FMI 6-02.45, C1 Signal Support to Theater Operations (May 2008) - page 3

 

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FMI 6-02.45, C1 Signal Support to Theater Operations (May 2008) - page 3

 

 

Chapter 2  

medical VSATs for transmission of health care information, in the near future these systems will rely on 
Army communications systems and networks. 

TROJAN S

PECIAL 

P

URPOSE 

I

NTEGRATED 

R

EMOTE 

I

NTELLIGENCE 

T

ERMINAL 

2-83.  TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) is a critical network 
enabler for the commander and the intelligence Warfighting function. It is another SATCOM based 
architecture and is the primary network capability that connects the deployed user to TS SCI WANs 
including the JWICS and the National Security Agency networks. Later trends will incorporate "tunneling" 
of TS SCI data over the LWN transport layer. Under this plan, the TS SCI intelligence gateway equipment 
will be owned, operated, and maintained by those military intelligence and signal personnel that establish 
and operate the tactical sensitive compartmented information facility (TSCIF) in the BCTs and 
reconnaissance and target acquisition elements. The TROJAN Network Control Center performs 
centralized TROJAN SPIRIT network management to include managing the intelligence gateway 
equipment and associated users in the TSCIF. 

B

LUE 

F

ORCE 

T

RACKING AND 

J

OINT 

B

LUE 

F

ORCE 

S

ITUATIONAL 

A

WARENESS 

2-84. 

Blue Force Tracking (BFT) 

is a system that provides the Warfighter with a globally responsive and 

tailorable capability to identify and track friendly forces in assigned areas of operations (in near real time), 
thereby augmenting and enhancing C2 at key levels of command. The primarily satellite-based architecture 
of BFT supports a wide variety of joint missions and operations. Major systems contributing to the DOD's 
BFT capability include the FBCB2-BFT, the MTS, and Talon Reach. 

2-85. 

FBCB2-BFT 

generates and distributes a common view of the operational environment at the tactical 

and operational levels, identifying and sharing that view with ground vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, 
command posts, and Army and joint command centers. 

2-86. 

MTS 

is a system designed for the Army and its vehicle operators for tracking vehicles and 

communicating while on and off the road. MTS incorporates digital maps in the vehicles and allows two-
way satellite messaging thereby allowing the transportation coordinator the ability to “talk” to the driver of 
any truck, regardless of location. 

2-87. 

Talon Reach

 is a position and status reporting system that marries global positioning system 

receivers with personal digital assistants (PDAs) and Iridium low Earth orbit SATCOM services to users of 
the Space-Based BFT Mission Management Center. 

2-88. 

Space-Based Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA)

 is defined as the ability to use 

BLOS communications to know the position, status, and intent of units on the battlefield. With the 
incorporation of new processing technology, the Mission Management Center is now able to apply the 
national collection of broadcasts from remote assets BFT-based JBFSA services (and wartime lessons 
learned) to JBFSA data from a wide variety of military and commercial Space-Based BFT systems. 

T

HEATER 

N

ETWORK 

C

APABILITIES 

2-89.  The capabilities that both strategic and tactical networks can be tailored to meet those requirements 
needed for any contingent operation around the world and in the United States.  With adequate planning 
and support leveraging, the local government and private commercial infrastructure and resource 
capabilities can also contribute to the success of the mission. 

Joint Military Operations 

2-90.  A signal command is primarily structured, equipped, trained, and employed to support wartime 
offensive, defensive, and joint C2 to stability operations that include certain contingencies and peacetime 
military engagements. CCDRs, at the direction of the President or SecDef, may employ US forces to deter 
war, promote peace, and demonstrate US resolve and capability. A signal command will provide support in 
order to extend DISN services and link to commercial communications when available, and provide 

2-16 

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5 July 2007 

Theater Network Support and the LandWarNet 

connectivity to local embassies, air, sea, and rail ports, and other sustaining activities. Such operations 
include— 

z

Major Combat Operations. 

z

Peace Operations. 

z

Peacetime Military Engagement. 

z

Limited Intervention.. 

z

Irregular Warfare. 

2-91.  Theater level network nodes are further categorized as major and extension. Major nodes have larger 
voice and data packages and can support larger numbers of customers. They also have larger numbers of 
transmission systems that serve as geographic network hubs supporting numerous extensions in hub-spoke 
network configurations. Extension nodes have smaller voice switches and data packages designed to 
support smaller numbers of customers. They also have smaller numbers of associated transmission systems 
and typically are employed at locations needing less capability than major nodes in the hub role. 

2-92.  The network equipment sets are scaleable in that the architecture can be easily expanded without 
reconfiguring the entire network. Extensions can be added to the satellite systems, links can be added to the 
data systems, and additional voice switching capabilities may be added without interrupting existing 
service to users. 

Department of Homeland Security 

2-93.  Within CONUS, signal brigades are called upon to provide support to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) mission in the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster in the United States. The Army 
National Guard (ARNG) forces may be ordered to active duty by the governor of their state to provide area 
communications first responder support, including restoration of communications for federal, state, and 
municipal authorities to use in crisis coordination. Signal brigades, through assigned ESB assets, can 
support first responders, the Federal Emergency Management Agency  command centers, and crisis 
response command post locations by extending DISN services from a CONUS STEP or teleport site, or by 
coordinated interface with the local director of information management (DOIM) from a post, camp, or 
station allowing access to commercial networks. 

Commercialization of Network Assets  

2-94.  Historically, theater signal planners have leveraged transitioning to commercial networks and 
infrastructure in order to free up valuable tactical signal assets. Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert 
Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, and conflicts as recent as Afghanistan are examples of a tactical theater level 
communications element installing the initial communications infrastructure and transitioning that 
capability to a commercial provider. The signal command, in coordination with the JTF and JTF ARFOR, 
should begin planning to transition the communications network to commercial means as soon as directed 
by the GCC. Transitioning a communications network to another provider, while ensuring interruption of 
services to the user is minimized, is a complicated and precise process. Coordination with tactical signal 
brigades and embedded tactical signal organizations is important in maintaining visibility of the status of 
contractual negotiations and ensuring requirements are adequately identified and fed into the contract 
documents. Commercialization can be a long lead-time process and consequently must be a factor in the 
initial planning process, and whenever possible, should include pre-negotiated commercial contracts for 
services. Planning factors are identified in the Signal Systems Engineering Design that include, but are not 
limited to— 

z

Leased SATCOM. 

z

Other available commercial infrastructures. 

z

SIPRNET, NIPRNET, IP addressing, and routing schemes. 

z

VTC equipment and control mechanisms. 

z

DISN and commercial access. 

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

2-17 

Chapter 2  

z

Wiring and cable plans. 

z

Cellular and satellite telephone capabilities. 

z

Secure wireless LAN and point-to-point services. 

2-95.  Early entry communications packages, which are equipment and personnel organized, are designed 
to support rapid deployment, insertion, and employment into an AO or theater at the discretion of the 
CCDR and based on political or tactical necessity. These packages are configured in small, medium, and 
large scales and are highly mobile, fully joint, and DISN capable. The typical content of deployed 
contingency packages is decided on a case-by-case basis. This is determined by mission, enemy, terrain 
and weather, troops available and civilian (METT-TC). Most packages always rely on multiband 
SATCOM, base band data capability, secure VTC, and secure voice while using minimal lift resources. All 
packages will support initial entry, theater, and strategic links for JTF, JFLCC, or ARFOR and can sustain 
DISN services until larger, less mobile follow-on support arrives. Space segment and satellite terminal 
availability allow for up to 8 Mbps bandwidth. See Figure 2-1. 

Figure 2-1. Example of an early entry communications package 

New Developments 

2-96.  GBS Theater Injection Point (TIP) will be available under selected theater tactical brigades that are 
equipped and structured to install, operate, and maintain it. The GBS TIP enables in-theater forces to 
transmit information via the GBS as opposed to being able only to receive information transmitted by the 
PIPs. Currently, the Army is testing three GBS TIPs. 

2-97.  Low Earth orbit Constellations provide an additional capability to the use of military and civilian 
geostationary satellites that would operate in a manner similar to Iridium. Such constellations could 
provide additional bandwidth and on-the-move capability. Systems design considerations include omni-
directional antennas to adapt to the moving satellites which will result in lower bandwidth than that 
obtained with directional antennas. When directional antennas are used, they require tracking mechanisms 
with wide ranges of motion. These would be more expensive to acquire and maintain than antennas with 
limited or no tracking mechanisms. 

2-98.  Airborne relays are another growing development. The increased demand for BLOS bandwidth 
combined with limitations on the availability of satellites and SATCOM systems may drive adoption of one 

2-18 

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5 July 2007 

Theater Network Support and the LandWarNet 

or more systems of airborne relays. Other considerations are the availability of earth terminals. What is less 
often considered is that “parking space” in geostationary orbit for new satellites is also a constrained 
resource. If satellites are placed too close together, multiple satellites will be illuminated by the beam width 
of a single ground station antenna. Planners cannot automatically assume that spending enough money to 
put up more satellites will increase that available space segment bandwidth. 

2-99.  Changes in the allocation of frequencies for SATCOM and advances in the technologies that enable 
efficient use of RF EMS, for example, modem and multiplex technologies, will affect the saturation level 
of this resource. Signal planners making long-term technology decisions must consider the question of 
saturation of orbital parking space for systems and operational concepts that would increase the number of 
orbital platforms. Airborne relay concepts include both stationary and non-stationary platforms. Key 
system design considerations for airborne relay platforms are discussed in the following paragraphs. 

2-100.  As with satellite systems, non-stationary airborne platforms will require ground stations to have 
either omni-directional antennas or directional antennas with tracking mechanisms. This creates a trade-off 
between cost and bandwidth. Nearly the same trade-off applies in the case of mobile ground users and 
stationary airborne platforms. The difference is that there is some possibility of frequency reuse through 
strategically positioning the stationary airborne platforms and using tracking antennas on the mobile 
ground stations. 

2-101.  Stationary platforms such as tethered aerostats or high altitude lighter-than-air ships with station 
keeping capability can be equipped with relays that are compatible with existing multichannel tactical 
satellite (TACSAT) or LOS ground stations. The ground stations can continue to use their fixed or 
relatively fixed directional antennas (in some cases, SATCOM ground antenna systems have tracking 
systems with limited ranges of motion in order to deal with slight imperfections in satellite orbit). Ground 
stations would have a dual purpose. In the case of SATCOM compatible relays on the aerial platforms, the 
platforms would be deployed in a manner that the antennas of all the supported ground stations would be 
pointing in directions well away from the orbital plane of satellites. This would enable the ground stations 
to reuse the satellite frequencies without creating interference. 

SECTION V – PLANNING THEATER NETWORKS 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

2-102.  Information systems and networks provide the predominant source from which the Warfighter 
generates, receives, shares, and utilizes information. Simplicity in planning is maintained by developing 
simple, coherent rule sets, commander’s intent, and leveraging doctrine. The operational environment is 
also vital to planning a conducive network. The information systems and networks must be of sufficient 
scale, capacity, reach, and reliability to support the evolving operational and training missions. With all this 
in mind we must consider the following planning processes before establishing a theater of operations 
communications network. 

J

OINT 

O

PERATION 

P

LANNING 

2-103.  Joint operation planning includes preparing operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans 
(CONPLANs), campaign plans, and OPORDs. It encompasses the full range of activities required to 
project power into the JOA and theater of operations. Planning for joint networks is essential in that the 
GIG is the tool that binds all other actions together and ensures power projections. The GIG and LWN 
become more central to operational planning to include the following: 

z

Mobilization Planning

. Primarily a service and component responsibility, mobilization 

planning assembles and organizes national resources to support national objectives in time of 
war and other emergencies. 

z

Deployment Planning.

 The combatant command, in close coordination with US Transportation 

Command, conducts deployment planning as a measure necessary to provide lift, embarkation, 
debarkation, and intra and inter-theater movement of forces. 

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FMI 6-02.45 

2-19 

Chapter 2  

z

Employment Planning.

 Employment planning stipulates how to project and utilize military 

power to attain specified objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by CCDRs 
through their component commands. 

z

Sustainment Planning.

 Sustainment planning provides and maintains levels of personnel, 

materiel, and consumables required to sustain operations for the full duration of a campaign, 
operation, or engagement. 

z

Redeployment Planning.

 Redeployment planning transfers units, individuals, or supplies 

deployed in one area, to another location in the area, or to the zone of interior (JP 5-0). 

2-104.  The joint operation plan (OPLAN) and OPORD format is not the same as the Army tactical 
OPLAN/OPORD format located in Appendix G of FM 5-0. The joint OPLAN format is designed to 
address those functions and activities at the operational level of war and provides instruction to 
synchronize all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and SOF. 

J

OINT 

O

PERATION 

P

LANNING 

A

ND 

E

XECUTION 

S

YSTEM 

2-105.  The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is used to accomplish the task of 
providing a unified planning system within the DOD to translate policy decisions into plans and orders. 
The JOPES consists of a contingency and a crisis action planning process. 

Deliberate Planning Process 

2-106.  This process is used primarily in peacetime, when time permits detailed communications system 
planning and analysis. Deliberate planning is scenario-based for the most probable types of conflict that the 
US Armed Forces will confront. The five phases are initiation, concept development, plan development, 
plan review, and supporting plans, which must be completed in sequence and take 18-24 months to 
finalize. Additionally, all deliberate plans must be reviewed annually. The deliberate planning process 
depends on the JOPES automated data processing system to produce the time-phased force and deployment 
data (TPFDD). 

Crisis Action Planning Process 

2-107.  This process is used when a crisis is underway and time is limited. Crisis action planning has six 
phases: situation development, crisis assessment, course of action (COA) development, COA selection, 
execution planning, and execution that can be completed out of sequence or omitted as the situation 
dictates. Crisis action planning may or may not utilize an existing deliberate plan with pre-defined 
communications system assets. A deliberate plan may require modification as details emerge based on 
communications system equipment or personnel requirements and their availability. Crisis action planning 
may be conducted even though deliberate planning has been conducted. 

2-108.  For additional information on the JOPES, refer to the following publications: 

z

JP 5-0. 

z

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A. 

z

CJCSM 3122.03B. 

z

CJCSM 3150.16A. 

J

OINT 

N

ETWORK 

P

LANNING 

2-109.  Joint network planning and other related mission support activities take place in unison with the 
activation and subsequent phases of JTF operations. Joint planning guidance, found in Chapter III of JP 6-
0, includes the following: 

z

During the mobilization phase, the JFC is designated, forces are assigned, and G-6 staff begins 
the assumption of the role as J-6 with phased augmentations. 

z

During the deployment phase, the joint network plan is completed and published. Network 
assets incrementally deploy in support of the buildup in the operational area. Initial tactical 

2-20 

 

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Theater Network Support and the LandWarNet 

communication is global, but with minimal capacity. Decision support should be focused on the 
on-scene commander. 

z

In the employment phase, the JTF and the components continue to deploy incrementally. As 
these assets arrive, they are added to the existing network, dynamically increasing its capacity. 

z

During sustainment, improvements are continually made to the networks to include work toward 
commercialization of the theater infrastructure. Changes to the OPLAN are made using the in-
place networks as departure points. 

2-110.  Significant effort is required in network planning for theater operations and the continued 
operation of the LWN in support of theater forces. The plan must provide details necessary to bring 
communications system support together. Also, continuous analysis of the performance of the network will 
identify trends and tendencies that may need to be changed during future operations or mission completion. 

2-111.  For additional information on joint planning, refer to the following publications: 

z

CJCSM 6231.07D. 

z

JP 6-0. 

S

YSTEM 

R

EQUIREMENTS 

P

LANNING 

2-112.  System requirements for any theater network or LWN segment are mission driven and will also 
determine the organization and location of forces providing network resources. Capabilities and limitations 
of all potentially available strategic, operational, and tactical communications systems and equipment, 
whether they are organic to services and agencies, belong to non-US forces, are commercial, or are 
provided by a host nation. Typically, the combined system will provide voice, data, and video 
communications. Early identification of network resources will preclude having information demands 
outstripping network capabilities and capacity. It is crucial that the JFC identify early communications 
system requirements that are external to the command or require support from national and host-nation 
resources, e.g., space-based systems support, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled 
assets, joint communications support element, NATO standing communications system equipment pool, 
and EMS. Multinational communications system planning must include the early establishment and 
incorporation of multinational networks. Resources need to be identified and planned for accordingly. The 
guiding criteria should focus on SATCOM, electromagnetic EMS management, and multinational and 
interagency networks. Appendix B in JP 6-0 addresses specific guidelines necessary for developing joint 
network plans. 

SATCOM P

LANNING 

2-113.  The Joint Staff ensures the distribution and arbitration of on-orbit satellite assets. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 6250.01B establishes a Satellite Communications Operational 
Manager (SOM) in order to provide a single operational manager for SATCOM systems. Consistent with 
assigned Unified Command Plan responsibilities, the SOM function was assigned to the United States 
Space Command and was transferred to USSTRATCOM when the two organizations merged. With the 
evolution to the CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 37 and then to CJCSI 6250.01B, the regional 
satellite communications support centers (RSSCs) have matured into one global satellite communications 
support center (GSSC) and three RSSCs providing entire spectrum SATCOM planning and management 
support for all the DOD SATCOM users. The SSCs have transformed over recent years to meet the 
challenges of SATCOM management. Figure 2-2 shows the SATCOM operational management structure 
and planning levels. 

Note.

 Chapter 8 in 

The Army Satellite Communications Architecture Book 2003

 addresses 

Army SATCOM planning in greater detail. 

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FMI 6-02.45 

2-21 

Chapter 2 

Direct 
Support 

Level 1  - Oversight 

Level 2  - System Level 

Staff & Management 

Level 3  -

24 Hour 

Operations Functions 

MOA 

Direct
Support

Level 1  - Oversight

Level 2 - System Level

Staff & Management

Level 3 -

24 Hour

Operations Functions

MOA

AFSPACE 

(EHF) 

NNSOC 

(UHF) 

SMDC/ARSTRST 

(SHF/WGS/GBS) 

DISA 

(DSCS) 

SATCOM System Experts (SSE) 

Level 1  - Oversight

Level 2 - System Level

Staff & Management

Level 3 -

24 Hour

Operations Functions

CJCS 

Joint Staff 

SATCOM Operational Manager 

(SOM) USSTRATCOM 

Global Regional 
SATCOM Support 
Centers 

UHF 
EHF 
SHF 
GBS 
Commercial 
Etc. 

CCs/Users 

4SOPS 

NAVSOC 

WSOCs 

3SOPS 

SATCOM C2 Centers 

MOA

MOA

Figure 2-2. SATCOM planning and coordination 

2-114.  Oversight functions are provided by the Joint Staff J-6 and accomplished primarily by the Joint 
Communications Satellite Center. The Joint Communications Satellite Center is responsible for ensuring 
the effective and efficient distribution, allocation, and adjudication of on-orbit satellite assets during all 
phases of conflict, from peacetime to war, for DOD and non-DOD users. 

2-115.  The SOM and Satellite Communications Systems Experts (SSEs) form the second level of 
support, performing staff management functions for SATCOM resources. The SOM and SSEs develop and 
implement standards, policies, and procedures, while performing daily operational responsibilities for all 
SATCOM systems. The SOM receives SSE support from within the USSTRATCOM component structure 
or from external agencies by the use of a memorandum of agreement. 

2-116.  The third level of support is the GSSC and the RSSCs. The GSSC maintains the global SATCOM 
system picture and coordinates the activities of the respective RSSCs. It also coordinates between two 
RSSCs and provides support to any users who are not assigned to an RSSC. The RSSCs assist the 
combatant commands and other theater users in the daily management of all SATCOM resources available 
in theater. Additionally, RSSCs coordinate between users for resource sharing and maintenance issues. 
These agencies provide LWN communications planners, network managers, and SATCOM users a single 
point of contact for accessing and managing SATCOM assets. Table 2-1 shows associated satellite support 
centers and the agencies they support. 

Table 2-1. SATCOM support structure 

Satellite Support Centers 

Supports 

GSSC (Peterson AFB, Colorado) 

USNORTHCOM 
USSTRATCOM 
USTRANSCOM 
CJCS 
SECDEF 
White House Communication Agency (WHCA) 
Defense Agencies 
Authorized non-DOD Users 

RSSC-CONUS (MacDill AFB, Florida) 

USJFCOM 
USCENTCOM 
USSOUTHCOM 
USSOCOM 

RSSC-Europe (Patch Barracks, Germany) 

USECOM 

RSSC-Pacific (Wheeler AAF, Hawaii) 

USPACOM 

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Theater Network Support and the LandWarNet 

2-117.  Determining SATCOM requirements and obtaining access for real-world deployment is complex 
and time consuming. Factors to consider when using manual techniques to determine SATCOM 
requirements include general architecture layout, user requirements, and previous experience with traffic 
flow and voice requirements. SATCOM planners must obtain a clear and detailed picture of the AO or the 
respective theater requesting SATCOM support. Planners must pay special attention to where units are 
located or are moving to and the information requirements that will support their activities. Planners should 
take into consideration previous modifications, operations, exercises, or deployments, use historical data to 
measure the recorded information flow, and observe SATCOM usage. Information on past use is helpful in 
determining system requirements, identifying potential problems, and trends for similar operations and 
deployments.  

2-118.  Any change in satellite resources, such as bandwidth or power, requires a change request 
coordinated with a ground mobile force (GMF) manager at the RSSC and documented with satellite access 
request modifications. The GMF network controller can approve some changes, like reducing the data rate 
or changing to a larger antenna. The unit S-3/G-3 may coordinate and submit requirement changes in 
satellite service for routine operations. These will also be coordinated between the GMF manager and 
DISA before contacting the GMF network controller. 

2-119.  Several guidelines are useful in formulating SATCOM plans supporting the LWN. The following 
are considerations when planning for SATCOM resources: 

z

What is the mission? Who is the user and what are the information needs? 

z

What is the duration of the mission and how long is the service required? 

z

What are the multinational or allied system considerations tied to the network? 

z

Are there validated requirements to support the mission? 

z

Do we need to submit requests for SATCOM database numbers? 

z

What type of traffic requires protected SATCOM links and what could use commercial 
SATCOM? 

z

What are the SATCOM priorities for individual links? 

z

What terminals are required to support the mission? 

z

Where will the terminals be located? Are there any interoperability issues? 

z

What potential phasing of communications might we encounter? 

z

Are there any host-nation agreement problems? 

z

What is the current operational area communications infrastructure? 

z

Can we leverage off the current communications infrastructure? 

z

What is the deployment timeline? 

z

What types of terrain will interfere with SATCOM access or terminal placement? 

z

What types of backup communications will be required? 

E

LECTROMAGNETIC 

S

PECTRUM 

P

LANNING 

2-120.  Detailed planning and coordination is the key to effective EMS management in any theater at all 
levels. Under modularity, corps, division, and BCT brigade signal companies and G-6 staff, all have 
dedicated EMS managers. This provides a robust, interconnected synchronizing structure that allows each 
combat formation to employ and control frequency as it would any weapon system. Each BCT EMS 
manager has the responsibility to manage the allocated EMS requirements supporting all emitters, sensors, 
radars, communications systems, or battlefield systems that rely on frequency use. Any number of systems 
will directly or indirectly affect the LWN within the BCT. The same is true at Army, corps, and division 
for the theater as a whole. 

2-121.  All frequency use must be coordinated before any emitter is activated in order to mitigate or 
eliminate interference or other negligible effects, and all interested parties must be in agreement before a 
reliable frequency can be assured. Joint environments complicate this need as coordination is not only 
necessary between echelons but also between services and components. OCONUS requires even more 
consideration in the use of the equipment and in regard to emissions effects on host nation and affiliated 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

2-23 

Chapter 2  

territories’ EMS requirements. The Military Communications-Electronics Board  manages most of the 
foreign coordination processes through the military area theater combatant command, or in some instances, 
directly with each nation. 

2-122.  EMS management is accomplished at every echelon. At the theater level, EMS management 
becomes even more complex in order to support joint operations. EMS planning requires consideration of 
employment of all EMS-dependent systems; and EMS-dependent platforms such as unmanned aircraft 
systems (UASs), IO requirements, EW operations, national and international coordination process used; 
electromagnetic environmental effects; and electromagnetic compatibility. The following are useful in 
EMS planning: 

z

Transmitter and receiver locations. 

z

Antenna technical parameters and characteristics. 

z

Number of frequencies desired and separation requirements. 

z

Nature of the operation (fixed, mobile land, mobile aeronautical, and over water or maritime). 

z

Physical effects of the AO (ground and soil type, humidity, and topology). 

z

All EMS-dependent equipment to be employed to include emitters, sensors, UASs, 
commercially used communications, and local broadcasting usage. 

z

Start and end dates for use. 

Note

. FMI 6-02.70

 addresses spectrum planning in greater detail. 

M

ULTINATIONAL 

C

OMMUNICATIONS 

P

LANNING 

2-123.  Multinational communications system operations may be composed of allied and/or coalition 
partners. Coalitions can be composed of diverse groups of security and information sharing domains. 
Multinational forces may have differences in their communications system, language, terminology, 
doctrine, and operating standards that can cause confusion and interoperability problems in an operational 
environment. Multinational network system planning and integration is an integral part of joint force 
planning. Planners must— 

z

Understand, expect, anticipate, and be prepared to deal with continuous change as requirements 
are either met or redefined to meet multinational needs. 

z

Clearly understand the capabilities, limitations, and availability of all strategic, operational, and 
tactical communications system resources. 

z

Establish information sharing with non-US and host-nation participants in compliance with joint 
doctrine and the commanders’ direction. 

z

Identify communications system requirements that exceed the capabilities within the joint or 
multinational force and coordinate (EMS, equipment, or connectivity) any mitigating actions 
through appropriate channels when host-nation support is required. 

z

Ensure communications system capabilities and employment procedures for non-US forces are 
understood. To enhance multinational operations, provide several options for communications 
system assets and interoperability. 

z

Use system-to-system compatibility to ensure interoperability. The United States may have to 
provide communications system resources to multinational partners to achieve this.  

z

Establish and manage an interface between incompatible communications systems through a 
combination of liaison, hardware and software interface, and tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP). 

z

Establish basic (voice and data) communication links and ensure unity of effort through the use 
of TTP and liaison personnel. 

2-24 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

Theater Network Support and the LandWarNet 

Note.

 For more information on multinational operations see JP 3-16. For more detailed guidance 

on foreign access, connections, and COMSEC release, see CJCSI 6510.06A, CJCSI 6211.02B, 
CJCSM 6510.01, and CJCSM 3320.01B. 

2-124.  Once the JFC establishes the specific C2 organization for a joint or multinational operation, the 
information exchange requirements (IERs) are established as network planning begins. Minimal 
coordination considerations for linking multinational networks with the LWN include— 

z

EMS management and procedures for resolving frequency problems. 

z

Equipment compatibility. 

z

Procedural compatibility. 

z

Cryptographic and information security. 

z

Routing and data link protocols. 

z

Use of technical interpreters to ensure that US interests are adequately protected. 

2-125.  Releasability, a planning consideration, pertains to the US keying material and equipment, and 
multinational connectivity to the US networks. The operational acceptability and disclosure or release of 
COMSEC to foreign governments for multinational use will be determined and approved by the National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee before entering into 
discussions with foreign nationals. Commanders and their staffs should be aware of the limitations in 
sharing classified information with multinational partners, especially information from space platforms or 
other national assets with multinational partners. The JFC must plan for the additional time and 
coordination necessary to ensure compliance with established security requirements. The dissemination, 
disclosure, or release of DOD intelligence information to foreign governments for multinational use is 
approved only by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Council, or the senior 
intelligence officer in theater, and should not be confused with disclosure of the US keying material or 
equipment outlined in the previous sentences of this paragraph. 

2-126.  Factors which enhance achieving multinational interoperability are liaison teams. Establishing a 
knowledgeable team on structure, capabilities, and communications system operations are often essential to 
multinational system interface in joint operations. Their importance as a source of both formal and informal 
information exchange cannot be overstated.  

2-127.  Standardization of principles and procedures in joint networks is essential. As US forces introduce 
new technology and become more network enabled, this area of concern is increasingly important. 
NETOPS, including activities conducted to monitor, control, and protect our networks, must be evaluated, 
especially in the context of multinational networks. 

2-128.  Foreign disclosure officers should be appointed early in the planning process at all levels of 
command directly involved in multinational operations. Establishing disclosure policies are a primary 
responsibility for these appointed officers so that it is understood what information can be shared with 
multinational partners. Commanders and planners must consider several factors as they establish 
multinational communications system architectures:  

z

What is shared, when, and with whom? 

z

The mission, intent, and concept of operations (CONOPS). Different phases of a multinational 
operation necessitate different and distinct levels of communications system support. 

z

A comprehensive knowledge of the multinational structure and relationships. 

DHS

 AND 

I

NTERAGENCY 

C

OMMUNICATIONS 

P

LANNING 

2-129. 

DHS/Defense Communications System. 

The disparity of communications systems, use of 

allocated bandwidth (both civilian and military), and limited interoperable systems hinder the capability of 
collaborative incident management and response in CONUS. Standing JTFs exist that provide the C2 
interface with federal, state, and local authorities. Interfaces include military web portals accessible by non-
.mil domains, unclassified defense collaborative tool suite, JTF-owned deployable commercial voice 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

2-25 

Chapter 2  

switching, secure VTC in each governor’s office, radio cross-banding so that land mobile radios, TACSAT 
radios, HF radios, and cell phones can communicate with each other, and links to national laboratories and 
other subject matter experts. USNORTHCOM DHS units include Joint Forces Headquarters National 
Capital Region, Joint Task Force Alaska, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Joint Task Force North, Standing 
Joint Force Headquarters North, Army North, and Air Force North Additionally, each state adjutant 
general is building an Standing Joint force headquarters with similar communications capabilities. 
Commanders and communications system planners need to consider the detailed planning and analysis to 
determine CONUS-based communications system requirements in support of federal, state, and local 
agencies. The J-6, when required and authorized, must bridge the gap among civilian, DOD, and other 
government agencies to develop mission oriented communications solutions. 

2-130. 

Interagency Communications. 

Of increasing importance to joint operations is effective 

connectivity to non-DOD departments and agencies. Previously, only connectivity to the Department of 
State, DIA, and National Security Agency were essential. In today’s environment, connectivity with all 
departments and agencies may be critical. JFCs need to identify interagency IERs and coordinate 
connectivity and access as required. 

2-26 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

Chapter 3 

Network Operations 

Crucial to the effective employment and survival of the LWN is the need for 
successful management and defense as a single, coherent, seamless enterprise. 
NETOPS is the cornerstone of managing the LWN at strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels. NETOPS provide integrated visibility and end-to-end collaborative 
management of systems, services, and applications as part of a joint network 
environment. It is essential to achieve NETOPS situational awareness in order to 
allow commanders to manage their networks as they would other combat systems. 
For signal forces, this also improves the quality and speed of decision making in 
regards to the employment, protection, and defense of LWN. 

SECTION I – NETWORK OPERATIONS IN THE LANDWARNET 

NETWORK OPERATIONS GOALS 

3-1.  NETOPS is defined as those activities conducted to operate and defend the GIG. The goal of Army 
NETOPS is to provide assured and timely network enabled services across strategic, operational, and 
tactical boundaries (LWN). These services will support the commanders’ entire spectrum of Warfighting, 
intelligence, and business mission requirements. NETOPS is the essential set of policies, structures, 
capabilities, techniques, and procedures that ensure that the systems and services provided by signal 
command provides the highest level of quality of service for the LWN users. 

3-2.  Properly coordinated and executed in a joint environment, NETOPS will provide the Warfighter 
with the following desired effects: 

z

Assured system and network availability provides visibility and control over the system and 
network resources. These resources are effectively managed and problems are anticipated and 
mitigated. Proactive actions are taken to ensure the uninterrupted availability and protection of 
the system and network resources. This includes providing for graceful degradation, self-
healing, fail over, diversity, and elimination of critical failure points. 

z

Assured information protection provides protection for the information passing over networks 
from the time it is stored and catalogued until it is distributed to the users, operators, and 
decision makers. 

z

Assured information delivery provides information to users, operators, and decision makers in a 
timely manner. The networks are continuously monitored to ensure the information is 
transferred with the correct response time, throughput, availability, and performance that meet 
user needs. 

NETWORK OPERATIONS PROCESSES 

3-3.  NETOPS enable signal organizations to operate, manage, defend, and respond to issues which 
negatively impact the ability to use networks as a combat multiplier. NETOPS processes are defined in 
three interdependent essential tasks: GIG Enterprise Management (GEM), GND, and Global Content 
Management (GCM). See Figure 3-1. 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

3-1 

Chapter 3 

Decision Superiority for the Warfighter

Decision Superiority for the Warfighter

Right Information - Right User

Right Information - Right User

Right Time – Right Protection

Right Time – Right Protection 

Horizontal Fusion Across The GIG

Horizontal Fusion Across The GIG

Connect 

Route

Connect

Route

Process

Process

Flo

Fl w

ow

Allocate

Allocate

Account

Account

Configure

Configure

Maintain

Maintain

GEM

GEM

Assured System &

As

Assured System &

sured System & 

Assured Information

A

Assured Information

ssured Information 

Network Availability

N

Network Availability

etwork Availability

Delivery

De

Delivery

livery

Resist 

NETOPS

Resist

NETOPS

Retriev

Retrie e

ve

Recognize 

GND 

GCM

Recognize

GND

GCM

Cache

Cache

Respond

Respond

Comp

Com ile

pile

Recover

Recover

Catalo

Catal g

og

Reconstitute

Reconstitute

Dist

Dis ribute

tribute

Assured Information

As

Assured Information

sured Information

Protection

Prote

Protection

ction

Figure 3-1. NETOPS interdependent essential tasks 

NETOPS E

SSENTIAL 

T

ASKS 

3-4.  GEM is defined as the technology, processes, and policy necessary to operate effectively the systems 
and networks that compromise the GIG. This essential task merges the five major IT services with the 
NETOPS critical capabilities. The following IT services are within the GEM and manage the GIG services 
and technologies: 

z

Systems management. 

z

Enterprise services management. 

z

Network management. 

z

SATCOM management. 

z

EMS management. 

3-5.  The GND ensures and manages the integrity, viability, availability, identification, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation of friendly information and systems. The following fundamental 
attributes are an essential element of network protection, which encompasses those prior actions needed for 
counter attack, intrusion or exploitation of the LWN transport, storage, and operational uses: 

z

Protection. 

z

Monitoring. 

z

Detection. 

z

Analyzing. 

z

Responding. 

3-2 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

Network Operations 

3-6.  GCM is defined as the technology, processes, and policy necessary to provide awareness of relevant, 
accurate information, automated access to newly discovered or recurring information, and timely, efficient 
and assured delivery of information in a usable format. The following core services are envisioned to be 
enterprise-wide services used by the entire DOD to ensure information is available to all authorized users: 

z

Content discovery. 

z

Content delivery. 

z

Content storage. 

3-7.  NETOPS will be addressed in greater detail with the future publication of FMI 6-02.71, 

Network 

Operations

SECTION II – MANAGING THE LANDWARNET 

3-8.  Managing the LWN encompasses a number of different, often overlapping and mutually supporting, 
organizations, environments, and architectures. Added to that are Army commands, and ASCCs that 
operate separate networks to support specific facilities located around the world, such as the Army Corps 
of Engineers, Army Recruiting Command, Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic 
Command, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and United States Army 
Reserve Command (USARC). One challenge to the LWN is that some separate networks create duplication 
of effort in network management and integration. In the worst case, having different networks with 
potentially different security policies and practices can create security vulnerabilities for the entire Army 
when the various networks are linked together with each other and with mainstream Army networks.  

LANDWARNET AWARENESS 

3-9.  NETOPS requires developing an integrated view of the overall health of the network, providing real-
time or near real-time NETOPS situational awareness. This will provide Army commanders and other 
users information related to the LWN system and transport failure, service attrition or shortfalls, and 
possible resolutions. Ideally, the NETOPS situational awareness will provide a valuable tool in predictive 
analysis regarding changes in operational requirements, allocation of LWN resources, preventing network 
attacks and reducing their related mission impacts, and utilization of limited or critical systems and high 
priority applications. Developing a useful picture of the LWN status involves the collection of data from 
various classified and unclassified sources provided by all LWN echelons. These sources provide 
reportable conditions, network event data, historical records, and data from network management tools and 
systems. The data is compiled and provided to users much in the same way battle command systems 
provide commanders the status of forces, logistics, intelligence, and maneuver, enhancing his C2 ability. 

I

NSTALLATION 

L

EVEL 

3-10.  The objectives of the LWN are to increase effectiveness, promote efficiencies, and increase 
standardization so that the Army can achieve a more seamless worldwide network. Managing towards 
these objectives starts at the installation level, which permits users to access authorized network resources 
regardless of where those resources are or where the users are located. The responsibilities of who manages 
them differ in CONUS and OCONUS. 

Continental United States 

3-11.  The LWN management at the CONUS installation level is one supporting aspect of the move toward 
centralized installation management under the Installation Management Command (IMCOM). Previously, 
installations were owned and managed by the various ASCCs. Installation management is now delegated to 
the directors of IMCOM regions. Refer to Figure 3-2. The IMCOM is responsible for providing IT services 
for posts, camps, and stations in CONUS. 

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

3-3 

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Chapter 3 

West

 

Northeast

West

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Yakima Trai

Yakima Training

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Cent r

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Fort Lewis

Fort Lewis

ick R & D Ctr

Natick R & D Ctr

Fort Drum

Fort Drum

Devens  RFTA

Devens  RFTA

(USAR)

(USAR)

Umatilla Chem

Umatilla Chem Depot

ervliet Ars

Watervliet Ars

SAG Selfridge

USAG Selfridge

Toby

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Tobyhanna Army Depot

t

West Point

Ft. Hamilton

Ft. Hamilton

Picatinny Arsenal

Picatinny Arsenal

t McCoy

Fort McCoy

Scr

Scranton AAP

rlisle Barracks

Carlisle Barracks

Fort Monmouth

Fort Monmouth

Detroit Ars

Let kenny AD

Letterkenny AD

Fort Dix (USAR)

Fort Dix (USAR)

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Sierra Army Depot

Rock Is d Ars

Rock Island Arsenal

Fort Myer

Fort Myer

Ft Detrick

Ft. AP Hill

Ft. AP Hill

Parks RFTA (USAR)

 Prov

Dugway Proving Ground

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a Arm

Lima Army

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Fort Eustis

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Fort Riley 

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Tooele AD

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Walter Reed

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Pueblo Depot

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Fort Leonard Wood

Fort McNair

Fort McNair

Kansas AAP

Kansas AAP

rt Knox 

Fort Belvoir

Fort Knox

Fort Belvoir

Fort Hunter Liggett (USAR)

p l

Fort Campbell

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Fort Bragg

Fort Bragg

Fort Irwin

MOT Sunny Point

MOT Sunny Point

McAlester AAP

Milan AAP

Fort Sill

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Redstone Arsenal

Fort Jackson

Fort Jackson

ing Ground

Yuma Proving Ground

hite

White Sands Missile

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Anniston AD

Fort Gordon

Fort Gordon

Ars

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Fort McPherson

Fort McPherson

Fort Hauch a

Fort Hauchuca

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Louisi

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Louisiana AAP

F

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Ft. Gillem 

Fort Benning

Ft. Gillem

Fort Bliss

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Fort Rucker

Hunter Army Airfield

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Fort Hood

Fort Stewar

Fort Stewart

Fort Polk

Fort Polk

Fort

Sam Houston

Camp Stanley

Mississippi AAP

Mississippi AAP

Storage Actv

USAG Miami

USAG Miami

Southeast

Corpus Christi AD

Southeast

Ft Buchanan, PR

Ft Buchanan, PR

Pacific

Pacific

Fort Wainwright 

Region HQs /

Fort Wainwright

Region HQs / 

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Director Locations

Ft

. Greely

Director Locations

Korea 

Europe

Korea 

Europe

Fo

hards

NE:  Ft Monroe

Fort Richardson

NE:  Ft Monroe

Tokyo/Yokohama

i

SE:  Ft McPherson

Akizuki/Kure

SE:  Ft McPherson

Yongsa

Yongsan

Zama/Sagamihara

W: Ft Sam Houston

W: Ft Sam Houston

Schofield

Schofield
Barracks

 

Europe: Heidelberg

Barracks

Europe: Heidelberg

Heidelber

Heidelberg

Pacific: Ft Shafter

Pacific: Ft Shafter

Kwajalein 

Fort

Kwajalein

Fort

Korea: Yongsan

Korea: Yongsan

Okinawa

 

Shafter

Okinawa

Shafter

Figure 3-2. IMCOM regions 

3-12.  LWN installation services are most often viewed as part of the strategic level. These IT services are 
provided and administrated by local DOIMs. DOIMs are organic elements of the United States Army 
Garrison (USAG). While DOIMs report directly to their Garrison Commander, Network Enterprise 
Technology Command (NETCOM)/9th Signal Command (Army) (SC(A)) manages the CONUS DOIMs’ 
technical functions through their regional chief information officer (RCIO), who is co-located with the 
IMCOM regional HQ. 

3-13.  NETCOM RCIOs are OPCON to IMCOM region directors and serve as the G-6 for the region. They 
focus on day-to-day network related issues and develop and enforce network architectures, programs, IT 
budgets, policies, and standards. There are three CONUS RCIOs located at Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Sam 
Houston, TX; and Fort Monroe, VA. 

3-14.  DOIMs support specific installations. While most commands and tenant organizations on Army 
installations are responsible for the operation and management of their own networks, e-mail servers, and 
desktops, each installation DOIM is responsible for operation and management of the installation campus 
network. The DOIM has the responsibility for installation specific IT assets while RCIOs provide technical 
guidance to the DOIM for the IM services. In this way, standardized basic service levels are provided 
throughout the enterprise, independent of a user's organization or location. 

3-4 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

Network Operations 

Outside the Continental United States 

3-15.  In OCONUS locations, a DOIM is established under the signal battalion/support battalion 
authorization documents and structured based on command modifications to the standard garrison 
organization. Though IMCOM is responsible for resource and delivery, the LWN installation IT services 
are provided for and administrated by these battalions. These signal organizations also operate and manage 
all common user networks of baseline IT services. These services include (but are not limited to) help desk 
services, management of e-mail servers, voice services (Secure and Unclassified), VTC services, IA 
devices, WANs, as well as installation networks and reach back services for deployed forces. 

3-16.  NETCOM/9th SC(A) manages the OCONUS signal organizations through their respective Theater 
Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSCs). TSSBs, TTSBs, and battalions which have a DOIM 
established under them report to their TNOSC. 

3-17.  There are three OCONUS RCIOs located in Heidelberg, Germany; Yongsan, Korea; and Fort 
Shafter, Hawaii, designated from theater signal commands. 

3-18.  The Army is currently implementing the Single DOIM Concept which will bring the operation 
and/or management of all common user networks and baseline IT services under USAG. This will 
eliminate those personnel, both government and contractor, from performing communications system 
operations of common-user baseline IT services on independent Army networks outside of the DOIM, 
which are known as “shadow” DOIMs and bring all Army organization and installation networks into the 
Army Enterprise Infostructure. At the completion of this plan, the IMCOM director will serve as the 
primary interface between the DOIM and the supported organization(s). IMCOM will manage mission 
unique systems, advocate for the tenant, and coordinate IT service requirements with the supporting 
DOIM. NETCOM/9th SC(A) will provide technical support of all required network services for all Army 
installation and off-installation activities CONUS and OCONUS. 

M

ANAGEMENT IN THE 

T

HEATER 

3-19.  LWN management in theater addresses the GIG as it extends service-controlled assets to users in 
unit locations, base clusters, and enclaves connected by Army or DISA-controlled network assets in a 
theater of operations. The complex nature of the GIG in theater requires that all component NETOPS 
organizations work together closely under the direction of the J-6 to ensure the reliable operation of the 
GIG. 

3-20.  At the center of LWN NETOPS is the ability of NETCOM/9

th

 SC(A) to execute through a tiered 

structure that includes an Army and TNOSCs and regional directors/theater signal commanders.  The Army 
Global Network Operations and Security Center (A-GNOSC) utilizes centralized direction to execute the 
Army’s NETOPS enterprise operations, control, and defense mission.  Each TNOSC in their respective 
theater AOR acts as the single point of contact for Army network services, operational status, reporting, 
and functionality in the theater and serves as the coordinating agency with other service NETOPS elements 
operating in the theater.  Each TNOSC exercises authoritative enterprise NETOPS guidance over all 
organizations that operate, connect to or maintain the LWN.  Each Geographical Component Command in 
Europe, Pacific, Korea, Southwest Asia (SWA), and the USSOUTHCOM has OPCON of the TNOSC. 
NETCOM also operates a CONUS TNOSC. An organization chart is provided in Figure 3-3. 

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

3-5 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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