FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 5

 

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FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 5

 

 

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Appendix A

SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATION

1.  Human Intelligence/Counterintelligence (HUMINT/CI).  HUMINT is intelligence
derived from information collected and provided by human sources.  One key benefit of
HUMINT is that it can provide an indication of enemy intentions.  Counterintelligence is
information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelli-
gence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign govern-
ments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terror-
ist activities.  The Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) provides HUMINT/CI intelligence as
well as the CIA. During wartime, valuable HUMINT can also be obtained from activities
undertaken by the combat elements of the joint force (for example, via pilot debriefings
following attack operations missions and SOF).  SOF as HUMINT is discussed in Appendix
B.

a.  Capabilities.  Information gained from human sources can provide specific details of

weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, and other data important for conducting TMD
operations.  HUMINT encompasses a broad range of potential data sources, including
debriefings of enemy prisoners of war (EPW); information from government, military, and
civilian persons within the target country; and/or third country persons.  Strategic debriefs
of persons entering the US and tracking international commerce (business, shipments, and
labor) are means of collecting potentially useful data.  US persons and organizations
involved in activities abroad can also provide a wealth of current information.  These
include inspection teams, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary
organizations (PVO), etc.  Use of agents and low-level source operations (LLSO) are
additional means of collection.

b.  Limitations.  Limitations of HUMINT include timeliness of collection, if in fact

sources are available at all.  The retasking process is slow and possibly impractical or
impossible to accomplish.  Additionally, HUMINT is subject to misinformation and the
quality of information gathered is personality dependent.

2.  Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).  IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of
collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors
such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR), wherein images of objects are reproduced optically
or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media.  Examples of IMINT

To be successful at determining potential enemy TM COAs, TM IPB requires

interface with, and support from national, theater, and tactical/organic sensors and
surveillance system networks.   The discussion of sensors in this appendix is broken out
by intelligence disciplines as described by Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for
Intelligence Support to Operations
, and focuses on how each discipline contributes to the
JTMTD process.  These discussions are, by design, general in nature and not specific to
any particular AOR or sensor platform.  They should be considered within the scope of
the JTMTD process described in Chapter III of this publication.

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collection platforms include National Technical Means (NTM), U-2s, EP-3s, Joint Surveil-
lance, Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), and UAVs.

a.  Capabilities.  IMINT provides the ability to monitor HPTs, including production

sites, installations, and other significant points of interest.  Imagery provides visual
evidence and clues of activity and can convey a great deal of information.  A variety of
electro-optical (EO), infrared, and radar sensors are available, each of which has its own
benefits and limitations.

(1)  EO imagery (digital-based pictures) is useful for a variety of tasks,  including

searching broad areas for activity, terrain analysis and LOC studies.  High resolution
imagery can be used for detailed analysis of installations and equipment and for production
of target materials.

(2)  Infrared imagery is subject to the same atmospheric constraints as EO but can

detect heat from vehicles, buildings, etc.   Infrared can penetrate certain types of
camouflage netting and can be combined with other types of imagery for better overall
analysis. Infrared is also effective at night.

(3)  Radar imagery is effective in daylight, at night, and in adverse weather. Radar

imaging platforms are often the sole means of collecting during extended periods of poor
weather.  Radar is good for detection of vehicles in the field or other mobile targets and,
depending on imagery quality, can aid in identification efforts.

b.  Limitations

(1)  Collected imagery requires interpretation by analysts in some form.

Depending on the type of sensor, imagery analysis may be near real-time or take hours to
exploit.

(2)  EO and infrared imagery cannot penetrate clouds; also, other atmospheric

disturbances can degrade their quality.  Enemy CCD efforts may also make activities
difficult or impossible for imagery analysts to properly discern, depending on imagery
quality and the type of CCD applied.

(3)  Radar imaging is subject to radar shadow in areas of rugged terrain.  Also,

features easily seen on EO imagery may not be as apparent to radar imagery.

3.  Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).  SIGINT comprises either individually or in combina-
tion all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation
intelligence, however transmitted.  Examples of SIGINT collection platforms include RC
135V/W (Rivet Joint), C-130 (Senior Scout), U-2s, EP-3s, and Guard Rail/Common Sensor.

a.  Capabilities.  SIGINT provides the ability to identify command, control, and

communications nodes; aircraft; and integrated air defense system (IADS) components and
other communications or electronic platforms.  Collectively, SIGINT can identify unit
locations and other key elements of enemy forces.  SIGINT information can be used alone or
to cross-cue other collection capabilities.   SIGINT is useful in determining activities
planned or in progress by the adversary that may not be detectable by other means.

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b.  Limitations.  SIGINT is reliant on emissions intercept of communications or

electronics.  If an adversary is communicating via courier, landline communications, or
encrypted means, interception may be impossible or difficult to exploit.  If a radar is not
operating, SIGINT sensors will not intercept.  SIGINT is also subject to deliberate jamming
or deception efforts by the enemy and can be affected by line-of-sight restrictions in some
cases.

4.  Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).  MASINT is scientific and
technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric,
angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic)
derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive feature
associated with a target.  The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted.  Ex-
amples of MASINT collection platforms include RC135s (Cobra Ball), DSP satellites,
JSTARS, and developmental UGS such as Steel Rattler and Steel Eagle.

a.  Capabilities.  For many applications, MASINT means measuring some physical or

chemical features associated with a target, analyzing the features to develop a
characteristic target signature, and then comparing that signature to the entries in a pre-
existing signature library to characterize or identify the target.  This process can require
specialized signal processing and data analysis techniques, which can be computationally
intensive, although modern MASING systems are generally designed to accommodate this
need.  Different types of MASINT sensors are applicable across the full spectrum of TM
activity.  For example, nuclear, biological, and chemical sensors can be used to help with the
detection of production and storage facilities and to characterize missile warheads.  Seismic
and acoustic UGS are excellent for the remote detection/identification of moving TM
elements.  Radar and radio frequency sensors can be effectively used to cross-cue other
sensors and to detect, characterize, and track vehicles.  Non-imaging infrared sensors can be
used for TM performance characterization, launch detection, missile tracking, and impact
point prediction and for contributions to the overall combat assessment process.

b.  Limitations.  MASINT characterization and identification of a particular target

may depend on the prior acquisition of a unique signature for that target type.  Some
MASINT phenomena are detectable only at very short ranges, or through the use of
specialized detection equipment; this may necessitate hand-emplacement of certain kinds of
sensors.  Limited availability of some types of MASINT assets places particular importance
on thorough and constantly updated IPB to ensure the best possible coverage of TM force
operating areas.  Also, the timeliness of the information gathered can vary, depending on the
capabilities of the MASINT sensors and their means of communication.

5.  Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).  OSINT is information of potential intelligence
value that is available to the general public.  Sources of OSINT include Defense publica-
tions, the World Wide Web (WWW), and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
reports, etc.

a.  Capabilities.  Open source data is widely available through publications, electronic

media, and broadcasts and is easy to access and analyze.  Depending on the situation,
reporting on events may be instantaneous as they occur.  While a voluminous amount of
data may be available for a specific area of interest, searching through it can be manpower
intensive.

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b. Limitations.  One significant drawback to open source data is that it may be

incomplete, outdated, and subject to misinformation/deception efforts.

6.  Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).  TECHINT is intelligence derived from the
exploitation of foreign material produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level com-
manders.  Technical intelligence begins when an individual Service member finds some-
thing new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it.  The item is then ex-
ploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the
adversary’s technological advantage.  There are various components of the DIA responsible
for analysis and production of TECHINT, e.g., the NGIC, NAIC, and MSIC.

a.  Capabilities.  While TECHINT is not a source that can be directly used to locate

elements of an opposing missile force, exploitation of equipment and systems gives valuable
insight regarding the operational capabilities and limitations of the items in question.
Therefore, TECHINT may materially aid the IPB process in a variety of ways.

b.  Limitations.  TECHINT is limited by the requirement to possess the equipment that

will be exploited and by time required to achieve an effective countermeasure.  TECHINT is
not a source for locating elements in wartime.

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Appendix B

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1.  Command of Special Operations Forces.  The United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) and its components organize for war and contingency operations by
providing Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations Command units to a JFC under the
command and control of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).  Service
components of the JTF may receive any one of the following liaison elements to conduct
tactical operations or facilitate planning:

a.  Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).

b.  Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD).

c.  Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE).

d.  Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).

2.  SOF Integration Considerations.  To effectively integrate SOF into TMD planning,
SOF planners must have access to the following information:

a.  How has the JFC organized the battlespace?

b.  What is the assessment of threat TM capability?

c.  What is the estimate of future threat TM capability as it pertains to quantity and

capability improvement through foreign acquisition, domestic production, and operational
reconstitution, to include WMD?

d.  What are the probable threat TM COAs?

e.  What effect will threat TM attacks have on the joint force’s centers of gravity, and

what conditions will result?

f.  What are the JFC priorities for resourcing TMD?

g.  How has the JFC organized and assigned functional responsibility to counter the

TM threat with regard to target identification, acquisition, and interdiction; less SOF?

h.  Who is responsible for organizing the TM collection plan and the TMD IPB?

This appendix provides guidance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and staff for the

integration of SOF assets into TMD operations.  Two caveats that must be considered in the
employment of SOF are as follow: (1) there are no prepackaged SOF solutions available on request,
and (2) the SOF mission profile in support of counter-TM operations is the same as many other
target systems. This appendix also provides the non-SOF joint planner insight into considerations
for SOF employment in order to facilitate friendly COA development, to include SOF integration.

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i.  Who is tasked with operational responsibility and control of TMD attack operations?

j.  What conditions, natural and man made, adversely affect the joint force  mechanism,

less SOF, to counter the TM threat?  This must consider all aspects of TMD.

k.  What is the JFC guidance for SOF in support of TMD?

l.  What resources are available to support SOF mission planning?

3.  Force Optimization

A successful campaign to attack and neutralize an opponent’s TM capability consists

of two distinct aspects, intelligence collection and interdiction.  To effectively integrate SOF,
these aspects must be deliberately separated and the JFC’s requirements for both must be
evaluated against strategic and operational capabilities.  The discrepancies between
theater/JTF intelligence requirements and collection capabilities become
operational imperatives for focusing planning initiatives for SOF application.
SOF assets do not compete with other collection assets, but complement them by filling
intelligence gaps that cannot be accomplished by other systems.

4.  SOF Value Added

Economy and responsiveness define SOF “value added.”  SOF economy is not

measured simply by its relatively small signature, but also by the extent they can be
synchronized with other requirements and operations of other components.
Responsiveness, on the other hand, does not imply “quick reaction” to a mission tasking
measured in real time, but rather the ability to apply adequate force and appropriate action
across the battlespace in time to ensure the favorable development of any emerging
situation.  SOF operations in support of JFC objectives include strategic and operational
combat information collection, tactical SIGINT collection, and discriminate interdiction,
either as a “stand alone” or as an enhancement to other attack platforms.  During coalition
operations, SOF combat advisory/trainer capabilities can effectively extend the theater SOF
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) umbrella by integrating
multinational forces and/or guerilla forces.

5.  Special Requirements

The environment at the limit of a JTF’s operational range is characterized by limited

or non-existing support for threat early warning, suppression, and recovery.  SOF
employment to locate, identify, and/or provide direct action destruction or terminal guidance
operations against TM components can not be an afterthought. The ability of SOF to
operate successfully and provide discriminate action in this environment depends on an
intimate knowledge of, and interaction with, the natural and manmade conditions in the
area of operations.   To achieve this level of knowledge, SOF requires specific, detailed, and
unique information about the battlespace.  This information enables SOF to conceal or
reduce the signature of their presence, thereby enhancing mission duration and
survivability.  RFIs generated during the SOF mission planning process must be given

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priority.  Additionally, all planning information used to recommend SOF inclusion in an
operation must be forwarded to the SOF planners, along with the mission directives or
orders.

6.  SOF Placement

The process to develop NAIs and nominate them for SOF application must be

deliberate and discriminate.  Each NAI supports a specific PIR.  A PIR should focus on
locating HPTs such as FOBs or other key infrastructure critical to the enemy’s ability to
sustain TM launch operations.  Planners use the points of known TM activity, combined
with mobility analysis data and information about the enemy’s operation procedures to
determine where the greatest opportunity exists for observing TM operations.  SOF may not
be able to cover all NAI for survivability reasons.  SOF coverage may be extended by use of
UGS and other devices.  The number of NAIs that can be covered will depend on SOF
mobility as dictated by the tactical situation and force protection requirements.  Mobility
choke points between the tentative FOB and surrounding sites can serve as either point
NAIs for SOF collection or possible countermobility interdiction targets to direct TM
movement in the direction of SOF or designated engagement areas.

7.  Special Reconnaissance

Early SR observation and reporting is essential to validate potential TM locations for

additional collection and/or interdiction.  SOF support to JTMTD for the initial phase of a
war is especially critical and must be deliberately planned during peacetime to provide the
responsiveness necessary to achieve pre-launch attack operations.  In situations where the
war is characterized by high-threat, high-intensity close battle, the JFC’s operational focus
will likely center on counterbattery and close battle operations.  This situation creates a
condition in which the JFACC may be compelled to concentrate on operations in the vicinity
of the forward line of own troops (FLOT), resulting in diminished resources for supporting
threat TM operations.  Conversely, without a threat to their FOB and supporting
infrastructure, the adversary’s TM sortie generation rate and freedom to conduct launch
operations remains unaffected.  Relying on SOF SR operations to validate TM targets before
diverting air assets is a viable technique to counter this problem.

8.  Reporting

When and how SOF reports their findings can have a direct bearing on SOF

survivability.  The tendency to default to satellite communications (SATCOM) and near-
real-time reporting pose a significant and often unnecessary risk for SOF from threat
SIGINT.  In the deep battle area, relay through an airborne platform (Airborne Warning and
Control System [AWACS], HAWKEYE, etc.) reduces the interference of terrain masking,
removing the potential compromise of SOF because of a forced relocation in order to
establish a LOS communications link.  It is important to remember that each TM target
component has a different dwell time (the time it will remain in its current location).  When
targeting a FOB or other TM associated infrastructure that is semi-stationary, a SOF
observation message delay of 1-2 hours is acceptable.  Unless there is a critical event (FOL
displacement, transload in progress, etc.), this delay should not have an adverse impact.
When a TST, such as TEL is discovered, and if SOF has the ability to communicate directly

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or indirectly to the JFACC, the option for terminal guidance operations (TGO) exists.
Additionally, the assistance of an airborne controller can determine the best initial point
(IP) for the attack to ensure that the risk to SOF personnel is minimized.  SOF reports can
be used to cross-cue other sensors, that is, used to associate moving target indicators (MTI)
from Joint STARS or U2.  This enables the tracking of otherwise innocuous activity and
may help define TM OB and TTP in one part of the theater that apply to intelligence gaps
at other locations.

9.  Conclusion

SOF assets are truly a joint force multiplier.  In some areas, JTF operations must be

restricted to avoid third party provocation.  Political sensitivity or restrictive weather may
preclude JFACC air interdiction, leaving SOF as the lowest signature option able to both
collect and interdict TM targets.  There are numerous instances that present compelling
reasons for SOF to take a more active role in interdiction through direct action (DA).
However, the IPB must validate that the intelligence necessary to support detailed mission
planning is available and that the additional risk of compromise can be mitigated by
securing theater assets to facilitate the expeditious recovery of SOF personnel.
Compromising SOF missions for missile destruction requires careful consideration.

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Appendix C

QUESTIONS FOR TM IPB DEVELOPMENT

1.  Define the Battlespace Environment

a.  Representative questions for identifying significant characteristics.

(1)  How many launchers/missiles are available?

(2)  What are the maximum, minimum and effective ranges of missiles?

(3)  Where are likely targets for these missiles?  Are they effective against this

kind of target?

(4)  Does the country produce their own launchers and/or missiles or are they

imported?  What type of reinforcement capability does the enemy have?  (That is, does the
country have the ability to rebuild equipment or purchase equipment from neighboring/
friendly countries?)

(5)  What have been the threat country’s attempts to acquire new missile systems

and from where?

(6)  Do TM forces have any special support requirements that will indicate the

specific areas of operation?

(7)  What areas provide the necessary prerequisites in terms of infrastructure,

camouflage, cover and concealment to support TM operations?  Which areas can be
eliminated for lack of the same?

b.  Representative question for defining the TM Area of Operations.

From what areas can the adversary conduct launch operations?

NOTE:  This appendix contains a list of considerations for developing TM IPB.  They are

presented to help orient analysts and operators by providing relevant questions, which may need to
be answered.  This list is not meant to be all encompassing.

Identifying significant characteristics of the environment.

Defining the TM Area of Operations.

Defining the TM Area of Interest.

Explore enemy’s options for using TMs across the spectrum of conflict

.

Focuses the TM IPB effort by accomplishing the following:

GOAL = Determine Intelligence Gaps; Define Parameters

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c.  Representative question for defining the TM Area of Interest.

From what areas can the adversary expect support for the conduct of launch

operations?

d.  Representative questions for exploring enemy’s options for using TMs.

(1)  What are the enemy’s primary goals for fielding a mobile missile force -

political, military, economic, or a combination?

(2)  What, if any, are the apparent political goals?  For example:

(a)  Influence peacetime regional/global politics?

(b)  Deter potential hostile nations from attacking?

(c)  Influence other nations during crisis or wartime (actual participation or

political or economic support for belligerents)?

(d)  Negotiate favorable cease-fire terms in the face of military defeat

(threaten use)?

(3)  What, if any, are the apparent military goals?  Such as:

(a)  Destroy enemy forces?

(b)  Impact enemy OPTEMPO?

(c)  Affect resupply or other rear area support operations?

(d)  Conduct psychological operations?

(e)  Employ long-range terrestrial and/or sea strike capability?

(f)  Establish/maintain zones of control (cruise missiles)?

(4)  What, if any, are the apparent economic goals?  Like:

(a)  Replace/supplant high numbers of conventional weapons with relatively

inexpensive TM force?

(b)  Export missiles/missile equipment?

(c)  Force neighbors to make economic concessions?

(5)  What are the likely adversary’s targets for TMs?  For example:

(a)  Cities, population centers?

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(b)  Military forces in the field or naval vessels?

(c)  Important installations for resupply and large fixed targets (ports,

airfields, transshipment nodes, and storage areas)?

2.  Describe the Battlespace Effects

a.  Representative questions for terrain analysis.

(1)  What are the likely areas of TM activity, considering the following?

(a)  Ground slope?

(b)  Elevation?

(c)  Road accessibility?

(d)  Vegetation/overhead cover?

(e)  Soil trafficability?

(2)  How do terrain factors affect enemy TM force operations?

(3)  What areas support FOB activity?  What types of road networks are required

to support FOB activity?  What are the terrain and other mobility limitations for the
deployment of a FOB?

(4)  What are the terrain/other mobility limitations for both launcher and support

vehicles?  What types of road networks are required to support resupply and transload
activities?

b.  Representative questions for weather analysis.

(1)  What are the typical regional climatological factors affecting operations?

(a)  Rain, snow, fog, wind?

(b)  Heat and cold?

(c)  Cloud cover and other atmospheric factors?

                     Examines influences of the battlespace by accomplishing the following:

Conducting terrain analysis.

Conducting weather analysis.

Analyzing other characteristics of the battlespace.

       GOAL = Understand how aspects of the battlespace effect enemy TM and friendly COA

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(2)  How do seasonal variations in weather patterns change potential operating

areas?

(3)  How do climatological factors affect how TM operations are conducted in the

field?

(4)  How do typical weather patterns affect friendly force operations?

c.  Representative questions for other characteristics of the battlespace.

(1)  What is the current status of expressway and rail construction projects?  What

future projects are planned?  How will this improved/deteriorated transportation
infrastructure help or hinder TM operations?

(2)  Where are missile units garrisoned?  Where do they routinely train?

(3)  Where are missiles stored?

(4)  Where are the special weapons storage areas?  Is there a signature that can be

exploited?

(5)  Where are the missile fuel storage depots?  Is there a signature that can be

exploited?

(6)  Are warheads produced in country?  Where?  Is there a signature that can be

exploited?

(7)  Is there in-country production of chemical/biological agents?  Where?  Is there

a signature that can be exploited?  What are the key components of these chemical/
biological agents?  Where are they produced?  Is there a signature that can be exploited?

(8)  Are missiles or their components produced in country?  Where?  Is there a

signature that can be exploited?  If not produced in country, where are they assembled?

3.  Evaluate the Adversary

a.  Representative questions for conducting OB analysis.

 Models enemy capabilities based upon known intelligence by accomplishing the following:

Conducting OB analysis to include technical capabilities and limitations.

Conducting mobility requirements (spatial) analysis.

Incorporating temporal (timing) analysis.

Examining TM doctrine and tactics to include target selection procedures, missile allocation,
C3 techniques, navigation capabilities and limitations, and force protection assets.

                           GOAL = Develop doctrinal templates; identify HVTs

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(1)  What is the organizational structure of missile units (TO&E)?  How many

TELs comprise each battalion?  How many and what type(s) of missile are available?

(2)  What is the command structure for TM units?

(3)  What is the status of the equipment?  Serviceable?  Poorly maintained?

(4)  What level of experience do operators have in operating the equipment?  Do

they have “in-the-field” operational experience?

(5)  What is the minimum/maximum range and maximum effective range of each

missile?

(6)  What type of warheads are available (high explosive, nuclear, biological, and/or

chemical)?  How many are there?  Does the type of warhead effect storage requirements?  Is
there a particular signature to these warheads that can be used in collection efforts?

(7)  What is the missile’s accuracy?  What is the circular, error, probable (CEP) of

each missile type?

(8)  What is the CEP of each warhead type?

(9)  What special handling characteristics do the missiles require?

(10)  Are missiles built in country or imported?  If imported, are they pre-

assembled or assembled once they arrive in country?

(11)  What fuels are used (liquid/solid)?  Are they produced in country?  What kind,

where and how?  Do they produce a signature that can be exploited?

(12)  What types of special, non-launcher vehicles/equipment items do missile

units require?  Do they produce a special signature that can be exploited?

(13)  What types of vehicles are used to transport missiles and TELs?  Civilian or

military vehicles?  Do they produce a special signature that can be exploited?

b.  Representative questions for conducting mobility (spatial) analysis.

(1)  What are the terrain and other mobility limitations for the deployment of a

FOL or FOB?

(2)  What are the operational ranges of launch units and support vehicles without

refueling?

(3)  What is the doctrinal distance between the launcher and its re-supply source?

(4)  What are the doctrinal distances between firing sites and FOLs?

(5)  What is the doctrinal distance between the FOL and the FOB?

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(6)  What is the maximum distance TELs operate from a FOB?

(7)  What is the normal distance between a battalion support base and its brigade

support base?

(8)  When, where, and how do units fuel their missiles?

(9)  When, where, and how are warheads mated with the missile?

c.  Representative questions for incorporating temporal (timing) analysis.

(1)  How do equipment-related requirements such as maintenance effect the

tempo and sustainability of launch operations?

(2)  What is the doctrinal rate of fire?  What is the rate of fire for different

warheads?

(3)  What is the average transload time for a single TEL?

d.  Representative questions regarding TM doctrine and tactics.

(1)  Doctrine

(a)  Does the threat TM force follow another country’s doctrine or do they

have their own?

(b)  Are there any doctrinal considerations that affect the determination of

firing positions, firing rate, and distances between firing units?

(c)  What doctrine modifications has the threat made based upon weapon

quantity/quality, weather factors, and terrain constraints?

(d)  What are the doctrinal targets for TMs?  Are launch units routinely given

alternate targets?

(e)  What historical use of TMs influences the threat’s doctrine?   What is the

doctrine for NBC use?  Does it change?  If so, how?

(f)  Are TM launch operations conducted in cooperation with air strikes or

other missile/rocket launches?

(g)  What is the re-supply rate in terms of missile availability per launcher?

What is the organic quantity of “ready rounds” available per launcher?  Where are the
“ready rounds” kept?

(h)  Do TM units have organic engineering equipment for construction of hide

sites, repair of LOC, and mine removal?

C-7

(i)  Do TM units plan to remain under an air defense umbrella during field

operations?  If so, what type of air defense systems will be responsible for this coverage?  Do
particular TM elements normally operate in cooperation with any ground or air defense
unit?  Does this provide a clue that can be collected against?

(j)  When more than one launch is planned for the same time, is the preferred

method to launch together from one location or to separate the TELs individually?

(k)  What do launch point operations consist of?  Does this produce an

identifiable signature that can be collected against?

(l)  What are the launch countdown timelines?

(m)  What are the missile checkout techniques?

(n)  Will the enemy employ from pre-surveyed or non-surveyed launch sites?

(2)  C3I

(a)  Where are the communications infrastructures that support TM

operations?

(b)  What is the primary method of communications between TELs in hide

sites and next higher command element?  What is the secondary method?

(c)  How do higher command elements provide launch orders to TM field

commanders?

(d)  What type of communications will be used in emergency situations

between launch, transload, and forward support personnel; and between commanders and
the next higher command element.  What types of field radios are used by TM elements and
do all, some, or none have encryption capability?

(e)  Do TM elements in the field attempt to stay close to any communications

infrastructure?

(f)  When TM launch elements are deployed, do they already have a launch

plan in hand or do they receive them at the deployed site?  What is the lowest
organizational level at which discretionary launch authority is given?  How does this
change in the case of NBC vice high explosive (HE) warheads?

(g)  Is there a standard plan to be used in case of disrupted launch

operations?  At what level is this plan formulated—battalion, brigade, or higher command
authority?

(3)  CCD

(a)  What does the threat country know about US intelligence

collection, targeting, and attack operations capabilities?

C-8

(b)  What CCD does the threat employ with its TM force?

(c)  What types of decoys are available and what are their levels of fidelity?

(d)  Does the adversary prefer day or night launch operations? Have TM

forces trained for night operations?  Does operational employment change during poor
weather?

(e)  What force protection measures do TM forces employ before, during, and

after launch?

(f)  Are hide sites pre-planned or ad hoc?

(g)  Do TELs hide alone or in groups?  If so, how many and how close to each

other?

(4)  Logistics and Support

(a)  How is propellant and oxidizer transported and stored for units in the

field?  Are there designated regional storage facilities established for this purpose and
stocked for sustained operations?

(b)  What preparations and activities are conducted prior to field operations?

(c)  How are TM operations sustained in the field?  Of what does the in-field

support infrastructure consist?  Are these permanent or ad-hoc missile support
installations?  What types of installations?  What is the distance between support nodes?
What is the dispersal within a specific node?

(d)  How are transload operations conducted?  Do the TELs transload at a

FOL or FOB or do GSE deploy forward to transload TELs at tactical resupply points in the
field?

(e)  Where are NBC warheads stored?  What special handling and security

measures are taken with NBC warheads?  Are chemical warfare agents in bulk storage or
in filled warheads?  Do they produce a signature that can be exploited?

(f)  Are TM support operations conducted primarily during the day or at

night?

(g)  If forward support bases (FOL or FOB) are used during deployment, what

are the stated requirements in terms of facilities?  In peacetime, are these facilities in
military or civilian installations?

(h)  Is there a brigade-battalion-platoon structure and are there forward

support bases at each of these levels?  If so, are these further subdivided into separate
support areas?  How do the units move to the field?  How does this take place- all at once or
piecemeal?  How can this displacement be best observed?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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