FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 3

 

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FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 3

 

 

III-4

2.  JTMTD Process

a.  There are multiple paths to countering TMs; some defensive, others offensive.

Offensive measures to prevent launch are significantly complicated by the target system’s
mobility, dispersed operating patterns, and elusive tactics.  Achieving pre-emptive success
against TMs requires a melding of three processes: IPB, collection management, and target
development (refer  back to Figure III-1).  While each process is distinct, they cannot
achieve their collective purpose if they are not properly harmonized.

b.  Effective theater missile defense (TMD) requires a cohesive collection plan, capable

of providing timely intelligence information into a well established IPB process.  The enemy
TM picture provided by IPB requires constant monitoring and must be updated in near-real
time.  Equally important is the need for streamlined target nomination procedures.  IPB,
CM,  and target development processes are a routine part of operations at all echelons of
command.  “Harmonizing” these processes requires implementing TTPs that provide quality
TM target nominations through established staffing mechanisms (for example, the JTCB).
Achieving this “harmony” is a challenge – and the focus of this chapter.

c.  JTMTD is the synergistic outcome of allocating, integrating, and

synchronizing resources in order to identify and nominate selected targets in the
TM target system for timely attack
.  It is how we accomplish the following:

Figure III-2. TMD Attack Operations Activities

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Sensor Activities

(Nomination)

C4I Activities

(Prosecution)

Attack Activities

(Execution)

Collection Management

and Fusion

TMD Attack Operations Activities

Post-atta

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III-5

(1)  Apply the IPB process in a logical manner to TMs.

(2)  Establish a common perspective of the enemy TM intelligence picture among

all analysts, planners, and execution forces.

(3)  Use this common understanding and the JFC’s objectives and guidance to

devise a joint attack strategy against the entire TM target system to disrupt, neutralize, or
destroy the threat missileer’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO – the ability to conduct and
sustain launch operations).

(4)  Submit TM intelligence requirements into the CM process for application of

national and theater assets.

(5)  Employ joint C4I systems to monitor, detect, and report TM activities, and

responsively cue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to confirm TM
activity.

(6)  Collaboratively integrate perishable combat and all-source intelligence

information to refine the TM picture and confirm which COA the adversary has chosen.

(7)  Capitalize on situational awareness (SA) to rapidly develop target

nominations.

(8)  After force execution, integrate post-strike combat assessment (CA) to adjust

the attack strategy.

3.  TM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (TM IPB)

a.  Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is the analytical process

used to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence support products
that enable the JFC and the joint staff to visualize the full spectrum of adversary
capabilities and COA across all dimensions of the battlespace.  JIPB for TMs is the
integration of national, theater and component intelligence operations to develop a single
TM intelligence picture.  The guiding principles for conducting JIPB are delineated in Joint
Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (Draft), and US Army
field manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.  The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC)-061-0789-97 (S), Theater
Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Methodology 
(S), provides in-
depth information on conducting TM-specific IPB.

b.  JIPB is the process of building an extensive database for each potential JOA and

then analyzing it in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain
on friendly operations.  JIPB is a continuous and iterative process (Figure III-3) with input
from many levels and is usually presented in graphic form.  Components conduct IPB to
meet their respective needs, which contributes to the overall JIPB process for the joint force.

“A good IPB is essential if the operators are to understand how the threat is likely to operate, to get
the sensors in the most effective configuration and to react to subtle TM activity indicators.  The
IPB information helps sort out real TM information from the distracting background traffic”.

- Joint Theater Missile Defense – Attack Operations Joint Test Force, 1997

III-6

c.  TM IPB is the continuous application of the JIPB methodology against each specific

missile threat in a specific geographical area.  A well-developed TM IPB provides the
intelligence necessary to determine likely TM COA and associated COA branches and
sequels and describes the environment in which friendly operations and planning must
occur.  TM IPB supports offensive, defensive, and passive counter missile efforts.  TM IPB
differs from other air-, land-, or sea-focused IPB.  For example, while a ground IPB
concentrates on maneuver forces in defensive positions or moving forward, TM IPB focuses
on dispersed ground activities in the enemy’s rear area most likely moving away from the
front.  Likewise, an air-focused IPB would center on intelligence required to achieve air
superiority, conduct air interdiction and strategic attack vice the more narrow focus TM
threat.  From an analytical perspective, TM IPB breaks down and correlates the who
(units), what (equipment), when (timing), where (infrastructure), why
(objectives), and how (operations) of an enemy TM force to derive likely enemy
COA.

d.  Developing a TM IPB requires dedicated analysts who have developed a keen

understanding of the enemy’s TM forces through repetitive analysis – it is a full-time
function.  While all missile systems have similar characteristics, each country’s TM force
will differ depending on how it is equipped, organized, trained, and employed.  Appendix C
provides a list of questions that can help analysts start the TM IPB process.

e.  As depicted in Figure III-3, IPB is a continuous and iterative process, with each step

looping back to previous steps to keep the IPB valid and complete.  IPB provides
intelligence and operational decision-makers direction in adjusting collection efforts and
conducting operations.  For TM IPB efforts to be effective, all commanders and supporting
staffs must understand and apply the methodology in the same manner.  The following
sections provide the basis for a common approach.

f.  TM IPB Process.

(1)  Define the Battlespace Environment – Step 1 (Figure III-4)

(a)  The objective of Step 1 is to focus the IPB effort on the areas and

characteristics of the battlespace that will influence the joint force’s response to TM threats.
This step focuses initial intelligence collection efforts and provides the foundation for the

Define the

Battlespace

Environment

(Focus)

Describe the

effects of the

Battlespace

(Influence)

Evaluate

theThreat

(Model)

Determine

Threat COA

(Integrate)

STEP 1

STEP 2

STEP 3

STEP 4

Figure III-3. JIPB Iterative Steps

III-7

remaining IPB steps; it identifies the dimensions of the battlespace and the significant
characteristics that require in-depth evaluation.  Most importantly, this step evaluates the
amount of time available to conduct the IPB and  the completeness of existing database
information and identifies intelligence gaps.

(b)  Identifying significant characteristics includes developing a broad

understanding of the region’s terrain and climatology and the enemy’s national strategic
context (geopolitical environment) and a basic understanding of the threat’s TM capability.
This understanding is the basis for defining TM AO and area of interest (AI) – see glossary
for definitions.  Given the range of weapons systems and the size of potential adversary
countries, the typical AO and AI is usually quite large.  Accessing the amount of time
available to achieve the desired level of intelligence “readiness” is very important.
Overcoming time limitations requires prioritizing efforts and maximizing analytical and
collection resources.  This means that the AO and AI must be “scoped down” to the areas
that require detailed analysis and “ordered” according to priority of work.

(c)  One technique for “scoping down”  is to examine the friendly defended

asset list (DAL) in conjunction with the adversary’s national strategic context.  In doing so,
analysts can develop an initial list of most likely friendly targets for enemy missiles.  Using
this list of likely friendly targets at risk and the maximum range of the enemy’s TM
weapons systems, analysts can then “reverse engineer” the most likely TM operating areas.
As stated in Chapter II, the enemy missile force is likely to be as deep into his AO on Day 1
of a conflict as they will go.  Therefore, initial area delimitation can be accomplished by
drawing weapons systems maximum range arcs on a map from the likely targets (friendly
key assets) back into the adversary’s operating area.  This “arced in” area can be further
refined by eliminating areas that do not have sufficient infrastructure (road networks, rail
lines, cover and concealment, etc.) to support missile force operations based on knowledge of

Figure III-4. Define the Battlespace Environment

Define Area of Interest

• TM threat coverage
• Unit’s Capability
• TMD deployment
• Lines of communication
• Missile targets
• Other countries

Define Area of Operations

• Assigned Responsibility
• Unit’s Capability
• TM infrastructure
• TMD deployment
• TM threat coverage
• Missile targets

Organize and Evaluate Intelligence Data; Identify Intelligence Gaps

Determine Amount of

Detail Required and Time

Available

• Time to complete IPB
• Detail required
• Evaluate existing data
• Initiate data collection

Identify Significant

Characteristics of the

Environment

• Terrain
• Climatology
• National strategic context
• General threat TM

capabilities

Associated TM IPB Data

• Top-level terrain and LOC
• Climatology data overview
• National security context
• Threat TM force overview
• Intelligence information requirements
• Intelligence search & retrieval
• Points of contact

III-8

the adversary’s TM TTPs.  What remains are the likely TM forward operating areas that
require detailed analysis (Figure III-5).

(d)  During subsequent IPB steps, these likely operating areas, TM

infrastructure (such as lines of communications, storage sites, ports of entry, etc.) and the
TM systems themselves are analyzed in detail to provide an initial TM intelligence picture.
Because IPB is an iterative process, this initial TM picture is continually refined as new
information becomes available through collection efforts.  Likewise, collection efforts are
adjusted to cover new intelligence gaps resulting from updates to the IPB.  Figure III-6
provides critical requirements and key threads for Step 1.

(2)  Describe the Battlespace’s Effects – Step 2 (Figure III-7)

(a)  This step determines how the battlespace environment affects enemy TM

and friendly operations.  The assessment of the environment includes an examination of
terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the battlespace.  It identifies the influences
(limitations and opportunities) the environment provides for friendly and enemy operations.
For TM IPB, this step focuses on area limitation assessments of probable missile operating
areas and a detailed analysis of the supporting strategic infrastructure.

(b)  It is important to remember that the most important operating

characteristic of ballistic and cruise missile target systems is their mobility.   To
achieve and sustain launch operations requires a great deal of movement from all of the
target system components (launch platforms, GSE, transshipment from strategic storage,
etc.).  Detecting and tracking the movement of various target system components is the key

SCUD B

SCUD C

Likely Enemy Targets

Example
Weapons
Systems
Range Lines

Example
Maximum
Range Arc

Potential TM
Operating
Area

Figure III-5.  Initial Area Delimitation Technique

III-9

to determining actual enemy COA and disrupting the enemy’s plans.  Therefore,  area
delimitation and mobility analysis are two critical parts of the TM IPB process.

(c)  Analysis of the battlespace’s effects (especially mobility analysis), when

combined with Step 3’s “evaluation of the adversary” and Step 4’s “determine adversary
COA,” drives initial sensor employment recommendations and the overall TM collection
effort.  To achieve the level of analysis required, it is essential to have current terrain data
and adequate terrain data postings.   Without this information, analytical  results will be
questionable.  For example, if new road networks are missing from the database, an ideal

Key Threads to Other JTMTD Process

Focuses and prioritize subsequent IPB step.

Provides initial collection requirements.

Provides initial adversary operation data to support parallel planning.

IPB -

CM -

TD  -

Critical Requirements for Step 1

  A thorough understanding of theater and national intelligence architectures.

  Knowing where to locate data already available in the intelligence community.

Figure III-6. Key Points Step 1

Figure III-7.  Describe the Battlespace’s Effects

Terrain Analysis

• Military Aspects of Terrain

- Observation and Fields of Fire
- Concealment and Cover
- Obstacles

• Effects on Missile Operations

 

 Describe the Battlespace’s Effects on Threat and Friendly Capabilities and Broad COAs

 

• Integrated Area Limitation Product

Weather Analysis

• Military Aspects of Weather

- Visibility
- Winds
- Precipitation
- Temperature and Humidity

• Effects on Missile Operations

Other Characteristics of the Battlespace

 

• TM Infrastructure
• TM Target Set
• Command, Control, Communications
• WMD Infrastructure
• LOCs including Road Networks
• Air Defense Supporting TM Ops

Associated TM IPB Templates

• Reconnaissance Coverage of TM Operations Areas
• Concealment and Cover Areas (Hide Site)
• Missile operating areas classification
• Missile operational forecast based on weather
• Detailed Infrastructure Definition (R&D, Fixed Operational)
• Missile network definition and critical node identification
• Digital Road Network

III-10

TM operating area can be overlooked.  Likewise, if the data postings are only to 100-meters,
then trying to determine where a 5-meter long TEL can move, hide, or launch from is
impossible.  Because demand for sensor systems can quickly outstrip availability, getting
them in the right place the first time is extremely important.  This is especially true of
special operations forces (SOF).  If the terrain database is inadequate, the likelihood of
wasting collection resources increases substantially.

(d)  Products produced during step 2 (such as terrain masking data, mobility

analysis, slope information) are not end products themselves; rather they are tools for
analysts to determine their effect on threat COA and which friendly COA are feasible.
There are a variety of automated terrain analysis tools available to assist in area
delimitation efforts.  When combined with supplemental reconnaissance, analysis of high
resolution maps and imagery, and knowledge of the enemy’s TM TTPs, it is indeed possible
to determine the most likely launch sites, hide sites, transloading areas, FOLs, FOBs, and
forward storage areas.

(e)  While analysis of potential TM operating areas is critical, analysis of the

TM infrastructure is equally important.  Missile units must move through the various
phases described in Chapter II and cannot sustain operations without support from the TM
infrastructure.  Analyzing deployment routes, ports of entry, weapons and warhead storage
sites, supply routes, etc., is important for target development purposes, and, more
importantly, to identify which areas must be monitored as hostilities increase.  Tracking the
deployment of TM forces is ideal, but, in reality, this is a difficult task.  Nevertheless,
monitoring TM infrastructure activity may provide key clues to which COA the enemy has
chosen.

(f)  When conducting TM IPB against cruise missiles and airborne TM launch

platforms, air avenues of approach (AA) must also be analyzed.  Likely AAs are those that
protect missiles or airborne launch platforms from detection and engagement (masking
terrain) while still allowing maneuver and providing adequate line-of-sight (LOS) to the
target.  Other factors that will affect cruise missile AA include attack profile, ordnance,
point of origin, and ground control radar positions.   Like cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft
used as TM launch platforms will usually follow major terrain or man-made features and
attempt to maximize terrain masking.  Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude
of the air platform and thus influence the selection of AA.  Adverse weather such as strong
winds, extreme cold, icing conditions, and poor visibility may also affect the enemy’s ability
to employ both types of air breathing systems.

(g)  Performing IPB correctly in peacetime significantly increases the

likelihood that, as hostilities approach, initial collection efforts will occur at the right place
and at the right time.  This will increase the accuracy of the TM intelligence picture
available to the JFC.  Without such detailed preparations, TM attack operations will likely
default to reactive post-launch strikes against TELs instead of achieving a broad attack
strategy against the entire TM target system and ultimately the missile force’s OPTEMPO
and ability to launch.

(h)  Figure III-8 provides critical requirements and key threads for Step 2.

(3)  Evaluate the Adversary – Step 3 (Figure III-9)

III-11

(a)  This step examines in detail (model) the TM force’s capabilities and its

normal doctrinal organization for combat and TTPs.  Understanding how the enemy TM
force organizes, trains, and prepares for war during peacetime training is the best indicator
of how it will react in combat.  During this step models (known as doctrinal
templates) are prepared to depict how TM forces prefer to conduct operations
under ideal conditions
.  These models include graphical depictions/symbols and simple
text descriptions of threat tactics and employment options.  Examples include determining
what the timing of movement patterns between elements are, what the relative location of
equipment is to other elements, etc.

(b)  The accompanying narrative should include known information on how

the TM force reacts to certain situations.  For example, what options may be employed if an
operation fails, what subsequent operations may be planned if operations succeed, and an
evaluation of the enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities.

(c)  Templating should also include an evaluation of high value targets

(HVTs) and their associated vulnerabilities.  HVTs are those assets that the adversary
commander requires for the successful completion of the mission.  HVTs are identified
froman evaluation of the database, the doctrinal and TTP templates, supporting narrative
and the use of tactical judgement.  The initial list of HVTs is developed by wargaming the
operation and considering how the threat will use each type of equipment subset to
accomplish specific operational objectives.  HVT evaluations consider the relative worth
of each TM component and how its potential loss would affect enemy’s operations in
terms of  response.  Normally it is during this HVT analysis that the enemy TM force’s
vulnerabilities and exploitable decisive points are identified.

Key Threads to Other JTMTD Process

Terrain and mobility analysis form basis of  SIT template.

Terrain and weather data support sensor employment decisions.

Identifies potential HVTs, HPTs, and countermobility targets for
further analysis.

IPB -

CM -

TD  -

Critical Requirements for Step 2

  Terrain data with postings appropriate for TEL (below 100-meters).

  Terrain feature data must be complete and less than 1 year old.

  Detailed imagery of potential TM operating areas.

Figure III–8.  Key Points Step 2

III-12

(d)  A variety of doctrinal templates at the operational  and tactical level are

needed to fully evaluate the threat’s capability.  A systematic method for analyzing threat
capabilities starts with a detailed analysis of the enemy’s TM order of battle (OB).  OB
analysis consists of the following factors: TM unit identification and organization
(composition), physical location (disposition), weapons, personnel and equipment strength,
tactics, training, logistics, combat effectiveness, C4I, and miscellaneous data.  The Military
Intelligence Integrated Database (MIIDB) should be used to begin the analysis, but a
comprehensive evaluation of all available databases; published Defense Intelligence
Reference Documents (DIRDs); and direct interface with national intelligence organizations
such as DIA, MSIC, NAIC, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), etc., is essential.
This information must be continually updated and revised to reflect the latest information
available.  During actual combat operations, this must also include results of combat
assessment.

(e)  When evaluating ballistic missiles, a key point to remember is that the

target system employs a large number of support vehicles.  While analysis of the missile
and launch system is important, emphasis must be given to analyzing the function, value,
mobility characteristics, etc., of these support vehicles.  While the missile launcher will most
likely have good to excellent cross-country capability, support vehicles will most likely not.
This must be factored into the overall analysis of the TM operating area.  Additionally,  TM
replenishment operations must also be closely scrutinized.  Empty launchers are of little
value to the enemy commander.  Analysts should look for HVTs and vulnerabilities in TM
support operations.

(f)  It is imperative to remember that templates reflect the ideal.  Combat

typically dictates modification to doctrinal practice due to conditions such as understrength
units, shortage of logistical support, the lack of air superiority, etc.  Enemy operations

Figure III–9. Evaluate the Adversary

Create and Update Threat Models

• Normal Execution of Operations
• Based on Detailed Study of Threat

Identify Threat Capabilities

• General COAs

- Types of operation
- Use of NBC
- CC&D

Associated TM IPB Templates

• Common Understanding of the Battlespace
• Doctrinal Templates
• TOE
• TTP
• High Value Targets Matrix
• Capabilities Based COAs Matrix

Doctrinal Templates

• Order of Battle and Pattern Analysis

- Organization (including C3)
- Equipment
- TTP

• Spatial Employment Factors
• Temporal Employment Factors
• Description of Tactics and Options
• Use of terrain and weather
• Force and Unit level

High Value Targets

• Assets required for Operations
• Capability to Substitute

Common Understanding of the Battlespace

III-13

security (OPSEC) will not be limited to equipment dispersal and random timing of
launch cycles, but will also include deception operations to reinforce our perception of
the ideal.  Analysts must avoid becoming “attached” to the template as the “definitive”
instead of using it as a tool to guide analysis of current intelligence information.  Figure
III-10 provides critical requirements and key threads for Step 3.

(4)  Determine Adversary COA – Step 4 (Figure III-11)

(a)  This step integrates the results of the previous steps into a meaningful

conclusion.  That is, given what the threat TM force normally prefers to do, and the
specific effects of the battlespace environment in which it is operating, what are the
enemy’s likely objectives and COA.  The desired end state of step 4 is to replicate the set
of specific COA the enemy commander is considering (this is predictive analysis).  To
determine adversary COA, follow the logic depicted in Figure III-11.

(b)  Only in rare cases will sufficient intelligence be available to state the

threat’s objectives and desired end state as facts.   Therefore, when developing
estimates it is necessary to ensure that confidence levels are clearly indicated.
Understanding what the enemy is trying to achieve with TM forces is the foundation for
COA development.  It is important that the full set of COAs available to the adversary be
considered, regardless of whether they adhere to doctrine.  Unless approached
objectively, COA development may overlook sub-optimum or “wildcard” COAs available
to the enemy commander.  To avoid surprise from an unanticipated COA, analysts must
also account for all recent activities and events.  Table III-2 contains a partial list of COA
development considerations.

(c)  While it is important to examine the full set of COAs available to the

enemy, it is also necessary to prioritize them and establish a most likely COA.  This
allows commanders and staffs to maximize resources during planning.  Recent activities
or events may provide indicators that one COA is already being adopted.  Examining all
he potential COAs first will also help analysts recognize when the enemy has changed to
a new COA.

Key Threads to Other JTMTD Process

Serves as the foundation for threat COA analysis.

Doctrinal templates assist in sensor-to-shooter planning.

OB assist in planning CA.  Helps refine DAL, and overall attack strategy.

IPB -

CM -

TD  -

Critical Requirements for Step 3

  Access to all available SCI and collateral intelligence on TMs.

  Appreciation of outside influences and their effect on TM forces.

  Ready access to CA results affecting TM IPB.

Figure III-10.  Key Points Step 3

III-14

(d)  After COA priorities are set, each COA must be developed in detail as

time permits.  This detail includes creation of situation (SIT) templates, description of
potential COA branches and sequels, and a listing of HVTs.  Situation templates combine
doctrinal templates derived from Step 3 with the area limitation and mobility analysis
information produced in Step 2.  SIT templates represent an image of the “ideal”
adjusted to the circumstances.  
TM analysts create templates to depict the entire TM
intelligence picture.  At the strategic level, this means focusing on TM forces moving
from garrison to field locations, as well as political and economic developments.  At the
operational level, the focus is on LOC, storage sites, FOBs, and FOLs, while tactical
level templates reflect small unit operations to include individual vehicle disposition
based on mobility networks and transport times.

(e)  SIT templates allow staff planners to wargame enemy COA to determine

how and where individual elements provide support to the TM target system and help
refine the HVT list developed in step 3.  Any area where HVTs must appear or be
employed to make the enemy’s operation successful should be noted on the situation

TABLE III-2.  COA Development Considerations

The threat’s intent or desired end state.
Likely attack objectives.
Effects of the battlespace environment on operations from step 2.
Threat vulnerabilities or shortages in equipment or personnel.
Current disposition of TM forces.
Threat perception of friendly force capabilities.
Threat efforts to present an ambiguous situation or achieve surprise.

TM IPB STEP 4 TEMPLATES

SITUATION TEMPLATE FOR EACH SPECIFIC COA

TARGET RELATIVE VALUE MATRIX FOR EACH SPECIFIC COA

HPT EVENT TEMPLATE

NAI EVENT MATRIX

HPT EVENT MATRIX

NAI / HPT DESCRIPTION TEMPLATES

IDENTIFY THE THREAT’S

LIKELY OBJECTS

AND DESIRED END STATE

IDENTIFY THE FULL SET OF COAs

AVAILABLE TO THE THREAT

EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE

EACH COA

DEVELOP EACH COA IN THE

AMOUNT OF DETAIL TIME ALLOWS

IDENTIFY INITIAL COLLECTION

REQUIREMENTS: NAIs

INDENTIFY INITIAL TARGET

NOMINATIONS: HPTs

Figure III-11. Determine Adversary COAs

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template.  For example, after missile launch a TEL must undertake transloading
operations.  This is clearly an operation of high value to the enemy’s success; therefore,
it is designated a HVT.  It may also be designated a HPT.  HPTs are–simply defined—
enemy targets that, if successfully attacked, will lead to the overall success of the JFC’s
campaign.  Some HVTs, while valuable to the enemy’s operation, do not have a direct
bearing on the success of the friendly COA and are not designated as HPTs.  Using our
example, a “TEL transload operation” could be also classified as a HPT because it is of
high value to the enemy and meets the friendly COA requirement for preventing TM
launches and preserving freedom of action.

(f)  Activities that reveal the enemy’s selected COA are called “indicators.”

Where and when these indicators are likely to appear in the battlespace are labeled
named areas of interest (NAI).  Where and when HPTs are likely to appear are labeled
target areas of interest (TAI).  Using the term TAI indicates the intent to attack the
target when acquired and the requirement to coordinate sensors and shooters for the
target area.  TAI, NAI, expected indicators, and anticipated timing of HPT exposure
(known as time phased lines – TPL) combine to form “event templates.”  Event templates
depict where and when TM actions are expected to occur based on our knowledge of the
adversary’s CONOPS.  Event templates provide the basis for formulating information
requirements (IRs) for the collection management process, where collection plans are
developed to support monitoring NAI for COA indicators and TAI for potential HPTs.
Figure III-12 provides critical requirements and key threads for Step 4.

(g)  In summary, the four step IPB process provides analysts and operators a

comprehensive methodology for developing an intelligence picture, for TMs or any other
target system.  IPB is the foundation on which collection strategies and operational plans
are built.  Crisis does not change the IPB process other than the pace at which it is
 conducted.  The key word in the term IPB is preparation.  To establish an adequate TM
knowledge base requires dedicated resources and personnel and a considerable amount of
time.  TM IPB requires a major effort by theater and national intelligence centers.
Operational forces that will fight in the theater must also be involved so that they will have
“first-hand” knowledge of the enemy’s TM operating procedures.  If TM IPB database
production is not done in considerable detail before hostilities commence, it is
unlikely that it can be done well enough once hostilities begin to be effective in a
short conflict
.  While TM IPB may not provide an abundance of targets on D-Day, it is the
key to having the right sensors in the right place at the right time to detect pre-launch TM
activity so that we may intercede quickly.

4.  Collection Management Strategies

a.  Of all the processes involved in JTMTD, CM is the most critical—it is the

linchpin.  TM IPB and target development cannot succeed without the effective
employment of sensors.  While available sensor systems can readily support the JTMTD
process, it can also create a dilemma for the JFC.  Finding (and disrupting) TM activity can
quickly become a res    ource-intensive operation.  The challenge for the JFC is in balancing
the intelligence requirements for countering TMs with the intelligence needs of the overall
joint force.

III-16

b.  The primary purpose of CM is to answer the commander’s IRs by making the best

use of scarce RSTA assets.  CM’s secondary purpose is to answer IRs from other
intelligence users.  IRs orient on intelligence required to:  prevent surprise, support
planning, support decision-making during execution operations, and support
engagement of HPTs.  To be useful, the information being gathered must be relevant,
accurate, analyzed, properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the
appropriate user.

c.  The link between IR originators and the sensors/collectors themselves is the

collection manager.  The collection manager is responsible for translating IRs into
effective collection strategies; therefore, it is paramount that collection managers
clearly understand what the requester needs.

d.  In theater, IRs originate from intelligence analysts, targeteers, combat

assessment, and combat operations planning at the joint force and component levels.
They may also originate from external intelligence organizations, such as CIA, NSA,
DIA, etc.  In-theater IRs are products of decision making and target development
planning processes.  It is during these processes that IRs gain priority relative to how
important they are to joint force’s mission success.  Collection managers participate in
these processes and develop a list of PIRs for the JFC’s approval.  In joint operations,
these collection management priorities are normally established at a daily meeting of
collection managers chaired by the J2 or the J2 collection manager and approved by the
JFC.

e.  While TM related IRs are important, they do not have “full reign” over RSTA assets

and must compete for these resources with other joint force IRs.  It is the collection
manager’s responsibility to insure that the collection strategy developed fulfills the most
important IRs first, and most completely, using all available RSTA assets.  If countering

Key Threads to Other JTMTD Process

Provides analysts “indicators” to watch as operations develop.

TAI/NAI serve as the basis for sensor system employment.

Provide refined HVT list for wargaming  and evaluation of HPTs.

IPB -

CM -

TD  -

Critical Requirements for Step 4

  Access to real time/near-real time sensor data and CA results.

  Ability to rapidly correlate sensor data with expected event templates.

  Direct input to sensor retasking as situation warrants. 

Figure III-12.  Key Points Step 4

III-17

TMs is one of the highest priorities, the IRs developed during the TM IPB process
become part of the JFC’s PIRs.  If TMs are not a high priority, it is still possible some of
the information requested can be gathered by integrating the requirements into existing
or planned collection efforts (commonly referred to as “piggybacking”).

f.  The CM Process.

(1)  Collection managers use PIRs to begin the CM process.  There are six

collection management functions that are managed under two headings:  Collection
Requirements Management (CRM) and Collection Operations Management (COM).  The
six steps outlined in Figure III-13 depict how collection managers participate in
formulating collection requirements, submit those requirements through appropriate
channels to the collectors, and monitor/manage/track all activities required to satisfy
those requirements. CRM prioritize competing requests for information (RFI) based on
the JFC’s guidance and objectives and keeps the collection strategy synchronized with
the overall campaign (Figure III-9, Steps 1 and 6).  COM develops the collection plan,
tasks collectors, disseminates results, evaluates ongoing operations (Figure III-9, Steps
2 through 5), and assists CRM in keeping the strategy up-to-date (Step 6).

(2)  Steps 1 & 2 are most critical because they determine how PIRs are translated

into specific information requirements (SIRs) and then into specific orders and request
(SORs) for transmission to collectors.  Poorly written PIRs do not produce well-defined and
focused SORs.  If PIRs are poorly written, the collection effort will not likely produce the
information needed to fill the intelligence gap.  Good PIRs have several things in common—
they ask only one question; they focus on a specific fact, event, or activity; and
they provide intelligence required to support a single decision.  Table III-3 indicates the
information necessary to make IRs complete and precise.
NOTE:  In completing the “why” portion of the TM IR request, it is important to include in
the justification that it supports force protection operations.

g.  Collection Strategy Development.

(1)  Four key characteristics of a good collection strategy are redundancy, mix,

cross-cueing, and integration.

(a)  Redundancy implies the use of several same-discipline assets to cover the

same target.  Redundancy is used against high priority collections when the probability of
success by any one system is low and to improve the chance of obtaining a more accurate
position location of the target.

(b)  Mix means providing complementary coverage by combining assets from

multiple disciplines.  Sensor mix increases the probability of collection, reduces the risk of
successful enemy deception, facilitates cross-cueing, and provides more complete reporting.

(c)  Cross-cueing involves using one or more sensor systems to “cue” or direct

other sensors on “where to search.”  Sensor cross-cueing refers to automatic or semi-
automatic redirection of a sensor’s specific search area.

III-18

 Cross-cueing requires that the platform hosting the sensor be in view of

the new collection location or able to move within collection range within available time
windows.  Automatic redirection is cross-cueing based on pre-established criteria that
conform to collection priorities.  Semi-automatic redirection means an operator is “in-the-
loop” to redirect the sensor to the new collection location manually.  This decision is based
on an indicator from another source and whether the cross-cue satisfies pre-established
conditions (such as higher priority tasking, etc.).  Cross-cueing can be intra-platform
(multiple sensors on single platform), inter-platform (between two sensor platforms), or
some combination thereof from ground-based, airborne, and/or overhead systems.
Sensor cross-cueing is highly dependent on dissemination architectures, sensor system
design, and operator training.  Although cross-cueing may only change the sensor’s

TABLE III-3.  PIR Information Requirements.

WHAT?

Activity or indicator.  Also include accuracy required for targetable data.

WHERE?

NAI or TAI location.

WHEN?

Time the indicator is expected to occur.

WHY?

Justification for requesting the information.

WHO?

Who needs the results?

BY WHEN?

How quickly is the information needed?

MEDIA?

What is the desired format for the information; that is, report, briefing,
multi-media, verbal, direct feed, etc.?

1. DEVELOP REQUIREMENT

•  Participate in staff wargaming
•  Analyze requirements:

- Record

 - Validate
 - Consolidate

- Prioritize

• Develop SIR sets

3.  TASK OR REQUEST COLLECTION

• Determine tasking or request mechanism
• Execute and implement
• Collect and Exploit

2. DEVELOP COLLECTION PLAN

• Evaluate Resources
• Develop Collection Strategy

- Select Resources
- Synchronize collection to SIRs

• Develop SOR sets
• Prioritize SORs for collection assets

4.  DISSEMINATE

• Arrange direct dissemination
• Determine perishability
• Determine how much to disseminate
• Identify media for dissemination
• Disseminate

5.  EVALUATE REPORTING

• Monitor and maintain synchronization
• Correlate reports to requirements
• Screen reports
• Provide feedback to collectors and exploiters

6.  UPDATE COLLECTION PLANNING

• Eliminate satisfied requirements
• Redirect assets to unsatisfied requirements
• Cross-cue assets to catch targets of opportunity
• Maintain synchronization
• Add new requirements

COLLECTION

 REQUIREMENTS

MANAGEMENT

(CRM)

COLLECTION

OPERATION

MANAGEMENT

(COM)

COLLECTORS

Figure III-13. Collection Management Functions and Process

III-19

search area temporarily, the value of any lost intelligence during this period must be
weighed against the expected value of the new intelligence gained.  For example, if a
sensor is in the process of monitoring an event as it occurs, cross-cueing the sensor at
that particular moment might result in a complete loss of information about that event.
Because an “informed” operator-in-the-loop is needed to make these type of decisions,
the amount and type of automatic cross-cueing is normally limited.

  Cross-cueing is very important to TM IPB and target development.  This

can be especially true for locating FOLs and FOBs.  For example, a TM launch location
provided by Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite warning or “hit” can be cross-cued
to a platform employing a ground movement target indicator (GMTI) or other applicable
sensor system.  This sensor would then monitor the TEL’s movement and track it back to
the transloading site and then, in turn, track the ground support vehicles back to the
FOL or FOB.

(d)  Integration means bringing new, higher priority or existing lower priority

requirements into planned or ongoing missions.  Integration helps avoid undertasking very
capable assets and reduces disruption of the overall collection strategy caused by dynamic
retasking.

(2)  Dynamic Retasking

(a)  Dynamic retasking refers to changing a sensor’s collection focus while it

is actively engaged in supporting collection requirements established prior to its current
mission.  Like cross-cueing, the value of the collections lost as a result of dynamic retasking
must be compared with the value of the new intelligence gained.  Sensors are not normally
dynamically retasked unless the new requirement meets a higher JFC priority and the
particular system is capable of being retasked in time to fulfill the new requirement.  For
overhead collection systems, dynamic retasking is normally limited to changing the sensor’s
“boresight.”

(b)  Dynamic retasking  may also require that the platform hosting the sensor

be moved to within viewing range of the new collection area.  For airborne assets, this
means changing the track the platform is flying in order to support the new collection
requirement.  Current UAVs are generally the most flexible asset but have longer transit
times because of low airspeeds.  Overhead asset “orbits” or a U2’s “track” cannot be altered
quickly and therefore are usually not considered for dynamic retasking when the “orbit/
track” requires alteration.  (NOTE:  The U2’s onboard sensors are capable of being cross-
cued or dynamically retasked when a flight path change is not required).  The flexibility of
other airborne assets may also be constrained by self-protection and airspace deconfliction
issues. UAVs are vulnerable to the same air defense threats as manned aircraft and
therefore require the same IPB considerations when determining safe flight routes.  These
issues must be carefully considered when deciding to dynamically retask a collection asset.

(3)  Cross-cueing and dynamic retasking require collection managers to maintain

“sensor situational awareness,” that is, a picture of where sensors are, their capabilities,
range, etc.   Sensor SA is still mostly a manual process.  This impedes flexibility and the
responsiveness of the collection management system.  Several near-term systems may
improve these shortcomings.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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