|
|
|
Personnel
z
In the absence of existing agreements, negotiating with local governments concerning
procurement, seizure of property for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal
jurisdiction.
z
Ensuring that all adverse actions are properly administered.
z
Advising the commander on international directives and agreements that form the basis for the
multinational operations. This includes such issues as HN support, diplomatic status, foreign
criminal jurisdiction, ROE, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians.
z
Providing legal advice on prisoners of war (POWs), refugees, displaced and detained civilians;
PSYOP and CMO/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); local culture and customs; government,
military, and political liaison; investigations; the legality of landing fees; and interpretation of
transit agreements.
z
Establishing liaison as early as possible with multinational, international, and HN legal officials,
local police, authorities, and court officials who administer the judicial system.
z
Implementing, interpreting, or executing a system for payment of claims arising from personal
injury or property damage resulting from the operation.
z
Advising the force on legal and fiscal restraints involving logistics assistance to nonmilitary
organizations and multinational forces.
z
Advising the command on issues affecting the detention of persons who may attack or otherwise
disrupt the force in accordance with customary international law, applicable UN Security
Council resolutions, alliance or coalition directives, and national policies. The force must be
sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures, especially where there are distinct cultural
differences in the AO.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-10. It is vital that commanders and planners of multinational forces understand the legal basis for all
operations. All applicable laws must be obeyed. Even multinational forces conducting operations under
UN mandates have no overall immunity under the law.
JURISDICTION
3-11. Jurisdiction is based on the national laws of the country sending the troops, as far as they have
extraterritorial application outside the country concerned. SOFAs for stability operations should grant total
exclusion of host-state jurisdiction; thereby providing a legal framework for the strictly international and
neutral status of the multinational forces. The multinational force cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of
any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality.
Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the multinational force or community could
directly influence the activities of the operation.
3-12. The consensual basis for the multinational force’s presence in the host country, its mandate, and the
privileges and immunities of any civilians should be established. This should be provided in a document of
treaty status. In most cases, an international organization, such as the UN, will perform this task. However,
when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, it is incumbent on the participating nations to
establish a legally sound basis for such an operation that is sustainable under international law.
3-13. Most stability operations SOFAs allow members of the multinational force to be exempt from local
jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts “related to the official duties of the member.” A claims regime
compensating for damages arising from such acts will almost always be a feature of any SOFA or other
agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, multinational members are
subject to local jurisdiction, with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If service members
are involved in any incident while on leave, they may be sued for any damage they do or injury they cause.
3-14. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners will be bound to comply with
obligations that arise from the treaties to which they are party. As not all multinational members will be
party to the same treaties, this may create a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
3-3
Chapter 3
cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from customary international law and are
binding on states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. Most of the major rules
relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of the force fit within this category.
3-15. The question of what element of international law is applicable may be a complex issue that depends
on several factual considerations. It is an issue on which expert legal advice should be sought. However,
such operations will never be conducted in a legal vacuum. The international law requirement for humane
treatment and respect for the life, rights, and property of noncombatants remains constant even if the treaty
or customary basis for those protections differ.
LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE
3-16. There are a variety of internationally recognized legal bases for the use of force in multinational
operations. For the majority of multinational operations, the UN charter provides the primary authority for
the use of force under Security Council sanctions. (For example, Chapter VII enforcement actions.) Under
Chapter VII of the UN charter, the Security Council is empowered to determine what measures are
appropriate to use against acts of aggression or other threats to international peace and security. However,
prior to use of military force, the Security Council must first determine the basis of the threat and then
employ measures less than use of force to attempt to compel compliance. Using the authority granted to it
under Chapter VII, the Security Council has authorized multinational operations to compel compliance
with the Security Council’s resolutions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. For further
information on this and other legal issues, see the Operational Law Handbook published by the Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (email: CLAMO@hqda.army.mil).
3-17. Because of the complexity of multinational operations, it is vital that commanders and planners of
multinational forces understand the legal basis for their involvement in the operation. Legal issues affecting
use of force, detention, searches and seizures, foreign criminal jurisdiction, and adherence to international
law all impact upon mission accomplishment. Close coordination with the multinational force legal advisor
is therefore essential.
FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
3-18. One of the most important issues affecting commanders and their Soldiers is criminal jurisdiction.
This is especially true in multinational operations. Because of the variety of stability operations often
performed by multinational forces, the issue of criminal jurisdiction is central to the ability of the
multinational force to accomplish its mission. Mission realities dictate the multinational force not be
subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an
undermining of impartiality essential to mission success. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try
members of the multinational force could directly influence the activities of the operation. As a result, the
consensual basis (mandate) for the multinational force’s presence in the host country and the privileges and
immunities of any civilians should be clearly established.
3-19. In a best-case scenario, these protections should be provided in a document with treaty status and,
because of the nature of multinational operations, negotiated by an international organization such as the
UN. However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, it is incumbent on the
participating nations to establish a legally sound basis that is sustainable under international law.
3-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Personnel
STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS
3-20. Generally, international law recognizes that each sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all persons
within its recognized borders. A receiving state must therefore consent to any limitations on this sovereign
right before any foreign nation sending forces (sending state) into that host nation can assert jurisdiction
over sending state personnel sent for military operations. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
military personnel taking part in a multinational operation are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state. Because of the potential ramifications that may result from a receiving state exercising
jurisdiction over multinational deployed personnel, a SOFA is often deemed essential prior to a
deployment. While a SOFA may come in many procedural formats, it generally addresses three substantive
areas of foreign criminal jurisdiction:
z
The first involves those cases where the sending state has exclusive jurisdiction. Under
exclusive jurisdiction, the sending state retains sole jurisdiction over cases where its personnel
have committed an offense punishable under its laws, but not the laws of the receiving state.
These offenses are primarily those characterized as purely “military” offenses (such as absent
without leave or dereliction of duty) under the sending state’s military criminal code.
z
The second area involves those cases where the receiving state exercises exclusive jurisdiction.
These offenses are commonly receiving state traffic offenses—offenses that are punishable
under the laws of the receiving state but not the sending state.
z
The last area commonly addressed in SOFAs involves those cases where jurisdiction is shared
by both the sending and receiving states. This is commonly referred to as concurrent
jurisdiction. Under concurrent jurisdiction, either the sending or receiving state may exercise a
primary right of jurisdiction depending upon the negotiated offense. As is often the case, in
those cases where the receiving state has a primary right of jurisdiction, the receiving state may
either waive its right, or, give “sympathetic consideration” to requests by the sending state for
jurisdiction.
3-21. In the absence of a SOFA, it is still possible for a sending state to retain some criminal jurisdiction
over its deployed forces. In those cases where military personnel are participating in a UN mission, those
military personnel will typically have special protection. Further (under Article VI of the convention on the
privileges and immunities of the UN charter) the state may grant deploying forces “expert on mission”
status in order to provide a strong legal framework for the international and neutral status of the
multinational force. In this case, complete immunity for crimes committed by members of the multinational
force is granted. Alternatively, the UN may negotiate a SOFA with the host nation that is commonly
referred to as a status of mission agreement retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the sending states
participating in the multinational mission.
3-22. In addition to criminal jurisdiction, civil liability for acts of omission by multinational personnel is
also an important concern to commanders and planners. (This includes, for example, claims by receiving
state civilians for damage during a deployment.) Most SOFAs allow members of the multinational force to
be exempt from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts “related to the official duties of the
member.” For example, a claims procedure compensating for damages arising from such acts will almost
always be a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to
official duties, multinational members are subject to local jurisdiction, with only a few minor concessions
in favor of the force. Therefore, if service members are involved in any incident that is not in performance
of their official duties, they could be liable in the courts of the receiving state for any damages or injuries
they cause.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
3-23. International law applies to all operations. Multinational partners will be bound to comply with
obligations that arise from the treaties to which they are party. Not all multinational members will be party
to the same treaties. This may create a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do.
Some obligations under international law arise from “customary” international law and are binding on
states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. For example, most of the internationally
recognized rules relating to humane treatment of persons who are within the power of a military force fit
within this category.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
3-5
Chapter 3
3-24. The law of war is binding on the multinational partners in any operation where a state of armed
conflict exists to which the multinational members are a party. Some aspects of the law of war, such as
prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, may bind multinational partners even though no “state of war”
exists. Even when not strictly applicable, the law of war may provide guidance and may be applied as a
matter of a multinational member’s national policy. Within the scope of multinational operations,
international human rights law is an issue at the forefront. In particular, both treaty and customary
international law prohibitions are binding on the multinational force and its members. These prohibitions
include-
z
Genocide.
z
Slavery.
z
Torture.
z
Inhumane treatment.
z
Arbitrary detention.
z
Deprivation of civil rights.
PRISONERS OF WAR AND DETAINED PERSONS
3-25. Troops involved in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are in a special position. While
such troops are expected to respect the laws relating to the use of force, they are not parties to the conflict
where they maintain peace. Thus, if they are taken prisoner, they are not POWs, but are considered to be
illegally held and must be immediately released.
3-26. Although not a party to the conflict, members of the multinational force must comply with the spirit
of all provisions of the law of war. In many operations, persons who are not entitled to POW status may be
detained by the force. Either the situation has not reached the threshold of international armed conflict or
the individual is not a combatant or otherwise entitled to enjoy POW status under Geneva Convention III.
The force may also need to detain common criminals who pose a threat to the force or to law and order.
3-27. The status of a person who has been captured may not be known immediately. This is particularly so
where opposing forces comprise or include irregular militia, where there are civilians accompanying the
force or acting as unlawful combatants, or where a spontaneous uprising has occurred.
3-28. Similarly, there may be a question as to whether the situation has reached the point of being an
armed conflict for the purposes of the law of war or of being an international armed conflict. Detainees are
often taken in circumstances, such as UN or other peace support operations, where the law of war may not
strictly apply. However, international law has developed to the point that no person who is in the power of
a force is without legal protection.
3-29. International rules of humane treatment must be applied to any persons captured, arrested, interned,
retained, or otherwise detained by multinational personnel. It does not matter whether the persons are
enemy POWs, retained personnel, internees, or detainees. It does not matter whether captivity arises out of
international armed conflict, armed conflict not of an international character, or during peace support
operations. It is important to understand that different countries have different rules regarding the holding
and transfer of enemy POWs. These rules may preclude the transfer of enemy POWs between national
contingents.
3-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Personnel
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
3-30. All nations in the multinational force will be provided with ROE by their respective chains of
command. Multinational force ROE will be developed during the planning process by the force
headquarters. Subsequently, subordinate formations, from nations other than that of the force headquarters,
must develop supporting ROE. It is probable that some subordinate ROE will be at variance with the lead
nation’s ROE in compliance with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided
by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent must also provide
clear national guidance on other nations’ weapons usage that would be prohibited by law or restricted in
usage for that contingent. Commands should also be aware that using another nation’s capability that is
prohibited by the command’s national ROE may place the command at risk of national prosecution.
3-31. U.S. forces assigned OPCON or TACON to a multinational force will follow the ROE of the
multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the president of the U.S. or secretary of
defense. U.S. forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When U.S. forces, under U.S.
OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to
effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will operate under standing ROE. To
avoid misunderstanding, the multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the
operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under these standing ROE and to exercise unit and individual
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Participation in multinational
operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements. For
example, other multinational force members may not be parties to treaties that bind the U.S. Or they may
be bound by treaties to which the U.S. is not a party. U.S. forces remain bound by U.S. international
agreements even if the other members are not parties to these agreements and need not adhere to the terms.
3-32. ROE are the primary tools used by multinational forces to regulate the use of force. ROE provide
operational constraints based on the mission the multinational force is conducting. Although numerous
legal factors serve as a foundation for multinational ROE, the fact remains that multinational ROE reflect
both international law and the national laws of the various participating nations. Nonlegal issues, such as
the political objectives of the multinational force and the individual troop-contributing nations combined
with military mission limitations, also play an essential role in the creation and application of ROE.
Determining and implementing acceptable ROE between all nations involved in the multinational operation
is the challenge faced by both commanders and their legal advisors. The multinational force legal advisor
has an important role in assisting commanders and staffs with the preparation, dissemination, and training
of ROE. However, ROE are ultimately the commander’s “rules” to be implemented by the force.
3-33. All troop-contributing nations in the multinational force will be provided with the operational ROE
by their respective national chains of command. However, multinational force ROE will be developed
during the planning process by the multinational force headquarters. Subsequently, subordinate national
force commands from nations other than that of the force headquarters, will develop supporting ROE that
follows, to the extent possible given possible national limitations, the ROE promulgated by the
multinational force headquarters. As a result, it is probable that some subordinate nation’s ROE will differ
from the lead nation’s ROE because of national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE
provided by their respective national chains of command. To prevent confusion that may impact upon the
ability of the multinational force to accomplish its mission, a subordinate command’s ROE should provide
clear national guidance on other participating nation’s ROE differences. For example, weapons use (such
as use of riot control agents and measures) that would be prohibited by law or restricted in use for one
nation should be clearly explained for all other multinational participants. Participating nations must
remain aware not to adhere to ROE measures (whether multinational force or another troop-contributing
nation) that would violate their own national laws when doing so could place the command at risk of
national prosecution. An example would be using landmines when their nation has signed international
treaties banning landmine use.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
3-7
Chapter 3
3-34. Because ROE are intended to be a control mechanism for use of force during military operations,
individual Soldier and collective unit training is essential. This is made even more important by the
potential for varied differences between the national ROE that a contributing force regularly uses in
training or operations and the ROE promulgated by the multinational force headquarters. To assist the
command in ensuring that ROE can be properly understood and applied under mission conditions, realistic
and rigorous scenario- or vignette-driven training exercises are often the best means of training ROE.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-35. During multinational operations, particularly stability operations, force members must be aware of
the environmental considerations of HN and participating nations’ environmental legislation. Military
materiel restrictions, by one or more armies or the host nation—such as the use of depleted uranium
rounds—may also limit the method by which forces conduct operations. Additionally, HN cultural and
historical sensitivities should be considered as a factor in the planning process. The force headquarters
should produce an environmental constraints and factors checklist for the force. This will also assist
subordinate commands in understanding the impact of operations on the environment. Force planners
should also consider these as factors in operational planning.
3-8
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Personnel
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer
the following questions with respect to the personnel support portion of the operation.
PERSONNEL
3-36. What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
3-37. What are the special skill requirements (unit or individual) of the command?
3-38. What are the requirements for reserve component units, individuals, or a combination of both?
3-39. What is the personnel replacement and rotation scheme?
3-40. What language-qualified personnel are needed for augmentation? What training is available?
3-41. Has the G-3 or S-3 been consulted on required augmentation?
3-42. What is the primary means of maintaining personnel accountability and strength management?
3-43. What is the primary means of processing awards and evaluations?
3-44. How is the G-1 tracking medical evacuations?
3-45. What national agreements relating to personnel policy or service exist? If there are any constraints,
what are they?
3-46. What communications capabilities exist to support the submission of personnel reports?
(For
example, automation nonsecure internet protocol, secure internet protocol, and combined enterprise
regional information exchange voice networks.) At what echelon are the capabilities available? What are
the theater and national reporting requirements?
3-47. What are the personnel service support capabilities of multinational force units to provide essential
services? Where do units require capabilities augmentation to ensure minimum essential services? What
LNO requirements exist? What translator requirements exist for the multinational force units?
3-48. What is the leave policy for force members? Which units are eligible to participate in the rest and
recuperation leave and or pass programs? Which are not eligible? Can a multinational or joint task force
limit multinational force units leave programs to ensure personnel readiness?
3-49. What are the equivalent modified tables of organization and equipment for multinational force units?
How can a multinational or joint task force headquarters conduct personnel replacement and rotation to
ensure unit personnel readiness levels?
3-50. Does the deployed theater accountability system or the joint personnel status report all personnel?
3-51. What processes do multinational force units use to track, process, and report casualties within the
theater and to national headquarters? What are their next-of-kin notification procedures? What is the
theater feedback mechanism to the controlling headquarters?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
3-9
Chapter 3
3-52. What support agreements exist to facilitate postal operations for multinational force units? Do units
have access to Army Post Office mail? Free mail?
3-53. How are multinational force replacements requisitioned, processed, and delivered to their respective
units?
3-54. What are the morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) capabilities of the multinational force units?
What agreements exist to share MWR assets? Are there any special MWR considerations?
3-55. What national service and/or achievement awards are available to force personnel? What are the
theater processing requirements? How does the theater awards policy ensure equity?
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-56. What areas come under multinational control and what areas remain national issues?
3-57. Do legal advisors understand national policies?
3-58. Has a SOFA or status of mission agreement been established with the receiving nations?
3-59. What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the multinational force area of responsibility?
3-60. What are the environmental constraints and factors that may affect the conduct of operations?
3-61. Is there a system to pay for claims arising from personal injury or property damage resulting from
the operation?
3-62. What are the legal and fiscal restraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary organizations and
other nations’ forces?
3-63. What are the multinational force’s obligations to war crimes’ investigations and indictment? Are
these obligations consistent with the multinational force’s mandate?
3-64. What are the multinational force’s obligations to the HN police forces, international police force, or
both forces deployed within the multinational AO?
3-65. What are the HN laws with respect to civil rights of its citizens?
3-66. Are HN judicial infrastructures intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what resources and
procedures are required to establish them?
3-67. What is the legal status of enemy POWs?
3-68. What is the legal status of displaced civilians?
3-69. What are the differing troop-contributing nation’s national policies for the use of antipersonnel
mines? How does this affect the multinational force?
3-70. Who is responsible for interrogation of enemy POW or detainees?
3-10
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Personnel
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
3-71. Are there multinational ROE that all nations have agreed to?
3-72. What is the impact of the ROE to the troop-contributing nations?
3-73. How does each troop-contributing nation disseminate and train ROE to its Soldiers?
3-74. Have the ROE been distributed to the Soldiers? Has training been conducted prior to deployment?
Has the ROE training been effective?
3-75. What are the key differences in ROE across the multinational force? How does this impact upon the
multinational force headquarters’ ability to accomplish its mission?
3-76. Are there national restrictions or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must
know?
3-77. Are there ROE on the use of indirect fire? Are there force guidelines on the use of indirect fire as a
demonstration of intent? Is there a difference between the multinational force ROE on the use of indirect
fire and national protection requirements?
3-78. Does each troop-contributing nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the
ROE?
3-79. Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents, or land mines—
been evaluated for its impact in relation to the ROE and upon the multinational force’s ability to
accomplish its mission?
3-80. Is there a joint targeting process? Are there ROE for joint fires? Are there systems available to assess
collateral damage from joint fires?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
3-11
Chapter 4
Intelligence
Every multinational operation is different. So are the ways in which intelligence will
be collected and disseminated within the force. Classification may present a problem
in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve
interoperability and trust within the multinational force. Commanders must know
their own and other nation’s positions on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of
information during planning ensures that multinational force requirements are clearly
stated; guidance supports the commander’s intent; and the multinational force uses
procedures supportable by other nations.
The G-2 or S-2 must clearly articulate the releasability instructions to analysts and
planners who must “write for releasability” to the members of a particular coalition.
The intelligence foreign disclosure officer must be consulted early in an operation to
facilitate smooth lines of communications between U.S. Army elements and allied
nations.
The national policies on intelligence affect the intelligence cycle. Each multinational
force must develop intelligence procedures tailored to the mission. These procedures
must be responsive to the commander and deliver timely intelligence products.
PLANNING OPERATIONS
4-1. Centralized control is desired but frequently unattainable in intelligence operations. As
with
command relationships, an organization may evolve that has some national assets and intelligence at the
multinational force’s disposal, while others are under national control. Due to the nature of many
intelligence sources, it is unlikely that nations will make all of their sources available for tasking by a
multinational force. This must be taken into account when planning multinational intelligence operations.
Many nations will have a national intelligence cell at the multinational force headquarters. Taskings by,
and support to, the multinational force will flow through this cell. Integrating intelligence representatives
and liaison personnel at each organizational level will improve access to intelligence capabilities. Matching
intelligence requirements with available assets in an AO is the basis of a collection plan.
4-2. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort must be unified. The commander
must provide the G-2 or S-2 with a clear mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs). A multinational force’s ability to gather and process intelligence varies
widely. The command’s collection manager must account for this and task accordingly. The collection
manager must match various sources, with requirements to answer CCIR. Sharing and mutual support are
key to integrating all resources into a unified system to best meet the command’s intelligence requirements.
The G-2 or S-2 prioritizes intelligence requirements to meet the commander’s needs.
COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING
4-3. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral
and vertical communications. The multinational force must have a system and operating procedures that
can transmit critical intelligence rapidly to units. This system may rely on the distribution of standardized
equipment by the lead nation to ensure commonality. It should include LNOs at major intelligence centers
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
4-1
Chapter 4
to provide redundant communications to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence
uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.
4-4. Multinational intelligence operations cannot be effectively conducted using U.S. systems
exclusively. Multinational force members must be able to readily exchange intelligence information among
each of the partners. As a result, intelligence staffs must assist in the development of an intelligence
architecture that enables participating members to communicate effectively within the multinational force
without compromising U.S. security interests. The establishment of a local area network using systems
such as linked operations-intelligence centers Europe or Combined Enterprise Regional Information
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) will greatly enhance information sharing within the coalition. The basic
CENTRIXS operational architecture framework is the same for all combatant commands and leverages
existing networks, technology and network centers. CENTRIXS services include email, web, chat, and
common operational picture capabilities and uses controlled interfaces for two-way information flows
among U.S. military commands and multinational partners.
EFFECTIVE COORDINATION
4-5. A multinational force must compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination. The
communications architecture is an essential element in this area. Areas requiring extensive coordination
include the following:
z
Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
z
Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of intelligence collection targets.
z
Intelligence centers, which should be multinational, serving both the multinational and national
needs. Such centers require the personal involvement of the multinational commander to make
this a reality.
4-6. The CCIR and priority information requirements should serve as the focus of the intelligence effort,
the answers to which can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.
SUPPORT TO STABILITY OPERATIONS
4-7. There are no standard templates for intelligence support to stability operations. Commanders must
use the same approach for stability operations as for war. In stability operations, the nature and intensity of
a potential threat can change even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.
4-8. Stability operations demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in
an AO than conventional war demands. Stability operations expand intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently
are not military forces or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauging the potential reactions of the
population to the operation, to avoiding misunderstandings, and to improving the effectiveness of
operations. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in multinational
strategy. Biographic information and leadership analyses are key factors to understanding adversaries or
potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge
of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the hostilities underlying the
deployment are vital to mission success. Such information helps to prevent unintentional mission creep and
ultimately achieve the objectives of the operation. Mission creep consists of tangential efforts to assist in
areas of concern unrelated to assigned duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment.
4-9. The commander’s understanding of the local infrastructure improves his or her situational
understanding. While traditional reconnaissance elements still provide much information, local media,
diplomatic mission personnel, and civilian agencies can provide information not available elsewhere.
Special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that all Soldiers have in stability operations.
Medical, transportation, CA, PSYOP, military police, and engineer personnel and peace observers are
superb sources of information. These personnel routinely operate in the HN environment and can discern
change within it.
4-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Intelligence
4-10. The primary source of intelligence in stability operations is normally derived from human
intelligence (HUMINT). Interpreters, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations,
and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and
political intent of those receiving assistance. Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being
intelligence conscious and provide basic guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability.
Multinational commanders should be aware that each nation has a set of established legal norms that
govern HUMINT and counterintelligence. Therefore, to achieve a multinational HUMINT effort requires
coordination at the national level.
4-11. In multinational operations, the intelligence community may work with a variety of government
agencies. Synthesizing and leveraging intelligence information from the various agencies presents many
challenges. To overcome this, agencies may assign personnel to a multinational headquarters to improve
interagency coordination. For example, during past operations-
z
Central Intelligence Agency analysts have worked with military intelligence analysts.
z
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents have worked with military members conducting forensic
analysis of explosions.
z
Department of the Treasury agents have worked with military analysts on foreign funding of
insurgency operations.
z
Drug Enforcement Administration agents have worked with military analysts to determine
linkage of drug trafficking and insurgent actions.
Agents have served as liaisons to a multinational corps or a multinational force to facilitate intelligence
support and synchronize agency operations with military operations. Interagency players have access to
many forms of specialized information that will help to complete intelligence picture.
4-12. Counterintelligence operations are a good source of security intelligence. (UN operations may inhibit
collection of information.) This intelligence will aid in determining any threats to the multinational force or
its mission by adversarial intelligence personnel. It will aid in determining the host nation’s willingness
and ability to protect multinational resources and personnel. Counterintelligence also provides input into
protection and OPSEC estimates.
4-13. Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information should be characterized
by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the use of the information, to avoid
undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies. If you keep the media informed, they may become
willing to exchange information with your staff.
INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE
4-14. In multinational operations, national sensitivities may exist concerning the dissemination of
intelligence. These sensitivities may even extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of
labeling information as intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. In many cultures,
intelligence connotes information gathered on the nation’s citizens for use against them. Further, attempts
to exchange information with civilian agencies may be stifled as they try to maintain neutrality by not
being part of any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging information, the command
should consider labeling unclassified data as “information” rather than “intelligence” and using “informa-
tion collection” rather than “all-source intelligence collection.”
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
4-3
Chapter 4
GEOSPATIAL DATA
4-15. Multinational operations require interoperable geospatial information and services data and data
exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to and ensure all work is on a standard
datum. A geospatial information and services plan must coordinate all multinational products, to include
access approval procedures and blending multinational assets into a cohesive production program. The
following concepts should guide multinational intelligence operations:
z
Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
z
Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence center with representatives from all
participating nations within the national limits on intelligence sharing.
z
View the mission from a multinational as well as a national perspective. Treat an adversary’s
threat to one member as a threat to all members.
z
Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
z
Plan complementary intelligence operations using all multinational intelligence resources,
focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.
z
Exchange LNOs to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence
requirements.
4-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Intelligence
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer
the following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation.
WARNING/PLANNING PHASE
4-16. What are the CCIRs? Have the CCIRs been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?
4-17. Does the multinational force have an initial all-source cell and collection management cell? What are
their positions in the deployment timetable?
4-18. Has the command conducted initial IPB, to include counterintelligence estimates?
4-19. Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence? Does the collection plan incorporate all
collection assets available for tasking?
4-20. Are there any unique cultural, historical, or religious relationships between the multinational force
partners and the adversary?
4-21. Have the cultural, social, political, and economic factors in the AO been included in the intelligence
estimate?
4-22. Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful
space information to the adversary been considered?
4-23. What is the intelligence architecture?
4-24. Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?
4-25. Has the C2 system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate to all participants the
time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction?
4-26. Do multinational forces have the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type
commonly used by other multinational forces?
4-27. Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the multinational
force? Are the national resources immediately responsive to the multinational force?
4-28. Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized
processing and exploitation centers?
4-29. What are the commander’s requirements for intelligence briefings and products?
4-30. What is the counterintelligence plan?
4-31. Is there a single focus for asset management?
4-32. Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned in accordance with the CCIR and the capability of the
multinational equipment under multinational force control?
4-33. Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to utilize available assets?
4-34. What are the multinational force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?
4-35. What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies?
Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
4-36. How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?
4-37. What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems, to include
database compatibility?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
4-5
Chapter 4
4-38. What are the staffing requirements for the G-2 or S-2 staff including specialists, linguists, and LNOs
to include a subordinate J-2X staff? What support is available from the G-1 or S-1?
4-39. What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?
4-40. What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
4-41. What are the requirements for ROE governing intelligence aspects of the operation such as
HUMINT activities or reporting?
4-42. What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?
4-43. What are the multinational or force security procedures?
4-44. What links should be established with civilian agencies, to include the media? Have efforts been
made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?
4-45. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted through the J-2X?
4-46. Has the use of a counterintelligence coordinating authority and HUMINT operations chief been
staffed and resources within the J-2X to deconflict and synchronize collection, debriefing, and
interrogation activities within the AO?
4-47. Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their capabilities
and limitations?
4-48. Is the analysis effort prioritized and have analytical production responsibilities been clearly laid out
for coalition members?
4-49. Are intelligence LNOs planned for in the operation?
4-50. Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to
supporting units?
4-51. Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?
4-52. Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy
dispositions, order of battle, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
4-53. Has intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine
briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?
4-54. Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?
4-55. Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in theater?
4-56. Have routine and emergency “classified” destruction procedures been promulgated along with
classified handling procedures?
4-57. What is the criminal threat? How is criminal intelligence incorporated into the CCIR?
THREATS
4-58. What enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, delivery means, and
employment doctrine exists?
4-59. What infrastructure
(such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy
sources) exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards?
4-60. What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor CBRN threat changes?
PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-61. Have the commander and staff been briefed on the initial IPB?
4-62. Who are the HN, civilian agency, and media contacts?
4-63. Have all intelligence systems, to include communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
4-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Intelligence
4-64. Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?
4-65. Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?
4-66. How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between multinational nations?
DEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-67. Has the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems and supporting
LNOs, been established and tested?
4-68. Are links with the HN, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
4-69. Has the collection management plan been refined?
4-70. Have the commander’s briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?
4-71. What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?
4-72. What is the effectiveness of SOPs for-
z
Handover by the in-country force?
z
Operations of all-source cell, collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management
cell, and national intelligence cell?
z
Compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems?
z
Protocols for the handling of HUMINT sources?
4-73. Was the actual process for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between nations
effective?
4-74. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?
4-75. Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination
been shared?
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS THREAT
4-76. What are the explosive hazards (such as mine, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), booby trap,
or improvised explosive device (IED) in the AO?
4-77. What data is available on mines already in place or the types of booby traps/IEDs that have been
employed in the AO?
4-78. What types of friendly munitions have been employed in the AO and at what location? What is the
likelihood of components of those becoming IEDs?
4-79. Are there indications that booby traps have been or will be emplaced by withdrawing forces or threat
elements that stay behind?
REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-80. What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the UN or other
agencies? Do the procedures include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or
handover of HUMINT sources?
4-81. Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate
and properly supervised?
4-82. What are the requirements for briefings, and have necessary debriefings been conducted?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
4-7
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 5
Operations and Planning
Operations conducted by a multinational force require continuous coordination
among throughout the process. Coordination must occur in all phases of the operation
from planning and deployment to redeployment. Multinational force commanders
and their staffs should involve their partners in each phase to the greatest extent
possible. Exchanging information among multinational formations must occur as
soon as possible.
PLAN EARLY
5-1. Multinational planning should start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans to
build the specific plan around. Depending on the type and nature of operations to be conducted, planning
may include governmental agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Predeployment, deployment,
sustainment, and transition operations must be addressed in the plans.
STRATEGIC SCHEME
5-2. Military advice to the president and the secretary of defense or another nation’s national authority is
critical in the early stages of multinational planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and
composition of the multinational force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political
leaders fully understand the force’s abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and
prepare for an operation. See Appendix A for further details on multinational capabilities.
5-3. Strategic planning is also supported by the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or
other multinational political organization. The mandate is usually expanded by TOR that establish for the
military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations.
(For example, the right to search civilians and seize property.) Nations often supplement the TOR with
national guidance for their own military force.
5-4. Whether in TOR or another form, this guidance must be secured because it is the starting point for
the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in
campaign planning, establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners.
Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces,
acceptable risk, and ROE cannot be formed.
CAMPAIGN PREPARATION
5-5. Thorough campaign planning is a vital factor in achieving unity of effort among multinational
partners and civilian agencies. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and
understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allows enough
time for multinational planners to teach others the key points of the process and build consensus on the
approach to the particular operation.
5-6. The mandate expresses political will. The TOR establish conditions for execution. The campaign
plan translates these into military and political tasks, ways, and means. Transition planning should be an
integral part of campaign planning and should be done simultaneously with the other elements. This not
only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force, but also promotes a smooth transition.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-1
Chapter 5
FORCE PROJECTION
5-7. Force projection, especially for a multinational force, is critical to overall mission success.
Participants must know from the beginning the multinational considerations to smoothly deploy forces and
to effectively use lift assets. Multinational operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For
example, before the UN protection force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating
nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This resulted in duplications and
omissions. The multinational force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during this phase to
maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and HN
assets. They should also agree on a division of labor.
5-8. Limited lift calls for maximizing its efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with
the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some
cases, one multinational force may transport another nation’s forces to the AO. LNOs from national
contingents either must coordinate directly with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force
headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 6 provides
additional information on logistics.
MISSION FOCUS
5-9. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important
factors in multinational operations. The commander must remain focused on the assigned mission. He or
she must understand the reason each national contingent is participating. This determines the structure and
resultant taskings of the multinational force. Failure to understand may cause the force to split into
components operating under differing political directions. While agreeing to the overall goal, national
contingents may have different ideas about how to execute the mission. The commander must recognize
that political considerations may force the choice of an acceptable course of action, rather than the
optimum military solution. The commander must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political
influences, keep the multinational forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.
5-10. To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to
a smaller group of partners. For example, the multinational force could assign the mission of support area
security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the multinational
force with air defense (AD), coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat’s special
capabilities. They must recognize the strengths and differences of the cultures from which these forces
come. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, must consider the capabilities of
the forces. Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to
that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as they are needed, while maintaining
concentrated critical capabilities.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
5-11. The glue that binds a multinational operation together is the commander’s ability to understand and
integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force. This requires the commander to clearly articulate
his or her intent. This enables each nation to form the same picture of the end state and the rules governing
engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational forces, the commander’s intent
must be clearly and simply stated.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
5-12. At some point, national units come under the control of the designated multinational commander.
This process, known as TOA, should be accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the transfer must
be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners must determine
where the TOA—and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters—occurs. Early TOA enables the
multinational commander to plan and conduct effective integration training.
5-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
5-13. The first option is to arrange TOA to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s home station.
Commanders can then control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate
reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on
national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force
headquarters.
5-14. A second option is to have TOA at an intermediate staging base (ISB) en route to the operational
area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. They deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence re-
quired by the multinational force.
5-15. The third option is to have TOA occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation
responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the multinational force
positive control of deployment into the AO. This option is less than optimum if immediate combat is likely.
5-16. Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then reception
operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow provides the best
support to the multinational force’s requirements and the best support to the forces.
5-17. Each multinational nation has a slightly different process for planning operations. If a lead nation
commands the multinational force, then the planning process that will be used is that of the lead nations. At
national contingent headquarters, nations will use their own planning process.
PLANNING GROUP
5-18. Forming a multinational planning group will facilitate the multinational planning process. When the
multinational force is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the planning
group as well as how the group and the staff sections will interact during planning and execution. This
planning group should-
z
Conduct crisis action planning.
z
Be the focal point for OPLAN or OPORD development.
z
Perform future planning.
z
Perform other tasks as directed.
The planning group comprises representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections, national
formations, and others as deemed necessary.
TRANSITION PLANNING
5-19. Most multinational operations end in a transition from multinational control to UN, HN military, or
HN civilian control. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. It must extend
throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other
planning. It should be done in cooperation with the organization taking control. The multinational force
will be most vulnerable during transition and redeployment. Therefore, protecting the force is likely to be
the most important consideration.
5-20. Staff sections should highlight in the transition plan how they are organized and how they function.
Checklists should be developed to facilitate the transition. Staff sections should recommend how to
organize the incoming staff. Staff sections should develop turnover files. These often are forgotten in the
haste to redeploy.
5-21. Planning should link the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking
charge. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount. Funding can be a major obstacle,
especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is to ensure that enough
UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The incoming headquarters should co-locate
with the multinational force headquarters. This will enhance the assimilation of the incoming staff with the
outgoing staff.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-3
Chapter 5
TYPES OF TRANSITIONS
5-22. The following describe the types of transitions. Also included are some of the key planning aspects
of transition operations:
z
Multinational force military relief-in-place. This transition has normal military operation
emphasis on mission and protecting the force. The relief-in-place would use doctrine from the
lead nation.
z
Multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition occurs with a normal
UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN
missions. Both the military and civilian authorities would need to-
Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
Identify and agree on responsibilities for C2 of operation.
Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
z
Escalation or de-escalation by UN chapter or the roe situation. The command places emphasis
on ROE and protection. The command must-
Confirm multinational members.
Identify national differences of ROE.
Identify protection issues.
z
Multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition is a withdrawal
conducted in peaceful conditions having achieved the desired end state. The military places
emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power
and authority. The command must identify those capabilities that will need to remain behind to
ensure that a seamless handover of authority and support to the government occurs.
TRAINING
5-23. The success of the operation may well depend on the training the command does before and during
the operation. Most components of the force likely will not have trained together. If they have, it will be of
limited frequency. The importance of training together should therefore be stressed to participating nations.
Training is the best way to develop an effective multinational force formed from national units. It should
be a continuing process for both personnel and units.
5-24. The predeployment and in-theater training programs should be based on assessments of the mission
and AO. The command may be presented with national contingents from different cultural backgrounds
that are at different states of training. The more that multinational forces and civilian agencies participate in
the training, the more the command will learn about how these organizations think and operate. This
participation will also enhance team building and staff member’s perceptions of one another. Multinational
force commanders must also be prepared to receive, train, and integrate multinational contingents during
the course of operations. This will require commanders to be flexible and adaptable.
IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
5-25. Training teaches the participants about the strengths and weaknesses of multinational partners and
about how to integrate them into an effective force. Training should be conducted at all levels of command
and include all staffs. Before deployment, command post exercise simulations can be used for staff training
and solving problems in the multinational force command structure.
5-26. Training continues once the command arrives in the AO. It is based on specific requirements and
functions. Training should include exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the OPORD, or new missions.
They may also be used to advertise the command’s capabilities and serve as a deterrent.
5-27. Command post and field training exercises can be used with simulations. Distributed simulation can
enhance training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps commanders
identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders should arrange
seminars to develop or stress SOPs and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Protection requirements may
impact on areas available for training. Some training, such as live-fire exercises, will require HN approval.
5-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
IDENTIFY CAPABILITIES
5-28. Some nations possess doctrine that fully addresses strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other
nations focus primarily on the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized
operations. Others focus on counterinsurgency or light infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile
operations—emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent. Some
nations regard this approach as too risky. Because of these variations, commanders must carefully consider
which units are best suited for particular missions.
5-29. When the situation permits, commanders should seek to improve the contributions of national forces
by providing training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. The
importance of training assistance and dedicated liaison teams cannot be overstated, particularly when
working between a force with digital warfighting capability and a force that works with analog means.
Multinational exercises are essential to training and doctrine refinement. Multinational exercises should
exercise logistic support mechanisms and identify possible problems in providing logistic support with
forces from other nations.
PROPER CONDUCT
5-30. All it takes is one Soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill
in an AO. Inappropriate individual statements and actions may offend forces from other nations or civilians
in the AO, creating negative perceptions. Individuals should not assume that others would not understand
derogatory statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct
and its continued emphasis may prevent this.
5-31. All personnel should receive instruction on understanding the methods of operating in a
multinational environment. Commanders must do the following:
z
Ensure that all augmentees participate in their host formation training events.
z
Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.
z
Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation. This includes training offered by the
Seventh U.S. Army Training Command in Germany, the UN Operational Training and Advisory
Group in the UK, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center. These all have extensive
experience in training units and individuals for operations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-5
Chapter 5
PREDEPLOYMENT FOCUS
5-32. Predeployment training should focus on the following areas:
z
Individual military skills.
z
Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.
z
First aid, both individual and “buddy.”
z
Terrorism awareness and prevention.
z
Education lessons in the multinational structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of
responsibilities to include NGO and international agency structures.
z
Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations.
z
Team building and staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary
organizations.
z
LNO training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives.
z
Information on the customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, and the
economic and historical background of the situation and the population of the AO.
z
Capabilities of the adversary.
z
How to effectively communicate to the public through the news media.
z
Negotiation and mediation.
z
Language training, especially key phrases. Although ABCA armies all speak English, not all
operational terms have the same meaning to each army.
z
Situational awareness to include mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition.
z
ROE.
z
Law of war.
z
Crowd control and the use and employment of nonlethal riot control agents.
z
Employment and use of nonlethal weapons capabilities.
z
Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in-theater driving conditions and skills.
z
Training service members to accommodate environmental constraints.
z
Detainee handling operations.
IN-COUNTRY TRAINING
5-33. The multinational commander may need to evaluate the level of training of each troop-contributing
nation to determine if it is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training may be necessary prior to
commitment. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to the host nation.
5-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer
the following questions with respect to the operations and planning portion of the operation.
OPERATIONS
5-34. What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
5-35. Does the command have a capabilities brief and description or organizational chart of its own force
and the multinational forces?
5-36. What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment?
(See Chapters 1, 3, and 13 for additional information on ROE.)
5-37. Do the ROE support protection?
5-38. Does the force have a mechanism to identify potential threats to the force?
5-39. What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its
employment?
5-40. What is the current situation in the AO?
5-41. Has the mission, to include commander’s intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons
down understand it?
5-42. Has planning begun for the transition to UN or other organizations that will take over from the
multinational force? (See transition below.)
5-43. What is the logistic situation?
5-44. What are the language and interpreter requirements?
5-45. What are the security screening procedures and limitations relating to contracted interpreters?
5-46. How does ROE apply to contracted civilians?
5-47. What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO or among multinational
forces?
5-48. Does the command have a SOP that includes reporting requirements and procedures?
5-49. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
5-50. How will the command coordinate ground and air reconnaissance?
5-51. Has a common map database been established?
5-52. Have staff visits been coordinated?
5-53. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
5-54. What forces remain to support the multinational and how long are they required when redeploying or
moving?
5-55. What national forces will interface with the joint movement control center?
5-56. What training is required before deployment?
5-57. What training is required once deployed?
5-58. Has a PSYOP program been developed to support the operation?
5-59. Have PSYOP assets been requested?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-7
Chapter 5
5-60. Has a CA/CMO plan been developed to support the operation?
5-61. Have CA/CIMIC assets been requested?
5-62. Has an information operations (IO) plan been developed to support operations?
5-63. Have IO assets been requested?
5-64. Has a search been conducted to determine if extant documents are available to support operations or
on a given capability? Both for military and nonmilitary agencies?
5-65. Is there a mine or UXO threat in the AO?
5-66. Is there an existing mine or UXO action center?
5-67. What is the status of law enforcement capabilities in the current environment?
5-68. Is there additional training required for law enforcement personnel in the current environment in
order to maintain security and stability?
5-69. Are there measures of merit for tasks and subtasks?
PLANNING
5-70. Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
5-71. Have members of the coalition been included on the operational planning team?
5-72. Has the political advisor, a representative from the Department of State, and a representative from
the host nation been included on the operational planning team?
5-73. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other
multinational members been included in the supporting nation’s deployment sequence?
5-74. Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to
avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
5-75. Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?
5-76. To what standard have multinational forces been trained?
5-77. Does the multinational force have a standard of training? Is a standard provided by an outside
agency?
5-78. Have all multinational forces received the proper predeployment training?
5-79. What type of predeployment training have multinational forces received?
AVIATION PLANNING GUIDE
Force Structure
5-80. What is the multinational aviation force structure?
5-81. What is the desired aviation organization for battle for early entry forces?
5-82. What is the desired order of arrival of aviation assets?
5-83. What types of readiness are multinational aviation forces and supporting elements, including
strategic air and shipping for deployment, ordered to maintain? How long can they sustain this readiness?
5-84. What are the phases and flow of aviation units, capabilities, and materiel to the AO? Is this flow
reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
5-8
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
Command and Control
5-85. What is the commander’s intent?
5-86. What is the multinational C2 structure for aviation?
5-87. Has a multinational aviation commander been appointed? What is his or her command, control, and
coordination authority?
5-88. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned
aircraft system use?
5-89. Has other nations’ navigational equipment performance
(input requirements, accuracy and
susceptibility to attack) been ascertained? Will relative performance affect control and use of operational
environment? Will it affect control, direction, and coordination of fires and ROE?
5-90. Are nations’ target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be done
to avoid or mitigate these designators?
5-91. Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?
5-92. When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?
5-93. Is there a requirement for a multinational operational environment management cell?
5-94. What will be the multinational command relationships—for example, OPCON versus TACON—for
aviation assets?
5-95. What are the command arrangements for the conduct of multinational longer range operations?
5-96. What national aviation command arrangements are required to support the multinational command
structure?
5-97. What are the national requirements for aviation LNOs?
5-98. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?
5-99. What multinational bearer communications system will be used?
Mission and Tasks
5-100. What is the multinational aviation mission?
5-101. What are the multinational aviation specified tasks?
5-102. Are there any multinational aviation implied tasks?
5-103. What is the multinational C2 warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its effectiveness?
5-104. Are multinational aviation assets for communications and information systems protected against
possible attacks?
5-105. What is the multinational CBRN threat assessment? What can aviation forces do to identify and
monitor hazards, including contamination?
5-106. What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and
resources?
Constraints and Freedom of Action
5-107. Has the multinational headquarters established constraints on aviation output and technical media
activity or effect? Do these constraints include legal factors, acceptance of risk, financial factors, and
human factors such as physical, moral and cultural?
5-108. Is the nations’ capability confirmed for night movement and finding, fixing, and striking the
enemy?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-9
Chapter 5
5-109. Do international organizations, NGOs, and CMO activities affect the aviation plan?
5-110. Has the multinational headquarters established environmental and AO characteristics (such as
terrain, altitude, and climate) likely to impact on aviation equipment and multinational interoperability?
Subsequently, has the multinational headquarters reviewed participating nations’ capabilities and aircraft
performance (weapons, payload and radius of action) in light of environmental conditions?
5-111. Has the multinational headquarters established the mapping, global positioning system, and
geodetic datums to be used? Has it ascertained consequent implications for multinational interoperability
and coordination of fires?
Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
5-112. Has a multinational aviation electronic preparation of the battlefield been prepared? Is the
electronic preparation of the battlefield continuously being reviewed, developed, and disseminated
throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?
5-113. Is there a multinational aviation electronic warfare (EW) targeting process or surveillance and
target acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures
are in force?
5-114. What factors will frustrate multinational control of the electromagnetic spectrum? Are all nations’
cryptographic driven systems interoperable?
5-115. What multinational EW assets are available to support aviation maneuver?
Information and Intelligence
5-116. Has a multinational aviation IPB been prepared? Is the IPB being reviewed or developed and
disseminated continuously, throughout the multinational aviation chain of command?
5-117. What is the multinational’s information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan? How
is this information collected from and disseminated to aviation?
Protection
5-118. What are the multinational aviation protection requirements?
5-119. Is there a multinational aviation EW targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan?
What countersurveillance control measures are in force? Have limitations been placed on using white
illumination to facilitate aviation night-vision goggle operations?
5-120. Have the national and individual aircraft EW and defensive aid capabilities been compared against
threat and aircrew individual protective equipment? Have they been compared against laser and CBRN
hazards? Is the multinational C2 structure capable of delivering threat information and essential codes and
preflight messages? Are means and media to move and load codes and fills interoperable? Are fills and
threat library information for the following available-
z
Identification, friend or foe systems?
z
Missile approach warning equipment?
z
Infrared or radar jammers?
5-121. Are combat identification systems available to all allies? If not, can they be made available and
embodied to enhance allied freedom of action? Are nations’ combat identification systems interoperable? If
not, what multinational joint antifraticide measures are in place?
5-122. Are multinational plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and
timeliness) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?
5-10
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
5-123. What CBRN protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations’ air
crew, ground crew, and technical personnel? What effect will adopting protective measures or using
protective equipment have on multinational aviation operations (quality, quantity, and sustainability)? Are
nations able to decontaminate aircraft, to what standards and what effect will residual CBRN
contamination or hazards have on operational output?
5-124. Has the multinational headquarters established differing national approaches to risk management?
How have these approaches affected multinational operational output? What is the impact on the planning
cycle and battle procedure?
Weapons Effects and Rules of Engagement
5-125. Has the multinational headquarters established contributing nations’ aircraft weapons’ capabilities
and performance? What are their effects on ROE?
5-126. What systems will be used for collateral damage assessment?
Doctrine
5-127. What level of aviation doctrine standardization has been achieved within the multinational force?
What does the lack of standardization for multinational aviation operational output imply?
5-128. Is there a multinational aviation mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations to
ease continuous review of equipment performance; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and other
vital information?
5-129. What multinational agreements or standards are available to enhance operational output? What
scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards or to develop new ones?
G-1 or G-4
5-130. What aircraft are multinational partners bringing to theater?
5-131. Has the nations’ aircraft performance, given ambient conditions in the AO (payload and radius of
action) been confirmed?
5-132. Has a multinational, HN, or theater facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the
multinational headquarters aviation level?
5-133. What is the logistics structure?
5-134. What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common user items? If fuel and
munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?
5-135. Does the lead nation’s criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national
equipment requirements?
5-136. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?
5-137. Has the multinational headquarters established the support capabilities and levels of service—to
include national environmental restrictions—that nations’ aviation forces can offer each other?
5-138. Has the multinational headquarters established national aircrew duty time specifications? What
impact will this have on planned multinational aviation surge and continuous operational output?
5-139. Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected multinational operational
output?
5-140. Are there multinational support issues that will affect the nations’ efficient aircraft fleet
management resulting in reduced operational output?
Finance and Budget
5-141. What are the multinational funding arrangements for aviation mission or tasks?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-11
Chapter 5
5-142. Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?
5-143. Are multinational and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the multinational
force?
Training and Collective Performance
5-144. What scope is there for multinational aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming? Is appropriate
simulation equipment available? Can it be made available? Can an appropriate environmental database be
developed?
5-145. Are there any multinational mission-specific training requirements and training responsibilities?
5-146. What scope exists for multinational forces using multinational, national, or HN facilities,
particularly simulation and live-firing training space?
Host-Nation Issues
5-147. Has the multinational headquarters coordinated the HN provision of aviation services?
5-148. Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered HN cultural issues that will likely
impact multinational aviation operations?
CBRN DEFENSE
5-149. What is the CBRN warning and reporting structure in-theater? What communication nets will be
used to pass CBRN information?
5-150. How are the high-value assets such as biological detectors allocated and deployed in-theater? Are
there enough assets to available to be allocated among multinational partners?
5-151. What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?
5-152. Have armies adopted a standardized individual CBRN protective dress state?
5-153. Has an operation exposure guide been established to manage radiation exposures?
5-154. Have armies adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical detectors?
5-155. Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs)?
5-156. Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty
violations?
5-157. What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do multinational partners have for CBRN protection
such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?
5-158. How will the psychological impact of potential enemy WMD use be countered?
TRANSITION
5-159. What are the issues and key multinational force events (past and present) that lead to the current
situation?
5-160. What work is required to accomplish the transition?
5-161. What force or agency is taking control of the operation?
5-162. Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?
5-163. Who will determine when the transition begins or is completed?
5-164. Who will fund the transition?
5-12
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Operations and Planning
5-165. What is the multinational force policy for transition and redeployment?
5-166. What issues exist before the transition? What potential issues will exist for the transition force
once the transition is completed? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force?
5-167. Has the multinational force’s end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the
incoming force?
5-168. If there is a new mission, can the multinational force assist the incoming force in preparing for it?
5-169. What multinational forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?
5-170. What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?
5-171. What will be the command relationship for the multinational force during the transition and for
those multinational forces remaining behind?
5-172. Who will support the multinational force remaining behind?
5-173. What will be the communications requirement for the multinational force remaining behind?
5-174. Will the multinational force provide communications capability to the incoming force?
5-175. Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?
5-176. Will new ROE be established for the transition?
5-177. Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
5-178. Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the multinational force?
5-179. What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that may impact the incoming force?
5-180. Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?
5-181. What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?
5-182. Will sufficient security be available to provide protection? Who will provide it?
5-183. How will the turnover be accomplished?
5-184. Who will handle PA for the transition?
5-185. What C2 arrangements are for departure?
5-186. What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing
forces?
5-187. What are the identities of all stakeholders and their level of involvement in the transition
operation?
5-188. What are the outgoing multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and
contractors?
5-189. What are the incoming multinational forces’ obligations with respect to employed local labors and
contractors?
5-190. What are the functions and appointments that the outgoing force should maintain during the
handover period?
5-191. Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?
5-192. What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?
5-193. What effects does transition have on the local economy and security situation?
5-194. Is this an in-contact (hot) transition operation or an administrative (cold) peaceful transition
operation?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
5-13
Chapter 5
TRAINING
5-195. What predeployment training has been conducted by the troop-contributing nations?
5-196. Have designated troops from the various participating nations previously trained with each other?
5-197. What predeployment or in-country training will be necessary before the commitment or
deployment of troops into the AO?
5-198. What level of training is posed by each of the troop-contributing nations?
5-199. Does each of the nations have some form of training for LNOs or will the coalition headquarters
need to establish a program?
5-14
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Chapter 6
Logistics
A coordinated logistics effort within a multinational force is essential to the success
of accomplishing its mission. The multinational commander must consider how best
to ensure that the logistics effort is coordinated. If nations are competing for HN
resources to provide logistical support to troop-contributing units, it will only hamper
the multinational force’s efforts in achieving its mission. The multinational
commander will strive to achieve unity of effort in the logistics effort.
UNITY OF EFFORT
6-1. Unity of effort is essential to multinational logistics operations. This requires coordination not only
between contributing nations, but also with civilian agencies in the AO. Executing multinational logistics
must be a collective responsibility of the multinational force. When possible, mutual logistic support
should be developed for economy of effort. Multinational logistics should be flexible, responsive, and
predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire multinational force. The multinational
logistics plan should incorporate the logistics requirements capacities and capabilities of all contributing
forces. This will ensure sustained and synchronized execution of the plan.
6-2. Consensus on multinational logistics issues and requirements should be formed early. Commanders
must thoroughly comprehend multinational forces’ doctrine. They must also have good relations with
subordinate commanders and civilian leaders. There should be cooperation and continuous coordination
between all elements providing logistic support and the operational elements. This must begin during the
initial planning phase and continue through the operation’s termination and redeployment of forces back to
their countries of origin.
6-3. Commanders must handle logistics on a multinational basis, with as much centralized control over
logistics as interoperability permits. Under certain conditions, creating a single multinational logistics
command may provide economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants (for
national command reasons) insist on maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics
responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4 or S-4 should establish a planning group with
members from all participating nations to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between
multinational forces. Commanders should identify the funding authority, as early as possible, to support
multinational forces and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.
6-4. Multinational operations can complicate logistic support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent
in a national logistics system. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all
nations have deployable logistics capabilities. Such nations then become dependent on other nations for all
or part of their support. In these cases, the multinational force must be prepared to provide the required
support to both military and civilian organizations. Support may include both deployment and sustainment.
For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift C2 can assist in coordinating approval and facilitating
airlift once approved. When support is required, close liaison will ensure funding lines are clearly
identified.
RESPONSIBILITY
6-5. In multinational operations, logistics is primarily a national responsibility. Therefore, some nations
may not want to relinquish authority over their logistics assets. However, relations between NATO and the
U.S. have evolved to where logistics is seen as a collective responsibility. The multinational commander
needs the authority and control mechanisms for logistics to achieve the mission. Having each nation to
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
6-1
Chapter 6
perform logistics functions separately would be inefficient and expensive for each nation. Varying degrees
of mutual logistic support among multinational partners must be planned to complement partners’
capabilities and minimize weaknesses. The multinational force staff should evaluate the degree of
interoperability among the participating nations. After which, the participating nations can discuss which
nations will provide support functions for the multinational force and the procedures and methods of how
that support will be provided. For additional information on multinational logistics, see JP 4-08, AJP-4,
and FM 4-0.
6-6. In some cases, the multinational force may exercise control over the national logistics units, in other
cases it will act only as the coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend on existing
agreements and arrangements negotiated with contributing nations. The multinational force commander
may delegate to subordinate commanders the level of authority granted by the individual nations. The
multinational force commander may establish a logistics coordination or control center headed by a senior
logistics coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support within the AO.
6-7. The G-4, in coordination with the multinational force J-4, must determine what, if any, logistics
authority for a common support capability that national authorities have delegated to the multinational
force. The G-4 or S-4 must also determine whether that authority meets the multinational’s requirements.
The multinational force’s delegated or directed authority does not negate national responsibilities for
logistic support or discourage coordination. Nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures and the efficient
use of facilities or organizations.
6-8. Three methods of executing cooperative logistics exist in a multinational force. Each can be used
singularly or combined. Regardless of the method used, national decisions and commitments must lead or
participate in such arrangements provided early during the planning cycle. The three methods are-
z
The lead-nation concept. For this method, one nation accepts the responsibility for providing the
framework for one or more logistics functions in support of the multinational force.
z
A role-specialization agreement. Under this method, one nation accepts responsibility for
providing a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the multinational force.
z
Pooled assets and resources. For this method, two or more nations form an integrated logistic
support structure to provide supply or support functions to the multinational force.
PLANNING
6-9. The logistics staff must become involved early in the planning process. This ensures that sustainment
requirements balance with capabilities. To facilitate planning, the staff should identify personnel and make
them available as early as possible. Concurrent logistics and operations planning is critical. Staffs should
develop plans with all participating nations to achieve logistics efficiencies. The multinational headquarters
should determine the logistic support needed to uphold the commander’s plan and provide estimates of
these requirements to national units. Planners should share partial planning data with prospective partners
to facilitate parallel planning. Staffs should-
z
Evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations.
z
Determine differences in logistics doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements,
stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems.
z
Account for these differences in the plan.
z
Account for differences in language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure,
nutritional standards, and social outlooks that may impact logistic support to multinational
forces.
6-10. The logistics planners should assign responsibilities and procedures for providing logistic support
within the multinational force and the task organization of multinational logistics units. NGOs normally
support the local population. However, in some circumstances, military support may be required. In those
circumstances, the plan must also address the requirements of the local population if they are being
supported. When planners quickly determine what support the civilian populace requires, they help
develop that supporting plan.
6-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Logistics
6-11. A key tool to help logistics personnel in building a flexible operational support plan is the logistics
preparation of the theater. Logistics preparation consists of actions taken by logistics personnel at all
echelons to optimize the means (force structure, multinational and HN resources, and strategic lift) for
supporting the multinational force commander’s plan. These actions include-
z
Identifying and preparing ISB and forward operating bases.
z
Selecting and improving line of communications (LOC).
z
Projecting and preparing forward logistics bases.
z
Coordinating multinational logistic support.
z
Forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat.
6-12. Those actions focus on identifying resources that are currently available in the theater for use by
multinational forces and ensure access to those resources. (FM 4-0 provides the details of logistics
preparation of the theater.)
6-13. The plan must ensure all appropriate environmental reviews are completed in accordance with
environmental laws, policies, and regulations. The plan must be in accordance with national, international,
and HN agreements. The G-4 or S-4 must coordinate with legal and other appropriate staff officers to
ensure that current environmental conditions—such as water and soil contamination—epidemiological
surveys, and disease risk assessments comply with legal requirements. The G-4 or S-4 must also ensure
that the data has been recorded for future remediation.
6-14. When planning to acquire real property and lease facilities, planners must determine what facilities
and land are needed and whether they exist in the AO. Planners should establish priorities for property
acquisition taking into account when the property is needed.
6-15. Logistics planners must determine the multinational force resupply requirements and make
recommendations to the commander on the best method and type of servicing recommended.
HOST-NATION SUPPORT
6-16. The command must analyze the physical infrastructure in the host nation to determine what facilities
and services are available to support the command and how they can reduce the logistics footprint. The
command should have a good understanding of the culture, business practices and laws, religious
implications, and political and social structure of the host nation. Evaluation should include location and
what the command will be allowed to use. AOs without a functioning government may only be able to
provide limited support. HN support may be integrated into the logistics structure of the command to
ensure their effective use. Commanders should be prepared to assume all logistics responsibilities in the
event this support is curtailed. Allocating this support is based on command priorities. Nations must agree
on whether a multinational force will have the authority to conclude HN support arrangements on behalf of
participating nations, or whether prior national approval is required.
6-17. HN support expertise
(legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative) should be
centralized within the logistics staff for both identifying and procuring HN support. This ensures that the
command’s requirements are known and prevents competition between partners.
6-18. Local procurement efforts may be beneficial to the host nation, but they may also undermine
important goals. Local suppliers may have important political connections. An otherwise innocent
procurement decision may have significant political meaning in the host nation. Procurement may bid up
local prices with negative impacts on local groups or civilian agencies. These effects may influence the
attainment of the end state and the timing of withdrawal. CMO and CA personnel are trained to identify
and coordinate HN support and can provide valuable assistance to the logistics staff in this area.
6-19. The command must obtain authorization from national authorities to negotiate for HN support.
Agreements with the host nation should include the authority for the command to deal directly with the
host nation for support. The command should develop a list of current HN agreements. The command legal
advisor helps to negotiate HN support agreements. Agreements should be negotiated for local contracting,
currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales, and customs regulations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
6-3
Chapter 6
6-20. The logistics staff should evaluate current HN contracts between the HN and civilian agencies in the
AO and evaluate their effectiveness. Then, the staff must determine the best lead agency (military or
civilian) to negotiate and contract for HN support. Figure 6-1 provides HN considerations for support.
6-21. Multinational forces need to have intelligence on HN support personnel and contractors. Based on
experiences from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, HN support personnel and
contractors may have family, social, organizational or financial ties or routine contact with insurgents.
Item and considerations
Accommodations
Communications
Billeting
Local
Offices
International
Stores and warehouses
Security
Workshops, vehicle parks, gun parks
Finance. Payment for—
Medical
Accommodations, supplies,
Hardstands
communications, equipment, local labor
Fuel
maintenance, medical, and movement
facilities
Weapons and ammunition
Emergency facilities
Transportation, including aircraft
Personal facilities
Firing ranges
Training areas and facilities
Fuel
Recreation areas and facilities
Aircraft
Laundry and dry cleaning facilities
Vehicles
Ships
Weapons and Ammunition
Method of Delivery
Security
Storage
Storage
Interoperability of refueling equipment
Collection or delivery
Common use of refueling installations
Local Labor
Rations
Method of hiring
Fresh
Method of payment
Pack
Administration
Potable water
Medical
Translation
Normal facilities
Interpreters/language specialists
Emergency facilities
Translation of documents
Reciprocal national health agreements
Evacuation of causalities
Medical and blood supply system
Figure 6-1. Host-nation considerations
6-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Logistics
Item and considerations
Maintenance
Supplies and Equipment (other than
ammunition, fuel, or rations)
Accommodations
Common use items
Vehicles
Ships
Water
Equipment
Production/purification capability
Roads (including snow clearance)
Municipal
Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft
Other water treatment systems
Provision of assembly areas
Distribution capability
Damage control
Trucks
Emergency facilities for visitors’ vehicles
Pipeline
and equipment
Hoseline
Recovery and transportation of disabled
Storage capability
vehicles and equipment
Receipt and issue capability
Waste and disposal
Available water sources
Movement
Wells
Airheads
Surface
Alternates
Subsurface
Facilities
HN water quality standards
Ships
Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Refueling
HN military vehicles, equipment, ships,
aircraft
Ports
Locally hired vehicles and equipment,
Alternates
ships, aircraft
Draft
Policy on drivers and handlers for above
Bunkering/fueling
Repair
Road and rail movement
Personnel
Equipment
Security
Traffic control
Pipeline movement
Figure 6-1. Host-nation considerations (continued)
ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS
6-22. Agreements for transferring defense goods and services between nations must be done at the national
government level. This may prove cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in
multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and
cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), national authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-
servicing logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for
equal value basis. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing
arrangement. The agreement is conducted by the J-4 and the Department of State with the country involved
in the ACSA. Approval is provided by and the agreement is signed by the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the country involved in the ACSA. Major commands in country then negotiate the details with their
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
6-5
Chapter 6
counterparts and reference the ACSA for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement
contains specific details under which orders for logistic support are placed. ACSA can cover-
z
Food.
z
Billeting.
z
Transportation.
z
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
z
Clothing.
z
Communications.
z
Health service support.
z
Ammunition.
z
Base operations support to include construction.
z
Storage.
z
Use of facilities.
z
Training.
z
Spare parts.
z
Repair and maintenance.
z
Calibration.
z
Port services.
6-23. Items not included are-
z
Weapons systems.
z
Major end items.
z
Guided missiles.
z
Nuclear and chemical munitions other than riot control agents.
z
Cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components.
z
Chaff and chaff dispensers.
z
Guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition.
CONTRACTING
6-24. Contracting, such as theater-support contracting, is a means to acquire locally available logistic
support for immediate use by deployed units at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward
operating locations. Contracting may be conducted with foreign governments, commercial entities, or
civilian agencies. Contracting does not replace HN support or existing supply systems where these systems
are available or operational. When properly used, contracting is an essential tool for supporting the
mission. Deployments in remote AOs are most likely to require contingency contracting support. FM 3-
100.21 and FM 4-92 provide more information on contractor support to the Army. The commander or G-4
or S-4 must prioritize available contractor resources in the AO. Contracting can accomplish the following:
z
Bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic or HN support is available.
z
Reduce dependence on a nationally based logistics system.
z
Improve response time and reduce footprints.
z
Augment the existing logistic support capability for critical supplies and services.
z
Transition from military to civilian-controlled operations.
z
Manage limited resources by using contractors instead of calling up reservists.
z
Reduce demands for military resources and improve relationships with the populace.
6-25. Contracting is valuable where no HN support agreements exist, or where HN support agreements do
not provide for required supplies or services. Contracting can be expensive. Funding guidance is required.
Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support is essential. Upon mission
termination or redeployment, the command must close out all records or files and submit them to the
appropriate authorities for disposition. The same economic considerations apply for contracting as for HN
6-6
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Logistics
support (see previous). Contractors external to the AO may be used, but the logistics staff must consider
such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees. The command must have a comprehensive
contracting support plan to ensure the force uses proper legal methods when getting supplies and services.
The plan should meet the following requirements:
z
Include procedures and policies for contracting support in the AO. These procedures and
policies should assure full use of HN support and contracting resources.
z
Ensure contracting receives consideration during logistics planning and becomes part of the
OPORD or OPLAN.
z
Identify subordinate command’s requirements for HN support or contracting support.
z
Include an area database containing all available data concerning local resources from area
studies, Foreign Service personnel, civilian agencies, and locally developed logistic support
data. It should also contain a list of contracting and HN support agreements in the AO. A source
of information on current global complex emergencies is the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs’ relief internet site
current field reports from civilian agencies.
z
Address security performance measures and quality control aspects of contracting to include
inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style
actions.
6-26. The command should establish a multinational contracting office. This office, working with the
multinational logistics procurement support board, coordinates contracting requirements for and assists in
acquiring local logistic support. Highly trained contracting personnel, linguists and interpreters, and
representatives from all the multinational forces staff the contracting office. If more than one contracting
office is required, contracting officers will be assigned to provide support on an area basis. The contracting
office should perform the following:
z
Provide coordination and cooperation among nations that maintain contractors performing
parallel functions in the AO. This avoids competition for local services and obtains the best
prices through consolidated requirements.
z
Coordinate with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.
z
Provide contracting representatives to subordinate logistics organizations.
ROLE SPECIALIZATION
6-27. Role specialization is where a nation or organization assumes the sole responsibility for procuring
and providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a multinational force. Normally
performed at echelons above corps, role specialization may be executed at a lower level depending upon
the size of the multinational force. Role specialization is normally used for a finite mission and time
because of the great burden it places upon the nation or organization. First, unless reimbursement across
national lines is agreed to before deployment of the force, the providing nation bears an unfair portion of
the financial cost of the operation. Secondly, the nation or organization may use an inordinate amount of its
own resources supporting others. This leads to internal supply shortfalls or delays in resupply and increases
wear and tear on vehicles and personnel. Other multinational force members may then have to provide
other support to the partner doing the role specialization.
6-28. If properly planned and negotiated, this approach promotes greater efficiency in cases where one
multinational force member is already well established in the area and has contractual arrangements in
place, has a unique relationship with the populace, or has a much greater capability than other nations. One
example is Saudi Arabia’s role of supplying fuel to multinational members during Operation Desert Shield
and Operation Desert Storm. Another is the French role in supplying theater-level transportation and
certain logistics commodities to members of the UN protection force in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
ORGANIZATION
6-29. The logistics organization should include specialists from all logistics functional areas. Some or all
logistics responsibilities will follow single-nation channels so the logistics staff should have representatives
from each multinational nation. Representatives should have sufficient expertise in logistics to interface
with their national channels.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
6-7
Chapter 6
6-30. The G-4 or S-4 should assign an officer or team to prepare the daily logistics status report for the
command. One point of contact becomes the command expert for logistics status and issues. The
capabilities of any civilian agency logistics organization should be incorporated into the logistics status
report. The logistics status report should clearly identify what critical shortfalls exist and are anticipated,
what actions are being taken to resolve the shortfalls, and if any assistance is required. A secure means of
communications, such as a secure coalition email system, should be used as a means to receive and forward
the logistics status report.
6-31. The multinational headquarters must establish effective logistics coordination and communications
links with multinational forces and civilian agencies. Links to civilian agencies should be established in
cooperation with the CMOC. Much of this coordination can be accomplished by establishing a logistics
readiness center that can perform the following:
z
Monitor current and evolving multinational force logistics capabilities.
z
Coordinate logistic support and maintain total assets visibility.
z
Recommend the priority of logistics resources.
z
Determine logistics sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
z
Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.
6-32. Additionally, the following positions in the logistics readiness center require personnel with
multinational experience:
z
Supply and contracting officers with appropriate warrants.
z
Explosive ordnance disposal personnel for mines and other UXO.
z
Transportation officers.
z
Materiel support officers.
z
Customs officials.
z
Engineers or facility managers.
z
Bulk liquid specialists—water and POL.
BOARDS, OFFICES, AND CENTERS
6-33. While not all of the following organizations may be required, the logistics staff should evaluate the
need for each to assist in coordinating logistics efforts:
z
Multinational petroleum office. This office coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as
the supply of common bulk petroleum products.
z
Multinational civil-military engineering board. This board establishes policies, procedures, and
priorities for civil-military construction and engineering requirements.
z
Multinational facilities utilization board. This board evaluates and reconciles requests for real
estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction in compliance with the multinational
civil-military engineering board.
z
Multinational logistics procurement support board. This board coordinates contracting
operations with national authorities and host nation for acquiring supplies and services.
z
Multinational materiel priorities and allocation board. This board modifies and recommends
priorities for allocating materiel assets for multinational forces.
z
Multinational movement center. This center establishes the taskings and priorities for
movement. It also coordinates the employment of all transportation assets in the AO, to include
movement into and out of the airports and seaports of debarkation. This center is responsible for
establishing priorities for troop contributing nations for the movement of their forces into the AO.
z
Multinational mortuary affairs office. This office plans and executes all mortuary affairs
programs. It provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintain data.
z
Multinational deployment agency. This agency deconflicts the movement of forces into the AO
and creates the deployment plan.
z
Multinational contracting office. The responsibilities of this office are explained in detail in the
contracting section.
6-8
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Logistics
TRANSPORTATION
6-34. The G-4 or S-4 must understand the roles and functions and capabilities of all mobility assets used in
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the multinational force. Accurate, up-to-date transportation
information is vital to effective operations. The multinational force must be able to track multinational
assets into and within the AO. Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and
continually updated during operations.
6-35. Commanders must integrate the strategic and theater movement requirements to prevent congestion
at seaports and airports. Establishing in-theater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater
distribution. Nations must provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control
system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It
can be used to deconflict strategic movements with other theater movements.
6-36. Civilian agencies, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation
“choke points” en route to and within the theater. A G-4 or S-4 link with the CMOC may help provide a
solution to this type of circumstance.
6-37. The multinational force should designate a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a
senior officer familiar with the AO with an extensive background in airlift operations. The director serves
as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.
WASTE AND DISPOSAL PLANS
6-38. Inadequate waste disposal plans cause conflicts with public and international law and increase costs.
Waste and disposal must be addressed in the OPLAN or OPORD from initial planning to redeployment.
When cost becomes paramount during redeployment, waste and disposal are particularly important. These
commodities may require disposal:
z
Usable property and scrap.
z
Munitions list and strategic list items.
z
Captured and confiscated weapons.
z
Hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.
z
Rations and food.
z
Ammunition, explosives, and dangerous articles.
z
Radioactive materiel.
z
Medical waste.
z
Classified items.
z
Drugs, biological substances, and controlled substances.
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
6-39. The UN logistics system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level, normally for 60
to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and
establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assist to provide support for the
multinational. Once established, the UN logistics structure provides continuing support through a system of
lead nations, civilian contracts, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.
6-40. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate operational requirements and develop planning data
for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command should send a logistics representative
with the UN survey team if possible. The multinational force should coordinate with UN forces to improve
the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
6-9
Chapter 6
LEAD-NATION CONCEPT
6-41. A lead nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable
agreement. The lead nation would assume responsibility for providing an agreed upon list of logistic
support for itself and other troop-contributing nations. Supported nations then rely on the lead nation for
the agreed level of support. National contingents must have representatives within the lead nation’s
logistics organization.
FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT
6-42. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistic support group. The
group incorporates logistics units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role will be
responsible, along with the chief logistics officer at the force headquarters, for establishing local contracts
to support the force. Even with a force logistic support group, member states remain responsible for unique
national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—
unless an agreement is established between nations to provide this support. This would be on a
reimbursable basis under either a wet or dry lease arrangement agreed before deployment between the UN
and the contributing nation’s government.
CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR CONCEPT
6-43. The UN will attempt to economize the logistic support by using civilian contractors. The goal is to
achieve the most economical logistics organization that both meets the demands of the force and releases
military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters will coordinate the process. UN contracting does
not fall under the logistics division but rather the purchasing and transport services division. The UN
procurement process can be bureaucratic and slow. It is decentralized, with each agency using its own
procedures. The interagency procurement services office of the UN development program is slated to
create a standard procurement system.
6-44. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the force commander, but reports to the
special representative of the secretary general. The civilian logistics infrastructure, to include the budget
officer, reports to the chief administrative officer. Logistics problems will not be resolved unless the chief
administrative officer is involved in the process. Maximum liaison between military and civilian
counterparts is required to allow synchronization of effort.
6-45. The UN normally coordinates such logistics areas as bulk supplies and services. National standards
such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels may exceed UN standards. Sophisticated
multinational military equipment may require different standards of support than what the UN has agreed
to provide or fund. UN standards must be clearly understood concerning level and quality of support
provided and funded. Logistic support that significantly extends beyond what is outlined in the UN
agreement may not be reimbursable. The multinational force must be prepared to bring its own support in
the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.
MOVEMENT
6-46. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its
supporting combatant command, normally plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it
remains a national responsibility to move forces into the operating area. The multinational force
headquarters is responsible for coordinating these deployments to support the commander’s plan and then
for planning and controlling intratheater movement through the reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSOI) process.
6-10
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
|
|