement center
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JP
joint publication
JTF
joint task force
L
LNO
liaison officer
LWR
Lutheran World Relief
MCA
military civic action
METT-T
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available, civil considerations
*MNC
multinational corporations
MP
military police (Army and Marine Corps)
MSF
Médecins Sans Frontières (“Doctors Without Borders”)
MSR
main supply route
MTTP
multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures
MWD
military working dog
N
NAC
North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIS
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NGO
nongovernmental organization
*NLCS
NLW capability sets
NLW
nonlethal weapon
NWDC
Naval Warfare Development Command
O
OP
observation post
OPLAN
operation plan
OPR
office of primary responsibility
OPSEC
operations security
P
PA
public affairs
PAO
public affairs officer
PEO
peace enforcement operations
*PERSEC
personnel security
*PHYSEC
physical security
PIR
priority intelligence requirement
PKO
peacekeeping operations
PM
provost marshal
PO
peace operations
POL
petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POLAD
political advisor
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