FMI 6-02.45, C1 Signal Support to Theater Operations (May 2008) - page 1

 

  Главная      Manuals     FMI 6-02.45, C1 Signal Support to Theater Operations (May 2008)

 

Search            copyright infringement  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..      1       2         ..

 

 

 

FMI 6-02.45, C1 Signal Support to Theater Operations (May 2008) - page 1

 

 

*FMI 6-02.45  

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

*This publication supersedes FM 6-02.45, 

12 

April 

2004. 

      

 

5 July 2007 

 
Field Manual Interim 

No. 6-02.45 

Headquarters 

Department of the Army 

Washington, DC, 5 July 2007 

 

Signal Support to Theater Operations 

Contents 

Page 

 PREFACE .............................................................................................................iv

 

 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................v

 

Chapter 1 

THE JOINT FORCE AND ARMY NETWORKS ................................................ 1-1

 

Section I – Joint and Army Operations .......................................................... 1-1

 

Understanding “Jointness” ................................................................................. 1-1

 

Section II – The Modular Army and Joint Networks ..................................... 1-5

 

Modularity ........................................................................................................... 1-5

 

Section III – Changes in Theater Signal ......................................................... 1-9

 

Army Network Operational Environment ............................................................ 1-9

 

Chapter 2 

THEATER NETWORK SUPPORT AND THE LANDWARNET ........................ 2-1

 

Section I – Principles and Objectives............................................................. 2-1

 

LandWarNet ....................................................................................................... 2-1

 

Section II – End User Support for the Soldier ............................................... 2-5

 

Home Station Services in a Deployed Environment .......................................... 2-5

 

Section III – Theater Networks ........................................................................ 2-9

 

Strategic Networks ............................................................................................. 2-9

 

Tactical Networks ............................................................................................. 2-11

 

Section IV – Specialized User Information Systems................................... 2-15

 

The Federation of Networks ............................................................................. 2-15

 

Section V – Planning Theater Networks ...................................................... 2-20

 

Planning Considerations .................................................................................. 2-20

 

Chapter 3 

NETWORK OPERATIONS ................................................................................ 3-1

 

Section I – Network Operations in the LandWarNet ..................................... 3-1

 

Network Operations Goals ................................................................................. 3-1

 

Contents 

Network Operations Processes ..........................................................................3-1

Section II – Managing the LandWarNet ..........................................................3-3

LandWarNet Awareness .....................................................................................3-3

Section III – Joint Global and Joint Theater Organizations..........................3-8

Strategic/Joint .....................................................................................................3-8

Army Service Components ...............................................................................3-10

THEATER OPERATIONS ..................................................................................4-1

Chapter 4 

 

Leveraging Theater Operation Assets ................................................................4-1

Providing “Other” Service Support......................................................................4-1

Section I – Major Commands...........................................................................4-2

NETCOM/9th SC(A)............................................................................................4-2

Section II – Strategic and Fixed Station Elements ........................................4-5

Strategic Signal Brigades....................................................................................4-5

Section III – Signal Operations ........................................................................4-9

Organizations for the Modular Force ..................................................................4-9

Appendix A 

 

NOTIONAL DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO FOR SIGNAL SUPPORT ................ A-1

Appendix B 

 

THEATER LANDWARNET EQUIPMENT OVERVIEW .................................... B-1

 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... 

Glossary-1

 REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1

 INDEX 

......................................................................................................... 

Index-1

Figures 

Figure 1-1. Full spectrum operations ..................................................................................... 1-4

Figure 1-2. ASCC support to JTF and theater forces ............................................................ 1-6

Figure 1-3. Division force structure........................................................................................ 1-7

Figure 1-4. Global information grid ........................................................................................ 1-8

Figure 1-5. Changes in network requirements ...................................................................... 1-9

Figure 2-1. Example of an early entry communications package........................................ 2-18

Figure 2-2. SATCOM planning and coordination................................................................. 2-22

Figure 3-1. NETOPS interdependent essential tasks............................................................ 3-2

Figure 3-2. IMCOM regions ................................................................................................... 3-4

Figure 3-3. Theater NETOPS and Security Center ............................................................... 3-6

Figure 3-4. Global NETOPS .................................................................................................. 3-8

Figure 3-5. Theater NETOPS ................................................................................................ 3-9

Figure 4-1. NETCOM/9th SC(A) organization ....................................................................... 4-3

Figure 4-2. Strategic design................................................................................................... 4-7

Figure 4-3. SC(T) subordinate elements ............................................................................. 4-11

Figure 4-4. Theater tactical signal brigade .......................................................................... 4-13

Figure 4-5. The ESB structure ............................................................................................. 4-16

Figure 4-6. Theater TIN Company....................................................................................... 4-19

FMI 6-02.45 

 

5 July 2007 

ii 

Contents 

Figure 4-7. TNOSC DSD structure.......................................................................................4-20

Figure 4-8. TNOSC DSD elements – TNT, TIC, and TLT with corps/division .....................4-22

Figure 4-9. TNOSC DSD elements – TNT, TIC, and TLT without corps/division ................4-22

Figure A-1. Mobilization phase - GIG supports CCDRs’ daily operational 

requirements .......................................................................................................A-3

Figure A-2. Deploy to theater .................................................................................................A-4

Figure A-3. Deployment phase – extending the GIG into the JOA ........................................A-5

Figure A-4. Shaping RSOI and force projection to build combat power in the JOA ..............A-6

Figure A-5. Employment phase – tactical integration, establishing theater hubs, 

teleports, and gateways ......................................................................................A-7

Figure A-6. Offensive operations to seize key terrain, secure lines of communication, 

and affect enemy center of gravity......................................................................A-8

Figure A-7. Sustainment phase – extending GIG services to tactical organizations 

and echelons, LNOs, joint and coalition, broaden network access, 
NETOPS .............................................................................................................A-9

Figure A-8. Attack to seize capital and key facilities in Southern region, restore 

friendly government ......................................................................................... A-10

Figure A-9. Redeployment phase – stability operations and restoring friendly 

government, commercialization and restoration.............................................. A-11

Figure B-1. AN/TSC-85B(V)2 .................................................................................................B-2

Figure B-2. AN/TSC-93B........................................................................................................B-3

Figure B-3. AN/TSC-143 ........................................................................................................B-4

Figure B-4. AN/TSC-156 Phoenix ..........................................................................................B-5

Figure B-5. AN/USC-60A........................................................................................................B-6

Figure B-6. AN/TRC-173 ........................................................................................................B-7

Figure B-7. AN/TRC-173B......................................................................................................B-8

Figure B-8. AN/TRC-174B......................................................................................................B-9

Figure B-9. AN/GRC-239 .................................................................................................... B-10

Figure B-10. AN/TRC-170(V)2 Heavy TROPO ................................................................... B-11

Figure B-11. AN/TRC-170(V)3 Light TROPO ..................................................................... B-12

Figure B-12. AN/TTC-56 SSS ............................................................................................. B-13

Figure B-13. AN/TTC-48(V)2 SEN ...................................................................................... B-14

Figure B-14. AN/TTC-58(V) BBN ........................................................................................ B-15

Figure B-15. AN/TTC-59 JNN ............................................................................................. B-15

Figure B-16. Promina 400 and Promina 800....................................................................... B-17

Figure B-17. AN/FCC 100 ................................................................................................... B-17

Tables 

Table 2-1. SATCOM support structure.................................................................................2-22

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

iii 

Preface 

Field Manual Interim 6-02.45 is the Army’s doctrine for signal support at the theater level. It is consistent with 
and expands on the doctrine in Joint Publication 6-0, Field Manual 6-0, Field Manual 3-0, and Field Manual 3-
13. It contains joint, Army, and proponent guidelines to support the entire signal spectrum of operations in the 
contemporary operational environment. 

This manual provides a doctrinal foundation for force design, combat development, professional education, and 
training of signal Soldiers. It establishes the importance of the LandWarNet, not only to the Soldiers’ mission at 
the tactical levels, but also to the vital need at the theater commander’s level. This manual provides information 
to leaders and planners on how signal assets and the LandWarNet support their operations. 

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United 
States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. 

The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 
The preparing agency is the United States Army Signal Center, approved by Combined Arms Doctrine 
Directorate. Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army Form 2028 directly to: 
Commander, United States Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, ATTN: ATZH-IDC-CB (Doctrine Branch), 
Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905-5075, or via electronic mail t

doctrine@gordon.army.mil 

or 

signal.doctrine@us.army.mil

. Key all comments and recommendations to pages and paragraph numbers to 

which they apply. Provide reasons and rationale for your comments to ensure complete understanding and 
proper evaluation. 

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

iv 

Introduction 

This manual is applicable at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and pertains to major combat 
operations, small scale contingencies, Department of Homeland Security, and to a lesser degree, special 
operations. The content is based on lessons learned from operational experience, combatant commander 
operational requirements, current and emerging concepts, programmatic initiatives, and the incorporation 
of new technology. This doctrine examines how the Signal Corps— 

 

Keeps pace with the Army’s transformation. 

 

Meets joint imperatives for command and control and communications systems. 

 

Develops and adapts new concepts and designs for employing and protecting the LandWarNet, 
the Army portion of the Global Information Grid. 

 

Integrates and employs joint networks. 

 

Reshapes our organizational structure to meet the imperatives of modularity. 

 

Meets user requirements in response to the changing role of providing information networks for 
the Army. 

This manual introduces several new organizational constructs that will bridge the gap between the current 
and objective modular design and make signal organizations relevant across all components: the United 
States Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. 

The Army continues transforming to meet new threats by becoming more network enabled, incorporating 
information technology as a means to ensure joint interoperability, and enabling battle command, 
intelligence sharing, and effective logistics. It continues evolving to meet the challenges of a new theater of 
operations. As we become network enabled, as defined by the Joint Staff, we will continue to grow from a 
voice-reliant environment to one that is almost solely data-centric. The LandWarNet in theater will 
empower combatant commanders to think better, make faster decisions, and generate and focus decisive 
combat power more effectively than any adversary. Theater LandWarNet will use extensive data networks 
to link combatant commanders, organizations, capabilities, and business practices for the explicit purpose 
of developing and shaping the operational environment and executing meaningful, coherent action. 

The Army is spiraling towards being network enabled in an environment that requires investment and 
experimentation, which will result in changes in Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 
and education, personnel and facilities. The risk for not ensuring a smooth transformation to a jointly 
focused, network capable force is mission failure. This is all part of the Army evolution to incorporate 
knowledge-based warfare. The LandWarNet provides infrastructure, knowledge, and Warfighters across 
the Army to afford combatant commanders’ unparalleled ability to defeat threats to this nation and our 
allies. It includes computers, software, architecture, security, communications, programs, and facilities. It 
provides processing, storing, transporting, and staging information over a seamless network. It captures 
emerging capabilities and technologies encompassing all aspects of evolving battle command, 
communications, information management, and decision support. It includes all Army networks, from 
sustaining military bases to forward-deployed forces, and aligns Army network goals with those of the 
Navy and the Air Force. It supports the active component forces, the Army National Guard, and the Army 
Reserve, from the Soldier in the field to strategic services in the continental United States. The 
LandWarNet provides the network environment that is a key enabler for ten battle command tenets: 

 

Commander driven – Battle command that is purpose-oriented and knowledge-based. 

 

Flexible force tailoring – Command echelons may not be the same as unit echelons. 

 

Sustained battle command – Resourced for changing and continuous joint operations. 

 

Unrestricted battle command – Extend the combatant commanders reach anytime, anywhere. 

 

On-demand collaboration – Teaming commanders and leaders regardless of place and time. 

 

Singular and seamless – One battle command system. 

 

Fully integrated – From knowledge bases to forward-deployed. 

 

Dependability – Unprecedented network performance and quality of service. 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

Introduction  

 

Tailorable battle command – Modular and scaleable to meet dynamic conditions and force sizes. 

 

Smaller footprint – Dramatically lessens deployed force size without cutting capability. 

Army commanders operate in an environment significantly different from the joint commander. The joint 
commander is in a fixed, well-connected location, as opposed to the Army commander who operates far 
from any supporting network infrastructure. More importantly, Army combat operations are conducted on 
the move. Today’s Army networks are moving closer to operational requirements being more inherently 
joint, supporting the geographic combatant commander’s networks of choice. The LandWarNet will 
continue to evolve with a desired end state of meeting the requirements of a continuously evolving Army. 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

vi 

Chapter 1 

The Joint Force and Army Networks 

The ability to conduct land operations as a part of the joint force is the main focus of 
today’s Army. Using a modular and capabilities-based design, the Army will have 
greater capacity for a rapid and tailored force that will be more capable of achieving 
the strategic responsiveness of a full spectrum operation. This will allow combatant 
commanders (CCDRs) to expand the joint team’s ability to deploy rapidly, employ, 
and sustain forces throughout the global operational environment in any 
environment. An Army force empowered by joint capabilities and knowledge-
networked forces will be the way of the future.  

SECTION I – JOINT AND ARMY OPERATIONS 

UNDERSTANDING “JOINTNESS” 

1-1.  Global interests, diffused technology, and adaptive enemies are critical aspects that influence joint 
operations as outlined in Joint Vision 2020 . 

1-2.  The overarching focus of Joint Vision 2020 is “full spectrum dominance achieved through the 
interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full 
dimensional protection.” Army operations focus on employing combined tactical formations conducting 
battles and engagements geared toward the destruction of enemy forces. Joint operations generate decisive 
combat power available from all services on a synchronized timeline with a determined scope and purpose 
of other military service forces, multinational forces, nonmilitary government agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations. Joint force commanders (JFCs) conduct unified actions, 
integrating and orchestrating operations directly with the activities and actions of other military forces and 
nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. 

1-3.  Joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations, while the functional and service components 
of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not isolated or independent 
campaigns. The joint force increases its total effectiveness without necessarily involving all forces or 
incorporating all forces equally. 

1-4.  Joint missions and joint forces drive specific information requirements, procedures, techniques, 
systems, and capabilities. The goal is to provide rapid information sharing in order to integrate joint force 
components, allowing them to function effectively to facilitate a common understanding of the current 
situation – a common operational picture. 

1-5.  Technological developments, which connect the information systems of partners, will provide the 
links that lead to improved command and control (C2). Critical to maintaining the tempo of operations 
which incorporate multi-service and multinational capabilities is the sharing of information needed to 
develop a common understanding of operational procedures and compatible organizations. 

A

RMY 

S

UPPORT TO THE 

J

OINT 

F

ORCE 

1-6.  Theater operations are inherently joint and multinational, resulting in the need for greater levels of 
cooperation between United States (US) forces, other Department of Defense (DOD) components, and 
governmental, coalition, and host-nation organizations. The Army provides a complete range of force that 
meets the needs of JFCs, whether by deterring adversaries and potential enemies or by forming the nucleus 

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

1-1 

Chapter 1  

of the joint force land component that will prosecute wartime operations. Army Forces provide the Joint 
Force Commander (JFC) the capability to— 

z

Deploy quickly into an area of operations (AO). 

z

Establish and secure lodgments for projecting follow-on forces. 

z

Sustain the joint force indefinitely. 

z

Employ airborne and air assault capabilities, which allow JFCs to seize airfields or other 
important facilities. 

z

Conduct amphibious operations in conjunction with the Marine and Naval forces. 

z

Employ Army special operations forces (SOF) which add highly specialized and unique area-
focused capabilities to joint forces. 

1-7.  The development of manageable and coordinated intelligence and communications functions 
continues to provide significant contributions to joint capabilities. Recent operations in the European, 
Pacific, and Central Command areas of responsibility (AORs) have contributed to the modernization of the 
communications and automation management that support these intelligence requirements. This resulted in 
removing traditional barriers that hampered information and intelligence sharing. 

1-8.  Central to a theater campaign are those forces employed by the JFC. At the Army’s operational level, 
the senior commander responsible for executing the operational fight, C2 of tactical forces, integration of 
multiple services, and managing the theater support structure is the Army Service component command 
(ASCC). 

1-9.  The ASCC challenge is to shape the military environment and set the conditions for qualified success 
in the joint operations area (JOA) and the theater in general. Success depends on the ability to 
communicate across a wide range of agencies and forces using networks that provide links which 
ultimately allow the ASCC commander to conduct his operational mission and enable subordinate 
commanders to accomplish their missions. 

C

HANGES IN THE 

C

ONTEMPORARY 

O

PERATIONAL 

E

NVIRONMENT 

1-10.  The United States can no longer view adversaries through the lens of the Cold War and Warsaw 
Pact, nor can we judge military operations merely by analyzing an adversary’s stage of economic 
development. Small scale, regional, or local powers may employ extremely advanced military 
technologies. An adversary’s actions require intelligent analysis of fields extending far beyond the 
traditional battlefield focus. Boundaries between traditional echelons of operations are even more blurred. 
Current political and technical trends suggest that successful conflict prosecution and termination will 
depend on multinational commitment, joint operations, and a high professional tolerance for the new forms 
of conflict. 

1-11.  The operational environment will continue to be characterized by constant instability. Threats 
continue to evolve from the familiar conventional formations to those that are more likely to be 
characterized by— 

z

No longer clearly presenting themselves in terms of intent, capability, or modes of operation. 
They will minimize predictability. 

z

Using irregular military or paramilitary forces and forces forming coalitions of their own to 
combat US influence. 

z

An ability to leverage information technology (IT) while engaging in computer and network 
attacks, electronic warfare (EW), and hostile information operations (IO). 

z

A range of capability between highly modern conventional armies and simple terrorist actions 
designed against US interests around the world that either directly or indirectly affects 
deployment and support of US forces. 

z

Employing high-tech levels of firepower, protection, and mobility to compete against our state-
of-the-art weaponry and precision firepower. 

z

The ability to change or adapt to the nature of conflicts (especially the political nature) to 
include multiple, concurrent fights and the combination of different types of threats. 

1-2 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

The Joint Force and Army Networks 

z

An increased unpredictability of conflict locations and the sources of opposition. They will use 
complex terrain and urban environments and disperse forces to offset US capabilities in 
targeting and precision engagement. 

z

Offsetting our Warfighting and industrial dominance by exploiting available technologies which 
are essential to our information and technical superiority. 

z

Willingness to engage in or exploit weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. 

Note.

 WMD have made the threat qualitatively different. WMD offer the potential to do extreme 

damage, both physical and psychological, with a single strike. Many nations are attempting to 
produce nuclear weapons. The proliferation and acceptance of chemical and biological weapons 
are growing, because they are relatively inexpensive and easy to produce. 

1-12.  Generally, antagonists will seek victory against US forces by conducting force-oriented operations 
that concentrate on prolonging conflict and inflicting unacceptable casualties. They will create conditions 
designed to defeat US forcible entry operations and use a transition to a defensive framework that avoids 
decisive battle. They will attempt to preserve their capability and use irregular tactics to erode US public 
support and cohesion within US coalitions while forming their own coalitions that seek international 
support. 

1-13.  Tactically, conflicts will involve an increased use of terrain and urban areas to disperse mechanized 
and armored units. Enemy forces will concentrate and disperse them as opportunities allow and employ 
upgraded camouflage and deception techniques in order to reduce exposure to US surveillance, targeting, 
and precision strike technology. 

1-14.  Army missions dictate continued preparation for and participation in efforts that span the entire 
spectrum of conflict. It is essential to understand that Army Forces participate in almost all operations as 
part of a joint team. CCDRs rely upon Army Forces to conduct sustained land operations as a part of an 
overall strategy involving land, air, sea, and space forces. The following is the operation construct of full 
spectrum operations: 

z

Offensive operations—intend to destroy or defeat an enemy with the purpose of imposing the 
commander’s will on the enemy and achieving decisive victory by focusing on seizing, 
retaining, and exploiting the initiative. 

z

Defensive operations—defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop 
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations preserve control over land, 
resources, and populations. They retain terrain, guard populations, and protect key resources. 

z

Stability operations—sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and 
resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support 
civilian agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may 
occur before or after offensive and defensive operations but are accomplished separately, 
usually at the low end of the range of military operations. Stability operations lead to an 
environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of 
national power can predominate. 

z

Civil support operations— address the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and 
incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. Army forces do not conduct stability 
operations within the United States; under U.S. law, the federal and state governments are 
responsible for those tasks. Instead, Army forces conduct civil support operations when 
requested, providing Army expertise and capabilities to lead agency authorities.  

1-15.  Commanders combine and sequence the types of operations to form their overall operational design 
for campaigns and major operations. Army Forces conduct full spectrum operations abroad by executing 
offensive, defensive, and stability operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational 
teams. Army Forces within the United States and its territories conduct full spectrum operations by 
combining offensive, defensive, and civil support operations to support homeland security. Operations at 
home and abroad occur concurrently at the strategic-level. See Figure 1-1. 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

1-3 

Chapter 1  

Figure 1-1. Full spectrum operations 

1-16.  Commanders allocate different proportions of their force to each type of operation during different 
phases. Large units usually conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations abroad, as well as 
stability operations. Units at progressively lower echelons receive missions that require fewer combinations 
of them. At lower echelons, units usually perform only one type of operation at a time. 

1-17.  Today’s Army responds rapidly with forces that move quickly and commence operations 
immediately upon arrival in distant theaters of operation. This expeditionary mindset demands joint-
capable forces that can— 

z

Deploy rapidly into austere theaters with little or no advance materiel buildup. 

z

Rely on more efficient use of precision strike capabilities requiring even closer coordination and 
use of strategic and tactical intelligence. 

z

Integrate and employ land forces immediately with little time to reorganize after deployment. 

1-18.  With the changes in the operational environment, there is a significant increase in the need for 
information sharing, collaboration, and information services. Deployed forces depend upon joint and 
national assets to facilitate a commander’s information superiority (IS) and the ability to prosecute 
offensive IO while actively engaged in defending friendly information. When required, Army Forces 
develop the situation through maneuvers to identify enemy intentions, mask larger friendly operations, or 
preclude enemies from improving their information posture. The challenge to leaders and planners at all 
levels is to maintain information and technological dominance over our adversaries throughout this 
environment. 

1-19.  The joint environment, coupled with the demands of network enabled expeditionary operations, 
significantly increases reliance on accessing the Global Information Grid (GIG). Army tactical and 
maneuver elements rely on networks to leverage strategic and national capabilities which allow them to 
deploy into theaters from multiple force projection platforms and fight upon arrival. This complex 
environment demands that commanders have full network connectivity, complete network synchronization, 
and consistent standards to access the network immediately and to fight. 

1-4 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

The Joint Force and Army Networks 

Note. 

A scenario contained in Appendix A depicts the mobilization and projection of US and 

coalition forces.  

SECTION II – THE MODULAR ARMY AND JOINT NETWORKS 

MODULARITY 

1-20.  Joint requirements developed a new mindset of expeditionary warfare, which calls for different 
combat and support structures that will rapidly deploy into austere theaters with little or no advance 
materiel buildup. The concept of a modular design will enable these support structures to conduct 
operations on arrival with other services, multinational forces, or SOF in a joint theater. They are designed 
to employ communications and automation interoperability. 

1-21.  This presents a significant change to the Army’s post-Cold War organizations. Army Forces began 
to change in order to be more flexible and responsive. These modular organizations meet the JFC’s 
requirements while reducing organizational turbulence, inefficiency, and slow response times. The Army 
became more brigade-centric, often disassembling existing unit structures to design purpose-built, 
permanent combat teams. The focus was on developing modular organizations that could provide a mix of 
land combat power more easily organized for any combination of Army missions as part of a joint 
campaign. The redesign produced units that— 

z

Operate as part of a joint or mulitnational force as the rule, not the exception. 

z

Are expeditionary in nature, being lighter and more strategically deployable forces. 

z

Reduce their physical and logistical footprint by increasing reliance on reachback logistics and 
intelligence support. 

z

Are more mobile and lethal with an increased area of control and influence, using smaller 
tactical formations. 

z

Enable commanders to see first, understand first, and act first, placing IS as an element of 
combat power. 

z

Are information and network enabled by leveraging IT at all possible levels.  

T

HE 

M

ODULAR 

A

RMY 

C

ORPS AND 

D

IVISION 

1-22.  The most significant advantage of modularization is greater strategic, operational, and tactical 
flexibility. The numbered ASCC, corps, and division will serve as the following: 

z

A theater’s operational, strategic, and tactical C2. 

z

A land force and joint support element. 

z

C2 for a brigade combat team (BCT) or sustainment brigade, which serves as the primary 
tactical and support elements in a theater  

1-23.  While conventional thinking is to view these echelons as linear improvements to the original division 
and corps, they are not. Both higher echelons will be complementary, modular entities designed to employ 
task-organized forces within integrated joint campaigns. 

1-24.  The modular numbered Army is organized and equipped primarily as an ASCC for a geographic 
combatant commander (GCC) or combatant command and serves as the senior Army headquarters (HQ) 
for a theater. It is a regionally focused, but globally networked, headquarters that consolidated most 
functions that were performed by the traditional Army and corps levels into a single operational echelon. 
The ASCC is responsible for— 

z

Administrative control (ADCON) of all Army serviced assigned forces and installations in the 
GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). 

z

Integrating Army Forces into the execution of theater security cooperation plans. 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

1-5 

Chapter 1  

z

Providing Army support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces as 
directed by the GCC. 

z

Support to Army, joint, and multinational forces deployed to diverse JOAs. 

1-25.  The ASCC modular design provides enough capability to execute theater entry and initial phases of a 
campaign, while providing a flexible platform for Army and joint augmentation as the theater develops. It 
provides ADCON of all Army personnel, units, and facilities in the AOR. The ASCC is also responsible 
for providing continuous Army support to joint, interagency, and multinational elements as directed by the 
GCC, regardless of whether it is also controlling land forces in a major operation. 

1-26.  The ASCC will command and control a diverse construct of Army subordinate commands and 
separate functional elements which provide the theater an assigned mix of regionally focused, supporting 
resources and capabilities to include the following: 

z

Theater sustainment command. 

z

Signal Command (Theater) (SC[T]) or Theater Signal Brigade. 

z

Theater medical command. 

z

Theater Intelligence Brigade (TIB). 

z

Civil affairs brigade. 

z

Battlefield surveillance brigade. 

z

Theater Fires Brigade. 

z

Theater MP Command 

1-27.  An ARFOR commander in a JOA exercises operational control (OPCON) to supporting subordinate 
units and attachments in the form of brigades, battalions, and elements that were drawn from a “force 
pool.” These units and attachments would provide additional reinforcement through a combination of 
modular command, control, and support to that JOA and joint task force (JTF). The actual size, 
composition, and designation are adjusted to the demands of the GCC or ASCC. Refer to Figure 1-2. 

Figure 1-2. ASCC support to JTF and theater forces 

1-28.  The ASCC may also provide the resources needed for corps or division to stand up as an ARFOR, 
joint force land component commander (JFLCC), or a JTF HQ. The divisions have self-contained 
headquarters with deployable command posts supported by division signal companies (DSC), security, and 
sustainment units. As a completely modular entity, it may command a tailored mix of forces determined by 
the ASCC and in coordination with the GCC. Refer to Figure 1-3. 

1-6 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

The Joint Force and Army Networks 

Figure 1-3. Division force structure 

J

OINT 

N

ETWORKS 

1-29.  The networking of all Joint Force elements creates capabilities for unparalleled information sharing 
and collaboration, adaptive organizations, and a greater unity of effort via synchronization and integration 
of force elements at the lowest levels. 

1-30.  Modular Army signal organizations are designed to be interoperable with all other services to 
include the network capabilities within the joint information and communication systems (formally known 
as C4 systems in the joint community) in support of joint operations. The joint communications system 
must— 

z

Provide the right information in a useful format to the right place and to the right user at the 
right time. 

z

Provide a secure, robust, reliable, and trustable means for the JFC to exercise authority and 
direct forces. 

z

Span large geographic areas and a range of conditions, in austere or complex environments, and 
in all weather conditions. 

z

Be tactically agile and globally deployable, support tactical operations under highly mobile 
situations, and support en route, intra-theater, and inter-theater C2. 

z

Connect superior and subordinate commanders during all phases of an operation and rapidly 
adapt to changing demands. 

z

Facilitate interface with governmental and NGOs, local officials, and multinational forces. 

1-31. 

The GIG is the DOD information environment that supports joint communications systems and 

networks supporting joint operations. Joint Publication (JP) 6.0 defines the GIG as “the globally 
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for 
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to Warfighters, policy 
makers, and support personnel.” The GIG— 

z

Spans all services and components and includes all owned and leased computing systems, 
communications, software and applications, data, security services, and other information 
services necessary to achieve IS. 

5 July 2007 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

1-7 

Chapter 1 

z

Supports all DOD, national security, and related intelligence community missions and functions 
(strategic, operational, tactical, and business). 

z

Extends capabilities from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile 
platforms, and deployed sites). 

z

Provides interfaces to multinational, coalition, non-DOD users, and systems as required. 

z

Integrates computing platforms, weapons systems, and sensors that exchange information 
through a globally interconnected network. 

1-32.  In concept, the GIG (see Figure 1-4) is very much like the Worldwide Web. It exists as a baseline 
capability and is comprised of information and information services residing on transporting infrastructures 
and segments. It is described in seven components: warrior, global applications, computing, 
communications, network operations (NETOPS), information management (IM), and foundation. 
Authorized users access the GIG and its services either through military or commercial communications or 
through a series of entry points, e.g., standardized tactical entry point (STEP) and teleport facilities. These 
points provide information transfer gateways as a means of forming a junction of space-based and 
terrestrial networks and a connection for strategic or fixed assets and tactical or deployed users. It provides 
multiple connection paths between information users and information producers and enables effective 
bandwidth management. 

Infor

m

ation Management

Netw

ork
 Operations 

Warrior Components 

MEDICAL

Global Combat 

Support System 

Business 

Applications 

Global Applications 

Computing 

Communications 

Foundation 

Software Distribution 

Web Services 

Mega Member 

Service 

Electronic Mail 
Delivery 

SATCOM 

Wireless 

Com 

RF NETS 

DISN 

Commercial Fiber 

MSS 

POLICY

DOCTRINE 

SPECTRUM 

ARCHITECTURE 

STANDARDS 

ENGINEERING 

GOVERNANCE 

Network Operations 

Provides the integrated, secure end-to- end 

management of networks and applications across the GIG.  It also 
includes information assurance and content staging/information 
dissemination management (awareness, access, and delivery of the right 
information, in the right place, at the right time). 

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID COMPONENTS 

Warrior Components 

Connects 

warfighters and their combat platforms to the 
network. 

Global Applications 

The set of 

information applications used by the Warfighter. 

Information Management 

Controlling and 

prioritizing of information through its life cycle – 
creation or collection, processing, dissemination, 
use storage and disposition. 

Computing 

DOD hardware, software, 

and processes, including search services, 
shared data ware-housing, software 
distribution,  e-mail delivery, web services, 
collaboration services, common directories, 
and data services. 

Communications 

Provide common-user 

information transport and processing services 
to all DOD users—extends from base, post, 
camp, and station, through the strategic 
networks to the last tactical mile. 

Foundation 

Anchors the enterprise 

through standards, doctrine, policy, 
compliance, architecture, testing, spectrum, 
and host nation approval. 

Infor

m

ation Management

Netw

ork
 Operations

Warrior Components

MEDICAL

Global Combat

Support System

Business

Applications

Global Applications

Computing

Communications

Foundation

Software Distribution

Web Services

Mega Member 

Service

Electronic Mail
Delivery

SATCOM

Wireless

Com

RF NETS

DISN

Commercial Fiber

MSS

POLICY

DOCTRINE

SPECTRUM

ARCHITECTURE

STANDARDS

ENGINEERING

GOVERNANCE

Network Operations

Provides the integrated, secure end-to- end 

management of networks and applications across the GIG.  It also
includes information assurance and content staging/information 
dissemination management (awareness, access, and delivery of the right
information, in the right place, at the right time).

GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID COMPONENTS

Warrior Components

Connects 

warfighters and their combat platforms to the 
network.

Global Applications

The set of

information applications used by the Warfighter.

Information Management

Controlling and

prioritizing of information through its life cycle –
creation or collection, processing, dissemination, 
use storage and disposition.

Computing

DOD hardware, software, 

and processes, including search services,
shared data ware-housing, software 
distribution,  e-mail delivery, web services, 
collaboration services, common directories,
and data services.

Communications

Provide common-user 

information transport and processing services
to all DOD users—extends from base, post,
camp, and station, through the strategic
networks to the last tactical mile.

Foundation

Anchors the enterprise 

through standards, doctrine, policy,
compliance, architecture, testing, spectrum, 
and host nation approval.

Foundation

Anchors the enterprise 

through standards, doctrine, policy,
compliance, architecture, testing, spectrum, 
and host nation approval.

Figure 1-4. Global information grid 

1-8 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

The Joint Force and Army Networks 

SECTION III – CHANGES IN THEATER SIGNAL 

ARMY NETWORK OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

1-33.  On the battlefield, information systems provide the vital link among tactical, operational, and 
strategic operations. These are particularly attractive to adversaries because attacks by a foreign power are 
indistinguishable from hacking or criminal activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. The 
theater signal operational environment that drives theater signal doctrine and force structure includes all of 
the elements of the larger operational environment which affect all US forces, and the additional factors 
imposed by the requirements, characteristics, and doctrine of the forces supported by theater signal. 
Highlights of the changes to the theater signal operational environment are shown in Figure 1-5. 

Note.

 The DOD defines an operational environment as a “composite of all the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the 
decisions of the unit commander.” 

Then 

Now

Then 

Now

Area-Centric Support

Area-Centric Support

Multiple Scenarios

Multiple Scenarios

Minimal Data Demand

Minimal Data Demand

High Data Demand

High Data Demand

Large Footprint

Large Footprint

Reduced Footprint

Reduced Footprint

Voice Reliant

Voice Reliant

Voice and Data Reliant

Voice and Data Reliant

Cold War Focused

Cold War Focused

Operational Focused

Operational Focused

Terrestrial Transport Intensive

Terrestrial Transport Intensive 

SATCOM Transport Intensive

SATCOM Transport Intensive

Figure 1-5. Changes in network requirements 

1-34.  Army networks meet these changes with the ever increasing use of modernized communications 
resources, emerging technologies, and compatible government off-the-shelf and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) equipment as part of networks designed to interface with the GIG infrastructure. 

1-35.  Coalition, multinational, interagency, and commercial networks exist throughout the operational 
environment but must be fully integrated to “Fight the Network.” The DOD’s dependence on commercial 
networks and competing commercial priorities adds additional complexity to planning and execution. 
These commercial networks may include the communications infrastructure of hostile or occupied 
territories. The challenges associated with network security in this “mixed” network environment cannot be 
ignored. 

1-36.  Joint access to the GIG and its services are provided through STEPs, teleports, and other points of 
presence (POPs) located in all theaters and coordinated by the ASCC. Joint doctrine and policy must 
govern operations due to their global interdependence. For example, USCENTCOM reachback occurs 
through facilities located in the USPACOM, USEUCOM, and continental United States (CONUS). The 
Army, along with the other services and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), must work in 
concert to ensure that only the most modern capabilities and systems are fielded to these sites, while 
maintaining backwards compatibility for servicing those units that have not been fully modernized. 

1-37.  Theater networks are an extension of the GIG and stability operations and strategic functions for the 
GCC and ASCC. Theater networks operate continuously and extend horizontally and vertically to enable 

5 July 2007 

FMI 6-02.45 

1-9 

Chapter 1  

simultaneous operations while sustaining Army business lines and reachback to installations and power 
projection platforms. It is at the ASCC that critical theater resources, e.g., electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) 
management and satellite access, are allocated and synchronized with the GCC requirements. The theater 
network, through fixed and deployable formations, delivers Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) 
services and the Army capabilities that comprise the theater GIG. Additionally, the theater network 
supports the combatant command’s and host nation’s unique requirements. In addition to coordinating 
daily theater operations and the theater signal battle, theater network assets may augment division and BCT 
operations. 

1-38.  Tactical users require extensive networks to enable battle command, intelligence, and sustainment 
operations. They must leverage internal, strategic, and national capabilities and the ASCC to orchestrate 
the theater network battle. Corps, division, and the BCT will deploy into theaters from multiple force 
projection platforms. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM lessons learned highlighted initial operational risk 
from shortfalls caused by lack of interoperability standards. Therefore, this complex environment demands 
full connectivity, complete synchronization, and consistent worldwide standards to allow immediate access 
to the fight. Corps, division and the BCT will dynamically maneuver forces and capabilities within the 
constructs of a joint capable network, and this capability will extend across all tactical echelons. 

T

HEATER 

N

ETWORK 

M

ISSIONS 

1-39.  The effect on network elements in a theater of operations is profound, resulting in the theater signal 
mission expanding significantly. The former doctrine of “install, operate, maintain and protect” no longer 
captures the necessity to meet new network enabled requirements in the areas of data services, satellite 
communications (SATCOM) usage, network protection, non-traditional roles and support relationships, 
increased use of commercial systems, components, and contractor support. 

1-40. 

Greater Demands for Data Services.

 Deployed tactical elements demand the same data services 

provided in home stations. This includes new applications and requirements for significantly increased 
bandwidth. Deployed forces must retain this “home station quality” interoperability with the sustaining 
base for all forms of C2, intelligence, and logistic support. 

1-41. 

Increased Reliance on SATCOM. 

To support modularity designs and capabilities, mobility and 

battle command systems, tactical elements need to untether from terrestrial transport systems. The 
capability to fight in a non-contiguos, asymmetrical battlefield within an enclave operational environment 
will become more the norm than the contiguous battlefield of the Cold War era. These enclaves are, more 
often than not, beyond line of sight (BLOS) distances from each other and require a quality of service 
measure of connectivity that is not available in terrestrial systems. SATCOM: 

z

Enable joint C2, logistics, and support for employed units while incorporating commercial 
technology insertions and a more flexible and responsive architecture. 

z

Support the commander’s ability to tailor network resources based upon tactical and strategic 
needs and better facilitate ready interface to the GIG. 

z

Capitalize on efficiencies gained by specific technology insertions while leveraging commercial 
EMS management within the network. 

1-42. 

Protecting Networks and Information. 

Protecting the networks that comprise the GIG requires 

significant efforts of information assurance (IA) and computer network defense (CND), both essential 
elements of Global Information Grid Network Defense (GND), an integrated task of NETOPS. GND 
efforts facilitate the availability, integrity, identification, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation of friendly information and information systems while denying access to our adversaries. It 
provides end-to-end data quality and protects against unauthorized access, damage, or modification. GND 
incorporates those actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity 
within DOD information systems and computer networks. GND requires— 

z

Protection capabilities that include emission security, communications security (COMSEC), 
computer security, and information security by means of access control, cryptography, network 
guards, and firewall systems. 

1-10 

 

FMI 6-02.45 

5 July 2007 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Content      ..      1       2         ..

 

 

///////////////////////////////////////