FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 1

 

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FM 90-43 JTMTD MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT (OCTOBER 1999) - page 1

 

 

iv

FM 90-43

MCWP 3-42.1A

NWP 3-01.13

AFTTP(I)  3-2.24

FM 90-43

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

MCWP 3-42.1A

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

NWP 3-01.13

Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.24

Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

15 October 1999

JTMTD

Multiservice Procedures for

Joint Theater Missile Target Development

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER I

Overview
Background ............................................................................................. I-1
The Case for Pre-launch Attack Operations against Theater
   Missiles ................................................................................................ I-1
The Case for Joint Theater Missile Target Development ................. I-3
JFC Influences ....................................................................................... I-4
Peacetime Imperatives .......................................................................... I-5
Conclusion .............................................................................................. I-7

CHAPTER II

Theater Missile Systems
Background ............................................................................................ II-1
Generic Architecture ............................................................................ II-2
Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) ...................................................... II-3
Cruise Missiles ...................................................................................... II-7
Air-to-Surface Missiles ........................................................................ II-14
Conclusion ............................................................................................ II-14

v

CHAPTER III

Strategies and Procedures
Theater Missile Strategy Development ............................................ III-1
JTMTD Process .................................................................................... III-4
TM Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (TM IPB) ............. III-5
Collection Management Strategies ................................................... III-15
Target Development ........................................................................... III-22
Conclusion ........................................................................................... III-28

CHAPTER IV

JTMTD Integration Options
Background ............................................................................................ IV-1
Integration Options .............................................................................. IV-2
JTMTD Integration Through Consolidation ..................................... IV-4
JTMTD Integration Through Collaboration ...................................... IV-6
JTMTD Integration Through Liaison ................................................. IV-6
JTMTD Integration Through Collocation .......................................... IV-6
Conclusion ............................................................................................. IV-6

APPENDIX A

SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS .......................... A-1

APPENDIX B

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ................................................................... B-1

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS FOR TM IPB DEVELOPMENT .............................. C-1

APPENDIX D

THEATER TARGET DEVELOPMENT MODELS ....................... D-1

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... References-1

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. Glossary-1

INDEX ................................................................................................................................ Index-1

FIGURES

I-1

Joint Targeting Process ............................................................... I-3

II-1

Theater Employment Operations ............................................. II-5

II-2

Vehicles Required to Generate an SS-1 Launch ...................... II-7

II-3

Typical TM “Flow” National to Tactical .................................... II-8

II-4

National Theater Level TM Material Feeder System ............. II-9

II-5

Typical Deployed TM Organization ......................................... II-10

II-6

Launch/Support System Interface ............................................ II-11

III-1

Joint Theater Missile Target Development Construct .......... III-1

III-2

TMD Attack Operations Activities ........................................... III-4

III-3

JIPB Iterative Steps .................................................................. III-6

III-4

Define the Battlespace Environment ...................................... III-7

III-5

Initial Area Delimitation Techniques ...................................... III-8

III-6

Key Points Step 1 ....................................................................... III-9

III-7

Describe the Battlespace’s Effects ........................................... III-9

III-8

Key Points Step 2 ...................................................................... III-11

III-9

Evaluate the Adversary ............................................................ III-12

III-10

Key Points Step 3 ...................................................................... III-13

vi

III-11

Determine Adversary COAs .................................................... III-14

III-12

Key Points Step 4 ...................................................................... III-16

III-13

Collection Management Functions and Process .................... III-18

III-14

Cognitive Hierarchy Associated with RSTA Tasks ................ III-21

III-15

CM Relationships ...................................................................... III-22

III-16

CM Decisionmaking Process .................................................... III-23

III-17

Countermobility Concept ......................................................... III-24

TABLES

III-1

Example Task to Subtask Translation ..................................... III-3

III-2

COA Development Considerations ......................................... III-14

III-3

PIR Information Requirements ............................................... III-18

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JTMTD

Multiservice Procedures for Joint Theater Missile Target Development

The quote for Basil Collier reminds us that conducting offensive operations against

theater missiles has never been an easy task.  The Coalition’s troubles in finding Saddam
Hussein’s Scuds during DESERT STORM are reminiscent of the difficulties faced by the
Allies in locating Nazi V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II.
Today our National Military Strategy recognizes that “the proliferation of theater
missiles is one of the greatest dangers to US national interest and global security and
will remain so into the foreseeable future.” Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint
Theater Missile Defense,
 states “the preferred method of countering enemy theater
missile (TM) operations is to attack and destroy or disrupt TMs prior to their launch.”
Recognition of the importance of this threat, the doctrinal preference for attack
operations, and the historical difficulty in achieving successful attacks against TMs were
the impetus for producing this publication.

Many of the problems in locating mobile missiles in the past can be traced to

difficulties in obtaining timely information and organizing and filtering intelligence
operations. This publication establishes a common framework for those individuals
responsible for intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), sensor employment,
collection management, current and future operations, target development, and force
application.  This common framework will enable them to establish a comprehensive and
coordinated approach for countering TMs through prelaunch attack operations.

The focus of this publication is Joint Theater Missile Target Development (JTMTD).

JTMTD is the synergistic outcome of allocating, integrating and synchronizing
resources in order to identify and nominate selected targets in the TM target
system for timely attack
.  Achieving an effective JTMTD process is a challenge for
operational forces.  Applying the concepts discussed in this publication will facilitate the
process.

Overview

Chapter I provides the reader an understanding of the difficulties associated in

trying to find, track, and interdict TM forces.  It discusses the joint force commander’s
(JFC’s) influence in achieving a cohesive JTMTD effort (principally through training and
dedication of resources).  It highlights peacetime actions that are imperative to making
the JTMTD process effective during crisis or conflict.

“On the whole, offensive counter-measures to the flying bomb [V-1] brought no direct return

commensurate with the great effort devoted to them.  A bolder investment in that class of
operation might have achieved much.  But the W estern Allies, hampered by their failure to make a
clear-cut choice between the various courses of action open to them, never achieved the singleness
of purpose which might have helped them to stake successfully on information that fell short of
certainty.

Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom

viii

Threat Missile Systems

Chapter II provides the reader a basic understanding of the TM target system,

generic operating phases, and some specific operating characteristics common to similar
systems.  It establishes the common framework necessary for the TM IPB development.

Strategies and Procedures

Chapter III explains how to achieve a coherent attack strategy against TMs.  It

provides a detailed description of how to conduct TM-specific IPB, collection
management, and target development processes to achieve the defined objectives.

JTMTD Integration Options

Chapter IV describes options available to the JFC for integrating and synchronizing

TM intelligence, collection, and targeting efforts.  The four methods discussed in detail
are consolidation, collaboration, exchange of liaisons, and collocation.

                            

KEY JTMTD POINTS TO REMEMBER

•  Preventing TM launches requires the entire TM target system to be attacked simultaneously and continuously.

•  TM IPB must begin in peacetime to succeed in conflict.

•  Successful TM IPB comes from knowing the enemy; therefore, it is imperative that analysts who will take it
   to war help in its creation.

•  Collection managers must understand the threat 

equally as well as

 analysts; otherwise, the collection effort will be

   unfocused.

•  Every TM event provides a clue--apply knowledge learned from each event to develop the IPB.

•  Crosscueing of sensors is imperative to timely target development.

•  Avoid the temptation of fixating on killing TELs.  Stay focused on neutralizing the enemy's launch capability.

•  Transload operations are 

excellent

 targets, but forward operating locations/bases (FOLs)/FOBs) are 

outstanding

    targets.

  Operational decision makers must understand the JTMTD process too!

ix

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

Joint

Joint Warfighting Center, Ft Monroe, VA
Joint Theater Missile Defense-Attack Operations Joint Test Force, Kirkland AFB, NM
Joint Warfighters Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), Suffolk, VA
Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck, VA
Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, VA
Joint Attack Operations Working Group, (BMDO/J-8), Washington, D.C.
Joint National Test Facility, Colorado Springs, CO
Air Intelligence Center, Norfolk, VA
BMDO, AQJ, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Unified/Combined

USCINCPAC/J222, Honolulu, HI
USCENTCOM, JICCENT/WMD Cell, MacDill AFB, FL
USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL
USACOM, JT2, Suffolk, VA
USFK, J-3, Korea

Army

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCSDOC (ATDO-A), Fort Monroe, VA
Third Army Deep Operations Coordination Cell, Fort McPherson, GA
ARSPACECOM, Colorado Springs, CO
Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX
Army Deep and Simultaneous Attack Battlelab, Fort Sill, OK
Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK
Army Military Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ
Army Space and Missile Defense Battlelab, Colorado Springs, CO
XVIII Airborne Corps, Collection Management, Fort Bragg, NC
1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, WA

Marine Corps

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Joint Doctrine Branch (C427), Quantico, VA
COMMARFORLANT, G-2, Norfolk, VA

Navy

Navy Warfare Development Command (Det Norfolk), Norfolk, VA

Air Force

HQ AFDC, Det 1, Langley Air Force Base, VA
ACC/DIFT, Langley AFB, VA
28th Test Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL

x

32d AOS, Ramstein AFB, GE
609th Combat Plans Squadron, Shaw AFB, SC
497 IG/INOT, Falls Church, VA
93rd ACW, Robins AFB, GA
607th AIS, Osan AFB, ROK

OTHER

Zel Tech Corporation, Hampton, VA
Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA
SPARTA Corporation, Huntsville, AL
ARES Corporation, Arlington, VA
BDM Corporation, Hampton, VA

I-1

Chapter I

OVERVIEW

1.  Background

Ballistic, cruise, and nontactical air-to-surface missiles have been a threat to the

United States (US) and its military operations for over 50 years.  During the Cold War, the
strategic balance and deterrence created by the theory of mutually assured destruction
(MAD) between Soviet and US forces held this threat in check.  The value of retaliation as a
deterrent to rogue states has waned in the post-Cold War era as theater missiles (TMs)
have proliferated.

The military arsenals of nations worldwide are becoming stocked with an expanding

number and variety of missile systems.  Most are imported, some are developed
domestically, and a few are indigenously modified.  Missile threats emanate primarily from
developed first-tier and emergent second-tier countries armed with missiles that can range
from 30 to greater than 3000 kilometers.  Some countries possess hundreds of fixed and
mobile missile launchers.  Although they currently pose only a regional threat, the trend is
clearly towards systems with greater range, lethality, accuracy, and sophistication.

TMs appeal to developing nations for a variety of reasons and are often considered

symbols of national stature.  TMs enable rogue states to strike deep into neighboring
nations, placing the populace as well as that government’s forces at risk.  Compared to other
weapon systems, TMs’ relatively long range, short time-of-flight, low cost, and flexibility in
carrying a variety of warheads provide numerous political and military advantages.  TMs
also appeal to developing nations because defenses against them are not as mature as
defenses against other weapons systems.  Our National Military Strategy recognizes that
“the proliferation of theater missiles is one of the greatest dangers to US national interest
and global security and will remain so into the foreseeable future.”

2.  The Case for Prelaunch Attack Operations against Theater Missiles

No nation in any war has ever effectively countered TMs by reactively attacking

missile launchers.  There are many parallels between the allied efforts during World War II
(WWII) to counter Hitler’s V-1/V-2 rockets and the Coalition’s efforts to counter Saddam
Hussein’s Scuds during the Gulf War.  The vignettes cited throughout this publication
reinforce one key point—mobile long-range missiles provide an adversary an asymmetric

From the beginning to the end of the war, Scuds introduced a serious friction into the conduct

of the air campaign—one that did not affect the final outcome, but only due to the absence of any
other Iraqi successes.  There is, moreover, a larger issue: the question of might-have-beens.
Except for the hit at the war’s end that killed a large number of U.S. Army reservists, the Scuds
achieved little damage and few deaths.  Nevertheless, a Scud nearly hit the USS Tarawa, while
that ship was tied up at the main dock at Dhahran—a dock piled high with ammunition.  It does
not take much imagination to visualize what an actual hit might have achieved in political and
psychological terms.

               - Gulf War Air Power Survey

I-2

means of leveraging military operations.  That is, the “owner” of TMs can choose to use them
politically or tactically against strategic, operational, or tactical targets; can make that
decision at the last minute; and change how they intend to use them daily.  Although the
less sophisticated variety of TMs may not be very effective tactically, even the hint of using
them to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) makes them significant threats.

Relying 100 percent on defensive measures to protect friendly forces is not

only a gamble; it also relinquishes the initiative to the adversary.  Prelaunch attack
operations against TMs are vital to protecting friendly forces and their freedom of action.
Enemy missiles can quickly disrupt deployment operations and consume operational forces
in counter TM efforts. While defensive measures are essential, so too are prelaunch attack
operations that reduce the volume of incoming missiles and put the adversary’s TM forces
at risk.

Because adversary TM forces use dispersed operating patterns and employ deception

efforts to hide their operations, finding and destroying launchers is a daunting task.  Not
only are these operations easy to hide, but they do not confine themselves to one segment of
the battlespace.  Unlike most threats, TMs can cut across all boundaries to threaten any
aspect of military force or political objective in a matter of minutes.  Also, missile launches
tend to cause considerable anxiety up and down the national chain of command, often
prompting an urge to respond.

Countering TMs has proven difficult for a variety of reasons, including insufficient

sensors capable of detecting missiles in prelaunch operations, an inability to unequivocally
identify TMs other than through actual launch indicators, and an inability to task assets in
time to strike targets when found.  Because of these shortcomings, attack operations have
gravitated toward reactive responses; however, reactive attack operations are not the
desired method.  Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, states
“the preferred method of countering enemy TM operations is to attack and destroy or
disrupt TMs prior to their launch.”

Preventing enemy launch operations requires a comprehensive strategy that targets

the enemy’s entire TM system—from launch platforms and ground support equipment
(GSE), to command and control (C2) nodes, missile stocks, and TM infrastructure.
Implementing an effective TM attack strategy depends on many things, but none more
important than timely, predictive intelligence.  US forces have proven much more capable of
attacking TM targets than in locating them.  While destruction of the missile transporter-
erector-launchers (TELs) can be a significant piece of an overall TM attack strategy, it must
not be the sole focus.  The broad goal of “preventing launch” must remain the watchword.
One of the key vulnerabilities of mobile TMs is that they must move, bringing
together elements in order to achieve launch.  Finding ways to prevent the
various elements of the target system from coming together and operating as a
whole is the key to developing a successful attack strategy.

As previously noted, successful prosecution of TMs cuts across many boundaries and

levels of command—national to tactical. This applies to the intelligence community as well.
Because TM intelligence information is extremely perishable in nature, the window of
opportunity to collect and exploit information is usually very short.  This means that unless
the intelligence and collection architectures are focused and responsive, vital information

I-3

can be completely lost.  TM intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) requires an
extensive intelligence effort and must be well coordinated long before hostilities commence.
A piecemeal, under resourced, or ad hoc TM intelligence effort can and does lead to missed
cues, missed information, or, at the very least, delayed responses to TM activity indicators.
TM intelligence centers at each echelon must work collaboratively to avoid creating
conflicting intelligence requirements.

3.  The Case for Joint Theater Missile Target Development

Target development is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems, individual

targets, and elements of each target for military, economic, and political importance and is a
critical part of the 6-step joint targeting process (Figure I-1).  Target development is driven
by the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives and guidance and is continually adjusted
by combat assessments (CAs).

This publication focuses on a singular target system—theater missiles.  Joint theater

missile target development (JTMTD) is not a separate targeting process but works through
the established targeting and intelligence structures (joint targeting coordination board
[JTCB], joint intelligence center [JIC], etc.) to achieve effective TM target nominations to
satisfy the JFC’s objectives.  For more information on the targeting process see Joint
Publication 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to
Targeting 
or Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP), The Joint Targeting
Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets.

COMMANDER’S OBJECTIVE

& GUIDANCE

TARGET

DEVELOPMENT

WEAPONEERING

ASSESSMENT

FORCE APPLICATION

EXECUTION

PLANNING/

FORCE
EXECUTION

COMBAT

ASSESSMENT

JOINT

TARGETING

PROCESS

Figure I-1. Joint Targeting Process

I-4

Current doctrine recognizes the fact that we fight as Service or functional

components within the framework of a joint force.  However, doctrine provides only
broad guidance and does not provide the required details to deal with elusive TM
threats.  Current technology also does not provide the kind of “interoperable
communications and software” necessary to develop a commonly shared, near-real-time
TM intelligence picture supported by an integrated, robust collection effort.  This
manual seeks to address means to cope with these shortcomings.

This publication focuses on integrating TM IPB, collecting/sensoring management, and

targeting processes to achieve effective TM target nominations.  JTMTD is a process derived
from the synergistic outcomes of allocating, integrating, and synchronizing resources in
order to identify and attack selected targets within the TM target system. Only with a
commonly shared perspective of the enemy TM force and aggressive collection management
effort will the joint task force (JTF) be able to achieve a coherent and effective TM attack
strategy.  This can only be achieved when the JTMTD processes are commonly understood
by analysts, collection managers, targeteers, and, most importantly, operational planners
and decision makers.

4.  JFC Influences

As noted in joint doctrine, the role of the JFC in organizing forces is the first step

towards successful JTMTD efforts.  Besides structuring the JTF, the JFC establishes
theater specific guidance and objectives and disseminates them to subordinate commanders
through mission-type orders.  These orders help define command relationships to facilitate
mission accomplishment.  The guidance and objectives are the “guideposts” subordinate
commanders and staffs use to prepare, coordinate, and execute their assigned
responsibilities.

a.  Peacetime JFC Considerations.  JFCs take many actions to prepare their

components for war, among the most critical for JTMTD is joint training.  Exercising TM
attack operations and the inherent JTMTD processes is essential.  Only by training as we
intend to fight can we find and correct deficiencies in interoperability of equipment and
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).  Every training opportunity should seek to
improve working relationships among elements tasked with countering TMs and refining
theater JTMTD TTPs.  The second action the JFC can take during peacetime affecting
JTMTD is to dedicate resources (that is, time, personnel, collection resources, etc.) to TM
IPB development.  The work required to develop the TM intelligence database is
voluminous.  The JFC must use every means available to include national intelligence and

 …“Effective attack operations require real-time coordination between all component
commanders as well as continuous wide-area surveillance over the entire theater/joint operations
area (JOA), with emphasis on enemy missile systems and likely support, fabrication, assembly,
and launch areas.  Coordination of attack operations involves the detection, acquisition, and
identification of enemy TMs and the dissemination of the targeting information to the designated
attack system for execution.  These tasks are directed to subordinate elements as missions for
execution.”

                Joint Publication 3-01.5

I-5

combat support agencies (such as, National Security Agency [NSA], Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA], National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA], Missile and Space
Intelligence Center [MSIC], Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], etc.) to ensure friendly
forces have the best information available regarding the adversary’s missile forces,
capabilities, and intentions.  The depth of peacetime TM IPB development will
greatly influence whether attack operations during conflict are prelaunch
focused or reactive in nature.

b.  JFC Considerations in Crisis and Conflict.  As tensions rise and hostilities begin,

the joint force must be prepared to quickly leverage available assets to develop the TM
intelligence picture in detail.  When indications and warnings point towards the use of TMs
and/or WMD, the JFC may be required to accept risk by making tradeoffs in other areas
(such as, shifts in resources away from major operations, changes in special operations
forces (SOF) locations, diversion of sensors, changes in time-phased force and deployment
data [TPFDD] flow, etc.).  As a crisis escalates, prioritization of intelligence requirements
(IRs) and corresponding management of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA) assets will become critical.  The focus of JTMTD efforts throughout must
be on providing the JFC the best TM intelligence picture and most viable attack strategy
possible.

5.  Peacetime Imperatives

a.  TM IPB.  The commander uses the IPB process to clearly understand the

capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of the adversary.  IPB also helps leaders
understand the effects of geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) on enemy and
friendly operations.  Key requirements for TM IPB that must occur during peacetime are—

(1)  Collecting data and supporting material (on terrain, equipment, doctrine,

communications, lines of communication [LOC], etc.).

(2)  Conducting TM IPB using available information in coordination with DIA,

CIA, NSA, and other agencies.

(3)  Collecting imagery to validate and refine database information.

(4)  Defining intelligence gaps and preparing IRs.

(5)  Conducting area delimitation analysis of potential TM operating areas.

“The JFC will normally task component commanders for conduct of attack operations against

TMs within their assigned area of operations (AO).  Additionally, when ground forces have been
deployed and if a joint force air component commander (JFACC) has been designated, the JFC
will normally task the JFACC as the supported commander to plan for and conduct, as
apportioned, attack operations against longer range TMs outside the other component
commanders AO.  The JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater/joint
operations area (JOA)-wide attack operations effort.

Joint Publication 3-01.5

I-6

b.  Collection Management (CM).

Peacetime development of TM IPB is dependent upon collection efforts and the CM

process.  TM collection priorities must be integrated into the joint force’s overall collection
strategy.  Equally important is to plan for the employment of additional RSTA assets during
crisis and conflict.  This requires identifying assets needed to support JTMTD efforts and
developing “on-the-shelf” collection plans so that when tensions rise, collection efforts can
be quickly expanded.

The roles and responsibilities of supporting components and organizations should be

specified and should include the procedures for dynamically retasking sensors to meet
unanticipated priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).  Collection Management Authority
(CMA), Collection Requirements Management (CRM), and Collection Operations
Management (COM) duties need to be assigned and responsibilities clearly delineated.

Key requirements for on-the-shelf collection plans are—

(1)  Incorporating TM IPB-defined IRs for each phase into the JTF’s overall

priority intelligence requirements for JFC approval.

(2)  Identifying, within each intelligence discipline, available collection systems to

support TM intelligence and target development during crisis and conflict stages.

(3)  Examining anticipated available systems for correct sensor mix and ensuring

they are capable of providing the information required at the right time and place.
Identifying potential cross-cueing requirements required to support TM collection efforts.

(4)  Developing collection priorities for sensors based on the JFC approved

priorities, projected availability of RSTA assets, and probable combat and intelligence
operations.  If TM IRs are not a top priority, examining planned sensor flight tracks for
residual collection opportunities.

c.  Target Development.

Targeteers should be actively involved in developing targeting data against known TM

targets.  These will be primarily infrastructure-related targets, such as TM manufacturing
facilities, TM import facilities, missile storage facilities, chemical and biological weapon
production facilities, liquid and solid fuel production facilities, lines of communications
(LOC) (road, rail, communications, waterways, etc.), and garrison locations of TM missile
forces.

Key requirements for target development are—

(1)  Working with intelligence analysts to determine the enemy TM target system’s

vulnerabilities and exploitable decisive points.  Exploring these weaknesses to develop a TM
attack strategy against the entire target system.

(2)  Assisting in conducting countermobility analysis to determine potential

I-7

targets that will prevent or disrupt TM components from coming together (for example,
interdiction of choke points), with a goal towards defeating the enemy’s ability to achieve
missile launch.

(3)  Looking for opportunities to use nonlethal means to disrupt launch operations,

such as use of electronic warfare to disrupt signals.

6.  Conclusion

Preventing an adversary from launching TMs requires a cohesive and well-coordinated

joint effort.  Disrupting the enemy missile force’s ability to generate and sustain
missile launch operations requires JTMTD TTPs be refined and integrated into
peacetime training.
  The processes of JTMTD are the foundation for developing a
comprehensive TM attack strategy and for conducting deliberate and time-sensitive attack
operations against the entire TM target system.  The goal of this publication is to establish
a common perspective on this process.

Similarities in WWII and the Gulf War

Reports and prisoner of war debriefings obtained at the end of World War II indicate that the Allies’ strenuous

efforts to attack the small, dispersed V-1 flying bomb launch sites and mobile V-2 ballistic missile launching units did
not have any significant influence on the rate or volume of V-weapon fire.  The principal limiting factor on Nazi missile
operations was the level of production that could be sustained at the weapon manufacturing facilities in the Third Reich.

There is a direct comparison between the effect of the Scuds in the Gulf War and the effect of the Nazi V-1/V-2

campaign in the last years of World War II.  The Nazi missiles possessed no great accuracy but were nevertheless able
to draw off considerable resources from the Allied strategic bombing campaign, tactical air efforts, and aerial photo-
reconnaissance operations. The British government feared, quite rightly, that the explosion of large numbers of V-1/s in
southern England might have a serious impact on the morale of the population and its willingness to see the war through
to a successful conclusion.  In the end, Allied air and ground forces mastered the threat but only after the expenditure of
resources far in excess of what the Germans devoted to their program.

Many of the following tactics used by the Nazis to defeat Allied attack operations efforts ring familiar to those

employed by Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Gulf War:

  (V-1) 

The presence of large numbers of decoy launchers.

  (V-1/V-2) 

Extensive use of camouflage, concealment, and natural cover.

  (V-1/V-2) 

Dispersal of the launch forces into small elements.

  (V-1) 

Preparation of excess launch capacity to buffer launcher losses.

  (V-2) 

Mobile launch unit operations, including the following:

••

  Redeployment to entirely new operating areas.

••

  Day-to-day switching between multiple, randomly-situated launch sites.

••

  “Shoot and scoot” launch tactics.

  (V-2) 

Low-volume, low-rate missile firing that minimizes launch unit exposure.

  (V-2) 

Sheltering launch operations in areas populated by civilians.

  (V-1/V-2) 

Launch operations conducted during bad weather or at night.

Both Nazis and the Iraqis proved that a country can preserve its theater missile launchers through the use of simple

and well-chosen tactics, despite the fact that country’s opponents may have won air supremacy over the missile unit
operating areas.

--Dr. Ron Allen, Sandia National Lab

based on United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947

II-1

Chapter II

THEATER MISSILE SYSTEMS

1.  Background

TMs are defined as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles (not

including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs or rockets such as Maverick
or wire-guided missiles).  Their target is within a given theater of operation.  TMs have
unique capabilities that must be considered when planning countermeasures.  For example,
no other target system can put a warhead into the theater rear area or threaten neutral
countries in a matter of minutes.  Other target systems do not create public panic and a
political situation each time a launch is broadcasted on television worldwide by reporters
wearing gas masks.  These unique traits, coupled with the elusive nature of the TM target
system, require the dedicated attention of determined, knowledgeable professionals to
effectively counter the threat.

Modern TMs have very long ranges and can launch a variety of warheads, including

high explosive; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); etc.  They are also currently difficult
to counter.  Because they are relatively cost effective weapons, ballistic missiles are weapons
of choice for many developing nations.  Such weapons provide an offensive capability and,
when mated with a warhead of mass destruction, give a nation the ability to deter a
potential adversary by holding population centers and/or military forces at risk. Rogue
nations believe TMs provide them with a counter to sophisticated land, air, and naval forces.
As a result, nations around the world are actively pursuing missile capabilities.

TMs may be used alone or in conjunction with other weapon systems.  Their targets

can vary from political to military, such as population centers, ports, airfield, headquarters,
air defense sites, command and control (C2) elements, communications nodes, and logistic
centers.  They can quickly put key civilian facilities at risk, such as power and water
stations, petroleum pumping and storage sites, and industrial complexes.  Ballistic and
cruise missiles also present a serious threat to merchant shipping, critical sea-lanes, and
maritime operations in joint littoral warfare, as well as key offensive and defensive forces/
complexes and support organizations.  Air-to-surface missiles have also proven to be
effective weapons against point targets, and they are difficult to defend against.

“The Fuehrer and I have squared off the most rewarding targets on the map of London.  Twice
as many inhabitants are crammed into London as Berlin.  For three and a half years they have
had no sirens.  Imagine the terrific awakening that’s coming!  Our weapons [V-1/V-2} are
absolutely unprecedented.  There is no defense, no warning at all.  Wham!  It hurtles down into
the city, all unaware!  I cannot picture a more devastating attack on their morale…”

Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Minister of Propaganda, quoted by David Irving in The Mare’s Nest

II-2

2.  Generic Architecture

Although there are many variables between the different types of TMs, they generally

share a common architecture.  Countries possessing TMs either import them, reverse-
engineer them and/or develop their own technology.  Common aspects of all TM programs
are--

a.  Research and Development (R&D).  If a country is developing its own missile

system(s) or adapting a system purchased from another country, there will be a center,
institution, and personnel responsible for the R&D effort.  However, if a country purchases
the complete TM system, there may be no R&D effort.

b.  Manufacturing.  Countries that develop their own systems or adapt those produced

by other nations require dedicated manufacturing and testing facilities.  They may also
have to develop or refine the fuel for the missile systems.  Although the fuels are of a
specific type, they are commonly available on the international market from several
sources.

c.  Import.  Countries that purchase systems from other nations will have prepared

sites for receipt of missile system components and fuels.  These ports of entry may be air-,
land- (road or rail), or sea-based.  These locations must have receipt, inspection, and storage
capabilities.  If the equipment requires assembly, there may be facilities created nearby to
support these activities.

d.  Transportation.  TM components must move from their manufacturing or importing

site by rail, road, air, and/or sea to garrison or permanent storage sites.

e.  Missile Storage.  Missile storage locations are required at the point of manufacture,

at the point of receipt, in TM unit garrison locations, and at training installations.  Missile
storage sites are likely to be constructed and developed within projected operational areas
as well.

f.  Warhead Storage.  Warhead storage sites are usually located in ammunition areas

and may not be easily discernible from bunkers holding other munitions.  However, WMD
warheads require specialized storage, handling and, most notably, higher security.

g.  Garrison.  TM units are usually garrisoned at military bases.  Most training and

equipment maintenance occurs at these locations.  Land-based units will likely move from
their garrisons to conduct combat operations.  Air and naval TM units may conduct wartime
operations directly from their home air base or port facility.

h.  Dispersal.  During peacetime training or conflict, TM forces move from garrison or

permanent storage sites to operating areas.  These areas may include training areas,
forward operating bases (FOB), staging bases, hide locations, or air bases.  The missiles are
normally transported on a TEL, or they can be moved by railcar or covered truck.  For cruise
missiles and air-to-surface missiles, aircraft may move to designated dispersal or staging
bases, while ships may move out of port to a designated operating area.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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