Главная Manuals MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS (APRIL 2008)
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b.
During redeployment, the after-action review (AAR) process is used to help
evaluate mission and task performance. The AAR addresses the following:
•
What was the original mission? How was it stated, and how was it interpreted at
the various levels of command?
•
What should have happened (the mission or plan)?
•
What actually happened (a description of events)?
•
How did it happen (key facts that led up to the event)?
•
Why did it happen (inferences about probable causes)?
•
How can performance be improved next time (alternative COAs)?
c.
During a response, incoming and outgoing data (questions and responses) should
be captured and archived so that personnel reviewing the data at a later date can be
confident that it is complete and accurate.
d.
Following a response mission, the military response assets document lessons
learned, identify postoperation follow-up actions, and provide a copy of the AAR to the
applicable C2 headquarters. Key areas of documentation include personnel and equipment
expenditures or costs, incident event logs, and medical documentation for response
personnel.
e.
Establishment of active lessons-learned collection activities within service
channels or established command channels will follow individual service or command
procedures.
f.
Documentation of the incident occurs during the post-emergency period. Actions
that occurred during the notification, response, and recovery phases will be critical to
providing answers to questions that will be asked in areas such as fiscal or resource
management, MEDSURV, medical treatment, and mortuary affairs.
g.
Accurate record keeping also facilitates monitoring of DOD response-element
personnel for long-term health problems that could be incident-related.
h.
The following HSS considerations during redeployment operations should be
considered:
(1)
Ensuring that post-deployment health and risk communications debriefings
are provided to personnel who have returned or are returning from deployment.
(2)
Conducting long-term MEDSURV to detect latent diseases because
exposure to environmental health threats may have acute, chronic, or latent effects. Refer
to DOD 6055.5-M for more information.
(3)
Using health surveillance data to document any occurrence of disease or
health outcomes due to exposures, conducting epidemiological investigations, determining
new prevention strategies and countermeasures for current or future deployments, and
developing health risk communication materials.
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(4)
Establishing guidance for archiving operational records to investigate
deployment health-related questions and concerns.
(5)
Providing face-to-face health assessment with a trained health care
provider for redeploying personnel who are required to complete a DD Form 2796, (Post-
Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA)). Scheduling medical and dental referrals and
follow-up visits for health concerns or issues.
(6)
Ensuring that Reserve Component (RC) members receive medical and
dental care and disability evaluations according to DODD 1241.01, Reserve Component
Medical Care and Incapacitation Pay For Line of Duty Conditions, prior to the member’s
release from active duty. Assisting in medical and dental care, plus necessary health
monitoring after release from the military, if the member will not remain on active duty.
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Appendix A
PLANNING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
1.
Background
The CBRN CM response unit plan provides the command guidance that the unit will
follow during CM response and recovery operations.
2.
Plan Development
Services use various similar processes when developing a plan.
a.
Figure A-1 is a sample checklist for conducting CBRN CM planning.
• Receive the mission.
• Conduct mission analysis.
• Analyze higher headquarters order.
• Conduct threat assessment.
• Conduct operational environment assessment.
• Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks (mission-to-task analysis).
• Conduct capabilities assessment.
• Conduct VA.
• Determine constraints.
• Identify facts and assumptions.
• Conduct risk assessment.
• Determine the initial commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR).
• Determine site survey requirements/conduct surveys (reconnaissance).
• Write a restated mission.
• Conduct a mission analysis briefing.
• Approve the restated mission.
• Develop the initial commander’s intent.
• Issue the commander’s guidance.
• Conduct COA development.
• Conduct COA analysis.
• Obtain COA approval.
• Produce a plan.
Figure A-1. Sample Plan Development Checklist
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b.
The development of a comprehensive, integrated, and executable response plan is
the responsibility of the commander. Important points to consider when developing a CBRN
CM response plan include the following:
•
Provide a clear and concise mission statement.
•
Convey the commander’s intent.
•
Focus on subordinate activities.
•
Provide tasks, activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.
•
Include annexes/appendixes, if required, in order to expand the information not
readily incorporated in earlier text.
•
Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.
•
Do not inhibit initiative.
c.
The unit response plan format follows the standard OPLAN and five-paragraph
order format, yet it is tailored to meet the unique requirements of CBRN CM operations.
The basic steps taken in developing a unit response plan include the following:
(1)
Gather and compile information.
(2)
Produce a summary and basic plan. The plan summary provides the reader
with a synopsis of the scope and purpose of the plan. The basic plan provides the
groundwork for all amplifying sections (annexes/appendixes) and is produced prior to its
documentation. The basic plan follows the five-paragraph order format and describes the
situation, plan for execution, commander’s intent, concept of operations (CONOPS), tasks,
coordinating instructions, administrative and logistics concepts, and C2 concepts.
(3)
Establish a plan of action, determine and assign responsibility for
developing annexes and appendixes, and assign task suspense dates for completion.
Annexes provide the details not readily incorporated into the basic plan; they are written to
increase clarity and usefulness of the basic plan. Annexes may address task organization,
logistics, intelligence, personnel, operations, and a multitude of CBRN CM-specific topics.
These are only required if deemed necessary. Each annex relates to a specific aspect of the
CBRN CM operations (such as MCD).
(4)
Coordinate development and review of the plan. Each service has published
guidance concerning deliberate planning, organization, and coordination of staff (FM 5-0,
Army Planning and Orders Production; Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 5-01, Naval
Operational Plans; Air Force Manual [AFMAN] 10-401, Planning Formats and Guidance;
and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process).
(5)
Finalize the plan, and submit it to the commander for review and approval.
The finalized plan should be—
•
Consistent with the organization/installation mission and responsibilities.
•
Oriented on a tactical perspective.
•
Adequately detailed to provide specific actions to be taken.
•
Easily understood.
•
Executed quickly and decisively, if required.
After the commander’s approval, the unit CBRN CM response plan becomes an OPORD.
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3.
Unit Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence
Management Plan Format
Figure A-2 provides an example of a unit CBRN CM plan format. As stated above,
units have the flexibility to tailor its plans to meet its specific requirement.
(Classification)
Copy ____ of ____ copies
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
DTG of signature
Message reference number
OPORD _________ (code name).
References.
Time zone used throughout the order.
Task organization.
1. SITUATION.
a. CM incident.
(1) Location.
(2) Name.
(3) Description (brief).
(4) Victim information.
(a) Signs, symptoms, and history.
(b) Number of victims (killed, casualties, and potentially affected).
(c) Location of the point of injury.
(d) Emergency decontamination (when, where, and method of confirmation of
decontamination) or MCD (where, when, etc.).
b. Environment.
(1) Weather.
(a) Present (next 12 hours).
• Temperature (ambient/wet-dry bulb).
• Humidity/precipitation.
• Barometric pressure.
• Wind speed.
• Wind direction (from).
• Cloud cover.
• Pertinent light data (time of day; estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise,
and moonset; moon phase; and percent nighttime illumination).
(b) Effects of present weather on personnel, equipment, incident area, and site.
(c) 12 to 24 hours.
• General forecast.
• High/low temperature.
• Barometric pressure trends.
Pertinent light data (time of day; estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset; moon phase;
and percent nighttime illumination).
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example)
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(d) 24 to 48 hours.
• General forecast.
• High/low temperature.
• Barometric pressure trends.
• Pertinent light data (time of day; estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise,
and moonset; moon phase; and percent nighttime illumination).
(e) Effects of weather during the next 12- to 48-hour period on personnel, equipment,
incident area, and site.
(2) CM incident area and site.
(a) Area.
• Terrain.
• Population.
• Avenues of approach.
• Congested areas and obstacles.
(b) Detailed description of CM incident site.
(c) IC-defined exclusion area.
(d) Key surrounding areas potentially affected by the hazard.
c. Threat. The threat assessment includes actions that occurred at an incident site, the likelihood
of possible future adversary COAs, the possibility of multiple terrorist events being conducted
simultaneously, and the potential for the use of secondary improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or
chemical devices aimed toward debilitating the capabilities of responders. If a separate intelligence
annex is not being produced, current intelligence should be discussed in this paragraph.
(1) Perpetrator identification and ideology or goals (if known).
(2) Tentative CBRN identification.
(a) Known agent(s).
(b) Probable agent(s).
(c) Dispersion method.
(d) Plume (hazard modeling).
(3) Secondary devices or additional hazards.
d. Higher/supporting agencies (point of contact [POC] name and contact number). The plan
should include the mission, the commander’s intent, and the CONOPS for headquarters one and two
levels up (if available). Subparagraphs identify additional military response elements being deployed to
a site. Fragmentary orders can be used to update this information as the situation matures. Any units
whose actions would have a significant bearing on the response unit should also be included. If known,
information concerning the ICS for the AO may be included.
(1) Higher commander’s mission.
(2) Higher commander’s intent.
(3) DCO.
(4) Other task force resources.
(5) BSI POC.
(6) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
(7) DOD subject matter experts.
(a) Chemical.
(b) Biological.
(c) Radiological.
(d) Nuclear.
(e) Hazard modeling.
e. Incident command (POC name, agency, and contact number or frequency).
(1) Single or UC.
(2) IC.
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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(3) Safety officer.
(4) Information officer.
(5) Liaison officers (LNOs).
(6) Planning section.
(7) Operations section.
(8) Logistics section.
(9) Finance/Administrative section.
f. CM assets available (attachments and detachments). Do not repeat information already listed
under task organization or in Annex A (Task Organization). Try to put all information in the task
organization or in Annex A and state “See Task Organization” or “See Annex A.” However, when not in
the task organization, list the assets that are attached or detached to the headquarters that issues the
order. State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when OPORD or OPLAN
is effective.
(1) HAZMAT.
(2) Decontamination.
(3) EMS.
(4) Fire services.
(5) Local law enforcement/security.
(6) Local bomb squad.
(7) Federal or military EOD.
(8) Hospitals.
(9) State agencies or units (such as WMD-CSTs).
(10) Federal agencies.
(11) PVOs.
(12) Other.
2. MISSION.
State the mission derived during the planning process. There are no subparagraphs in a mission
statement which will also cover on-order missions. The mission statement should be short, concise, and
focused on the efforts of the response unit (such as, By order of the commander ________ CBRN CM
unit deploys NLT [time] ___________ to [location] ____________ to assess a potential hazard, advise
the IC on CBRN-related aspects of CM, and facilitate the mobilization of additional military and federal
assets to assist in CM in order to prevent loss of life, human suffering, and property damage).
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.
a. Commander’s intent. States the commander’s intent derived during the planning process,
describes the commander’s vision of the operations, describes the purpose, visualizes the end state,
and illustrates how the operation will facilitate future operations.
(1) Key tasks (IC objectives).
(2) Desired end state.
b. CONOPS (general). The CONOPS may be a single paragraph, may be divided into two or
more subparagraphs, or, if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The CONOPS
should be based on the COA statement from the decision-making process and, at a minimum, will
provide sufficient detail to ensure understanding of the commander’s intent and purpose. It should
specify the priority of support and the tasks allocated to the response unit. The concept describes⎯
• The employment of the response unit.
• The identification of any protection issues and its implementation.
• The integration of other major organizations within the incident response system. These
include active and reserve military forces that may be involved in incident mitigation.
• Any other aspects of the operation that the commander considers appropriate to clarify
the concept and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination are too lengthy for this
paragraph, they are addressed in the appropriate annexes.
When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the CONOPS may be
prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Designate phases as “Phase” followed by the
appropriate Roman numeral, for example, Phase I.
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and
the complexity of any given operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what may
be required within the CONOPS.
c. Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S). This paragraph should specify the R&S plan and
describe how it ties in with the basic CONOPS.
d. Operations Security (OPSEC). The plan identifies on-scene security requirements.
e. Environmental considerations. The plan should identify whether the incident site falls into a
geographic area with unique environmental considerations (such as local population, industrial base, or
soil composition).
f. Coordinating instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely
covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in Paragraph 3. Complex instructions
should be referred to in an annex. The following information should be included:
• Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
• CCIR. List priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly
information, friendly force information requirements, and risk reduction control measures.
(1) Phase I, Predeployment—continuous unit operations end upon alert notification.
(a) Mobilization records.
(b) Daily personnel/logistics status reports.
(2) Phase II, Deployment—begins on receipt of the mission and ends upon arrival at the
incident site assembly area.
(a) Alert notification/assembly procedures.
(b) Deployment of the response unit.
(c) WARNORD/OPORD.
(d) Convoy operations.
(3) Phase III, Response Operations—begins in the assembly area and ends at the
completion of IC-assigned tasks.
(a) Perform liaison operations/quartering.
(b) Conduct unit decontamination operations.
(c) Establish and maintain an OC.
(d) Establish and maintain communications operations.
(e) Provide logistic support operations.
(f) Conduct administrative support operations.
(g) Conduct HSS operations.
(h) Conduct CBRN survey operations.
(i) Conduct radiological survey operations.
(j) Conduct assessments.
(4) Phase IV, Redeployment—begins at the completion of IC-assigned tasks and ends upon
return to the unit area.
(5) Phase V, Recovery—begins upon return to the unit area and ends when all sensitive
items and equipment are inventoried and secure.
g. Subunit missions (composition and location).
(1) ADVON.
(2) First sortie.
(3) Second sortie.
(4) Command.
(5) Liaison.
(6) Modeler.
(7) OC.
(8) Logistics.
(9) Communications.
(10) Medical treatment.
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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(11) First hot-zone entry.
(a) Survey.
(b) Backup.
(c) Decontamination line.
(12) Second hot-zone entry.
(a) Survey.
(b) Backup.
(c) Decontamination line.
h. Key personnel (name and location).
(1) Commander.
(2) Liaison.
(3) Operations.
(4) Survey.
(5) Technical decontamination.
i. Medical disqualified (personnel identified as a risk for dress-out).
j. Detailed instructions (such as security and rules of engagement [ROE]).
k. Routes to the incident site.
(1) Primary.
(a) Route.
(b) Checkpoints.
(c) Rally points.
(d) Forward staging area.
(2) Alternate.
(a) Criteria for use.
(b) Route.
(c) Checkpoints.
(d) Rally points.
(e) Forward staging area.
(3) Actions if a break in contact occurs during movement.
(4) Actions if a breakdown occurs during movement.
(5) Actions if a loss of communications occurs during movement.
l. Forward staging area.
(1) Estimated time of arrival at the forward staging area.
(a) ADVON.
(b) First sortie.
(c) Second sortie.
(2) Actions of the main body in the staging area.
m. Actions at the incident site.
(1) Estimated time of arrival at the incident site.
(a) ADVON.
(b) First sortie.
(c) Second sortie.
(2) Site contamination check.
(3) Plan if the site is contaminated (alternate site).
(4) IC liaison and site occupation.
(5) Priorities of work.
(6) Tentative timeline.
(7) Sampling plan.
(8) Priority of decontamination.
(9) Hasty withdrawal plan.
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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n. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Uniform.
(a) Common items worn by all.
(b) Cold-zone uniform—survey and decontamination.
(c) Cold-zone uniform—all others.
(d) Decontamination line IPE/PPE.
(e) Survey team IPE/PPE.
(f) Backup team IPE/PPE.
(2) Tentative timeline—time of departure.
(3) Rehearsals.
(4) Inspections.
(5) PIR.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
Address service support in the areas shown below, as needed, to clarify the service support concept.
Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include:
• Support concept. State the concept of logistic support to provide personnel a visualization of
how the operation will be logistically supported.
• Material and services.
• Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
• Personnel support.
a. General.
(1) Logistics SOP is in effect for sustainment operations.
(2) Logistics section will be collocated with the tactical operations center (TOC).
(3) Damaged equipment will be reported immediately.
(4) Medical treatment will be located in the survey dress-out and medical rehabilitation/
surveillance area.
b. Materials and services.
(1) Supply.
(a) Class I: The unit will deploy with a 72-hour supply of meals, ready to eat (MREs).
(b) Class III: Class III items will be locally purchased using the vehicle-assigned General
Services Administration (GSA) fuel card.
(c) Classes II and VII: Sections are to deploy with a 72-hour basic load. The Command
Support Center will forward the prescribed push packages at H+8, H+24, H+48, and H+72.
(d) Class VIII: The medical section will deploy with a 72-hour basic load. Emergency
items will be locally purchased. Prepare to plus-up additional medical CB defense materiel. Coordinate
locally for withdrawals from the strategic national stockpile (SNS).
(e) Class IX: Items will be requested through local contract support.
(f) Distribution methods:
• Ration plan: The unit logistics noncommissioned officer (NCO) will issue three
MREs daily. Unit contract meals can be provided.
• Medical: The unit logistics NCO will issue supplies to the medical section;
although a unit supply function, medical section will resupply combat lifesaver or EMT supplies, as
needed.
• Repair parts: Issued by the unit logistics NCO.
(2) Transportation. See unit movement plan.
(3) Services.
(4) Maintenance. Operators will continue to perform before, during, and after
preventive-maintenance checks and services (PMCS). Findings will be reported to the unit logistics
NCO for coordination with appropriate maintenance support.
c. Medical evacuation (method and priorities).
d. Personnel (method of cordoning off the unit AOs, managing the entrance and exit point, and the
designation of the medical area).
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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e. Miscellaneous.
(1) Special equipment.
(2) Contaminated equipment. Describe how this will be handled.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command. State the map coordinates for the unit OC and the ICS CP. Identify the chain of
command if not addressed in the unit SOPs.
(1) Provide the EOC location.
(2) Provide phone numbers for the EOC.
(3) Identify where the commander will be located.
(a) Phase I, unit headquarters.
(b) Phase II, briefing area/command vehicle.
(c) Phase III, ICP/unit TOC.
(d) Phase IV, command vehicle/unit headquarters.
(e) Phase V, unit headquarters.
(4) Succession of Command: commander, deputy commander, operations officer, followed
by date of rank.
b. Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs. Identify the specific signal operating
instructions in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are submitted. Identify any
unique frequency management issues in the AO.
(1) Communications plan.
(2) Methods of communication (by priority).
(a) Voice.
(b) Data.
(3) Signals (hand and arm).
(4) Signals (audible).
(5) Code words.
(6) Challenge/password. The challenge/password system will be briefed at the initial team
briefing and updated as necessary.
(7) Recognition signals. Primary recognition signals for both day and night will be via
frequency modulation radio. Primary recognition signal for night will be the military issue flashlight with
red lens (blinking the light on and off three times). The primary recognition signal for day will be
personal recognition and/or identification card.
(8) Special instructions. Use of code words will be implemented by the commander or his
designated representative. Use of challenge/password system will be implemented by the commander
or his designated representative. Any change in frequencies or radio configuration will be directed and
implemented by the communications team through the commander or his designated representative.
(9) Provide time check.
6. SAFETY BRIEFING.
a. Weather.
(1) Current temperature.
(2) Cold- and hot-weather hazards. Hydration (rate of consumption).
b. Lifting.
(1) Use multiple-person lifts when lifting heavy and/or uneven objects.
(2) Use proper lifting techniques; use your legs, not your back.
(3) Use a guide to clear any hazards when moving large or heavy objects.
c. Communications.
(1) Avoid antenna fields that are marked; these areas will have tripping and radio frequency
radiation hazards.
(2) Avoid electrical cables, wires, and grounding rods.
(3) Follow proper procedures, and wear required personal protection (gloves, goggles, hard
hat, and safety boots) for erecting and stowing antennas.
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
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d. Vehicles.
(1) Use seatbelt (mandatory).
(2) Use lights when operating a vehicle.
(3) Use ground guides when parking, backing up, and moving in heavily populated areas
(assistant driver’s responsibility).
(4) Observe posted speed limits and roadway signs.
e. Unit operations.
(1) Be situationally aware of all hazards (identify, mitigate, notify, and supervise).
(2) Be aware of shock hazards; avoid them if possible.
(3) Follow the proper procedures for safe operation of equipment.
(4) Use buddy teams at all times.
(5) Wear the appropriate IPE/PPE.
(6) Eat, drink, and rest in designated areas.
f. Conclusion.
(1) Safety is everyone’s responsibility.
(2) Stop unsafe acts.
(3) Halt potentially unsafe activities or conditions and notify a supervisor.
(4) Follow policies, procedures, directives, and standards.
(5) Use common sense at all times.
(Classification)
Figure A-2. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Plan (Example) (Continued)
4.
Operation Order Format
Figure A-3 provides an example of a unit CBRN CM OPORD. Various OPORDs
received will have various degrees of detail dependent on the time and information
available.
[Classification]
Copy 01 of 25 copies
United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)
Atlanta, Georgia
070500Z AUG 2017
OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [001-07] [BIG WASH]
References: FM 3-11 series publications
Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: Zulu
Task Organization
1007th Regional Readiness Command
1448th Chemical Company (Decontamination)
2332nd Chemical Company (Recon)
4077th Combat Support Hospital
1. SITUATION.
a. Incident. The universal adversary (UA) built six spray dissemination devices and released Sarin (GB)
vapors into the ventilation systems of three large commercial office buildings in downtown Birmingham,
Alabama. In addition, some of the agent exited through rooftop ventilation stacks, creating a downwind
hazard. Sarin is a human-made chemical warfare agent (CWA) classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents
are the most toxic and rapidly acting of the known CWAs. Sarin is a clear, colorless, and tasteless liquid
that has no odor in its pure form. However, Sarin can evaporate into a vapor and spread into the
environment.
Figure A-3. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Order (Example)
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b. Victim information. The agent killed 95% of the people in the buildings and killed or injured many of the
responders. Injured personnel showed various signs of miosis (constriction of the pupils), headaches,
runny nose, salivation, tightness in the chest, nausea, vomiting, giddiness, anxiety, muscle twitches,
weakness, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and involuntary urination and defecation.
c. Environment.
(1) Terrain. Urban environment.
(2) Weather (next 12 hours).
Temperature. 65 degrees Fahrenheit.
Humidity/precipitation. 64 percent/10 percent.
Barometric pressure. 29.82 inches and rising.
Wind speed. 11 miles per hour.
Wind direction. From the Southwest.
Cloud cover. 25 percent.
Pertinent light data. Sunrise at 0652 hours and sunset at 1653 hours.
(3) Civil considerations. Fatalities and major injuries have occurred due to falling and crushing
during the panic on the street and due to vehicle accidents. There is little direct damage due to the
attack except that the building interiors and contents are highly contaminated by agent condensing
on the surfaces. The three buildings and its contents will be a total loss due to decontamination
measures and/or psychological impacts of future usability. However, airing and washing should
decontaminate adjacent structures adequately. Overwhelming demand has disrupted
communications (landline telephone and cellular) in the local area. There are large numbers of
“worried well” personnel overwhelming the medical system. Loss of three fire crews and three EMS
crews will impact readiness for other events in the short term.
(4) Threat. Sarin liquid and vapor contamination within the three buildings and downwind vapor
hazard traveling northeast from the incident site for approximately 1,200 meters. Identification of a
secondary device has not yet been determined. The UA has not yet been determined.
d. Supported agencies. The supported agencies are the local and county emergency response assets
to include the fire services, law enforcement, EMS, and emergency management agencies.
e. Incident command.
(1) The incident is being managed by a single incident command. Supporting military assets will
remain under the C2 of the DOD.
(2) The IC is the Birmingham Metropolitan Fire Chief. Military supporting units should report to the
ICP upon arrival at the incident area for further instructions.
f. Response Assets. Contact information for the available response assets can be requested at the
ICP. The following assets are available to assist in the response operation.
(1) HAZMAT. Local and county HAZMAT response teams.
(2) Decontamination. Local and county HAZMAT response teams and supporting military chemical
decontamination units.
(3) EMS. Local and county EMS.
(4) Fire services. Local and county fire services.
(5) Law enforcement. Local, county, and state law enforcement.
Figure A-3. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Order (Example) (Continued)
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FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37
A-11
(6) Hospitals. Local and county hospitals.
(7) State agencies. Emergency management agencies.
(8) Federal agencies. FEMA, DHS, and DOD.
(9) PVO’s. Red Cross.
g. Assumptions. Each building is assumed to have occupancy of 2,000 personnel, and the outdoor
population density of the surrounding areas is 3,900 people per square mile. Evacuation and/or sheltering
of downwind populations will be required. Tens of thousands of people will require monitoring and
decontamination as they are allowed to leave their buildings. Hundreds will require hospital treatment.
Anything exposed to a high-vapor agent concentration will require decontamination, including bodies.
However, decontamination of some materials may be difficult or impossible. Even if structures and property
could be decontaminated, the psychological impact on future usability would be significant.
2. MISSION.
The 1007th Regional Readiness Command will deploy chemical decontamination assets to support
emergency and MCD operations. All 1007th assets will provide support to the IC. Decontamination assets
will advise the IC on all aspects of the decontamination operation to assist in the evacuation of chemical
casualties to EMS/facilities. Decontamination assets will advise the IC on infrastructure contamination
containment and/or decontamination aspects once casualties have been evacuated. The 1007th will
deploy chemical reconnaissance assets to assist in casualty extraction at the incident site. Chemical
reconnaissance assets will advise the IC on all aspects of casualty extraction. The 1007th will deploy area
medical support assets, with clinical operational equipment set, to assist with medical treatment of
chemical casualties at the incident site. HSS assets will advise the IC on all aspects of casualty treatment.
All 1007th assets will prepare for redeployment and recovery operations upon notification that support is no
longer required and higher headquarters has approved redeployment.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent. The commander’s intent is to prepare supporting units for deployment to the incident site; deploy
the supporting units; provide decontamination, casualty evacuation, and medical treatment support
operations; prepare for redeployment; redeploy supporting units; and conduct recovery operations without
incident.
a. CONOPS.
(1) Key tasks. MCD operations, casualty evacuation operations, and casualty treatment operations.
(2) Desired end state. Evacuate all casualties and nonresponders, while controlling the spread of
contamination, and provide casualty medical treatment without incident.
(3) CONOPS (general).
(a) Phase I, Predeployment. Conduct precombat checks (PCC) and precombat inspections
(PCI), rehearsal, and safety briefing operations. Deploy ADVON and establish liaison and
communications with the IC.
(b) Phase II, Deployment. Deploy to the incident area, and report to the local incident command.
(c) Phase III, Assist. Conduct MCD operations, casualty evacuation operations, and casualty
treatment operations. Advise the IC on all aspects of the assigned support missions, as
required.
(d) Phase IV, Sustain. Establish and conduct sustainment operations as required.
(e) Phase V, Redeployment. On order, conduct redeployment operations.
(f) Phase VI, Recovery. Achieve 100% accountability of sensitive items, conduct PMCS on all
deployed equipment, and turn in all items that require repair or replacement.
b. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Effective Date. This order becomes effective upon receipt.
Figure A-3. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Order (Example) (Continued)
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1 April 2008
(2) Uniform/IPE/PPE. Individual physical fitness uniform and IPE/PPE up to Level A will be required.
(3) Risk Reduction Control Measures. Premedical screening requirements, hydration monitoring,
IPE/PPE, and work and rest cycles will be maintained.
(4) Tentative timeline. Advanced party will be prepared to depart within 2 hours of receipt of this
order; follow-on support assets will be prepared to depart within 6 hours of receipt of this order.
(5) Environmental Considerations. Sarin nerve agent hazards and control of incident casualties off
the incident site.
(6) Rehearsals/inspections. The supporting unit command will ensure that PCC/PCI and premission
rehearsals are conducted prior to deployment.
(7) Safety briefing. A complete safety briefing will be conducted prior to any element departing to the
incident area.
(8) Civilian resources. Identify civilian jurisdictions and their response resources.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Materiel. All supporting units will deploy with a minimum of 72 hours of its basic load for all classes of
supply. Class V (ammunition) will be distributed according to the established ROE.
b. Services. Essential services to sustain operations past 72 hours will be coordinated, as required, at
the incident site.
c. Health service support. Medical support for 1007th personnel will be provided internally by the
deploying combat support hospital.
d. Personnel. Administrative requirements will be coordinated through unit administrative personnel, as
necessary.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command. The IC will be in command of the incident. The senior military official on site will be in
charge of all DOD assets supporting the IC. A military liaison will coordinate support operations
between the IC and the supporting military units.
b. Signal.
(1) Internal. Current signal operating instructions are in effect.
(2) External. Direct liaison authorized with the IC.
(3) Forms. Operational forms used during incident response should meet the intent of the example
forms provided in the NIMS, Appendix A.
ACKNOWLEDGE:
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator’s Name]
[Authenticator’s Position]
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
[Classification]
Figure A-3. Unit CBRN Consequence Management Operation Order (Example) (Continued)
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5.
Department of Defense Consequence Management Assets
The following paragraphs identify representative military assets/units with
capabilities that could be tasked to support a CBRN CM incident. A more comprehensive
listing of military capabilities, assets, and units for CBRN CM operations can be found in
CJCSI 3110.16A.
a.
United States Air Force.
(1)
Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT).
(a) The AFRAT is a globally responsive, specialty asset team that
provides health physics and radiological support in response to radiation incidents and
accidents. The team provides field radioanalytical support to the assigned theater medical
authority. It measures, analyzes, and interprets environmental and occupational samples
for its radioactivity content, providing expert guidance on the type and degree of
radiological hazards that face deployed forces.
(b) The AFRAT will perform radioanalytical analysis on environmental
samples (such as swipes, soil, water, air, and foodstuffs) and occupational samples (such as
the whole body, breath, urine, and feces). Analysis results are interpreted for the impact on
deployed forces and noncombatants. The information is compiled for use by the medical
authority on dose avoidance, dose reduction, and dose assessment; risk of communication;
and additional requirements for effective CBRN CM.
(2)
Theater Epidemiology Team (TET).
(a) The TET provides threat assessments of environmental and
occupational factors, evaluates infectious disease risks, and DNBI rates from all sources
and recommends interventions to minimize degradation of mission staff. These tasks are
accomplished as part of the initial site or theater assessment and during ongoing operations
and disease and environmental health threat assessments.
(b) The TET is a light, mobile, multidisciplinary team with limited
environmental and occupational sampling equipment. It has a portable high-end computing
capability and uses a communications infrastructure that allows for theater-wide data
collection and coordination with the JTF.
(3)
USAF EOD. The USAF EOD forces locate, identify, disarm, neutralize,
recover, and dispose of hazardous explosives; chemical, biological, incendiary, and nuclear
ordnance; and criminal and terrorist IEDs. The highly mobile teams can deploy anywhere
in the United States within 24 hours.
(4)
USAF CBRN CM Assets. The USAF maintains unit type codes (UTCs)
capable of supporting CM and specific CBRNE response capabilities. These UTCs are
available for CM response as tasked by authorities at the installation level, up to and
including COCOMs. Civil engineer (CE) Readiness serves the USAF as the CBRN experts
for the Service. As such, their support includes providing technical advice and response
team management, conducting CBRN detection planning, establishing a threat detection
grid, and performing active and passive CBRN detection via established detection tools and
networks. CE Readiness defines the initial contamination footprint to include declaring
contamination control areas (CCAs) contamination-free and establishing an initial hazard
perimeter. Additionally, CE Readiness performs initial CBRN identification as part of
initial detection operations and conducts planning, sampling, and analysis to identify
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CBRN materials in support of operational risk assessment. These experts gather CBRN
hazard concentration data and establish a COP while providing CBRN hazard
concentration readings from chemicals, leading active and passive monitoring to shape
hazard footprints, and conducting hazard monitoring in CCA and CCS. They advise
decontamination teams on CBRN decontamination after the attack and support HAZMAT
decontamination operations. CE Readiness supports the bioenvironmental engineer (BEE)
in collecting samples from an incident site—including packaging, preserving, and
transporting—and supports CE in development of the CWA section of the hazardous waste
collection and disposal plan. Additionally, professional CE Readiness technicians advise
commanders on MOPP decisions; plan and execute hazard modeling, plotting, and
reporting; and establish a CBRN warning and reporting network. Experts in this specialty
provide isolation zones, hazard areas plotting, responder safe routes, protective action
zones, and split MOPP zone status and direct CBRN reconnaissance while coordinating
with bioenvironmental teams for the appropriate downwind hazard area and evacuation
planning. Representative capabilities are as follows:
(a) UTC 4F9DA, EM CBRN Defense 1200 Team. This team provides
limited response to the full-spectrum of physical threats, to include the CBRN control
center (CBRNCC) and CM supporting activities throughout the full range of military
operations to major theater war (MTW) and response to major accidents and natural
disasters. Capabilities and assets include preliminary risk/vulnerability assessments and
threat analysis; planning, detection, identification, warning, and reporting; expedient and
operational decontamination operations; disaster response equipment; technical data; roll-
on/roll-off capability; and pallets.
(b) UTC 4F9DB, EN CBRN Defense 600 Team. This team provides
minimal full-spectrum threat response, to include CBRNCC and WMD defense supporting
activities (ranging from smaller-scale contingency operations to MTW) and response to
major accidents and natural disasters. Capabilities and assets include preliminary
risk/vulnerability assessments and threat analysis; planning, detection, identification,
warning, and reporting; decontamination; contamination control area; and disaster
response equipment; technical data; roll-on/roll-off capability; and pallets.
(c)
First responders, as defined by the Air Force Incident Management
System (AFIMS), are members of the Disaster Response Force (DRF)—elements that
deploy immediately to the disaster scene to provide initial C2, save lives, and suppress and
control hazards. Firefighters, law enforcement and security personnel, and key emergency
medical personnel provide the initial, immediate response to major accidents, natural
disasters, and CBRNE incidents. All first responders are emergency responders, but not all
emergency responders are first responders.
(d) Emergency responders, as defined by AFIMS, are members of the DRF
response elements that deploy after the first responders to expand C2 and provide
additional support. Emergency responders include follow-on firefighters, law enforcement
personnel, security personnel, and emergency medical technicians, as well as emergency
management and operations (civil engineer readiness specialty) personnel, EOD personnel,
physicians, nurses, medical treatment providers at medical treatment facilities, public
health officers, BEEs, mortuary affairs personnel, and other specialized team members.
(e)
Headquarters, Air Combat Command (ACC), maintains and ensures
that the ACC Response Task Force (RTF) is equipped and trained for response to
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radiological incidents or accidents other than for Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
assets within the continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico, or U.S. Virgin Islands.
(f)
Headquarters, Air Mobility Command (AMC), provides airlift, air
refueling, and air mobility support operations in a CBRNE threat environment and
provides airborne survey platforms for the Department of Energy observation over areas
affected by a nuclear weapons accident. Additionally, AMC serves as lead major command
to decontaminate large frame aircraft and handle contaminated cargo and provides
resources for CBRNE casualty aeromedical evacuation.
(g) Headquarters, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), maintains,
equips, and trains the AFSPC RTF for ICBM radiological incidents or accidents involving
USAF-owned ICBM assets. The AFSPC also develops and implements AFSPC Plan 10-1,
ICBM Radiological Accident/Incident Response and Recovery Plan, and provides RTF
response to incidents involving ICBM and other applicable assets.
(h) Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE),
maintains, equips, and trains the USAFE RTF for radiological incidents or accidents within
the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR and provides RTF response to
incidents within the USEUCOM AOR.
(i)
Air National Guard (ANG) assets in the Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS) plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for
CBRNE incident management operations through the supported combatant command
(COCOM) DCO. ANG/JTF-CS deploys to the incident site, establishes C2 of designated
DOD forces, and provides military assistance to the primary agency for CBRNE events.
ANG/JTF-CS must be requested by the primary agency, authorized by the Secretary of
Defense, and directed by the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to
respond. ANG/JTF-CS serves as USNORTHCOM’s primary interface with the
environmental radiation ambient monitoring system, the Rapid Response Information
System, and the Unified Command Suite during CBRNE events.
(j)
The ANG assets in the WMD-CST deploy rapidly, assist local first
responders in determining the precise nature of an incident, provide expert medical and
technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on
military support. Unless federalized, the ANG CSTs will remain state National Guard
assets that can be quickly accessed by proximate governors. The ANG CST mission is to
assess a suspected WMD attack, advise civilian responders on appropriate actions, and
facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces. Each team consists of 22
full-time ANG and ARNG personnel and is broken down into six smaller teams—command,
operations, communications, administration and logistics, medical, and survey—that have
been trained and equipped to provide a technical capability to reachback to other experts
who can assist the IC. In essence, these "scouts" are a unique military capability. They can
deploy rapidly to a suspected or actual terrorist attack, conduct special reconnaissance to
determine the effects of the attack, provide situational understanding to military command
channels, provide technical consultation to local authorities on managing the effects of the
attack to minimize the impact on the civilian population, and facilitate follow-on military
support performing validated civilian requests for assistance.
(k) Headquarters, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA),
supports CBRNE incidents through the Headquarters, AFCESA CE Readiness Operations
Center.
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(l)
The Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA) ensures that installation
weather squadrons can provide weather data for CBRN material dispersion models,
including toxic industrial chemical (TIC) or TIM assessments, and ensures that operational
weather squadrons provide the meteorological information necessary to produce chemical
downwind messages and effective downwind messages for radiological fallout.
(m) The Air Force BEE may assume incident command for recovery
operations where a health risk assessment is the primary mission and support incident
command throughout a CBRN event. The BEE supports CE Readiness with active and
passive CBRN detection and contamination footprint definition and hazard location when
additional manpower or equipment is required or requested; conducts planning, sampling,
and analysis operations to identify CBRN materials and pathogens in support of a health
risk assessment and health hazard control, but not for risk assessment; performs
presumptive CBRN agent identification; and quantifies CBRN materials, pathogens, and
hazardous conditions to support health risk assessment and health hazard control. The
BEE also conducts active and passive monitoring to determine contamination extent,
hazard condition changes, and personnel dose estimates to support health risk assessment
and health hazard control; collects samples from the incident site including packaging,
preserving, and transporting to support health risk assessment and health hazard control
with CE Readiness assistance; supports waste disposal through health risk assessment and
health hazard control to maximize force health protection; evaluates and certifies PPE
planned for use in any HAZMAT operation; and provides health risk assessment to support
MOPP reduction in collaboration with CE Readiness before providing recommendation to
command authority.
(n) Additional assets are available from the Air Force medical service
through expeditionary UTCs and home station response teams. Capabilities cover the range
of medical services from the smallest (a preventive aerospace medical [PAM] team
consisting of an aerospace medicine physician, BEE, public health officer, and an
independent duty medical technician) to the largest (an expeditionary medical support
[EMEDS] +25, a modular, scalable, rapid response medical package with surgical capability
and the capacity to care for 25 inpatients) facilities. In between are teams designed to
decontaminate patients, collect environmental samples, conduct epidemiology
investigations, and dispense pharmaceuticals to the masses. See Air Force instruction (AFI)
41- and 48-series publications for additional information on USAF medical CBRN CM
capabilities.
b.
United States Army.
(1)
United States Army Chemical Corps. The United States Army Chemical
Corps provides CBRN CM capabilities throughout the force with CBRN units from
company to brigade levels, staff expertise from company to theater Army levels, specialized
staff augmentation elements, and specialized units that include CBRN reconnaissance,
decontamination, and technical escort capabilities.
(2) CBRNE Operational Headquarters. The CBRNE Operational Headquarters
is an organization primarily focused on conducting WMD-Elimination operations in support
of CCDRs. The 20th Support Command (CBRNE), a FORSCOM unit, is the only existing
organization of this type. The 20th Support Command provides support for CM as a force
provider of CBRN and EOD assets to support CM operations and to provide technical
advice and support through technical reachback capabilities to national assets. It also
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includes small-scale technical teams to conduct sampling, detection, monitoring, and
analytical support to the IC.
(3)
Army Service Component Commands (ASCC). ASCCs support CM
assessment, planning, preparation, and execution activities in support of geographic
CCDRs within respective assigned AORs. The United States Army North (USARNORTH)
provides a representative illustration of an ASCC support to CM in the domestic
operational environment as follows:
(a) The purpose of USARNORTH is to save lives, prevent injury, and
provide temporary critical life support during a CBRNE situation within the
USNORTHCOM AO. USARNORTH is the ASCC for USNORTHCOM providing Homeland
Defense and DSCA, including CBRN CM operations.
(b) Established in September 2005, USARNORTH is comprised of Active
Army, United States Army Reserve (USAR), and ARNG members, as well as civilian
personnel. It is commanded by an Active Army three-star general officer.
(c) USARNORTH is capable of deploying two operational CPs, each
commanded by a two-star general officer, and able to conduct operations as a JTF or Joint
Force Land Component Command and staff with augmentation. The commander exercises
OPCON of all federal DOD resources (not including United States Special Forces Command
and United States Army Corps of Engineers®) committed to providing DSCA, provides
LNOs to appropriate civil agencies, and receives LNOs from appropriate military
commands and agencies.
(d) USARNORTH maintains DCOs with defense coordinating elements in
each of the ten FEMA regions to plan, coordinate, and integrate DSCA with local, state, and
federal agencies.
(e) USARNORTH accomplishes its CBRN CM mission in strict adherence of
public law and DOD policies. Deployment of USARNORTH, at the direction of the
USNORTHCOM commander and on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, occurs only
after a governor requests federal assistance from the President, and after the President
issues a Presidential Disaster Declaration. In any DSCA setting, USARNORTH remains in
support of the lead federal agency throughout the CBRN CM operation.
(4)
Area Medical Laboratory (AML).
(a) The AML provides confirmatory analysis and long-term CM of
CBRNE incidents.
(b) The AML, on order, deploys worldwide in tailored teams to conduct
health threat detection, confirmation, and medical surveillance for CBRNE occupational
and environmental health, endemic diseases, and CM to protect and sustain the health of
the force across the full spectrum of military operations.
(5)
Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team (MCBAT).
(a) The MCBAT is the primary source of medical information dealing with
the management of CWA casualties for the federal government. Through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or agencies within the Department of Health and Human
Services, the team provides consultation to state, city, or local agencies. As necessary, they
supervise the collection of biological samples (body fluids) for subsequent verification of
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chemical agent exposure that can be used to facilitate the confirmation, diagnosis, and
treatment of casualties.
(b) The MCBAT is staffed by technical experts from the United States
Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) and the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). The MCBAT
provides—
•
Input into the development of operating procedures.
•
Training in the management of chemical agent casualties.
•
Clinical advice and consultation in matters related to the initial and
long-term management of chemical agent casualties.
•
Essential medical information during the recovery phase of the
operation for the safe return to normal activities.
•
On-site training for medical professionals on the management of CB
casualties.
(6)
Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams (SMARTs). The United
States Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) and its subordinate commands organize, man,
and equip the SMARTs. SMARTs are task-organized as temporary organizations from
existing medical activities. These teams provide MSCA during disasters, civil-military
operations, and humanitarian and emergency services incidents occurring in the United
States, its territories and possessions, and outside the continental United States
(OCONUS) UC AORs. The following functional SMARTs have been established:
•
SMART-Emergency Medical Response (SMART-EMR).
•
SMART-Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear (SMART-CBRN).
•
SMART-Stress Management (SMART-SM).
•
SMART-Medical Command, Control, Communications, and Telemedicine
(SMART-MC3T).
•
SMART-Pastoral Care (SMART-PC).
•
SMART-Preventive Medicine/Disease Surveillance (SMART-PM).
•
SMART-Burn (SMART-B).
•
SMART-Veterinary (SMART-V).
•
SMART-Health Systems Assessment and Assistance (SMART-HS).
•
SMART-Aeromedical Isolation (SMART-AI).
•
SMART-Logistics (SMART-LOG).
•
SMART-Smallpox Emergency Response (SMART-SER).
•
SMART-Smallpox Specialized Treatment (SMART-SST).
•
SMART-Investigational New Drug (SMART-IND).
•
SMART-Radiological Advisory Medical (SMART-RAM).
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Additional functional teams are being organized and will be manned and equipped in the
near future. For detailed information on the SMARTs, refer to MEDCOM Pamphlet 525-1.
(7)
United States Army Reserve Command. The USARC maintains RC
multifunction CBRN companies with a specified domestic reconnaissance, casualty
decontamination (DRCD) mission for DCM during civil support operations.
(a) These units are designed for overseas deployment, but may also be
tasked by the Secretary of Defense to provide domestic CBRN CM support. These units are
not designed or intended to replace functions carried out under the ICS or to replace those
functions normally performed by the emergency responder community, but rather provide
additional capability as needed.
(b) These units are not designed for a rapid response, but can be mobilized
and deployed within days. Its support is requested through the implementation of DSCA
policies and processes. These units are best employed by pre-positioning them in
preparation for high-threat, high-visibility events (such as the Olympic Games).
(c) DRCD-designated CBRN companies within the USARC are equipped
with platoon sets of CBRN detection and identification equipment to support CBRN CM
assessment activities, with specialized MCD equipment sets to support both ambulatory
and nonambulatory casualties.
c.
United States Marine Corps.
(1)
USMC Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force. The CBIRF was
created in 1996 to respond to terrorist attacks or other attacks from WMDs. Prior to the
unit’s activation, the federal government did not have a coherent response capability for
CBRNE that could holistically provide detection, identification, extraction, mass
decontamination, and medical triage. This single-source concept was initiated by General
Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and The Honorable Richard Danzig,
Secretary of the Navy, in response to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, U.S. Policy
on Counterterrorism, and PDD 62, Combating Terrorism.
(a) The CBIRF is a battalion-size unit of nearly 500 Marines and Sailors
comprised of more than four dozen military occupational specialties (MOSs) and capable of
performing a broad range of CM tasks. Due to the nature of the WMD threat, the CBIRF
has to be prepared 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to respond to a sudden attack or
incident. CBIRF maintains a standing operational task-organized force, known as the
Initial Response Force (IRF). The IRF is a task-organized, trained, standing reaction force
comprised of approximately 131 CBIRF personnel. It is manned and equipped to provide
the full range of initial response capabilities for contaminated environment operations to
include C2, agent detection and identification, casualty extraction, extrication, emergency
medical care and stabilization, limited EOD capability, response force and casualty
decontamination, and internal organic protection. This force is logistically self-sustained
and prepared to integrate into either the civilian incident or UC system or as part of a DOD
JTF. Upon deployment of the first IRF, the CBIRF will immediately stand up its second
IRF. Within 6 hours, this force will be ready to either act as a follow-on force for the first
IRF and/or as an independent response force for another incident.
(b) The II Marine Expeditionary Forces (IIMEF) retain OPCON of CBIRF
and remain the USMC’s POC for the request for forces (RFF) process used to request the
commitment of CBIRF personnel. RFFs flow from the President to the Secretary of Defense
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through the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Approved requests for CBIRF participation
are assigned by the JFCOM to Marine Forces Command and IIMEF for action and to the
CBIRF commander for execution. Additionally, the CBIRF is often tasked to pre-position
forces in support of specific NSSEs designated by the United States Secret Service.
Although it is generally believed that the CBIRF directly supports the Joint Task Force
National Capital Region, the CBIRF may be (and has been) tasked to support missions
within CONUS outside of the NCR and OCONUS.
(c)
Mission. The CBIRF’s mission statement is as follows: “When directed,
forward deploy and/or respond to a credible threat of a CBRNE incident in order to assist
local, state, or federal agencies and Unified Combat Commanders in the conduct of
consequence management operations. CBIRF accomplishes this mission by providing
capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel
decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated
personnel.” Additional planning considerations include the following:
•
CBIRF, either on its own or in conjunction with other DOD assets
such as the USMC National Guard WMD-CST, CERFP, or Coast Guard strike teams will
detect and identify CBRN agents and/or substances, assess the potential effects of the
WMD incident, advise local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist
with appropriate requests for additional support to minimize the impact on the civilian
populace.
•
CBIRF has the ability to locate and extract victims from a
contaminated environment, perform medical triage and treatment in contaminated
environments, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination to support civil first
responders or military authorities. In a general-tiered response scenario, WMD-CST,
USMC National Guard CERFP, and CBIRF capabilities would be complementary and
completely interoperable with civilian responders according to the NIMS, using the ICS.
Identified in the WMD CM Functional Needs Analysis as a “dual purpose” unit because of
its worldwide deployment status, CBIRF is also capable of deploying in support of a foreign
CM incident, enabling it to augment a Joint force commander, DOS officials, or other U.S.
or non-U.S. agencies as directed. To accomplish these tasks, CBIRF personnel receive
specialized training in HAZMAT operations, PPE, and additional training in the technical
aspects of performing their regular duties as well as their specialized duties in hazardous
environments.
(d) Capabilities. The CBIRF includes a complete WMD CM response
package and remains the only single-source DOD unit capable of providing all C2 and
supporting elements required for a CBRN CM incident—foreign or domestic. When
required, the CBIRF has a second IRF that can deploy and operate independently, or
augment the first IRF for sustained operations. Each of the IRFs provides the following
capabilities:
•
Detection and identification of all known CW agents, many
biological agents, and more than 200,000 TICs and TIMs.
•
Casualty search and extraction with more than 150 Emergency
Medical Technician-Basic trained Marines able to operate in PPE at levels A through C.
•
Personal decontamination and self-contained decontamination for
ambulatory and nonambulatory casualties.
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•
Medical care and stabilization with 50 emergency room doctors,
nurses, physicians’ assistants, and corpsmen—all able to operate in full PPE.
•
Technical rescue with approximately 35 FEMA urban search and
rescue qualified Marines.
•
Ten EOD Marines capable of operating in full PPE.
(2)
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) CBRN CM Assessment Set.
(a) Purpose. MAGTFs require CBRN detection, identification, and
protective equipment that exceeds those required for defense against traditional CBRN
threats and allows monitor/survey and reconnaissance operations in the most hazardous of
environments. The MAGTF CBRN CM set is a suite of specialized CBRN detection,
identification, and protective equipment that will be used by MAGTF CBRN defense
officers and specialists with MOS 5702 and MOS 5711 and other trained personnel to
support the MAGTF commanders in CBRN CM and TIM assessment operations.
(b) Mission. The MAGTF CBRN set of equipment will increase the
MAGTF commander's CBRN monitor/survey and reconnaissance capability by permitting
operations into known and unknown environments and providing an increased CBRN and
TIM detection and identification capability.
(c)
System Description. The MAGTF CBRN set provides a CBRN
detection and force health protection capability to the MAGTF commander that allows
detection, identification, and sampling of CBRN agents and TIMs, as well as protection for
CBRN reconnaissance elements in known and unknown environments. Equipment required
for this capability is a mixture of current organic and current COTS equipment.
(d) MAGTF CBRN CM set teams consist of the following:
•
3 x 4-man reconnaissance teams.
•
Hot-zone controller.
•
Cold-zone controller.
•
On-scene commander.
(e) Additional support required:
•
Security.
•
Decontamination.
•
Communications.
•
Administrative assistance.
•
Medical.
•
EOD.
(f)
Methods of Employment. The MAGTF commander must have the
capability to conduct monitor/survey and reconnaissance operations against all potential
CBRN and TIM hazards. MAGTF CBRN CM teams are employed in a mature operational
environment to perform reconnaissance of known or unknown CBRN threats at the major
subordinate command (MSC) level or higher, as determined by the MAGTF commander.
These teams may be employed in general support of other organizations or in direct support
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of the parent organization. Employment of equipment will be according to unit SOPs as
guided by 29 CFR 1910.120.
d. United States Navy.
(1)
Navy Forward Deployed Preventive Medicine Unit (FDPMU). Through its
rapidly deployable CBRN environmental defense response teams, the FDPMU provides
assessment, identification, and mitigation of near- and long-term health effects and the
consequences of disease from the public health aspect. Response teams augment the Naval
Medical Research Center (NMRC) field laboratory on-site.
(2)
Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG). The DTRG can provide
assistance with nuclear and IND EOD.
(3)
Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).
NRL assets are arrayed strategically at CONUS locations and conduct broad-based,
multidisciplinary research. The ONR and NRL are available to rapidly deploy uniformed
experts in microbiology who are trained in CB threat agents to support field investigations.
e.
National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB maintains CBRNE-capable forces that
are under state government control according to Title 32 USC, but may be federalized to
respond to CBRNE incidents under Title 10 USC. These forces include—
(1) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. The WMD-CSTs consist
of both ARNG and ANG personnel, and are designated to provide a specialized capability in
response to a CBRN incident primarily within Title 32 USC operations status within the
United States and its territories, as established by Title 10 USC. Responding under the
authority of the governor, they support civil authorities in a domestic CBRN incident site
by identifying CBRN agents, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on
response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. The
WMD-CSTs may also be federalized and deployed as a part of a federal response to an
incident within or outside the WMD-CST's assigned state. See FM 3-11.22, Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for more
information.
(2) National Guard Response Force (NGRF). NGRFs provide every state with a
ready combat arms force capable of delivering a company-size security element at the
request of the governor or the President. The NGRF may assist local and state law
enforcement officials by protecting key sites or facilities, performing traffic control duties,
and conducting cold-zone security operations at a CBRN incident site.
(3) CBRNE Emergency Response Force Package. The CERFP is a battalion-size
task force tailored with existing ARNG units that are mobilized under Title 32 USC to
provide a regional response in the event of a CBRNE incident. The CERFP follows WMD
CST and NGRF capabilities during the immediate and reinforcing response phases of the
response spectrum. The CERFP deploys to CBRNE incident sites to provide civil support to
ICs by conducting CM operations to save lives and prevent human suffering. The CERFP is
typically task-organized as a task force that includes a battalion-level command and staff
for C2, a company-size medical capability for triage and stabilization (such as an ANG
medical group), a table of organization and equipment (TOE) CBRN company to provide
casualty decontamination, and a TOE engineer company for casualty search and extraction.
The CERFP units maintain additional specialized equipment and receive specialized
training to perform safe operations in a CBRN environment.
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f.
Other DOD CM Support Activities.
(1)
Joint Task Force-Civil Support.
(a) The purpose of JTF-CS is to save lives, prevent injury, and provide
temporary critical life support during a CBRNE incident in the United States or its
territories and possessions. JTF-CS is the only military organization dedicated solely to
planning and integrating DOD forces for CBRN CM support to civil authorities in such a
situation.
(b) JTF-CS is a standing JTF comprised of Active, Reserve, and National
Guard members of the USA, USN, USAF, USMC, and United States Coast Guard (USCG),
as well as civilian personnel, and is commanded by a federalized ARNG general officer.
Established in October 1999, JTF-CS is a subordinate unit of USNORTHCOM, a unified
COCOM formed in October 2002 to plan, organize, and execute homeland defense and CS
missions. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM
provides military assistance to civil authorities, including CM operations.
(c)
JTF-CS accomplishes its CBRN CM mission in strict adherence with
the principles of the Constitution and public law. Deployment of JTF-CS, at the direction of
the Commander, USNORTHCOM, and on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, occurs
only after a governor requests federal assistance from the President, and after the
President issues a Presidential Disaster Declaration. In any domestic setting, JTF-CS
remains in support of the IC throughout the CBRN CM operation.
(d) CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). The
CCMRF is a brigade-size combined arms task force tailored as a reinforcing effort for DSCA
in response to CBRNE incidents, and operates under Title 10 USC authority, and in
support of USNORTHCOM under JTF-CS. A CCMRF task force constitutes the majority of
the JTF-CS task force response requirements, and provides force-tailored capabilities, such
as casualty decontamination, security operations, medical triage and treatment, aviation,
logistics, and transportation.
(2)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The DTRA consequence management
advisory team (CMAT) deploys to provide joint technical support to the supported
commander with expertise in CBRNE response procedures, requirements, resources, C2,
health physics, public affairs, legal affairs, and specialized technical information. The
CMAT coordinates technical information flow by controlling and resourcing requirements
passed to the supported TOC. The CMAT is able to task-organize and deploy to support
commanders in the technical aspects of CBRNE accidents or incidents. The incident-
tailored force has secure communications, trained technical experts, hazard prediction
modeling capability, and rapid reachback capability.
(3)
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). The AFRRI can
provide DOD technical support capability for nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents.
(a) The AFRRI medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) responds as
part of the DTRA CMAT and is available at all times. The MRAT can provide on-site
training to health professionals on the management of nuclear or radiological casualties.
The team provides state-of-the-art expertise and advice to commanders and primary care
providers following a nuclear or radiological accident (nuclear weapons, reactor, or
radiological material). The MRAT provides access to biodosimetry and bioassay support to
incident responders and local health authorities.
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(b) The MRAT is a primary source of medical and radiological health
information dealing with the management of casualties from nuclear warfare weapons and
RDD accidents. Senior medical experts provide on-site advice to physicians on—
•
Resuscitative techniques for radiation injury and radionuclide
contamination therapy.
•
The use of investigative chelation therapy for internal contamination
by radioactive material.
•
Therapeutic drug combinations for acute radiation injury, infection,
and protection against late-occurring diseases (such as cancer).
•
Radiation injury interventional therapy and dose estimate bioassay.
(4)
Joint Task Force-Consequence Management. When directed, a response
task force headquarters may be tasked to support the IC during an incident. The
commander may assume OPCON of committed DOD elements (less United States Special
Operations Command and United States Army Corps of Engineers), coordinate military
support of CM operations, and redeploy units when DOD disengagement criteria are met.
The commander establishes a fully functional CP near the incident within 24 hours of
notification. He exercises OPCON of DOD resources committed to providing DSCA,
provides LNOs to appropriate civil agencies, and receives LNOs from appropriate military
commands and agencies. The response team establishes initial liaison with supported civil
agencies and coordinates support for follow-on personnel. See JP 3-41 for more information.
6.
Other Federal Agency Consequence Management Assets
The following paragraphs identify representative federal assets that could be tasked
to support a CBRN CM incident:
a.
Department of Homeland Security.
(1)
The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). The MMRS operates
as an organized team of specialists. The team’s capabilities include agent detection and
identification, patient decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient
transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law enforcement activities. Twenty-
seven teams have been established. As of February 2007, there are 125 MMRS cities, 113 of
which have attained baseline capabilities.
(2)
The USCG National Strike Force (NSF) provides rapidly deployable
technical expertise, specialized equipment, and incident management for lead agency ICs
and federal on-scene commanders for oil, HAZMAT, and WMD incidents.
b.
Health and Human Services.
(1)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). CDC capabilities are
epidemiological surveillance, biological agent identification, and public health consultation
and response. The CDC maintains the SNS which can deploy a “push pack” of critical
chemical and biological countermeasures to any point in the United States within 12 hours.
In addition, the SNS can provide civilian medical resupply through its vendor-managed
inventory.
(2)
Office of Preparedness and Response National Medical Response Teams
(NMRTs). NMRTs are manned by medical personnel. These teams are capable of agent
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A-25
identification, patient decontamination, triage, and medical treatment in support of local
health systems. There are three NMRTs:
c.
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(1)
The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). As an office under the
FBI, Department of Justice, the NDPO coordinates all federal efforts to assist state and
local responders with planning, training, equipment, and exercises necessary to respond to
a CBRN incident. The NDPO—
(a) Supports functional program areas for domestic preparedness. An
improved intelligence and information-sharing apparatus underpins the services provided
to the federal, state, and local responder community to distribute lessons learned, asset and
capabilities information, and general readiness knowledge.
(b) Coordinates the establishment of training curricula and standards for
responder training to ensure consistency, based upon training objectives, and to tailor
training opportunities to meet the needs of the responder community.
(c)
Facilitates and coordinates the efforts of the United States
Government to provide the responder community with detection, protection, analysis, and
decontamination equipment necessary to prepare for and respond to an incident involving
WMD.
(d) Seeks to provide state and local governments with the resources and
expertise necessary to design, conduct, and evaluate exercise scenarios involving WMD.
(e) Is responsible for coordinating federal, state, and local WMD
preparedness planning and policy.
(2)
Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU). The HMRU is capable of
specialized sampling, detection, and identification of CBRN agents. It is also equipped with
a variety of rescue equipment and PPE (OSHA levels A through C).
(3)
Evidence Response Teams. The main functions of the evidence response
teams are crime scene documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal
investigations. Some evidence response teams are HAZMAT-trained.
(4)
Critical-Incident Response Group (CIRG). CIRG teams are specially
assembled to conduct tactical and crisis management efforts.
(5)
Intelligence Collection and Analysis. The FBI has experts that contribute to
and coordinate detailed interagency threat assessment activities.
d.
Environmental Protection Agency.
(1)
EPA On-Scene Commanders (OSCs). Under the authority of the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, EPA OSCs coordinate all
federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an incident.
(2)
Emergency Response Team (ERT). The EPA ERT provides 24-hour access
to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases and advice to the OSC in areas
such as hazard evaluation, risk assessment, multimedia sampling and analysis, on-site
safety, and clean-up techniques. The ERT has portable chemical-agent instrumentation
that is capable of detection and identification in the low and subparts per million
categories, as well as entry-level capabilities using PPE levels A through C.
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(3)
Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT). The EPA RERT provides
on-site monitoring and mobile laboratories for field analysis of samples, along with
expertise in radiation health physics and risk assessment. The RERT is accessible 24 hours
a day.
7.
Technical Reachback
Technical reachback provides commanders with added expertise and knowledge when
needed during the conduct of CBRN CM.
a.
Technical reachback is the capability to contact technical subject matter experts
when an information requirement (IR) exceeds the knowledge base of the responding ICS
organization. A common SA among all elements at the incident site, military and civilian, is
imperative. Critical command decisions rely on multiple information sources that include
technical reachback input. Table A-1, page A-28, provides a representative list of agencies
that can provide technical reachback.
b.
Reachback should be conducted using established protocols. Technical reachback
can support the following representative requirements:
(1)
Nonstandard Agent Identification of CBRN Warfare Agents and TIM.
Military responders are trained to detect and identify selected military warfare agents. If a
TIM is used, or is suspected, then ICS personnel should obtain additional technical
information. This technical information may include persistency, medical effects,
decontamination methods, and/or protection requirements.
(2)
Modeling. During CBRN CM operations, the spread of contamination must
be limited. Technical reachback can help support detailed analysis of an area to assist in
determining downwind hazards; locating staging areas, OCs, and decontamination sites;
making SIP decisions; and conducting an evacuation.
(3)
CBRN Agent Sample Analysis and Evacuation. Sample analysis and
evacuation can use technical reachback to obtain critical information for patient treatment.
Samples evacuated can also be used as forensic evidence.
(4)
Hazard Prediction. Technical experts can use modeling to provide a better
indication of where vapor, liquid, or aerosolized hazards may occur.
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Table A-1. Technical Reachback Contact Information
Capability
DOD Agencies
C
B
R
N
AFRRI
301-295-0316/0530
X
X
DTRA
877-240-1187
X
X
X
X
Edgewood Chemical-Biological
X
X
800-831-4408
Center
USAMRIID
888-872-7443
X
USAMRICD
410-436-3277
X
800-222-9698
USACHPPM
X
X
X
X
Capability
DHS Agencies
C
B
R
N
National Response Center, Chemical
800-424-8802 or 202-267-2675
X
X
Terrorism/CB Hot Line
FEMA
800-621-FEMA (3362)
X
X
X
X
Capability
Other Federal Agencies
C
B
R
N
CDC
800-CDC-INFO (232-4636 )
X
X
Department of Energy, Radiation
865-576-3131
X
X
Emergency Assistance Center
EPA Environmental Response Team
732-321-6743
X
X
X
X
NIOSH
800-35-NIOSH (800-356-4674)
X
National Atmospheric Release
X
X
X
X
202-586-8100
Advisory Center (NARAC)
Capability
State Agencies
C
B
R
N
State Emergency Management
X
X
X
X
Agencies
contact/statedr.shtm>
c.
Preincident planning can identify technical reachback sources that may be used
to provide verifiable, validated, and reliable information. The planning and execution
process helps determine the operational value of those capabilities. Other planning
considerations include the following:
Is technical reachback available at the incident site or at a remote site?
Do communication requirements include secure or nonsecure capabilities
and/or audio or video capabilities?
Does fiscal resourcing support 24 hours a day and 7 days a week technical
reachback?
8.
Health Service Support
A sample checklist for an HSS plan in support of a CBRN CM operation is provided in
Figure A-4.
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1 April 2008
•
Establish response capabilities and prepare specific equipment lists. Include incident site EMT
medical evacuation, PVNTMED services, veterinary services, behavioral health personnel, C2
staff, health service logistics (HSL), hospitalization capabilities, and a medical laboratory to
receive samples or specimens, as required.
•
Identify the capabilities (to include IPE/PPE requirements) of HSS staffs and organizations to
respond to a CBRN CM event.
•
Define roles and responsibilities for DOD personnel augmenting local, state, HN, or other medical
organizations and facilities.
•
Describe the location and responsibilities of medical personnel supporting MCD operations.
•
Define requirements to check food and water supplies for contamination.
•
Address health hazard VAs, MEDSURV, and OEH surveillance activities.
•
Address procedures for the care of animals.
•
Provide reachback contact information for USAMEDCOM, USAMRICD, USAMRIID, AFRRI, CDC,
and USACHPPM for technical guidance and support.
•
Establish liaison (as required) with local, state, federal, and HN agencies.
•
Provide guidance to response units or staffs on their relationships with local, state, federal, and
HN agencies as they relate to CBRN CM incident response.
•
Outline procedures for medical response units or staffs to obtain support from the USAMEDCOM
SMARTs.
•
Address—
Availability of mass prophylaxes.
Evacuation and SIP guidance.
Prophylaxis and vaccination distribution guidance.
Ability to develop surge capacity.
Decontamination and evacuation capabilities.
Restriction of movement, isolation, and quarantine procedures.
•
Establish a staging area for all response units or staffs.
•
Provide procedures for alerting response units or staffs, establish medical C2 for the response
units or staffs, establish liaison procedures, brief response units or staffs, dispatch response units
or staffs, monitor response activities, and request additional support as required.
•
Address—
Debriefing all response personnel.
Preparing AARs.
Replenishing all expended medical equipment and supplies.
Rotating dated medications through the supporting MTF to maintain the current stockage
and prevent exceeding expiration dates.
Releasing units and staffs not involved in the postincident site decontamination
operations to begin preparation in the event another incident occurs.
Providing medical advice to the local, municipal, state, federal, and HN agencies, and
incident site restoration teams and personnel, as required.
Providing assignments to designated units or staffs.
Receiving response unit or staff duty assignments.
Assembling supplies and equipment in functional sets or as directed by the commander
or planning staff.
Storing supplies and equipment as directed, ensuring that all supplies and equipment are
safeguarded and that all antidotes, anticonvulsants, and other medications are properly
stored and at the correct temperatures.
Requesting training material and doctrinal publications and guidance on incident
response activities. Training units and staffs to meet response requirements.
Closing all response unit or staff locations.
Terminating operations and preparing for the closure of response site activities.
Decontaminating response personnel before departing the incident site.
Decontaminating nonexpendable material and equipment, placing contaminated
expendable items in the designated contaminated disposal site, and closing the
decontamination site.
Continuing to monitor operations during the postincident site decontamination
operations, and providing recommendations on findings during the monitoring process.
Figure A-4. Sample Health Service Support Plan Checklist
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Appendix B
PREPARATION TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
1.
Vulnerability Reduction Measures
a.
A key element of ensuring preparedness is to recognize and eliminate
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability reduction measures help units correct weaknesses identified
during the VA. Below is a list of training-, logistics-, personnel-, and readiness-focused
vulnerability reduction measures that can be used to assist a unit in preparing to conduct
or support CBRN CM operations. Other CBRN-related vulnerability reduction measures
can be found in Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Vulnerability Assessment.
•
Develop common SOPs and TTP with expected supported and supporting
elements.
•
Task-organize to fill any gaps in duties and responsibilities.
•
Train personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used
during a CBRN CM operation (such as NIMS or ICS).
•
Obtain (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel (such as
HAZMAT technician or IC training).
•
Exercise and refine plans with military and civilian counterparts.
•
Obtain the proper equipment to protect against, detect, and decontaminate
identified hazards.
•
Develop, request, and maintain push packages for follow-on resupply and
maintenance of all classes of supplies in support of extended operations.
•
Prepare and maintain medical records for all personnel to ensure that proper
physicals, immunizations, and qualifications for specific hazardous duties (such as site
entry personnel) are up to date.
•
Ensure that all communications equipment, communications security, and
controlled cryptographic items are serviceable and ready to deploy. This includes
determining the compatibility of communications equipment with other expected
responders.
b.
During preparation, unit checklists are revised and updated. Checklists are
valuable tools to assist units in responding to incidents. The following checklists provide
examples of activities that should be conducted when responding to a CBRN CM support
operation. The examples are not all-inclusive for every unit and should be viewed as
guidelines to build from for Service-specific requirements. Figure B-1, page B-2, contains a
representative checklist for a CBRN CM (HAZMAT) unit; Figure B-2, page B-4, contains a
representative checklist for a CBRN CM (technical decontamination) unit.
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B-1
Preincident
Identify CBRN team members.
Maintain a current alert roster.
Maintain an “alert notification package” of specialized equipment for all team members.
Ensure that respiratory equipment is maintained and training is conducted according to
Army Regulation (AR) 11-34, The Army Respiratory Protection Program, and
29 CFR 1910.134.
Ensure that HAZMAT emergency response meets the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.120(q).
Ensure that the capability exists to conduct atmospheric monitoring and detection needed to
determine the level and extent of CBR contamination.
Ensure that the decontamination team is fully trained on all PPE worn and trained and certified
on all equipment that is being operated.
Coordinate contaminated casualty extraction with installation fire and emergency services.
Ensure that HAZMAT training complies with applicable requirements of 29 CFR 1910.120;
NFPA Standard 472, Standard for Professional Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding
to Hazardous Materials Incidents; and the appropriate federal, state, or HN regulations
governing prehospital care providers (EMS operations).
Provide training requirements for installation personnel who handle or use HAZMAT, to include
DODI 6050.5, DOD Hazard Communication Program.
Develop and maintain proficiency in essential CBRN tasks.
Develop and maintain ICS forms. Examples of ICS forms can be found in the NIMS publication.
Incident
Establish an ICP to support the ICS. Initiate communications with the EOC.
Initiate personal protection and accountability measures.
Perform positive and negative pressure tests when donning a respirator to ensure satisfactory
fitting and valve function.
Determine the wind direction prior to approaching the scene.
Locate and assess the incident site.
Conduct contaminated casualty extraction in coordination with fire and emergency services.
Provide triage and EMS, if required.
Search for secondary devices in coordination with EOD.
Detect CBRN hazards.
Identify the CB agent.
Establish exposure limits and stay times in the area requiring protective equipment based on
agent type; concentration, if known; and ambient temperature. Rotate personnel based on
exposure levels and stay times.
Conduct a survey to analyze agent transfer and spread.
Initiate initial CBRN reports to the IC.
Position CBRN detectors.
Mark contaminated areas to prevent casualties and the spread of the hazard.
Determine the initial cordon size, based on the type and quantity of material involved at the
incident.
Establish the contamination control line or “hotline.”
Establish the entry and exit control points to the contamination control line upwind of the
incident site. Ensure that security is adequate to prevent persons from entering at points other
than the entry lane.
Communicate to the IC through the ICP that the incident site perimeter is established.
Reassess the cordon size and locations of the entry control point based on weather conditions
and recovery operations.
Figure B-1. CBRN Consequence Management (HAZMAT) Unit Checklist (Example)
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Incident (Continued)
Determine if the incident site should be treated as a crime scene, and coordinate with the
security team for jurisdiction and handling of evidence, if required.
Maintain continuous communications with the IC, the ICP, and other responder organizations.
Maintain continuous coordination with the MTF, and coordinate the evacuation of casualties to
the MTF or nearest hospital for further stabilization.
Coordinate administrative and logistical support to sustain operations in a contaminated
environment.
Establish personnel and equipment decontamination stations, in conjunction with medical
personnel.
Secure a water source for the decontamination station.
Set up wash stations for the decontamination station.
Begin decontamination operations. Contain the hazard and decontamination runoff.
Evacuate contaminated casualties to the decontamination station.
Conduct limited personnel and equipment decontamination to sustain operations and limit the
spread of contamination.
Collect aerosol, environmental, plant, animal, and medical samples.
Prepare and forward samples to the laboratory for further analysis and identification.
Assist in hazard prediction for limited early warning.
Confirm the results of atmospheric monitoring and detection using an approved and designated
laboratory for analysis.
Initiate a request to the IC for external augmentation, if the CBRN team capabilities are
exceeded.
Relocate detectors to the predicted agent location and verify hazard prediction.
Record HAZMAT exposure for each member of the CBRN team.
Coordinate with Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT)/grave registration
for disposition of human remains.
Postincident
Provide HAZMAT support to the ICP through recovery.
Develop and provide input to incident AARs.
Figure B-1. CBRN Consequence Management (HAZMAT) Unit Checklist (Example)
(Continued)
1 April 2008
FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37
B-3
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