F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

failure off the catapult, 14° AOA provides the best compromise between arresting rate of descent off

the bow and controllability (increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional

controllability). In all cases, once control is established (and sink is stopped), allow the aircraft to

accelerate to on-speed to provide the best flyaway handling qualities. When an engine fails in flaps

HALF or FULL, the first perceptible aircraft motion is a yaw toward the failed engine. The rudders are

the primary flight control surface used to counter the yaw caused by the operating engine. Using too

much rudder pedal is not harmful, but using too little rudder pedal may not counter the yaw and cause

controllability problems. In addition to yawing into the failed engine, the aircraft also tends to roll into

the failed engine. The natural pilot reaction is to oppose the roll with lateral stick, but the resulting

differential aileron deflection generates adverse yaw and increases the demand on the rudders to

maintain directional control. As AOA increases above 10° AOA, the aircraft becomes less directionally

stable and rudder control effectiveness deteriorates. In this instance, the rudders may become

saturated (surfaces against the stops). When saturated, the rudders cannot counter any additional

adverse yaw, resulting in an increase in sideslip and the potential for an adverse yaw departure. If

airspeed is too slow, the rudders cannot generate enough control power to oppose the yaw toward the

failed engine.

For some situations, controllability alone will not guarantee flyaway (e.g., excessive rate of descent),

but may only ensure controllability for a long enough period of time to complete the requisite

immediate action procedures and make a timely ejection decision, if warranted.

When single engine with the operating engine at MAX, the possibility of

an adverse yaw departure increases as AOA exceeds on-speed.

NOTE

• In straight and level flight, a small amount of lateral and/or directional

trim is required to maintain balanced flight.

• Loss of either HYD 1 or HYD 2 due to engine failure or hydraulic

pump failure does not effect flight control with flaps AUTO; however,

failure of either HYD 1 or HYD 2 with flaps in HALF or FULL may

cause uncommanded but controllable yaw and roll transients as the

switching valves cycle. These yaw and roll transients may last 3 to 6

seconds.

• To prevent repeated switching valve cycling, avoid stabilized flight

where engine windmill rpm results in hydraulic pressure fluctuations

between 800 and 2,000 psi.

11.4.1.3 Single Engine Waveoff. Refer to Chapter 16, paragraphs 16.1 and 16.3.

11.4.2 Leading Edge Flap Asymmetry. Leading edge flap asymmetries can occur when one of the

LEF hydraulic drive units (HDU) stalls/fails or the mechanical interconnect between the inboard and

outboard LEF surfaces fails. The most common LEF asymmetry results from a weak LEF HDU that

stalls

(stops moving due to aerodynamic loading) during abrupt longitudinal maneuvers at high

airspeed and low altitude. When this happens, a roll-off away from the failing HDU as AOA or g is

increased followed by an abrupt roll-off in the opposite direction is typical. Failure detection logic in

IV-11-11

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

the FCS software is designed to provide advanced warning of a LEF asymmetry; however, during

extremely abrupt maneuvers, an HDU stall may not be detected in time to allow the pilot to abandon

the maneuver and avoid a large roll transient. The FCS software uses two specific monitors to detect

weak LEF HDUs. The first monitor results in a FLAP SCHED caution accompanied with BLIN 256.

It sets and holds the FLAP SCHED caution for 6 seconds following the HDU stall. The second monitor

results in a FLAP SCHED caution accompanied by a BLIN 537. When accompanied by a BLIN 537,

the FLAP SCHED caution is displayed only as long as the failing HDU condition exists (e.g., when

AOA >12°).

Avoid high-g maneuvers at low altitude if an HDU stall has been detected during the flight (BLIN

256 or 537 on the FCS status page) even if the FLAP SCHED caution has cleared. BLINs 256 and 537

indicate a weak/failing HDU that may result in very large roll transients and/or over-g during high-g

maneuvers.

11.4.2.1 LEF Failure Landing Handling Qualities (Symmetric or Asymmetric). With a LEF failure,

the LEF symmetric commands are frozen when the FLAP switch is set to AUTO; however, differential

LEF and TEF continue to be commanded. With the FLAP switch set to HALF or FULL, the LEF

commands are frozen while the TEF and aileron droop commands follow the normal schedules for PA.

Shore and ship based flight tests were conducted with LEF frozen at both symmetric and asymmetric

(up to 34°/5° LEF split) deflections. Straight in, on-speed approaches in flaps HALF are recommended

for all frozen symmetric or asymmetric LEF configurations. General flying qualities, as well as waveoff

and T&G performance are acceptable for all LEF configurations.

Light to moderate buffet is present in most of the LEF configurations, especially for AOA greater

than on-speed. The buffet is more pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less than the normal

scheduled positions. Selecting flaps FULL with small LEF deflections results in higher buffet levels at

lower AOAs than with the FLAP switch set to HALF. Noticeable buffet is normal near on-speed

conditions with either HALF or FULL flaps for the degraded LEF condition, but may be uncomfort-

able during maneuvering. Maintaining on-speed or slightly fast approach AOA (to minimize buffet)

results in the best flying qualities for any off-schedule symmetric or asymmetric (left/right) LEF

configuration. Where practical, flying slightly fast (6-7° AOA) minimizes exposure to the buffet. For

carrier landings, the tendency to fly the approach in a ″fast″ condition should be avoided because the

recovery WOD requirements are based on the on-speed approach airspeed. Flying a ″fast″ approach

may result in aircraft and/or arresting gear overstress upon arrestment.

Small (1-3°) roll-off due to buffet can be expected but is easily controllable with small lateral inputs.

Roll and line up control are not significantly different than normal scheduled positions. The aircraft

rolls faster into the lesser-deflected LEF and slower when rolling away from the lesser-deflected LEF.

Roll-off may also be experienced with AOA/pitch attitude changes. As AOA decreases, the aircraft rolls

away from the lesser-deflected LEF and as AOA increases, the aircraft rolls into the lesser-deflected

LEF. Lateral stick and/or trim easily counters this roll-off tendency. A small roll off will occur with

airspeed changes during a waveoff or bolter but are easily controlled with small lateral stick inputs.

Glideslope control degradations are more pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less than

the normal scheduled positions. The addition of wing stores will further degrade glideslope control.

The aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and smaller in magnitude than normal flap

configurations. Therefore, compared to normal flap configurations, larger, longer and more anticipa-

tory power corrections are required to effect a glideslope change. Power corrections translate to an

airspeed change first before a rate of descent change is noticed. The delay in aircraft response coupled

with the larger throttle inputs leads to the tendency to over−control the glideslope. The technique of

applying power and waiting for a glideslope change will lead to larger glideslope deviations.

IV-11-12

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to controlling glideslope. The sluggish power response also

degrades waveoff performance slightly. When operating shipboard, the waveoff window for all LEF

failure conditions should be moved farther out and the LSOs should be made aware of the degraded

glideslope performance. Upon bolter/waveoff, climb−out attitude will appear flatter than normal. The

LSOs and PRIFLY personnel should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of bolter/waveoff

performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of aircraft response to control

and throttle inputs, including a waveoff maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard landing.

11.4.3 Trailing Edge Flap Failure. TEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or

three-four channel failure) or by a dual HYD 1A/2B circuit failure. TEF actuators continue to operate

following two channel failures. If a TEF actuator is shutdown, the surface is hydraulically or

aerodynamically driven to 5° TED and locked. If the left to right TEF asymmetry exceeds 6°, the

opposite TEF fails off and is also driven to 5° TED and locked.

11.4.3.1 TEF Failure Landing Handling Qualities. Shore and ship based flight tests have been

conducted with the TEF in the failed position of 5° TED. Straight in, 10° AOA approaches in flaps

HALF or FULL are recommended for TEF failures. Pitch, roll, and line up control are similar to those

for normal approaches. Approach speeds will be high and every attempt should be made to reduce gross

weight. If shore based, consideration should be given to making an arrested landing taking into account

maximum arresting gear engagement speed and nose tire limit.

With this failure, approach drag is reduced and approach power settings are less than normal. This

results in slower engine response to throttle changes compared to normal HALF or FULL flap

approaches. Flying a slightly slow approach (10° AOA) reduces approach speed and increases approach

power setting slightly. Flying qualities at 10° AOA are similar or improved over those observed at

on-speed AOA. The aircraft easily trims to and maintains 10°AOA. Glideslope maintenance will

dominate the approach task and the tendency is to relax AOA maintenance. The 10° AOA approach

reduces WOD requirements by approximately 12 to 16 KCAS and improves approach flying qualities.

When operating at the ship, the recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the Aircraft

Recovery Bulletin recommendations. Due to the large difference between WOD requirements at

on−speed and 10° AOA, it is imperative that AOA be maintained at 10°. The sight picture behind the

ship is altered, but the field of view over the nose is not degraded.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive sink

rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should be kept as

close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

The aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and smaller in magnitude than for normal TEF

configurations. TEF failures require larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections to effect

a glideslope change. There is a tendency to over control the power due to the low approach power

setting and the longer time to effect a change. Power corrections translate to an airspeed change first

before a rate of descent change is noticed. Aggressive, well−timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are

required for glideslope control. The technique of applying power and waiting for a glideslope change

will lead to larger glideslope deviations. Waveoff performance is degraded for TEF failure approaches.

The waveoff technique is the same as normal flap configurations; apply power, maintain AOA until

positive rate of climb is achieved, and capture 10° pitch attitude for the climb−out. Time to achieve

positive rate of climb is slower than for normal TEF configurations. At the ship, the waveoff window

for a TEF failure condition should be moved farther out. The LSOs should be aware of degraded

IV-11-13

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

waveoff and glideslope performance. Upon bolter/waveoff, climb−out attitude will appear flatter than

normal. The LSOs and PRIFLY personnel should monitor rate of climb as the primary indication of

bolter/waveoff performance. It is recommended aircrew perform a familiarization check of aircraft

response to control and throttle inputs, including a waveoff maneuver, prior to attempting a shipboard

landing.

11.4.4 Stabilator Failure. Since there is no mechanical reversion mode of the flight controls, the FCS

control laws automatically reconfigure in each axis to allow continued flight in the event of a single

stabilator failure. This failure mode, known as stabilator reconfiguration, or STAB RECON, is

designed to compensate for the loss of the contribution of the failed stabilator to pitch and roll control.

This is accomplished by disabling differential stabilator commands and using the other rolling surfaces

to counter the roll and yaw moments produced when the remaining stabilator responds to pitch axis

commands. Flight tests demonstrated excellent handling qualities with a stabilator failed off during

maneuvering flight and aerial refueling. The pitch axis is slightly sluggish, maximum roll rate is

noticeably lower, and roll coordination is slightly degraded.

In UA, with a failed stabilator, maximum roll rate is extremely low in the

transonic region below 20,000 feet, especially when rolling away from the

failed side. Significant roll and yaw coupling may occur with forward stick

inputs at Mach >1.4 and altitude >30,000 feet.

The degradation in roll coordination is characterized as a small amount of sideforce during lateral

inputs with flaps AUTO and noticeable sideslip with flaps HALF. Configuration changes exhibit a

slight roll toward the failed stabilator when transitioning from flaps AUTO to flaps HALF; away from

the failed stabilator when transitioning from flaps HALF to flaps AUTO. Flight tests demonstrated

that flight with a stabilator failed in flaps HALF was nearly transparent to the pilot from a handling

qualities perspective during normal approaches, waveoffs, and bolters or flared landings. A small but

controllable yaw away from the failed stabilator is apparent at touchdown. Additionally, pitch stick

inputs during the landing roll complicate directional control and should be avoided.

Extending the speedbrake may produce uncommanded roll into the failed stabilator. The uncom-

manded roll is more pronounced at low speed flight conditions due to the reduced aileron effectiveness

at the large trailing edge up aileron deflections commanded by the speedbrake function. The roll can

be balanced with lateral stick deflection.

In UA, with a failed stabilator, nose down pitching moment capability is degraded at low to moderate

airspeeds, especially for aft center of gravity and heavy wing store loadings. A safe level of nose down

pitch capability is available for flight below 10° angle of attack.

In UA, with a failed stabilator, do not exceed 10° AOA due to reduced

nose down pitch authority.

Carrier based flight tests (STAB RECON/flaps HALF) demonstrated that carrier approaches were

easily controlled but were characterized by slightly degraded flying qualities which required increased

pilot attention to the landing task. Slight rolling and/or yawing motions were apparent when making

longitudinal inputs. Multiple small lateral inputs were required to maintain a centered approach.

IV-11-14

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

During bolters, the aircraft yawed into the good stabilator when the flight control system deflected the

good stabilator trailing edge up (TEU) in preparation for aircraft nose down rotation. The yaw was

sudden and pronounced, but easily controlled with rudder to counter the yawing motion.

Flight with flaps FULL has not been demonstrated due to limited nose-up control authority from

the remaining good stabilator.

• Do not select flaps FULL for landing with a failed stabilator, because

longitudinal control authority may be insufficient for landing.

• With a failed stabilator, do not exceed 10° AOA in AUTO flaps with

wing stores or wing tanks.

11.4.5 GAIN ORIDE. While not a failure mode, GAIN ORIDE is prescribed for certain AOA or

pitot-static sensor failures to provide better or more predictable handling qualities (see Warning/

Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1). With flaps AUTO, selecting GAIN ORIDE results in fixed

gains that correspond to Mach 0.80, 39,000 feet, and 250 KCAS. At flight conditions that deviate from

the fixed gains, a slight degradation in handling qualities should be expected. The aircraft is less

sensitive to longitudinal inputs, as less pitch rate is generated per given stick input. Lateral stick inputs

provide similar responses as in GAIN NORM. In GAIN ORIDE, the aircraft is more sensitive to

directional inputs. Regardless, handling qualities remain very good within the 10° AOA and 350 KCAS

NATOPS limits for GAIN ORIDE operation. If the airspeed limit is exceeded, self-sustained pitch

oscillations will start to occur above 375 KCAS, and the aircraft will become uncontrollable above 450

KCAS due to the fixed air data values in the flight control system gains. If the AOA limit is exceeded,

departures are likely since the fixed values of the air data and AOA severely reduce departure

resistance. Additionally, the aircraft will stall at a higher than normal airspeed due to the fixed position

of the LEFs.

With flaps HALF or FULL, GAIN ORIDE results in fixed gains that correspond to 8.1° AOA and

500 feet; handling qualities are best at these conditions and degrade slightly away from on-speed AOA.

At higher airspeeds in 1g flight, the aircraft will stabilize at lower than normal AOA, due to the TEF

position frozen at higher than normal deflections. While not dangerous, this characteristic is

uncomfortable. Also, at higher airspeeds, higher than normal aft stick force is required to maintain

flight path while in a turn. Flight is prohibited above 190 KCAS (flaps FULL) or 200 KCAS (flaps

HALF) due to these characteristics. Flight is also prohibited above 10° AOA due to the reduced stall

margin available with fixed LEF deflections.

Transition to or from landing configuration should be done in level flight at 180 KCAS. Transition

should not be made while in a bank due to the higher than normal aft stick forces required to maintain

flight path angle. Sideslip excursions may also occur if flap transition is made in a turn.

Carrier based flight tests (GAIN ORIDE/flaps HALF) demonstrated satisfactory approach handling

qualities. The aircraft remained easily controllable, though increased pilot attention to the landing task

IV-11-15

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

was required. During descent, small longitudinal inputs were required to maintain proper AOA and

pitch attitude. Approaches flown at conditions other than on-speed resulted in sluggish longitudinal

handling qualities.

Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft stick

during rotation, 1/2 aft stick is recommended. Deflections of less than 1/2

aft stick will result in excess settle during bolters.

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14° when

decelerating from a trimmed on-speed condition. Timely longitudinal

stick inputs will be required to prevent excessive sink rates and correct a

deceleration as power alone will not change the AOA or pitch attitude

sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE. Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE

with FLAPS HALF or FULL.

11.4.6 AHRS Failure Flying Qualities. An AHRS channel failure is defined as the loss of both rate

and acceleration data (Xs in CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC). Single or dual channel AHRS

failures should have no adverse effect on flying qualities. If a third channel failure is detected, all four

channels will be Xd out because the FCCs will be unable to confirm which channel is providing valid

data. If the third failure can be isolated to a particular channel, all four channels will be Xd out but

the flying qualities will be unaffected with the exception of a small degradation to the g-limiter. If a

third failure occurs but is not detected (two columns of Xs), or is detected but not isolated to a

particular channel (four columns of Xs), flying qualities will be somewhat degraded. When flying

qualities are degraded due to AHRS channel failures, poor roll coordination for large lateral inputs,

pitch coupling, and/or sluggish pitch response can be expected. Due to the higher reliability of AHRS

over previous rate and acceleration sensors, a four channel failure is highly unlikely. However,

simulator evaluation has shown that a complete four channel AHRS failure (no rate and acceleration

inputs to FCCs) is controllable for most of the flight envelope with the flaps in AUTO. Refer to figure

11-1 for AHRS channel failure indications and effects.

AHRS failure modes have not been flight tested. With a four channel

AHRS failure, the aircraft is not controllable with the flaps in HALF or

FULL. At altitudes above 25,000 feet, loss of control occurs below Mach

0.92. For loss of AHRS above 25,000 feet, maintain airspeed above Mach

0.92 while descending.

With a four channel AHRS failure at altitudes below 20,000 feet, flying qualities are optimum

between 190 to 210 KCAS, and are acceptable above 370 KCAS. When decelerating below 370 KCAS,

flying qualities are degraded until below 270 KCAS. The worst flying qualities are between 270 to 370

KCAS. Flying qualities do improve above 370 KCAS, with a further improvement at supersonic speeds.

Execute a straight-in on-speed approach with flaps in AUTO, and limit angle of bank to 20°. Pitch and

directional damping will be very low and roll coordination weak. If not positioned for landing by in the

IV-11-16

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

middle to in close, a wave-off and go-around should be executed. A clean, lightly loaded aircraft

exhibits the best flying qualities. Flying qualities are not affected by CG locations, and the aircraft can

be landed to the aft CG limit. An arrested landing should be made if airspeed permits. Avoid stabilator

braking.

Level of AHRS

Indications

Effects

Channel Failure

One Channel Failure

• Xs in one column (CAS P, CAS

No effects on flying qualities.

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• DEGD X

Two Channel (incremental fail-

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

ure)

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• DEGD X

Two channel (simultaneous fail-

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

ure caused by loss of communica-

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

tion between the two AHRS

• DEGD X

channels and the FCCs)

Three channel (detected and iso-

• Xs in four columns (CAS P,

Small degradation to the g-limiter

lated)

CAS R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L

ACC)

• DEGD X

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cau-

tions

Three channel (detected but not

• Xs in four columns (CAS P,

• Poor roll coordination for large

isolated)

CAS R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L

lateral inputs

ACC)

• Sluggish pitch response

• DEGD X

• Pitch coupling

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cau-

tions

Three channel (not detected)

• Xs in two columns (CAS P, CAS

R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L ACC)

• DEGD X

Four channel

• Xs in four columns (CAS P,

• Uncontrollable in flaps HALF

CAS R, CAS Y, N ACC, and L

or FULL

ACC)

• Poor roll coordination for large

• DEGD X

lateral inputs

• PCAS, RCAS, and YCAS cau-

• Sluggish pitch response

tions

• Pitch coupling

Figure 11-1. AHRS Channel Failure Indication and Effects

IV-11-17 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

EMERGENCY INDEX

Conference X-ray telephone number (Inflight emergencies only)

314-232-9999 and 866-543-5444

CHAPTERS 12 THRU 17

Page

No.

ABORT

V-14-2

AFTERBURNER FAILURE

V-15-1

AILERON HINGE FAILURE - SUSPECTED, INBOARD

V-15-47

ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) FAILURE

V-15-44

AOA PROBE DAMAGE OR BINDING

V-15-45

AOA PROBE SELECTION

V-15-46

ARRESTMENT - FIELD

V-16-13

Arresting Gear Types

V-16-13

Arrestment Decision

V-16-14

Arrestment - Short Field

V-16-14

Arrestment - Long Field

V-16-14

ARS MALFUNCTIONS

V-15-25

ARS Hose Fails to Retract

V-15-25

ARS Refueling Hose Jettison

V-15-25

ARS Hydraulic Pressure Light

V-15-25

No RDY Light

V-15-26

BARRICADE ARRESTMENT

V-16-14

BOLTER

V-16-3

BRAKE FAILURE/EMERGENCY BRAKES

V-13-4

COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

V-15-16

COCKPIT TEMPERATURE HIGH

V-15-15

CONTROLLABILITY CHECK

V-15-22

CV RECOVERY MATRIX

V-16-18

DISPLAY MALFUNCTION - AMCD AIRCRAFT

V-15-19

DITCHING

V-17-4

DOUBLE TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER FAILURE

V-15-10

DUAL AOA FAILURE ON TAKEOFF

V-15-47

DUAL MISSION COMPUTER (MC) FAILURE - AMCD AIRCRAFT

V-15-19

Emergency Index-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Page

No.

EJECTION

V-17-1

Ejection Procedures

V-17-3

Ejection Seat Restrictions

V-17-1

Airspeed during Ejection

V-17-2

Injury Risks - Nude Weight Greater than 213 lb

V-17-1

Injury Risks - Nude Weight Less than 136 lb

V-17-1

High Altitude Ejection

V-17-3

Low Altitude Ejection

V-17-2

EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

V-14-1

EMERGENCY TANKER DISENGAGEMENT

V-15-26

EMERGENCY EGRESS

V-13-3

ENGINE FAILS TO START/HUNG START

V-13-1

EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON

V-15-23

FCS FAILURE INDICATIONS AND EFFECTS

V-15-27

FORCED LANDING

V-16-4

FUSELAGE FUEL LEAK

V-15-4

GENERAL

V-12-1

Immediate Action Items

V-12-1

Warnings, Cautions, and Advisories

V-12-1

GO AROUND

V-14-3

GROUND FIRE

V-13-2

HOT BRAKES/BRAKE FIRE

V-13-2

HOT START

V-13-1

HUNG START

V-13-1

HYDRAULIC FAILURES

V-15-5

HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW/NO MASK FLOW

V-15-17

LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXTENSION

V-16-5

LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT

V-14-6

LANDING GEAR UNSAFE/FAILS TO EXTEND

V-16-4

LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION

V-15-18

LOSS OF DC ESSENTIAL BUS

V-13-1

LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF OR LANDING

(BLOWN TIRE, NWS FAILURE )

V-14-4

Emergency Index-2

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

WARN/CAUT/FCS/HYD/ADVIS

Warn/Caut/FCS/Hyd/Advis

Page No

Warn/Caut/FCS/Hyd/Advis

Page No

A/A

V-12-71

EGT HIGH L/R

V-12-17

A/G

V-12-71

ENG L/R

V-12-17

ABLIM

V-12-64

ENG VIB L/R

V-12-17

ACI

V-12-64

ERASE FAIL

V-12-17

AHMD

V-12-64

EXT TANK

V-12-18

AIR DATA

V-12-7

EXT XFER

V-12-18

ALGN Xd

V-12-64

FADEC

V-12-66

AM DL

V-12-64

FADEC HOT

V-12-19

AMAD & PR L/R

V-12-7

FC AIR DAT

V-12-41

ANTI ICE L/R

V-12-7

FCCGN

V-12-66

ANTISKID

V-12-7

FCES

V-12-42

AOA

V-12-38

-V-12-47

AOA TONE

V-12-8

FCS HOT

V-12-42

APU ACCUM

V-12-8

FCS Initial

V-12-35

APU FIRE

V-12-3

FCS AHRS 1/2

ARS DROGUE

V-12-8

Ch Fail

V-12-36

ATC FAIL

V-12-39

FCS AHRS 4 Ch Fail

V-12-37

ATS L/R

V-12-9

FCS Ail Fail

V-12-38

AUTO PILOT

V-12-9

FCS AOA Fail

V-12-38

AV AIR HOT

V-12-10

FCS AOA 4 Ch Fail

V-12-39

BALT

V-12-64

FCS Singl Ch Fail

V-12-40

BATT SW

V-12-10

FCS Rud Fail

V-12-46

BAY DISCH

V-12-10

FCS Stab Fail

V-12-47

BAY FIRE

V-12-11

FIRE

V-12-4

BINGO

V-12-11

FLAMEOUT L/R

V-12-19

BIT

V-12-64

FLAP SCHED

V-12-45

BLD OFF L/R

V-12-12

FLAPS (Amber)

V-12-71

BLEED DUAL

V-12-3

FLAPS OFF LEF

V-12-43

BLEED Single

V-12-4

FLAPS OFF TEF

V-12-44

BOOST LO L/R

V-12-13

FLIR OVRHT

V-12-19

BRK ACCUM

V-12-13

FPAH

V-12-66

CABIN

V-12-13

FPAS

V-12-66

CANOPY

V-12-14

F-QTY

V-12-66

CAS P/R/Y

V-12-40

FUEL HOT L/R

V-12-20

CAUT DEGD

V-12-14

FUEL INLT L/R

V-12-20

CFIT Xd

V-12-64

FUEL LO

V-12-20

CHECK SEAT

V-12-14

FUEL XFER

V-12-21

CHECK TRIM

V-12-14

FULL

V-12-71

CK ECS

V-12-14

GEAR HANDLE

V-12-5

CK FLAPS

V-12-14

GEN L/R

V-12-22

CNI

V-12-15

GEN TIE

V-12-23

COM1H/2H

V-12-64

G-LIM 7.5G

V-12-23

COM1L/2L

V-12-64

G-LIM OVRD

V-12-23

COM1S/2S

V-12-64

GPS

V-12-66

CDATA

V-12-64

GPS DEGD

V-12-23

CONFG

V-12-65

GPSMP

V-12-66

CONSNT

V-12-71

GSEL

V-12-66

CPLD

V-12-65

GTRK

V-12-66

CRUIS

V-12-65

GUN GAS

V-12-24

V-12-71

HALF

V-12-71

D BAD

V-12-65

HAND CNTRL

V-12-24

D LOW

V-12-65

HDG

V-12-66

DC FAIL L/R

V-12-15

HEAT L/R

V-12-67

DCSCS

V-12-65

HEAT Xd

V-12-67

DECM

V-12-65

HEAT FAIL

V-12-24

DCOY ON

V-12-71

HIAOA

V-12-67

DEPLOY

V-12-15

HMD

V-12-67

DEVC BLD L/R

V-12-15

HOME FUEL

V-12-24

DFIR OVRHT

V-12-15

HOOK (red)

V-12-5

DFIRS GONE

V-12-15

HOOK (green)

V-12-71

DISCH

V-12-71

HOSE

V-12-67

DPLY

V-12-71

HSEL

V-12-67

DUMP OPEN

V-12-16

HUDBU Xd

V-12-67

EBC

V-12-65

HYD 1A

V-12-48

ECSDR

V-12-65

HYD 1B

V-12-48

ECS ICING

V-12-16

Emergency Index-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Warn/Caut/FCS/Hyd/Advis

Page No

Warn/Caut/FCS/Hyd/Advis

Page No

HYD 2A

V-12-49

NWS

V-12-46

HYD 2B

V-12-49

OBOGS DEGD

V-12-28

HYD 1A/1B

V-12-50

OCS

V-12-28

HYD 1A/2A

V-12-51

OIL HOT L/R

V-12-29

HYD 1A/2B

V-12-52

OIL PR L/R

V-12-29

HYD 1B/2A

V-12-53

OVRSPD L/R

V-12-29

HYD 1B/2B

V-12-54

PARK BRAKE

V-12-30

HYD 2A/2B

V-12-55

P/INS

V-12-69

HYD 1A/1B/2A

V-12-56

PCODE

V-12-69

HYD 1A/1B/2B

V-12-58

PITOT HT L/R

V-12-30

HYD 1A/2A/2B

V-12-60

POS/ADC

V-12-30

HYD 1B/2A/2B

V-12-62

POS ERROR

V-12-30

HYD 1B/2B

V-12-54

PROBE UNLK

V-12-30

HYD 5000

V-12-63

RACK UNCPL

V-12-30

HYD 1/2 HOT

V-12-63

RALT

V-12-69

ID LT

V-12-24

RMMCD

V-12-69

IFF 4

V-12-24

RMMFL

V-12-69

IFFAI

V-12-24,

RCDR Xd

V-12-69

V-12-68

RCDR ON

V-12-72

IFF OVRHT

V-12-24

READY (APU)

V-12-72

INLET ICE

V-12-25

READY (Fire)

V-12-30

INS ATT

V-12-25

REC

V-12-72

INS DEGD

V-12-25

REFUEL DR

V-12-31

JAM ON

V-12-72

RIG

V-12-31

L BAR (Red)

V-12-6

RIGHT

V-12-72

L BAR (Green)

V-12-72

R-LIM OFF

V-12-30

L DEGD

V-12-68

ROLL

V-12-69

LADDER

V-12-26

RSET

V-12-69

LAND

V-12-68

RSET Xd

V-12-69

LEFT

V-12-72

SAM

V-12-72

LOAD Xd

V-12-68

SPD BRK

V-12-72

LOCK/SHOOT

V-12-72

SPN Light

V-12-6

M2ID

V-12-68

S/W CONFIG

V-12-31

M4 OK

V-12-68

SEVER

V-12-31

MASTER CAUTION

V-12-72

SKID

V-12-69

MC 1

V-12-26

SQTTR

V-12-69

MC 2

V-12-26

STALL L/R

V-12-32

MC CONFIG

V-12-26

STBY

V-12-72

MIDS

V-12-68

TK PRES LO

V-12-32

MIDS OVRHT

V-12-27

TK PRES HI

V-12-32

MNTCD

V-12-68

THERMAL L/R

V-12-33

MSNCD

V-12-68

TRIM

V-12-69

MU FL

V-12-68

UNSAFE (Rear Cpt)

V-12-6

MU LOAD

V-12-27

VOICE/AUR

V-12-33

NAV FAIL

V-12-27

VVEL

V-12-70

NAV HVEL

V-12-27

WDSHLD HOT

V-12-33

NAV VVEL

V-12-27

WING UNLK

V-12-34

NFLR OVRHT

V-12-27

WPNS

V-12-70

NODOV

V-12-68

WRMUP

V-12-72

NO RATS

V-12-28

XMT

V-12-72

NOSE

V-12-72

Y CODE

V-12-70

NOSEC

V-12-69

Emergency Index-5 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

CHAPTER 12

General Emergencies

12.1 GENERAL

Part V contains procedures to correct an abnormal or emergency condition. While these procedures

provide guidance in dealing with an emergency; they should be modified, as required, in case of

multiple/combined emergencies, adverse weather, or other peculiar factors. Use common sense and

sound judgment to determine the correct course of action.

Unless specifically stated in NATOPS, BLIN or MSP codes shall not be used for in-flight decision

making.

Apply the following rules to all emergencies:

1. Aviate: first and foremost, maintain aircraft control.

2. Analyze the situation and take proper action. Perform immediate action procedures without

delay; however, initially do only those steps required to manage the problem. When operating a

control, be prepared to immediately return the control to its former setting if an undesirable

response occurs.

3. Navigate: land as soon as practical, unless the situation dictates otherwise.

4. Communicate: As soon as possible, notify the flight lead, ship, ATC (air traffic control), or tower

of the emergency, aircraft position, and intended course of action. Relay emergency indications,

actions taken, flight conditions, power setting, etc., as time permits.

12.1.1 Immediate Action Items. Procedural steps preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered

immediate action items. Pilots shall be able to accomplish these steps without reference to the Pocket

Checklist (PCL).

12.1.2 Warnings, Cautions, and Advisories. Warnings, cautions, and advisories are displayed in the

cockpit on the LDDI, on the upper warning/caution/advisory lights panels, or on the lower right

caution lights panel. Certain cautions provide two indications: one on the LDDI and one on the lower

right caution lights panel.

Warnings, cautions, and advisories are categorized and are listed alphabetically by category in figure

12-1 together with cause, remarks, and corrective action. Potential cause(s) for the associated

warning/caution/advisory is indicated by a bullet (•) under the Cause/Remarks column. The categories

are as follows:

a. Warning Lights.

b. DDI Cautions and Caution Lights not associated with FCES or HYD cautions.

c. Flight Control Electronic System (FCES) Cautions.

d. Hydraulic System (HYD) Cautions.

e. DDI Advisories.

f. Advisory Lights.

g. CFIT Voice Warnings.

V-12-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Fire/overheat condition detected in the APU bay.

APU FIRE extinguishing system operates automatically

with WonW and must be manually activated with WoffW.

System activation secures fuel to the APU, arms the fire

bottle, and discharges the bottle after a 10 second delay.

Discharge is delayed to allow the APU time to spool down

IN FLIGHT or on GROUND

APU

before extinguishing agent is introduced.

*1. APU FIRE light - PUSH

FIRE

*2. FIRE EXTGH READY light - PUSH

Warning Light

GROUND

• Since the fire extinguishing system requires 28 vdc

*3. Throttles - OFF

‘‘APU Fire,

essential bus power, the fire bottle may not be discharged

4. Egress.

APU Fire’’

if the BATT switch is turned OFF during the 10 second

delay time.

• Airborne, if the DISCH light does not come on 10

seconds after the APU FIRE and READY/DISCH lights

have been pushed, the READY/DISCH light should be

pushed and held until the DISCH light comes on.

• Bleed air leak or fire detected in common ducting AND

the overheat condition still exists (e.g., automatic BALD

GROUND

shutdown did not secure the leak).

1. Throttles - OFF

2. APU switch - OFF

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959,

IN FLIGHT

960, or 961 (code determines leak location)

*1. Throttles - MINIMUM PRACTICAL

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

BLD OFF cautions indicate that the corresponding

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT

DUAL

primary bleed air shutoff valve has been commanded

CYCLE)

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

closed and are not an indication of actual valve position.

cabin altitude.

Valve(s) could still be open allowing bleed air to leak.

If dual BLEED warning lights go out,

L BLEED

execute DUAL BLD OFF caution pro-

If hook release cable is damaged by a bleed air leak or fire,

cedure.

and

it may be impossible to lower the hook.

If lights remain on -

5. Land as soon as possible.

R BLEED

6. Airspeed - Maintain below 325 KCAS

(300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

7. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

Warning Lights

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy

8. AV COOL switch - EMERG

(of any duration)

breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes

9. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

of emergency oxygen may be available.

10. HOOK handle - DOWN

″Bleed Air Left

• If both bleeds secured -

11. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

12. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

(Right),

- No OBOGS

13. OBOGS control switch - OFF

Bleed Air Left

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

14. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL

(Right)″

- No anti-g protection

prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10

to 20 minutes).

- No external fuel transfer

15. Consider removing mask and resetting

- No crossbleed start

emergency oxygen system once below

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

10,000 feet MSL.

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

16. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

(e.g., RADAR, UFCD controlled avionics,

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to HIGH

ECM, sensors, MC2)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 1 of 71)

V-12-3

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

• Bleed air leak or fire detected on designated side AND the

1. Throttles - OFF

overheat condition still exists (e.g., automatic BALD

shutdown did not secure the leak).

IN FLIGHT

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

*2. BLEED AIR knob - L OFF or R OFF

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959,

(DO NOT CYCLE)

960, or 961 (code determines leak location)

If light goes out, execute SINGLE

BLD OFF caution procedure.

BLD OFF cautions indicate that the corresponding primary

SINGLE

If light still on, do the following in

bleed air shutoff valve has been commanded closed and are

order until light goes out -

not an indication of actual valve position. Valve(s) could still

*3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

L BLEED

*4. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) -

be open allowing bleed air to leak.

PULL

*5. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT

CYCLE)

*6. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000

R BLEED

feet cabin altitude.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If both bleeds secured -

Warning Light

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 325 KCAS

(of any duration)

(300 to 325 KCAS optimum).

breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes of

2. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

emergency oxygen may be available.

″Bleed Air Left

3. AV COOL switch - EMERG

• If both bleeds secured -

4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

(Right),

- No OBOGS

5. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

Bleed Air Left

6. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

(Right)″

7. OBOGS control switch - OFF

- No anti-g protection

8. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet

- No external fuel transfer

MSL prior to emergency oxygen

- No crossbleed start

depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

9. Consider removing mask and resetting

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

emergency oxygen system once below

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

10,000 feet MSL.

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to HIGH

10. Non-essential avionics equipment -

OFF (e.g., RADAR, UFCD controlled

avionics, ECM, sensors, MC2)

• Fire/overheat condition detected in corresponding

engine/AMAD bay.

GROUND

*1. Throttles - OFF

If dual FIRE light indications and unable to determine which

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

light came on first, check engine instruments for indications of

*3. FIRE EXTGH READY light -

a fire. High fuel flow, high EGT, rough running, or smoke and

PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH

fumes may indicate the affected side, even if present prior to

LIGHT COMES ON (5 seconds

the FIRE light coming on. Do not hesitate to push the FIRE

maximum)

EXTGH READY light and lower the HOOK handle once

4. BATT switch - OFF

FIRE

FIRE procedures have been initiated. If the hook release cable

5. Egress.

is damaged by an engine bay fire, it may be impossible to

Warning Light

lower the hook.

IN FLIGHT

Dual FIRE lights -

″Engine Fire Left

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

(Right),

Single FIRE light or Dual when side

Engine Fire Left

• The probability of extinguishing a fire and preventing

confirmed -

(Right)″

relights is greatly increased by immediately discharging the

*2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

fire extinguisher.

*3. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

*4. FIRE EXTGH READY light -

• An engine bay fire may damage the engine bay door, which

PUSH AND HOLD UNTIL DISCH

is critical to structural integrity. Following an engine bay

LIGHT COMES ON (5 seconds

fire, limit maneuvering to 5g, limit descent rate at

maximum)

touchdown to less than 1,000 fpm, and minimize roll and

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN

yaw at landing. An off-center arrestment following an engine

6. Land as soon as possible.

fire can lead to catastrophic structural failure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 2)

V-12-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Arresting hook position does not agree with HOOK handle

position.

• Hook not fully extended with the HOOK handle down in

flight.

• Hook down with WonW.

IN FLIGHT

1. Reduce airspeed.

With the HOOK light on, the HOOK handle up, and the

If HOOK light remains on -

hook up, the hook will drop during engine shutdown.

2. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

Ensure personnel are clear of the hook prior to engine

If the hook is in the up position -

shutdown

2. HOOK circuit breaker - PULL

If the mechanical hook uplatch mechanism fails, the hook

HOOK

If the HOOK light remains on and

cannot be released and an arrested landing is not possible. If

the hook is partially extended -

the hook is unlocked (HOOK handle down) but fails to leave

(Red)

3. Throttle right engine - IDLE for one

the up position, an arresting hook system failure may be

minute then OFF

applying HYD 2B pressure to hold the hook up. For this

Warning Light

4. Reduce airspeed to drop HYD2

reason, pulling the HOOK circuit breaker deenergizes the

pressure to zero (if practical).

hook selector valve and ensures HYD 2B pressure is removed.

5. Restart for landing.

If hook still fails to extend (Carrier

If the arresting hook snubber is not properly charged, the

landing) -

arresting hook may not fully extend due to airloads and HYD

6. Divert.

2B back-pressure. In this case, if reducing airspeed does not

If the hook is partially extended -

extinguish the HOOK light, shutting down the right engine

7. Attempt a normal carrier landing.

reduces HYD 2B back-pressure and should increase arresting

hook extension. After engine restart, the hook may retract at a

maximum rate of 2° minute. If the HOOK light remains on

after this procedure and a visual inspection confirms the hook

is partially extended, a successful arrestment is possible due to

g-loads at landing.

STEADY

1. Check gear down indications.

• Landing gear in transit.

2. Refer to appropriate emergency

Landing Gear

• Landing gear unsafe.

procedures.

Warning Light

• Planing link failure.

D LDG Gear Fails to Retract

--------------------------------------------------------------

D LDG Gear Unsafe/Fails to Extend

(Light in LDG

FLASHING

D Planing Link Failure

GEAR Handle)

• Wheels warning (less than 7,500 feet, less than 175 KCAS,

----------------------------------------------------

and over 250 fpm descent rate).

FLASHING (Wheels Warning)

• Loss of air data.

1. LDG GEAR handle - DN or increase

airspeed and/or altitude.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 3)

V-12-5

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

Warning Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

ON DECK

1. Suspend catapult launch.

2. LAUNCH BAR switch - RETRACT

If launch bar fails to retract -

ON DECK

3. LB circuit breaker - PULL

• Launch bar control system malfunction (proximity switch

IN FLIGHT

failure).

1. LDG GEAR handle - LEAVE DN (if

IN FLIGHT

practical)

• Launch bar failed to retract after catapult launch (Launch

RED

2. LAUNCH BAR switch - VERIFY

bar not up and locked AND weight off the left main gear).

RETRACT

• Launch bar control system malfunction (proximity switch

L BAR

3. LB circuit breaker - PULL

failure).

Carrier -

Warning Light

4. Divert or remove cross deck pendants

If the red L BAR light remains on, assume that the launch bar

1 and 4 (1 and 3 as appropriate) and

is NOT up and locked and it may drop to the deck during

make a normal landing. Refer to

landing. The nose landing gear cannot be retracted. Placing

Landing Gear Malfunction Landing

the LDG GEAR handle UP raises the main landing gear and

Guide.

leaves the nose landing gear extended.

Ashore -

4. Remove arresting wires and make a

normal landing. Refer to Landing

Gear Malfunction Landing Guide.

RALT Warning

• Aircraft is below the primary low altitude warning (LAW)

1. Climb above primary RALT setting or

(on UFCD)

setting.

reset LAW setting to a lower altitude.

• SPIN switch in the RCVY position.

SPN

1. SPIN switch - NORM (GUARD

DOWN)

Warning Light

Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch to

RCVY) seriously degrades controllability, prevents recovery

from any departure or spin, and is prohibited.

THREAT

Refer to Tactical Manual.

WARNINGS

• Landing gear in transit.

• Landing gear unsafe.

UNSAFE

• If illuminated with no indications in the front cockpit,

1. Confirm landing gear position with

indicates a popped LG circuit breaker.

pilot.

(rear cockpit)

Does not illuminate for a planing link failure, loss of air data,

or wheels warning.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 4)

V-12-6

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• MC unable to determine which source error

correction to utilize (e.g., configuration discrepancy).

1. Perform FCS IBIT.

• FCC source error correction disagrees with MC

AIR DATA

If caution remains/returns -

commanded source error correction.

2. Do not takeoff.

Caution is only activated WonW.

1. GEN switch affected engine - OFF

• Loss of designated AMAD oil pressure.

If more than 5 minutes to landing -

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

Securing the GEN (ac output) greatly reduces the heat

3. Restart for landing (if required).

load imparted to the AMAD oil and may prevent

4. Land as soon as practical.

heat-related damage to the generator.

If restarting affected engine for landing -

5. GEN switch affected engine - ON

6. Affected engine - Restart

After engine restarted -

L AMAD PR

7. GEN switch affected engine - OFF

R AMAD PR

A L/R AMAD PR caution could be an indication of an

AMAD oil leak which may result in an engine /AMAD

SINGLE GEN FAILURE AND AMAD PR

bay fire.

1. GEN switch affected engine - OFF (DO NOT RE-

SET)

SINGLE GEN FAILURE AND AMAD PR

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF immediately (if

• A single GEN failure accompanied by an AMAD PR

practical)

caution on the same side is a potential indication of

3. Land as soon as practical.

major mechanical damage to the generator and

AMAD.

4. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing pro-

cedure.

1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

• Engine anti-ice valves failed to close when

If not in icing conditions -

commanded by the FADEC.

2. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

L ANTI ICE

If caution is removed -

R ANTI ICE

3. Resume normal engine operation.

If caution remains/returns -

Unregulated engine anti-ice airflow may damage the

4. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

inlet device and cause potential engine FOD.

5. Land as soon as practical.

• Anti-skid system failed BIT.

Anti-skid protection not available for use with normal

braking.

GROUND

• Use of brakes without anti-skid at high speed can

1. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

result in blown tires resulting in loss of directional

control. If practical, rollout speed should be slow as

IN FLIGHT

possible before applying brake pedal pressure.

If more than 30 seconds to landing -

D Do not cycle the ANTI SKID switch in response to

1. ANTI SKID switch - CYCLE ONCE

ANTISKID

an ANTISKID caution immediately prior to landing

If caution reappears or if less than 30 seconds

for the following reasons:

to landing -

a. The ANTISKID caution is removed for up to

2. ANTI SKID switch - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

13.5 seconds as the system performs IBIT even

3. Consider Short Field arrestment.

though the anti-skid system may still be failed.

4. If arresting gear not available or not desired, regu-

b. If the system is not failed, wheel motion at

late brake pedal force to prevent wheel skid.

touchdown or during landing rollout may cause a

false BIT failure and a dump of normal brake

pressure when brakes are applied.

D If the ANTI SKID switch is not placed to OFF with

an ANTISKID caution displayed, normal braking

capability may be lost completely.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 5)

V-12-7

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• AOA warning tone in flaps AUTO is unavailable due

to AOA failure or more than one invalid value used

If caution caused by AOA failure -

to calculate the FLY lateral weight asymmetry.

1. Execute AOA Four Channel Failure procedure.

AOA TONE

Otherwise -

If caution caused by AOA failure, the AOA limit will

1. Manually calculate lateral weight asymmetry to

still be displayed on the CHKLST page. Otherwise, the

FLY lateral weight asymmetry value and AOA limit

determine AOA limit.

value will be removed from the CHKLST page.

• APU accumulator pressure low (below 2,450 psi).

IN FLIGHT

The APU ACCUM caution can be expected after APU

If APU ACCUM caution appeared following

start or after emergency gear/probe extension in flight.

emergency gear or probe extension or APU

With WonW, the APU accumulator recharges

start -

automatically. With WoffW, the HYD ISOL switch may

APU ACCUM

1. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until 10 seconds after

need to be held for up to 20 seconds following

APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately 30

emergency gear/probe extension or APU start to remove

APU ACC

seconds total)

the APU ACCUM caution and 30 seconds to provide a

Otherwise, if required or desired -

full charge (up to 40 seconds after in-flight APU start).

Caution Light

1. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (10 seconds maximum)

If caution remains or returns -

2. Do not select HYD ISOL ORIDE. (To inhibit leak-

ing out HYD 2B.)

If the APU ACCUM caution appears in flight and is

3. Extend landing gear as soon as practical.

not related to emergency gear/probe extension or APU

start, it may indicate a possible leak in the isolated

HYD 2B system.

GROUND

1. Ensure ground crew properly stows drogue by

manually rotating RAT CCW.

If caution remains -

2. Do not takeoff.

IN FLIGHT

1. Maintain airspeed at/below maximum hose/drogue

retraction airspeed.

2. ARS PWR switch - ON

• ARS PWR switch is OFF and the drogue is not fully

3. HOSE switch - CYCLE TO EXT THEN RETR

ARS DROGUE

retracted.

4. ARS PWR switch - OFF

If caution remains -

5. Get a visual inspection.

If drogue appears stowed -

6. Make a normal landing.

If drogue extended and does not retract -

6. HOSE jettison switch - HOLD IN CUT (until hose

is severed)

If hose jettison is unsuccessful -

7. Perform a field landing with the arresting cable re-

moved.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 6)

V-12-8

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated air turbine starter rpm too high (e.g.,

GROUND

both sources of ATS overspeed cutout protection

After engine start (other than momentary) -

have failed).

1. APU switch - OFF

2. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

• ECS valve failures are routing engine bleed air to

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

rotate the corresponding ATS.

4. ENG CRANK switch - VERIFY OFF

IN FLIGHT (other than momentary)

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

altitude.

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as

If caution remains -

minutes of emergency oxygen may be available.

5. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

• If both bleeds secured -

With both BLEEDS secured -

- No OBOGS

L ATS

6. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

R ATS

KCAS optimum).

- No anti-g protection

7. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

- No external fuel transfer

8. AV COOL switch - EMERG

- No crossbleed start

9. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

10. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

11. Land as soon as practical.

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

12. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to

13. OBOGS control switch - OFF

HIGH

14. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to

emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

15. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency

oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

Regardless of the engine start air source utilized, the

16. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., RA-

corresponding GEN switch should be ON, as the

DAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM, sensors,

generator provides primary overspeed cutout protection

MC2)

for the ATS.

17 Land as soon as possible.

1. Paddle switch - PRESS

2. Desired autopilot mode - RE-ENGAGE

AUTO PILOT

• Requested autopilot mode has disengaged.

If in RVSM airspace and BALT inhibited -

3. Notify ATC that the aircraft is no longer RVSM

compliant.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 7)

V-12-9

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. ECS mode switch - VERIFY AUTO

• The avionics undercool sensor, located forward of the

2. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE

avionics bays, has determined that avionics airflow

If conditions permit -

and temperature are deficient. The system assumes

3. Either throttle - ADVANCE ABOVE 74% rpm

that if flow and temperature downstream of the

If conditions do not permit engine runup -

avionics bays are deficient, effective avionics cooling

4. APU switch - ON

is not being provided.

5. BLEED AIR knob - AUG PULL

If caution on after 3 minutes -

6. Do not takeoff.

If caution removed prior to 3 minutes -

In flight, in ECS AUTO mode with the throttles above

7. BLEED AIR knob - Push down to normal

IDLE, if an AV AIR HOT caution is displayed, then

position

the ECS is most likely degraded. On deck, the avionics

8. APU switch - OFF prior to takeoff

cooling fans provide adequate avionics cooling up to an

ambient temperature of approximately 103°F, but

IN FLIGHT

AV AIR HOT

above that an AV AIR HOT caution can be expected.

1. Throttles - Maintain above IDLE

Advancing one or both throttles above approximately

If caution on after 1 minute -

74% N₂ rpm or selecting AUG PULL should remove

2. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet (20,000 to

the caution within 3 minutes. If an AV AIR HOT

25,000 feet optimum for cooling).

caution cannot be cleared, maintenance action is

3. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

required.

KCAS optimum for cooling).

4. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

5. AV COOL switch - EMERG

6. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD (cabin pres-

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is

sure altitude will slowly increase)

prohibited. Selecting MAN while the aft cooling fan

If caution off -

shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to overspeed

7. Land as soon as practical.

resulting in a catastrophic fan failure potentially

If caution remains -

leading to loss of OBOGS.

7. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF

(e.g., RADAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

8. Land as soon as possible.

ALL AIRCRAFT

1. BATT switch - CONFIRM ON

• BATT switch is ON on the ground in the absence of

ac power (first engine start). Battery is depleting and

LOT 21

the switch should be placed to OFF unless APU start

If all cockpit displays operating (battery

is about to be made.

charger has failed) -

BATT SW

• BATT switch is OFF in flight. (Switch should be

2. Land as soon as practical.

placed to ON to provide essential bus backup

If accompanied by R GEN and GEN TIE caution

BATT SW

capability from the PMGs and the battery.)

lights -

LOT 21

2. Refer to GEN TIE caution procedures.

Caution Light

• Battery is not being recharged in flight (BATT

3. Land as soon as practical.

switch ON). Battery charger has failed or the R GEN

If all cockpit power lost (except essential bus

has failed with the buses isolated (R GEN and GEN

equipment) -

TIE caution lights).

2. Refer to L GEN/R GEN (DUAL GEN

• Battery is powering essential bus in flight (dual

FAILURE) procedures.

generator and dual PMG failures). At least 5 to 10

3. Land as soon as possible.

minutes of battery power remains to run the FCCs.

• Dry Bay Fire Suppression System (DBFSS)

1. Use all available means to confirm absence of fire.

BAY DISCH

discharged.

2. Land as soon as practical.

DBFSS is only armed with the LDG GEAR handle UP.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 8)

V-12-10

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• The corresponding primary bleed air shutoff valve

has been commanded closed.

1. BALD system detected a leak in one or both

bleed air systems and the overheat condition no

longer exists (L, R, or both cautions).

2. Over pressurization detected in one or both

systems (both cautions).

GROUND

3. BLEED AIR knob in L OFF, R OFF, or OFF (L,

1. APU switch - OFF

R, or both cautions).

IN FLIGHT - DUAL

4. ENG CRANK switch in L or R (L or R caution,

*1. Throttles - Minimum practical

respectively).

*2. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*3. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

5. FIRE test switch in TEST A or TEST B (both

*4. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin

cautions).

altitude.

5. MSP codes − CHECK for 953 to 961 and for 833

BLD OFF cautions are not an indication of actual valve

If 833 present without 953 to 961

position. Valve(s) could still be open allowing bleed air

(over pressurization) -

6. BLEED AIR knob - NORM

to leak.

If cautions do not return -

7. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

Bleed air leak MSP codes: 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958,

8. Reset emergency oxygen system.

959, 960, or 961 (code determines leak location)

9. Throttles as desired.

If 953 to 961 are present (BALD shutdown) or

Over pressurization MSP code: 833

if both cautions return -

L BLD OFF

6. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

R BLD OFF

7. Airspeed - Maintain below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

KCAS optimum).

8. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

(Both BLEED

• Automatic functioning of the BALD system may

9. AV COOL switch - EMERG

warning lights

extinguish the red BLEED warning light(s) prior to

10. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

out)

aircrew recognition and may not trigger the

11. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

12. Land as soon as practical.

appropriate voice alerts or the voice alerts may be the

13. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

only indication of a bleed air system leak. In this case,

14. OBOGS control switch - OFF

cycling the BLEED AIR knob to remove the BLD

15. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL prior to

OFF caution(s) reintroduces hot bleed air to the

emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20

minutes).

leaking duct. If the sensing element was damaged by

16. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency

the leak, automatic shutdown and isolation capability

oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

may be lost. Extensive damage or fire may result.

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

17. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g., RA-

DAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

sensors, MC2)

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3

18. Land as soon as possible.

minutes of emergency oxygen may be available.

IN FLIGHT - SINGLE

• If both bleeds secured -

1. BLEED AIR knob - L OFF or R OFF (DO NOT

- No OBOGS

CYCLE)

- No ECS or cabin pressurization

2. Land as soon as practical.

- No anti-g protection

- No external fuel transfer

- No crossbleed start

- No windshield anti-ice/rain removal

- May get AV AIR HOT during approach

- To prevent canopy fogging, select OFF/RAM or

RAM/DUMP and move the DEFOG handle to

HIGH

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 10)

V-12-12

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Loss of fuel boost pressure to designated engine.

• May indicate fuselage fuel leak.

• May indicate fuel transfer failure.

• May indicate a power transmission shaft failure

1. Limit corresponding afterburner usage above

if accompanied with the corresponding GEN, DC

30,000 feet.

L BOOST LO

FAIL, and both HYD circuit cautions.

2. Check for indications of fuselage fuel leak.

R BOOST LO

• May result from prolonged transitions through

3. Monitor fuel transfer.

zero g (greater than 2 seconds).

4. Land as soon as practical.

Afterburner may not operate above 30,000 feet. The

crossfeed and cross cooling valves open

automatically.

• Brake accumulator pressure low (below 2,000

psi).

Emergency brakes may not be available.

BRK ACCUM

1. Extend landing gear as soon as practical.

A BRK ACCUM caution in flight is not normal and

may indicate a possible leak in the isolated HYD

2B system. If the caution appears in flight, do not

attempt to recharge the accumulator as this may

result in additional loss of HYD 2B fluid.

BELOW 47,000 FEET MSL

• Cabin pressure altitude above 21,000 +/- 1,100

feet.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

Cabin light may not extinguish until cabin pressure

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

altitude is below 16,500 feet.

cabin altitude.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - CHECK NORM

5. ECS MODE switch - CHECK AUTO

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms present -

• CABIN light may appear with normal cabin

6. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL.

pressurization when aircraft altitude is above

CABIN

7. Land as soon as possible.

47,000 feet MSL. If altitude is maintained,

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

aircrew should continuously monitor

Caution Light

6. Reset emergency oxygen system and resume

physiological condition.

normal OBOGS operation.

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

• DCS may be experienced when operating with

8. Land as soon as practical.

cabin pressure altitude above 25,000 feet even

with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of

ABOVE 47,000 FEET MSL

DCS include pain in joints, tingling sensations,

dizziness, paralysis, choking, and/or loss of

1. Continuously monitor physiological conditions

consciousness.

and cabin pressure altimeter.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 11)

V-12-13

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

IN FLIGHT

1. CANOPY switch - CONFIRM DOWN

2. Slow below 300 KCAS, 200 KCAS in F/A-18F

• Canopy not down and locked.

(if practical).

3. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

CANOPY

In the F/A-18F, rear seat occupant should lower

4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

seat and lean as far forward as possible in case the

5. CANOPY switch - DOWN

canopy departs the aircraft.

6. CABIN PRESS switch - NORM

If light stays on -

7. Land as soon as practical.

• Capability to display cautions degraded.

NOTE

1. FUEL page/SDC - RESET

LOTs 21-24: Back-up TOTAL fuel quantity

2. MC1 - CYCLE to 1 OFF then NORM

CAUT DEGD

value may be reset to zero following MC1

power cycle. If fuel quantity information

If caution remains or reappears -

is critical and other MC functions appear

3. Land as soon as practical.

to be working normally, MC1 power cycle is

not recommended.

Cautions may be false or erratic.

CHECK SEAT

1. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle(s) -

• With WonW, one or both ejection seats are not

CHECK ARMED

CK SEAT

armed when both throttles are advanced beyond

If caution remains -

27° THA.

2. Do not takeoff.

Caution Light

• With WonW, trim is not set for takeoff.

1. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM

The caution is displayed when both throttles are

ADVISORY DISPLAYED (stabilators 4° NU)

CHECK TRIM

advanced beyond 27° THA if the stabilators are

If carrier-based -

trimmed less than 3.5° TEU with the launch bar up

2. TRIM - SET FOR CATAPULT LAUNCH

(field takeoff) or 6.5° TEU with the launch bar

down (carrier takeoff).

• ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

1. ECS MODE/CABIN PRESS switches/BLEED

CK ECS

• CABIN PRESS switch - DUMP or RAM/DUMP

AIR knob - CHECK POSITION

• BLEED AIR knob - OFF

Caution Light

• With WonW, flaps are not set for takeoff.

If shore-based -

The caution is displayed when both throttles are

1. FLAP switch - HALF

CK FLAPS

advanced beyond 27° THA with the FLAP switch

If carrier-based -

not in HALF and the launch bar up (field takeoff)

1. FLAP switch - FULL

or with the FLAP switch not in FULL and the

launch bar down (carrier takeoff).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 12)

V-12-14

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• CSC MUX FAIL or CNI interface failure.

• May also be caused by an MPCD malfunction.

MPCD and UFCD may not operate in some or all

modes. If CSC indicates MUX FAIL, the

VOICE/AUR, FCS, and G-LIM 7.5G cautions are

also set, and the following equipment is inoperative:

1. BIT page - CHECK CSC and MPCD BIT

RALT, CFIT protection

STATUS

CNI

Voice alerts

If MPCD indicates DEGD -

COMM control except by UFC BU

2. MPCD knob - OFF, wait 15 seconds, ON

TACAN, beacon, IFF

SDC RESET function

LOCK/SHOOT lights

TACTS functions

ILS control except by ILS panel

EMCON control

• All three PMG outputs have failed on the

corresponding side.

• May indicate a power transmission shaft failure

1. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

if accompanied with the corresponding BOOST

If caution clears -

L DC FAIL

LO, GEN, and both HYD circuit cautions.

2. Continue normal operations.

R DC FAIL

If caution remains -

The affected FCC channels are powered by the

2. Land as soon as practical.

essential bus. One level of redundancy for the

essential bus is lost.

• The RFCM is in AUTO, PPLAN, or SEMI and

DCOY is selected without a decoy out.

1. Either dispense a decoy (consent) or unbox

DEPLOY

DCOY on EW page.

The RFCM cannot respond to a threat using the

decoy.

• A hot air leak from the inlet device anti-ice

system has been detected.

Inlet device anti-ice capability degraded or lost.

If not in icing conditions -

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

L DEVC BLD

If caution remains with switch OFF -

R DEVC BLD

2. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

3. Land as soon as practical.

If not secured, a hot air leak can cause structural

damage to the inlet device and possible engine

FOD.

DFIR OVRHT

• DFIRS reporting an overtemperature condition.

Information

Unless visually confirmed intact -

DFIRS GONE

• DFIRS inadvertently deployed.

1. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 13)

V-12-15

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Fuel dump valve open with DUMP switch in

OFF.

1. DUMP switch - CYCLE

2. BINGO setting - Set above internal fuel state.

If the dump valve cannot be closed, fuel continues

If caution remains -

to dump until Tanks 1 and 4 are empty. Selecting

3. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

WING INHIBIT diverts recirculation fuel from the

If external fuel also remains -

wings to the feed tanks. Stopping external transfer

4. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

may make this fuel available if the dump valve is

5. Land as soon as possible.

DUMP OPEN

subsequently closed. When uncommanded fuel

When capacity available in feed tanks -

dump ceases (Tanks 1 and 4 empty), the feed tanks

6. EXT TANKS switches - NORM

should contain between 4,200 and 4,900 lb,

If fuel continues to dump on deck -

depending on JLS cycling.

7. Turn aircraft into the wind.

8. Throttles - OFF

Delaying landing until the transfer tanks are empty

If caution removed -

and uncommanded fuel dump ceases will prevent

3. EXT TANKS switch(es) - CHECK NORM

fuel from dumping onto hot exhaust nozzles and

fouling of the landing area.

• The ECS compressor/turbine is icing (e.g., an

ECS valve failure or malfunction in the warm air

GROUND

system which normally prevents ECS icing

1. Throttles - IDLE

occurred).

2. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

• ECS controller failure with altitude below 30,000

3. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

feet (ECS DEGD, MSP 8A0 or 8A1).

4. Do not takeoff.

• ECS icing sensor failure with altitude below

30,000 feet (MSP 8E1).

IN FLIGHT

1. MSP codes - CHECK

For a sensor or ECS controller failure, the caution

If MSP 8A0 or 8A1 (ECS control failure) or

is inhibited above 30,000 feet, since insufficient

8E1 (sensor failure) present -

moisture is present to cause ECS icing.

2. Throttles - Minimum practical (to reduce cabin

pressurization surge)

The ECS system incorporates a bypass valve

3. BIT/HYDRO-MECH/ECS RESET option -

designed to prevent ECS compressor/turbine failure

SELECT

when icing occurs. Depending on the severity of the

If ECS continues to operate (good pressur-

failure which caused the icing condition, the

ization and no AV AIR HOT caution) -

capacity of the bypass valve may be exceeded. If an

1. ENG page - SELECT

ECS ICING caution appears (without MSPs 8A0,

2. Airspeed - Increase to at least 0°C INLET

ECS ICING

8A1, or 8E1), there is one of two outcomes: (1)

TEMP (if possible)

bypass, in which case the system needs to be

If ECS fails (pressurization lost or AV AIR

de-iced but the ECS continues to function or (2)

HOT caution) -

the ECS compressor/turbine fails and conditioned

1. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet (20,000-

ECS airflow is lost (loss of cabin pressurization and

25,000 feet optimum for cooling).

AV AIR HOT caution).

2. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

KCAS optimum for cooling).

The ECS ICING caution may or may not be

3. ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM

removed after selecting OFF/RAM.

4. AV COOL switch - EMERG

5. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD (cabin

pressure altitude slowly increases)

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

6. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF

Selection of MAN with the ECS MODE switch is

(e.g., RADAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

prohibited. Selecting MAN while the aft cooling fan

sensors, MC2).

shutoff valve is open may cause the fan to

7. Land as soon as possible.

overspeed resulting in a catastrophic fan failure

Otherwise -

potentially leading to loss of OBOGS.

6. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 14)

V-12-16

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE or engine

L EGT HIGH

response is abnormal -

R EGT HIGH

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

• Designated exhaust gas temperature out of

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

limits.

″Engine Left (Right),

procedure.

Engine Left (Right)″

If caution clears -

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

• Abnormal engine condition due to a failure(s) in

the engine control system. The failure(s) result in

a change in ENG STATUS on the ENG page:

GROUND

a. PERF90 - 10% or less thrust loss and/or

1. Do not takeoff.

slower engine transients. AB is not inhibited.

b. AB FAIL - No afterburner capability.

IN FLIGHT

c. THRUST - Engine thrust limited to between

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

40% and 90% and significantly slower

2. ENG page - Determine ENG STATUS

transients.

If PERF 90, ABFAIL, THRUST, or IDLE -

d. IDLE - Engine limited to idle power.

3. Use throttles as required.

e. SHUTDN - Engine automatically shutdown.

4. Land as soon as practical.

For landing -

L ENG

5. FLAP switch - HALF (THRUST or IDLE)

R ENG

6. Assess throttle response in the landing

If ENG STATUS has changed, a FADEC reset

configuration.

″Engine Left (Right)

should not be attempted, particularly airborne, as

If SHUTDN -

Engine Left (Right)″

any degrade in ENG STATUS is most likely

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

indicative of the failure of a mechanical component.

4. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

Under these conditions, the engine may fail to

procedure.

restart following shutdown and FADEC reset

If SHUTDN and operational necessity

attempt.

dictates -

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

With an ENG STATUS of PERF90, AB FAIL,

4. Reset lined out FADEC by commanding a

THRUST, or IDLE, engine performance is

channel transfer.

degraded, but the FADEC is still controlling the

If caution clears -

engine and there are NO throttle restrictions.

5. Attempt affected engine restart.

A FADEC reset should not normally be attempted.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE -

L ENG VIB

• Excessive engine vibration in either the fan or

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R ENG VIB

compressor section of the engine.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

FAN VIB greater than 1.6 ips

procedure.

″Engine Left (Right)

CORE VIB greater than 2.2 ips

If caution removed and engine is required -

Engine Left (Right)″

3. Throttle - Advance slowly, maintaining vibra-

tion level below the caution threshold.

• A component which contains classified

information has reported a critical failure which

ERASE FAIL

Information

may prevent successful erasure of stored

classified data.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 15)

V-12-17

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• External tanks are pressurized with WonW (EXT

TANKS switch(es) in ORIDE).

• External tanks over pressurized with WoffW.

GROUND

1. EXT TANKS switch(es) - VERIFY NORM

External tank pressurization is terminated for

If caution remains -

EXT TANK

in-flight refueling (PROBE switch in EXTEND) and

2. Do not catapult.

for arrested landing (both HOOK and LDG GEAR

IN FLIGHT

handles down).

1. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP (when external

NOTE

transfer complete)

Carrier launch prohibited with less than 2,700 lbs

(1,700 lbs for ARS) and greater than 100 lbs in

external drop tank.

1. FUEL page/EFD - IDENTIFY EXT TANK

WITH TRAPPED FUEL

• One or more external tanks failed/slow to transfer

Perform the following steps while monitoring

when commanded.

fuel transfer, tank quantities, and lateral

asymmetry -

The EXT XFER caution can be set, even if no

2. EXT TANKS switch(es) - ORIDE

failures exist, if the external fuel tanks do not transfer

3. EXT TANKS switch(es) - CYCLE TO STOP

at the same rate. During normal external fuel transfer,

AND BACK TO ORIDE

fuel quantity splits between external tanks may be as

4. EXT TANKS switch(es) - NORM

much as 2,000 lbs. with the centerline tank usually

5. PROBE switch - CYCLE

transferring slower than the wing tank(s). As long as

6. Apply positive and negative g.

external fuel transfer keeps the internal fuel tanks full

7. FUEL page/SDC - RESET

(greater than 12,000 lbs), no corrective action is

If practical -

required.

8. Descend below freezing level and repeat steps 2

thru 7.

Icing may occur in the external fuel tank

9. If below 10,000 feet MSL, BLEED AIR knob -

pressurization system inhibiting external tank transfer

CYCLE THRU OFF TO NORM

and refueling. Descending and accelerating may

10. LDG GEAR and HOOK handles - DOWN

reduce the effects of icing.

11. LDG GEAR and HOOK handles - UP

EXT XFER

12. Perform in-flight refueling.

If 5-wet loading and fuel is transferred from

Failure to transfer may also affect ability to refuel

IB tanks before MB tanks are empty -

affected tank(s). If in-flight refueling is required,

13. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS/0.6 IMN,

consider inhibiting refueling of external tank(s) that

whichever is less.

set the caution and were slow to transfer

If a MB tank is trapped near full -

(corresponding EXT TANKS switch to STOP).

14. SELECT JETT failed tank or control fuel

transfer to prevent exceedance of 29,000 ft-lb

lateral weight asymmetry limit.

If/when transfer complete but prior to landing -

When in 5-wet loading, if fuel is transferred from IB

15. EXT TANKS switch(es) - NORM

tanks before MB tanks are empty, failure to maintain

If external wing tank fuel trapped -

airspeed below 300 KCAS/0.6 IMN, whichever is less,

16. Ensure lateral asymmetry within limits for landing.

may result in aircraft structural damage.

NOTE

FOR CARRIER LANDING -

In the event that an ARS Control Panel is installed in

If IB or C/L tank(s) over 800 lb/ARS or MB

the aircraft, the TRANS switch on the ARS Control

tank(s) over 500 lb -

Panel overrides the FUEL panel.

17. Divert or SELECT JETT non-transferring tank(s).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 16)

V-12-18

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

WonW, both engines shutdown -

1. Discontinue any electrical power to FADECs

• Left or right engine FADEC indicates an overheat con-

for 30 to 60 minutes.

dition.

2. Do not attempt engine start.

After the cooling period and prior to any

FADEC HOT

FADEC operation -

3. Confirm absence of engine related MSP

codes.

------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------

WonW, IDLE or above -

• Insufficient fuel flow through the FADEC for adequate

1. Both engines - SHUTDOWN

cooling.

• Designated engine flamed out.

• Ignition automatic with throttle at or above IDLE when-

ever flameout sensed.

Single Engine Flameout

• Accessories lost on corresponding side by indication:

- BOOST LO caution

- HYD cautions

- GEN and/or DC FAIL cautions

- AMAD PR caution

SINGLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT

• One generator supplies sufficient power to operate all

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

L FLAMEOUT

systems.

If rpm continues to decrease with in-

R FLAMEOUT

• As corresponding HYD pressure decays below 900 psi,

creasing EGT (failed auto-restart) -

aileron, rudder, and LEF switching valves function (typi-

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

″Engine Left

cally within 2 seconds).

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Land-

(Right),

• If any FCS X’s appear, there is no hazard with multiple

ing procedure.

Engine Left

FCS reset attempts to regain the Xd surface.

If engine auto-restarts -

(Right)″

• If a windmilling engine causes HYD pressure to fluctuate

4. Check engine response at safe altitude.

between 800 and 2,000 psi, the switching valves cycle be-

5. Land as soon as practical.

tween their primary and backup circuits. If this occurs,

reduce airspeed until hydraulic pressure fluctuations

cease.

Dual Engine Flameout

• Generators drop off line as rpm decays through 60%.

• Stand-by instruments must be used.

• EFD only displays RPM and EGT.

• PMGs supply power to run flight controls down to ap-

proximately 20% N2 (battery below 20%)

FLIR OVRHT

• Targeting FLIR internal overheat detected.

1. FLIR switch - OFF (if practical)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 17)

V-12-19

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Engine FUEL INLET TEMP high (>121°C).

• Engine FUEL NOZ TEMP high (>177°C).

PREFLIGHT

• FEED TANK TEMP high.

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

WoffW: ≥ 60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

WonW: ≥ 80°C for 15 sec (<5,000 lb fuel)

IN FLIGHT

≥ 60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

1 RADAR knob - STBY (if practical)

(>5,000 lb fuel)

Without a THERMAL caution -

• Parameter which triggered FUEL HOT caution should

2. Throttle affected engine - Increase fuel flow

be highlighted in red on ENG page.

above 3,500 pph. (MIL power optimum) and

- In LOT 26 and up, the feed tank temperature limits

maintain at least 80% N₂ rpm whenever pos-

that trigger a FUEL HOT caution differ for in-flight

sible.

L FUEL HOT

and on-deck conditions.

3. Land as soon as practical.

R FUEL HOT

• Fuel system should provide adequate cooling for FA-

With either THERMAL caution -

DECs and subsystem accessories under normal ambient

2. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

conditions.

3. Consider restarting affected engine for land-

• Fuel system temperature can approach limits under ex-

ing.

tremely hot ambient conditions (>103°C) particularly

• Engine Restart

during extended low altitude flight or with low fuel

• Single Engine Approach and Landing

states.

POSTFLIGHT

• If corresponding THERMAL caution appears, the fuel

1 RADAR knob - OFF

thermal management system has lost the capability to

If caution remains for more than 5

regulate fuel system temperatures. Increasing fuel flow

minutes-

may not have the desired effect of reducing fuel system

2. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

temperatures.

• The designated fuel/air heat exchanger is leaking, and

the fuel system has failed to shut off flow to the heat

exchanger.

Due to fuel/air heat exchanger location (above the engine

inlet), engine fuel ingestion is possible if fuel flow is not

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

L FUEL INLT

immediately secured.

*2. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

R FUEL INLT

3. Land as soon as possible.

Failure to secure an engine with an unisolated fuel/air heat

exchanger leak may result in catastrophic engine failure

and/or fire.

• At least one feed tank below 1,125 lb.

• May also be an indication of a fuel transfer failure.

• May indicate fuselage fuel leak.

• Sideslip may be required to transfer wing fuel.

1. Throttles - REDUCE FUEL FLOW (IF

FUEL LO

If a low level indication was caused by a transient

PRACTICAL)

condition such as prolonged negative g flight, the FUEL

2. Land as soon as possible.

FUEL LO

LO caution remains for 60 seconds after the low level

3. Check for fuel transfer failure indications.

indication has cleared.

If trapped fuel indicated -

″Fuel Low, Fuel

4. EXT TANKS - CHECK

Low″

5. Avoid negative g maneuvering.

If the FUEL LO caution remains displayed, aircrew must

assume that at least one feed tank is below approx. 1,125

lb regardless of displayed fuel quantity.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 18)

V-12-20

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Internal wing tank fuel asymmetry exceeds 350 lb.

• Tank 1 and 4 fuel is not scheduling properly (e.g., Tank

4 full and Tank 1 empty).

INTERAL WING TANK FAILURE

• Most likely result of a valve failure.

• If one internal wing tank fails to transfer, the other is

commanded to stop transferring when wing tank balance

logic detects a 200 lb split.

• When Tank 4 drops to approximately 3,000 lb, the SDC

declares a wing transfer failure, cancels wing balance

logic, and reinitiates transfer from the good internal wing

tank.

1. FUEL page - Check wing and transfer tanks

• All fuel from the failed internal wing tank should gravity

If wing asymmetry exceeds 350 lb -

transfer with the aid of bank angle changes or a steady

2. Monitor wing tank transfer.

sideslip.

3. Roll heavy wing up 5° (if required).

• Selecting INTR WING INHIBIT isolates normal wing

If one wing still fails to transfer or when

transfer/ refuel and diverts recirculation fuel to the feed

both wings below approximately 200 lb -

tanks.

4. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

FUEL XFER

5. Recalculate lateral weight asymmetry if

TANK 1 TRANSFER FAILURE

wings are split for landing.

• Tank 1 fails to stop transfer (pump and/or valve failure)

6. Land as soon as practical.

• Tank 1 depletes as soon as the feed tanks can accept its

If Tank 1 empty & Tank 4 full -

fuel causing FUEL XFER caution.

2. INTR WING switch - INHIBIT

• Assuming normal Tank 4 transfer, caution is removed

3. Monitor Tank 1 and 4 transfer.

when Tank 4 depletes to approximately 2,100 lb.

4. Land as soon as practical.

TANK 4 TRANSFER FAILURE

• Tank 4 fails to transfer (pump failure).

• Tank 1 also stops transferring when it reaches the fuel

transfer schedule (approximately 1,000 lb).

• Tank 4 continuously gravity transfers to Tank 3 and,

when feed tank balance logic is initiated, to Tank 2 using

scavenge pump.

• The last 1,000 lb of Tank 1 transfers when Tank 2 cycles

in and out of FUEL LO.

• With Tank 4 near full, the FUEL XFR caution is set

when Tank 1 drops below 400−500 lb.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 19)

V-12-21

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

SINGLE GEN FAILURE

1. GEN switch - CYCLE

• Designated generator ac power source is off line.

If GEN fails to reset -

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

May indicate a power transmission shaft failure if

If GEN still failed -

accompanied with the corresponding BOOST LO,

3. GEN switch - OFF

DC FAIL, and both HYD circuit cautions.

4. Land as soon as practical.

SINGLE GEN FAILURE

DUAL GEN FAILURE

• Either generator is capable of powering the entire

1. RADAR knob - OFF

electrical load of the aircraft.

2. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

DUAL GEN FAILURE

If either GEN fails to reset -

• Primary failure indications:

3. Failed GEN switch(es) - CYCLE

- Loss of all displays

If both GENs remain inop -

- Loss of cabin pressurization (both bleed valves

4. Battery gauge - CHECK (BATT SW caution

close)

• GEN caution lights are inop.

light - CHECK in LOT 21)

• May be caused by a fault in the RADAR.

If gauge reads 28 vdc (BATT SW caution

L GEN

• Standby flight instruments must be used and

light out in LOT 21)-

R GEN

EFD only displays RPM and EGT.

5. Land as soon as practical.

• COMM 1 (last frequency), G XMT, and IFF

EMERG available.

For landing -

L GEN

R GEN

• Gear must be emergency extended.

6. IFF MASTER switch - EMERG

• Anti-skid inoperative.

7. G XMIT switch - COMM 1 (if required)

Caution Lights

• PMGs are powering FCC channels and essential

8. Refer to Landing Gear Emergency Extension

bus indefinitely if:

- Battery gauge indicates 28 vdc (LOT 22 and

procedure.

up), or

9. Make a short field arrestment (if available).

- BATT SW caution light is out (LOT 21)

10. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

• Only 5 to 10 minutes of battery power remains to

sure. (Anti-skid is not available.)

power essential bus and the FCCs if:

- Battery gauge indicates 24 vdc or below (LOT

If gauge reads 24 vdc or below (BATT SW

22 and up), or

caution light on in LOT 21) -

- BATT SW caution light is on (LOT 21)

5. Land as soon as possible using ″For landing″

• Refer to Emerg Pwr Dist chart for inoperative

procedures.

equipment.

SINGLE GEN FAILURE AND AMAD PR

• A single GEN failure accompanied by an AMAD

1. GEN switch - OFF (DO NOT RESET)

PR caution on the same side is a potential

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF immediately (if

indication of major mechanical damage to the

generator and AMAD.

practical)

3. Land as soon as practical.

4. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing

procedure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 20)

V-12-22

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

If PARK BRK released during first engine

start -

Battery Start

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

2. Operating GEN switch - CYCLE

• Left and right 115 vac buses are isolated (bus tie

3. Start second engine.

open).

External Power Start

• May be caused by electrical fault protection

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

circuitry.

2. GEN TIE CONTROL switch - CYCLE

• May be caused by initial engine start with the

3. Start second engine.

PARK BRK released.

IN FLIGHT

GEN TIE

1. GEN TIE CONTROL switch - NORM (DO

NOT CYCLE)

Caution Light

If both GENs operating -

If the left and right buses are isolated because of a

2. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

detected fault, cycling the GEN TIE CONTROL

3. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

switch reenergizes the faulty bus/equipment and

With L or R GEN caution light -

may cause further damage or loss of the remaining

2. GEN switch affected side - CYCLE

generator.

3. Electrical RESET button - PRESS

If GEN restored -

4. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

5. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

If GEN still failed -

4. GEN switch affected side - OFF

5. Land as soon as practical.

6. Refer to Emergency Power Distribution chart.

• Nz REF (g-command limiter) set to 7.5g

regardless of gross weight.

1. Limit symmetrical accelerations to the

following:

G-command limiter will not prevent an aircraft

G-LIM 7.5G

overstress at gross weights above 42,097 lb. Above

GW (lb)

Acceleration (g)

42,097 lb gross weight, pilot must limit g to prevent

≤42,097

-3.0 to +7.5

″Flight Controls,

an overstress.

45,000

-2.8 to +7.0

Flight Controls″

50,000

-2.5 to +6.3

Normally, for aircraft gross weights of 42,097 lb to

55,000

-2.3 to +5.7

57,405 lb, Nz REF is reduced by the FCS to

60,000

-2.1 to +5.2

prevent aircraft overstress. Above aircraft gross

66,000

-1.9 to +4.7

weight of 57,405 lb, the FCS maintains 5.5g.

• G-limiter overridden.

Selected by momentarily pressing the paddle switch

when the stick is near the full aft limit. Maximum

allowed g-limit increased by 33% (allows a 10g

1. Stick - Return to near neutral to disengage

G-LIM OVRD

command at 7.5g Nz REF). Unless g-limiter

override.

override is desired, control maximum g-level. If the

paddle switch has failed electrically, NWS and the

autopilot may be commanded off without pilot

action or notification.

• GPS approach flight phase and HERR exceeds

GPS DEGD

Information

108 feet for 10 seconds.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 21)

V-12-23

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Gun purge air pressure low.

GUN GAS

1. Do not fire gun, even if caution clears.

Failure to purge cartridge combustion gases may

result in a gun bay explosion and significant aircraft

damage.

HAND CNTRL

• Either hand controller inoperative.

Information

• Engine anti-ice failure detected while the ENG

ANTI ICE switch is ON.

The corresponding L HEAT or R HEAT advisory is

1. Avoid icing conditions.

removed on the failed side. Engine and inlet device

HEAT FAIL

If icing conditions encountered -

anti-ice capability lost on failed side.

2. Refer to Extreme Weather procedures.

If the ENG ANTI ICE switch is placed to OFF, the

HEAT FAIL caution is replaced by the HEAT

advisory.

• Fuel remaining sufficient to fly to HOME

waypoint with 2,000 lb reserve or less.

1. Change HOME waypoint (if appropriate) or

HOME FUEL

HOME FUEL caution logic is disabled with WonW,

analyze configuration, fuel flow, and profile for

the refueling probe extended, the landing gear

BINGO.

cycled down then up, or within 5 seconds after a

HOME waypoint change.

• A failure is detected in the day ID strobe light,

1. Identify aircraft type on approach to make sure

ID LT

interconnecting wiring, or the day ID power

of proper arresting gear weight setting.

supply.

• Transponder failed to respond to a valid Mode 4

interrogation (failure or Mode 4 not enabled).

IFF 4

• Failure in the KIT 1C.

• Mode 4 codes zeroized, or KIT 1C installed but

Information

″Mode 4 Reply,

not keyed with crypto.

Mode 4 Reply″

The IFF 4 caution and voice alert are disabled with

the IFF MODE 4 switch in the OFF position.

1. BIT/COMM/PIDS MAINT - Check Crypto

Status

If CRYPTO lined out -

D Fault with the airborne interrogator.

2. Reload M4 Crypto.

IFFAI (OFP 18E)

If CRYPTO not lined out -

Unable to interrogate Mode 4 or cannot interrogate

2. Information:

any mode.

D IFF may be DEGD

D Unable to interrogate Mode 4

D Unable to solve ROE if M4 not removed

IFF OVRHT

• IFF overheat detected.

1. IFF - OFF (if practical)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 22)

V-12-24

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

NO ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

3. Airspeed - Increase until INLET TEMP is at

• Engine inlet icing conditions detected.

least +5°C (+10°C preferred) on ENG page (if

• INLET ICE caution comes on when 0.025 inch of

possible).

ice has accumulated on the ice detector located in

4. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

the left inlet.

prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX.

• DO NOT delay activating engine anti-ice.

5. Climb or descend out of icing danger zone

Any delay can result in ice accumulating rapidly

(> 25,000 feet, or below freezing level).

on IGVs and shedding into the engine when

When clear of icing conditions and caution

system is turned on.

removed -

• Ice accumulation on LEFs is similar to inlet lip

6. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

and can serve as an indication of how much ice

may be on the inlet.

ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

• As little as 0.5 inch of ice ingested by the engine

3. Throttles - Reduce below 80% N₂ rpm (if

can result in compressor stalls and major FOD.

possible). Avoid throttle transients above 90%

INLET ICE

N₂ rpm.

WITH ICE CLEARLY VISIBLE ON LEFs

4. Airspeed - Maintain above 250 KCAS.

• Reduce throttle settings below 80% N₂ rpm while

5. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

descending below the freezing level to prevent ice

prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX.

shedding into the engine.

6. Avoid abrupt maneuvers and bank angles over

• Avoid throttle transients above 90% N₂ rpm,

20°.

abrupt maneuvers, and bank angles over 20° to

7. Descend below the freezing level.

prevent ice from detaching from the inlet lip.

For landing in icing conditions -

8. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

WITH NO ICE VISIBLE ON AIRCRAFT

(as required)

• Maintain INLET TEMP of at least +5° C (+10°

9. Reduce airspeed and lower the landing gear at

C preferred) to provide sufficient aerodynamic

the last possible moment (minimizes ice

heating to prevent ice accumulation on LEFs and

accumulation on the gear).

inlet lips.

If a missed approach is necessary -

10. Slowly advance throttles to the minimum power

required for a safe waveoff.

11. Raise landing gear and flaps as soon as

possible.

1. ATT switch - STBY

• HUD displayed aircraft attitude is supplied by

2. Verify HUD pitch ladder coincides with the

the standby attitude indicator.

standby attitude reference indicator.

INS ATT

3. Attempt an in-flight alignment.

W replaces O on the HUD.

If IFA unsuccessful -

GPS functions still operate.

4. Refer to HIAOA procedure.

GROUND

1. Secure and realign INS.

IN FLIGHT if INS information is incorrect -

• INS failure detected during periodic BIT.

1. ATT switch - STBY

INS DEGD

2. Verify HUD pitch ladder coincides with the

GPS function still operates.

standby attitude reference indicator.

ABLIM function may not be available.

3. Attempt an in-flight alignment.

If IFA unsuccessful -

4. Refer to HIAOA procedure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 23)

V-12-25

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

IN FLIGHT

1. Reduce airspeed to minimum practical.

• Boarding ladder unlocked.

2. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

LADDER

3. Consider shutting off left engine to prevent

May FOD left engine.

engine FOD.

4. Land as soon as practical.

• Mission Computer 1 failed.

LOTs 21-24 -

• The only cautions available are MC 1, HYD 1A,

HYD 1B, HYD 2A, HYD 2B, NO RATS,

and AUTO PILOT.

1. MC switch - CYCLE to 1 OFF then NORM

• GPS assisted velocity vector enhancement is

If caution remains -

disabled.

LOTs 21-24 -

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5g.

2. Use no more than ½ lateral stick with EFTs or

(G-LIM 7.5G caution is not displayed.)

• Roll limiting inoperative.

A/G stores on the wings.

• RATS inoperative.

3. Refer to G-LIM 7.5G and NO RATS proce-

• UFCD reverts to the top level CNI page.

dures.

• Autopilot is inoperative.

4. Land as soon as practical.

• FCS page not available.

MC 1

NOTE

LOTs 25 and up -

LOTs 21-24: Backup TOTAL fuel quantity value

2. Refer to G-LIM 7.5G procedures.

may reset to zero following MC1 power cycle. If fuel

3. Manually calculate lateral weight asymmetry to

quantity information is critical, MC1 power cycle is

determine AOA limit.

not recommended, or note fuel state and burn prior

to MC1 cycle.

4. Land as soon as practical.

All aircraft -

LOT 25 and up -

• All cautions are available except: AIR DATA,

If in RVSM airspace -

GPS DEGD, HOME FUEL, MC CONFIG, OCS,

5. Notify ATC that the aircraft is no longer

and S/W CONFIG.

RVSM compliant.

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5g and sets G−LIM 7.5G

caution.

• Autopilot is inoperative.

• LDDI inoperative.

• Flaps AUTO AOA warning tone inoperative.

1. MC switch - CYCLE to 2 OFF then NORM

• Mission Computer 2 failed.

If caution remains -

LOTs 21-24 -

With MC2 failed:

2. Use no more than ½ lateral stick with EFTs or

• All cautions are available.

A/G stores on the wings.

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5g and sets G−LIM 7.5G

3. Refer to G-LIM 7.5G procedures.

caution.

• Roll limiting inoperative.

4. Land as soon as practical.

• UFCD reverts to the top level CNI page.

LOT 25 and up -

MC 2

LOT 25 and up -

2. Refer to G-LIM 7.5G procedures.

• All cautions are available except: AIR DATA,

3. Manually calculate lateral weight asymmetry to

GPS DEGD, HOME FUEL, MC CONFIG, OCS,

and S/W CONFIG.

determine AOA limit.

• G-limiter defaults to 7.5g and sets G−LIM 7.5G

4. Land as soon as practical.

caution.

All aircraft -

• Autopilot is inoperative.

If in RVSM airspace -

• RDDI inoperative.

• Flaps AUTO AOA warning tone inoperative.

5. Notify ATC that the aircraft is no longer

RVSM compliant.

MC CONFIG

• OFP loaded into either MC is incorrect.

1. Do not takeoff.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 24)

V-12-26

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• MIDS overheat condition.

If an overheat occurs, the MIDS will secure itself in

30 seconds unless MIDS O/H OVRD is boxed.

1. TCN - OFF

MIDS OVRHT

2. D/L, BCN, ILS - OFF

If TCN or D/L turned back on, expect MIDS O/H

3. MIDS page - Verify MIDS page deactivates

caution to return until MIDS page activates. If

MIDS O/H then remains, MIDS is still in an over-

heat condition.

LOTs 21-22 -

1. Verify MU is installed and seated properly.

If caution remains -

2. Do not takeoff.

LOT 23 and up -

• AMU/mission card problem.

1. Verify mission/maintenance cards installed in

MU LOAD

proper AMU slot and AMU door is closed.

Caution is disabled in flight.

2. If accompanied by a MNTCD or MSNCD

advisory, refer to MNTCD or MSNCD

procedures.

3. If not accompanied by a MNTCD or MSNCD

advisory, do not takeoff.

GROUND

1. INS knob - OFF then realign (GND, CV, or

IFA)

IN FLIGHT

• Indicates functional failures of the INS, GPS,

NAV FAIL

1. Use standby instruments for altitude/airspeed/

and air data functions.

vertical velocity.

2. Attempt an in-flight alignment.

If in RVSM airspace -

3. Notify ATC that the aircraft is no longer

RVSM compliant.

GPS operating and POS/AINS selected -

• Aided INS and air data function horizontal

velocities disagree.

GPS operating and POS/INS selected -

1. Crosscheck velocity vector.

NAV HVEL

• INS, GPS, or air data function horizontal

2. Crosscheck horizontal velocities on HSI/DATA/

velocities disagree.

NAVCK page.

GPS failed or inoperative -

• INS and air data function horizontal velocities

disagree. May be caused by high wind velocity.

INS declared invalid -

• GPS and air data function vertical velocities

disagree.

1. Crosscheck HUD velocity vector, HUD digital

GPS declared valid -

vertical velocity, and standby rate-of-climb

NAV VVEL

• INS and GPS vertical velocities disagree.

indicator.

GPS declared invalid or ANAV installed and

2. If vertical velocities disagree, consider using

INS aided -

standby attitude for landing.

• INS and air data function vertical velocities

disagree.

NFLR OVRHT

• NAVFLIR overheat detected.

1. LST/NFLR switch - OFF (if practical)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 25)

V-12-27

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Carrier based -

1. SDC - RESET

2. Cycle gear and hook (if practical).

• RATS not available.

If caution remains -

3. Advise carrier of NO RATS condition.

One of the following input parameters

Ship should increase wind-over-deck (WOD).

missing/invalid: longitudinal acceleration, WonW,

If required WOD not available -

wheel speed, hook down position, THA.

4. Reduce gross weight to permit recovery with

NO RATS

available WOD.

When single engine, RATS is not available and the

If shipboard recovery not possible -

NO RATS caution should be expected.

5. Divert.

6. Execute shore based procedure.

Caution is displayed when the INS knob is OFF.

Shore based -

1. MSP codes - CHECK for 851

If set -

2. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

GROUND

1. Check oxygen system integrity:

• Mask integrity

• Hose connections

• OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger

unlocked and fully extended

• Oxygen concentration is below acceptable limits.

IN FLIGHT

• Disconnected oxygen hose.

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

• Removing oxygen mask without placing the OXY

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

FLOW knob to OFF.

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

• System gas leak (broken integrity).

cabin altitude.

4. Check oxygen system integrity:

• Mask integrity

OBOGS DEGD

• Hose connections

D Good flow does not equate to good oxygen

• OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger

(Cautions of any duration)

concentration. An OBOGS DEGD caution

unlocked and fully extended

indicates that the oxygen concentration is

If system integrity not compromised -

inadequate and hypoxia may result.

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

D Under less than optimum conditions (low

Once below 10,000 feet cabin altitude and

altitude, heavy breathing, loose fitting mask,

no hypoxic symptoms present -

etc.), as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen

7. Consider removing mask and resetting

may be available.

emergency oxygen system or resuming normal

OBOGS operation if flow appears normal and

donning of mask is desired.

8. Land as soon as practical.

If system integrity restored -

5. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

6. Reset emergency oxygen system.

• MC or SMS overlay halted due to run time.

OCS

1. Attempt to reload overlay.

Stores that require overlay may not be available.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 26)

V-12-28

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated ENG OIL TEMP high (149°C or

PREFLIGHT

above).

1. Throttle affected engine - ADVANCE ABOVE

• Designated AMAD OIL TEMP high (88°C or

74% rpm

above).

2. ENG page - Identify out of limit parameter

May be caused by: Engine malfunction, hot fuel at

If caution removed in 20 seconds -

low fuel states, over-serviced AMAD, AMAD/fuel

3. Continue mission, monitoring OIL TEMPs

heat exchanger failure, fuel recirculation system

until airborne.

failure, motive flow system failure, or with a

If caution remains longer than 20 seconds -

normally operating system during extended ground

3. Do not takeoff.

operations with OAT > 103°F.

4. Throttle affected engine - OFF (within 5

minutes)

IN FLIGHT

L OIL HOT

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

R OIL HOT

Prolonged operation of a hot AMAD may result in

If caution removed -

an engine bay fire.

2. Land as soon as practical.

If caution remains at IDLE -

• Parameter which triggered caution should be

2. ENG page - Identify out of limit parameter

highlighted in red on the ENG page.

If AMAD OIL TEMP hot -

• If OIL HOT caution caused by extended ground

3. GEN switch affected side - OFF

operations (OAT > 103°F), increasing affected

If caution remains and more than 5 minutes

engine rpm should clear the caution within 20

to landing -

seconds (normal operating system).

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Consider restarting for landing.

AMAD OIL TEMP HIGH

• Securing the GEN greatly reduces the head load

POSTFLIGHT

imparted to AMAD OIL and may prevent

If caution on for more than 5 minutes -

heat-related damage to the generator.

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

• Designated engine oil pressure out of limits.

If caution remains after 15 seconds -

L OIL PR

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R OIL PR

Zero oil pressure without the L/R OIL PR caution

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

indicates the oil pressure transmitter has failed and

procedure.

″Engine Left (Right),

the oil pressure switch is detecting oil pressure

If caution clears -

Engine Left (Right)″

greater than 35 psi. Flight may be continued.

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE or engine

L OVRSPD

response is abnormal -

R OVRSPD

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

• Designated fan or compressor rpm high.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

″Engine Left (Right),

procedure.

Engine Left (Right)″

If caution clears -

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 27)

V-12-29

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Parking brake still set when throttles are

GROUND

advanced over 27° THA with the INS on.

1. PARK BRK handle - RELEASE

IN FLIGHT

1. PARK BRK handle - CYCLE AND CHECK

PARK BRAKE

FULLY STOWED

Even if PARK BRAKE caution is extinguished in

Whether or not the caution clears -

flight, the possibility exists that the parking brake

2. Make a fly-in arrested landing with LSO

may still be engaged.

assistance (if available).

• Designated pitot tube, AOA probe, or AOA probe

cover heater malfunction.

1. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

L PITOT HT

After landing -

R PITOT HT

If displayed immediately after takeoff, the caution

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - AUTO

may also be an indication of a WonW proximity

switch failure on the corresponding side.

• INS velocities unreliable.

Position keeping supplied by the air data function.

POS/ADC is not as reliable a position keeping

1. Verify selected TCN information is loaded in

POS/ADC

source as the INS or GPS.

TCN Data Table on HSI/DATA/TCN page.

2. Position keeping - SELECT POS/TCN

Automatic position keeping reversion with a

hierarchy of AINS, INS, GPS, MIDS (if installed)

and FCC air data is provided in case of an INS

and/or GPS failure.

• A present position discrepancy exists between

INS position and GPS position.

1. Waypoint 0 - CHECK

POS ERROR

ANAV is preventing aided navigation because

2. Realign INS.

horizontal position is more than 20 nm different, or

vertical position is greater than 5,000 feet different.

• Air refueling probe not fully retracted with

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

PROBE UNLK

PROBE switch in RETRACT.

2. PROBE switch - CYCLE

1. Use no more than ½ lateral stick with tanks or

R-LIM OFF

• Roll rate limiting failed.

A/G stores on the wings.

• BRU-32 rack(s) failed to lock or unlock during

rack test.

GROUND

RACK UNCPL

1. Do not takeoff.

Store may not be jettisonable.

FIRE EXTGH

• Fire extinguisher bottle armed.

If FIRE light unintentionally pressed -

READY

1. Identify affected FIRE light.

FIRE light or APU FIRE light pressed.

2. FIRE light - RESET

Light

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 28)

V-12-30

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Ensure ground crew secure door prior to

• Ground refueling door not properly secured.

takeoff.

REFUEL DR

If caution remains -

Only activated with WonW.

2. Do not takeoff.

• Flight controls out of rig.

RIG

1. Do not takeoff.

Only activated with WonW.

• Software incompatible and/or engine FADEC

1. BIT/CONFIG page - Identify lined out system

software mismatched.

2. Turn on affected system if not already on.

S/W CONFIG

3. IBIT affected system.

Incompatible software is lined-out on the

If caution remains -

BIT/CONFIG page.

4. Do not takeoff.

• JAMMER switch OFF for greater than 10

seconds with decoy deployed. (H2E and up)

• Deployed decoy/towline failed (electrically or

mechanically) with AUTO RDPLY not selected

1. JAMMER switch - CHECK ON

and usable non-deployed decoy available.

If gear or hook lowered -

• Cable severing signal failed to fire the squib.

2. EW page CUT/VERIFY options - SELECT or

• Landing gear or hook lowered with decoy

JAMMER switch - CUT

deployed.

If decoy failure and ECM required -

2. Throttle dispenser switch - UP (auto-sever and

redeploy)

SEVER

If decoy failure and ECM not required -

2. EW page CUT/VERIFY options - SELECT or

JAMMER switch - CUT

Turning the JAMMER power switch to OFF

If caution remains -

with a decoy deployed (H1E and prior) will

prevent subsequent activation of the SEVER

3. JAMMER switch - CUT

caution under any of the conditions listed

4. Get a visual inspection (if possible).

above. Aircrew must ensure no decoy is

If caution still remains -

deployed prior to securing the JAMMER

5. Set 25° AOA with AB selected.

power switch.

Sever decoy in a clear area.

Once CUT/VERIFY is selected, the option

is removed from the display.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 29)

V-12-31

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Engine stall detected on designated side.

• Engine stalls result from conditions which exceed

and reduce the stall margin of the engine (high

AOA, steam or exhaust ingestion, engine/aircraft

damage, etc.)

• Engine stall indications:

- Audible bangs

- Airframe vibration

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

- Visible flames out the exhaust and/or inlet

If stall does not clear or L/R ENG VIB

• Self-recovering single pop or surge stalls DO NOT

L STALL

caution present -

result in L or R STALL caution unless engine

R STALL

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

limits are exceeded.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

• Hung stall or multiple pop stalls (three or more

″Engine Left (Right),

procedure.

in 5 seconds), will result in L or R STALL

Engine Left (Right)″

If stall clears -

caution with following indications:

2. Check engine response at a safe altitude.

- Lack of throttle response

3. Land as soon as practical.

- Increasing EGT

- Steady or decreasing rpm (rpm that continues

to decrease may result in L or R FLAMEOUT

caution)

NOTE

A L or R STALL caution caused by a hung

stall will time out after 5 seconds regardless of

whether the stall has actually cleared.

1. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO

• Internal fuel tank pressure low above 20,000 feet.

NORM

Possible fuel pump cavitation and engine flameout

If caution remains or reappears -

TK PRES LO

above 40,000 feet.

2. Do not exceed Mach 0.9 in dive.

High rates of descent may damage fuel cells.

3. Altitude - Maintain below 40,000 feet (if practi-

cal)

GROUND

• Internal fuel tanks pressurized with WonW.

1. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

2. Do not takeoff.

Catapult may cause structural damage.

TK PRES HI

IN FLIGHT

1. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO

• Internal fuel tank pressure high.

NORM

If caution remains or reappears -

Possible exceedance of tank structural limits.

2. Maintain +0.2 to +2.5g.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 30)

V-12-32

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Designated engine thermal control valve (TCV)

has failed open. Fuel thermal management

system has lost capability to regulate fuel system

GROUND

temperatures.

1. Do not takeoff.

If a TCV fails open, hot feed fuel is recirculated

IN FLIGHT

back to the fuel tanks instead of being burned. May

1. ENG page - Monitor corresponding FEED

eventually lead to a corresponding FUEL HOT

L THERMAL

TANK TEMP, FUEL INLET TEMP, and

caution.

R THERMAL

FUEL NOZ TEMP

2. RADAR knob - OFF

Engine FUEL INLET TEMP high (≥121°C).

3. Land as soon as practical.

Engine FUEL NOZ TEMP high (≥177°C).

If either FUEL HOT caution comes on -

FEED TANK TEMP high.

4. Throttle (THERMAL caution side) - OFF

WoffW: ≥60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

5. Restart for landing.

WonW: ≥80°C for 15 sec (<5,000 lb fuel)

≥60°C for 10 min or >65°C for 15 sec

(>5,000 lb fuel)

1. BIT page - CHECK CSC BIT status

• Voice alert or master caution aural tone

VOICE/AUR

If CSC MUX fail -

inoperative.

2. Refer to CNI caution procedure.

If visible moisture not present -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - OFF

If visible moisture present (ice/rain) -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

(for a maximum of 5 minutes )

• Windshield temperature high or sensor failed.

If caution remains and switch OFF -

2. Throttles - Minimum practical

If caution remains with the switch in OFF, an ECS

3. Land as soon as practical.

valve failure may be directing hot air to the

If greater than 5 minutes to landing -

windshield. In this case, securing the ECS may be

4. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

the only means to stop windshield airflow.

5. OXY FLOW knob(s) − OFF

6. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

7. BLEED AIR knob − OFF (DO NOT CYCLE)

8. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

KCAS optimum).

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

9. ECS MODE switch − OFF/RAM

WDSHLD HOT

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as

10. AV COOL switch − EMERG

3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be available.

11. EXT TANKS switch(es) − STOP

12. Maintain altitude below 10,000 ft MSL prior to

emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 min-

utes).

Once below 10,000 feet MSL −

13. Consider removing mask and resetting

Do not operate the windshield anti-ice/rain removal

emergency oxygen.

system on a dry windshield. If a WDSHLD HOT

14. CABIN PRESS switch − RAM/DUMP

caution appears, place the WINDSHIELD switch to

15. OBOGS control switch − OFF

OFF immediately to prevent heat damage to the

If AV AIR HOT caution appears −

windshield.

16. Non−essential avionics equipment − OFF (e.g.,

RADAR, UFCD controlled avionics, ECM,

sensors, MC2)

17. Land as soon as possible.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 31)

V-12-33

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Either wing indicates unlocked (beer can up).

• Catapult with the WINGFOLD switch in FOLD

or HOLD.

• An electrical failure in the WING UNLK caution

circuitry.

The wings cannot be unlocked or folded in flight,

even if the WINGFOLD switch is placed to FOLD

IN FLIGHT

or HOLD. If a WING UNLK caution appears with

1. WINGFOLD switch - VERIFY SPREAD

the beer cans down, an electrical failure has

2. Wingfold unlock flag (Beer Cans) - CHECK

occurred in the caution circuitry and not in the

DOWN

wing unlock circuitry. If the WINGFOLD switch is

inadvertently placed to HOLD or FOLD in flight,

If wings inadvertently unlocked/folded on

the wings unlock and the ailerons fair when the

aircraft transitions to WonW during landing. In

catapult shot -

FOLD, the wings fold when the aircraft decelerates

1. Do not change WINGFOLD switch position.

below 66 KCAS during landing rollout.

2. Climb to a safe altitude.

3. WINGFOLD switch - SPREAD

WING UNLK

If the wings are partially folded -

4. Unload the aircraft to reduce aerodynamic

forces.

Ensure the WINGFOLD switch is lever-locked in

the SPREAD position during takeoff checks. If the

FOR LANDING

wings are commanded to unlock or fold during a

If both beer cans down -

catapult shot, the wings unlock, the ailerons fair,

5. Make a normal landing.

the wings may fold partially, and the aircraft will

If both beer cans are up -

settle.

5. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

6. Make sure NWS HI not engaged.

If the wings are unlocked during landing rollout,

ensure the NWS button is not pressed and full-time

NWS HI is not engaged. In NWS HI, rudder pedal

inputs command significantly greater nosewheel

deflections and may result in a loss of directional

control.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 32)

V-12-34

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Cease maneuvering.

2. FCS page - SELECT and identify failure

If AOA Xd in all four channels -

3. Execute AOA Four Channel failure procedure.

INITIAL FCS/FCES CAUTION

All other failures -

PROCEDURES

3. FCS RESET button - PUSH

If in RVSM airspace and BALT inhibited -

• An FCS/FCES related failure has occurred.

4. Notify ATC that the aircraft is no longer

•

FCS page Xs and/or BLIN codes identify the

RVSM compliant.

location and type of failure.

If no reset and no more than single X in any

- BLIN codes may be the only indication of a

FCS

row -

failure and should be treated with the same

5. Land as soon as practical.

Initial

initial level of concern as failures that also

If no reset and two or more Xs in any row -

produce Xs.

5. The following general restrictions apply:

• FCS RESET button

• AOA below 10° in flaps AUTO, on-speed in

- Clears the FCS caution whether or not the reset

flaps HALF/FULL

was successful.

• 2g maximum

- Successful reset indicated by RSET advisory

• Minimum sideslip

and removal of all Xs from the FCS page.

• Half lateral stick maximum

- Unsuccessful reset indicated by RSET.

6. Refer to the appropriate failure procedure:

• AHRS 1/2 Channel Failure

FCS

• AHRS Four Channel Failure

• Aileron Failure

FCES

• AOA Four Channel Failure

• FCS page Xs indicate respective FCS function

• P/R/Y CAS

Caution Light

has been shutdown. The FCS RESET button

• FCS Single Channel Failure

does NOT fix a detected failure, but merely

• FC AIR DAT

″Flight Controls,

allows the components to be restored and

• FCES Caution Light

Flight Controls″

failure indications to be removed if the failure

• FLAPS OFF-LEF Failure

no longer exists.

• FLAPS OFF-TEF Failure

• Avoid multiple FCS reset attempts of a

• FLAP SCHED

recurring FCS failure to preclude the failure

• Rudder Failure

from occurring during a critical phase of flight

• Stab Failure

(e.g., during final approach to landing)

If no procedure applies -

7. Execute Controllability Check procedure (if

required).

8. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

9. Land as soon as practical.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 33)

V-12-35

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AHRS ONE OR TWO CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCCs have detected a failure of AHRS rate or

acceleration data in one or two channels.

For each failed channel, rate sensor failures will

occur in all three sensor axes (Xs in CAS P, CAS R,

LOT 22 and up (AHRS equipped aircraft) -

AHRS

and CAS Y) and acceleration sensor failures will

One or Two

occur in both sensor axes (Xs in N ACC and L

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

Channel Failure

ACC) simultaneously.

complete -

Loss of one or two AHRS channels will not affect

One channel AHRS failure -

flying qualities.

7. Land as soon as practical.

FCS

Loss of redundancy in rate and acceleration

Two channel AHRS failure -

information to the FCCs is the primary concern for

7. Descend below 25,000 feet.

FCES

a two channel failure. Although there is no

If degradation in flying qualities is

degradation in flying qualities, subsequent AHRS

present -

Caution Light

failures could lead to controllability problems if the

8. Refer to AHRS Four Channel Failure

two channel AHRS failure procedures are not

procedures.

Five Xs will appear for

followed.

each failed channel

If no degradation in flying qualities is

(CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y,

present -

N ACC, and L ACC)

It is possible that a third AHRS channel has failed

8. Land as soon as practical.

but is not detected. Flying qualities will be

degraded for this situation and will include poor

roll coordination for large lateral inputs, pitch

coupling, and sluggish pitch response. If flying

qualities are degraded, assume a four channel

failure has occurred, and refer to AHRS Four

Channel Failure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 34)

V-12-36

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AHRS FOUR CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCCs have detected a failure of AHRS rate or

acceleration data in three or four channels.

For each failed channel, rate sensor failures will

occur in all three sensor axes (Xs in CAS P, CAS R,

AHRS

and CAS Y) and acceleration sensor failures will

Four Channel

occur in both sensor axes (Xs in N ACC and L

Failure

ACC) simultaneously.

LOT 22 and up (AHRS equipped aircraft) -

It is possible to experience a three channel failure

PCAS

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

with only two channels Xd out. Flying qualities will

RCAS

complete -

be degraded for this situation.

YCAS

7. FLAP switch - AUTO

FCS

8. If above 25,000 feet, maintain >Mach 0.92 until

A detected loss of a third AHRS channel will result

in all four AHRS channels being Xd out. Three

descent below 25,000 feet is accomplished.

FCES

columns of Xs will not be displayed because the

9. Jettison unwanted stores, if required, to

FCCs cannot determine the good channel.

improve flying qualities.

Caution Light

10. Execute a straight-in on-speed approach with

Below 20,000 feet, flying qualities are best between

flaps in AUTO. Limit angle of bank to 20°.

190-210 KCAS. Pitch and directional damping will

11. If not positioned for landing by in-the-middle

″Flight Controls,

be very low and roll coordination will be weak.

to in-close, a wave off and go around should be

Flight Controls″

executed.

12. Make an arrested landing if available.

Five Xs will appear for

13. Avoid stabilator braking.

each failed channel

• With a four channel AHRS failure, the aircraft is

(CAS P, CAS R, CAS Y,

not controllable with the flaps in HALF or FULL.

N ACC, and L ACC).

At altitudes above 25,000 feet, loss of control will

occur below Mach 0.92. For loss of AHRS above

25,000 feet, maintain airspeed above Mach 0.92

while descending.

• Potential for lateral pilot induced oscillations

(PIO) exists when landing with a Y CAS failure.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 35)

V-12-37

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AILERON ACTUATOR FAILURE

Aileron Failure

• Aileron failures may be caused by an actuator

failure (mechanical or two channel failure) or by

a switching valve failing to switch to the backup

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures com-

circuit following a HYD circuit failure.

plete -

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

FCS

• Failed aileron surface driven to a faired position

7. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

by air loads and damped to prevent oscillations.

FCES

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For Flaps

For landing -

FULL approach speed will be increased by about

8. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

Caution Light

11 knots. Flaps HALF 17 knots.

• Avoid overcontrolling lateral stick inputs as it can

9. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

cause lateral PIO especially when approaching

10. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

touchdown.

″Flight Controls,

• Operating aileron continues to provide roll

Flight Controls″

control.

- Roll damping is noticeably less.

• FCCs have detected an excessive split between

the left and right AOA probes immediately after

takeoff.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF

1. Throttles - MIL (MAX if required)

2. Fly straight ahead.

With an AOA caution set, HUD displayed AOA

3. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with the

may be grossly in error and should not be utilized

waterline symbol.

to control aircraft flyaway.

When safely airborne -

AOA

4. FCS page - SELECT

• AOA caution can only be activated within 12

If FCS caution set and AOA Xd in all four

FCES

seconds after WoffW. With AOA caution set:

channels -

- During first 12 seconds, FCCs utilize a fixed

5. Execute the AOA Four Channel Failure proce-

Caution Light

gain (on−speed AOA) for pitch axis control, so

dure.

expected flying qualities should be fairly

If no AOA Xs present -

″Flight Controls,

nominal.

5. Continue mission. Split was transitory but in-

Flight Controls″

- Movement of FLAP switch does not change flap

dicative of a binding-probe condition. Monitor

scheduling (e.g. flaps stay down).

AOA for proper indications.

- After 12 seconds, caution is removed even if

failure remains.

For landing -

6. Execute the AOA Four Channel Failure proce-

• After 12 seconds, if failure remains, an FCS

dure.

caution is set along with Xs in all four AOA

channels.

- HUD displayed AOA value is the average of the

two split AOA probes.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 36)

V-12-38

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AOA FOUR CHANNEL FAILURE

• A persistent (>10 second) mismatch between the

left and right AOA probes has been detected

(15° in flaps AUTO or 5.5° to 15° in flaps

HALF/FULL depending on sideslip).

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

• Mismatch may be caused by a transient

condition; a stuck, binding, or damaged probe; or

complete -

a two-channel probe failure.

7. The following general restrictions apply:

• AOA below 10° in flaps AUTO, on-speed in

Autopilot inoperative.

flaps HALF/FULL

• 2g maximum

FLAPS AUTO

• minimum sideslip

• If the probe split clears, the AOA Xs are

• Half lateral stick maximum

automatically removed. The split/AOA Xs may

re-appear when/if the split conditions reoccur.

For landing -

• With an AOA failure, FCCs use the AOA

8. Slow below 180 KCAS at a safe altitude.

estimator for gain scheduling.

9. LDG GEAR handle - DN

• Flying qualities should be essentially normal

AOA Four Channel

10. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

provided aircrew avoid high AOAs.

Failure

11. GAIN switch - ORIDE (ATC is not available in

GAIN ORIDE.)

FLAPS HALF/FULL

12. FCS page - SELECT

• Rudder toe-in is disabled.

13. If possible, identify undamaged probe using

• FCCs use a fixed gain of 8.1°.

center (INS) AOA value, airspeed crosscheck,

• HUD AOA, E-bracket and AOA indexers can be

wingman or BLIN code 475.

restored by selecting GAIN ORIDE and boxing

FCS

the valid AOA probe on the FCS page.

D BLIN 475

- CH 1 & 4 - LEFT PROBE FAILED

FCES

- CH 2 & 3 - RIGHT PROBE FAILED

If undamaged probe identified -

Caution Light

14. Undamaged probe - SELECT (PB 16)

• If an AOA probe is stuck or damaged (IFR

15. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

basket impact, bird strikes, probe icing), AOA

″Flight Controls,

16. Notify LSO that GAIN ORIDE and a single

errors may be unannunciated if the AOA split

Flight Controls″

thresholds are not exceeded.

probe has been selected.

• Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed

17. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

require positive aft stick during rotation; 1/2 aft

18. Maintenance action required prior to next

stick is recommended. Deflections of less than

flight.

1/2 aft stick will result in excessive settle during

If undamaged probe NOT identified -

bolters.

14. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

15. Determine on-speed for intended landing GW.

16. If on-speed AOA and airspeed do not cross-

check, fly airspeed to touchdown.

17. Notify LSO that GAIN ORIDE has been se-

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily

increase above 14° when decelerating from a

lected and AOA indications may be in error.

trimmed on-speed condition. Timely longitudinal

18. Maintenance action required prior to next

stick inputs will be required to prevent excessive

flight.

sink rates and correct a deceleration as power

alone will not change the AOA or pitch attitude

sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE. Alpha tone is

disabled in GAIN ORIDE with flaps

HALF/FULL.

• Auto throttle control (ATC) failed.

• GAIN ORIDE selected with ATC approach mode

ATC FAIL

1. Control throttles manually.

engaged.

2. Avoid flight above 700 KCAS or Mach 1.8.

• Bank angle >70° in HALF or FULL flaps.

FCES

If GAIN ORIDE selected with ATC

approach mode engaged -

ATC capability not available. Supersonic engine

Caution Light

1. FCS RESET button - PUSH

thrust limiting (SETLIM) and ABLIM may be

disabled.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 37)

V-12-39

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

P CAS

LOT 22 and up (AHRS equipped aircraft) -

Refer to AHRS Four Channel Failure

R CAS

procedures.

• FCS degraded in its ability to measure rates or

Y CAS

acceleration in either pitch (P), roll (R), or yaw

LOT 21 -

(Y) axis, as indicated.

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

FCS

complete -

P CAS

FCES

7. Make smooth longitudinal inputs only.

Potential for lateral PIO exists when landing with a

R CAS

Caution Light

Y CAS failure.

7. Limit pedal inputs to half throw.

Y CAS

″Flight Controls,

7. Make smooth lateral inputs only.

Flight Controls″

8. Limit pedal inputs to half throw.

FCS SINGLE CHANNEL FAILURE

• FCC channel failure.

No change in flying qualities.

Speedbrake function inoperative.

FCS Single

Channel 2 or Channel 4:

Channel Failure

• ATC inoperative.

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

• Normal NWS inoperative.

complete -

Channel 2 also:

7. Circuit breaker failed channel - PULL, pause

• Loss of HUD baro altitude and IFF reporting

20 seconds, RESET

FCS

(standby altitude and RALT still available).

8. Land as soon as practical.

• MAD sensor data lost. (Mag heading may

With CH 2 or CH 4 failed -

FCES

degrade).

9. Consider a precautionary arrested landing (if

available). (Normal NWS is not available.)

Channel 4 also:

Caution Light

• AOA indexer/approach lights inoperative.

Pulling the wrong circuit breaker shuts down a

second flight control channel and may result in

degraded flying qualities or loss of control.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 38)

V-12-40

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Caution indicates one of the following:

D Left and right pitot-static probes are reporting in the valid range

but disagree.

D Pitot-static failure (both pitot probes invalid, PTS inoperable or

an excessive split between left and right readings).

Caution is also accompanied by four channel PTS X-out.

FCCs use the highest total pressure input if valid.

D Wheels Warning also set if caution resulted from a loss of air

data.

D With loss of static pressure, HUD altitude and vertical velocity

are blanked.

D With loss of total pressure, HUD Mach and airspeed are blanked.

- Altitude appears with an X to the right (e.g., value is

uncorrected).

WITH GAIN ORIDE SELECTED

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

D FCCs use fixed values for speed, altitude, and AOA depending on

flap position causing LEFs, TEFs, and AIL droop to be driven to

complete -

fixed positions.

7. Assess airspeed indications.

If HUD airspeed and standby airspeed

Flaps

Mach KTAS Feet

°AOA

AUTO

0.80

459

39,000

3.5

indicators agree −

HALF

0.23

151

500

8.1

8. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

FULL

0.21

139

500

8.1

If airspeed blanked or does not agree

with standby indicator -

D FLAPS light comes on along with:

- CRUIS advisory in flaps AUTO

8. Establish 4° to 5° AOA (DO NOT EX-

FC AIR DAT

- LAND advisory in flaps HALF/FULL

CEED 10° AOA).

D Noticeable transients may occur when selecting GAIN ORIDE.

Once below 350 KCAS/above 4° AOA

FCS

D Longitudinal and lateral response is more sluggish as airspeed is

in wings-level flight -

reduced below the gain values and is more sensitive as airspeed is

increased above the gain values.

9. GAIN switch - ORIDE

D Do not lower flaps in a turn as higher than normal aft stick

FCES

forces are required and side-slip excursions may occur.

For landing -

D Avoid over-control and resulting PIO during flap transition.

1. Airspeed - Below 180 KCAS (approxi-

Caution Light

mately 6° to 7° AOA).

In wings-level flight -

2. LDG GEAR handle - DN

D With an FC AIR DAT caution, HUD displayed airspeed may be

in error. Fly an on-speed AOA approach (GAIN ORIDE

3. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

selected).

4. DO NOT EXCEED 190 KCAS or 10°

D Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed, require positive

AOA.

aft stick during rotation; 1/2 aft stick is recommended.

5. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

Deflections of less than 1/2 aft stick will result in excessive

settle during bolters.

6. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

D AOA warning tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE with flaps

(ATC is not available in GAIN ORIDE.)

HALF/FULL.

• Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of 350 KCAS

(flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS (flaps HALF), or 190 KCAS (flaps

FULL) may result in an uncontrollable aircraft.

D In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14°

when decelerating from a trimmed on- speed condition. Timely

longitudinal stick inputs will be required to prevent excessive

sink rates and correct a deceleration as power alone will not

change the AOA or pitch attitude sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE.

D If left pitot probe is damaged or suspect, standby instruments

including standby airspeed indicator may be significantly

erroneous. In all cases where airspeed are suspect, reference AOA

values to approximate airspeed for selection of GAIN ORIDE,

landing configuration, and approach to landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 39)

V-12-41

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

When FCS/FCES Initial procedures

complete -

• If MC1 is inoperative, the FCES caution light is

the only indication of a FCES failure.

7. Airspeed - Maintain below 250 KCAS

8. Attempt to identify the malfunction.

The FCS page is not available.

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

If failure not identified and DDI warnings

FCES

and FCS cautions still inoperative -

Caution Light

Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of

For landing -

350 KCAS (flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS (flaps

10. Slow below 180 KCAS at a safe altitude.

(With MC1

HALF), or 190 KCAS (flaps FULL) may result in

11. LDG GEAR handle - DN

Inoperative)

an uncontrollable aircraft.

12. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

13. GAIN switch - ORIDE (if required)

If the FCES light remains on after an FCS RESET

14. FCS page - SELECT VALID AOA PROBE (if

attempt, an actuator is still failed or one of the fol-

required)

lowing cautions did not reset: AOA, ATC FAIL; P,

15. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

R or Y CAS; FC AIR DAT, FCS, FLAP SCHED,

16. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown. (ATC is not

FLAPS OFF, HYD 5000, or NWS.

available in GAIN ORIDE.)

17. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

required).

• FCC A over-temperature detected.

• AHRS over-temperature detected.

FCS HOT

• FCCs can only operate for a short time without

cooling.

FCS HOT

• Placing AV COOL switch to EMERG provides

1. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to 325

emergency ram air cooling to FCC A and right

KCAS optimum for cooling).

Caution Light

TR.

2. AV COOL switch - EMERG

• If airspeed above 325 KCAS required, delay de-

3. Land as soon as possible.

ploying FCS ram air scoop, as ram air tempera-

″Flight Computer Hot,

ture may actually increase FCC heating and de-

Flight Computer Hot″

crease operating time.

• Once deployed, the FCS ram air scoop cannot be

closed in flight.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 40)

V-12-42

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

CORRECTIVE

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

ACTION

LEF FAILURE

• LEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or two channel failure)

or by a switching valve failing to switch to the backup circuit following a HYD circuit

failure.

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

• Failed LEF surface is mechanically locked in its current position.

- Opposite LEF held frozen by FCCs except for differential control in flaps AUTO.

• In most cases, LEFs should be fairly symmetric; however, multiple FCS reset attempts

may aggravate the asymmetry.

• With a LEF locked near 21° LED (± 5°):

When FCS/FCES Ini-

- Flaps HALF/FULL handling qualities essentially normal.

tial procedures com-

- If locked above this position, stall margin reduced.

• With LEF locked near 0° LED (± 5°):

plete -

- Light to moderate buffet levels persist for AOAs above on−speed (Buffet more

pronounced with LEF deflections significantly less than normal scheduled positions).

If failed in flaps

LEF

- Selecting flaps FULL not recommended due to higher buffet levels at lower AOAs

HALF/FULL and flaps

Failure

than with flaps HALF.

AUTO required -

ROLL AND LINE-UP CONTROL

7. Airspeed - 180 KCAS

• Expect slight roll-off (1-3°) due to buffet and/or AOA/pitch attitude changes. Roll off

8. LDG GEAR handle -

will not significantly degrade line-up control.

• A small roll-off will occur with airspeed changes during wave-off or bolter that is

easily controllable with small lateral stick inputs.

9. FLAP switch - AUTO

10. GAIN switch -

GLIDESLOPE CONTROL

ORIDE

FLAPS

• Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced depending on frozen LEF

When TEFs retract to

OFF

position. Wing stores will further degrade glideslope control.

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of descent

4° TED -

change is noticed. This may lead to a tendency to over control glideslope. Anticipatory

11. GAIN switch -

FCES

throttle inputs are key to glideslope control.

NORM

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a bolter/waveoff due to sluggish

Caution

throttle response. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter than normal.

• When operating shipboard, the waveoff window for all LEF failure conditions should

For landing -

Light

be moved farther out and the LSOs should be made aware of the degraded glideslope

12. Execute Flaps-HALF

performance.

Controllability Check

procedure, including

GAIN ORIDE CONSIDERATIONS

FLAPS AUTO

throttle response and

FLAPS

• GAIN ORIDE will drive the unfailed LEF to a fixed position of 5° LED in AUTO. If

waveoff maneuver.

the failed LEF is near 21°, this will cause a controllable but undesirable LEF split.

13. FLAP switch - HALF

Amber

Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF retraction is essential or if the LEFs are

14. Fly a straight-in ap-

fixed near 5° LED.

• If fuel or range is a concern, momentary selection of GAIN ORIDE brings the TEFs

proach (if practical).

up to 4° TED and then returns them to normal scheduling when NORM is selected.

15. Field - If buffet level

FLAPS HALF/FULL

is uncomfortable on-

″Flight Con-

• GAIN ORIDE will drive the unfailed LEF to a fixed position of 21° LED in

speed, fly a slightly

trols,

HALF/FULL. If the failed LEF is near 0° LED, this will cause a controllable LEF

split.

fast approach (6° to

Flight Con-

7° AOA) then slow to

trols″

on-speed AOA prior

to touchdown.

Carrier - Fly on-

• Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft stick during rotation;

1/2 aft stick is recommended. Deflections of less than 1/2 aft stick will result in

speed throughout ap-

excessive settle during bolters.

proach.

• Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of 350 KCAS (flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS

(flaps HALF), or 190 KCAS (flaps FULL) may result in an uncontrollable aircraft.

In GAIN ORIDE, AOA will tend to readily increase above 14° when decelerating from a

trimmed on-speed condition. Timely longitudinal stick inputs will be required to prevent

excessive sink rates and correct a deceleration as power alone will not change the AOA

or pitch attitude sufficiently in GAIN ORIDE. Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE

with flaps HALF/FULL.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 41)

V-12-43

ORIGINAL

A1-F18EA-NFM-000

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

TEF FAILURE

• TEF failures may be caused by an actuator failure (mechanical or three-four

channel failure) or by a dual HYD 1A/2B circuit failure.

Speedbrake function and autopilot inoperative.

• If a TEF actuator is shutdown, the surface is hydraulically or aerodynamically

driven to 5° TED and locked.

• If/when left versus right TEF asymmetry exceeds 6°, the opposite TEF turns

off and is also driven to 5° TED and locked.

• With both TEFs locked at 5° TED, drag is significantly reduced, approach

speeds are significantly higher, and on-speed power settings are near idle.

• A 10° AOA approach is required to attain acceptable approach throttle

response nearing touchdown.

TEF

• Approach speeds for shore landing may be near the maximum nose tire speed

Failure

(195 KGS). If making an arrested landing take maximum arresting gear

When FCS/FCES Initial

engagement speed into consideration.

procedures complete -

• Expect slower engine response to throttle changes.

FLAPS OFF

For landing -

• Flying a 10° AOA approach reduces approach speed and increases approach

7. Execute Controllability

power setting slightly.

FCES

Check procedure,

- Aircraft easily trims to and maintains 10° AOA. Expect normal flying

including throttle response

qualities.

Caution Light

and waveoff maneuver.

• Sight picture behind the ship is altered, but field of view over the nose is not

8. Adjust gross weight to the

degraded.

FLAPS

minimum practical.

• Due to large difference between wind over the deck requirements at on-speed

9. FLAP switch - FULL or

and 10° AOA, it is imperative that AOA be maintained at 10°.

Amber

HALF

- Tendency exists to relax AOA control while maintaining glideslope.

10. Fly a straight-in approach

(if practical).

GLIDESLOPE CONTROL

″Flight Con-

11. Trim to and fly 10° AOA to

• Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small in magnitude.

trols,

touchdown.

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of descent

Flight Con-

change is noted.

trols″

• Expect larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections to be required in

order to effect a glideslope change. Aggressive, well-timed, and anticipatory

throttle inputs are key to glideslope control.

• There is a tendency to over control power due to the low approach power

setting and the longer time required to effect a change.

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a bolter/waveoff due to

sluggish throttle response. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter than normal.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive

sink rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should

be kept as close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin

recommendations.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 42)

V-12-44

ORIGINAL

F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 24