III-20
h. CM Focus.
(1) CM processes for peacetime, crisis, and conflict do not differ greatly.
However, the level of hostilities will change the focus of the CM effort and number/types of
RSTA assets available for collection tasking.
(a) Peacetime CM
·• CM during peacetime has two purposes: acquiring sufficient database
information to permit analysts to develop a credible IPB and developing plans for
employment of RSTA assets during crisis and conflict. Peacetime TM collection efforts will
generally focus on facilities related to research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E), production and manufacturing, national storage sites, import operations,
supporting infrastructure, doctrinal information, training and exercises, and strategic
TM operations.
·• RSTA assets will likely be constrained during peacetime due to overflight
restrictions and worldwide commitments. However, there is no prohibition against planning
for periods of crisis or conflict. TM analysts and collection managers develop on-the-shelf
collection plans that include provisions for RSTA assets needed to quickly “mature” the TM
IPB and monitor TM forces in garrison before they deploy.
(b) Crisis CM. Monitoring TM activity during the early stages of a crisis is
critical. If hostilities appear imminent, the adversary will likely deploy TM forces to
dispersed locations to prepare for their employment and to protect them from attack.
Available in-theater RSTA assets, as well as other national technical means, must watch for
the deployment of missile forces and, if possible, track them to their various operating
areas. Having an on-the-shelf crisis collection plan that includes TM NAIs is essential.
(c) Conflict CM. Once conflict begins, the CM effort in support of TM target
development shifts from the strategic to the tactical. Strategic TM targets (normally fixed)
developed during peacetime planning should already be included in the initial attack
strategy, air tasking orders, target list, and collection assessment requirements. If the
enemy has already dispersed the missile forces, these attacks against strategic fixed-targets
will have only minimal immediate effect on launch operations, but may affect the
adversary’s ability to reconstitute forces. During crisis, the key to effective TM collection
efforts is establishing a near-real time intelligence feed and responsive cross-cueing
procedures for sensors.
(2) It is important to note here that RSTA operations (with exception) do not
generally collect intelligence. Rather they collect data that becomes intelligence after it is
processed, evaluated, and integrated (fused) with other pieces of information and data.
When dealing with a mobile TM threat, the classic intelligence functions of collection,
situation awareness, analysis and production, and target development must be compressed
in time, level of detailed analysis, coordination, and decision making. Figure III-14 shows
the cognitive hierarchy associated with these tasks. Tactical TM activities produce
perishable intelligence information. Unless the TM analyst knows what to look
for and, can see and interpret events in near-real time, it is unlikely that a
proactive response can be developed before the opportunity disappears. This
means that direct dissemination of data to TM analysts and targeteers is essential to