FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 4

 

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FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 4

 

 

III-20

h.  CM Focus.

(1)  CM processes for peacetime, crisis, and conflict do not differ greatly.

However, the level of hostilities will change the focus of the CM effort and number/types of
RSTA assets available for collection tasking.

(a)  Peacetime CM

·• CM during peacetime has two purposes: acquiring sufficient database

information to permit analysts to develop a credible IPB and developing plans for
employment of RSTA assets during crisis and conflict.  Peacetime TM collection efforts will
generally focus on facilities related to research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E), production and manufacturing, national storage sites, import operations,
supporting infrastructure, doctrinal information, training and exercises, and strategic
TM operations.

·• RSTA assets will likely be constrained during peacetime due to overflight

restrictions and worldwide commitments.  However, there is no prohibition against planning
for periods of crisis or conflict.  TM analysts and collection managers develop on-the-shelf
collection plans that include provisions for RSTA assets needed to quickly “mature” the TM
IPB and monitor TM forces in garrison before they deploy.

(b)  Crisis CM.  Monitoring TM activity during the early stages of a crisis is

critical.  If hostilities appear imminent, the adversary will likely deploy TM forces to
dispersed locations to prepare for their employment and to protect them from attack.
Available in-theater RSTA assets, as well as other national technical means, must watch for
the deployment of missile forces and, if possible, track them to their various operating
areas.  Having an on-the-shelf crisis collection plan that includes TM NAIs is essential.

(c)  Conflict CM.  Once conflict begins, the CM effort in support of TM target

development shifts from the strategic to the tactical.  Strategic TM targets (normally fixed)
developed during peacetime planning should already be included in the initial attack
strategy, air tasking orders, target list, and collection assessment requirements.  If  the
enemy has already dispersed the missile forces, these attacks against strategic fixed-targets
will have only minimal immediate effect on launch operations, but may affect the
adversary’s ability to reconstitute forces.  During crisis, the key to effective TM collection
efforts is establishing a near-real time intelligence feed and responsive cross-cueing
procedures for sensors.

(2)  It is important to note here that RSTA operations (with exception) do not

generally collect intelligence.  Rather they collect data that becomes intelligence after it is
processed, evaluated, and integrated (fused) with other pieces of information and data.
When dealing with a mobile TM threat, the classic intelligence functions of collection,
situation awareness, analysis and production, and target development must be compressed
in time, level of detailed analysis, coordination, and decision making.  Figure III-14 shows
the cognitive hierarchy associated with these tasks.  Tactical TM activities produce
perishable intelligence information.  Unless the TM analyst knows what to look
for and, can see and interpret events in near-real time, it is unlikely that a
proactive response can be developed before the opportunity disappears.
  This
means that direct dissemination of data to TM analysts and targeteers is essential to

III-21

success.   TM analysts and targeteers need direct input into the cross-cueing and
dynamic retasking processes when countering TMs is a JFC priority.

(3)  To be effective, the planned wartime collection architecture must be exercised

during peacetime.  Unless exercised routinely, connectivity cannot be guaranteed and data
stream problems identified and resolved.  Without pre-conflict testing and effective
management, communications paths can quickly become saturated by duplicative
information, greatly hindering the analysis and production efforts.  Figure III-15 illustrates
the complexity of collections and intelligence information pathways that exist in support
of operations during crisis or conflict.  The dashed line indicates coordination, the solid
lines with arrows at both ends indicate interaction (requirements development,
coordination, communication, etc.), and the solid lines with a single arrowhead indicate
tasking or passing of information or requirements.  Continuous coordination and cross-
talk is critical between CMs, intelligence analysts, personnel involved in combat
assessment, targeteers, and the operational decision-makers to ensure that all of the
information gaps are identified and covered.  During peacetime, interaction between
these various sections occur during intelligence briefings and through established daily
working relationships.  During crisis and conflict, much of this interaction occurs at
daily CM or JTCB meetings.  Extra “TM-focused” meetings that bring the theater and
component TM players together to synchronize intelligence, collection, and target
development operations are also essential.

(4)  Besides understanding the CM process, it is equally important to

understand RSTA capabilities and limitations.  Appendix A contains information on

Information

Data

Knowledge

Understanding

Action

Judgment

Cognition

Processing

What will happen?

What should be done?

What does it show?

What can be seen?

Execution

End State

Common Relevant

Situational

Awareness

Sensor

Observations

• Commander’s Intent

• Concept of Operations

• Seize the Initiative

• Maintain Momentum

• Exploit Success

Figure III-14. Cognitive Hierarchy Associated with RSTA Tasks

III-22

sensor considerations to aid the development of a TM collection strategy.  A critical
RSTA asset to TM IPB is HUMINT, especially SOF.  Sensors cannot replace the quality of
intelligence from “eyes-on” observations.  Appendix B contains information on SOF
employment in support of JTMTD and direct action.

(5)  Near-real-time intelligence collection is the key to turning IPB templates

developed during peacetime into a near-truth TM intelligence picture.  Figure III-16
diagrams the CM decision-making process in support of JTMTD.  How well the TM IPB
and CM processes are “harmonized” will determine the quality of predictive intelligence
and whether target nominations can be produced and executed within the short window
of opportunity presented by TMs.

5.  Target Development

a.  Target development is the third aspect of JTMTD.  While TM IPB and CM are

important in determining which COA the enemy has chosen and what he is doing where,
unless this information is “acted upon” within the required timelines it is irrelevant.  Target
development is the process of turning intelligence information into target nominations.
Target development is the second step in the joint targeting cycle (Refer back to Figure I-1
in Chapter 1).

b.  Target Identification and Nomination.

(1)  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, after the TM attack strategy has

been refined and approved, targeteers use the tasks and subtasks to define appropriate
target system components and HPTs.  HPT target nominations (supported by target folders

BDA

TGTs

CMs

INTEL

ANALYSTS

COMBAT

OPS

INTEL

OPS (J2/J3)

National

Assets

Theater

Assets

Exploitation

Dissemination

Interaction/Exchange

Taskings

Coordination

Figure III-15.  CM Relationships

III-23

or lists) are developed in as much detail as possible and refined as additional information
becomes available.  Preplanned target nominations are approved according to the
procedures established by the JTCB or established target coordination forum.  If TMs are
designated as high priority, components prosecute immediate TM target nominations within
their AO and coordinate with other components as necessary for execution or target
handoff.

(a)  Peacetime Target Development.  Peacetime target development should

focus on two aspects of the target system—infrastructure and potential operating areas.  If
TMs are accorded high priority for national and theater collection/intelligence production,
much of the TM infrastructure (such as the missile force’s garrison facilities, weapons
storage depots, LOC, production facilities, etc.), can be identified, validated, and nominated
for attack prior to hostilities.  Detailed information on targets, to include weaponeering
solutions produced by appropriate Service component operators, are built and maintained
on air tasking orders and target lists for immediate use at the onset of hostilities.  Based on
the TM IPB, potential tactical operating areas for the missile forces (such as potential FOB
locations; transload, launch, and hide sites; countermobility targets; etc.) are also
“weaponeered” and put on-the-shelf.  During crisis and conflict, these pre-planned targets
can be quickly validated and nominated for execution.  This pre-planning effort will require
a substantial commitment of manpower and collection resources but is critical to attaining
successful pre-launch attack operations.

(b)  Crisis and Conflict Target Development.  Once a crisis begins, additional

RSTA assets planned for during peacetime CM analysis will become available.  These RSTA
assets will help confirm targets anticipated during peacetime TM IPB efforts.  On-the-shelf
target nominations are then quickly completed and nominated for execution.  While
peacetime JTMTD efforts will provide an initial list of fixed-targets, the majority of the

CM DECISION MAKING PROCESS

LAUNCH DETECTION,

EYES ON REPORT

DATA  INPUT

VARIOUS

COLLECTION

SOURCES

NONIMATE AS  TST,

PASS COORDINATES TO OPS

INTERNAL ANALYSIS,

MTI OF KNOWN SITE

PASS COORDINATES TO

COLLECTIONS FOR

IMMEDIATE SENSOR

RETASKING

TMD ACTIVITIY

NO  TMD ACTIVITIY

RECEIVE

COLLECTION

RESULTS

ANALYZE FOR TM

ACTIVITY

NO

YES

DATA  INPUT

     IS ADDITIONAL

  SENSOR NEEDED TO

CONFIRM TARGET

RECEIVE

STRIKE

RESULTS

CONTINUE ANALYSIS

PASS INFORMATION

TO TM INTEL CELL

COORDINATE WITH

COLLECTIONS FOR

FOLLOW-UP BDA

Figure III-16.  CM Decisionmaking Process

III-24

mobile target system components will only emerge after hostilities commence.  As the
TM IPB process narrows the focus of collections, fleeting targets such as TELs and GSE
should emerge.  If the opportunity exists, these targets can be immediately nominated
for attack as TSTs.  Even if they cannot be attacked immediately, these components of
the TM target system should be “tracked” by sensor systems to help develop the TM
intelligence picture.  If a post-launch TEL can be tracked to its hide site, it can be
attacked there; or better yet, perhaps it can be tracked to a transload site and attacked
there, or the transload GSE tracked back to the FOL or FOB to discover the operating
network.  Once there is confirmation that the enemy is using a particular TM operating
area, further area delimitation analysis may provide good countermobility targets for
interdiction of the mobility network.

(2)  The countermobility concept capitalizes on the enemy TM’s greatest

vulnerability - the requirement to bring components together to accomplish launch
operations.  Countermobility analyzes the TM mobility network in each operating area for
points of interdiction that will keep components separated.  Depending on the topography of
the terrain, countermobility can be extremely effective.  For example, if a TEL has difficulty
moving from a hide site to its launch point, the launch may be delayed out of its approved
launch window.  Such a delay could be extremely important if the enemy is trying to
saturate our defenses with salvo launches.  Countermobility targeting also forces the
adversary to find alternate routes to accomplish essential tasks.  When forced into changing
operating patterns, TELs and GSE become exposed for greater periods of time; thus
lengthening the attack window of opportunity.  Because GSE may have limited off-road
capability, alternate routes may become very circuitous, further disrupting the enemy’s
OPTEMPO.  Figure III-17 illustrates countermobility targeting options based on detailed
mobility analysis.  The success of this type of analysis is highly dependent on knowledge
of  enemy operating patterns derived from the IPB process.

H

F

H

H

F

F

H

H

F

H

R

H

F

F

F

H

H

F

H

B

C

A

=  Road Segment Used By 3 Of 4 Possible 

Pathways.  Cut Will Disrupt / Delay 3 TBM 
Launches 

=  Road Segment Used By 2 Of 4 Possible 

Pathways.  Cut Will Disrupt / Delay 2 TBM 
Launches 

=  Cut Will Guarantee No Second Shots For 

4 Of 4 Pathways 

=  Road Segment Used By 2 Of 4 Possible 

Pathways.  Cut Guarantees No Second 
Shots For 2 Of 4 Pathways 

=  Reinforce Probable Location Of Reload 

Site

A

B

B

A

C

C

B

A

Analysis

+

+

+

 H

 = Hide Site

 F

= Firing Site

 R

= Reload Site

Figure III-17.  CM Decisionmaking Process

III-25

(3)  Combat Assessment (CA).  Targets are also nominated based on the results

of CA.  These will be either known targets requiring restrike or new targets that arise as
the overall attack strategy causes the enemy to react.  As with all operations, pre-
planned and effective CA is critical and affects the entire JTMTD process.  Two key
assessments which analysts must examine are the impact of friendly operations on the
enemy’s TM capability and the enemy’s reaction in terms of changes to their operating
procedures.

(4)  TM IPB must be continuously updated to reflect changes to the enemy’s TM

order of battle, operating procedures, and results of infrastructure attacks (destruction
of bridges, rail networks, etc.) that affect the enemy missile force’s ability to operate.  CA
directly measures if the attack strategy is succeeding, whether a particular phase has been
completed, or when strategy changes are required.  For example, if a bridge is destroyed as
part of countermobility targeting, it should be immediately incorporated into the area
delimitation database and used to analyze how the enemy will react and where new HPTs
will appear.

(5)  There are three aspects of  CA, each of which must be done correctly to

determine the overall effectiveness of operations:  physical damage assessment,  functional
damage assessment, and target system assessment.

(a)  Physical damage assessment estimates the quantitative extent of

physical damage through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects to a
target.  This assessment, also called battle damage assessment (BDA), is based on observed
or interpreted damage reported by the attacking force or component-level BDA collection
efforts.

(b)  Functional damage assessment estimates the effect of attack on the

target’s ability to perform its intended mission compared to the operational objective
established against the target.  This assessment is inferred on the basis of all-source
intelligence and includes an estimate of the time needed to replace or recuperate the target
function.

(c)  Target system assessment is a broad assessment of the overall impact and

effectiveness of attacks against the entire target system’s capability.  It is also used to judge
an enemy unit’s combat effectiveness.  A target system assessment looks at elements of the
target system in comparison to the commander’s stated operational objectives.  Target
system assessment is a relatively permanent assessment and is used for more than one
mission.

(6)  Strategy Assessment.  The following indicators and measures can be used to

assess the effect of friendly operations on the TM force:

(a)  Physical Count: Enemy TM assets are subtracted from the OB based on

CA estimates of targets destroyed/damaged.  While this is the most straightforward means
of measuring success, the complete reliability of such numbers has generally been proven
false during combat.  Nevertheless, it is important to maintain an accurate count of the
TM OB in order to assess remaining TM capability.

III-26

(b)  Reduction in TM Launch Rate/Volume: This indicator is easily

observed and measured and can provide insight into the TM force’s current capability.  A
significant reduction in the launch rate may indicate attrition of launchers/missiles,
disruption of TM logistics, or a deliberate reduction to reduce exposure to attack.  This
may also indicate a change in enemy strategy or intent.

(c)  Shift to New Operating Area: This may indicate change in operations

due to threat and/or loss of key infrastructure.  It may also indicate the adoption of a
new strategy, that is, a shift from strategic or political targeting to focusing on tactical
units.

(d)  Reduction in TM Accuracy/Effectiveness: Degraded accuracy, missile in-

flight failures, and use of inert warheads may indicate a loss of preferred firing locations
and/or a disruption of the TM logistics system.

(e)  Shift in Timing of Launches: A temporal change in the launch pattern

(that is, from day to night operations) may indicate a change in operations in response to
attacks.

c.  Deception.  Deception is an integral part of all TM operations because it is the key to

survival.  During TM IPB it is important to consider what options the enemy might employ
to deceive us as to their intentions and physical operations.  Deception operations range
from misinformation about capabilities and range of systems to decoy launchers deployed in
likely launch areas.  While it is impossible to characterize all possible CCD methods, it is
important to consider all possibilities in the context of the battlespace.  Intelligence
information that appears “out-of-synch” should be analyzed in this light.  It is necessary to
question every piece of information and learn something from every TM event so that the
deception will become intuitively obvious.

d.  Attack Platforms.  Once targets are identified, confirmed, and nominated, there are

a variety of weapons systems available to engage TM targets.  While it is not the intent of
this publication to go beyond the target nomination process, the attack system selected does
have a direct bearing on the scope of intelligence required (that is, imagery requirements,
target location accuracy requirements, etc.)  It is important to emphasize that each Service
brings unique capabilities to the fight.  In support of the mission, the goal must be to
maximize the use of each system’s strengths according to the circumstances.  The following
is brief description of attack platform options:

(1)  Fixed Wing Attack Aircraft (Fighters and Bombers): Air Force, Naval, and

Marine aircraft provide advantages of speed, range, and flexibility in responding
to both preplanned and TST targets.  
Trained aircrews can extend a weapon system’s
capability against moving targets or those that can quickly relocate.  A wide variety of
munitions with varying precision, weapon effects, penetration, and area-denial capabilities
can be optimally delivered against specific elements of the TM target system.  Risk
management considerations for crew exposure must also factor into employment, although
stand-off weapons further reduce exposure time.

(2)  Surface-to-surface tactical missiles: The Army Tactical Missile System

(ATACMS) is an all-weather, day or night, semi-ballistic, guided missile armed with anti-
personnel and anti-material bomblets designed to engage soft, stationary targets at

III-27

ranges out to 300 km.  The ATACMS can engage TSTs or preplanned targets when precise
target location data (within 150 meter accuracy) is available.  ATACMS  require little time
to accomplish fire direction calculations and have a relatively short time of flight.
ATACMS should be considered for use against targets protected by a sophisticated enemy
air defenses when risk to aircraft and personnel are high.  For example, a well-defended
FOB is an excellent ATACMS target if within range.  Airspace deconfliction requirements
are a major consideration when employing ATACMS.  Procedures for establishing
airspace control measures for ATACMS are discussed in MTTP, The Joint Targeting
Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets, July 1997.

(3)  Cruise Missiles: Cruise missiles such as TLAM and CALCM can be employed

against high-value stationary targets in highly defended areas.  However, these systems
require precise coordinates and a considerable amount of lead-time for planning.  TLAM and
CALCM are effective against a variety of stationary TM-related vehicles and support
equipment.  Standoff delivery methods and precision strike against fixed/stationary targets
are a primary advantage of cruise missiles.

(4)  SOF: SOF provides a low-signature operation to fill gaps in sensor coverage, in

order to support target identification and acquisition through:  Special Reconnaissance (SR),
direct observation, tactical SIGINT collection, and precision emplacement of Unattended
Ground Sensors (UGS).  Additionally, SOF can facilitate attack operations through target
acquisition/terminal guidance for airborne platforms and, as necessary, direct action.  Risk
management considerations for SOF exposure and survivability considerations for delivery
aircrews must also factor into employment.  For a more complete discussion, see Appendix B.

(5)  Attack Rotary-Wing Aircraft: The AH-64 (Apache) is a day/night adverse

weather attack helicopter that employs an array of rockets, missiles and cannon fire.  The
Apache has a combat range of approximately 670 km and a stand off range of 8 km.  The AH-
64 can conduct “search and attack” missions against targets when the target location has not
been sufficiently refined to permit engagement by other attack systems.  Depending on the
range to the target area, an AH-64 battalion can spend approximately 1-2 hours searching
an area in which enemy TM forces are known to be operating.  The Apache is equipped with
sophisticated night vision, navigation, and target acquisition systems to locate targets not
readily visible and can be teamed with other sensor systems to refine search areas.

(6)  Non-lethal Attack Options: A variety of non-lethal means are available to

support and enhance targeting of the TM target system.  Portions of the TM C2 system may
be vulnerable to a variety of electronic and information attack.  Psychological operations
(PSYOP) and deception operations may be beneficial as well.  Weather data collected by TM-
related radar systems may be vulnerable to direct jamming.  Combining both lethal and non-
lethal forces can enhance the overall TMD strategy.

(7)  The JFC must take advantage of all attack platforms, to include multinational

assets.  Multinational operations serve to expand and enhance the availability of lethal
and non-lethal weapons systems for TM target engagement.

III-28

6.  Conclusion

The JTMTD process defines the relationship that must exist between TM IPB, CM,

and target development to achieve the desired end state for attack operations –
reducing or preventing enemy TM launches.  While on the surface the harmonization of
these three processes appears simple, in reality, the operational architectures,
databases, resources, and enemy’s efforts to elude detection make it very difficult.  The
processes described can help establish a common perspective of TM target development
procedures for everyone involved in countering TMs.

Attack Operations During World War II

During the war, RAF Fighter Command, 2nd Tactical Air Force, and the US 9th Air Force

conducted a variety of missions (Codename CROSSBOW) against the Nazi V-2 threat.  First, fighter
planes and ground attack aircraft flew armed reconnaissance patrols over known or suspected V-2
operating areas (a “V-2 Combat Air Patrol [CAP]”) for the purpose of hunting for fleeting target and
maintaining a threatening presence  to disrupt and suppress V-2 operations.  Fighter/bombers and
light bombers were used to deliver pre-planned strikes against specific missile-related targets.  Also,
ground attack aircraft attempted to interdict rail traffic moving into and within the V-2 operating
areas.  Finally, specially equipped light bombers also flew a small number of night intruder missions
against suspected CROSSBOW targets.

No missile firing units were ever attacked during launch operations, despite the fact the V-2 CAP

sometimes reached levels as high as 100 fighter sorties per day over suspected missile unit operating
areas.  As was the case with the V-1 CROSSBOW effort, the attack operations missions that had
measurable impact on the volume and rate of missile fire involved air strikes against the forward
support elements and supply lines of the V-weapon forces.

One such mission occurred in February 1945 over a large wooded park in The Hague called the

Haagsche Bosch.  Dutch underground had reported substantial V-2 activity at this location, and
Allied photo-reconnaissance flights had also occasionally spotted groups of rockets in the area.  On
the recommendation of his chief intelligence officer, Air Marshal Hill of Fighter Command decided
to abandon combat air patrols for several days and use his strike resources for a concentrated attack
on the park.  The Haagsche Bosch, with its natural cover and proximity to a rail line turned out to be
the site for a Nazi missile technical battery.  According to Nazi accounts obtained after the war, the
February attack damaged a number of missile transporters, rockets, the special gantry crane used to
transfer missiles, and the missile checkout station located in a large sound stage of a Dutch film
studio adjacent to the park.

The average launch rate from The Hague during February 1945 was approximately ten missiles

per day.  After the Fighter Command air strikes went in on February 21 and 22 (after a one day gap
during which the missiles already at the launch units were used up),  firing essentially stopped for
several days while the technical battery moved to a new location and received replacement
equipment.

-- Dr. Ron Allen, Sandia National Lab

          based on United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

IV-1

Chapter IV

JTMTD INTEGRATION OPTIONS

1.  Background

a.  JTMTD, as described in Chapter III, is a process derived from the synergistic

outcome of melding TM IPB, CM, and target development processes into a cohesive strategy
to achieve the JFC’s object in regards to attack operations against TMs. As noted in the
preface, countering TMs is not a mission area itself, but rather a problem that cuts across
many operational and component lines.  It is an inherently joint mission.

b.  In examining ways to integrate JTMTD efforts, it is necessary to understand

capabilities and limitations of current technology and force structure.   Current
architectures and methods have not proven effective in reducing or preventing enemy TM
launches.  While some reasons for this ineffectiveness stem from the lack of interoperable
systems, a significant percentage of the problem can be traced to deficiencies in joint
training and joint personnel training programs.  Developing TTP “work-arounds” to
interoperability problems requires staffs to explore and experiment with various options,
that is, work to find joint solutions rather than single-Service remedies.

c.  The need for an integrated approach to JTMTD needs no justification.  Because

multiple intelligence organizations – national, theater, JTF, and component – have a need
for TM intelligence, the goal of JTMTD must be to create a mutually agreed upon,
comprehensive, and accurate TM picture.  This requires effective integration of all JTMTD
efforts to accomplish the following:

(1)

Ensure a single TM IPB, CM, and targeting effort.

(2)

Expedite access to decision makers for dynamic re-tasking of sensors.

(3)

Reduce duplication of effort.

(4)  Prevent information from being “stove-piped” instead of shared.

 d.  The above quote from joint doctrine acknowledges the need for interoperable

intelligence operations.  However, currently fielded technology has limited capabilities in
terms of developing a commonly shared, near real-time TM IPB picture.  This chapter
explores integration options that are feasible given the constraints of current systems.

“TMD is inherently a joint mission.  Therefore, joint force components, supporting

combatant commanders, and multinational force TMD capabilities must be integrated
towards the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy’s TM capability.
This must be integrated into and in support of the JFC’s overall concept of operations and
campaign objectives.”

-Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

IV-2

Theater Combatant Commanders (CINCs)/JFCs must task their staffs to explore these
options with the goal of creating a more cohesive JTMTD effort.  The options discussed are
in practice in various theaters.  Appendix D provides some information on theater-specific
and deployable models.

2.  Integration Options

a.  TMD organization and integration varies by theater depending on forces available

and threat capabilities.  The goal of integration is achieved when a common picture of TM
activity is established, TM data flows smoothly between C2 nodes, and fewer “work-
arounds” are required to overcome hardware/software interoperability problems.  Four
methods for achieving an integrated JTMTD effort are—

(1)  Consolidation.

(2)  Collaboration.

(3)  Liaison.

(4)  Collocation.

3.  JTMTD Integration Through Consolidation

a.  Consolidating all “in theater” TM analysis efforts and equipping that effort with

appropriate tools and access offers the best opportunity (given current technology) for
producing planned and TST nominations within the attack windows of opportunity.  A
consolidated TM analysis element would also be responsible for fulfilling all JTF and
individual component JTMTD requirements.  When established, a jointly staffed Theater
Missile Analysis Element (TMAE) serves as a single focal point for all JTMTD efforts.  A
single analysis element is beneficial because it improves communications, reduces
misunderstandings between intelligence cells, reduces redundancy by maximizing use of
limited resources, improves TM target production, and reduces manpower requirements.
The TMAE works with existing intelligence, collection management, and targeting
operations to produce TM target nominations.  The location of the TMAE depends on the
situation and organization of forces available.  For example, in Combined Forces Command
(CFC) Korea, the TMAE is located with the 7

th

 Air Force Air Operations Center (AOC),

which provides the core manning.  Appropriate tasks for a TMAE are as follow:

(1)  Conduct, update TM IPB.

(2)  Recommend TM targeting strategy and target nominations.

“The intelligence function is carried out through a geographically dispersed network in which

national and service systems are interconnected to form a disciplined and responsive information
gathering and dissemination structure.  Though the functional systems may be dissimilar,
interoperable communications and software must be provided to allow them to operate most
effectively.”

- Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

IV-3

(3)  Provide TM situational updates to the JFC commander and components.

(4)  Provide WMD situational updates to the JFC commander and component.

(5)  Monitor SOF operations to coordinate CM activities and TM attack operations.

(6)  Recommend a synchronized TM collection strategy.

(7)  Coordinate dynamic re-tasking of sensors in support of TM TST target

nominations.

b.  A notional TMAE organization and associated responsibilities for each functional

cell follows:

(1)  TM Analysis Cell.  Responsible for the following:

(a)  Developing and continuously updating the TM IPB.

(b)  Providing near real-time reporting of TBM launches and impact points.

(c)  Maintaining interoperability of intelligence database systems.

(d)  Identifying TM indications & warnings.

(e)  Submitting IRs to collection management cell.

(f)  Disseminating intelligence to components.

(g)  Nominating TM targets to the targeting cell.

(h)  Assisting with CA for the TM target system.

 (2)  Collection Management Cell.  Responsible for the following:

(a)  Tracking and responding to IRs submitted by the analysis cell.

(b)  Maintaining sensor situational awareness.

(c)  Developing, in conjunction with the JTF collection manager, a TM

collection strategy.  Provide requirements for cross-cueing and dynamic re-tasking to the
collection manager.

(3)  Targeting Cell.  Responsible for the following:

(a)  Developing, in conjunction with JFC/joint intelligence officer (J2)/joint

operations officer (J3), a joint TM attack strategy and prioritizing targets that meet
established attack strategy criteria.

IV-4

(b)  Maintaining a joint TM targeting database and target folders.

(c)  Submitting target nominations to JTCB or appropriate TST agency based

on the approved attack strategy.

(4) WMD Cell.  Responsible for the following:

(a)  Developing enemy NBC courses of action.

(b)  Serving as the joint force NBC subject matter expert.

(c)  Monitoring enemy use of NBC.

(5)  SOF Liaison.  Responsible for coordination between TMAE and SOF planning

and execution elements.

c.  To accomplish the tasks listed in paragraph 3a above, a TMAE requires, as a

minimum, the following functions/capabilities:

(1)  Terrain delimitation.  Current processors available: Generic Area Limitation

Environment (GALE), Engineer Operations Support (E-OPS), Interactive Battlespace
Intelligence Server (IBIS).

(2)  Near-real time imagery display for theater and national imagery Current

systems available: Time Critical Targeting Aid (TCTA), Multiple Input Sensor Terminal
(MIST), Multiple Source Tactical System, Army (MSTS-A).

(3)  Missile launch indications and electronic intelligence information. Current

feeds available: Tactical Data Dissemination System  (TDDS), and  Theater Information
Broadcast System (TIBS).

(4)  Air situation awarenessCurrent system available: Air Defense System

Integrator (ADSI ).

(5)  Connectivity to theater intelligence systems.  Some current processors: All

Source Analysis System (ASAS), Combat  Information System (CIS).

(6)  Target nomination processor.  Current systems available: Advanced Field

Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Rapid Application of Air Power (RAAP),
Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), and Automated Deep
Operations Coordination System (ADOCS).

(7)  Collection management tool.  Current system available: Joint Deployable

Intelligence Support System (JDISS) with COLISEUM software.

4.  JTMTD Integration Through Collaboration

a.  A second method for achieving integration of the various JTMTD efforts is through

“virtual” collaboration.  While currently fielded technology has limited virtual-sharing

IV-5

capabilities, the push towards better information technologies will make this option
increasingly possible and will improve intelligence workload distribution.  Virtual
collaboration allows all analysts to share data simultaneously and keep the TM intelligence
picture current.  The following information discusses several possible techniques for
improving JTMTD coordination and synchronization using existing systems.

b.  The most rudimentary form of collaboration is via the telephone.  Verbal cross-talk

among TM analysts, collection managers, and targeteers over existing communications is
simple and effective and can diminish misinterpretation of TM events.  Telephonic
communication, however, requires transcription of data manually and cannot provide visual
exchange of information or transfer of massive amounts of data.

c.  One virtual option currently available is the use of Intelligence Link-S (INTELINK-

S) and JDISS.  JDISS is a transportable workstation and communications suite that
electronically extends a JIC to a JTF joint intelligence support element (JISE) or other
tactical user.  JDISS uses Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
connectivity to share intelligence production in near-real-time.   JDISS terminals are
normally located in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and not with
current operations intelligence activities.  This makes real-time data sharing difficult.
Nevertheless, JDISS can provide a virtual link and offers several applications.

(1)  One technique available is the establishment of a TM “home page,” if

authorized by the J2, containing such information as the TM IPB database (OB data,
templates and imagery), the base collection plan (PIR, essential elements of information
[EEI], collection strategy, etc.), the approved attack strategy, and target information for use
in preparing the air tasking order (ATO) or other plans, etc.  The TM home page should also
include “links” to information in other Department of Defense Intelligence Information
Systems (DODIIS) such as MIIDB, automated message handling system (AMHS), and
integrated production agency (IPA).  The J2 designates the “web master” in charge of
establishing and hosting the home page, and each component is responsible for helping to
maintain the data by posting related intelligence products, to include target folders, for
quick and easy access by others.  Having a TM “home page” can also facilitate peacetime
information exchange between the theater staffs and CONUS forces programmed for
deployment.

(2)  While the “home page” serves as a repository of current information, the

multimedia collaboration manager (MCM) tool available within JDISS provides a forum for
expanding verbal communications when necessary.  MCM provides video teleconferencing
capability (VTC), a keyboard chat room, and white-boarding capabilities ideal for
exchanging IPB products, to include imagery, templates, and intelligence reports.  This
capability could also be used to host a daily Threat Missile Analysis Meeting (TMAM) via
VTC using either JWICS or JDISS.  This meeting allows analysts and operators to
resynchronize the TM intelligence picture, coordinate TM collection priorities, and
revalidate the overall attack strategy.  The JISE Director could chair such a meeting for
component operational planners and TM analysis representatives.  Other participants
should include the JTF collection manager and the joint operations center (JOC) targeting
officer.  Ideally, this meeting should precede the J-2’s collection management meeting to
facilitate the identification and consolidation of TM collection requirements.

IV-6

d.  Although currently not available, a joint, interoperable, automated target

database system is needed to facilitate data exchange and target nomination.  Currently
each Service has automated targeting systems, but they are not  fully interoperable.  For
example, the Army’s AFATDS does not interface with the Air Force’s RAAP or CTAPS
programs.  Efforts to correct these deficiencies are still in progress.  Better virtual tools
are also under development within the framework of the Global Command and Control
System (GCCS) and other technological initiatives.

5.  JTMTD Integration Through Liaison

 The most common means of coping with today’s integration problems is through the

use of liaison officers (LNOs).  When communication links are limited or are not fully
interoperable, LNOs are critical.  In regards to the JTMTD process, LNOs provide face-to-
face coordination that can alleviate problems of miscommunication and lend expertise in
terms of developing a joint attack strategy and a single TM intelligence picture.  Each
component LNO provides Service specific expertise, systems knowledge, and, in some cases,
additional collection support.  They can also provide connectivity between Service
components that facilitates a cross-flow of time-critical information and can shorten
response time.  Both the sending and receiving organization must properly plan for LNOs.
LNO requirements can be manpower intensive.  Eventually, as new distribution and battle
management capabilities are fielded, the need for LNOs may decrease.  In the interim,
LNOs often are the only connectivity between echelons capable of providing the degree of
coordination required.  See MTTP, JTF Liaison Operations, August 1998, for additional
information on effective liaison.

6.  JTMTD Integration Through Collocation

A final option to consider is to collocate TM intelligence activities.  This option could be

used in peacetime exercises to facilitate training, but has little practicality for deployed
forces.  Collocation presents a major security issue (a HPT for the enemy), and would
require components to detach these elements to remote sites during actual hostilities.
While collocation can be beneficial in training, it does not replicate the way we intend to
fight and should be used with caution to avoid counterproductive training.

7.  Conclusion

This chapter reinforces the need for JTMTD to be an imbedded and integrated process

in joint force operations.  The need for integration is readily apparent, especially in light of
past performance in wartime and exercises.  Given the current limitations in force
structures and available collection systems, we cannot afford self-conflict and unnecessary
redundancy.  This chapter outlines “options.”  Regardless of which option the JFC chooses to
implement, the goal must remain to develop a comprehensive target development strategy
based on a sound TM IPB supported by a responsive collection system.

IV-7

All-Source Correlation Cell at Fighter Command HQ  - WWII

The ability of the V-2 units to stop operations at one location, move to a completely new
operating area, and then resume launching within a few days was a crucial component of
the Nazi campaign, especially at the outset in September 1944.  In order to direct attack
operations  against the V-2 batteries, the Allies needed to quickly localize the new
operating areas after the batteries moved.  This problem proved to be more difficult than
anticipated.  One example that highlights the extent of the problem occurred on September
25, 1944, when a V-2 battery opened fire on Norwich and Ipswich, England.  Initial Allied
estimates of the battery’s operating area ranged along an arc 100 miles in length.  It took
several days for the British to narrow the arc down and correctly identify the vicinity of
Staveren, Holland, as the new operating area.

What was the problem?  The British had established an analysis cell at Fighter Command
Headquarters to correlate data from various sources to localize the V-2 launch areas.  This
analysis cell received data on missile tracks from air defense radars in the UK, flash-
spotting and sound-ranging reports from a survey regiment on the English coast; and aerial
photographic reconnaissance images of suspected launch areas.  Once the actual campaign
began, it was discovered that these sources were not sufficient to cover an attack
originating at long range from the coast of Holland.  Provisions were quickly made to
enhance the information flowing into the “V-2 cell” at Fighter Command.  The survey
regiment brought balloons into use for their spotters in England. Spotters were also moved
to the European mainland, together with additional missile tracking radar systems, to
observe the V-2 launches at shorter ranges.  A new unit was also set up near Brussels to
pass on reports from these mainland sources through a direct communications link back to
Fighter Command Headquarters.  Missile contrail sightings by Allied bomber pilots flying
past the launch areas were also added to the mix.  The best new source was information
coming in from the Dutch underground.  New arrangements were made to get agent
reports on missile force operations passed over to Fighter Command with minimum delay.

Once the front line stabilized in October 1944, the V-2 battery at Staveren displaced to
southwest Holland to begin firing at London.  Through this consolidated approach and
with these new sources in place, Fighter Command knew about this move even before the
first missiles were launched from the new operating area in The Hague.

-- Dr. Rob Allen, Sandia National Lab

based on United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

F ig h te r  C o m m a n d   H Q

V -2   C ell

S tan m o re ,  U K

1 0 5 th   M o b ile   A ir

R e p o rtin g  U n it

M a lin s, B e lg iu m

1 0 th   S u rv e y R e g t,

R o ya l A r tille r y

E aste rn  B e lg iu m

1 1 th   S u rv e y R e g t,

R o ya l A r tille r y

C a n te rb u r y ,  U K

In te llig e n c e  S o u r ce s

H U M IN T

A g e n t r ep o r ts

C o n tr a il sig h tin g s

F lig h t  c re w   d e b rie fs

M A S IN T

R a d a r  tra c k in g

F las h  sp o ttin g

S o u n d   ra n g in g

IM IN T

P h o to -re c o n n aissa n ce

S I G IN T

U L T R A   re p o rts

C o r r ela tin g   In fo r m a tio n   o n   V -2   O p e ra tio n s

O c to b e r   1 9 4 4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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