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Chapter 10
Financial Management
10-1. Financial management focuses on supporting local procurement efforts, funding and tracking
operations costs, and military pay support. Finance elements help access host nation and other support by-
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Paying for contracts.
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Providing cash to agents making local purchases.
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Providing military pay support.
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Providing limited support to other services such as cashing checks and currency exchange for
individuals.
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Preparing and instructing paying agents to disburse funds for purchases and or services.
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Identifying funding sources that are external to national funding of participating nations.
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Determining policy and procedures for operationally related funding.
10-2. Resource managers focus on obtaining obligation and expenditure authority. They also focus on
tracking the costs of the operation. Finance elements provide essential input into the accounting systems to
support cost capturing. Accurate, detailed costs are needed for reporting dealings with multinational
partners to determine how costs have been or should be apportioned.
RESOURCE MANAGER (COMPTROLLER)
10-3. The multinational force must develop a policy for funding the operation. Commanders need to
understand the importance of integrating financial management with mission needs in order to successfully
execute multinational operations. Every mission, to include peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, and
foreign humanitarian relief efforts, must be accomplished with a variety of funding sources and authorities.
The G-8 or resource manager is the special staff officer responsible for leveraging resources to support the
multinational operation. The G-8 is the commander’s principal resource advisor who is responsible for-
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Coordinating with other staff sections in the development of resource requirements.
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Providing guidance, determining requirements, identifying sources of funding, distributing and
controlling funds, determining and tracking costs, determining cost capturing procedures, and
establishing a management control process.
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Serving as multinational force principal financial management advisor.
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Representing the commander in identifying multinational resources and financing country needs
to the national authorities, national components, and others as required.
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Establishing financial management responsibilities for the AO. This includes designating lead
agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
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Providing estimates of resource requirements to the national authorities, national component
commands, and others as required.
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Establishing positive controls over resources and funding authority received.
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Coordinating with adjacent staff for managerial controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
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Coordinating with the staff judge advocate on funding authority issues.
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Handling reimbursement for nations providing services to multinational forces and others.
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Preparing finance and disbursing policies, procedures, and guidelines for the personnel annex of
the OPLAN or OPORD.
For more information on the G-8 and his or her responsibilities, see JP 1-06.
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10-1
Chapter 10
10-4. Each level of financial management is inherently responsible for developing resource requirements.
The G-8 uses the same basic process of receiving guidance, determining total resource requirements,
applying available resources to those requirements, and identifying unresourced requirements. Determining
what resources are required and available to support the mission and meet the commander’s intent is a
responsibility that is common to all levels of financial management.
RESOURCING GUIDANCE
10-5. Resourcing guidance may come from multiple sources. It is the G-8’s responsibility to-
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Provide consistent financial management guidance in support of operations. This includes being
involved in the staff estimate process, development of the OPLAN or OPORD and, when
necessary, conducting an economic analysis of the AO.
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Ensure consistency of financial service support. The DOD and the military services financial
managers will coordinate with the G-8 to ensure that consistent financial services are provided
to all personnel assigned to the joint force commander. This includes making appropriate
provisions for military pay and services, payment of travel entitlements, and cash operations to
support service member requirements.
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Ensure the most efficient use of all available resources. At some level and to some degree,
resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the commander must
continuously consider limitations on available resources, but not to the detriment of mission
accomplishment.
10-6. The G-8, in conjunction with the legal advisor, provides the commander with advice and
recommendations on all legal aspects of financial management. This requirement is derived from fiscal
law. Preventing shortfalls during operations presents unique challenges. Every mission requires use of a
variety of funding sources, authorities, assistance, HN support, and extraordinary reimbursement
procedures. The G-8 must perform two key functions for the commander:
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Ensure that resources are available when and where they are needed.
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Aid the commander in maintaining his or her fiscal responsibilities.
10-7. Determining requirements relies heavily on the commander’s guidance, OPLANs, and input from the
adjacent staff and subordinate units. The G-8 focuses on the detailed resource requirements for each
mission or task (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Armed with these details, G-8s use cost
factors—UN, NATO, or coalition approved—to verify and validate event and task costs.
FUNDING
10-8. The commander will have numerous sources of appropriated funds available for multinational
operations. These sources include DOD and other federal agency appropriations, as well as UN or coalition
funding authorities. It is critical that the G-8 understands the time, purpose, and amount of each funding
authority. The G-8 must understand the prescribed method of obligating funds, tracking costs, and
reporting requirements. G-8s must consider all sources of available funds, with their restrictions and
variations, to effectively and efficiently resource the mission. Doing so reduces the immediate impact on
the commander’s internal funds and maximizes the commander’s flexibility. The G-8 must understand the
multiple funding sources or agreements and their numerous national, international, or coalition specific
purposes, availability, and constraints to keep the commander informed. In short, G-8s must understand
funding sources to-
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Accomplish the missions assigned.
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Maximize all resource options.
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Avoid violations of fraud, waste, or abuse.
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Determine costs.
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Financial Management
10-9. G-8s are responsible to their commander when determining and validating costs to accomplish the
mission. Accurate and detailed determination of costs (by type) enables the G-8 to-
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Determine a baseline for future planning.
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Estimate future costs.
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Properly allocate resources.
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Develop a baseline for monitoring execution.
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Report costs.
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Seek proper reimbursement.
10-10. The process of preparing budget cost estimates in support of the commander’s intent is the same as
the one for developing an OPLAN. The G-8 must delineate the specified, implied, and essential tasks
associated with resources, and understand the mission and commander’s intent two echelons above. He or
she must make assumptions concerning a variety of factors (such as the operation’s duration, logistic
support, force size, environmental conditions, transportation, special pay and allowances, multi-national
participants, and so forth). Additionally, the G-8 must consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) when developing
assumptions and cost estimates. Several methods are available to determine costs for requirements. G-8s
can estimate costs using standard cost factors or models, historical data, or the best judgment if no standard
cost factors exist.
FUNDING AND CONTROL PROCESSES
10-11. Coalition commands will receive their operating budget in various ways and through numerous
channels such as DOD, Department of State, or UN. Often the responsible executive agency or government
will provide coalition operations with internal funds and seek reimbursement for all appropriate and agreed
upon costs after the initial phases of the operation. Methods of reimbursement vary, but all require that a
manual receipt is available, an approved automated accounting system is used, and evidence that the goods
or services are used for the intended purpose of the mission. The G-8 must have accurate cost capturing
methods to depict the costs by type for reimbursement.
10-12. Commanders determine how their funds are distributed and controlled by the G-8. However,
certain staff elements may direct the G-8 on the use, release, or flow of funds in support of the
commander’s guidance and intent. As the commander’s executive agent, the G-8 distributes, controls, and
monitors the execution of resources. G-8s control funds by centralized or decentralized methods.
Regardless of the method, G-8s must have effective and efficient fund certification and control to maintain
accuracy, ensure proper fiscal use, and capture costs.
10-13. Accounting systems track costs (by event, program, unit) based on a fiscal code. G-8s—who must
keep their commanders informed on a daily basis of all aspects of financial management—use the fiscal
code for two main purposes:
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First, the fiscal code helps track expenditures at a detailed level.
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Second, the fiscal code helps prepare and present fiscal information to the command and staff,
including the status of funds, mission or event cost, and obligation rates.
10-14. G-8s must establish cost-capturing procedures for both internal and external reporting
requirements. This provides visibility of estimated and/or actual commitments, obligations, and
reimbursable and future costs. Reporting procedures should provide accurate information while remaining
simple and flexible.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
10-3
Chapter 10
10-15. In accordance with AR 11-2, all commanders have an inherent responsibility to establish and
maintain effective management controls, assess areas of risk, identify and correct weaknesses in those
controls, and keep their superiors informed. The G-8 coordinates management controls throughout the unit.
The management control process is designed to provide reasonable assurance that accountability and
control procedures comply with applicable laws and regulations. As it pertains to financial management,
the management control program provides reasonable assurance that obligations and costs comply with
international/coalition agreements, that funds are protected, and that proper accounting is kept of all
expenditures. The management control process must be established as soon as possible, but not at the
expense of operational or tactical considerations.
REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES
10-16. Reimbursable costs will occur during multinational operations as a result of providing support to
other nations, organizations, units, and sister services or agencies. Support is defined as performing a
service or providing a product to another organization. At the strategic level, reimbursement is coordinated
from the UN, NATO, foreign nations, NGOs, or private volunteer organizations. Usually, costs reimbursed
only cover incremental costs to organizations (the percentage over and above normal operating costs).
10-17. For U.S. forces, Congress must authorize provisions of certain support and judge advocate general
reviews are required. Throughout operations, careful consideration must be given to funding, monitoring
expenditure authority (see DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 15), maintaining
accountability, tracking costs, and tracking support received from or provided to the foreign nation, UN, or
other designated agencies. This information is necessary to determine the detailed costs of an operation or
event and to support the process of billing for reimbursement at all levels. Congress requires detailed
reports on the projected and actual costs of operations. Accurate, detailed cost reports are needed to
determine what types of goods or services to charge. G-8s capture these costs and provide the required
reports and detailed billings.
10-18. When the commander establishes support agreements, the G-8 should ensure that the requesting
units and agencies understand what assistance can be rendered. If a current agreement exists, the G-8—
with legal assistance, if necessary—reviews the agreement for proper procedures and support. If an
agreement does not exist, the G-8 coordinates with the logistics and legal staff counterparts for required
support.
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Financial Management
CHECKLIST
Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the
following questions with respect to financial management.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
10-19. What are the arrangements to provide or receive multinational support to the local procurement
process?
10-20. Who is providing check-cashing funding for finance elements of other nations?
10-21. What are the limitations on the amounts of cash payments (including check cashing) that Soldiers
may receive in the AO? Who imposes the limitations?
10-22. How will the multinational force finance support provide currency exchange?
10-23. Will contracted subsistence support to the command affect entitlements to personnel?
10-24. What financial support weapon bounties and claims are needed?
G-8
10-25. Have support agreements been analyzed for financial management implications?
10-26. Has an executive agent been designated?
10-27. Has the financial management appendix to the OPLAN been prepared?
10-28. Have cost capturing mechanisms been established?
10-29. Will financial management support be required for other agencies (such as MWR, ICRC, NGOs,
private volunteer organizations, and PA)?
10-30. If necessary, are unique reimbursement procedures through the UN required to capture
incremental costs?
10-31. If required, have special appropriations been requested?
10-32. Have procedures been implemented to track multinational support costs and review billing
procedures?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
10-5
Chapter 11
Health Service Support
HSS plays a key role in developing and maintaining combat power and can be a
major factor in achieving strategic goals. The health services mission is promoting
health, preventing casualties, and providing medical units capable of responding to
the challenging worldwide deployments in multinational operations. How HSS is
delivered in the field may be a factor in a particular nation’s decision to participate.
Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination
and planning.
The multinational forces commander must ensure that forces deliver medical care
rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the multinational forces
mission. Health care is a national responsibility. The command must assess HSS
requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively and provide
guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. Any
medical services that a nation can not provide must be covered by agreements
between national governments of the nations making up the multinational force. This
requires coordinating all HSS assets, providing a detailed health plan, and conducting
effective liaison between the senior health service officers of each nation. The
multinational command surgeon plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the HSS plan
based on actual capabilities of contributing nations with standing health agreements
between the contributing nations. The concept of one nation’s forces being treated by
another nation’s medical personnel or in another nation’s treatment facilities should
be achievable.
PRINCIPLES
11-1. For effective and efficient multinational medical support, personnel must adhere to long established
principles. The following principles should be the focus of each nation’s health service:
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Conformity with operations and administrative plans.
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Proximity to forces being supported.
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Flexibility to change with the tactical picture.
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Mobility to maintain contact with supported units.
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Continuity of treatment through the casualty management system.
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Protection and prevention to minimize avoidable casualties.
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C2 of health assets clearly defined at an appropriate level.
For an in-depth discussion of these principles, see FM 8-55 or ABCA Publication 256.
MEDICAL STAFF
11-2. It is necessary to identify a command surgeon early in the process to oversee and coordinate HSS
activities and to advise the multinational forces commander. This surgeon should be involved in all
planning and provide a representative to the assessment team. (See Chapter 1.)
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Chapter 11
11-3. The multinational forces surgeon’s office, staffed with representatives from participating nations,
must be established to facilitate the development of the HSS plan.
11-4. Specific responsibilities of the multinational forces surgeon during the force generation process
include the following:
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Identifying the HSS assets required to support the planned operation.
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Determining the disease and nonbattle injury rate for planning purposes.
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Obtaining the casualty rates from the operations officer.
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Developing the multinational forces health plan.
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Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other service
sources.
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Advising the multinational forces commander on health risks relevant to the operation.
COMMAND SURGEON
11-5. The command surgeon is responsible to the commander for medical support in the AO. The surgeon
should have direct access to the commander as chief medical advisor. He or she must understand the
medical capacities and capabilities of all multinational nations. The surgeon should plan to deploy medical
personnel early so they can establish, monitor, and evaluate HSS. The surgeon’s staff should have
representatives from all nations.
11-6. The surgeon prepares the HSS plan and medical annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. This plan should-
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Define the scope of medical care to be delivered in detail.
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Allocate resources.
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Determine the number of medical personnel required to staff the multinational surgeon’s office.
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Detail the medical resources required to support the operation.
11-7. The surgeon coordinates HSS provided to or received from multinational forces and the appropriate
reimbursements. The surgeon also advises the commander on the following:
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HSS to the operation.
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Intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution.
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Preventive medicine.
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Dental and veterinary medicine requirements.
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Other medical factors that could affect operations.
11-8. In addition, the surgeon performs the following:
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Informs the commander on the status of HSS units and assistance required by and provided to
the civilian populace and multinational nationals.
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Reviews health programs of civilian agencies in the AO to determine the feasibility for
emergency usage. Advises on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the AO.
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Establishes and coordinates a comprehensive medical logistics system for medical materiel,
blood, and fluids.
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Supervises the activities of any medical cells, boards, and centers established by the
multinational. For example, he or she would supervise a patient movement center to identify bed
space requirements and the movement of patients within and out of the AO.
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Coordinates medical intelligence support for HSS organizations.
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Develops a preventive medicine program that-
Includes pre- and post-surveillance programs.
Evaluates infectious disease risks.
Determines the requirements for an entomologist for vector control.
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Provides technical assistance and advice to the CMOC.
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Ensures liaison is established with each nation’s surgeon.
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Health Service Support
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Resolves the multinational medical equipment and supply requirement because medical items
frequently require long lead-times and special handling.
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Identifies and coordinates appropriate medical facility accreditation and medical professional
certification requirements.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
11-9. As a multinational force matures, the members will centralize their efforts by establishing a lead
nation command structure. Subordinate national commands will maintain national integrity. The lead
nation command establishes integrated staff sections with the composition determined by the leadership. A
national commander commands all elements including the supporting combat HSS system. For command
purposes, the commanders normally delegate command of their assigned HSS resources to their senior
HSS officer, located in the national support element. At each level of command, the senior HSS officer
must possess the right of direct access to the commander on matters affecting the health of the command.
11-10. The command relationships of the HSS components must be clearly defined when the
multinational forces are organized. These relationships must be embodied in the command directives issued
to each national component commander by the authority creating the multinational force. Operational
(technical) control of national HSS resources may be delegated to the senior HSS officer to facilitate
overall coordination of resources in the theater of operations. It may not be possible to establish C2 over all
participants. Some nations may have specific requirements that limit how much command authority the
multinational or national commanders can exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense may not
exist and a system of cooperation may exist in its place.
11-11. During operations, the responsibilities of the senior HSS officer at each level include the
following:
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Advising the commander on the health of the command.
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Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of health care.
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Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring HSS policy and procedures with
commanders of National Health Service units.
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Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other Service
sources.
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Monitoring the activities of HSS assets assigned to their command.
11-12. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation must understand the legal limits
concerning the use of nonnational medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their
nations’ forces. Exchanging blood between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated as early as
possible. Mutual medical support must be in accordance with existing legal directives. Coordination for
any lead nation, role specialization, or ACSA authority must be addressed during the multinational
planning process. Casualty evacuation, especially outside the AO, and the use of nonnational medical
facilities requires careful planning and an agreement.
PLANNING
11-13. HSS planning is done at all levels. The process aims at developing a system that provides for the
best possible use of HSS resources in a given situation. Details of the HSS planning process are contained
in ABCA Publication 256. Considerations include the operational situation (commander’s overall mission)
and basic medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate appropriate to the theater of
operations. Issues specific to the operation also should be identified and considered in planning.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
11-3
Chapter 11
11-14. The following factors are normally critical aspects of HSS planning:
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Mission and type of operation.
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Operation concept or plan.
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Anticipated duration of the operation.
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Evacuation policy from the combat zone to the theater of operations.
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Selection and consideration of the HSS aim.
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Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.
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Health surveillance.
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Provision of casualty estimate by the staff and effects on health care delivery.
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Availability of and restrictions on resources.
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Availability and access to HN facilities.
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C2 requirements and limitations.
THREAT ASSESSMENT
11-15. The medical threat assessment is a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions and
environmental conditions that might reduce the effectiveness of the multinational forces through wounds,
injuries, diseases, or psychological stressors.
11-16. The medical threat is a composite of-
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Infectious disease.
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Environmental conditions.
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Occupational health threats.
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Conventional and irregular warfare.
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Biological warfare.
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Chemical warfare agents.
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Directed-energy weapons.
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Blast effect weapons.
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Combat operational stress.
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Flame and incendiary weapons.
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Nuclear warfare.
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Radiological agents.
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Accidents.
POLICIES AND ISSUES
11-17. Force HSS policies must be established to cover the many facets of HSS in multinational
operations. The multinational forces surgeon establishes policies with senior health services officers of
contributing nations.
11-18. Subject areas for force policy and coordination include the following:
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Eligibility for medical care including noncombatants, contractors, displaced persons, refugees,
and HN civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.
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Coordinating HSS provided to or received from the multinational forces or other friendly
nations to include using HN facilities.
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Mass casualty response plan.
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Establishing liaison with each nation’s surgeon.
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Medical regulating, to include evacuating casualties to nonnational medical facilities.
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Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.
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Policies on the exchange of medical equipment accompanying patients.
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Health Service Support
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Policies on transferring a patient from one nation’s evacuation system to another.
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Mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another
nation’s medical facility.
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Medical support to detainee/enemy POWs operations and facilities.
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Establishing an evacuation system for the theater of operations, to include defining the theater’s
holding and evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.
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Determining HSS reports and returns required, including format, content, and frequency.
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Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that should include
the following:
Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing
treatment may be related to past events and post-deployment actions.
Information to notify the patient’s next-of-kin.
Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.
Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.
Materials for medical research.
Information to track patients whose whereabouts is unknown.
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Policies on blood supply source, screening standards, storage, and use.
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Policies on pharmaceutical source, acceptance standards, storage, and use.
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Policies on sharing and exchange of occupational and environmental health surveillance data.
Data could include:
Air, soil, and water sampling.
Individual or group exposure results.
Any other environmental sampling.
COUNTERMEASURES
11-19. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more Soldiers combat ineffective than
actual battle casualties. Countermeasures must be taken to reduce disease and nonbattle injuries. The
capability to assess the Soldier’s health continuously and improve Soldier sustainability is required to
protect the force.
11-20. The following countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:
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A comprehensive medical intelligence system.
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Continuous health surveillance.
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Countermeasures, prophylaxis, and immunization policies approved by the multinational forces
commander and implemented by all contributing nations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
11-5
Chapter 11
STANDARDS OF CARE
11-21. The multinational HSS must ensure continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable to
all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability
of treatment principles and clinical policies. As a national responsibility executed under national standards
or care and practice, each nation sets medical policy for its Soldiers. As such the multinational commander
can not direct a sovereign nation’s armed forces to adopt a different standard for sake of uniformity across
his or her command. Patient management is a continuous process of medical care, increasing in complexity
by roles (levels) of capability to deal with the clinical needs of the patient. While optimal patient
management is never compromised unless dictated by the combat situation, it is also a balance between
many conflicting factors. These factors include the following:
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Treatment.
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Evacuation.
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Resources.
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Environmental and operational conditions.
11-22. Dental support is arranged in levels, reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding level.
The functions of each lower level of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher
level. A preventive dentistry program can be provided in the theater of operations.
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES
11-23. The health support plan will address the following HSS functional areas, as described in the
ABCA Publication 256:
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Preventive medicine.
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Combat casualty care.
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Hospital, surgical, and dental services.
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Ground and air evacuation.
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Stress management.
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Outpatient services.
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Veterinary services.
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Medical nuclear, biological, and chemical considerations.
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Health surveillance.
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Medical logistics.
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Blood.
11-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Health Service Support
CHECKLIST
Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the
following questions with respect to the HSS portion of the operation.
MEDICAL STAFF
11-24. Has a command surgeon been appointed?
11-25. Are there health services representatives on the assessment team?
11-26. Have contributing nations provided staff or liaison to the multinational forces surgeon?
COMMAND AND CONTROL
11-27. Have national elements appointed senior health service officers?
11-28. Are the C2 relationships of health service assets clearly defined?
11-29. Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison between health service elements?
SUPPORT PLAN
11-30. Does the HSS plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?
11-31. Are all forces in reasonable proximity to HSS?
11-32. What flexibility is there in the HSS plan? Are there health assets available for surge situations?
11-33. Are the HSS assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?
11-34. Will a casualty receive continuous treatment while in the health care system?
11-35. Have the following medical protection issues been addressed:
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Health threat assessment?
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Medical countermeasures and vaccination?
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Health surveillance system?
11-36. Who is entitled to treatment? Are cross-servicing provisions in place?
11-37. What responsibilities do the multinational forces HSS assets have to noncombatants?
11-38. What is the response to a mass casualty?
11-39. How will casualty evacuation be coordinated?
11-40. Are there sufficient evacuation assets?
11-41. How will medical regulations, both in and out of theater, be affected?
11-42. What are the multinational forces obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva conventions?
11-43. What HSS reports and returns will be available to the commander multinational forces?
11-44. What are the arrangements for preventive medicine measures?
11-45. Are there adequate dental services available?
11-46. What provisions are there for combat stress management?
11-47. Who will inspect foodstuffs from a health perspective?
11-48. How will units obtain class VIII supplies?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
11-7
Chapter 11
11-49. How will medical equipment get repaired?
11-50. What is the blood supply system?
11-51. Does the support plan include provision of, or access to, limited critical medical equipment such as
magnetic resonance imagery?
11-52. Does the support plan identify any unusual Soldier physical screening standards necessary for this
operation?
11-53. What are the medical support requirements for detainee operations and facilities?
MEDICAL
11-54. What does the SOFA with the HN state in regards to the use of HN medical facilities for the
treatment of U.S. personnel? What is U.S. policy on using HN medical facilities for this specific
operational period?
11-55. Are medical facilities identified to support the operation?
11-56. Are chemical weapon threats known? Are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their
possible use?
11-57. Are procedures in place to service multinational casualties to include recognizing cultural
differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians? Have procedures
been coordinated with national commands.
11-58. What are the other multinational element capabilities and procedures for medical evacuation? Do
they include air and ground capabilities, both intra- and inter-theater, that multinational forces will be
supported by or required to support?
11-59. What are the sources of medical supply and payment options?
11-60. What are the procedures for tracking patients?
11-61. What are the coordination requirements for return-to-duty transportation?
11-62. What forces have organic level I, II, or III combat health support? For those that do not have this
support, what level will other multinational forces provide?
11-63. What are the policies and procedures for medical personnel to use on level II through V medical
treatment facilities to provide medical treatment for multinational forces?
11-64. Who is eligible for medical care, both routine and emergency, and under what conditions? This
must be coordinated with other staff sections.
11-65. What is the blood policy and distribution system? What is U.S. policy for emergency use of blood
from other than U.S. sources, such as host nation, for this operational period?
11-66. What is the mass casualty response plan?
11-67. Is there a medical surveillance program to follow disease trends and detect disease outbreaks?
11-68. What is the public health policy?
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Chapter 12
Operational Considerations
Military capabilities differ based on national interests and objectives, national
character, doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. Some
doctrines emphasize offensive operations while others emphasize defensive
operations. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations. Other
nations concern themselves with counterinsurgency operations. The multinational
force commander must know and consider these differences when assigning missions
and conducting operations. This chapter provides operational considerations to
improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces when operating with the multinational force.
A variety of functions help commanders build and sustain combat power. In general
terms, these are called elements of combat power and are described fully in FM 3-0.
Army commanders and staffs translate the elements of combat power into more
specific operational functions when conducting missions and tactical operations. The
five operational-level functions discussed in this chapter are movement and
maneuver, intelligence, firepower, support, and protection.
At the operational level, C2, intelligence, and support are critical to building an
effective multinational force. A major weakness in one of these areas is a far greater
threat than one in other systems. All other elements hinge on the effective integration
of these three systems. Major differences, real or perceived, among alliance or
coalition partners cannot be tolerated. Within these operating systems, effective
liaison and language capabilities make effective operations possible and alleviate
friction and confusion.
FIRE SUPPORT
12-1. The multinational force commander must ensure that the force develops good fire support
coordination. This will maximize the fires and minimize the possibility of fratricide. Fire support
coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with multinational force members
and local authorities. These special arrangements include communications and language requirements,
liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. An SOP should be established for fire support to
achieve the most effective results for its use by the multinational force.
12-2. Effective C2 of multinational force firepower is the key to its use. The staff must judge whether
resources and requirements are balanced over the course of a multinational campaign or operation,
ensuring the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities exist. Effective joint fire support will contribute
substantially to multinational success. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the
multinational force is critical.
ENGINEERS
12-3. Multinational forces may require multinational-level engineers to support operations. These
engineers will be responsible for a broad range of technical and dispersed, operational and tactical tasks.
These tasks are included in the engineer operational environment functions of-
z
Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
z
General engineering.
z
Geospatial engineering. (This may be referred to as geomatic by some multinational forces.)
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
12-1
Chapter 12
See FM 3-34 and JP 3-34 for a further discussion of the engineer operational environment functions and
engineer operations.
12-4. The tasks associated with the three engineer operational environment functions include-
z
Providing a full range of operational and tactical level combat engineering
(mobility,
countermobility, and survivability) support.
z
Providing a full range of general engineering support (to include protection construction, diving,
firefighting, facilities engineering, infrastructure, sustainment support; power generation and
distribution; and in some Services or multinational forces this may include EOD and CBRN as
well).
z
Providing a full range of operational and tactical-level geospatial engineering support.
12-5. To ensure that efficient and effective engineer effort, the multinational headquarters may require
both a senior engineer and a supporting engineer staff to plan and coordinate engineer effort in support of
the multinational commander’s plan. The senior engineer and associated staff may also C2 force-level
designated engineer units on behalf of the multinational commander. This C2 includes-
z
Planning.
z
Setting engineer standards.
z
Supervising, coordinating.
z
Controlling engineer support to the force and, when necessary, to the local population.
z
Potentially performing C2 for other nonengineer capabilities and assets.
12-6. Engineers will also be responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors who are engaged to
complete tasks in the AO. Control of engineer support will be in accordance with the multinational
commander’s priorities and intent. For further operational considerations and details on the employment of
engineer assets in a multinational environment, refer to the ABCA Multinational Engineer Handbook.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
12-7. All multinational commanders should consider several general principles when planning to employ
engineers. Of these principles, a force engineer commander should adhere to both centralized control and
early warning to give engineer operations the best opportunity to succeed.
Centralized Versus Decentralized
12-8. When employing engineers, an important principle is that of centralized command with decentralized
execution of tasks. This allows the force engineer assets to be optimized against the multinational
commander’s priority of tasks. These tasks can be applied to all units and may include such missions/tasks
as combined arms breaching operations; gap crossings and other mobility support; support to demining
operations; construction of bridges, roads, base camps, hospitals, or other sites; or other tasks performed
directly for the multinational commander.
Early Warning
12-9. Due to the long lead times necessary to plan, coordinate, purchase, and assemble the necessary
engineer assets and specialist personnel, engineer planning must have an early and well-informed warning.
Since much of the necessary information will often not be available, contingency engineer planning will be
essential, especially for critical issues and items. Therefore, commanders and staff need to provide as much
guidance as possible. The engineer commander and staff will need to be proactive and seek guidance
regularly. This results in an iterative planning process with engineer estimates initially being plus 50
percent, and aiming to reduce to plus 5 percent, as more reliable information becomes available. For
example, engineers may need to consider redeployment issues early—possibly before deployment takes
place—to ensure that critical-path items are considered in a timely manner and that the necessary engineer
assets will be in the AO when required, to include those associated with transitions.
Priority of Work
12-10. Since it will seldom be possible to execute all the required engineer tasks simultaneously, the force
commander must lay down a clear priority of work after receiving staff and engineer advice. Engineers can
then plan appropriately and avoid wasting scarce resources on low priority tasks.
12-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operational Considerations
Economy
12-11. Engineers are trained and equipped to carry out technical tasks. It is costly to employ them on
tasks that can be carried out by other arms. Similarly, it is also costly either to apply more engineer effort
than necessary to complete tasks in the required time or to use engineer labor on the unskilled aspects of
engineer tasks. Economy of force is facilitated by a good priority of work.
Continuity
12-12. As handovers between engineer units will always increase the time to complete a task, and may
also result in some minor points being overlooked, the unit which starts the job should be allowed to
complete it where possible. This continuity, or momentum, must be retained to optimize the use of
engineer assets.
Protection
12-13. Engineers cannot work effectively and protect themselves at the same time. Where possible and
when necessary, protection should be provided for engineers.
ENGINEER SUPPORT
12-14. The role of engineers is to provide support across the engineer operational environment functions
(combat, general, and geospatial engineering) to support for the multinational force. While focused on
support of the land commander, this includes to both aviation and naval forces and commanders as well.
The following paragraphs provide a summary of the typical tasks performed by engineers in a theater. All
ABCA armies have differences with regard to the specific responsibilities of their engineers. For further
detail, refer to the ABCA Multinational Engineer Handbook. Liaison with the multinational force engineer
staff is also recommended.
COMBAT ENGINEERING
12-15. Combat engineering includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability with a primary focus on
supporting combat maneuver forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. It is an integral part of a
combined arms unit’s ability to maneuver. It is focused on the support of land component forces engaged
in close combat. Combat engineering tasks are typically supported by combat engineers. In some cases,
they may be performed by general engineers.
GENERAL ENGINEERING
12-16. General engineering, the most diverse of the engineer operational environment functions, may be
performed throughout the area of responsibility. It is closely linked to the operational and strategic levels
of war. As one of the areas of logistic support, general engineering is a critical component of logistic
planning and operations. General engineering support-
z
Provides broad mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment support
to the multinational force.
z
Enhances the combat capability of the multinational force in all phases of a combat operation.
z
Encompasses those engineer tasks that establish and maintain the infrastructure. This includes
the construction and repair of LOCs, main supply routes, railroads, roads, bridges, ports,
airfields, utility systems, logistic facilities, bed down or base camp facilities, and the provision
of environmental services.
z
Includes critical enablers such as firefighting, engineer dive operations, power generation and
distribution, and other specialized capabilities. It may also include support to camouflage,
concealment, and deception and the operational level.
12-17. In some Services and multinational forces, these may include aspects of EOD and CBRN support.
These operations include both horizontal and vertical construction and may include use of both expedient
repair methods and more deliberate construction methods characterized by the application of design
criteria, advanced planning, and preparation, depending on the mission requirements.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
12-3
Chapter 12
12-18. General engineering tasks are usually resource and time-intensive, demanding a high degree of
preplanning to meet operational requirements. While general engineering may be performed in direct
support of combat operations, those engineer tasks performed by general engineers in support of combat
maneuver forces at the tactical level are often combat engineering tasks. The joint commander will depend
upon a combination of multinational engineer units, civilian contractors, and HN capabilities to accomplish
general engineering requirements.
12-19. General engineering tasks are typically performed by general engineering units, but they may also
be performed by combat engineer units in some cases. All engineer units may be required to execute
elements of general engineering tasks consisting primarily of repair and construction tasks.
GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT
12-20. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels appreciating the
terrain over which operations are to be conducted. The better the appreciation of this terrain, the greater the
degree of certainty of successful prosecution of operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information
enhances geospatial knowledge and hence situational understanding. It also assists commanders in gaining
a better appreciation for the influence of terrain on operations. Engineers can provide specialist advice on
the effects of terrain, climate, and weather.
12-21. Multinational force operations will generally be characterized by only a basic level of geospatial
information available to commanders and their staffs. This information may come from the host nation, by
one or more multinational partners, or more probably a combination of sources. Furthermore, potential
adversaries will likely have access to the same basic level of geospatial information plus a far more
intimate knowledge of the AO. Focused operational and tactical-level topographic support, using available
geospatial information, can provide the force commander with decision-support aids often unavailable to
an adversary. This information could contribute significantly to minimizing the adversary’s advantage
gained by local knowledge. These decision support aids assist the force commander to visualize, operate
on, and exploit the operational environment. Timely and relevant topographic support, therefore, has the
potential to be a significant combat multiplier in multinational operations.
12-22. Quickly acquiring and providing appropriate and relevant geospatial information is generally a
resource intensive undertaking requiring specialist capabilities. Topographic support relies on a
fundamental layer of geospatial information being available. While the responsibility for providing
topographic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, efficiencies and
synergies can be gained from coordinating this support. This is particularly true with acquiring and
providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation should be assigned the lead
responsibility for acquiring and providing geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting
roles. This division of responsibilities is a high priority requirement and should be addressed early in the
planning.
12-23. Geospatial information should be coordinated at the highest possible level due to the complexities
involved with acquiring and providing it. The responsibility for coordination should be assigned to the
force engineer commander. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also
need to be addressed early in the planning process. The force engineer commander should have access to
an appropriate level of topographic advice within the engineer staff so he or she can aptly assign
responsibilities.
12-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operational Considerations
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS SUPPORT
12-24. Engineers play an important role in supporting CAO. This support may involve the following:
z
Bridging and demining critical civilian areas or routes to enhance mobility.
z
Providing essential services such as power, water, sewage, and decontamination.
z
Firefighting.
z
Providing shelter.
12-25. Engineers must satisfy the needs of the force as a priority before offering any residual capacity to
civilian authorities. Engineers may be limited to only providing advice to the civilian authorities and
population on works being completed.
INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION
12-26. For Army units involved in multinational operations, one of their major operational considerations
is their ability to operate with units of the other nations. Interoperability is the ability of forces to train,
exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Historically, the
problems of interoperability have been solved primarily through trial and error during actual conduct of
operations over an extended period of time. In order to avoid the problems associated with this method of
interoperability, the Army participates in multinational and bilateral standardization programs.
12-27. According to NATO, standardization is the development and implementation of concepts,
doctrines, procedures, and designs to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility,
interchangeability, or commonality in operational, procedural, materiel, technical and administrative fields
to obtain interoperability. The Army participates in two multinational programs that work towards
standardization. Those two programs are NATO and the ABCA Armies program. The final result of this
standardization work is NATO STANAGs and ABCA standards.
12-28. Implementation of standardization agreements, either NATO or ABCA, is transparent to U.S.
units. In the case of doctrine, implementation occurs when the content of the standardization agreement is
incorporated into Army field manuals. Additionally, Soldiers of each NATO or ABCA nation use their
own national doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. To them, the interoperability is transparent
as well. For example, the NATO and ABCA nations have agreed to use the same military symbols. (See
STANAG 2019.) This way, participating units passing graphic operational information, such as overlays,
will understand the symbols. U.S. Army forces find these military symbols in FM 1-02. Therefore, when
the nations operate together, there is no need to develop a common set of military symbols to conduct
operations within NATO or ABCA forces. There are standardization agreements for the five-paragraph
OPORD, close-air support procedures, call-for-fire procedures, CBRN reporting procedures, and numerous
other areas.
12-29. Within a coalition, standardization agreements can provide a baseline for cooperation.
Additionally, in many parts of the world, there may be bilateral interoperability agreements among
potential coalition members in place prior to the formation of the coalition. Students who have attended
professional military development courses in other nations are additional sources for interoperability.
However, in most ad hoc coalitions not all participants are immediately familiar with such agreements. The
multinational commander must initially rely on lead nation or designated SOPs; good LNOs: and clearly
written, uncomplicated operation orders.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
12-5
Chapter 12
CHECKLIST
To assist commanders and staff in planning operations, the following checklist fire support and
engineer support is provided.
FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING
12-30. What is the nature of the multinational operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?
12-31. Where does the operation lie in the spectrum of conflict?
12-32. What is the likely scale of effort?
12-33. What is the likely duration of the operation? What are the issues of rotation and sustainability?
12-34. Are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from
national backfilling or fall under a call-up of reserves policy?
12-35. What are the intended end state and exit strategy?
12-36. What is the commander’s intent?
12-37. Where is the AO? Consider the climatic, terrain, cultural, political, and socio-economic issues.
12-38. What is the overall multinational force structure?
12-39. What capabilities need to be held at multinational level? Which will provide national support
only?
12-40. What fire support assets are the multinational forces providing? What are their capabilities and
command status?
12-41. What is the desired fire support organization for early entry forces?
12-42. What is the deployment time frame?
12-43. How will the deployment be carried out (land, air, or sea)?
Surveillance Target Acquisition
12-44. What situational understandings will the multinational force have?
12-45. Will there be a common operational picture? How will ISTAR for maritime, land, and air units
contribute to it?
12-46. How will ISTAR assets be coordinated and tasked? What are the battle damage assessment
requirements?
12-47. Is there a policy for unmanned aircraft system over-flights of opposing forces prior to hostilities?
Delivery Systems
12-48. What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?
12-49. What are the characteristics, capability, and quantity of fire support assets, including range,
tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?
12-50. What is the multinational policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?
12-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operational Considerations
Weapons
12-51. What is the capability and interoperability of multinational munitions including proofing
compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?
12-52. What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?
12-53. What are the key interoperability constraints?
12-54. Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or
limitations?
12-55. Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?
12-56. Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?
12-57. What nonlethal weapons are available?
Command
12-58. What are the multinational levels of command?
12-59. What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?
12-60. What is the command arrangement for conducting multinational decisive and shaping operations
in longer range areas?
12-61. What are the intercomponent liaison arrangements?
Control
12-62. Will real estate requirements to support offensive operations be considered in the overall
deconfliction of real estate by the G-3?
12-63. What is the requirement for LNOs on a 24-hours per day basis?
12-64. What operational environment control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect
fire, and unmanned aircraft system assets?
12-65. What battle spectrum management requirements exist in relation to EW?
12-66. What will be the multinational ROE before beginning hostilities and after committing the first
hostile act?
12-67. What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using nonprecision munitions within the ROE?
12-68. What is the policy for using smoke and illumination within the ROE?
Communications and Information Systems
12-69. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?
12-70. What multinational bearer communications systems will be used?
12-71. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the LNO requirements? How will digitized
and nondigitized forces operate together?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
12-7
Chapter 12
Logistics
12-72. What is the multinational policy on battle casualty replacement?
12-73. Based on identified battle winning equipment, what is the priority for repair of fire support assets?
12-74. What will be the in-theatre repair policy?
12-75. How will ammunition be tracked around the battlefield?
12-76. What are the national integrated logistics systems?
12-77. What key integrated logistics systems might be identified as a multinational system or capability?
12-78. Are there any commercial or national constraints on employing equipment?
Doctrine
12-79. Is there a common multinational fire support doctrine, including definitions and fire support
coordination procedures?
12-80. If no common multinational doctrine exists, what is the lead nation’s fire support doctrine?
12-81. What are the applicable ABCA standards and other standardization agreements?
12-82. What is the availability of doctrinal publications?
Organization
12-83. What is the multinational structure and staffing?
12-84. What limitations are there on the national contingent structure?
Training
12-85. When will training take place? At home, en route to operation or in concentration area?
12-86. Will in-theater ranges be available?
12-87. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
12-88. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
12-89. What collective training will take place?
ENGINEER PLANNING
12-90. What are the engineer multinational tasks and the division of responsibilities to achieve those
tasks?
12-91. What is the engineer C2 structure for the mission?
12-92. Has a force engineer been appointed? What is the command, control, and coordination authority?
12-93. What are the mission-specific training requirements and responsibilities?
12-94. What are the engineer coordination interfaces?
12-95. When will these coordination measures take effect?
12-96. What are the capabilities of the allies’ engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to
other multinational forces?
12-97. Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities are they providing?
12-98. What capabilities is the host nation providing?
12-8
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operational Considerations
12-99. What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as ABCA standards?
12-100. What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?
12-101. What are the unique AO characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climatic
conditions?
12-102. Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?
12-103. What is the threat assessment for the enemy engineer force?
12-104. Are engineers involved in the targeting process to assess or estimate the work required to repair
infrastructure and utilities. Are engineer involved in the process to clear the area and route of mines and
UXO at the end of the hostilities?
12-105. What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to
support the plan?
12-106. Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
12-107. Are there any unique multinational engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?
12-108. Is there a clear multinational engineer C2 structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?
12-109. What are the protection requirements?
12-110. Has a common multinational facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force
engineer level?
12-111. Is an engineer materiel management system in place?
12-112. What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?
12-113. What are the multinational funding arrangements for multinational engineer tasks?
12-114. Are there any specific engineer contracts with the host nation or other contractors?
12-115. What is the host nation actually providing in terms of engineer services?
12-116. How is engineer effort coordinated within the theater?
12-117. What is the multinational engineer priority of work?
12-118. What are the C2 mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks within the multinational force?
Execution
12-119. Have the engineer mission, tasks, or both changed?
12-120. Have there been any modifications to the engineer C2 structure?
12-121. What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?
12-122. What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as STANAGS and
ABCA standards?
12-123. What is the engineer information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan?
12-124. What, if anything, is the impact of NGOs and CAO activity in-theater on the engineer plan?
12-125. What is the interoperability disconnects between multinational engineer partners? Are they being
addressed?
12-126. What are the in-theater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are they capturing lessons learned and
informing all nations to allow in-theater adaptations to doctrine and new problems?
12-127. Are there any HN cultural constraints and restrictions that are or could impact on multinational
engineer operations?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
12-9
Chapter 12
Redeployment
12-128. What are the environmental considerations?
12-129. What is the remediation plan?
12-130. How do engineers plan to hand over projects, facilities, and resources?
12-131. What HN support or NGOs will be receiving projects and facilities?
12-132. Is there any change to engineer C2?
12-133. Is mission creep occurring in terms of engineer reconstruction tasks?
12-134. What engineer tasks will be required to facilitate redeployment?
12-135. What are the legal considerations for facilities and structures handover, taking cognizance of
international agreements and protocol?
12-136. What are the CAO considerations?
12-137. What is the plan for phasing engineer redeployment?
12-138. Have the engineer lessons learned been captured, documented, and recorded?
12-10
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Chapter 13
Maritime Operations
Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken by
multinational forces, in peacetime or in time of war, to exercise sea control or project
power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily navies. However, they may also include
maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government agencies
charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. When a situation
requires that maritime, land, air, space, or a combination of forces operate together,
the operation is referred to as joint.
CHARACTERISTICS
13-1. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments in support of
government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces may be
used to reassure or provide succor to allies and friends, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, or
respond to aggression.
READINESS
13-2. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to
contingencies. By maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime
forces can provide a wide range of services to support peacetime operations.
FLEXIBILITY
13-3. Maritime forces have been employed to resolve many international crises since the end of World
War II. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus
on, reconfigure, and realign forces quickly to handle various contingencies. Maritime forces provide a wide
range of weapons systems, military options, and logistics or administrative skills. Maritime forces can
control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or times of crisis. They perform tasks ranging
from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), disaster relief, and
humanitarian assistance. The excellent strategic and TACOM, control, and communications capabilities of
maritime forces provide for a uniquely controllable force that complements diplomatic efforts. Maritime
forces offer presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment. They represent a worldwide,
balanced, and autonomous intervention capability that may be employed nationally or multinationally.
SELF-SUSTAINABILITY
13-4. Although the degree of self-sustainment achievable by an allied force will be determined by the
nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the participants, maritime forces can operate in
forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With
replenishment-at-sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (their
ability to sustain damage and continue the mission), maritime operations may be continued indefinitely.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
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Chapter 13
MOBILITY
13-5. Maritime forces are much less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces.
Maritime forces can deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas in accordance with
international law. With their strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces can-
z
Monitor a situation passively.
z
Remain on station for a sustained period.
z
Respond to a crisis rapidly.
z
Deploy in combat with authority.
13-6. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and
threatening to adversaries, as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime
forces can be quickly withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to
indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of the theater to another or from one
theater to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces
quickly provides commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.
EMPLOYMENT OF MARITIME FORCES
13-7. Maritime forces seek to ensure continued, unhindered, and unrestricted use of the sea to further
national or shared interests and objectives. The following paragraphs discuss the nature of maritime force
employment in peace and war. It must be remembered, however, that the distinctions drawn between
peacetime and wartime operations are not clear-cut in many instances.
OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME
13-8. Maritime forces lend themselves well to various peacetime operations, which differ from wartime
operations in some respects. Although in some situations peacetime operations are designed to influence
governments and military forces (presence and deterrence), they are increasingly designed to influence
nonnational entities, such as criminal organizations and transnational groups. Nongovernmental and
nonmilitary organizations often have the expertise and finances to conduct certain operations and may be
involved in peacetime operations to varying degrees. Maritime forces should be prepared to deal with these
other organizations and recognize the contributions that they can bring to an operation. In some
contingencies, maritime forces may operate more in a supporting or enabling role, contributing a supply of
well-trained and equipped personnel who can adapt and sustain themselves. Peacetime operations will
normally have a varying mix of security, humanitarian, and environmental components and may be
grouped under the following broad headings.
PRESENCE AND DETERRENCE
13-9. The presence of maritime forces can avoid confrontation and support political aims without
necessarily violating national sovereignty. Maritime forces may strengthen diplomatic efforts by “showing
the flag” (presence) in a benign fashion as a general indicator of interest and latent capability, thereby
helping to prevent emerging conflicts. Alternately, maritime forces can be deployed as a deterrent against
specific actions. Maritime forces can also “shield” states at their request by establishing an at-sea presence
within territorial seas, thus providing a “trip-wire” function in threatened areas. These operations are,
however, fraught with danger because not all parties may cooperate with or refrain from challenging such
deployments. Nevertheless, using maritime forces is less intrusive than using land-based forces.
13-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Maritime Operations
PEACE OPERATIONS
13-10. Peace operations cover a range of activities including conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. The use of maritime forces in peace operations will
usually complement land forces and may involve a considerable range of tasks. These tasks may include
the following:
z
Monitoring or observing cease-fires.
z
Interpositioning between the maritime forces of belligerents.
z
Establishing disengagement zones.
z
Providing a neutral venue for supervised negotiations.
z
Preventing forces of the belligerent parties from violating agreements.
z
Humanitarian Operations.
13-11. Maritime forces are well suited to support humanitarian aid efforts that relieve or reduce the
suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made disasters. In particular,
maritime forces are useful to provide a secure environment to allow the humanitarian relief efforts of other
organizations to progress as directed by cognizant legal authority. Short notice readiness, flexibility, and
mobility allow maritime forces to respond quickly to a disaster, particularly if they have Marines or other
troops embarked. Maritime forces can be tailored to supplement or complement the efforts of the host
nation, civil authorities, or NGOs. Maritime forces may provide personnel, equipment, supply, medical and
dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, communication, and transportation support.
PROTECTION OF SHIPPING AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
13-12. When nations make claims over contested waters, challenges to freedom of navigation may arise.
In such instances, maritime forces can exercise freedom of navigation by traversing or exercising in the
contested waters (in accordance with recognized international law). Maritime forces may also protect
merchant shipping with flag-state consent that could otherwise be threatened.
MARITIME CONSTABULARY FUNCTIONS
13-13. In the last three decades developments in international maritime law, particularly the extension of
national authority further from shore, has resulted in various low-intensity constabulary functions. These
functions are likely to involve naval forces as well as coast guards, civilian maritime agencies, or both.
Specific functions may include the following:
z
Enforcement of fisheries regulations and exclusive economic zone arrangements.
z
Operations against piracy.
z
Counterterrorism.
z
Interdiction of drugs and other contraband trade.
z
Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration.
z
Enforcement of environmental regulations.
z
Control of traffic separation schemes and other maritime traffic management tasks.
ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATIONS
13-14. Maritime forces may also be tasked to respond to oil spills and other environmental disasters. In
these cases, maritime forces can be a valuable source of trained and disciplined personnel as well as
equipment. Often these operations will be conducted in concert with or in support of other governmental,
international, or private agencies whose specific missions include disaster response.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
13-3
Chapter 13
EMBARGOES/MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
13-15. Maritime forces may be tasked to enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effectively enforcing
sanctions may require sophisticated coordinating military operations at sea with those in the air. This is
especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the absence of commonly understood and
accepted ROE can greatly increase the risks to enforcement units. Assigned tasks may include-
z
Stopping, inspecting, seizing, and diverting suspect ships and aircraft.
z
Establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone for the maritime vessels of one or more
parties to a conflict.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
13-16. Forces conduct NEO to move personnel from an area where deteriorating security conditions place
lives at risk. This type of operation is similar to an amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary
occupation of an objective, and fast withdrawal after the mission is completed. During NEO, ROE usually
limit the use of force to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forces may
have an integral capability to accomplish NEO without assistance from other forces. If not, ships stationed
at sea may provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas for other forces. By evacuating directly
from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas, a very low political profile can be maintained. The
evacuation force commander must be prepared to deal with the political sensitivity of the situation that will
be monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level.
OPERATIONS IN WARTIME
13-17. In wartime the activities of the maritime force are normally aimed at achieving sea control and
projecting power ashore.
SEA CONTROL
13-18. Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long as an
adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control is normally established
within a designated area for a defined period of time. Sea control must provide security for forces,
facilities, and sea LOCs. Large maritime forces using an area for their own purposes can usually achieve
and maintain sufficient sea control. Smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping require sea control to be
established by other forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Sea denial is achieved when
maritime forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Sea denial is normally
exercised in a given area and for a limited time.
POWER PROJECTION
13-19. Conflicts at sea are rarely isolated from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial objectives.
Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate outcome in the theater is likely
to depend on success ashore. Maritime forces often must be prepared to operate in the littoral environment
to project force ashore as part of joint operations involving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are
normally the first forces into a crisis area and may comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force
access to the region. Naval forces then contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or
indirect support of those land operations. It is important to note that a maritime commander responsible for
sea control may find it necessary to plan and execute power projection actions—such as a maritime air
attack of a littoral enemy air field—to achieve, maintain, or achieve and maintain sea control.
13-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Maritime Operations
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer
the following questions with respect to the maritime portion of the operation.
13-20. Has liaison been established with the maritime headquarters?
13-21. Has a maritime component commander been named?
13-22. Has the staff identified the supported and supporting relationships with the maritime element?
20 May 2010
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13-5
Chapter 14
Air Operations
Multinational air operations aim to gain and maintain sufficient control of the air for
exploiting air power to achieve the multinational commander’s objectives or achieve
strategic goals through a multinational campaign. Unified action is essential for
effectively using air power. To achieve its greatest effects, air power must be
concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. To attain the strength of unified air
action and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are used efficiently as the
overall situation demands, air operations are based on two principles. The first
principle is that unity of command facilitates effectively applying air power to meet
the multinational objectives. This is normally achieved by designating a multinational
air component commander. The second principle is that centralized control and
decentralized execution of air and space power provides theater-wide focus while
allowing operational flexibility to meet theater objectives.
MULTINATIONAL AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER
14-1. The multinational commander may designate a multinational air component commander to control
the capabilities of air operations. The multinational commander establishes the authority and command
relationships of the multinational air component commander and assigns responsibilities. These include the
planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations based on the multinational
commander’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full
representation and expertise of all elements of the multinational force contributing to the air operation plan.
At the tactical level of operations, the multinational air component commander’s authority typically
includes exercising TACOM over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military
capabilities or forces made available for tasking.
14-2. The multinational commander may also establish supporting and supported relationships between
components to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly
using the multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander will normally vest authority in a
component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and air defense commander.
Because the multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations and airspace control
measures and AD operations have an integrated relationship, the multinational air component commander
would be the most likely choice for appointment as the air control authority and air defense commander.
Any division of these responsibilities would require detailed coordination for safe and effective air
operations.
AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING
14-3. Air operations planning involves-
z
Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.
z
Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational
objectives.
z
Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force’s strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives.
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14-1
Chapter 14
14-4. Air operations planning also involves developing the concept of operations that describes the best
course of action and produces the air OPLAN. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air
component commander’s strategy for achieving the multinational commander’s OPLAN.
14-5. The air tasking cycle is used to promote efficient and effective use of the available multinational air
capabilities and assets. It begins with the multinational commander’s air apportionment process and
culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides a repetitive
process for the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air missions and sorties while following
the multinational commander’s guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or
to the commander’s guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other
commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on
supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely multinational air tasking
order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling
in the air tasking order and depend on its accuracy.
AIRSPACE CONTROL
14-6. Airspace control primarily complements and supports the multinational commander’s campaign plan
without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any multinational
forces. Each commander must be able to use the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the
degree of operational risk directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures are
designed to-
z
Prevent mutual interference.
z
Facilitate AD identification.
z
Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.
z
Enhance combat effectiveness in support of the multinational objectives.
z
Prevent fratricide.
14-7. When designated by the multinational commander, the air control authority must-
z
Establish an airspace control system.
z
Prepare the airspace control plan.
z
Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.
z
Implement airspace control means.
z
Harmonize regional airspace control plans.
14-8. Rapidly distributing the airspace control orders and their updates to all commanders within the force
in the area of responsibility is a crucial factor in the operation of an airspace control system. The airspace
control authority is supported by the airspace coordination center where all component commanders with
air assets are represented. All component commanders must comply with the airspace control plan.
However, the multinational commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the airspace
control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the airspace
control authority does not imply that it assumes OPCON or TACON over any air assets.
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Air Operations
AIR DEFENSE
14-9. AD is an overall multinational force responsibility. Multinational AD integrates the capabilities of all
component AD assets to protect and influence the operational environment associated with the
multinational campaign plan. The air defense commander should plan and direct the multinational AD
assets that the component commanders will execute. The air defense commander-
z
Protects the force from hostile air activity.
z
Integrates and coordinates the force’s AD assets into a multinational AD plan (including the HN
AD systems).
z
Promulgates and employs common procedures for air battle management and the reduction of
mutual interference.
z
Controls and coordinates all AD operations by the component commanders.
z
Coordinates with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan best
supports AD operations.
MISSILE DEFENSE
14-10. The U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the U.S. Army’s operational lead
for Army theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys into the theater of operations in
support of the ARFOR commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander, and the
joint force air component commander ensuring that Army theater air and missile defense operations are
properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.
14-11. Also, based on METT-TC and augmentation with Army and joint, interagency, and multinational
personnel, the AAMDC has the capability to serve as an operational protection integrator for the ARFOR
or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army echelons above corps AD forces are properly
trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes a
variety of training activities, exercises, and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with
joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense
operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC may also support homeland defense operations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
14-3
Chapter 14
CHECKLIST
Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the
following questions with respect to the air portion of the operation.
14-12. Has a multinational air component commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-13. Has an airspace control authority been designated by the multinational commander?
14-14. Has an area air defense commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-15. Has liaison been established between the multinational air operations center and the other
appropriate headquarters?
14-16. What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs
been briefed?
14-17. Have planner’s considered all elements of airpower in the employment of multinational fires?
14-18. What is the desired AD organization for early entry forces?
14-19. Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they
consistent with the ROE?
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FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Appendix A
Capabilities
PLANNING
A-1. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it is
incapable of performing, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that the taskings are
appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element.
They must thoroughly understand their nation’s capabilities and limitations.
A-2. Within the ABCA Armies program, ABCA Standard 1030 provides a format for providing specific
details of each nation’s forces to guide planning decisions. Listed equipment is restricted to that which
materially affects the organization’s combat power and equipment unique to the organization. Using the
format in ABCA Standard 1030 presents an option for obtaining information. This document can be found
on the ABCA Web site www.abca-armies.org/.
INTEGRATION
A-3. Each of the multinational member nations provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a
multinational force. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control
limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and
domestic politics. Orchestrating these capabilities into multinational operations depends on understanding
the differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. The greater the number of nations involved, the
greater these differences will be for the multinational force.
A-4. Understanding these differences can determine if multinational operations are a success or failure.
Units of the same type in one nation’s army may not perform the same functions as units in another army.
An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be
limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.
A-5. The commander of the multinational force must be able to integrate force capabilities to achieve the
desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The multinational staff must be proactive in
understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the multinational force.
A-6. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation does not understand or train for a mission, it will
probably fail. National forces will normally operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally
their actions should conform to the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work,
however, multinational commanders must know the differences in the other nation’s doctrine. This can be
accomplished with LNOs or by augmentees and/or supplemental staff officers. When U.S. forces are
operating with NATO or ABCA countries as part of a multinational military command, they will follow the
doctrine and procedures imbedded in U.S. field manuals from previously ratified STANAGs and ABCA
standards.
A-7. Conventional multinational force capabilities should include the following assets and operations:
z
AD.
z
Armor.
z
Aviation.
z
Engineer.
z
Field artillery.
z
Infantry.
z
Intelligence.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
A-1
Appendix A
z
Medical.
z
Military police.
z
CBRN defense.
z
Ordnance.
z
Personnel.
z
Quartermaster.
z
Signal.
z
Transportation.
z
Aviation.
A-8. The following are aviation information requirements needed prior to deployment:
z
Determine the aviation assets, capabilities, and requirements of the multinational force.
z
Identify the aviation logistics capabilities of the multinational force.
z
Identify current and projected requirements for an air LOC.
z
Determine aviation support required from multinational forces.
z
Identify the intended base of operations.
z
Identify the personnel recovery plan in theater.
(Rotary-wing units should be prepared to
execute organic personnel recovery or depending on capabilities, theater-wide recovery.)
z
Identify secure communications capabilities of the higher headquarters and supported units.
ENGINEERS
A-9. QSTAG 1175 covers engineer support capabilities, utilities requirements and other information
required prior to deployment. This QSTAG is equally applicable to phases during operations with little
modification. In addition to QSTAG 1175, specific information on obstacles; equipment capabilities; future
engineer planning; engineer order of battle; and command, control, communications, and intelligence is
required. The following engineer information is required prior to a deployment:
z
Identify terrain visualization requirements.
z
Determine types and capabilities of engineer units for the multinational and other services.
z
Determine the facility support requirements, such as latrines and base camp construction, from
the multinational force and its supported units.
z
Determine the condition of and requirements for infrastructure in the civil-military operations
such as roads, airfields, ports, and power generation facilities.
z
Identify the availability and type of engineer resources in the operating area.
z
Determine real estate support requirements.
z
Identify humanitarian and nation assistance engineering requirements.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
A-10. Special operations forces can be a very valuable asset to a multinational force. These forces possess
unique capabilities that can compliment conventional capabilities. Selected special operations forces are
regionally oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures
found in the AO. They can assist with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When
the use of special operations forces is considered, it is very important to understand their capabilities and
properly apply those capabilities.
A-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Capabilities
A-11. The multinational force commander may designate a joint special operations task force composed of
forces from more than one service to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations
in support of a theater campaign or other operations in the AO. This commander will normally be the
commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite C2. The commander
would exercise day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached Special Operations Forces and allocate forces against
tasks in support of command. The command may define a special operations area for use by the special
operations forces. The establishment of a joint special operations area may delineate and facilitate
simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.
A-12. The commander must determine where in the organization certain Special Operations Forces best fit.
For example, as components, under the G-3 or S-3, or some other structure. The G-3 or S-3 normally
integrates both CA operations and PSYOP developed by the respective staff officers into the operation
order. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, approval authority for these operations normally
remains with multinational establishing authorities.
A-13. At the earliest opportunity, you must identify to the command’s higher headquarters the requirement
for CAO and PSYOP units and staff augmentation. These units may require reserve component
augmentation to be fully capable. This should be taken into consideration when requesting these assets
because of the process and lead-time necessary to obtain them. CAO, PSYOP, and PA actions can
dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. CAO should reinforce and be reinforced
by PSYOP themes and actions. PSYOP themes and actions should be coordinated with PA office
initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy, whether real or perceived.
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Appendix B
Threat Assessment
B-1.
The threat assessment should consider the following:
z
The adversary’s military ISTAR assets and capabilities. Can it detect and locate friendly
activities?
z
The adversary’s espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does it have operatives in the AO?
z
The adversary’s capability to conduct IO and C2 warfare activities, including those aimed at
audiences or targets outside the AO.
z
The adversary’s early warning—including distant early warning—capability. Can it intercept,
direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does it possess distant early
warning? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and other
weapon systems will probably be fielded in the near future.
z
The adversary’s WMD capability. This should consider political intent, industrial infrastructure,
delivery systems, and warheads. It should also consider the potential impact of strikes in terms
of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on allies
and civil populace.
z
The adversary’s capability to conduct long range operations, particularly with its longer-range
strike assets. Can its main forces interfere with the multinational’s sustaining operations? The
adversary’s weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts
should be considered. Factors include air, surface-to-surface missiles, air-delivered forces, naval
and marine assets, Special Operations Forces, operational level forward and raiding
detachments, and operational maneuver groups.
B-2.
The threat assessment should also consider-
z
Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they conduct information
gathering, espionage, guerrilla acts, or a combination of activities against us?
z
Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and methods?
z
In stability operations, the adversary’s antiair and antiarmor capability. Is additional protection
(such as defensive aid suites) required? An antiair and antiarmor capability is assumed in
warfighting.
z
The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they
hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards us? Could the population’s perceptions be altered
by friendly or adversary actions, including IO?
z
Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more
spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.
z
Subversion and hostile PSYOP. An adversary will usually attempt to subvert friendly forces,
either individually, to gain leverage, or collectively for political and military advantage.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
B-1
Appendix B
z
Likelihood of theft. This can be a significant problem in poorer countries.
z
Health risks. These include endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes, and
environmental and pollution hazards that may include residual WMD contamination and the
prevalence of illegal drugs.
z
Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and antipersonnel mines in the AO. Current and
earlier conflicts must be considered.
z
Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed by
military action.
z
Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation may create fire hazards. Living in makeshift
accommodations presents a substantial fire risk, particularly in a cold climate.
z
Fratricide. The risk of fratricide increases in warfighting, but is present at all times. It is
particularly likely in multinational operations.
z
Attack aviation. Adversary aviation attacks threaten our own sustaining operations. The most
vulnerable area for a threat posed by an adversary’s attack is the sustaining operations area.
Commanders must consider and plan for this threat.
B-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Appendix C
Civil Affairs Operations Estimate
C-1. The CAO staff officer prepares the CAO estimate during the commander’s decisionmaking process.
The CAO officer’s estimate and the commander’s decision will be the basis for the CAO (CMO) annex of
the operation order.
C-2. See figure C-1 for an example of the CAO estimate.
Civil-Military Cooperation Operations Estimate Number ____.
References: Maps, charts, or other documents.
1. MISSION. The commander’s restated mission.
2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS:
a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details
make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate
intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.
(1) Characteristics of the AO. These characteristics include physical features,
climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.
(a) Attitudes of the populace (cooperative or uncooperative).
(b) Availability of necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care). Include
civilian self-support capabilities.
(c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations, such as HN,
NGOs, and international organizations.
(d) Characteristics, migration rates, and numbers of dislocated civilians in the area.
(e) Amount and type of damage suffered by the economy—particularly in the
transportation, public utilities, and communication fields).
(f) Status and character of civil government.
(g) State of health of the civilian populace.
(2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion,
terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians.
(3) Enemy capabilities.
(a) Affecting the mission.
(b) Affecting CAO activities.
b. Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander’s planning guidance and from
the operations officer.
(1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
(2) Possible courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. (These COAs carried
forward through the remainder of the estimate.)
Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
C-1
Appendix C
(3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and
integration of staff estimates.
c. Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.
(1) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that
have an effect on the CAO situation.
(2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CAO.
d. Logistics Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
(1) Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that have an effect on the
CAO situation.
(2) Projected developments within the logistics field likely to include CAO.
e. CAO Situation. In this subparagraph, the status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the
case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the sub-
heading with reference to an annex to the estimate.
(1) Disposition and status of CAO elements and related significant military and
nonmilitary elements.
(2) Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the
supported unit operation pertinent to the CAO mission.
(3) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
(4) Government functions.
(a) Public administration.
(b) Public safety.
(c) Public health.
(d) Labor.
(e) Legal.
(f) Public welfare.
(g) Public finance.
(h) Public education.
(i) Civil defense.
(5) Economic functions.
(a) Economics and commerce.
(b) Food and agriculture.
(c) Civilian supply.
(d) Property control.
(6) Public facilities functions.
(a) Public works and utilities.
(b) Public communications.
(c) Public transportation.
(7) Special functions.
(a) Arts, monuments, and archives.
(b) Civil information.
(c) Cultural affairs.
(d) Dislocated civilians.
Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex. (Continued)
C-2
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20 May 2010
Civil Affairs Operations Estimate
(8) Public information functions.
(a) Television.
(b) Media.
(c) Coordination with joint task force information operations plan.
f. Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, assumptions may be required for
initiating planning or preparing the estimate. These assumptions are then modified as factual data
becomes available.
3. ANALYSIS OF COAs. Under each subheading (paragraph 2e) for each COA, analyze all CAO factors
indicating problems and deficiencies.
4. COMPARISON OF COAs
a. Evaluate CAO deficiencies; list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.
b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each operational and tactical COA under
consideration from the CAO standpoint. Those that are common to all COAs or are considered
minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or
modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to one major CAO activity that most
directly relates to the mission, such as minimizing civilian interference with tactical and logistics
operations or providing and supporting the functions of civil government, community relations, and
the like.
5. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CAO standpoint.
b. Indicate which COAs can best be supported from the CAO standpoint.
c. List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.
d. List the major CAO problems that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include specific
recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these
deficiencies.
Annexes (as required).
Figure C-1. Contents of CAO (CMO) annex. (Continued)
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
C-3
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