F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• FCCs have detected a LEF hydraulic drive unit

(HDU) stall.

If a weak HDU fails to drive a LEF surface to

the commanded position, an uncommanded

roll-off may result. When aerodynamic loads are

reduced, the weak HDU may operate normally.

There are two sets of LEF conditions that can set

FLAP SCHED

the FLAP SCHED caution:

FCES

CONDITION 1

If LEF Xs not present (HDU Stall) -

• Relates to aircraft maneuvering that may be

1. Limit AOA to 6° maximum when below 3,000

Caution Light

departure prone with incorrect LEF movement.

feet AGL and above Mach 0.6.

• FLAP SCHED caution asserted when all of the

following occur:

If LEF Xs present (HDU failed) -

FLAPS

1) 10° difference exists between LEF commanded

1. Execute FLAPS OFF procedure.

vs. actual position.

Amber

2) AOA > 12°

For landing -

3) Nz > 1.5g

2. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

4) LEF rate is less than 1.5°/sec OR is diverging

3. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

from its command.

4. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

″Flight

CONDITION 2

Controls, Flight

• Severely degraded LEF performance detected

Controls″

that can cause pronounced roll-off at

intermediate AOA due to less than optimum LEF

deflection on one side.

• FLAP SCHED caution asserted when all of the

following occur:

1) 4° difference between LEF commanded vs.

actual position.

2) LEF rate is 2°/sec slower than estimated rate

capability of the LEF.

• FLAP SCHED caution will remain on for an

additional 6 seconds after the HDU stall

condition clears.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 43)

V-12-45

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Nosewheel steering malfunction/failure

GROUND

(mechanical or electrical).

If no FCS Channel 2 or 4 failure -

1. Do not attempt taxi.

• Launch bar signal to the FCCs has failed.

If FCS Channel 2 or 4 failure present and

• NWS or NWS HI cue removed from HUD.

emergency high gain NWS required -

• NWS reverts to 360° free-swiveling mode.

1. WINGFOLD switch - HOLD or FOLD

• If NWS lost due to FCS CH2 or CH4 failure,

If FCS CH 4 failed -

emergency high gain NWS can be obtained by

NWS

2. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

unlocking the wings.

If FCS CH 2 failed -

• Single channel NWS operation in emergency

FCES

2. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

mode prevents detection of NWS command

3. Paddle switch - PRESS

failures.

Caution Light

4. NWS button - PRESS and RELEASE

• Disengage NWS if uncommanded motion occurs.

IN FLIGHT

If no BLIN code 123 present -

1. Make a precautionary arrested landing (if avail-

able).

When emergency high gain NWS mode is entered,

If BLIN code 123 present -

NWS indications may not be displayed on the

1. NWS Low gain available by holding the NWS

HUD. As a result, inadvertent nosewheel steering

switch pressed.

actuation may injure ground personnel.

RUDDER ACTUATOR FAILURE

• Rudder failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or two channel failure) or by

a switching valve failing to switch to the backup

circuit following a HYD circuit failure.

Speedbrake function, autopilot, and rudder toe-in

inoperative.

• Following rudder actuator failure, surface driven

Rudder Failure

to a faired position by air loads and is damped to

prevent oscillations.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering a

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

roll-off with lateral stick alone increases adverse

complete -

yaw and aggravates the roll-off.

• To ensure balanced flight, minimize sideslip by

7. Execute Flaps-HALF Controllability Check

FCS

the early use of the operating rudder.

procedure.

FCES

LINEUP CONSIDERATIONS

For landing -

• Lineup control will be degraded.

8. FLAP switch - HALF

Caution Light

• Make lineup corrections slowly and smoothly,

9. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

particularly when single engine.

10. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

(DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.)

″Flight Controls,

Flight Controls″

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to

prevent a departure when single engine if MAX

power selected. Large single engine throttle

transients can cause significant yaw and roll.

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

AOA.

• Bolter performance degraded due to lack of

rudder toe-in.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 44)

V-12-46

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

STABILATOR ACTUATOR FAILURE

• Stabilator failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or three-four channel failure)

or by a dual HYD circuit failure (1B/2A or

1A/2B).

Autopilot inoperative.

• Stabilator reconfiguration control laws are

automatically enabled following a single stabilator

failure to compensate for the loss of that surface.

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

Stabilator Failure

• With hydraulics intact, failed stabilator is driven

complete -

to 2° TEU and locked.

• Below 250 KCAS, flying qualities should be

7. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

nearly normal.

8. AOA - Maintain below 10°

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

D Flaps HALF

FCS

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

FCES

• In flaps AUTO, maximum roll rate is extremely

For landing -

low in the transonic region below 20,000 feet,

10. FLAP switch - HALF

Caution Light

especially when rolling away from the failed

11. Fly a straight-in approach.

stabilator. Significant roll and yaw coupling may

12. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

occur with forward stick inputs at >Mach 1.4 and

13. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

altitude >30,000 feet.

available).

″Flight Controls,

14. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

Flight Controls″

• In flaps AUTO, DO NOT EXCEED 10° AOA due

rollout (e.g., aero braking).

to reduced nose-down pitch authority.

• During a bolter, aircraft yaws into good stabilator

when the flight control system deflects the good

stabilator TEU in preparation for aircraft nose

rotation. The yaw may be sudden and

pronounced, but easily controlled with rudder to

counter the yawing motion. Positive aft stick is

required to achieve positive rotation during

bolters.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 45)

V-12-47

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

• HYD circuit 1A pressure low (<1,400 psi).

2. Land as soon as practical.

If right AIL Xs -

HYD 1A is the first circuit turned off during RLS

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

operation. If caution remains without HYD 1B, the

required)

leak was successfully isolated in HYD 1A.

If right AIL Xs remain -

HYD 1A

4. Read remarks for AIL Xs.

Right AIL Xs will occur if switching valve is

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

slow/fails to switch.

• Flaps HALF or FULL

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

pressure present.

If no Xs -

3. Fly a straight-in approach.

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

• HYD circuit 1B pressure low (<1,400 psi).

2. Land as soon as practical.

If left RUD and/or left LEF Xs -

HYD 1B is the second circuit turned off during

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

RLS operation. If caution remains without HYD

required)

1A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD 1B.

If left RUD and/or left LEF Xs remain -

HYD 1B

4. Read remarks for RUD and/or LEF Xs.

Left RUD and/or left LEF Xs will occur if

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

• Flaps HALF

D FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

pressure present.

If no Xs -

3. Fly a straight-in approach.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 46)

V-12-48

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

If right LEF Xs -

4. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

required)

• HYD circuit 2A pressure low (<1,400 psi).

If right LEF Xs remain -

5. Read remarks for LEF Xs.

HYD 2A is the first circuit turned off during RLS

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

operation. If caution remains without HYD 2B, the

• Flaps HALF

leak was successfully isolated in HYD 2A.

• DO NOT EXCEED ON−SPEED AOA.

If no Xs -

With HYD 2A failed:

4. Consider Select Jettison unwanted stores prior

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

to gear extension.

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

5. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension

HYD

• No normal braking

procedure.

• No anti-skid

• No probe retraction/normal extension

FOR LANDING

• No launch bar extension

• No gun

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

Right LEF Xs will occur if switching valve is

If arrested landing not practical -

slow/fails to switch.

3. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

sure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not avail-

pressure present.

able.

4. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

slow speed NWS.

Once stopped on runway -

5. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

moved).

• HYD circuit 2B pressure low (<1,400 psi).

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

2. Land as soon as practical.

HYD 2B is the second circuit turned off during

If left AIL and/or right RUD Xs -

RLS operation. If caution remains without HYD

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

2A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD 2B.

required)

If left AIL and/or right RUD Xs remain -

HYD

With HYD 2B failed:

4. Read remarks for AIL and/or RUD Xs.

D No hook retraction

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check acceptable

Left AIL and/or right RUD Xs will occur if

if no RUD Xs)

switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

If no Xs -

pressure present.

3. Fly a straight-in approach.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 47)

V-12-49

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual left HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

(a) Left HYD pump internal failure (needle NOT

3. Land as soon as practical.

stabilized at zero). May be accompanied by

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

HYD1 HOT caution.

4. Throttle LEFT engine - OFF

(b) HYD 1 leak which could not be isolated by

If HYD1 HOT caution never displayed -

RLS (preceded by RLS circuit caution

5. Consider restart for landing (if required).

sequencing).

If right AIL, left RUD, and/or left LEF Xs -

6. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

stabilized at zero).

required)

(d) Left power transmission shaft failure

If right AIL, left RUD, and/or left LEF Xs

(accompanied by L GEN, L DC FAIL, and L

remain -

BOOST LO cautions).

7. Read remarks for AIL, RUD and/or LEF Xs.

HYD 1A

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD 1B

Right AIL, left RUD, and/or left LEF Xs will occur

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check

if switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

acceptable if no RUD or LEF Xs)

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

pressure present.

FOR LANDING

If single engine -

Prolonged use of a failed hydraulic pump

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing

without the pump shaft shearing as indicated

procedure.

by the needle not stabilized at zero will

If both engines running -

generate considerable heat and may result in

1. FLAP switch - HALF (Flaps FULL acceptable

an AMAD bay fire. Consider restarting the

if no RUD or LEF Xs)

engine prior to landing.

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 48)

V-12-50

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

Flight control surface affected:

2. Land as soon as practical.

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

3. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

If right LEF Xs -

With HYD 2A failed:

4. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

required)

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

If right LEF Xs remain -

• No normal braking

5. Read remarks for AIL and LEF Xs.

• No anti-skid

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• No probe retraction/normal extension

• Flaps HALF

• No launch bar extension

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• No gun

If only right AIL Xs -

5. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs.

Right LEF Xs will occur if switching valve is

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

slow/fails to switch.

• Flaps HALF or FULL

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

HYD

pressure present.

HYD

FOR LANDING

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

If arrested landing not practical -

• 2g max

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

• Minimize sideslip

rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

• Half lateral stick

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

• Loss of speedbrake

sure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not avail-

• Loss of autopilot

able.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

Remarks for AIL Xs:

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps

slow speed NWS.

FULL, approach speed will be increased by

Once stopped on runway -

about 11 knots. Flaps HALF, 17 knots.

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

• Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it

moved).

can cause lateral PIO especially when

approaching touchdown.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 49)

V-12-51

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both TEFs lost

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

• Right stabilator lost

With HYD 2B failed:

• No hook retraction

Left and/or right AIL Xs will occur if switching valve is slow/fails to

switch.

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic pressure present.

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• 2g max

High approach speeds will likely

• Minimize sideslip

• Half lateral stick

preclude CV landing. Divert if able.

• Loss of speedbrake

• Loss of autopilot

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

Remarks for TEF/STAB/RUD Xs:

2. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

3. Land as soon as practical.

If aileron Xs -

4. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent a depar-

times if required)

ture when single engine if MAX power selected. Large single

engine throttle transients can cause significant yaw and roll.

If aileron Xs remain -

5. Read remarks for AIL Xs.

• TEF driven to 5° TED and locked.

In all cases -

• Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed power set-

6. Read adjacent remarks for TEF/

tings are near idle.

• Approach speeds for field landing may be near the maximum nose

STAB/RUD Xs.

HYD

tire speed (195 KGS).

7. Execute Controllability Check proce-

HYD

dure.

• Flaps HALF

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED

Expect slower engine response to throttle changes which may

AOA.

result in excessive sink rates under high WOD conditions. The

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum

recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the Air-

craft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

practical.

• Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small in

magnitude. Power corrections will translate into an airspeed

FOR LANDING

change before a rate of descent change is noted. Expect larger,

longer, and more anticipatory power corrections to be required in

order to effect a glideslope change. Aggressive, well-timed, and

1. FLAP switch - HALF

anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glideslope control.

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

• There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low ap-

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

proach power setting and the longer time required to effect a

If arrested landing not practical -

change.

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a bolter/

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during

waveoff due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out attitude will

landing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

appear flatter than normal.

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

Because of right rudder and stabilator loss, bolter performance

will be degraded due to the lack of rudder toe-in and aircraft

yawing left, into good stab, when stab deflects TEU in prepara-

tion for nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pronounced,

but controllable using rudder/NWS.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with lateral

stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-off.

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up cor-

rections (especially if single engine).

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed AOA.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 50)

V-12-52

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both LEFs frozen

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

• Left stabilator lost

• Both LEX spoilers lost

• TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

With HYD 2A failed:

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

• No anti-skid

• No probe retraction/normal extension

• No launch bar extension

• No gun

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

• 2g max

2. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

• Minimize sideslip

3. Land as soon as practical.

• Half lateral stick

• Loss of speedbrake

4. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

• Loss of autopilot

quired)

Remarks for LEF/STAB/RUD Xs:

5. Read adjacent remarks for LEF/STAB/

RUD Xs.

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• Flaps HALF

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent a

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

departure when single engine if MAX power selected. Large

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum

single engine throttle transients can cause significant yaw

practical.

and roll.

• Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

• Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

FOR LANDING

HYD

• Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff or

HYD

bolter that is easily controllable.

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

• Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

depending on frozen LEF position. Wing stores will further

degrade glideslope control.

If arrested landing not practical -

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during

a rate of descent change is noticed. This may lead to a

landing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

tendency to over-control glideslope. Anticipatory throttle

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

inputs are key to glideslope control.

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter/waveoff performance is

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is

degraded and climb-out attitude will appear flatter than

not available.

normal.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after

touchdown to preserve APU ACCUM

pressure for slow speed NWS.

Once stopped on runway -

Because of left rudder and stabilator loss, bolter

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is

performance will be degraded due to the lack of rudder

toe-in and aircraft yawing right, into good stab, when stab

removed).

deflects TEU in preparation for nose rotation. Yaw rate

may be sudden and pronounced, and not easily controlled

because of failed left rudder and no normal NWS.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates

roll-off.

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

corrections (especially if single engine).

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed AOA.

• If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL, the

TEFs will not retract except for loads alleviation (no higher

than 17°). While in AUTO, momentary selection of GAIN

ORIDE will command the TEFs to retract to 4° TED.

However, the operating LEF will also be commanded to move

to 5° LED. This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near 5° LED.

Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF retraction is

essential for range or fuel considerations.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 51)

V-12-53

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surface affected:

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

2. Land as soon as practical.

With HYD 2B failed:

• No hook retraction

If any RUD and/or left LEF Xs -

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times if

Left LEF, left RUD, and/or right RUD Xs will oc-

required)

cur if switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

If any RUD and/or left LEF Xs remain -

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

pressure present.

4. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs and RUD

and/or LEF Xs.

Remarks for any surface off:

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD 1B

• General Limits:

• Flaps HALF

HYD 2B

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• 2g max

If only left AIL Xs -

• Minimize sideslip

4. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs.

• Half lateral stick

• Loss of speedbrake

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• Loss of autopilot

• Flaps HALF or FULL

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

Remarks for AIL Xs:

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps

FULL, approach speed will be increased by

FOR LANDING

about 11 knots. Flaps HALF, 17 knots.

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

• Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it

can cause lateral PIO especially when approach-

ing touchdown.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 52)

V-12-54

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

3. Land as soon as practical.

4. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

5. Throttle RIGHT engine - OFF

If HYD2 HOT caution never displayed -

• Dual right HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

6. Consider restart for landing (if required).

(a) Right HYD pump internal failure (needle

If left AIL, right RUD and/or right

NOT stabilized at zero). May be accompanied

LEF Xs -

by HYD2 HOT caution.

7. FCS RESET button - PUSH (multiple times

(b) HYD 2 leak which could not be isolated by

if required)

RLS (preceded by RLS circuit caution

sequencing).

If left AIL, right RUD and/or right LEF Xs

remain -

stabilized at zero).

8. Read remarks for AIL, RUD, and/or

(d) Right power transmission shaft failure

LEF Xs.

(accompanied by R GEN, R DC FAIL, and R

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

BOOST LO cautions).

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check

With HYD 2A/2B failed:

acceptable if no RUD or LEF Xs)

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

If no Xs -

HYD

• No anti-skid

7. Consider Select Jettison unwanted stores prior

HYD

• No probe retraction/normal extension

to gear extension (if single engine, consider de-

• No launch bar extension

sired max gross landing weight).

• No gun

• No hook retraction

8. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension

procedure.

Left AIL, right RUD, and/or right LEF Xs will

• Flaps HALF if single engine

occur if switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

• FCS RESET recovers surface only if hydraulic

FOR LANDING

pressure present.

If single engine -

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing

procedure.

If both engines running -

1. FLAP switch - HALF (Flaps FULL acceptable

Prolonged use of a failed hydraulic pump

if no RUD or LEF Xs)

without the pump shaft shearing as indicated

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

by the needle not stabilized at zero will

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

generate considerable heat and may result in

If arrested landing not practical -

an AMAD bay fire. Consider restarting the

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

engine prior to landing.

sure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not avail-

able.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

slow speed NWS.

Once stopped on runway -

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

moved).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 53)

V-12-55

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both LEFs frozen

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

May be uncontrollable in flaps HALF if stores

• Left stabilator lost

• Both LEX spoilers lost

not jettisoned prior to transition to flaps HALF.

• TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

If HYD1 HOT caution appears, consider secur-

With HYD 2A failed:

ing left engine until preparing for landing. De-

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

parture is probable if left engine is secured.

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

• No anti-skid

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

• No probe retraction/normal extension

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

• No launch bar extension

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

• No gun

4. Land as soon as possible.

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

If HYD 1 needle stabilized at zero -

Jettison all stores prior to flaps HALF transition

6. DO NOT secure left engine.

since the transition with stores results in an un-

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

controllable nose-up tendency.

6. Consider securing LEFT engine.

Remarks for any surface off:

• DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF LEFT EN-

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

GINE IS SECURED.

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

• 2g max

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

• Minimize sideslip

BURNER.

• Half lateral stick

• Loss of speedbrake

7. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/LEF

• Loss of autopilot

Xs.

HYD

Remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/LEF Xs:

8. EMERG JETT button - PUSH (prior to landing

• Flaps AUTO flying qualities acceptable. Enough lat-

HYD

gear extension)

eral trim authority is available to balance the failure

HYD

induced roll-off up to Mach 0.85.

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• Flaps HALF

• DO NOT EXCEED ON−SPEED AOA.

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum practical.

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to pre-

vent a departure when single engine if MAX

FOR LANDING

power selected. Large single engine throttle tran-

sients can cause significant yaw and roll.

If single engine -

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and

Landing procedure.

If both engines running -

Flaps HALF transition from a clean configuration

can be accomplished (expect a LWD roll near on-

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

speed AOA). Carrier approach is possible but ex-

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

hibits sloppy directional/centerline control. In the

If arrested landing not practical -

event of a field bolter, the decision to go around

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing roll-

should be made immediately upon recognition of

a missed wire as rudder power may be insufficient

out (e.g., aerobraking).

to maintain directional control below 140 KCAS.

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps

(DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not available.

FULL, approach speed will be increased by about 11

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touchdown

knots. Flaps HALF, 17 knots.

to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for slow speed

• Line-up control is degraded. Avoid over-controlling

lateral stick inputs as it can cause lateral PIO espe-

NWS.

cially when approaching touchdown.

Once stopped on runway -

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter/waveoff perfor-

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is removed).

mance degraded. Climb-out attitude will appear flat-

ter than normal.

CONTINUED

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 54)

V-12-56

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Because of left rudder and stabilator loss, bolter

performance will be degraded due to the lack of

rudder toe-in and aircraft yawing right, into good

stab, when stab deflects TEU in preparation for

nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pro-

nounced, and not easily controlled because of

failed left rudder and no normal NWS.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off

with lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and

aggravates roll-off.

HYD 1A

• Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

HYD 1B

• Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

HYD 2A

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed

change before a rate of descent change is noticed.

(continued)

This may lead to a tendency to over-control glide-

slope. Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glide-

slope control.

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

AOA.

• If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or

FULL, the TEFs will not retract except for loads al-

leviation (no higher than 17°). While in AUTO, mo-

mentary selection of GAIN ORIDE will command

the TEFs to retract to 4° TED. However, the operat-

ing LEF will also be commanded to move to 5° LED.

This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near

5° LED. Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF

retraction is essential for range or fuel consider-

ations.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 55)

V-12-57

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both TEFs lost

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

• Right stabilator lost

With HYD 2B failed:

• No hook retraction

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

High approach speeds will likely preclude CV

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• 2g max

landing. Divert if able. If HYD1 HOT caution

• Minimize sideslip

appears, consider securing left engine until

• Half lateral stick

preparing for landing. Departure is probable if

• Loss of speedbrake

left engine is secured.

• Loss of autopilot

Remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/TEF Xs:

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

4. Land as soon as possible.

• Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to

If HYD 1 needle stabilized at zero -

prevent a departure when single engine if MAX

power selected. Large single engine throttle

5. DO NOT secure left engine.

transients can cause significant yaw and roll.

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

5. Consider securing LEFT engine.

• Slower engine response to throttle changes may

• DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF LEFT EN-

result in excessive sink rates under high WOD

GINE IS SECURED.

conditions. The recovery WOD should be kept

as close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery

• IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

HYD

Bulletin recommendations.

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

HYD

BURNER.

• Expect loose and sluggish response in flaps HALF,

HYD

6. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/TEF

with high approach speeds due to TEF failure.

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds.

Xs.

• Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can

7. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

cause lateral PIO especially when approaching touch-

• Flaps HALF

down.

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance de-

graded.

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum practical.

FOR LANDING

Because of right rudder and stabilator loss, bolter

If single engine -

performance will be degraded due to the lack of

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing pro-

rudder toe-in and aircraft yawing left, into good

stab, when stab deflects TEU in preparation for

cedure.

nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pro-

If both engines running -

nounced, but controllable with rudder/NWS.

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off

with lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and

If arrested landing not practical -

aggravates roll-off.

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing roll-

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth

out (e.g., aerobraking).

line-up corrections (especially if single engine).

• TEF driven to 5° TED and locked.

• Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-

speed power settings are near idle.

• Approach speeds for field landing may be near the

maximum nose tire speed (195 KGS). If making an

arrested landing, take maximum arresting gear en-

gagement speed into consideration.

• Expect slower engine response.

CONTINUED

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 56)

V-12-58

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and

small in magnitude. Power corrections will translate

into an airspeed change before a rate of descent

change is noted. Expect larger, longer, and more an-

ticipatory power corrections to be required in order

to effect a glideslope change. Aggressive, well-timed,

and anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glideslope

HYD 1A

control.

HYD 1B

• There is a tendency to over-control power due to the

HYD 2B

low approach power setting and the longer time re-

(continued)

quired to effect a change.

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer dur-

ing a bolter/waveoff due to sluggish throttle re-

sponse. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter than

normal.

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

AOA.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 57)

V-12-59

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

High approach speeds will likely preclude CV

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both TEFs lost

landing. Divert if able. If HYD2 HOT caution

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

appears, consider securing right engine until

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

preparing for landing. Departure is probable if

• Right stabilator lost

right engine is secured.

With HYD 2A/2B failed:

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

• No normal braking

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

• No anti-skid

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

• No probe retraction/normal extension

4. Land as soon as possible.

• No launch bar extension

• No gun

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

• No hook retraction

If HYD 2 needle stabilized at zero -

Remarks for any surface off:

6. DO NOT secure right engine.

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

6. Consider securing RIGHT engine.

• 2g max

• DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF RIGHT EN-

• Minimize sideslip

GINE IS SECURED.

• Half lateral stick

• Loss of speedbrake

• IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

• Loss of autopilot

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

BURNER.

Remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/TEF Xs:

7. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/TEF

Xs.

HYD

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

• Flaps HALF

HYD

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to

prevent a departure when single engine if MAX

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

power selected. Large single engine throttle

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum practical.

transients can cause significant yaw and roll.

FOR LANDING

If single engine -

In flaps AUTO, full LWD lateral trim and half

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing pro-

lateral stick are required to keep wings level at

cedure.

Mach 0.7 and 20,000 feet, while full lateral trim is

required at Mach 0.6 and 20,000 feet. Lateral

If both engines running -

authority is lost around 14° AOA. Transition to

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

flaps HALF/FULL may be safely accomplished

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

with or without stores. Consider SEL JETT right

If arrested landing not practical -

wing stores to balance failure-induced roll.

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing roll-

• Approach speeds are significantly higher and

out (e.g., aerobraking).

on-speed power settings are near idle.

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure

• Approach speeds for field landing may be near the

(DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not available.

maximum nose tire speed (195 KGS). If making an

arrested landing, take maximum arresting gear

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touchdown

engagement speed into consideration.

to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for slow speed

• Expect slower engine response.

NWS.

Once stopped on runway -

CONTINUED

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is removed).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 58)

V-12-60

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and

small in magnitude. Power corrections will translate

into an airspeed change before a rate of descent

change is noted. Expect larger, longer, and more an-

ticipatory power corrections to be required in order

to effect a glideslope change. Aggressive, well-timed,

and anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glideslope

control.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may

result in excessive sink rates under high WOD

conditions. The recovery WOD should be kept as

close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin

recommendations.

• There is a tendency to over-control power due to the

low approach power setting and the longer time re-

quired to effect a change.

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer dur-

HYD 1A

ing a bolter/waveoff due to sluggish throttle re-

HYD 2A

sponse. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter than

HYD 2B

normal.

(continued)

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance de-

graded.

Because of right rudder and stabilator loss, bolter

performance will be degraded due to the lack of

rudder toe-in and aircraft yawing left, into good

stab, when stab deflects TEU in preparation for

nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pro-

nounced, and not easily controlled because of

failed right rudder and no normal NWS.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off

with lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and

aggravates roll-off.

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth

line-up corrections (especially if single engine).

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

AOA.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 59)

V-12-61

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,400 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both LEFs frozen

• Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

Uncontrollable during transition from flaps

• Left stabilator lost

• Both LEX spoilers lost

AUTO to flaps HALF/FULL. Flaps AUTO ap-

• TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

proach required. High approach speeds will

With HYD 2A/2B failed:

likely preclude CV landing. Divert if able. If

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

HYD2 HOT caution appears, consider securing

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

right engine until preparing for landing. Depar-

• No anti-skid

ture is probable if right engine is secured.

• No probe retraction/normal extension

• No launch bar extension

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

• No gun

• No hook retraction

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

4. Land as soon as possible.

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

Maintain FLAP switch in AUTO. Transition to

If HYD 2 needle stabilized at zero -

flaps HALF/FULL results in an uncontrollable

6. DO NOT secure right engine.

nose-up tendency.

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero -

Remarks for any surface off:

6. Consider securing RIGHT engine.

• General Limits:

• DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF RIGHT EN-

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

GINE IS SECURED.

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

• 2g max

• Minimize sideslip

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

• Half lateral stick

BURNER.

• Loss of speedbrake

7. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/LEF

• Loss of autopilot

HYD

Xs.

HYD

Remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/LEF Xs:

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

• Flaps AUTO

• Flaps AUTO flying qualities are acceptable with

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

smooth lateral stick inputs. Wings level can be main-

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum practical.

tained up to Mach 0.85. Piloted simulation deter-

mined that flaps AUTO approach and landing is con-

trollable. A 10° AOA approach to reduce approach

FOR LANDING

speed is recommended.

If single engine -

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing pro-

cedure.

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to pre-

• Flaps AUTO

vent a departure when single engine if MAX

power selected. Large single engine throttle tran-

If both engines running -

sients can cause significant yaw and roll.

1. FLAP switch - AUTO

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds.

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

• Line-up control is degraded. Avoid over-controlling

lateral stick inputs as it can cause lateral PIO espe-

If arrested landing not practical -

cially when approaching touchdown.

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing roll-

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance de-

out (e.g., aerobraking).

graded.

5. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure

(DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not available.

6. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touchdown

to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for slow speed

Because of left rudder and stabilator loss, bolter

performance will be degraded due to the lack of

NWS.

rudder toe-in and aircraft yawing right, into good

Once stopped on runway -

stab, when stab deflects TEU in preparation for

7. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is removed).

nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pro-

nounced, and not easily controlled because of

failed left rudder and no normal NWS.

CONTINUED

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 60)

V-12-62

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off

with lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and

aggravates roll-off.

• Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

• Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed

change before a rate of descent change is noticed.

This may lead to a tendency to over-control glide-

slope. Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glide-

slope control.

• Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-

HYD 1B

out attitude will appear flatter than normal.

HYD 2A

• Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed

HYD 2B

AOA.

(continued)

• If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or

FULL, the TEFs will not retract except for loads al-

leviation (no higher than 17°). While in AUTO, mo-

mentary selection of GAIN ORIDE will command

the TEFs to retract to 4° TED. However, the operat-

ing LEF will also be commanded to move to 5° LED.

This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near

5° LED. Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF

retraction is essential for range or fuel consider-

ations.

• Hydraulic pressure is less than 4,600 psi when 5,000

HYD 5000

psi operation is requested from the hydraulic system.

If above

650 KCAS -

FCES

Expect degraded flying qualities above 380 KCAS and

1. Do not command rolling maneuvers above 4g.

reduced departure resistance above 650 KCAS. Uncom-

2. Full symmetric g capability still available.

Caution Light

manded roll possible following aggressive lateral maneu-

vering at greater than 4g above 650 KCAS.

• Hydraulic pump case temperature exceeds 400°F and

either the respective case drain temperature exceeds

275°F or the respective reservoir temperature ex-

ceeds 250°F.

HYD1 HOT

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

HYD2 HOT

May be an indication of an internal hydraulic pump

2. Land as soon as practical.

failure.

Hydraulic pump overheat may result in pump case fail-

ure and fire in the AMAD bay.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 61)

V-12-63

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Afterburner limiting function of the FADEC is

activated.

The ABLIM function is used during MAX power

ABLIM

Information

catapult launches only. ABLIM limits engine power

to half afterburner with the throttles at MAX.

ABLIM is disabled with an FCC Ch 2 or 4, MC1,

FADEC, or INS failure.

D An ACI configuration that is incompatible with

TAWS/GPWS is detected.

ACI

Information

TAWS/GPWS voice alerts are unavailable and are

replaced with ″whoop/whoop″. Visual cues are still

available.

• Aft Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is not

connected.

1. Verify aft HMD properly connected.

• Aft QDC is not properly secured to Quick

2. Verify aft QDC is properly connected and

Mounting Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

AHMD

• Aft coarse alignment is invalid or has not been

3. Aft HMD - ALIGN

performed.

4. Verify aft HDU is properly connected to the

• Aft Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not connected

helmet.

to the helmet.

• INS switched to NAV without a complete

1. INS knob - IFA or GYRO

ALGN

alignment.

• Radar hardware needed to support AMRAAM

AM DL

Information

data link not installed.

ARMAMENT

• Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

ADVISORIES

• Autopilot barometric altitude hold mode

BALT

Information

engaged.

BIT

• Built-in test failure detected.

1. BIT page - Identify failure

• Onboard unit other than MU contains classified

CDATA

Information

data.

• TAWS/GPWS has been deselected.

CFIT

Information

Protection against CFIT is unavailable.

COM1H

• ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with Have

Information

COM2H

Quick time.

• Indicates COMM 1 or COMM 2 is reporting

failed checksum or validity fill loading error.

COM1L

With COMM 1 and 2 on -

When selected on the MUMI page, COMM 1 boxes

COM2L

1. MUMI page - SELECT COMM

while the data is downloaded from the AMU to

COMM 1 and 2 and unboxes when the download is

complete.

COM1S

• ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with

Information

COM2S

SINCGARS time.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 62)

V-12-64

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• All systems have not been checked for configura-

tion compatibility because one or more of the

CONFG

Information

systems is off or not communicating. Typical

poststart with RADAR knob in OFF.

• Autopilot coupled to WYPT, OAP, SEQ #, or

CPLD

Information

TCN.

• GAIN switch in ORIDE with FLAP switch in

CRUIS

Information

AUTO.

D BAD

• ALE-47 dispenser failure.

Information

• ALE-47 dispenser expendables quantity below

D LOW

Information

set BINGO level.

• Indicates a failure of the COMSEC capability

DCSCS

Information

has been detected.

• Degrade detected that may result in loss of

DECM

jamming functionality or jammer interface

1. BIT/EW/DECM STATUS page - CHECK

problems.

• The integrity of the DFIRS-stored electronic

boresight constants (EBCs) is uncertain.

1. BIT/SENSORS/EBC ENTRY page - Verify per-

EBC

manent Mode S address

Mode S may be unavailable.

Advisory is disabled in flight.

• ECS auxiliary duct door not in commanded

position.

If the advisory is displayed above Mach 0.4, a door

is failed open. If the advisory is displayed below

Mach 0.32, a door is failed closed. The advisory

GROUND

clears if the doors are in the correct position for

1. Do not takeoff.

flight conditions. The advisory may return if the

failure still exists and the flight conditions reoccur.

IN FLIGHT

No flight restrictions are imposed as long as

airspeed is maintained above Mach 0.4.

1. Accelerate and maintain 0.40 IMN using

minimum power.

2. There are no throttle restrictions and the

ECSDR

mission may be continued provided airspeed

If ECS troubleshooting has been done while on

remains above 0.40 IMN to landing.

deck, check for an 8A6 MSP Code after takeoff. An

For landing -

8A6 MSP Code is set by a system flow modulating

3. Minimize time below 0.40 IMN.

regulating valve failure. This failure can potentially

lead to an unexpected loss of cabin pressurization.

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

Minimize operation at high power settings below

Mach 0.4 with both doors failed closed. A dual

bleed shutdown is possible under such conditions.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 63)

V-12-65

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Fuel page - CHECK

• Failure in fuel quantity gauging system that may affect fuel quan-

If all fuel quantities invalid -

F-QTY

tity indications or FUEL XFER caution display.

2. SDC - RESET

3. FLBIT - PERFORM

GROUND

1. ENG page - Verify ENG

STATUS

If ENG STATUS is NORM -

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

3. ENG page - Push unboxed

channel (A or B) on affected

• Left or right FADEC has lost backup redundancy in one channel.

engine

If dual channel lineouts are

FADEC

If advisory remains, a level of redundancy is lost. Another

removed -

engine/control system failure may result in engine shutdown.

4. Restart affected engine.

ABLIM function may not be available.

5. Continue mission.

If ENG STATUS is other than

NORM or dual lineouts do not

clear -

2. Do not takeoff.

IN FLIGHT

Information

D 5-Wet FCC control law gains are no longer being applied.

There is possibility of looseness in the flaps AUTO longitudinal

flying qualities at certain localized flight conditions. This is not

FCCGN

considered to be a safety of flight issue and will not interfere with

Information

in-flight refueling operations. The degradation, if any, may become

apparent for CGs aft of approximately 30% MAC. Flaps AUTO

lateral/directional and all flaps HALF or FULL flying qualities are

unaffected by this issue.

FPAH

• Autopilot flight path angle hold mode engaged.

Information

• Flight performance advisory system is unable to calculate HOME

FPAS

Information

FUEL caution.

GPS

• GPS NORM mode error > 1,000 feet.

1. INS knob - NAV

• GPS multi-path is detected.

GPSMP

Information

GPS-aided navigation is prevented.

GSEL

• Autopilot ground track select mode engaged.

Information

GTRK

• Autopilot ground track hold mode engaged.

Information

HDG

• Autopilot magnetic heading hold mode engaged.

Information

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 64)

V-12-66

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated engine anti-ice system is operating.

Both advisories should be displayed with the ENG

LHEAT

ANTI ICE switch ON. Single advisory displayed

Information

RHEAT

during post-start engine anti-ice functional test

with the switch OFF. Corresponding advisory is re-

moved if an anti-ice failure is detected.

• Engine anti-ice failure detected while the ENG

ANTI ICE switch is OFF.

1. Avoid icing conditions.

If the ENG ANTI ICE switch is placed to ON, the

If icing conditions are

HEAT

HEAT advisory is replaced by the HEAT FAIL

encountered -

caution. The corresponding L HEAT or R HEAT

2. Refer to Extreme Weather

advisory is not displayed on the failed side. Engine

procedures.

and inlet device anti-ice capability lost on failed

side.

• INS attitude data is not being provided to the

FCCs for sideslip and AOA estimation

calculations. May be caused by an INS failure

(INS ATT caution), by placing the ATT switch

to STBY with good INS data, or by an FCC

detected failure. Autopilot inoperative.

1. FCS RESET button - PUSH

If advisory remains -

HIAOA

Above approximately 20° AOA in flaps AUTO, the

2. Monitor any sideslip excursions above

20° AOA

FCCs use INS data for sideslip and sideslip rate

in flaps AUTO.

feedback to provide roll coordination and departure

resistance. When INS data is not available or

invalid, the FCCs will no longer use INS data.

There is no significant degradation to flying

qualities, departure resistance or roll performance

with this indication.

• Forward Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is

not connected.

1. Verify forward HMD properly connected.

• Forward QDC is not properly secured to Quick

2. Verify forward QDC is properly connected and

Mounting Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

HMD

• Forward coarse alignment is invalid or has not

3. Forward HMD - ALIGN

been performed.

4. Verify forward HDU is properly connected to

• Forward Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not

the helmet.

connected to the helmet.

If ARS switch ON and drogue deployed -

With ARS control panel power switch ON:

Information

• Drogue deployed for normal refueling (wet or

If ARS switch ON and hose reel failed to

dry).

secure hose -

HOSE

• Hose reel has failed to secure hose.

1. Hose EXT/RETR switch - CONFIRM

RETR

With ARS control panel power switch OFF, the

If drogue still does not retract -

ARS DROGUE caution message is displayed.

2. Refer to ARS DROGUE caution.

HSEL

• Autopilot heading select mode engaged.

Information

• SDC HUD Backup is unavailable.

HUDBU

Information

In the event of a dual MC failure, the backup HUD

page will not be available on the MPCD or UFCD.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 65)

V-12-67

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. BIT/COMM/PIDS MAINT - Check Crypto

Status

If CRYPTO lined out -

D Fault with the airborne interrogator.

2. Reload M4 Crypto.

IFFAI

If CRYPTO not lined out -

Unable to interrogate Mode 4 or cannot interrogate

2. Information:

any mode.

D IFF may be DEGD

D Unable to interrogate Mode 4

D Unable to solve ROE if M4 not removed

• GAIN switch in ORIDE with the FLAP switch in

LAND

Information

HALF or FULL.

• LTD/R and/or Marker degrade detected.

Laser designation/ranging and/or marking may be

If ATFLIR installed -

unavailable or inaccurate.

1. TAC/FLIR/SETUP page - IDENTIFY FAIL-

URE

If ATFLIR installed -

ALN DEGD - Neither LTD/R nor Marker will fire

If either TFLIR or ATFLIR installed -

L DEGD

due to alignment errors.

2. FLIR IBIT - PERFORM (SUPT/BIT/

PWR DEGD - LTD/R power could be deficient for

SENSORS/FLIR or ATFLIR)

ranging and/or designating.

If advisory remains -

RNG DEGD - Laser ranging will be invalid but

designating may still be possible.

3. FLIR switch - CYCLE

MRK DEGD - Marker will either not fire or fire at

low power.

1. SMS processor - Check for proper codes

LOAD

• Improper weapon load, codes, or incompatible

If LOAD remains -

fuzing. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-series.

2. Do not takeoff.

• ACL mode has been enabled and the current IFF

M2ID

Mode 2 code is not the same as the last four

Information

digits of the aircraft Link 4 address.

• Transponder replied to a valid Mode 4

interrogation.

M4 OK

Information

IFF MODE 4 switch must be in DIS or DIS/AUD

to enable this advisory.

MIDS

• MIDS fault detected.

1. MIDS page - IDENTIFY FAILURE

1. Verify maintenance card installed in proper

• AMU/maintenance card problem.

MNTCD

AMU slot and AMU door is closed.

Advisory is disabled in flight.

2. If indication does not clear - Do not takeoff

1. Verify mission card installed in proper AMU

• AMU/mission card problem.

MSNCD

slot and AMU door is closed.

Advisory is disabled in flight.

2. If indication does not clear - Pilot discretion

• Memory Unit memory full.

MU FL

Information

Oldest stored data will be overwritten.

• DoV mission card data is not present or failed to

load.

If DOV displayed on MUMI page -

• No DoV data is available for current position for

1. Remove and re-insert mission card.

NODOV

30 seconds.

If DOV remains -

2. Insert new mission card.

CV alignment times will increase.

INS performance while unaided may be degraded.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 66)

V-12-68

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

NOSEC

• GPS operating in non-secure mode.

Information

• GPS satellite communication lost.

P/INS

Position keeping has reverted from POS/AINS to

Information

POS/INS.

INS not being updated with GPS data.

PCODE

• GPS keys incorrect or not loaded.

Information

RALT

• Autopilot radar altitude hold mode engaged.

Information

RMMCD

• RMM not installed or failed.

Information

RMMFL

• RMM full (less than 20 minutes remaining).

Information

RCDR

• MU turned off.

Information

ROLL

• Autopilot roll attitude hold mode engaged.

Information

RSET

• FCS RESET attempt successful.

Information

• FCS RESET attempt unsuccessful.

RSET

Information

FCS failure and failure indications remain.

• Landing gear down with the ANTI SKID switch

SKID

Information

in OFF.

If Mode S operation desired -

• Mode S is enabled while acquisition squitter is

1. Enable acquisition squitter via the UFCD.

SQTTR

disabled.

If Mode S operation not desired -

1. Secure Mode S via the UFCD.

• Pitch, roll, and yaw trim properly set for takeoff.

TRIM

Information

Stabilators 4° TEU, roll trim zero, RUD TRIM

knob mechanically neutral.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 67)

V-12-69

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• GPS assisted velocity vector enhancement

disabled.

Only the air data function is being used to smooth

the velocity vector and may result in degraded

velocity vector accuracy.

1. Monitor velocity vector for errors.

If errors noted -

VVEL

2. Maintain level flight for 3 minutes (if practi-

With a VVEL advisory displayed, sustained climbs

cal).

and descents, such as penetration from the marshal

stack, can result in uncued (i.e., no cautions)

vertical velocity errors and a possible inaccurate

velocity vector position. Error magnitudes increase

at slower airspeeds and lower altitudes. Errors of up

to 3° (e.g., actual flightpath 3° below the displayed

velocity vector) have been observed in the landing

configuration.

• Bulk data transfer error or JSOW overheat

WPNS

Information

condition.

If GPS signals are believed to be accurate -

1. HSI/DATA/(A/C) page - SELECT NOSEC

• GPS receiver is not receiving encrypted code in

Y CODE

GPS OPTION

secure mode.

If GPS signals believed to be corrupted -

2. INS knob - NAV

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 68)

V-12-70

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Advisory Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A/A

• Air-to-Air master mode selected.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

A/G

• Air-to-Ground master mode selected.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

• RFCM or ALE-47 is requesting consent to

CONSNT

execute countermeasures response as indicated

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

by HUD cueing, or ALE-47 BIT underway.

• Continuous wave (RF Threat) detected.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

STEADY

Decoy is deployed and either transmitting or

enabled to transmit, or decoy portion of DECM

BIT is underway.

-------------------------------------------------------

DCOY ON

FLASHING

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

Decoy is deployed and transmission is inhibited due

to altitude limit or EMCON selected. Also flashes

for 30 seconds upon deployment of, or enabling

transmission from, last usable decoy if invalid reel

count occurs during its deployment.

• Fire extinguisher bottle discharge initiated or

GROUND

DISCH

pressure drop detected.

1. Do not takeoff.

STEADY

Decoy is deployed to, or beyond, the defined

minimum successful deployment length or 8 sec

(ALE-50)/16 sec (ALE-55) have elapsed since

launch squib firing, or decoy portion of BIT

underway.

-------------------------------------------------------

DPLY

Information

FLASHING

Decoy is currently being deployed, or decoy sever

has failed or cannot be determined. Flashes

indefinitely if first sever attempt unsuccessful.

Transitions to off if sever re-attempt successful or

continues to flash for 30 seconds and then

transitions to off if sever re-attempt fails.

• TEF(s) OFF, LEF(s) OFF, SPIN mode engaged,

FLAPS

GAIN ORIDE selected, or FLAPS HALF/FULL

Information

(Amber)

over 240 KCAS (auto flap retract).

FULL

• FLAP switch in FULL.

Information

HALF

• FLAP switch in HALF.

Information

HOOK

• Hook is down.

Information

(Green)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 69)

V-12-71

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Advisory Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• ASPJ or RFCM on board transmitter is active

JAM ON

and transmitting.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

• DECM BIT in progress

• Launch bar extended. (Weight on the nose gear,

L BAR

LAUNCH BAR switch in EXTEND, launch bar

Information

(Green)

not up (launch bar proximity switch not

energized))

STEADY

• Left main landing gear down and locked.

Information

--------------------------------------------------------------

LEFT

FLASHING

• Left planing link failure detected with the

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure procedure.

left main landing gear down and locked.

LOCK/SHOOT

• Radar in STT; ready to shoot.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

MASTER CAUTION

• Warning or caution has been activated.

1. MASTER CAUTION light - RESET

NOSE

• Nose landing gear down and locked.

Information

• CVRS mode switch in MAN or AUTO (in A/A or

A/G).

• The SSR is commanded to record.

RCDR ON

Information

The light is not an indication that tape is

actually pulling or SSR actually recording.

READY (APU)

• APU online and ready to support engine start.

Information

• ASPJ or RFCM is in receive or transmit mode

and is receiving threat signals that warrant a

REC

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

response.

• DECM BIT in progress.

STEADY

• Right main landing gear down and locked.

Information

-------------------------------------------------------

RIGHT

FLASHING

• Right planing link failure detected with the

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure procedure.

right main landing gear down and locked.

SAM

• SAM threat detected.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

SPD BRK

• Speedbrake function surfaces not fully retracted.

Information

STBY

• ASPJ in standby mode.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

• ASPJ or RFCM transmitters are in the warm up

WRMUP

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

cycle.

XMT

• ASPJ in transmit mode.

1. Refer to A1-F18EA-TAC-Series.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 70)

V-12-72

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

CFIT Voice Warnings

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

seconds after take-off/bolter or wave-off,

descending and landing gear is not down and

Wave-off

CHECK GEAR

locked for 0.3 seconds.

LDG GEAR handle - DN

There is no visual cue.

Approach Phase -

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

Immediately add power (up to MAX may be

seconds after take-off/bolter or waveoff, and sink

required) to reduce sink rate and pull up using

rate ≥ threshold for 0.3 seconds. Threshold varies

the direction-of-pull arrow on the HUD to

linearly with a maximum sink rate of 2,040 fpm

maintain 10 to 12° AOA.

POWER

from 150 feet.

Takeoff Phase -

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <250 KCAS, less than 60

seconds after take-off/bolter or waveoff, and a

Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).

sink rate ≥300 fpm for greater than 0.3 seconds.

• Aircraft is ≥150 feet and MC1 calculates a dive

recovery is required.

• Aircraft is ≤90 feet for 0.3 seconds and airspeed

Immediately pull-up using the direction-of-pull

PULL UP

is either ≥250 KCAS or ≥200 KCAS (when more

arrow on the HUD.

than 60 seconds after take-off/bolter or

wave-off).

• Aircraft is ≥150 feet, angle of bank >45°, and

MC1 calculates a dive recovery is required. May

be followed by PULL UP once bank angle is

Immediately roll towards wings level in

ROLL LEFT/RIGHT

≤45°.

direction indicated and pull-up using the

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

direction-of-pull arrow on the HUD.

seconds after take-off/bolter or wave-off, and at a

bank angle of ≥45° for more than one second.

• Aircraft is ≥150 feet, angle of bank >45°, and

MC1 calculates a dive recovery is required. May

be followed by PULL UP once bank angle is

Immediately roll towards wings level and pull

ROLL OUT

≤45°.

up using the direction-of-pull arrow on the

• Aircraft is <150 feet, <200 KCAS, more than 60

HUD.

seconds after take-off/bolter or wave-off, and at a

bank angle of ≥45° for more than one second.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 71)

V-12-73 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 13

Ground Emergencies

13.1 LOSS OF DC ESSENTIAL BUS

With WonW and both GENs offline, the Essential Bus is powered by the battery through the battery

contactor. If the battery contactor fails to apply power to the Essential Bus, the following cautions

and/or failures are displayed together and indicate an essential bus failure:

• L and R OIL PR cautions

• Landing gear position lights inoperative

• BINGO caution

• UHF 1 and 2 inoperative

• NWS caution

• Fuel dump inoperative

• FIRE EXTGH READY light on

• HOOK position light inoperative

• SPN RCVY light on

If a loss of the DC Essential Bus is suspected -

1. BATT switch - CYCLE

2. Electrical RESET button - PUSH

3. GEN switches - CYCLE

If DC Essential Power not restored -

4. APU start and crossbleed capability are lost.

13.2 ENGINE FAILS TO START/HUNG START

If no EGT rise within 20 seconds after throttle advance or rpm stabilizes below IDLE -

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Continue cranking for 3 minutes.

After 3 minutes -

3. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

4. APU switch - OFF

13.3 HOT START

If EGT climbs rapidly through 750°C -

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Engine - CRANK UNTIL EGT BELOW 200°C, reengage when rpm below 30%.

V-13-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

When EGT below 200°C -

3. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

4. APU switch - OFF

13.4 GROUND FIRE

Several fire conditions exist that may be detected and signalled by ground crew without correspond-

ing cockpit FIRE indications. These may include, for example, APU exhaust torching, ignition of fuel

or other flammable liquids exposed to hot surfaces, or brake fires. Aircraft location and the nature of

the fire condition will determine the course of action. In most cases, if ground crew signal a fire

condition, the aircraft should be stopped and shut down immediately. If a fire occurs during hot

refueling, the pilot must decide whether to taxi clear or shut down immediately.

13.4.1 HOT BRAKES/BRAKE FIRE. Hot brakes and/or melted wheel assembly fuse plugs can be

expected any time maximum effort braking is used at heavy gross weights with or without anti-skid,

e.g., aborted takeoff or heavy weight landing with high taxi brake usage.

There are basically two types of fires related to the brake system: flash fires and fires due to

continuous hydraulic fluid leakage onto hot brakes.

Brake flash fires are normally short in duration and self-extinguish. They can occur if excess grease

or residual/leaking hydraulic fluid have built up in the wheel brake assembly or on the carbon discs.

These materials may ignite at normal post-landing brake temperatures. Visible flames may extend

from the wheel assembly while flammable material is being consumed and smoke may be visible for a

short time after the fire goes out.

Continuous hydraulic fluid leakage coming into contact with hot brakes may result in a fire which

will not immediately self-extinguish. Setting the parking brake increases the rate of heat transfer from

the brakes to the wheel assembly which may lead to continuous hydraulic fluid leakage.

• Avoid setting the parking brake with hot brakes until the brake

assembly has cooled to prevent damage by heat and/or fire to the

brakes, wheel, tire, and landing gear components.

• If fire occurs with the parking brake set, the parking brake may

become non-operational and the aircraft may need to be chocked.

If hot brakes are suspected -

1. Continue to taxi to cool brakes (if practical).

2. DO NOT set parking brake.

3. Chock nosewheel (do not chock main wheels).

V-13-2

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

4. Park into the wind (if practical).

5. Cool brake assembly with ground cooling fan (if available).

If brake fire occurs -

1. Shut down both engines.

2. Chock nosewheel or PARK BRK handle - SET

3. Egress.

4. Ensure unnecessary ground personnel remain well clear of the aircraft.

13.5 EMERGENCY EGRESS

1. Canopy - OPEN (CANOPY switch, CANOPY JETT handle, or canopy handcrank)

CANOPY JETT rocket thrusters may ignite spilled fuel or hydraulic

fluid and may injure ground crew in the immediate vicinity.

NOTE

• The CANOPY switch should be used to raise the canopy unless there

are overriding circumstances. If weight is not on the left main gear

(e.g., gear up landing), the CANOPY switch must be held to raise the

canopy.

• In LOTs 21-25 aircraft the CANOPY JETT handle is the only means

of opening the canopy from the rear cockpit of the F/A-18F.

• If electrical power is not available, the canopy must be jettisoned or

raised with the handcrank.

2. Harness and leg restraints - RELEASE

NOTE

Several options exist for releasing the harness and leg restraints. (1) All

four harness buckles and all four leg restraints can be manually

released. (2) The upper Koch fittings can be manually released and the

manual override handle can be pulled to release the leg restraints and

the survival kit. The survival kit will be retained and may hamper

egress. (3) All four harness buckles can be manually released, and the

manual override handle can be pulled to release the leg restraints.

3. Oxygen/comm lead - DISCONNECT

V-13-3

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

4. EXIT THE COCKPIT

NOTE

If the boarding ladder has not been lowered, aircrew have several

alternatives, i.e., jump from the LEX (an approximately 8 ft drop),

slide down an extended TEF, or step down from the wing to an

installed wing tank/store.

13.6 BRAKE FAILURE/EMERGENCY BRAKES

The emergency brake system is powered by the brake accumulator or HYD 2B. Anti-skid protection

is bypassed when emergency brakes are selected or when the ANTI SKID switch is OFF. Normally

limited by the anti-skid system, 3,000 psi hydraulic brake pressure is available and regulated only by

pilot brake pedal forces. When using emergency brakes at high speed, initially apply very light brake

pedal pressure and gradually increase as required. There is a very small margin between effective

emergency braking and blown tires. If practical, rollout speed should be as slow as possible before

applying emergency brakes. The use of emergency brakes at high speeds should be considered a last

resort.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around.

If brake failure occurs at slow speed or flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Brakes - RELEASE

*2. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT

*3. Brakes - APPLY gradually

V-13-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 14

Takeoff Emergencies

14.1 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

After catapult launch, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle, e.g., slow catapult, AB

blowout, degraded engine performance, single engine total loss of thrust, improper trim setting, etc. If

settling cannot be stopped immediately, it is necessary to eject without delay. Priorities during

emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of the aircraft, arrest aircraft settle, and accelerate

for climbout.

If a settle is detected, the throttles should be advanced to MAX as soon as possible. If the thrust

output of one engine is degraded, some yaw and roll should be expected. If one engine is failed

completely, significant amounts of yaw and roll result with both throttles at MAX. In this worst case,

full rudder pedal and partial lateral stick may be required to oppose yaw/roll and maintain

lateral-directional control of the aircraft. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little rudder

pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is

prudent.

Proper AOA control is crucial to maintaining aircraft control and to arresting aircraft settle. AOA

must be high enough to minimize altitude loss yet low enough to maintain lateral-directional control.

During a nominal, two-engine catapult launch, the aircraft is trimmed to capture and maintain a

reference AOA of 12° (hands off). The FCS does allow small overshoots during initial flyaway, but peak

AOA should typically be below 13°. Catapult launch bulletins ensure an endspeed at least 15 knots

above minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). Vmc numbers for the F/A-18E/F launch bulletins are

defined at 14° AOA, which was selected as a compromise between arresting settle off the bow and

controllability. (Increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional controllability

resulting in higher minimum control speeds.) During single engine, MAX power catapult flyaway,

controllability should be sufficient if airspeed is above Vmc.

Under normal circumstances, proper AOA control should be provided by the FCS. However, certain

catapult failures (mis-trim, AOA probe splits or failures, FCS malfunctions) may require the pilot to

actively control flyaway pitch attitude/AOA. With an AOA malfunction, HUD displayed AOA may be

in error, so that pitch attitude becomes the only reliable source of AOA control. For this reason, the

recommended flyaway procedure is to maintain 10 to 12° pitch attitude with the waterline symbol

without exceeding 14° AOA (AOA tone). This should provide an AOA high enough to arrest the settle

yet low enough to retain lateral-directional control.

Depending on aircraft gross weight, stores jettison may be required to ensure a positive single engine

rate of climb (SEROC). Immediate jettison of excess weight minimizes altitude loss and, when

launching with a lateral weight asymmetry, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration,

potentially improving lateral-directional controllability.

It is also essential that the flaps remain in FULL until a positive rate of climb is established, as flap

retraction increases aircraft settle.

V-14-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

The first four steps in the procedure are the most important to arrest settle and maintain control of

the aircraft. Raising the LDG GEAR handle reduces drag and allows a greater rate of climb; however,

attention should not be diverted from maintaining aircraft control to perform this action. The landing

gear should only be raised when the first four immediate action steps have been accomplished,

controllability is not in question, and raising the gear does not compound the emergency.

NOTE

When the LDG GEAR handle is raised, the on-speed AOA bracket is

removed from the HUD.

If flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL

*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH

*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.

• Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).

If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -

*5. EJECT

• Exceeding 10° to 12° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral

directional control.

• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle.

14.2 ABORT

Maximum planned abort speed is dependent on ambient conditions, gross weight, runway length,

and runway and/or braking conditions. However, the decision to abort depends on the nature and

severity of the emergency.

Published maximum abort speeds for the existing conditions should allow the aircraft to be stopped

within the runway remaining without the use of long field arresting gear. For extreme emergencies, the

availability of long field arresting gear may influence the decision to abort. For other, less critical

emergencies, the decision to abort or continue the takeoff is crucial. Successfully stopping a heavy

weight aircraft on a high speed abort may prove to be a more extreme emergency than continuing a

takeoff with the given malfunction. No rule can be made to cover every situation, so good judgment and

common sense should be used. A thorough preflight briefing of abort contingencies should aid the pilot

in making a timely abort decision.

V-14-2

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Once the decision to abort is made, the amount of runway remaining dictates braking technique and

the decision to take any long field gear. After brakes are applied, stabilator braking with up to full aft

stick is extremely effective in aiding deceleration. At heavy takeoff gross weight, excessive brake

heating, melted wheel assembly fuze plugs, and/or blown tires should be anticipated. If the long field

gear is required to stop the aircraft, inform the tower and/or other members of the flight as soon as

possible. Lower the hook in time for it to fully extend. If the aircraft cannot be stopped in the runway

remaining, the decision whether or not to eject must be made. If in doubt, eject prior to the aircraft

leaving the prepared surface.

*1. Throttles - IDLE

*2. Speedbrake - AS DESIRED

*3. Brakes - APPLY

*4. Stick - AFT below 100 knots (if required)

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

NOTE

A rule of thumb to ensure full hook extension is 1,000 feet prior to the

arresting gear.

14.3 GO AROUND

Several emergency situations may require the use of the Go Around procedure: FIRE light on takeoff

(engine fire), loss of thrust on takeoff (engine failure), or loss of directional control on takeoff or

landing (NWS or blown tire). The decision to abort or execute a go around depends on the nature and

severity of the emergency. Refer to the preceding ABORT discussion.

For a loss of directional control on landing, the decision to execute a go around should not be

delayed. In most cases, it is better to go around immediately than struggle with directional control and

possibly depart the runway. An immediate go around allows time to assess the emergency and set up

for an arrested landing, if required.

The Go Around procedure provides a quick, simple way to safely get airborne if a situation arises

which requires immediate action. The use of MIL or MAX power depends on airspeed, runway

remaining, and aircraft configuration/asymmetry. If one engine fails, asymmetric thrust effects are

exacerbated at MAX power but are nonetheless controllable if AOA is maintained near on-speed.

When safely airborne, raising the landing gear, if HYD 2A is operative, improves acceleration and

climb; however, it may not always be prudent depending on the nature of the emergency.

With the FLAP switch in HALF, SEROC is normally sufficient at all gross weights and ambient

conditions. However, if the situation warrants, jettisoning excess weight increases SEROC and, if

asymmetric, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration, potentially improving lateral-directional

controllability. See figure 14-1 for the maximum weight and altitudes for 100 fpm SEROC.

1. Throttles - MIL or MAX

2. Maintain ON-SPEED AOA and balanced flight.

V-14-3

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

critical. The decision whether to continue a takeoff or to abort, or on landing, to continue rollout

depends on the speed at the time the directional control problem is detected, the stopping distance

required, and the availability of arresting gear.

Loss of brakes may be caused by a brake or anti-skid system failure. A brake system failure may

cause a locked brake and/or blown tire, resulting in ineffective braking and/or loss of directional

control. A blown tire may cause engine FOD or flap and gear door damage. If decision to stop is made,

the primary danger is loss of directional control. For Planing Link Failure Procedures, refer to chapter

16.

If the decision to takeoff is made, nose rotation and/or takeoff may be

delayed by abnormal aircraft attitudes due to failures, increased drag,

and lack of or reduced rudder toe due to rudder deflection to counter

directional motion.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around

If flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Select emergency brakes (if appropriate).

*2. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

If NWS failure suspected -

3. Paddle switch - PRESS

If takeoff is continued and blown tire suspected -

2. LDG GEAR handle - DO NOT CYCLE

3. Engine instruments - MONITOR FOR FOD INDICATIONS

4. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

5. Make a short field arrestment.

If decision to stop is made and blown tire suspected -

3. Do not retract flaps.

4. Do not taxi once stopped.

14.5 LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT

If LDG GEAR handle cannot be moved from the DN position -

1. LDG GEAR handle - LEAVE DN (DO NOT OVERRIDE)

V-14-5

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 15

Inflight Emergencies

15.1 AFTERBURNER FAILURE

Afterburner failure can be recognized by failure of the nozzle to open, which may be the only

symptom that is immediately recognizable. The afterburner receives continuous ignition any time the

throttle is above the MIL detent and afterburner lightoff is not yet detected. If an afterburner does not

light after selection or blows out, reduce the throttle to MIL and reselect afterburner. If an afterburner

fails to light on subsequent attempts, maintenance action is most likely required.

15.2 RESTART

Ignition is activated automatically whenever a flameout is sensed and the throttle is at or above IDLE. At

least 350 KCAS is required to maintain 12% rpm for a windmill airstart. When single engine, the hydraulic

system switches from 3,000 to 5,000 psi output pressure above approximately 500 KCAS/1.0 IMN (see figure

15-2). This results in additional horsepower extraction and reduced windmill rpm. The hydraulic system

output drops from 5,000 to 3,000 psi at approximately 480 KCAS/0.95 IMN. Therefore, maintain airspeed

below 480 KCAS/0.95 IMN to maximize the chance of a successful windmill restart.

Continuing automatic restart attempts at high altitude or high AOA may cause the engine to

overtemp. In this case, place the throttle OFF until in a better start environment. The optimum restart

envelope is below 25,000 feet. If the engine is shut down from a high power setting and rpm decays to

0%, temporary rotor binding may occur. In this case, engine rotation will not be regained until the

engine cools evenly (about 10 to 15 minutes). Windmill restart attempts made after rpm has degraded

to 0% may require up to 450 knots to obtain 12% rpm for ignition.

APU restart is the last alternative. If APU restart is required, HYD ISOL ORIDE should first be

selected for 10 seconds prior to APU start, assuming good HYD 2B. With the APU switch ON, and the

green READY light on, the engine crank switch may be used to crank the engine for restart. The APU

restart envelope is below 250 KCAS, below 10,000 ft. See figures 15-1 through 15-4.

Attempting to restart an engine that has flamed out for no apparent

reason may result in an engine bay fuel leak/fire.

If rpm above 30% -

1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE or above

If rpm below 30% -

1. Throttle good engine - 80% N₂ rpm minimum.

2. ENG CRANK switch - L or R (affected side)

3. Throttle affected engine - IDLE or above

4. Monitor EGT during start (871°C maximum). FADEC will not prevent hot starts airborne.

V-15-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

15.3 FUSELAGE FUEL LEAK

The possibility of fire is normally of prime concern with any fuel leak; however, with a massive leak,

the fuel loss itself must be dealt with promptly and correctly to ensure that sufficient fuel remains to

return to base. Fuel loss rates can be in excess of 1,000 ppm from failed main fuel lines. Left unchecked,

this leak can rapidly drain external tanks, both transfer tanks, and the feed tank on the leaking side.

Since leaks may occur upstream of the throttle-operated fuel shutoff valve in the fuel control, shutting

down the throttle may not stop the leak. Pressing the corresponding FIRE light closes the feed tank

fuel shutoff valve for that engine and stops fuel flow through the main fuel line.

The pilot may not be able to visually determine which side is leaking. Utilize a wingman, when

available, and check for secondary indications to determine the side of the leak. In addition to the

primary cockpit indications listed in the procedure, the following may also be indications of a fuselage

fuel leak: FUEL LO caution, erratic engine operation at high power settings, abnormal fuel flow

indications.

1. Afterburners - DESELECT

Afterburner operation with a fuselage fuel leak may result in a fire.

2. Analyze indications to determine which side is leaking:

• Visual confirmation of fuel leakage

• L or R BOOST LO caution

• FEED tank imbalance (lower feed tank)

• FUEL LO caution (lower feed tank)

• Erratic engine operation

If unable to confirm side -

3. Land as soon as possible.

If side confirmed -

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

4. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

Securing the good engine may result in flameout of both engines.

If fuel leak stops -

5. Land as soon as practical.

V-15-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

If fuel leak continues -

6. Land as soon as possible.

FOR LANDING (leak continues) -

1. Make normal vice arrested landing (if possible).

2. Use light braking.

After landing-

3. Turn aircraft into the wind.

4. Throttles - OFF

5. FIRE lights - PUSH

15.4 HYDRAULIC FAILURES

Hydraulic failures are indicated by the HYD 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B circuit cautions described in

Chapter 12. The effects of losing one or more HYD circuits can be seen by analyzing the Hydraulic

Flow Diagram shown in figure 15-5. For multiple hydraulic circuit failures, the Hydraulic Subsystems

Malfunction Guide (figure 15-6) shows which flight control surfaces are lost. Remarks regarding the

flight control effects due to hydraulic failures are shown in figure 15-7.

V-15-5

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FLIGHT CONTROL EFFECTS DUE TO HYDRAULIC FAILURES

Flight Control Failure¹

REMARKS

Any Surface Off

D General Limits:

D 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

D 2g max

D Minimize sideslip

D Half lateral stick

D Loss of speedbrake

D Loss of autopilot

AIL Xs

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL, approach speed

will be increased by about 11 knots. Flaps HALF, 17 knots.

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause lateral PIO espe-

cially when approaching touchdown.

RUD Xs

Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent a departure

when single engine if MAX power selected. Large single engine

throttle transients can cause significant yaw and roll.

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with lateral stick

alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-off.

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up corrections

(especially if single engine).

D Departure resistance is degraded above on-speed AOA.

LEF Xs

D Opposite LEF held frozen. TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO.

D Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

D Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

D Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff or bolter that

is easily controllable.

D Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced depending on

frozen LEF position. Wing stores will further degrade glideslope control.

D Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of

descent change is noticed. This may lead to a tendency to over-control

glideslope. Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glideslope control.

D Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-out attitude will ap-

pear flatter than normal.

D If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL, the TEFs will

not retract except for loads alleviation (no higher than 17°). While in

AUTO, momentary selection of GAIN ORIDE will command the TEFs to

retract to 4° TED. However, the operating LEF will also be commanded

to move to 5° LED. This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near 5° LED. Therefore,

only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF retraction is essential for range or fuel

considerations.

Note: (1) Surface inoperative due to lack of hydraulic pressure.

Figure 15-7. Flight Control Effects Due To Hydraulic Failure (Sheet 1 of 2)

V-15-8

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FLIGHT CONTROL EFFECTS DUE TO HYDRAULIC FAILURES (CONT)

Flight Control Failure(1)

REMARKS

STAB Xs

During a bolter, aircraft yaws into good stabilator when the flight con-

trol system deflects the good stabilator TEU in preparation for air-

craft nose rotation. Yaw rate may be sudden and pronounced.

D In flaps AUTO, max roll rate is extremely low in the transonic region be-

low 20,000 feet, especially when rolling away from the failed stabilator.

TEF Xs

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive

sink rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should

be kept as close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recom-

mendations.

D TEF driven to 5° TED and locked.

D Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed power settings are

near idle.

D Approach speeds for field landing may be near the maximum nose tire

speed (195 KGS). If making an arrested landing, take maximum arresting

gear engagement speed into consideration.

D Expect slower engine response.

D Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small in magnitude.

Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of

descent change is noted. Expect larger, longer, and more anticipatory

power corrections to be required in order to effect a glideslope change.

Aggressive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glides-

lope control.

D There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low approach power

setting and the longer time required to effect a change.

D Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a bolter/waveoff

due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter

than normal.

Note: (1) Surface inoperative due to lack of hydraulic pressure.

Figure 15-7. Flight Control Effects Due To Hydraulic Failure (Sheet 2 of 2)

V-15-9

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

15.5

DOUBLE TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER FAILURE

Failure of both transformer-rectifiers (TRs) can be recognized by loss of the HUD (but not the other

displays), bleed air including cockpit airflow/pressurization, and other equipment which operates on

the main dc busses. The FCC channels continue to be powered by their respective PMG outputs. The

Essential Bus is powered by the EBB PMGs with the battery charger and the battery as backups.

Therefore, the battery gauge should read greater than 24 vdc (26.5 nominal) and the BATT SW caution

light should be out.

With a dual TR failure, time is not critical, and essential bus equipment need not be turned off.

Equipment requiring ac power only will remain operable with a dual TR failure and need not be turned

off to conserve battery power. If the L or R DC FAIL caution lights illuminate, all three 28 volt dc

windings from the corresponding PMG are prevented from supplying FCC CH or essential bus backup

power. See the Emergency Power Distribution Charts (figure 15-8) for operative and inoperative

equipment.

1. BATT SW caution light - CONFIRM OUT

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

3. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

6. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

7. OBOGS control switch - OFF

8. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

9. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

10. Land as soon as practical.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

11. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., RADAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

12. Land as soon as possible.

For landing -

13. Perform Landing Gear Emergency Extension procedure.

14. Make a short field arrestment (if available).

15. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

V-15-10

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

BOTH GENERATORS INOPERATIVE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Caution lights panel

ENGINE

FLIGHT CONTROLS

(less GEN and FUEL LO lights.

Afterburner ignition

CAS

CABIN light may be on but is not accu-

Anti-icing

Flaps

rate. CK ECS light is not fully

func-

APU ready light

Flap position indicator

tional.)

APU start

Master caution lights

Bleed air leak detectors

Utility flood lights

Engine ignition

Engine start

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Fire detectors and extinguishers

Front cockpit standby attitude

COMM 1 R/T

Engine fuel display

reference indicator

IFF emergency

(RPM and EGT only)

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

Tank 4 scavenge pump

Standby altimeters

OTHER

Wing transfer

Standby rate-of-turn indicators

Arresting hook extension

Standby turn needles

Canopy

Emergency air refueling

Emergency jettison

FCS ram air selection

Intercom

Landing gear (emergency system)

Landing gear position indicator

Voice alerts (APU fire,

engine fire, bleed air)

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

OTHER

Anti-ice control

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

ALR-67 radar warning receiver

Bleed air system

Approach lights

ARS operation

Engine fuel display

Caution/advisory displays

Air refueling light and normal probe

(all functions except RPM

CK ECS caution light is not

extension

and EGT)

fully functional

Anti-skid

External fuel transfer

Flood lights

Arresting hook retraction

Fuel CG control/fuselage transfer

Formation lights

Battery charger

Fuel dump

GEN caution lights

CSC interference blanker

FUEL LO warning light

Instrument lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Fuel thermal mgmt

Landing/taxi lights

CVRS

Fuel transfer pressure light

Light test switch

DDIs/MPCD/UFCD

Inlet ice detector

Nav flood lights

Data link

Internal fuel tank pressurization

Position lights

Hook warning light

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Strobe lights

Hydraulic pressure indicator

N₁ lockup

JHMCS

Tank 4 transfer pump

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Landing gear (normal system)

ADF (If installed)

Landing gear warning tone

FLIGHT CONTROLS

COMM 2 R/T

Master caution tone

Autopilot

DMS

OBOGS

ICLS, IFF, INS/ANAV

OBOGS monitor

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

KY-58

Radar

Radar altimeter

Selective jettison

Aft cockpit standby ARI

Radar beacon

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

AOA indexer lights

TACAN

flight computer hot, flight controls,

HUD

mode 4 reply, engine)

L & R AOA heaters

Weapon fire/launch/release

L & R pitot static/total temp

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

heaters

MC1/2

Total temperature probe

Frequency selection lost. Will operate on last selected frequency. Guard transmit receive can be selected by COMM G XMT switch.

F/A-18F

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 1 of 4)

V-15-11

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

BOTH TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIERS INOPERATIVE

BOTH GENERATORS OPERATIVE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Front cockpit standby ARI

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Left and right pitot static/Total

COMM 1 R/T

ENGINE

temperature heaters

IFF

Afterburner ignition

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

IFF (emergency)

Anti-icing

Standby altimeters

INS/ANAV

APU ready light

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

Radar altimeter

APU start

Standby turn needles

Bleed air leak detectors

OTHER

Engine fuel display engine start

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Arresting hook extension

Engine ignition

Caution/advisory displays

Battery charger

Fire detectors and extinguishers

Caution lights panel (less GEN

Canopy

Fuel dump

and FUEL LO lights)

DDIs/MPCD/UFCD

Internal fuel transfer

CABIN light may be on but is not accurate.

Emergency air refueling

Tank 4 scavenge pumps

CK ECS light is not fully functional.)

Emergency jettison

Wing transfer

Console lights

FCS ram air selection

Emergency instrument light

Hydraulic pressure indicator

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Flood lights

Intercom

All channels autopilot

Instrument lights

JHMCS

All channels are operative

Master caution lights (and tone)

Landing gear (emergency system)

CAS

NVG floodlights

Landing gear position indicator

Flaps

Position lights

Voice alerts (all)

Flap position indicator

Utility floodlights

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

OTHER

AOA indexer lights

ALR-67 radar warning receiver

ENGINE

HUD

ARS operation

Anti-ice

Air refueling lights and

Bleed air system

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

normal probe extension

External fuel transfer

Approach lights

Anti-skid

Fuel c.g. transfer

CK ECS caution light is not fully functional

Arresting hook retraction

FUEL LO warning light

Formation lights

Cabin ram air selection

Fuel tank pressure light

GEN caution lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Fuel thermal mgmt

Landing/taxi lights

CVRS

Inlet ice detector

Lights test switch

Data link

Internal fuel tank pressurization

Strobe lights

Hook warning light

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Landing gear (normal system)

N₁ lockup

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Landing gear warning tone

ADF (If installed)

Nosewheel steering

COMM 2 R/T

OBOGS

DMS

OBOGS monitor

ILS

Radar

KY-58

Selective jettison

Radar beacon

Weapon fire/launch/release

TACAN

Windshield anti-ice removal

F/A-18F

Backup mode operative only.

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 2)

V-15-12

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

LEFT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ARS operation

ENGINE

Anti-skid

Afterburner ignition

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Arresting hook extension and retraction

Anti-ice control

Autopilot

Audio tones

Anti-icing

CAS

Battery charger

APU ready light

Flaps

Cabin ram air selection

APU start

Flap position indicator

Canopy

Bleed air leak detectors

Speedbrake

CPWS

Bleed air system

Speedbrake advisory light

CVRS

Engine fuel display

Data link

Engine ignition

ECS

Engine start

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Emergency air refueling

External fuel transfer

ADF (Before ECP 6061)

Emergency jettison

Fire detectors and extinguishers

COMM 1 R/T

FCS ram air selection

Fuel dump

IFF (less mode 4)

Hook warning light

Fuel quantity

IFF emergency

Intercom

Fuel tank pressure light

KY-58

Inlet ice detector

Radar altimeter

Interface blanker

Internal fuel tank pressurization

Radar beacon

JHMCS

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Landing gear (emergency system)

N₁ lockup

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Landing gear (normal system)

Tank 1 transfer pump

Approach lights

Landing gear position indicator

Tank 4 scavenge pump

Caution lights panel (less FUEL LO light)

Landing gear warning tone

Wing diverter valves

Emergency instrument light

Master caution tone

Wing transfers

Forward console, flood and instrument

Nosewheel steering

lights

OBOGS monitor

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Lights test switch

RDDI

AOA indexer lights

Master caution lights

Selective jettison (stations 6 thru 10 only)

HUD

NVG floodlights

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine fire

Right pitot static/total temp heaters

Position lights

bleed air)

Front cockpit standby ARI

Utility floodlights

Weapons launch/release (stations 6 thru

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

11 only)

Standby altimeters

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

Standby turn needles

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ENGINE

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Air refueling light

FUEL LO warning light

AFT console, flood and instrument lights

ALR-67 Radar warning receiver

Tank 4 transfer pump

Caution/advisory/display

LDDI/MPCD/UFCD

Formation lights

Nozzle indication on EFD

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Landing/taxi lights

OBOGS

L AOA probe heater

Strobe lights

Radar

L pitot static/total temp heater

MC1

Selective jettison (stations 2 thru 5 only)

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Total temp probe heater

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

DMS

flight computer hot, flight controls,

ILS

mode 4 reply, engine)

INS/ANAV

TACAN

Weapon fire/launch/release (Gun and sta-

tion 1 thru 5 only)

F/A-18F

Failure of stations 1 thru 5 will not be indicated on DDI until SMS attempts to communicate with failed stations.

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 3)

V-15-13

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

RIGHT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ENGINE

ALR-67 radar warning receiver

Afterburner ignition

ARS operation

Anti-ice control

FLIGHT CONTROLS

Air refueling light and normal probe

Anti-icing

Autopilot

extension

APU ready light

CAS

Anti-skid

APU start

Flaps

Arresting hook extension and retraction

Bleed air leak detectors

Flap position indicator

Audio tones (less Master Caution)

Bleed air system

Speedbrake

Cabin ram air selection

Engine fuel display

Speedbrake advisory light

Canopy

Engine ignition

CPWS

Engine start

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Data link

External fuel transfer

COMM 1 R/T

ECS (cold cockpit, defog air flow)

Fire detectors and extinguishers

COMM 2 R/T

Emergency air refueling

Fuel dump

DMS

Emergency jettison

FUEL LO warning light

IFF (Less mode C)

FCS ram air selection

Fuel tank pressure light

IFF emergency

Hook warning light

Internal fuel tank pressurization

ILS

Internal wing fuel inhibit

INS/ANAV

Intercom

N₁ lockup

Radar beacon

Landing gear (emergency system)

Tank 4 transfer pump

Landing gear (normal extension)

Wing diverter valves

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Landing gear position indicator

Wing transfer

Aft console, flood and instruments lights

Landing gear warning tone

Caution lights panel

LDDI/MPCD/UFCD

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Formation lights

Nosewheel steering

Front cockpit standby attitude

Landing/taxi lights

OBOGS

reference indicator

Lights test switch

OBOGS monitor

Left AOA heater

Master caution lights

Radar

Left pitot static/total temp heater

NVG floodlights

Radar coolant pump

Standby airspeed/Mach indicator

Strobe lights

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine fire,

Standby altimeters

Utility floodlights

bleed air)

Standby rate-of-climb indicators

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Standby turn needles

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

Inlet ice detector

OTHER

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Tank 1 transfer pump

Battery charger

Approach lights

CSC

Forward console, flood instrument lights

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

CVRS

Position lights

AOA indexer lights

Hydraulic pressure indicator

Aft cockpit standby attitude

Interference blanker

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

reference indicator

JHMCS

Radar altimeter

HUD

Master caution tone

MC2

RDDI

R AOA heater

Selective jettison

R pitot static/total temp heater

Voice alerts

(fuel low, bingo, altitude,

flight computer hot, flight controls,

mode 4 reply, engine)

Weapon fire/launch/release

F/A-18F

Back-up mode operative only.

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 4)

V-15-14

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

15.6 COCKPIT TEMPERATURE HIGH

Hot cockpit airflow may be caused by an ECS control failure or a valve failure. Selecting full COLD

on the CABIN TEMP knob should shut off warm air to the cockpit. If this procedure fails to secure

warm air to the cockpit, then the failure is most likely with the cockpit flow valve itself. If this is the

case, securing both BLEEDS may be the only means to stop the flow of warm air.

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is prohibited. Selection of

MAN while the aft cooling fan shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to

overspeed resulting in a catastrophic fan failure potentially leading to loss

of OBOGS.

1. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD

If temperature still high -

2. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

3. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

If temperature not reduced -

4. Emergency oxygen green ring - PULL

5. OXY FLOW knob - OFF

6. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

7. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

8. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300-325 KCAS optimum).

9. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

10. AV COOL switch - EMERG

11. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

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Once below 10,000 feet MSL -

12. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen.

13. OXY FLOW knob - OFF

14. OBOGS control switch - OFF

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

15. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., radar, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM, sensors,

MC2)

16. Land as soon as possible.

15.7 COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

Consider all unidentified fumes in the cockpit as toxic. Do not confuse condensation from the ECS

with smoke. The most probable source of visible smoke or fumes in the cockpit is from the engine bleed

air or residual oil in the ECS ducts. This smoke is blue gray in color, has a characteristic pungent odor,

and may cause the eyes to sting. Another source of smoke or fumes is an electrical malfunction or

overheat of equipment located in the cockpit. In the event of an electrical short or overload condition,

this equipment may generate electrical smoke (usually white or gray in color) but should not cause an

open fire since cockpit equipment uses very little electrical current. Cockpit electrical wiring insulation

may smolder and create smoke, but will not erupt into a seriously damaging fire.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

*4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

• DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin

above 25,000 feet even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of

DCS include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis,

choking, and/or loss of consciousness.

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing,

loose fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may

be available.

5. Airspeed - Maintain 200 to 300 KCAS.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

7. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10-20 minutes).

8. Consider resetting emergency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

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If smoke and fumes still present -

9. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

10. AV COOL switch - EMERG

11. EXT TANK switch(es) - STOP

If smoke and fumes persist or fire present -

12. All electrical equipment - OFF

13. UFCD controlled avionics - OFF (AC power is required.)

14. Required electrical equipment - ON

Restore power to equipment one at a time. If smoke/fire starts again, secure that equipment.

If still unable to clear smoke -

15. Slow and jettison canopy. Secure all loose articles and ensure helmet visor is down. In the

F/A-18F, the rear crewmember should lower the seat and lean as far forward as possible before

jettisoning canopy.

15.8 HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW/NO MASK FLOW

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

4. OBOGS control switch - OFF

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20

minutes).

If hypoxia symptoms persist -

6. Remain on emergency oxygen as long as possible.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If hypoxia symptoms removed -

6. Land as soon as practical.

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7. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system or resuming normal OBOGS

operation if flow appears normal and donning of mask is desired once below 10,000 feet cabin

altitude.

15.9 LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION

Decompression sickness (DCS) becomes a physiological concern at exposures to cabin altitudes in

excess of 18,000 feet. The potential for DCS increases at exposures above 25,000 feet or in the case of

a rapid decompression. Aircrew exposed to these conditions should be alert for the symptoms of DCS.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - CHECK NORM

5. ECS MODE switch - CHECK AUTO

DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin above

25,000 feet even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of DCS

include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis, choking,

and/or loss of consciousness.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms present -

6. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

6. Reset emergency oxygen system and resume normal OBOGS operation.

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

8. Land as soon as practical.

15.10 DISPLAY MALFUNCTION - NON-AMCD AIRCRAFT

If a display malfunctions, cycle power to attempt to restore normal functioning. HUD symbology is

provided by either DDI, with the LDDI as the primary driver. If the HUD malfunctions, consider also

cycling both DDI power knobs. The same holds true for the UFCD which is powered by the MPCD. If

a display continues to malfunction, turn it off to prevent an overheat.

If all displays are flashing, turn MC1 and MC2 off alternately to see if the problem clears. If one or

more displays are frozen with an accompanying MC1 or MC2 caution, turn off the failed MC. If all

displays then go blank, cycle power to the operating MC, then resecure the failed MC.

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15.11 DISPLAY MALFUNCTION - AMCD AIRCRAFT

If a display malfunctions (stale data or DDI pushbuttons do not work), attempt to restore by cycling

display power. If cycling power to the display does not fix the problem, cycling the corresponding

mission computer may restore the DDI (cycle MC1 for LDDI, MC2 for RDDI). HUD symbology is

driven by either MC1 or MC2. If the UFCD malfunctions, attempt to restore by cycling the MPCD or

(LOT 26 AND UP) 8 x 10 display.

If all displays are flashing STANDBY, and a backup HUD is displayed in the front cockpit, a dual

MC failure has occurred.

15.12 DUAL MISSION COMPUTER (MC) FAILURE - AMCD AIRCRAFT

A dual MC failure is recognized by STANDBY flashing on the HUD and L/RDDIs. In the front

cockpit, a backup HUD format (driven by the SDC) is displayed on the MPCD and UFCD. After

cycling an MC, the corresponding display (LDDI for MC1, RDDI for MC2) continues to flash

STANDBY for approximately 11 seconds while the MC boots up.

1. MC switch - CYCLE TO 1 OFF, THEN TO 2 OFF

After 15 seconds, if MC1 is restored (MC1 Backup Mode) -

2. MC switch - MOVE FROM 2 OFF TO NORM

15.13 OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT (OCF)

Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch in RCVY) seri-

ously degrades controllability, will prevent recovery from any departure

or spin, and is prohibited.

15.13.1 Departure from Controlled Flight. A typical F/A-18E/F departure occurs as a yaw diver-

gence (nose-slice) followed by an uncommanded roll in the same direction. The yaw divergence can

happen very quickly; therefore, the yaw rate tone may not provide sufficient departure warning.

Usually, a departure is preceded by a slow buildup in sideslip and uncomfortable sideforces. The

buildup of sideslip is accompanied by ″vortex rumble″; however, vortex rumble may not be noticed

during aggressive maneuvering. Therefore, excessive sideforce provides the most reliable departure

warning cue to the pilot. The initial phase of the departure is not particularly violent or disorienting

unless it occurs at high airspeed or Mach number. Recognition of these cues permits neutralization of

the controls and avoidance of a departure.

15.13.1.1 Departures with Lateral Weight Asymmetries. Complying with NATOPS limits for

asymmetric store loadings is required to prevent departures. Aggressive longitudinal maneuvering

beyond NATOPS AOA limits may result in a yaw departure away from the heavy wing, which cannot

be controlled with lateral stick or pedal inputs. At low airspeed, recovery is immediate when AOA is

reduced below NATOPS limits. At higher airspeed, more violent and sudden departures may occur

with little or no warning when maneuvering aggressively beyond NATOPS limits. In such cases, the

resulting post-stall gyrations rapidly transition to an upright spin away from the heavy wing.

15.13.1.2 Departure Recovery. Recovery is generally very prompt, on release of the controls. Some

departures, particularly from inadvertent tailslides, may exhibit large transitory sideslips or negative

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g rolls prior to positive recovery. Sideslip type departures yield excessive gravity-induced sideslip at

relatively slow airspeeds (<90 KCAS) and can quickly develop into a spin. In the absence of a steady

spin arrow, controls should remain neutral throughout all such post departure motion, as CAS reliably

regains control. Any pilot input will delay recovery or precipitate further departure. For departure

recoveries that stabilize in a negative g stall, application of aft stick may be used to finish the recovery.

15.13.2 Spin. Spin is confirmed by a steady spin arrow or the presence of a sustained yaw rate,

elevated positive or negative AOA, and airspeed less than 150 KCAS. F/A-18E/F spin arrows very

reliably indicate the appropriate recovery action. While some departures may generate sufficient yaw

rate to trip the command arrow, they are typically self-recovering by the time the arrow is displayed,

and the arrow will quickly disappear. Therefore, with the spin arrow present, a brief hesitation is all

that is required to confirm a steady, valid arrow prior to applying anti-spin lateral stick.

15.13.2.1 Spin Recovery. The command arrow indicates the proper control stick position for

upright or inverted spins. For upright spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full lateral

stick with the spin direction. For inverted spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full

lateral stick opposite the spin direction. In general, spin recovery is straightforward and reliable if the

OCF procedures are followed and sufficient altitude remains. For lateral weight asymmetry loadings,

recoveries from upright spins away from the heavy wing are essentially identical to the symmetrical

loaded airplane. Spin recoveries for less common upright spins into the heavy wing, and inverted spins,

were sometimes delayed due to the oscillatory nature of the spin. Recovery begins immediately but

may take up to one turn to become apparent. Recovery from a fully developed spin may include high

roll rates with significant negative g unloads, which, though disorienting and uncomfortable, should be

interpreted as a positive indication of imminent recovery. When the command arrow is removed,

lateral stick should be smoothly returned to neutral. Maintaining anti-spin lateral stick after the

command arrow has disappeared may transition the recovering spin into a controllable roll that could

delay recovery.

15.13.3 OCF Recovery Procedures

*1. Controls - RELEASE, FEET OFF RUDDERS, SPEEDBRAKE IN

If still out of control -

*2. Throttles - IDLE

*3. Altitude, AOA, airspeed, and yaw rate - CHECK

If command arrow present -

*4. Lateral stick - FULL WITH ARROW

When command arrow removed -

*5. Lateral stick - SMOOTHLY NEUTRAL

When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided, and

airspeed accelerating above 180 knots -

*6. Recover.

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