FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 2

 

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FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 2

 

 

II-3

i.  Assembly Areas.  In most cases missiles and warheads are shipped and stored

separately.  One of the final stages of preparing the weapon for launching is mating the
warhead to the missile body.  This applies to training and combat operations.

j.  Launch Areas.  TM attacks normally take place from preselected launch areas.  The

characteristics of the launch areas are dependent on missile-type.  Ballistic missiles usually
start from a hide position then move to the launch area.  Aircraft and naval vessels usually
proceed directly to a preselected launch area from their bases.

k.  Launch Preparation.  After arrival at a launch area, most ballistic missiles require

some prelaunch preparation.  These activities may involve fueling and testing the missile
and warhead components along with some assembly operations.  Launch preparations for
liquid-fueled TMs generally require longer set-up/check-out time than do solid fuel missiles.
For cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles, these activities will likely occur at an airfield
or port and may involve simply moving the missile from a storage area to a delivery
platform (aircraft or naval ship).

l.  Command, Control, and Communications (C3).  Planning TM operations is normally

a highly centralized process with tight control over the employment and selection of targets.
Execution of TM operations may be either centralized or decentralized.  The degree of
centralization is generally determined by the amount of control desired by civilian or senior
military leaders, the capability for secure radio or hardwire communications, the ability of
the opposing forces to detect or locate transmitters, and the tactics employed.  WMD-armed
missiles will be tightly controlled because of their political sensitivity and the possibility of
retaliation.  Thus, WMD-associated TM units will normally require robust communication
links or constant communication with national leadership for launch authorization.

m.  Support Units.  Most TM systems require an extensive support system.  Support

units provide a variety of functions to include maintenance, rearming and refueling,
personnel replacement, etc.  They also deliver replacement warheads and missiles and
conduct all the electronic testing and repair.  During peacetime, these units will probably be
collocated with the TM firing units in garrison.  In wartime, they may disperse to FOBs or
forward operating locations (FOLs), dispersal/staging airfields, or naval operating areas.

3.  Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)

a.  Definition.  TBMs or surface-to-surface missiles are characterized by their

trajectory, having one or more boosters and an initial steering vector.  They have a range of
30 to greater than 3300 kilometers (50 to 2000 miles) and can travel this distance in 5 to 20
minutes.  Once launched, ballistic missiles are guided to their preselected targets using
gyroscopic assemblies.

b.  Threat Employment Concepts.

(1)  Prime strategic targets for ballistic missiles are large, soft, heavily defended,

and deep rear area facilities that are critical to a nation’s warfighting ability.  Examples
include airfields, air defense sites, transportation centers (ports and airfields), logistical
hubs, and national command and control nodes.  Additionally, key population centers are

II-4

prime targets whose attack might create panic among the populace and foster a political
crisis.  TBMs may also be used in a tactical sense to affect battlefield logistics and
operations; although, this is less likely given the strategic importance of such weapons to
developing nations.

(2)  Mobility enhances TBM survivability and, conversely, complicates targeting

efforts.  Their long range affords the enemy increased options in selecting operating areas
and determining potential targets.  TBMs have been exported by many nations (the Scud
and its derivatives being the most common).  The Scud employs the full spectrum of
warheads.  The Scud, as well as the Soviet designed SS-21 Scarab, can be set up and fired in
less than 45 minutes and subsequently relocated within minutes.  Some modified versions
of the Scud missile have demonstrated a tendency to break up during terminal phase
descent; this break up further complicates defensive efforts.

(3)  Surface-to-air missile systems have been modified into surface-to-surface

missiles (SSM) in China and South Korea.  This trend will likely spread to other nations. As
missile systems and missile technology proliferate, nations will acquire or be able to
produce missile systems using solid fuels.  This will significantly reduce the dwell time
required for system checks and fueling during launch preparation.  This reduced dwell time
will significantly reduce the TMs signature and the time available for preemptive attack
operations.

c.  Threat Employment Operations.

(1)  TBM operations are generally broken down into five major phases.  These

include readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution.  Figure II-1
depicts of the phases.

(a)  Readiness Phase.  The readiness phase encompasses normal day-to-day

peacetime operations.  During this phase, TBM forces train on wartime tasks and practice
doctrinal employment in the local training areas (LTA) or in garrison.  This normally entails
missile erection, site preparation, TEL operations, and missile maintenance.  Support units
will perform maintenance on firing units and conduct resupply operations.

(b) Deployment Phase.  The deployment phase may include initial movement

from the garrison location(s) to the initial war fighting positions to support established
objectives.  TBM force deployment will depend on the range to the target, missile capability,
terrain, and survivability considerations.  Firing units will move to either hide positions or
directly into launch positions.  Support units will likely move to a FOB or FOL and from
there conduct support to transload operations.  (Note: Deployment may or may not
convey hostile intent, depending upon the circumstances.
)

(c)  Employment Phase.  The employment phase encompasses initial combat

operations.  During this phase, TELs move missiles to their initial firing positions from a
hide site and then, after launch, move to another hide site or directly to transload
operations, depending on the threat.  The support unit will establish the transload location
based upon doctrine, terrain, the TBM force commander’s firing schedule, and the threat.

II-5

Brigade HQ

Brigade HQ

Transloading Area

Transloading Area

Fire

Control

Site

Launch

Site

Missile

Checkout

Resupply

Vehicle

Loading

Propellant

Loading

Security

Forces

Support &

Services

Combat

Engineering

Battalion HQ

Transloading Area

Launch

Site

Hide Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Launch

Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Field

Operating Location

GENERIC FUNCTIONAL

DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE

for LAND-LAUNCHED THEATER MISSILEs

National

Command

Authority

Brigade HQ

Storage &

Maintenance

Garrison

Peacetime Depot/

Rear Combat Support

Missile

Storage

Warhead

Storage

Propellant

Storage

Missile

Storage

Missile

Storage

Propellant

Storage

Warhead

Storage

Warhead

Storage

Propellant

Storage

Forward

Operating  Base

(Could Be Assigned

To Battalion Level)

Security

Forces

Support &

Services

Combat

Engineering

Special Weapons

Storage

Fire

Control

Site

Fire

Control

Site

Fire

Control

Site

Intermediate
Military HQs

Transloading Area

Transloading Area

Fire

Control

Site

Launch

Site

Missile

Checkout

Resupply

Vehicle

Loading

Propellant

Loading

Security

Forces

Support &

Services

Combat

Engineering

Battalion HQ

Transloading Area

Launch

Site

Hide Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Launch

Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Field

Operating Location

Transloading Area

Transloading Area

Fire

Control

Site

Launch

Site

Missile

Checkout

Resupply

Vehicle

Loading

Propellant

Loading

Security

Forces

Support &

Services

Combat

Engineering

Battalion HQ

Transloading Area

Launch

Site

Hide Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Launch

Site

Fire

Control

Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Hide Site

Forward

Operating Location

Figure II-1. Theater Employment Operations

II-6

(d)  Sustainment Phase.  During the sustainment phase, support units will

likely use a FOB or FOL to conduct the necessary repair/replacement operations to sustain
the TBM force.  Sustainment operations require support units to use LOC from garrison
locations, field storage areas, and/or the manufacturing infrastructure/import facilities to
the FOB and forward.

(e)  Reconstitution Phase.  The reconstitution phase encompasses continuous

operations between firing units, support units, and higher echelon logistics locations to
regenerate TBM forces.

d.  Threat Employment–TTPs.

(1)  TEL Operations.  TELs serve as the transporter and launch platform for

missiles.  The most common TEL is the Soviet era MAZ-543.  TELs present a small,
extremely mobile target with very short dwell time.  The MAZ-543 has tremendous off-road
mobility and can easily hide.  TELs generally travel only short distances between hide sites,
launch sites, and transload sites, unless required to return to the FOB or FOL for additional
maintenance.   A TEL will be in launch configuration for a very short period of time and can
displace to a new hide site in a matter of minutes.

(2)  Transload Site.  The transload site is where fueled, ready missiles are loaded

onto TELs.  Support unit personnel, vehicles, and equipment from the FOB or FOL
rendezvous at this site with firing unit TELs.  At this site there are generally a number of
vehicles: missile resupply vehicles (with one to three missiles), a crane (possibly attached to
the resupply vehicle), and other GSE as required by the missile type.  Figure II-2 shows
an example of the GSE required to support a SS-1 launch.  GSE likely may not have
great off-road mobility; in such cases, transload sites will likely be only a short distance
from improved roads.  The transload site is usually an open area large enough to allow
the crane to lift/pivot the missile onto the TEL, approximately 50 by 50 meters.  This
operation can occur in large buildings or underground facilities with sufficient height,
approximately 20 meters.  When detected, this site will remain vulnerable throughout
its established dwell time.

(3)  FOL.  A FOL is typically where warheads and missiles are mated, missiles are

fueled, and missiles are loaded onto the resupply vehicle.  A FOL remains in place from half
a day to 3 days.  The FOL usually contains warheads and missile airframes, transporters,
cranes, checkout vehicles, fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel), and resupply and other
support vehicles.  FOLs can be located in rural or urban settings, and may be hidden in a
building complex or underground facility.  The FOL has a larger footprint than TEL or
transload operations but is still difficult to locate.  Some countries may not employ FOLs,
preferring to conduct these operations out of the FOB.

(4)  FOB.  The FOB is the main TM unit supply and storage activity and will be

spread out over a large geographic area for survivability.  The number of FOBs will depend
on the size of the missile force (targets selected and acceptable travel distances for support
units).  In situations where a country’s geographic area is small, it is possible that
operations typically associated with the FOB could be conducted from garrison.

II-7

(a)  A typical FOB contains warhead, missile and propellant storage sites;

transporters and cranes; checkout vehicles; fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel); and
resupply and other support vehicles.  An FOB can be established in an urban environment
hidden in large buildings or underground facilities or in the field.  The FOB will normally
deploy GSE to FOLs and/or transload sites as needed to sustain launch operations.  FOBs
require robust LOCs (primarily roads and rail lines) to support continuous operations.

(b)  The FOB cannot be easily hidden, but may be difficult to

distinguish from other logistics facilities.  Once established, the FOB will probably not
be moved in total, but certain components may be moved to complicate detection, create a
deception, or facilitate launch operations.

e.  Graphic Presentations.  Figures II-3 through II-6 depict the typical flow of TM (both

TBM and ground launched cruise missile) elements into a national level TM infrastructure.

4.  Cruise Missiles

a.  Definition.  Cruise missiles are defined as a guided missile, the major portion of

whose flight path to its target is conducted at approximately constant velocity, and depends
on the dynamic reaction of air for lift and upon propulsion forces to balance drag.  A cruise
missile is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of
aerodynamic lift over most of its flight.  Cruise missiles usually navigate autonomously to
the targets and depending on their sophistication can position themselves through a
number of update methods along extended flight routes.  Cruise missiles are capable of
delivering the full complement of warheads; from conventional to WMD.

b.  Threat Cruise Missiles.

•  An SS-1 Requires 5 To 8 

Separate Support Vehicles 
To Generate A Single Launch 

 
•  Other Missiles Are Similar

Command And Control Vehicle

Missile Fuel And Oxidizer Vehicles

Missile Transport Vehicle

Warhead Transport Vehicle

Crane Vehicle

Transporter Erector Launcher

Figure II-2.  Vehicles Required to Generate an SS-1 Launch

II-8

(1)  Very few nations currently possess sophisticated cruise missiles, such as

the US Navy Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) or US Air Force (USAF)
conventional air launch cruise missile (CALCM).  Employment by developed nations has
been limited.  The majority of cruise missiles in potential threat nations are short range
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) with ranges up to 100 nautical miles, such as China’s
Silkworm.  Some countries are modifying ASCM  for a land attack role.

Threat Nation

TBM and Cruise Missile

Infrastructure  and

Technical Base

Production Capabilities

Imported Capabilities

National Level  Depot Storage

Garrison Location

Theater Level Depot Storage

Garrison Location

Brigade Level  -Garrison

Responsible for establishing the Forward Operating Base (FOB)

Battalion Level  - Garrison

Responsible for establishing the Forward Operating Locations

and Transload Sites (FOL/TL)

Battery Level

Garrison

Figure II-3.  Typical TM “Flow” National to Tactical

II-9

Threat Nation

TBM  and Cruise Missile

Infrastructure  and

Technical Base

National Level  Depot Storage

Garrison Location

Tel Storage

Depot

Production Capabilities
Missile Body
Warhead
Fuel
TEL
Critical Repair Parts

Imported Capabilities
Missile Body
Warhead
Fuel
TEL
Critical Repair Parts

Msl Storage

Depot

Warhead Storage Depots

Critical

Repair Parts

Chemical

Nuclear

Conventional

Oxidizer

Starter

Fuel

Fuel Storage Depots

(Nuclear  warheads remain at National  Level)

Conventional and Chemical

Warhead Storage

Critical

Repair Parts

Msl Storage

Theater Level Depot Storage

Garrison Location

(Chemical warheads normally remain at Theater Level)

Tel Storage

Fuel Storage

All Fuel Elements

(2)  Future cruise missile technology will build on existing low observable, sensor

defeating designs using radar absorbing materials and composite materials such as Kevlar
or carbon fiber to further reduce their radar cross sections (RCS) and render them more
difficult to detect.  Cruise missile are characterized as having the following features:

·

RCS of .1 square meter or less (-10 decibel [db] and lower)

·

Low IR signature (varies by type of cruise missile)

Figure II-4.  National Theater Level TM Material Feeder System

II-10

National  or Theater Level

Garrison Location

Production Capabilities
Missile Body
Warhead
Fuel
TEL
Critical Repair Parts

Imported Capabilities
Missile Body
Warhead
Fuel
TEL
Critical Repair Parts

Operational (Brigade) Level

Garrison Location

 Deployed
Battalions

 Deployed

Forward Operating

Base

 Dispersed

Firing Battery

Forward

Operating

Location

Single

TEL

Transload

Sites

Single

TEL

Single

TEL

Figure II-5.  Typical Deployed TM Organization

II-11

·

Acoustic signature (varies by type of cruise missile)

·

Cruise altitude of 100’ to 2000’ above ground level (AGL) or 50,000’ above
mean sea level (MSL)

·

Range of 100 to 1000 nautical miles (NM)

Forward

Operating

Base

Support Missile (SM) Brigade

Dispersed

Firing

Battery

Forward

Operating

Location

(SM Battalion)

Numerous

Single

TEL’s

Missile Brigade

Garrison Location

 Moving 

 Moving To Pre-Launch 

Hide Sites

 Moving to Dispersion Sites 

Single

TEL

 Moving To Launch Site 

TELFires

Missile

Single

TEL

 Prep for Firing 

 Moving to Post Launch Hide 

Single

TEL

Return to

 Pre-Launch 

Hide Site

 Moving to Transload Site 

Transload

(SM Battery)

Transload Site

Reload  TEL

Figure II-6.  Launch/Support System Interface

II-12

·

Payload of 200 to 1000 pounds (lbs).

·

Speed range of high subsonic (low altitude) or supersonic (high altitude)

·

Air, land, or sea launched

c.  Threat Cruise Missile Employment.

(1)  Cruise missiles stress air defense systems because they are difficult for

theater sensors and weapons systems to detect, identify, track, acquire, and destroy.  Cruise
missiles are normally more difficult to detect than the larger TBM because they do not give
off as large a heat signature at launch and normally have a smaller RCS.  Ground based
surveillance radars may have a difficult time detecting cruise missiles when in low level
flight (following terrain contours) because of line-of-sight restrictions created by terrain
masking.  Similarly, airborne radar systems may have a difficult time isolating cruise
missiles from ambient noise caused by ground clutter.  These traits, when combined with
radar evasion techniques and low observable (LO) construction methods, cause delays in
detection and engagement decisions by battle managers.  However, once cruise missiles are
detected in flight, they can be engaged by fighters, air defense artillery (ADA), and surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs).

(2)  The expected flight profile for a cruise missile is low altitude, medium-to-high

speed.  Although a low altitude cruise missile flight profile presents a higher RCS view to
airborne radar, it also requires the airborne radar to search through ground clutter.  Ground
radars may be able to detect the release of an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), but will
have increased difficulty in tracking the cruise missile at low altitudes.

(3)  Sea-launched (SLCM) and ground-launched (GLCM) cruise missiles present

opportunities for detection as well as challenges for surveillance systems.  Surface
launch systems must normally be boosted to “cruise” altitude.  The boosted phase often
uses a rocket motor that will produce an infrared signature that could potentially be
exploited by space-based or properly positioned theater assets.  ALCMs do not have a
boost plume since aircraft or UAV deliver them above the cruise altitude.  Although the
cruise missile has a small RCS, it is vulnerable to radar detection during descent to its
low-level altitude.  Once near the surface and in a terrain following mode, sensors have
to filter radar ground clutter to extract a radar signature from these low altitude profile
missiles.

(4)  High altitude, high mach profiles rely on altitude and speed to overcome

defenses. Because the cruise missile is high, ground-based radars will not be obstructed by
the curvature of the earth and airborne radars can discriminate them from ground clutter.
As a result, when using the high altitude profile, cruise missiles are more likely to be
detected earlier in flight than when using a low-level profile.

(5)  Cruise missiles provide a significant standoff range for the aircraft or launch

platform and remove the “manned” component of the weapons system from the immediate
target area.  The release range of cruise missiles from aircraft and other platforms can
easily be beyond a defender’s radar and sensor range.  The long distance release or launch
of cruise missiles and their smaller radar signature increase the possibility that
surveillance assets will not detect missiles.  Battle managers require automated cues to

II-13

narrow their focus in detecting cruise missiles in any surveillance area.  Combining
hostile aircraft attacks with cruise missile and air-to-surface missile (ASM)  attacks may
allow  “leakers” to get through.  Indeed, cruise missiles may resemble and be
misidentified as manned aircraft.

(6)  Rapid combat identification is critical for cruise missile defense.  Rapid TBM

identification is a less important factor because they can be readily identified hostile based
on point of origin and identifiable flight profiles.  Cruise missile defense is further
complicated by the use of low observable (LO) technology and SOF aircraft without
identification-friend or foe (IFF) transponders operating, thus requiring verification as
friendly prior to attack.  Cruise missiles make surveillance and detection difficult because
their flight profiles are specifically designed to defeat or confuse radar tracking.  As with
ballistic missiles, the objective is to eliminate as many cruise missiles as possible before
launch. Cruise missiles in flight are definitely time-sensitive targets (TSTs).  The challenge
for defending against cruise missiles is to find them early, before launch if possible, and
engage them before they can navigate to their targets.

(7)  Training patterns or identifiable launch sequence events are rarely observed

or practiced in an overt environment.  Consequently, the probability of conclusively
identifying a ground-launched cruise missile TEL using current sensor data is small.
Attacking a cruise missile TEL requires the earliest possible detection of the target and the
ability of sensors to discriminate between TELs and other targets.  Targeting cruise missiles
will therefore depend in great part on pre-hostility IPB efforts.  Targeteers will require
information on infrastructure, logistic support patterns, movement discipline, and
signatures of typical storage and assembly facilities.  Identification by signature is key to
finding cruise missiles before launch, since detecting the launch itself or tracing the flight
path back to the launch site may be extremely difficult when they are launched from
maximum range.

a.  Cruise Missile Target Development

(1)  Procedures for finding and targeting cruise missiles on the ground are no

different than for finding other targets using a variety of theater and national sensors.
Space based and theater RSTA assets will normally collect intelligence data on these
targets prior to armed conflict as part of IPB.  Sensors on Joint Surveillance, Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and SOF pass mobile and
stationary cruise missile target information to analysts and battle managers by datalink or
voice.  Data collected and fused from multiple sensors will provide the necessary
confirmation of the target.  Characterization of a surface target as a WMD will depend on
data from high-resolution sensors such as Enhanced and Inverse Synthetic Aperture
Radars (E/ISAR).   Immediate threat data will be broadcast over intelligence processing and
transmissions systems such as Tactical Related Applications (TRAP) and Tactical Data
Dissemination Systems (TDDS).

(2)  When conflict begins, sensors must be used to validate known target

information.  Aircraft and naval launch platforms for ALCM and SLCM provide identifiable
signatures against relatively uncluttered backgrounds (sky and sea) and will yield
opportunities to detect, track, acquire, and attack these platforms.  GLCMs will present a
more difficult target set.  The following is a discussion of targeting methods against each
category:

II-14

(a)  ALCM.  Destroying ALCM capable aircraft on the ground or neutralizing

their supporting airstrips/bases is the best means to prevent ALCM employment.  In this
context, missions against this target system do not differ from other offensive counterair
(OCA) missions in terms of tactics or weapons.  The IPB process must focus on providing the
intelligence targeteers need to determine which aircraft and air bases support ALCM
activity and task missions against them accordingly.

(b)  SLCM.  Destroying the launch platform in port is the best means to

prevent SLCM launch.  The IPB process will provide the naval order of battle (OB)
information to identify specific SLCM carriers and support bases for targeteers and
battle managers to task missions against them.  Signatures of naval vessels and their
substantial support base infrastructure will facilitate finding SLCM targets by satellite,
UAV, and other surveillance platforms.

(c)  GLCM.  GLCM platforms are normally an adaptation of any available

vehicle chassis capable of supporting one to two tons.  Any medium to large size truck or
tracked vehicle could be developed into a cruise missile TEL.  These TELs will likely be
considerably smaller and less distinct than heavier TBM TELs; however, a robust IPB effort
can catalog such known and suspected vehicles for exploitation by surveillance sensors.
GLCM deployment and training in suspect nations must be collected against and studied
for behavioral cues to detection.  Long range GLCM permit the enemy to establish a large
number of well-dispersed, fixed launch locations (both actual and decoy) deep within their
own territory.  The enemy can be expected to employ camouflage, concealment, and
deception (CCD) against fixed and mobile TELs to reduce probability of detection.
Targeting mobile GLCM platforms or newly discovered fixed sites as TSTs will depend on a
robust IPB; dynamic management of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets;
dedicated and trained analysts aided by technology improvements such as automatic target
recognition (ATR) systems; and a responsive command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence (C4I) architecture.

5.  ASMs

ASM employment can be expected on all battlefields.  Like TBMs and cruise missiles,

ASMs are capable of delivering a complete range of warheads and can be carried by a
variety of rotary and fixed-wing platforms.  Flight profiles, short flight times, and reduced
RCS make these missiles difficult to track, acquire, and target. ASMs increase the
survivability of the delivery platform through standoff capability beyond the range of point
defenses.  Most of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and former Warsaw Pact
nations are equipped with US and Russian manufactured systems respectively and have
exported these systems throughout the world. The best method for countering ASMs is to
target the delivery platforms and related bases and facilities.

6.  Conclusion

While each TM system is unique, each category (TBM, Cruise Missile, and ASMs)

exhibits similar characteristics and functional operations.  This chapter discusses the
essential framework for each in a generic fashion and serves as a foundation for an initial
understanding of how TMs operate.  Specific analysis is required to apply this information

II-15

to a particular missile system and country.  The vignette at the end of this chapter is
included as a reminder that facts must be proven, not simply accepted.

The Lure of the Expected

Deception is a key part of any combat operations.  The examples below illustrate what happens

when analysts stop analyzing events and begin to believe what they think they are seeing.

World War II

Prior to the beginning of the V-1 attacks against London on June 12, 1944, the Allied attack

operations concentrated on an elaborate system of “sites” which were believed to be Nazi V-1 launch
locations.  The locations were dubbed “ski sites” because of the shape of several long, curved
buildings that were characteristic in the aerial photographs of each location.  These sites were targeted
and heavily bombed from December 1943 through May 1944.  Although the “ski sites” were largely
destroyed, not one of the real V-1 sites was attacked during this period.  Once Hitler unleashed his
missile force on England in June, the volume of V-1 launches provided incontrovertible evidence that
a second set of launch sites was actually being used.  Not until then did the weight of the Allied
bombing effort finally begin to shift to the correct targets.  Even so, the real sites were so hard to find
due to Nazi camouflage and concealment measures that attacks were still being made on nearby decoy
“ski sites” until the end of June.

-  Based on Operation CROSSBOW Volume of the US Strategic Bombing Survey

Gulf War

The initial hope of the planners in Riyadh that heavy attacks on the fixed Scud sites during the

opening hours of the air campaign would largely eliminate Iraq’s capability to launch ballistic missiles
against Israel or regional members of the U.S.-led Coalition proved to be illusory.  On the night of 16-
17 January 1991, the fixed Scud launchers in western Iraq functioned as “decoys” that diverted
attention away from the mobile launchers that had already deployed to their wartime “hide” sites, and
the first of Iraq’s extended-range Scuds were fired at Israel the following night.

Once Scuds started falling, first on Israel and then on Saudi Arabia two days later, the next best

military option would have been to locate and attack mobile launchers before they had time to fire.
Soviet exercise patterns in central Europe with Scud-B’s and Iraqi practice during the Iran-Iraq War,
indicated that if the Iraqis followed prior practices, there might be enough pre-launch signatures and
time to give patrolling aircraft some chance of attacking mobile launchers before they fired.  However,
the Iraqis dramatically cut their pre-launch set-up times, avoided any pre-launch electromagnetic
emissions that might give away their locations before launch, and seeded the launch areas with decoys
(some of which were very high in fidelity).  ….most (and possibly all) of the roughly 100 mobile
launchers reported destroyed by Coalition aircraft and special operation forces now appear to have
been either decoys, other vehicles such as tanker trucks, or other objects unfortunate enough to provide
“Scud-like” signatures.

- Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993

III-1

Chapter III

STRATEGIES AND PROCEDURES

1.  Theater Missile Strategy Development

a.  TM strategy development requires a joint effort between operations and intelligence

personnel at the JTF and component levels and must be an integral part of the JFC’s
overall campaign strategy (Figure III -1).  Planners develop a TM strategy based on the
JFC’s objectives and guidance and known intelligence.  In turn, the approved strategy
drives IPB, collection management, and target development.

b.  A TM attack strategy should do the following:

(1)  Plan for continuous  engagement of the entire TM target system.

(2)  Orient on the TM vulnerabilities and decisive points.

COLLECTION
MANAGEMENT

TARGET

      DEVELOPMENT

INTELLIGENCE

PREPARATION OF

THE

BATTLESPACE

JTMTD

JTF CAMPAIGN

TM
ATTACK
STRATEGY

Figure III-1. Joint Theater Missile Target Development Construct

“It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons
[V1/V2} six months earlier than he [Hitler] did, our invasion of Europe would have proved
exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.  I feel sure that if he had succeeded in using these
weapons over a six-month period, and particularly if he had made the Portsmouth-Southampton
area one of his principal targets, Overlord might have been written off”.
 

-- Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe

III-2

(3)  Be supported by predictive and developed intelligence.

(4)  Be synchronized with the overall phases of the campaign.

(5)  Maximize use of all available resources.

(6)  Be continuously assessed and adjusted.

c.  Continuous engagement of TMs is necessary to deprive the adversary of the

initiative.  Attacking the entire target system simultaneously prevents enemy TM forces
from conducting unimpeded operations and forces them to change their operating patterns
to regain the initiative.  This potentially creates further opportunities for exploitation by
exposing TM vulnerabilities.

d.  Doctrinal templates and enemy courses of action (COA) developed during initial IPB

serve as the basis for identifying TM vulnerabilities and exploitable decisive points.  A
decisive point is a point, usually geographical in nature, that, when retained, provides the
commander with an advantage over his opponent.  Decisive points may also be physical
elements such as critical equipment, command posts, communications nodes, etc.
Determining TM vulnerabilities and decisive points requires a thorough understanding of
the adversary’s operational capabilities, concept of operations (CONOPS), and intentions.
Once identified, these elements or specific aspects of the target system may become high
payoff targets (HPTs) for nomination and attack when acquired.

e.   The TM attack strategy is fully dependent on predictive and developed intelligence

derived from the IPB process.  Predictive intelligence implies that the friendly level of
understanding of the enemy’s plan is sufficient to predict what likely will occur next.  In the
case of TMs, this means developing a near-real time picture of TM activity and detailed
analysis of potential TM operating areas.  Because TM information is highly perishable, the
collection strategy and sensor distribution plan must be tailored to support these
requirements.

f.  The TM strategy also defines the phasing, timing, and desired effects of attacks.  For

example, the initial phase may focus on immediately reducing TM launches, while later
phases may focus on destroying the enemy’s ability to reconstitute TMs in the future.  The
strategy must also define what “success” means for each phase based on combat assessment
results (for example, TM launches reduced 70% by D+7).  An example of theater level
guidance regarding TMs might be written as follows:

Establish an intelligence collection plan, to include locating and targeting
enemy missile order-of-battle (i.e., WMD storage sites, manufacture and
assembly facilities), forward operating bases, and LOC supporting the
missile order of battle.  Reduce the enemy’s ability to reconstitute, store,
and transport TMs with WMD.  Complete destruction of missile manufac-
ture/assembly facilities, known storage facilities, and FOBs.  Degrade by
50% the LOC between storage facilities and FOBs
.

III-3

g.  Once a broad attack strategy has been defined, tasks and subtasks can be written

to amplify specifics and aid strategy implementation.  Table III-1 illustrates possible
attack strategy tasks and subtasks.

h.  As stated in Chapter 2, TM threats cut across many operational/component lines.

This makes countering TMs a joint task.  All collection and attack assets must be
employed in a manner that maximizes the strategies.  Fixating on one particular
platform over another is counterproductive.  
Each available asset must be considered
on the merit of how it best contributes to the strategy given the circumstances.  The attack
strategy should also define how time-sensitive TM targets will be prosecuted or tracked for
intelligence and should discuss optimal use of assets.

i.  Finally, just as the overall campaign is assessed and adjusted based on the situation,

so must the TM strategies.  Based on feedback from combat assessment of friendly
operations, weapon system availability, and the enemy’s response current operations and
intelligence personnel reassess collection and attack strategies.  These assessments help
determine when a particular phase has been completed, whether the next phase should be
implemented, and how to adjust plans to better meet the JFC’s overall objectives regarding
TMs.  Keeping continuous pressure on the entire TM target system during transition
between and throughout each phase of the operation is essential.

j.  Who conducts JTMTD and how it is integrated between echelons is the subject of

Chapter IV.  In the end, however, it is less important where these functions occur than that
they are done in a dedicated, cohesive, and timely manner to achieve the desired end state.
Figure III-2 depicts the activities and steps involved in conducting attack operations.  This
publication’s principal focus is on implementation of sensor activities necessary to achieve
TM target nominations.

     Task 1

Disrupt enemy TM launch operations.

     Task 1A:

Destroy FOBs and ground support equipment necessary to
conduct launch operations.

     Task 1B:

Countermobility: interdict key LOC between FOBs, transload
sites, and firing locations.

     Task 1C:

Destroy/disrupt enemy TM C2 capabilities: force enemy to use
more exploitable communications. 

     Task 2

Destroy enemy long-term TM capability.

     Task 2A:

Destroy key TM production/test facilities.

     Task 2B:

Destroy TM garrison and depot facilities.

     Task 3

Destroy TELs at firing locations and hide sites.

Table III-1  Example Task to Subtask Translation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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