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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
9.3.2.1
Tanker Safety Precautions.
1.
Do not extend the drogue when an ARS hydraulic leak is observed.
2.
Do not actuate the speed brake function during any part of the refueling operation.
3.
Single point failure of either the fuel/no air valve or ARS high level float sensor may result in fuel
discharge from the ARS vent during refueling as a receiver (ground or inflight). Inability to
transfer fuel from ARS to internal tanks, or failure to successfully complete pre-checks on ARS
prior to ground refueling (hot pit or truck), are indications of single point failures. If failures are
indicated, hot pit refueling and/or inflight refueling is prohibited.
NOTE
• When tanks 1 and 4 are empty, no more fuel can be transferred to the
ARS. With normal fuel transfer, this occurs at a normal aircraft fuel
state of 4,200 to 4,900 pounds.
• Anytime four external fuel tanks are loaded on wing stations (3, 4, 8,
and 9), selecting ORIDE on LI/RI external transfer switch will
improve dump performance and external transfer rate by commanding
simultaneous transfer of all external tanks vs. normal transfer
sequence (tanks on Stations 3/9 must be empty prior to tanks on
Stations 4/8 transferring). Performing this function imposes airspeed
limitations defined in Figure 4-12.
4.
Avoid use of barometric altitude hold in turbulent conditions or whenever receiver is having
difficulty achieving basket contact.
9.3.2.2
ARS Interior Checks -
1. PWR switch - OFF
2. STORE switch - OFF
3. HOSE switch - RETR
4. PWR switch - OFF
5. Fuel TRANS switch - OFF
6. Light switch - BRT (day), DIM (night)
7. REFUEL data display switch - DEL
8. HOSE CUT switch - SAFE/GUARD DOWN
NOTE
If the post guillotine shutdown relay in the tail section of the store has
not been reset following guillotine maintenance or actuation,
the
system will not operate.
9. EXT LT IDENT knob - Select appropriate strobe pattern
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
9.3.2.3
System Check - Prestart. Have the ground crew rotate the Ram Air Turbine (RAT)
counterclockwise, while facing aft, until the RAT blades are at full feather.
1. External electrical power - APPLY
a. EXT PWR switch - RESET
b. GND PWR switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 - B ON (hold for 3 seconds)
2. RAT unfeather test - PERFORM
a. ARS PWR switch - ON
b. STOW light and PRES light - CHECK ON
c. Make sure ground crew verify proper operation of RAT.
Prior to placing the ARS PWR switch to ON, make sure ground crew are
clear of the ARS as the RAT blades will move to the unfeather position
very rapidly.
3. BIT codes - CHECK
a. REFUEL DATA DISPLAY switch - BIT CODE
b. Refuel data display - CHECK (No codes should be present. If any codes are present, have
ground crew reset display).
4. BITE test - PERFORM
a. BITE TEST button - PRESS
b. ARS control panel lights - CHECK (All should illuminate for 10 seconds, then go out.)
c. Refuel data display - CHECK (Display counts from 00 to 500 in 25 pound increments, and then
returns to 00. If it indicates 0E, a serious malfunction has occurred and the ARS is down.)
d. Make sure ground crew verify proper operation of all tail cone lights.
5. ARS PWR switch - OFF (RAT remains unfeathered and control panel lights extinguish.)
9.3.2.4
System Check - Airborne.
1. HOSE switch - RETR
2. ARS PWR switch - ON (white STOW light illuminates)
3. BITE test - PERFORM
a. BITE TEST button - PRESS
b. ARS control panel lights - CHECK (All should illuminate for 10 seconds, then go out.)
c. Refuel data display - CHECK (Display counts from 00 to 500 in 25 pound increments, and then
returns to 00 if no faults detected. If 0E is displayed, it indicates a serious malfunction has
occurred and the ARS is down).
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
NOTE
• BITE check can only be performed with the hose stowed.
• Self-test of electronic and hydraulic systems takes approximately 90
seconds.
• If BITE is actuated with less than 300 gallons, or 200 pounds of fuel in
the store, invalid fault indications may result.
9.3.2.5
Drogue Extension.
1. LTDR switch - CHECK SAFE
• Permanent eye damage to the receiving aircrew can occur if laser is
armed and firing during aerial refueling, even when using ″eye safe″
mode.
• Do not attempt to extend the hose unless system self-test has been
successfully completed.
2. HOSE switch - RETR
3. PWR switch - ON (white STOW light illuminates)
NOTE
For the -4/-5 ARS stores, once powered on (220 KCAS min), airspeed
may be reduced to as slow as 180 KCAS to transfer fuel below 5,000 ft
MSL. Attempts to power on below 220 KCAS will be unsuccessful and
accelerating to 220 KCAS will not recover the RAT. Store power must
be turned off and airspeed increased to 220 KCAS or greater before
re-applying power.
4. Airspeed - Refer to ARS operating limitations, figure 4-13.
5. HOSE switch - EXT (White STOW light extinguishes; amber RDY light illuminates when drogue
reaches full trail. HOSE advisory appears on the DDI).
6. STORE switch - TO
7. Fuel TRANS switch - AUTO or OFF
9.3.2.6
Fuel Transfer. The amount of fuel to be transferred is automatically set at 2,500 pounds. To
change the scheduled amount, place the REFUEL switch to SCH, and the digital display shows the
amount scheduled. To increase or decrease the amount scheduled, hold the SLEW switch up or down,
respectively. When desired amount is shown on the digital display, release SLEW switch and return
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
REFUEL switch to DEL. When fuel is transferred with the TRANS switch in AUTO, the digital
display reads upward until the fuel transfer is automatically stopped at the scheduled amount.
Pressing the REFUEL RST button resets the digital display to zero and reschedules 2,500 pounds, or
the previously scheduled amount when the switch is in the DEL position.
The TRANS switch should always be in the AUTO position for normal
fuel transfer. The OVRD position is an emergency condition that
overrides normal system operation and provides fuel flow regardless of
hose position.
9.3.2.7
Receiver Hook-up and Refueling. Ater the receiver aircraft engages and moves forward into
the refueling range, the store amber RDY light extinguishes. Fuel transfer commences if the FUEL
TRANS switch is in the AUTO position. The green XFR light illuminates when the transfer rate is 20
gallons per minute or higher.
9.3.2.8
Stopping Fuel Transfer. The receiver aircraft receives fuel until one of the following occurs:
1. The IFR probe disengages.
2. The receiver aircraft moves out past the fueling range outer limit, approximately 5 feet from full
trail (the amber ready light comes on).
3. The receiver aircraft moves in past the refueling range inner limit, approximately 25 feet from full
trail (the amber ready light flashes).
• Refueling cannot be stopped by placing the PWR switch to OFF with
the hose extended.
• Lack of hydraulic pressure causes a loss of hose response resulting in
hose instability and a potential hose whip incident. If either the red
PRESS or LOW RESV light comes on, aerial refueling should be
terminated and the hose retracted.
Transfer of fuel to the aerial refueling store continues until one of the following occurs:
1. ARS TRANS switch is placed to OFF.
2. The BINGO caution comes on.
3. Tanks 1 and 4 are empty (with normal fuel transfer, this occurs at a fuel state of approximately
5,000 pounds of fuel). The FQTY advisory comes on.
9.3.2.9
Emergency Fuel Transfer. If problems are encountered in obtaining fuel transfer from the
store to the receiver aircraft, a system is provided that bypasses some normal switch functions to
provide fuel transfer. After the receiver is engaged in the coupling, turn the TRANS switch to OVRD.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
This switch provides power to open the shutoff valve and energize the priority valve to allow hydraulic
flow to the fuel pump motor, and bypasses the low level switch and the fuel flow range switches.
• The receiver aircraft should not attempt engagement when the switch
is in OVRD since there will be fuel pressure in the coupling that
increases the force required to make an engagement. The force will be
above that which provides adequate hose response and a damaging
hose whip may result.
• The TRANS switch should be moved from OVRD to OFF prior to the
receiver disconnecting. Fuel pressure in the coupling increases the
disconnect forces by 200 pounds above normal. Momentary fuel spray
may also occur.
NOTE
The TRANS switch should be taken out of the OVRD position if the
green XFR light on the ARS control panel extinguishes.
9.3.2.10 Drogue Retraction.
1. TRANS switch - OFF
2. Airspeed - Refer to ARS operating limitations, figure 4-13.
Field arrestment or carrier landing with the drogue extended is not
recommended. Guillotine (HOSE - CUT) drogue in clear or uninhabited
areas.
3. HOSE switch - RETR
4. When the white STOW light illuminates, and the HOSE advisory clears, PWR switch - OFF
9.3.2.11 Transfer Fuel from ARS to Tanker (Own Ship). If it is desired to transfer fuel from the
refueling store, do the following:
1. STORE switch - FROM
9.3.2.12 Before Landing.
1. STORE switch - OFF
2. HOSE switch - RETR
3. BIT codes - CHECK
a. REFUEL DATA DISPLAY switch - BIT CODE
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
b. Refuel data display - RECORD CODES
4. PWR switch - OFF
5. TRANS switch - OFF
9.3.3 ARS Jettison.
The ARS may be jettisoned in the same manner as other external stores.
9.3.4 ARS Limitations.
Refer to Chapter 4, Operating Limitations.
9.4 NIGHT VISION DEVICE (NVD) OPERATIONS
9.4.1 Effects on Vision. Flight techniques and visual cues used during unaided night flying also apply
to flying with night vision devices (NVD). The advantage of NVD is improved ground reference
provided through image intensifier systems (NVG/NAVFLIR). Dark adoption is unnecessary for the
effective viewing through night vision goggles (NVG). In fact, viewing through the NVG for a short
period of time shortens the normal dark adaptation period. After using NVG, an average individual
requires 1 to 3 minutes to reach the 30 minute dark adaptation level. Color discrimination is absent
when viewing the NVG image. The image is seen in a monochromatic green hue and is less distinct than
normal vision. Prolonged usage may result in visual illusions upon removal of the NVG. These illusions
include complement or green after-images when viewing contrasting objects. Illusions from NVG are
temporary and normal physiological phenomena and the length of time the effects last vary with the
individual.
• Aircrew are strongly cautioned against maneuvering above 3g with the
AN/AVS-9 in the up-locked (not in use but on helmet) position
because the NVD bracket cannot retain AN/AVS-9 under elevated
loads.
• Ejection wearing Night Vision Goggles is not recommended. Severe
neck injury may result.
9.4.2 Effects of Light. Any non-NVG compatible light source in the cockpit degrades the ability to
see with NVG. Filters are used to prevent stray or scattered light from reaching the NVG intensifiers,
which would cause the automatic gain control to reduce the NVG image intensification. Head down
displays (DDI, MPCD) are filtered to allow non-electrical-optical viewing of the display. Viewing areas
illuminated by artificial light sources with NVG (runway/landing lights, flares, or aircraft position
lights) limit the ability to see objects outside of the area.
NOTE
Bright ground lights may cause loss of ground references during
landing. Avoid looking directly at bright light sources to prevent
degrading NVG vision.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
The NAVFLIR is not affected by light sources and complements NVG use.
9.4.3 Weather Conditions. NAVFLIR and NVG provide a limited capability to see through visibility
restrictions such as fog, rain, haze, and certain types of smoke. As the density of the visibility
restrictions increases, a gradual reduction in light occurs. Use of an offset scanning technique will help
in alerting the pilot to severe weather conditions.
NOTE
Visibility restrictions produce a ‘‘halo’’ effect around artificial lights.
9.4.4 Object/Target Detection. Detection ranges are largely a function of atmospheric and environ-
mental conditions. Moving targets with contrasting backg1rounds or targets with a reflected or
generated light or heat sources can be identified at greater ranges when using NVD.
9.4.5 Flight Preparation. Flights with NVD require unique planning considerations that include
weather, moon phase/angle, illumination, ground terrain and shadowing effects. Tactical consideration
and procedures can be found in the Night Attack operational tactics guides (OTG).
9.5 SHORT AIRFIELD FOR TACTICAL SUPPORT (SATS) PROCEDURES
9.5.1 Landing Pattern. Approach the break point either individually or in echelon, parade formation,
at 250 KIAS. A 17 to 20 second break interval provides a 35 to 40 second touchdown interval. The
landing checklist should be completed and the aircraft should be at on-speed AOA/approach speed by
the 180° position.
9.5.2 Approach. Plan for and execute an on-speed approach. Pay particular attention to maintaining
the proper airspeed and correct lineup.
9.5.3 Waveoff. To execute a waveoff, immediately add full power and maintain optimum attitude.
Make all waveoffs straight ahead until clear of the landing area.
9.5.4 Arrested Landing. The aircraft should be on runway centerline at touchdown. Aircraft
alignment should be straight down the runway, with no drift. Upon touchdown, maintain the throttle
at the approach position. When arrestment is assured, retard the throttle to idle. Allow the aircraft to
roll back to permit the hook to disengage from the pendant. When directed by the taxi director, apply
both brakes to stop the rollback and raise the hook. If further rollback is directed, release brakes and
allow the aircraft to be pulled back until a brake signal is given. Apply brakes judiciously to prevent
the aircraft from tipping or rocking back.
Use extreme caution when taxiing on a wet SATS runway.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
9.5.5 Bolter. Bolters are easily accomplished. Simultaneously apply full power and retract the
arresting gear hook. Smoothly rotate the aircraft to a lift-off attitude and fly away.
• Bolters in GAIN ORIDE or with AOA failed require positive aft stick
during rotation, 1/2 aft stick is recommended. Deflections of less than
1/2 aft stick will result in excessive settle during bolters.
• If landing on a runway with a SATS catapult installed, care must be
taken to prevent engagement of the dolly arrester ropes with the
aircraft tailhook. Structural damage to the aircraft and catapult will
result.
9.6 HOT SEAT PROCEDURE
1. PARK BRK handle - SET
2. Paddle switch - PRESS (disengage NWS)
3. Left throttle - OFF
4. Throttle friction - MAX
5. Avionics - AS DESIRED
9.7 ALERT SCRAMBLE LAUNCH PROCEDURES
9.7.1 Setting the Alert. The alert/scramble aircraft shall be preflighted in accordance with NATOPS
normal procedures every 4 hours or as local directives dictate. The pre-alert turn shall consist of full
Plane Captain checks and full systems checks. Minimum requirements are:
1. Radar BIT status - GO
2. AIM-7 - TUNED (if loaded)
3. INS alignment status - OK
4. COMM 1 and 2 - SET TO LAUNCH FREQUENCY
5. Launch trim - SET ( IAW Catapult Trim Calculations, Chapter 8)
Before engine shutdown -
6. INS known - OFF (10 seconds before engine shutdown)
NOTE
Do not switch INS to NAV during pre-alert turn so that STD HDG
option will be available for next alignment.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
7. CRYPTO switch - HOLD THEN NORM
8. Sensors and weapon systems - ON
9. COMM 1 and 2 knobs - ON
10. EMCON - AS DESIRED
11. Exterior and interior lights - SET
12. DDIs, MPCD, and HUD - ON
13. OBOGS control switch and OXY FLOW knob - OFF
14. Landing gear pins - REMOVED and STOWED
After engine shutdown -
15. External electrical power -CONNECT (if applicable)
16. EXT PWR switch - RESET THEN NORM
17. GND PWR switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 - OFF
18. BATT switch - OFF
19. SINS cable - CONNECT (if required)
9.7.2 Alert Five Launch.
If on external power -
1. GND PWR switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 - B ON (hold 3 seconds)
2. INS known - CV/GND
3. INS - STD HDG (if available)
4. BATT switch - ON
5. APU switch - ON (READY light within 30 seconds)
6. R engine - START
7. L engine - START
8. FCS RESET button - PUSH (verify RSET advisory displayed)
9. OBOGS control switch and OXY FLOW knob - ON
10. External electrical power - DISCONNECT (if applicable)
11. SINS cable - DISCONNECT (if applicable)
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
12. INS knob - NAV, GYRO or IFA
13. T.O. checklist - COMPLETE
9.8 AIRBORNE HMD ACCURACY CHECKS
The procedures below shall be performed to verify JHMCS accuracy at any time system accuracy is
in question, including verifying the accuracy of the cockpit magnetic map. These procedures require an
airborne target.
If performing these procedures to determine if cockpit re-mapping is needed following maintenance,
only 9.8.2 Airborne HMD Accuracy Check with Radar is required. Cockpit re-mapping is not required
if 9.8.2 Airborne HMD Accuracy Check with Radar is successful.
9.8.3 Airborne HMD Accuracy Check with CATM/AIM-9X can be performed at the aircrew’s
discretion to verify accuracy in the high off-boresight field of regard.
NOTE
If preflight HMD Alignment occurred less than
15
minutes after
system powered on, repeat 9.8.1 HMD Alignment prior to any airborne
checks.
9.8.1 HMD Alignment.
(CVRS record HMD if desired)
1. SUPT/HMD/ALIGN page - SELECT
2. Superimpose the HMD alignment cross on the HUD/BRU alignment cross.
3. Cage/Uncage button - PRESS and HOLD until ALIGNING turns to ALIGN OK or ALIGN FAIL
If ALIGN FAIL -
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3.
If ALIGN OK and HMD alignment crosses are not coincident with HUD/BRU alignment cross -
4. Perform FINE ALIGN -
a. With FA DXDY displayed, use TDC to align azimuth and elevation HMD alignment crosses
with the HUD/BRU alignment cross.
b. Cage/Uncage button - PRESS and RELEASE
c. With FA DROLL displayed, use TDC to align the roll axis HMD alignment crosses with the
HUD/BRU alignment cross.
d. Cage/Uncage button - PRESS and RELEASE
If satisfied with alignment -
5. ALIGN - UNBOX
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9.8.2 Airborne HMD Accuracy Check with Radar.
1. Select STT while in trail of an airborne target.
2. Compare HMD TD Box to HUD TD Box and target’s actual position (when in HUD FOV) and
compare HMD TD Box and target’s actual position (when NOT in HUD FOV) at various
azimuth/elevation angles (up to 45° laterally left and right and 45° in elevation).
If HMD and HUD TD Boxes are not nearly coincident or portion of target is not located within
HMD and HUD TD Boxes -
3. Perform 9.8.1 HMD Alignment procedures.
4. Repeat steps 1 and 2.
If HMD Alignment does not correct -
5. Consider re-mapping the cockpit.
9.8.3 Airborne HMD Accuracy Check with CATM/AIM-9X.
1. No L&S track selected.
2. Select AIM-9X (manual mode).
• Verify AIM-9X symbology on HMD and AUTO not displayed below 9X at bottom of display.
• Verify AIM-9X slaved to HMD.
3. Perform the following steps at various azimuth/elevation angles throughout the AIM-9X field of
regard and outside the radar field of regard until aircrew are confident that the HMD and AIM-9X
are pointing properly:
a. Place aiming cross on the target.
b. Cage/Uncage button - PRESS to command AIM-9X to enter track
• Verify AIM-9X enters track on the target.
• Verify in-track seeker circle is within one 9X circle size of touching the target.
c. Cage/Uncage button - PRESS to slave AIM-9X to HMD
d. Set up next azimuth/elevation angle and repeat steps a through c.
If the in-track seeker circle is not within one 9X circle size of touching the target -
4. Perform 9.8.1 HMD Alignment procedures.
5. Repeat steps 1 through 3.
If HMD Alignment does not correct -
6. Consider re-mapping the cockpit.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
CHAPTER 10
Functional Checkflight Procedures
10.1 GENERAL
The intent of functional checks is to determine whether the airframe, power plant, accessories, and
equipment are functioning per predetermined standards. The unique electronic built-in test (BIT),
fault detection, and fault isolation capabilities of the F/A-18E/F allow functional checks that have
historically been performed inflight to be performed on the ground. In general, engine control and
flight control system faults are reliably detected, annunciated, and, in most cases, functionally
bypassed by the aircraft control systems.
In most cases, functional checks for the F/A-18E/F will be performed on the ground by maintenance
personnel based on the requirements set forth in the maintenance work package for the component
being removed, replaced, and/or installed and not by a pilot on a dedicated FCF. Required
maintenance ground checks take advantage of the aircraft’s BIT and fault detection capability and
ensure the health of the component and the integrity of the installation.
10.1.1 Engine Functional Checks. Based on the engine component replaced, ground functional test
requirements for the engine may include any or all of the following: idle speed test (low power turn);
air, oil, fuel leak test (leak check); anti-ice test; MIL power test; MIN AB test; MAX power test (high
power turn); transient test; and/or shutdown test. For instance, a single engine removal/reinstallation,
a single engine replacement, or a dual engine removal/reinstallation requires a low power turn and a
leak check. A dual engine replacement requires a low power turn, leak check, and high power turn. A
FADEC replacement requires ALL functional checks. Additionally, a crossbleed start is required on all
engine reinstallations and replacements. Given the FADEC’s fault detection capability, successfully
completing these functional checks ensures that the engine is properly installed and is functioning
normally. All engine functionality that would be checked inflight is checked during the required
ground checks. Dedicated FCFs are, therefore, not required following engine related maintenance
actions.
10.1.2 Flight Control System Functional Checks. Functional test requirements for the aircraft FCS
include electronic rigging, an FCS maintenance BIT, and a test group (TG) for the specific actuator or
surface which was reinstalled or replaced. The FCS maintenance BIT requires operator intervention
and is the most comprehensive test of the FCS. The FCS maintenance BIT also performs unique tests
to verify the proper installation of a system component. Successfully completing these functional
checks ensures that all surfaces and actuators are properly installed and the FCS is functioning
normally.
Generally, dedicated FCFs are not required following actuator/surface related maintenance actions.
An exception involves the replacement of a LEF hydraulic drive unit (HDU). It is possible for a weak
LEF HDU to pass ground checks yet fail to drive the LEF to the proper position when the surface is
subjected to air loads. A weak HDU may manifest itself by a LEF split, a FLAP SCHED caution,
and/or a possible roll off. Therefore, following the replacement of a LEF HDU, a series of inflight
functional checks are required to test the new component at flight conditions that safely detect weak
HDUs.
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10.1.3 Landing Gear Functional Checks. Ground functional test requirements for the landing gear
system include the following: aircraft jack, LDG GEAR handle mechanical stop and DOWNLOCK
ORIDE button test, landing gear warning light and warning tone test, normal landing gear extension
and retraction, planing link failure test, and emergency landing gear extension (front and rear cockpits
in the F/A-18F). Successfully completing these functional checks ensures that the normal and
emergency landing gear systems are functioning normally. While a dedicated FCF is not required
following landing gear related maintenance, an airborne functional check of the emergency landing
gear system may nonetheless be desired. An airborne functional check, coded E, has been included to
perform this test, at the discretion of the Maintenance Officer, on a ″pro and go″ (FCF combined with
but before operational flight) basis.
10.2 FCF REQUIREMENTS
Figure 10-1 lists the FCF requirements for the F/A-18E/F. Where appropriate, functional checks are
grouped by system and are coded with a letter, A thru E, to identify the type of FCF profile to be flown.
These letter codes appear next to each required item or groups of items in the FCF checklist.
COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 Series allows an FCF to be flown in combination with operational
flights at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, provided the operational portion is not conducted
until the FCF requirements have been completed and entered on the FCF checklist. Generally, a
profile ‘‘A’’ FCF is flown as a dedicated flight due to the number of required checks. However, due to
the limited number of required checks, profile ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘E’’ FCFs, as well as profile ‘‘D’’ FCFs required
solely by the reconfiguration of the rear cockpit, can be flown and are recommended to be flown as ‘‘pro
and go’s.’’
10.3 FCF QUALIFICATIONS
Aircrew who perform FCFs shall be qualified per OPNAVINST 3710.7 and must be designated in
writing by the Squadron Commanding Officer. For a profile ‘‘A’’ FCF, the complete FCF checklist shall
be utilized. For a profile ‘‘C’’ or ‘‘E’’ FCF, a special, abbreviated FCF checklist has been created which
incorporates only those checks required for a ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘E’’ profile. Prior to flight, FCF aircrew must
familiarize themselves with the FCF checklists and the specific functional checks required for the given
profile.
Historically, FCF checklists have only included FCF checks. To reduce confusion and provide a more
coherent checklist, the FCF checks presented in this chapter have been interleaved into the normal
NATOPS checklist. Specific FCF requirements are, therefore, highlighted in italics in this chapter and
in the FCF checklist which is utilized inflight. Additionally, check-off blocks, provided on the FCF
checklist, appear next to those items required by the FCF and not next to non-FCF, normal procedure,
items.
The FCF checklist shall be properly completed and promptly returned to Maintenance Control at
the completion of the FCF.
10.4 FCF PROCEDURES
FCFs shall be conducted with the minimum crew necessary to ensure proper operation of all
required equipment. FCF aircrew shall be given a thorough preflight briefing, coordinated by
Maintenance Control and given by appropriate QA and work center personnel. The briefing shall
describe maintenance performed, the requirements for that particular flight, and the expected results.
FCFs shall be performed using the applicable FCF checklist. The procedures contained in the FCF
checklist are presented in a recommended order. While the order of these functional checks may be
altered as required, the sequence of steps listed for any procedure is mandatory.
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If an FCF profile cannot be completed on a single flight due to time, fuel, operating area restrictions,
or other limiting factors, it is permissible to complete the remaining checks on a subsequent flight. This
subsequent flight may be flown by a different pilot, provided there is a thorough passdown, either
verbal or written, between the pilots.
Profile
Type of Checks/Requirements
A
Complete FCF profile
• Completion of SDLM, to be conducted by the rework facility.
• Acceptance of a newly assigned aircraft or upon receipt of an aircraft returned
from SDLM.
• Return to flight status of an aircraft that has not flown in 30 or more days.
• At the discretion of the Maintenance Officer (e.g., return to flight status of an
aircraft that has been excessively cannibalized).
NOTE
In an F/A-18F (missionized configuration), an FCF qualified
rear cockpit crewmember is required unless the Maintenance
Officer determines that the maintenance actions performed
do not require one.
B
Engine/FADEC/fuel control
• Not required.
C
LEF Checks
• Removal/reinstallation or replacement of a LEF HDU.
D
Rear cockpit checks of an F/A-18F (trainer configuration only)
• Acceptance of a newly assigned aircraft or upon receipt of an aircraft returned
from SDLM.
• Reconfiguration from missionized to trainer configuration.
NOTE
Aft crewmember is required.
E
Emergency landing gear extension
• At the discretion of the Maintenance Officer (e.g., following extensive mainte-
nance on the landing gear system).
Figure 10-1. Functional Checkflight Requirements
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10.5 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE A
10.5.1 Plane Captain Brief.
1. Connect external power.
2. FCS ram air scoop check (manually restow)
3. REFUEL DR check
4. Normal engine starts
5. Alternate engine shutdowns
a. Fuel/air heat exchanger leak check
b. Switching valve checks
c. Crossbleed restarts
6. ECS ram air scoop check
7. Engine runups to check cautions
8.
4 down but only 3 up (launch bar down)
9. Probe light check
10. Tail light check
10.5.2 Preflight Checks.
1. Exterior Inspection - Perform IAW NATOPS
a. No loose or improperly installed panels.
b. External canopy switch - CHECK
• Canopy opens and closes smoothly.
• Returns to center (hold) position when released.
c. Boarding ladder operation - CHECK
• Ladder electrically deploys.
• Ladder extends, locks, unlocks, and stows correctly.
2. Interior Checks - Perform IAW NATOPS
a. No loose or improperly installed components (both cockpits).
b. Brake accumulator pressure gauge reads 2,600 psi minimum.
c. Canopy and windscreen: No distortion, blemishes, or cracks (both cockpits).
III-10-4
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
10.5.3 Pre-Start Checks.
1. BATT switch - ON
2. Battery gauge - CHECK
• Nominal: 23 to 24 vdc
• FCF minimum: 18 vdc
3. Caution Lights Panel - CHECK CABIN light on (if CPWS installed)
4. ICS - CHECK (F/A-18F)
Apply external electrical power -
5.
EXT PWR switch - RESET
6.
GND PWR switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 - B ON (hold for 3 seconds)
• Audibly verify avionics cooling fans are on.
7.
COMM 1 and 2 knobs - ON/VOLUME AS DESIRED (both cockpits)
8.
L(R) DDI, HUD, and MPCD knobs - ON (both cockpits)
a. Display IBIT - Select ALL
• Approximately 3 minutes required before TEST patterns displayed.
• No stuck pushtile indications (small circles).
• Push STOP when complete.
• All displays operative.
• Note DEGD indications if present.
b. All mode (day/night), brightness, and contrast controls for all cockpit displays - CHECK/SET
(both cockpits)
c. Display surfaces - CHECK (both cockpits)
• No burned phosphor spots on HUD or DDIs.
• No lineouts or burned liquid crystals on MPCD, UFCD, or EFD.
d. HUD symbology reject - CHECK
(1) Select REJ2
• Heading scale, command heading, heading caret, nav range (if displayed), bank angle, g,
and airspeed and altitude boxes are removed.
(2) Select NORM
e. HUD displayed radar altitude - CHECK
(1) UFCD/RALT - ON
(2) ALT switch - RDR
• HUD displays radar altitude and ″R″.
(3) ALT switch - BARO
• HUD displays barometric altitude.
III-10-5
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
f.
(AMCD) HUDBU advisory - NOT DISPLAYED
9. LT TEST switch - TEST (both cockpits)
• All warning and caution lights properly illuminate.
• Landing gear warning tone annunciates (front cockpit switch only).
a. AOA indexer brightness - CHECK AND SET
10. Seat adjustment - CHECK (both cockpits)
• Smooth through full range of travel.
• Do not hold switch against stops (no limit switches).
11. Rudder pedal adjustment - CHECK (both cockpits)
• Adjustment smooth through full range of travel.
a. SET PEDAL POSITION FULL FORWARD
D Cycle left and right pedal to check for binding.
b. SET PEDAL POSITION AS DESIRED FOR FLIGHT
• Locks securely when RUD PED ADJ lever released.
12. EXT and INTR lights - Check for proper operation to extent possible for ambient conditions (both
cockpits)
• Signal: Point 2 fingers at eyes.
13. FIRE warning test
a. FIRE test switch - TEST A (hold until all lights and aural warnings indicate test has been
successfully passed)
b. FIRE test switch - NORM (pause 7 seconds or cycle BATT switch for system reset)
c. FIRE test switch - TEST B (hold until all lights and aural warnings indicate test has been
successfully passed)
10.5.4 Engine Start Checks.
APU start -
1. APU ACC caution light - VERIFY OFF
2. APU switch - ON (READY light within 30 seconds)
3. ENG CRANK switch - R
4. Right throttle - IDLE
• RPM
10% minimum
• TEMP
871°C maximum transient
• OIL
10 psi within 30 seconds
5. Battery gauge - VERIFY 28 vdc
• Battery charger failed if ≤ 24 vdc.
III-10-6
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
6. EFD - CHECK
Ground idle -
• RPM
61% minimum
• TEMP
250° to 590°C
• FF
600 to 900 pph
• OIL
35 to 90 psi (warm oil)
• NOZ
77% to 83%
7. External electrical power - DISCONNECT
8. BLEED AIR knob - NORM
9. ENG CRANK switch - L
10. Left throttle - IDLE
• RPM
10% minimum
• TEMP
871°C maximum transient
• OIL
10 psi within 30 seconds
11. ENG CRANK switch - CHECK OFF
12. EFD - CHECK
10.5.5 Post-Start Checks.
1.
APU automatic shutdown - CHECK
• APU shutdown 1 minute after second generator online.
2.
WINDSHIELD ANTI ICE/RAIN removal - CHECK
a. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE
• Verify airflow along the canopy bow.
b. WINDSHIELD switch - RAIN
• Verify reduced airflow along the canopy bow.
c. WINDSHIELD switch - OFF
• Verify airflow is secured.
3.
Canopy operation (front cockpit) - CHECK
a. CANOPY switch - CLOSE (half way)
• Canopy stops when switch is released.
b. CANOPY switch - OPEN then release
• Switch returns to HOLD position.
• Canopy moves to full open position.
c.
(LOTs 26 and up) Repeat steps a-b for the aft canopy switch.
III-10-7
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
d. (LOTs 26 and up) Front CANOPY switch - CLOSE, aft CANOPY switch - OPEN -
• Canopy should go up.
e.
(LOTs 26 and up) Aft CANOPY switch - CLOSE, front CANOPY switch - OPEN -
• Canopy should go up. Position canopy as desired.
4. WINGFOLD switch - SPREAD
5. FCS RESET button - PUSH (verify RSET advisory displayed)
• No flight control surface Xs.
• No BLIN codes.
• No complete FCC channel failures.
After successful FCS reset -
6. GAIN ORIDE - CHECK
With flaps FULL -
a. GAIN switch - ORIDE
• LAND advisory displayed.
• Amber FLAPS light on.
b. FLAP switch - AUTO
• CRUIS advisory displayed.
• Amber FLAPS light on.
c. GAIN switch - NORM/GUARD DOWN
• Amber FLAPS light out.
7. FCC keep-alive circuitry - CHECK
a. FCS CH circuit breakers - PULL IN SEQUENCE
1,
2,
3, AND
4
b. Immediately reset in sequence 1, 2, 3, 4.
• Complete within 7 seconds for valid test.
• No FCC channel completely Xd out.
• No FCS surface Xs and no BLIN codes.
Steps 8 thru 12 are to be performed on both engines (RIGHT then LEFT).
8. Engine FIRE light shutdown - PERFORM
a. Throttle affected engine - IDLE
b. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH
• FIRE EXTGH READY light comes on.
When BOOST LO caution appears, but no longer than 5 seconds -
c. Throttle affected engine - IMMEDIATELY OFF
• Master caution light comes on, and tone sounds when BOOST LO caution appears.
III-10-8
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
d. BIT/STATUS MONITOR/FXFR page - SELECT ON RDDI
• X COOL line reads CL (closed).
• Affected ENG SO line reads CL.
• CROSS FD line reads CL.
• Affected REC first value reads 0 (i.e., 0,0).
• FADEC HOT caution may appear and is not a failure indication.
e. FIRE light affected engine - RESET
• X COOL line reads O (open).
• Affected ENG SO line reads O.
• CROSS FD line reads O.
• Affected engine REC first value reads non-zero (e.g., 13,0).
Discontinue FCF upon failure of any item listed under b, c, d, and e above.
With affected engine below 10% N2 rpm -
9. Fuel/air heat exchanger leak check - PERFORM
a. RBYP or LBYP option (affected side) - PUSH TO READ HX
• Signal: Pull tip of nose with thumb and index finger.
• No fuel leaking from the heat exchanger drains (forward lower inboard side of the inlet on the
affected side) (thumbs up from PC).
b. FXFR/RESET option - PUSH
• RBYP or LBYP option (affected side) reads BP.
10. Verify proper switching valve operation.
a. Note hydraulic pressure decay through 500 psi on the affected side.
b. Cycle lateral stick and rudder pedals and verify aileron and rudder surface movement.
c. If aileron, rudder, or LEF surfaces X, maintenance action is required.
11. GEN/electrical system checks - PERFORM
With affected GEN inoperative -
• Opposite GEN picks up all three busses.
• GEN TIE caution light out.
• All displays operative.
• No FCS Xs or channel failures.
a. BATT switch - OFF (opens bus tie)
• Busses are isolated on affected side.
• BATT SW and GEN TIE caution lights on.
With R GEN off -
• HUD and RDDI inoperative.
• LDDI, MPCD, and UFCD operative.
III-10-9
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
With L GEN off -
• HUD and RDDI operative.
• LDDI, MPCD, and UFCD inoperative.
b. BATT switch - ON
• BATT SW and GEN TIE caution lights out.
• All displays operative.
c. GEN switch opposite side - OFF (for at least 30 seconds)
• PMGs pickup essential bus.
• Battery gauge reads >24 vdc (26.5 vdc nominal).
• BATT SW caution light out.
d. GEN switch opposite side - NORM
• No complete FCC channel failures on FCS page.
• ENGINE LEFT/RIGHT voice alert and BLIN code 260 can be expected and are normal in the
conduct of this check.
12. Inoperative engine - CROSSBLEED START
Advance operating engine to a minimum of 80% rpm.
13. Repeat steps 8 thru 12 for the left engine.
• Restart left engine within 15 minutes, else motor for
1
minute at
29% rpm or greater before
restart (to preclude engine damage).
14. GEN TIE operation - CHECK
a. GEN TIE switch - RESET
• GEN TIE caution light on.
b. GEN TIE switch - NORM/GUARD DOWN
• GEN TIE caution light out.
15. WYPT 0 and MVAR - CHECK/SET
16. GPWS/TAWS - CHECK BOXED
17. INS knob - CV OR GND (PARK BRK SET)
18. RADAR knob - OPR
19. FLIR and LST/FLR switches - AS DESIRED
20. UFCD avionics - TURN ON
a. RALT - ON/SET
b. TCN - ON, T/R, CH SET
c. IFF - ON/MODES UNBOXED
21. MPCD/UFCD - ENTER DESIRED WAYPOINTS
III-10-10
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
22. Fuel system checks - PERFORM
On the RDDI -
a. SDC/sensor operation - CHECK
(1) SUPT/BIT/STATUS MONITOR page - SELECT
(2) SDC BIT option - SELECT
• SDC BIT status indicates GO.
(3) FXFR page - SELECT
• Do not take off with flashing parameters.
(4) FQTY page - SELECT
• Do not take off with flashing parameters.
On the LDDI -
b. Fuel quantity/cautions/advisories - CHECK
(1) SUPT/FUEL page - SELECT
• No fuel cautions or advisories displayed.
• No CG DEGD, EST, INV, INVALID, or INVALID TIMER.
• BINGO, TOTAL, and INTERNAL fuel quantities agree with EFD.
(2) FLBIT option - SELECT
• On RDDI, TK2FL indicates GO within 2 seconds.
• On RDDI, TK3FL indicates GO within 13 seconds.
• FUEL LO caution and voice alert activated within 13 seconds.
• FUEL LO caution removed 60 seconds after displayed.
(3) SDC RESET option - SELECT
• CAUT DEGD caution displayed for 3 seconds.
On the EFD -
c. BINGO caution - CHECK
(1) BINGO - SET 200 lb above INTERNAL fuel
• BINGO caution and voice alert activated.
(2) BINGO - SET 200 lb below INTERNAL fuel
• BINGO caution removed.
(3) BINGO - SET AS DESIRED
23. Hydraulic pressure gauge - CHECK (2,600 to 3,300 psi)
24. ECS system checks - PERFORM
a. DEFOG - CHECK
III-10-11
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
(1) DEFOG handle - LOW
• Minimum defog airflow and maximum cabin airflow.
(2) DEFOG handle - HIGH
• Progressively decreasing cabin airflow and increasing defog flow.
b. ECS modes - CHECK
• Signal: Punch open palm with fist.
(1) ECS MODE switch - OFF/RAM
• Cabin airflow stops.
• Cabin ram air scoop opens (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light on.
• MASTER CAUTION light on and tone sounds.
(2) ECS MODE switch - AUTO
• Cabin airflow resumes.
• Cabin ram air scoop closes (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light out.
c. CABIN TEMP knob - ROTATE BETWEEN COLD AND HOT
• Air temperature changes to agree with setting.
d. Cabin Pressurization - CHECK
(1) CABIN PRESS switch - DUMP
• Cabin depressurizes.
• Cabin airflow remains.
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light on.
• MASTER CAUTION light on and tone sounds.
(2) CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP
• Cabin remains depressurized.
• Cabin airflow stops.
• Cabin ram air scoop opens (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light on.
(3) CABIN PRESS switch - NORM
• Cabin pressurizes.
• Cabin airflow resumes.
• Cabin ram air scoop closes (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light out.
25. ENG ANTI ICE system - CHECK
a. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON
• LHEAT and RHEAT advisories displayed.
III-10-12
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
b. ENG ANTI ICE switch - TEST
• INLET ICE caution displayed when switch held.
26. BLEED AIR system - CHECK
a. Throttles - IDLE
b. BLEED AIR knob - CHECK EACH POSITION INDIVIDUALLY
(1)
R OFF
• R BLD OFF caution displayed.
• M ASTER CAUTION light on and tone sounds.
• Left engine TEMP increases 5° to 90°C.
(2)
MASTER CAUTION light - RESET
(3)
Pause 5 seconds to allow Master Caution tone to reset.
(4)
OFF
• L and R BLD OFF cautions displayed.
• M ASTER CAUTION light on and tone sounds.
• Cabin airflow stops.
• ECS auxiliary duct doors close (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light on.
(5)
L OFF
• R BLD OFF caution removed.
• Right engine TEMP increases 5° to 90°C.
• Cabin airflow resumes.
• ECS auxiliary duct doors open (thumbs up from PC).
If CPWS installed -
• CK ECS caution light out.
c. BLEED AIR knob - NORM
• L BLD OFF caution removed.
• M ASTER CAUTION light out.
d. FIRE test switch - TEST A (for at least 2 seconds)
• L and R BLEED warning lights on while switch held.
• Voice alert sequence initiated.
• L and R BLD OFF cautions displayed.
• Cabin airflow stops.
e. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO NORM
• L and R BLD OFF cautions removed.
• Cabin airflow resumes.
f. Repeat steps d and e for the TEST B position.
27. Mission computer operation - CHECK
III-10-13
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
LOTs 21-24:
a. SUPT MENU - SELECT ON LDDI
b. MC switch - 1 OFF
• MC1 and NO RATS cautions displayed.
• BIT, CHKLST, ENG, and ADI options removed from SUPT MENU.
• ACL option appears on HSI.
c. MC switch - NORM
• MC1 and NO RATS cautions removed.
• SUPT MENU options return.
d. TAC MENU - SELECT ON LDDI
e. MC switch - 2 OFF
• MC2 caution displayed.
• STORES option removed from TAC MENU.
f. MC switch - NORM
• MC2 caution removed.
• STORES option returns.
LOTs 25 and up:
a.
SUPT MENU - SELECT ON RDDI
b.
MC switch - 1 OFF
• MC1 caution displayed on MPCD.
• BIT and CHKLST options removed from SUPT MENU.
• (A/A Master mode) STORES option removed from TAC MENU.
• LDDI displays green square.
c.
MC switch - NORM
• MC1 caution removed.
• LDDI display returns.
• SUPT MENU option returns.
d.
TAC MENU - SELECT ON LDDI
e.
MC switch - 2 OFF
• MC2 caution displayed on MPDC.
• RDDI displays green square.
• BIT, FCS, and CHKLST options removed from the SUPT MENU.
• (A/A Master mode) STORES option removed from TAC MENU.
f.
MC switch - NORM
• MC2 caution removed.
• RDDI display returns.
• STORES option returns.
III-10-14
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
28. (LOT 25 and up) HUD backup operation - CHECK
a. MC switch - 1 OFF FOR 3 SECONDS
b. MC switch - 2 OFF
• Both DDIs display a green square followed by a flashing STANDBY.
• Backup HUD provided on MPCD and UFCD.
c. MC switch - NORM
10.5.6 Before Taxi Checks.
1. WINGFOLD system - CHECK
With wings spread and locked -
a. WINGFOLD switch - HOLD
• Ailerons fair and beer cans pop up.
• WING UNLK cautions displayed.
b. NWS button - PUSH (twice if required)
• Full-time NWS HI available.
c. WINGFOLD switch - FOLD
• Wingfold system and locking pins operate properly.
• Both ailerons Xd out.
d. WINGFOLD switch - SPREAD THEN HOLD
• Wings stop at intermediate position.
With NWS HI selected -
e. WINGFOLD switch - SPREAD
• Wings spread fully.
• Beer cans go down.
• WING UNLK caution removed.
• NWS HI reverts to NWS (low).
f. NWS - PADDLE OFF
2. Throttle position related cautions - CHECK
a. PARK BRK handle - SET
b. FLAP switch - AUTO
c. Stabilator trim - SET LESS THAN 3° NU
d. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle(s) - SAFE (both cockpits)
e. Throttles - ADVANCE TO MIL MOMENTARILY (Do not allow engine RPM to exceed
80%.)
• CK FLAPS and PARK BRK cautions displayed momentarily.
III-10-15
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
• CHECK TRIM and CHECK SEAT cautions displayed.
• CHECK SEAT caution does not clear until seat(s) armed for takeoff.
f. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED
• CHECK TRIM caution removed.
To the maximum extent possible, make sure wings are spread and locked prior to FCS
IBIT to make sure all aileron related tests are performed.
3.
FCS RESET button - PUSH (if required)
• RSET advisory displayed.
• If wings are folded, both ailerons Xd out.
4.
FCS IBIT - PERFORM
a. FCS BIT consent switch - HOLD UP THEN PRESS THE FCS OPTION
b. AOA warning tone - VERIFY ANNUNCIATION AT FCS IBIT COMPLETION
c. FCS A and FCS B BIT status - VERIFY GO (if wings not folded)
d. FCS display - VERIFY NO BLIN CODES
5.
Trim - CHECK
a. Trim - FULL LEFT and UP (ailerons, rudders, and stabs)
• Control surfaces respond correctly.
b. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED
c. Trim - FULL RIGHT and DOWN (ailerons, rudders, and stabs)
• Control surfaces respond correctly.
6.
T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED (stabilators 4° NU)
7.
Controls - CHECK (tolerance ±1°)
a. Control stick - CYCLE
(1) Full aft
- CHECK 24° NU STABILATOR (check left and right stabilators track
symmetrically within ±1° of each other)
(2) Full fwd
- CHECK 20° ND STABILATOR (check left and right stabilators track
symmetrically within ±1° of each other)
(3) Full L/R - CHECK 30° DIFFERENTIAL STABILATOR (21° with tanks or A/G stores on
any wing station)
- CHECK DIFFERENTIAL TEFs
b. FLAP switch - HALF
c. Rudder pedals - CYCLE RUDDERS 40° L/R
III-10-16
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
d. FLAP switch - FULL (carrier-based)
e. TRIM - SET FOR CATAPULT LAUNCH (carrier-based)
8.
Five Down Checks
a. PROBE, speedbrake, LAUNCH BAR switches and HOOK handle - CYCLE
• Spoilers extend to 60° ±3° and retract in 3 seconds.
• SPDBRK light on when spoilers not fully retracted.
• Hook extends within 2 seconds and retracts within 4 seconds.
• Probe extends and retracts within 6 seconds.
• Probe light is on with the probe extended (thumbs up from PC).
• Launch bar extends (leave extended).
• Green LBAR advisory light on.
b. AV COOL switch emergency cooling check
• AV COOL switch - EMERG (FCS ram air scoop deploys)
9.
Pitot and AOA heat check - PERFORM
a. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON
b. Make sure ground crew verify proper operation.
c. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - AUTO
10. CHECK TRIM caution - CHECK
With launch bar extended -
a. Stabilator trim - SET LESS THAN 6° NU
b. Throttles - Advance to MIL momentarily. Do not allow engine rpm to exceed
80%.
• CHECK TRIM caution displayed.
c. Stabilator trim - SET ABOVE 7° NU
• CHECK TRIM caution removed.
d. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED
e. LAUNCH BAR switch - RETRACT
11. CVRS - AS DESIRED (both cockpits)
12. Standby attitude reference indicator - UNCAGE AND ERECT (both cockpits)
13. Altimeter setting - SET (both cockpits)
• Altimeter setting displayed on HUD.
• HUD altitude displayed within ±30 feet of parking spot elevation.
• Standby altimeter within ±60 feet of parking spot elevation.
14. INS - CHECK
III-10-17
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
a. PARK BRK handle - CYCLE
• INS alignment time flashes when PARK BRK released.
• Stops flashing after PARK BRK reset.
• On ANAV equipped aircraft the alignment time does not flash when PARK BRK is released
unless the aircraft moves.
b. Alignment status - VERIFY COMPLETE
• QUAL ″OK″ displayed within 6 minutes.
c. GPS HERR/VERR - VERIFY WITHIN LIMITS
When clear of overhead obstructions for 6 to 12 minutes -
• HERR and VERR less than 100 feet (with keyed MAGR).
d. INS knob - NAV (to check unaided drift)
e. Verify HUD airspeed indicates less than 50 kts.
15. MUMI/ID - SELECT/ENTER DATE and FLT
16. Stores page - Verify proper store inventory and station status.
17. ZTOD/LTOD - BOX TO ENABLE HUD DISPLAY (if desired)
18. Weapons/sensors - ON/BIT CHECK (as required)
19. BIT page - NOTE DEGD/FAIL INDICATIONS
20. Standby attitude data - CHECK
a. ATT switch - STBY
• Velocity vector disappears.
• Pitch ladder referenced to the W .
• INS ATT caution displayed.
b. Standby attitude reference indicator - ERECT
• HUD pitch ladder moves/coincides with the standby attitude reference indicator.
c. ATT switch - AUTO
21. OBOGS system - CHECK
a. OBOGS control switch - ON
b. OXY FLOW knob - ON/MASK(S) (both cockpits)
• System provides oxygen on demand.
• No excessive backpressure.
c. OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger - PRESS AND HOLD (do not rotate)
• OBOGS DEGD caution displayed within 65 seconds.
III-10-18
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
• Release plunger.
• Caution removed within 30 seconds.
Inadvertent rotation of the OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger
while pressed can result in the locking of the plunger in a maintenance
position and may result in intermittent OBOGS DEGD cautions and lead
to hypoxia. Rotation of the BIT plunger disengages the locking
slot
allowing the plunger to extend and move freely when pushed.
d. OBOGS electronic BIT button - PRESS AND RELEASE
• OBOGS DEGD caution displayed and removed within 15 seconds.
e. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF (both cockpits)
• OBOGS flow stops.
22. Engine status/FADEC channel transfer - CHECK
a. ENG format - SELECT ON LDDI
• LEFT and RIGHT engine STATUS is NORM.
b. FADEC channel transfers - A TO B AND B TO A ON EACH ENGINE
• FADEC channels change with selection.
• No channel line-outs.
23. REFUEL DR caution - CHECK
• Signal: (refuel cap) twist hand with curled fingers.
• REFUEL DR caution displayed when PC opens door 8R.
• Caution removed when PC closes door 8R.
• PC manually restows scoop.
• Thumbs up from PC checks complete good.
10.5.7 Taxi Checks.
1. Canopy - EITHER FULL UP OR FULL DOWN FOR TAXI
2. Braking system - CHECK
a. Normal brakes - CHECK
• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.
b. ANTI SKID switch - OFF
• SKID advisory displayed.
• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.
c. ANTI SKID switch - ON
• SKID advisory clears.
d. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT (both cockpits - separately for LOTs
21-25, front
cockpit only for LOTs 26 and up)
III-10-19
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
• Handle latches securely in detent.
• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.
e. EMERG BRK handle - NORM
3. Nosewheel steering - CHECK IN HIGH MODE L/R
• NWS responds appropriately in NWS and NWS HI.
• NWS disengages when paddle switch pressed.
10.5.8 Shipboard Taxi/Takeoff Checks.
1. Canopy - CHECK CLEAR/CLOSED (canopy caution removed)
2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - ON/MASK(S) ON prior to tiedown removal
3. Checklist page
a. FUEL TYPE - VERIFY
b. ABLIM OPTION - BOX
4. ABLIM advisory - VERIFY DISPLAYED on appropriate DDI
5. PARK BRK handle - FULLY STOWED
6. T.O. checklist - COMPLETE from Bottom to Top
7. IFF - SQUAWK MODES /CODES as appropriate
8. Heading checks
• NOTE HSI heading matches BRC within ±3° .
• STBY magnetic compass within limits of compass card.
At catapult tension signal -
9. Engine run-ups - PERFORM (together)
a. Throttles both engines - IDLE to MIL
b. ENG page - CHECK ENGINES AT MIL
• N1 rpm
86 to 98%
• N2 rpm
88 to 100%
• EGT
720 to 932°C
• FF
11,000 pph maximum
• NOZ POS
0 to 45% open
• OIL PRESS
80 to 150 psi
• THRUST
100% minimum on CAT officer/deck lighting signal
10. Afterburners - SELECT
• Both nozzles open correctly.
• Feed tanks remain full during takeoff, climb, and immediately following climb.
III-10-20
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
10.5.9 Shorebased Takeoff Checks.
1.
Canopy - CHECK CLEAR/CLOSED, canopy caution removed
2.
OXY FLOW knob(s) - ON/MASK(S) ON
3.
Checklist page
a. FUEL TYPE - VERIFY
b. T.O. checklist - COMPLETE
4.
PARK BRK handle - FULLY STOWED in position and hold
5.
IFF - Squawk appropriate modes/codes
6.
Heading sources - CHECK after runway lineup -
• HSI heading within ±3° of known runway heading.
• STBY magnetic compass within limits of compass card.
7.
Engine run-ups - PERFORM (individually)
a. Throttles affected engines - IDLE to MIL
b. ENG page - CHECK ENGINE AT MIL
• N1 rpm
86 to 98%
• N2 rpm
88 to 100%
• EGT
720 to 932°C
• FF
11,000 pph maximum
• NOZ POS
0 to 45% open
• OIL PRESS
80 to 150 psi
• THRUST
100% minimum
c. Throttles affected engines - MIL to IDLE, pause 1 second, IDLE to MIL
• Engine responds with normal acceleration characteristics.
• No stall or stagnation.
d. Throttles affected engines - IDLE
e. Repeat steps a thru d for opposite engine.
When cleared for takeoff -
8. Afterburner Takeoff - Perform IAW Chapter 7.
• Both nozzles open correctly.
• Feed tanks remain full during takeoff, climb, and immediately following climb.
10.5.10 After Takeoff Checks.
When definitely airborne -
1. LDG GEAR handle - UP
• Gear retracts within 7 seconds.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
10.5.11 Medium Altitude Checks (above 10,000 feet).
Altitude blocks are suggested ONLY to provide a logical sequence for the FCF procedures. Deviations
from these block altitudes are acceptable unless specified.
1.
Cabin pressurization - CHECK (both cockpits)
Aircraft Altitude
Cabin Altitude
• <8,000 feet
Aircraft altitude (+0, -3,000 feet)
• 8,000 to 24,500 feet
8,000 feet (±500 feet)
2.
Fuel transfer - CHECK INTERNAL and EXTERNAL
3.
RALT - CHECK SET to 5,000 FEET
4.
COMM - CHECK (both cockpits)
• Comm switches function normally.
• Both radios operative in transmit and receive.
• Preset and manual frequency selection operative.
5.
Flight control damping - CHECK
a. Airspeed - Maintain 300 to 350 KCAS
b. Make small, abrupt pitch, roll, and yaw inputs.
• Aircraft response is appropriate.
• No oscillation tendencies noted.
6.
Air refueling probe - CHECK
• Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS.
a. PROBE switch - EXTEND
• Probe extends normally within 6 seconds.
b. PROBE switch - RETRACT
• Probe retracts normally within 6 seconds.
• No PROBE UNLK caution when retracted.
c. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD
• Probe extends normally within 6 seconds.
d. PROBE switch - RETRACT
• Probe retracts normally within 6 seconds.
• No PROBE UNLK caution when retracted.
7.
HOOK - CHECK
a. HOOK handle - DOWN
• HOOK light on while hook in transit.
• HOOK light out when hook fully extended.
b. HOOK handle - UP
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
8. Fuel dump - CHECK
a. BINGO - CHECK/SET just below internal fuel level
b. DUMP switch - ON
• Fuel dumps from both vertical tails.
c. BINGO - Run above internal fuel level
• DUMP switch returns to OFF automatically.
• Fuel dump stops.
9. ATC cruise mode - CHECK
• ATC advisory in HUD when selected.
• Throttles respond correctly.
• ATC holds calibrated airspeed when straight-and-level and during turns, climbs, and descents.
10. HUD symbology - CHECK (both cockpits)
In NAV master mode with WYPT or TCN boxed -
• The following indications are present - heading, airspeed, altitude, AOA, Mach number,
aircraft g, bank angle scale, velocity vector, flight path/pitch ladder, steering arrow (TCN),
and distance to WYPT or TCN.
• WYPT # displayed to right of distance when WYPT boxed.
• Three-letter identifier displayed to right of distance when TCN boxed.
• HUD and MPCD distance agree.
• HUD format available on DDI, MPCD, or UFCD (both cockpits).
11. HSI symbology - CHECK on MPCD
a. HDG/TK set switch - SLEW (both cockpits)
• Heading bug moves in correct direction.
• Digital display and bug setting agree.
b. CRS set switch - SLEW (both cockpits)
• Steering arrow rotates in correct direction.
• Digital display and steering arrow agree.
c. TCN bearing and range - CHECK
• Symbol displayed at appropriate position when compared to a waypoint or known landmark.
• Digital display and symbol agree.
12. Standby flight instruments - CHECK (both cockpits)
a. Standby rate of climb indicator
• Indicates ±100 fpm or less during level 1g flight.
• Pointer movement smooth during climbs/descents.
b. Standby attitude reference indicator
(1) Perform a 360° roll right and left.
• No gyro tumble.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
(2) Perform a loop.
• Gyro indications are smooth thru bullseye.
c. Standby airspeed indicator
• Agrees with HUD.
• Pointer movement is smooth during airspeed changes.
d. Standby altimeter
• Agrees with HUD (accept -100 to 400 feet of error since value is uncorrected by FCC air data
function).
• Pointer and drum movement is smooth and does not hang up during thousand-foot changes.
13. INS/GPS operation - CHECK
a. TCN update - PERFORM
• Proper update mechanization.
• Reject update.
b. DSG update - PERFORM
• Proper update mechanization.
• Reject update.
c. GPS HERR/VERR - CHECK
• Less than 100 feet inflight (with keyed MAGR).
14. ADF receivers (if installed) - CHECK
a. ADF - BOX on COMM 1 and COMM 2 sub-levels (individually)
• Bearing within ± 5° off the nose.
• Bearing within ± 20° off the wing tip.
15. IFF operation - CHECK
• ATC reports valid mode 3 and C.
If/when possible -
a. IFF MASTER switch - EMERG
• ATC reports valid emergency squawk (7700).
16. Radar/HOTAS functionality - CHECK (both cockpits)
a. A/A master mode - CHECK
b. A/G master mode - CHECK
10.5.12 10,000 Feet Checks.
With an asymmetric FLIR pod on station 5 or 7 -
• Expect a gradually increasing amount of pod-induced roll-off during the accel to
500
KCAS on the FCS
RIG check or to Mach 0.9 to Mach 0.93 on the LEF/HDU stall check.
• In this configuration, FCS rigging is considered acceptable if the 300 and 400 KCAS points are passed.
• If encountered on the LEF/HDU stall check, this ″gradual″ roll-off is not indicative of an HDU stall.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
1.
FCS RIG check - 10,000 feet
Only perform if -
• Aircraft symmetrically loaded. (Asymmetric FLIR pod on station 5 or 7 acceptable for 300 and
400 KCAS points only.)
• External/internal wing tank fuel asymmetry less than 300 pounds.
a. Autopilot mode - Disengage in 1g flight
b. T/O TRIM button - PUSH (4 seconds minimum)
• Do not re-trim laterally or directionally for duration of check.
c. Stabilize at each incremental airspeed. Release controls from wings-level and record the
direction of roll-off and angle-of-bank (AOB) at the end of 10 seconds.
d. 300 KCAS
e.
400 KCAS
f.
500 KCAS
g. Mach 0.92
• Perform the Mach 0.92 check only if the AOB was > 30° at 300, 400, or 500 KCAS.
NOTE
RIG Check fails if any AOB > 30° (> 3° per second); however, for
diagnostics purposes, complete all applicable roll-off checks.
2. LEF/HDU stall check - 10,000 feet
a. G-warm - PERFORM
• 4g for 90°.
• 6g for 90°.
• -1g pushover to check for cockpit foreign objects.
b. FCS page - CHECK
• G-LIM value not Xd out.
• No G LIM 7.5G caution.
c. Speed - Accelerate to Mach 0.9 to Mach 0.93
d. Roll to 90° AOB, retard the throttles to IDLE, and smoothly pull to g-limiter.
At 25° AOA -
e. Terminate the maneuver.
• No ″abrupt″ rolling tendency.
• No FLAP SCHED caution.
• No BLIN code 256 (channel identifies weak HDU).
3. HYD system check - 10,000 feet
• May be accomplished in conjunction with the FCS RIG accel and LEF/HDU decel.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
a. Stabilize at 350 to 375 KCAS (less than Mach 0.65).
• HYD pressure is 3,000 psi (+300/-400).
b. Accelerate toward 450 KCAS.
• HYD pressure increases to 5,000 psi (+400/-500) by 420 KCAS.
c. Decelerate towards 300 KCAS.
• HYD pressure returns to 3,000 psi (+300/-400) by 330 KCAS.
4.
Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM (front cockpit)
a. FLAP switch - HALF
b. Slow below 170 KCAS.
c. LG circuit breaker - PULL
• Rear cockpit landing gear UNSAFE light on.
d. LDG GEAR handle - DN
e. LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 90° CLOCKWISE then PULL TO DETENT
• LDG GEAR handle stays in detent.
• Gear extends within 30 seconds.
• APU ACCUM caution displayed.
f. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately
20
seconds)
With the LDG GEAR handle outboard (DN position) -
g. LDG GEAR handle - PUSH IN then ROTATE 90° CCW
Pause 5 seconds -
h. LG circuit breaker - RESET
5.
(LOTs 21-25) Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM (rear cockpit)
In front cockpit -
a. LDG GEAR handle - UP
b. FLAP switch - HALF
c. Slow below 170 KCAS.
In rear cockpit -
d. EMERG LDG GEAR handle - PULL TO DETENT
• Gear extends within 30 seconds.
• APU ACCUM caution displayed.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
In front cockpit -
e. LDG GEAR handle - DN
f. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately
20
seconds)
In rear cockpit -
g. EMERG LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 45° CLOCKWISE and PUSH FULL IN
6. AOA warning tone - CHECK
With gear down and flaps HALF -
a. Increase AOA toward 15°.
• AOA warning tone comes on at 14 ± 0.5°.
7. PA throttle transients - 10,000 feet (INDIVIDUALLY)
With gear down, flaps HALF, and at onspeed AOA -
a. Throttle affected engine - IDLE to MAX
• Afterburner lights within 8 seconds.
b. Throttle affected engine - MAX to IDLE, pause 3 seconds, IDLE to MAX
• Afterburner lights within 8 seconds.
• Engine responds smoothly with no stall, stagnation, or flameout.
c. Repeat steps a and b for opposite engine.
8. LDG GEAR handle - UP
9. Wheels warning - CHECK
a. Descend below 7,500 feet MSL.
b. Reduce airspeed below 175 KCAS.
c. Establish rate of descent greater than 250 fpm.
• Landing gear warning light flashes.
• Landing gear warning tone sounds.
10. FLAP switch - AUTO
10.5.13 High Altitude (above 30,000 feet).
1. Cabin pressurization - MONITOR
Above 24,500 feet MSL, cabin pressurization shall remain within 5
psi differential
of
actual
altitude. A rule of thumb is altitude x 0.4.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
Aircraft Altitude
Cabin Altitude
• Less than 30,000 feet
10,000 to 12,000 feet
• 40,000 feet
15,000 to 17,000 feet
2. Throttle transients - 35,000 ± 2,000 feet (INDIVIDUALLY)
a. ENG ANTI ICE switch - CHECK OFF
b. Airspeed - Maintain 200 to 220 KCAS
c. Throttle affected engine - IDLE to MAX
• Afterburner lights within 12 seconds.
d. Throttle affected engine - MAX to IDLE, pause 3 seconds, IDLE to MAX
• Afterburner lights within 12 seconds.
• Engine responds smoothly with no stall, stagnation, or flameout.
e. Repeat steps a thru d for opposite engine.
10.5.14 10,000 Feet to Landing.
1.
Fuel transfer - CHECK (throughout flight)
With external fuel available -
• External fuel transfers normally.
• Internal tanks fill/stay near full.
With external tanks empty -
• Tank 1 depletes to approximately 1,000 pounds prior to wing tanks depleting.
When wing tanks are empty -
• Tanks 1 and 4 fall in approximately ¼ ratio.
• No FUEL XFER caution.
With fuel in tanks 1 and 4 -
• Feed tanks stay at or near full (2,100 to 2,450 pounds).
2.
RALT operation - CHECK
During descent through 5,000 feet AGL -
• Low altitude warning correctly comes on.
• Radar altitude tracks correctly during descent.
• Verify flashing B changes to a solid R when passing through 5,000 feet AGL.
3.
TCN or WYPT course intercept - PERFORM
• Course deviation indicator in HUD corresponds with steering arrow on MPCD.
4.
ILS/ACLS operation - CHECK (if available)
• Proper ILS and/or ACLS indications.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
10.5.15 Landing Checks.
1. Landing checklist - COMPLETE
2. ATC approach mode - CHECK
• ATC advisories in HUD when selected.
• Throttles respond correctly.
• Holds onspeed AOA during turns and on approach.
10.5.16 After Landing Checks.
1. Anti-skid system - CHECK
Above 75 KGS on landing -
a. Brake pedals - Apply full brake pressure
• Anti-skid cycles smoothly.
• No left or right pulling tendencies.
When clear of active runway -
2. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handle(s) - SAFE (both cockpits)
3. EJECTION MODE handle - NORM (rear cockpit)
4. Landing gear handle mechanical stop - FULLY ENGAGED
5. FLAP switch - AUTO
6. T/O TRIM button - PRESS UNTIL TRIM ADVISORY DISPLAYED
7. Mask(s) - OFF (both cockpits)
8. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF (both cockpits)
9. OBOGS control switch - OFF
10. Canopy - EITHER FULL UP OR FULL DOWN FOR TAXI
10.5.17 Before Engine Shutdown Checks.
1. PARK BRK handle - SET
2. BIT display - RECORD DEGD/FAIL INDICATIONS
3. BIT/HYDRO-MECH page - VERIFY absence of FADEC fault codes
4. Radar maintenance (BOA) codes - RECORD IF PRESENT
5. RADAR knob - OFF
6. FCS display - RECORD BLIN CODES
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
7. EFD - RECORD MSP CODES
8. INS - PERFORM POST FLIGHT UPDATE
• Maximum error is 1.5 nm per hour of operating time.
9. INS knob - OFF
10. Standby attitude reference indicator - CAGE (both cockpits)
11. HMD switch - OFF
12. Sensors, avionics, and CVRS - OFF
13. EXT and INTR lights knobs - OFF (both cockpits)
14. Canopy - CHECK CLEAR/OPEN
15. QDC - DISCONNECTED AND STOWED
10.5.18 Engine Shutdown Checks.
1. Brake accumulator gauge - CONFIRM 3,000 PSI
2. Paddle switch - PRESS (disengage NWS)
3. Confirm 5 minute engine cool down.
4. OBOGS control switch - OFF
5. BLEED AIR knob - OFF
6. Throttle - OFF (alternate sides)
7. Verify proper switching valve operation.
After hydraulic pressure decays through 500 psi -
a. FLAP switch - FULL
b. If aileron, rudder, or LEF surfaces X and the Xs do not clear after one FCS reset attempt,
maintenance action is required.
c. If one FCS reset attempt was required to reset surfaces Xs, cycle FLAP switch to AUTO then
back to FULL. If Xs reappear, maintenance action is required.
8. FCS page - Verify no channel is completely Xd out.
9. COMM 1 and 2 knobs - OFF (both cockpits)
10. L (R) DDI, HUD, and MPCD knobs - OFF (both cockpits)
11. Other throttle - OFF
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
When amber FLAPS light illuminates -
12. BATT switch - LEAVE ON
• Battery gauge reads 23 to 24 vdc (nominal).
• Automatic battery cutoff operates at 2 minutes (1 minute on LOT 21 aircraft).
13. FCF Profile A - COMPLETE
10.6 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE C
1. Perform engine start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS.
10.6.1 10,000 Feet Checks.
With an asymmetric FLIR pod on station 5 or 7 -
• Expect a gradually increasing amount of pod-induced roll-off during the accel to 500 KCAS on the FCS
RIG check or to Mach 0.9 to Mach 0.93 on the LEF/HDU stall check.
• In this configuration, FCS rigging is considered acceptable if the 300 and 400 KCAS points are passed.
• If encountered on the LEF/HDU stall check, this ″gradual″ roll-off is not indicative of an HDU stall.
1. FCS RIG check - 10,000 feet
Only perform if -
• Aircraft symmetrically loaded. (Asymmetric FLIR pod on station 5 or 7 acceptable for 300 and
400 KCAS points only.)
• External/internal wing tank fuel asymmetry less than 300 pounds.
a. Autopilot mode - Disengage in 1g flight
b. T/O TRIM button - PUSH (4 seconds minimum)
• Do not re-trim laterally or directionally for duration of check.
c. Stabilize at each incremental airspeed. Release controls from wings-level and record the
direction of roll-off and angle-of-bank (AOB) at the end of 10 seconds.
d. 300 KCAS
e.
400 KCAS
f.
500 KCAS
g. Mach 0.92
• Perform the Mach 0.92 check only if the AOB was > 30° at 300, 400, or 500 KCAS.
NOTE
RIG check fails if any AOB > 30° (> 3° per second); however, for
diagnostics purposes, complete all applicable roll-off checks.
2. LEF/HDU stall check - 10,000 feet
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
a. G-warm - PERFORM
• 4g for 90°.
• 6g for 90°.
• -1g pushover to check for cockpit foreign objects.
b. FCS page - CHECK
• G-LIM value not Xd out.
• No G-LIM 7.5G caution.
c. Speed - Accelerate to Mach 0.9 to Mach 0.93
d. Roll to 90° AOB, retard throttles to IDLE, and smoothly pull to g-limiter.
At 25° AOA -
e. Terminate the maneuver.
• No ″abrupt″ rolling tendency.
• No FLAP SCHED caution.
• No BLIN code 256 (channel identifies weak HDU).
3. FCF Profile C - COMPLETE
10.7 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE D (REAR COCKPIT)
1. When a profile D is required solely by the reconfiguration of the rear cockpit, perform engine
start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS.
10.7.1 Preflight Checks.
1. UFCD adapter - VERIFY NOT INSTALLED
10.7.2 Before Taxi Checks.
1. Rudder pedal adjustment - CHECK
• Adjustment smooth through full range of travel.
a. SET PEDAL POSITION FULL FORWARD
D Cycle left and right pedal to check for binding.
b. SET PEDAL POSITION AS DESIRED FOR FLIGHT
• Locks securely when RUD PED ADJ lever released.
2. Stick and rudder pedals - CYCLE
• No binding through full travel.
3. Throttles - Advance to MIL momentarily. Do not allow engine rpm to exceed
80%.
• No binding or sticking through range of travel.
• No engine shutdowns when pulled to IDLE.
10.7.3 Taxi Checks.
1. Braking system - CHECK
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
a. Normal brakes - CHECK
• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.
b. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT
• Handle latches securely in detent.
• Nominal braking performance at taxi speed.
c. EMERG BRK handle - NORM
2. Nosewheel steering - CHECK IN HIGH MODE L/R
• NWS responds appropriately in NWS and NWS HI.
• NWS disengages when paddle switch pressed.
10.7.4 Medium Altitude Checks (above 10,000 feet).
1.
Flight control damping - CHECK
a. Airspeed - Maintain 300 to 350 KCAS
b. Make small, abrupt pitch, roll, and yaw inputs.
• Aircraft response is appropriate.
• No oscillation tendencies noted.
2.
Throttles - CYCLE INTO AB
• Nominal engine response to throttle position.
• Afterburners light off normally and cancel when MIL selected.
3.
COMM switch - CHECK
• Comm switch functions normally.
• Both radios operative in transmit and receive.
4.
Speedbrakes - CHECK
a. Speedbrake switch - HOLD AFT
• Speedbrake surfaces extend normally.
• SPD BRK light on when surfaces not fully retracted.
b. Speedbrake switch - RELEASE
• Speedbrake surfaces retract fully.
In front cockpit -
c. Speedbrake switch - HOLD AFT
• Speedbrake surfaces extend normally.
In rear cockpit -
d. Speedbrake switch - HOLD FWD
• Speedbrake surfaces retract (rear cockpit override).
e. Speedbrake switches - RELEASE
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
5. Radar/HOTAS functionality - CHECK
a. A/A master mode - CHECK
b. A/G master mode - CHECK
6. FCF Profile D COMPLETE
10.8 FCF CHECKLIST - PROFILE E
1. Perform engine start, taxi, and takeoff IAW NATOPS.
10.8.1 10,000 Feet Checks.
1.
Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM (front cockpit)
a. FLAP switch - HALF
b. Slow below 170 KCAS
c. LG circuit breaker - PULL
• Rear cockpit landing gear UNSAFE light on.
d. LDG GEAR handle - DN
e. LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 90° CLOCKWISE then PULL TO DETENT
• LDG GEAR handle stays in detent.
• Landing gear extends within 30 seconds.
• APU ACCUM caution displayed.
f. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately
20
seconds)
With the LDG GEAR handle outboard (DN position) -
g. LDG GEAR handle - PUSH IN then ROTATE 90° CCW
Pause 5 seconds -
h. LG circuit breaker - RESET
2.
(LOTs 21-25) Emergency landing gear extension - PERFORM (rear cockpit)
In front cockpit) -
a. LDG GEAR handle - UP
b. FLAP switch - HALF
c. Slow below 170 KCAS
In rear cockpit -
d. EMERG LDG GEAR handle - PULL TO DETENT
• Gear extends within 30 seconds.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
• APU ACCUM caution displayed.
In front cockpit -
e. LDG GEAR handle - DN
f. HYD ISOL switch - ORIDE (until APU ACCUM caution removed - approximately 20 seconds)
In rear cockpit -
g. EMERG LDG GEAR handle - ROTATE 45° CCW and PUSH FULL IN
In front cockpit -
3. LDG GEAR handle - UP
4. FCF Profile E - COMPLETE
III-10-35
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
PART IV
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
Chapter
11 - Flight Characteristics
65
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
CHAPTER 11
Flight Characteristics
11.1 HANDLING QUALITIES.
The F/A-18E/F flight control system (FCS) is designed to present handling qualities that provide
virtually carefree maneuvering of the aircraft throughout most of the flight envelope. As such, there are
some flight characteristics which are somewhat unique to the F/A-18E/F airplane. A thorough
understanding of these flight characteristics along with the details of the flight control system
described in Chapter 2 and the operating limitations detailed in Chapter 4, allows the pilot to safely
and effectively exploit the full capabilities of the airplane.
11.1.1 Flight Control Mode Effects on Handling Qualities. Handling qualities are dependent on
which mode the flight control system is operating. FCS mode is determined primarily by the FLAP
switch position: power approach (PA) mode with the FLAP switch in HALF or FULL or up/auto (UA)
mode with the FLAP switch in AUTO. However, if airspeed is above approximately 240 KCAS, the
flight controls switches to, or remains in, UA mode regardless of FLAP switch position. FCS control
laws are also designed to minimize transients when switching flight control modes.
11.1.2 Handling Qualities with Flaps HALF or FULL. The FCS employs full-time AOA and pitch rate
feedback with flaps HALF or FULL. Therefore, longitudinal trim is required to maintain constant
AOA and/or airspeed. Once trimmed to an AOA, the aircraft tends to remain at that AOA until
changed by longitudinal stick or trim. The stick force gradient with AOA is constant up to 12° AOA
and does not vary with aircraft gross weight or center of gravity. Above 12° AOA, increased AOA
feedback increases stick forces as an artificial stall warning cue. Handling qualities are excellent up to
the 14° AOA limit. Maximum AOA at full aft stick with flaps HALF or FULL is approximately 25°
AOA. However, due to degraded handling qualities and reduced departure resistance above 15° AOA,
particularly with abrupt inputs, flight at greater than 14° AOA with flaps HALF or FULL is
prohibited.
The FCS provides good lateral directional control of the aircraft. The rolling surface to rudder
interconnect (RSRI) function along with sideslip and sideslip rate feedback are used to coordinate
lateral inputs, reducing pilot workload by allowing feet-on-floor maneuvering for most situations.
11.1.2.1 Stalls with Flaps HALF or FULL. The aircraft does not exhibit a classic stall break with flaps
HALF or FULL and both configurations are very departure resistant up to the 14° AOA limit for
normal two-engine operation, even with symmetric and asymmetric store loadings (see Single Engine
Operation). Roll and yaw control remain positive up to the 14° AOA limit in either flap setting but is
better above 10° AOA with flaps HALF. With flaps FULL, a distinct longitudinal buffet is felt at or
above 11 to 12° AOA which serves as a stall warning cue. This buffet tends to be more pronounced at
heavier gross weights and with wing tank loadings but does not adversely affect climb performance or
handling qualities. Above the AOA limit, uncontrollable roll-offs are possible in either flap setting,
particularly with high lateral weight asymmetry store loadings. An intermittent warning tone will
sound beginning at 14° AOA with an increasing beep frequency as AOA increases up to full aft stick.
11.1.2.2 Takeoff and Landing. Low gain nosewheel steering (NWS) incorporates yaw rate feedback
to stabilize directional control during the takeoff and landing roll. Maintaining runway position
without NWS using differential braking alone may be difficult. Crosswinds have minimal effect on
IV-11-1
ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
takeoff characteristics and only a small amount of lateral stick into the wind is required to keep the
wings level during the takeoff roll. Nosewheel lift-off speeds are dependent on CG location and aircraft
gross weight. At nominal and forward CG locations, the airplane requires aft stick to effect rotation.
Premature aft stick application during the takeoff roll can result in early nosewheel lift-off and
potential over-rotation, particularly with aft CG.
• Pitch attitudes in excess of 10° during takeoff rotation may result in
ground contact between engine exhaust nozzles and/or stabilators.
• With combinations of heavy gross weight, forward CG, high density
altitudes and late takeoff rotation, ground speed can exceed the
maximum nose gear tire speed of 195 knots ground speed (see
NATOPS performance charts).
Additionally, landing gear speed limits can be easily exceeded during shallow climbs after takeoff
with MAX power.
With large lateral weight asymmetries, there is a slight tendency to yaw into the heavy wing during
the initial ground roll and again during the takeoff rotation. Otherwise, takeoff characteristics are very
similar to symmetric store loadings. Directional trim may be required after takeoff for balanced flight
with store asymmetries. A small lateral-directional transient may occur during configuration changes
from flaps HALF to AUTO or from flaps AUTO to HALF. The lateral transient occurs since TEFs are
deflected differentially for lateral control with flaps AUTO and the additional lateral control results in
an associated directional transient due to the rolling-surface-to-rudder interconnect.
Normal approach and landing characteristics are excellent; with good speed stability and solid
lateral-directional handling qualities. With crosswinds, a wings-level crabbed approach with removal of
half the crab angle just prior to touchdown minimizes deviations from runway heading and landing
gear side loads during landings. Touchdown in a full crab angle results in an uncomfortable roll
opposite the crab angle and upwind drift, requiring large rudder pedal inputs to align the aircraft with
the runway. Likewise, removing the crab angle entirely results in downwind drift and directional
transients after touchdown. A wing down, top rudder approach results in excessive bank angle and is
not recommended.
With flaps HALF or FULL, handling qualities with large lateral weight asymmetries are virtually
identical to those with symmetric loadings; however, landing with crosswinds from the heavy wing side
results in less roll away from the wind at touchdown. With large lateral asymmetries, the aircraft will
fly with the heavy wing forward. Upon landing the aircraft will yaw into the heavy wing as the aircraft
straightens to its ground track. Once airborne on a touch and go or bolter, the aircraft will yaw away
from the heavy wing as the aircraft trims to a heavy wing forward position. Regardless of wind
conditions, the aircraft tends to yaw away from the heavy wing during periods of heavy braking but the
yaw is easily countered with a small rudder pedal input.
11.1.3 Flaps AUTO Handling Qualities. The FCS control laws create handling qualities that are
slightly different from aircraft with conventional flight control systems. The most apparent charac-
teristics are the neutral speed stability at low AOA and the excellent maneuverability at high AOA.
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
Neutral speed stability occurs since the FCS automatically attempts to keep the aircraft in 1g, zero
pitch rate flight. This has the effect of eliminating the need for frequent longitudinal trim adjustments,
lowering pilot workload for most tasks; however, some tasks are made slightly more difficult. For
example, during large airspeed changes, the aircraft may initially appear to be slightly out of trim for
a few seconds until FCS re-establishes 1g flight. Since pitch trim biases the FCS away from 1g flight,
any pitch trim used during large airspeed changes must be removed within a few seconds of
establishing the new airspeed and only adds workload. Additionally, during climbs or dives, a small but
constant forward stick force is required to maintain a constant pitch attitude and load factor. Again,
if pitch trim is used to eliminate these stick forces, additional short trim inputs will be required to
re-establish
1g flight, further increasing pilot workload. Another task with a slightly increased
workload is the instrument penetration/approach where neutral speed stability may cause difficulty in
maintaining a desired airspeed.
The longitudinal handling qualities are excellent with good pitch rate and damping that combine to
allow very aggressive maneuvering. FCS control laws modify aircraft response to stick inputs, creating
the effect of changing stick forces to provide pilot cueing in maneuvering flight. Actual stick forces for
a given stick displacement do not change with flight condition. Full forward and aft stick requires a 20-
pound push and 37-pound pull, respectively. At high airspeeds, the FCS is a g-command system
requiring 3.5 pounds of stick force per g. At medium airspeeds, the FCS acts as a hybrid pitch rate and
g-command system. Pitch rate feedback is used to increase apparent stick force per g as a cue of
decaying airspeed and available load factor. At low airspeed, the FCS is primarily an AOA command
system using AOA feedback above 22° to provide increasing stick force with increasing AOA. The
maximum commanded AOA is approximately 45° to 50° at full aft stick. Combined with the capability
to command high AOA is the ability to generate high nose-down pitch rates with large forward stick to
rapidly reduce AOA, particularly below approximately
200 KCAS. This nose-down pitch rate
capability is further enhanced as airspeed decreases to 150 KCAS. When airspeed is below 150 KCAS
and longitudinal stick is pushed far forward (greater than 1.7 inches), up to full stabilator, maximum
rudder flare-out, and LEX spoiler are commanded to rapidly get the aircraft nose moving down. This
FCS feature was added to enable pilots to rapidly reduce AOA when at low airspeed and high AOA for
quick nose repositioning. To maintain departure resistance, the enhanced nose-down pitch rate
capability is reduced when lateral stick is deflected more than one inch.
The g-limiter function in the FCS limits commanded load factor under most flight conditions to the
symmetric load limit (NzREF) based on gross weight below 57,400 pounds gross weight. Above 57,400
pounds, NzREF is held constant at 5.5g even though the allowable load factor may be below NzREF
(refer to G-Limiter). Above 57,400 pounds gross weight, the g-limiter does not provide adequate over-g
protection and pilot action may be required to prevent an aircraft overstress.
Very abrupt full aft stick commands with aft CG conditions can beat the g-limiter and cause a
positive over-g (811 MSP code). Likewise, very abrupt pushes can result in a negative over-g (925 MSP
code). Care should be taken during all abrupt maneuvers. During rolling maneuvers, the g-limiter also
reduces commanded load factor to 80% of NzREF. This feature can also be defeated with abrupt
lateral stick inputs at elevated-g. Abrupt full lateral stick inputs at NzREF may result in an aircraft
overstress without setting an 811 or 925 over-g MSP code (see figure 4-7, Acceleration Limits - Basic
Aircraft, Note 2).
Another flight characteristic related to g-limiter performance occurs during very high bleed rate
turns where even with full aft stick, load factor may be slightly less than NzREF. This can happen when
the aircraft decelerates much faster than the FCS can position the stabilators to maintain NzREF.
Additionally, during elevated-g maneuvering at transonic flight conditions, the g-limiter unloads the
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A1-F18EA-NFM-000
aircraft (and N
zREF) by as much as 1.0 to 1.7g. This feature helps prevent an aircraft overstress that
could result from the classic aerodynamic phenomenon known as ‘‘transonic pitch-up’’ experienced
during elevated-g decelerations at transonic flight conditions.
At low angles of attack, the aircraft is extremely smooth with little sensation of changing airspeed
or Mach. However, at transonic flight conditions, the aircraft may exhibit a mild buffet, which is more
pronounced with empty wing pylons or interdiction loadings but is almost nonexistent with clean
wings. Buffet begins at approximately 0.88M, subsides by 0.95M, and presents a sensation much like
riding on a ″gravel road″. Airframe buffet is also noticeable in the cockpit while maneuvering at tactical
speeds between approximately 6° and 11° AOA. At low altitudes, this AOA range begins at
approximately 6g but at high altitude begins at 2g to 3g. Above this AOA range, the buffet sensation
at the cockpit subsides slightly but is still apparent in the airframe. Although this buffet at elevated-g
is present in all configurations, it is most apparent with empty wing pylons at transonic flight
conditions. Additionally, persistent but bounded wing rock or roll-off may occur at some flight
conditions if the maneuvers linger in the 8 to 13° AOA range. Gun tracking is still good in the presence
of buffet but workload is slightly increased. Formation flight in the buffet AOA region also exhibits a
slightly higher workload.
The speedbrake function provides very good deceleration capability at subsonic flight conditions.
Deploying the speedbrake function results in a small nose-up transient; a small nose-down transient
during retraction. These transients still allow the speedbrake function to be used comfortably during
formation flight. With speedbrake function fully deployed, the aircraft may feel sloppy in the yaw axis
during large rudder pedal inputs due to one rudder stalling. With lateral weight asymmetries, a small
sideforce may also be apparent when deploying the speedbrake function. At most supersonic flight
conditions up to Mach 1.5, the spoilers are the only active speedbrake surface due to limited
effectiveness of the other surfaces. Deceleration capability is still adequate with throttles at IDLE; with
one exception. When less than MIL thrust is selected above Mach 1.23, the engine fan speed lockup
feature (to prevent engine inlet instability) maintains MIL thrust levels, which has the side effect of
limiting deceleration capability until fan speed lockup deactivates at Mach 1.18.
Lateral-directional handling qualities are also excellent, particularly at high AOA. Roll rates and roll
damping combine to provide very agile roll control. The FCS attempts to maintain consistent roll
response throughout the 1g flight envelope. Additionally, rolling surface to rudder interconnects
coordinate lateral inputs, reducing pilot workload by allowing feet on the floor maneuvering under
most circumstances. Maximum roll rates are in the 200 to 225°/second range with clean wings and
approximately 130 to 150°/second with wing tanks and/or air-to-ground stores. Flight tests with wing
tank loadings demonstrated a very localized drop in maximum roll rate of approximately 50°/second
at Mach 0.92 to Mach 0.93, most notably at 20,000 feet. The FCS reduces maximum roll rate by 40 to
60°/second at high subsonic airspeeds and low altitudes (approximately Mach 0.90 below 10,000 ft),
due to structural load concerns. For additional structural loads concerns during negative-g rolls,
maximum roll rate capability is reduced to approximately 60 to 80°/second above approximately 550
KCAS.
The most obvious lateral-directional characteristic is the excellent maneuverability at high AOA as
a direct result of specific FCS high AOA control laws. At 25° AOA and above, rudder pedal deflections
no longer provide yaw control inputs but instead act entirely as a roll control (identical to lateral stick
input) by commanding aileron and differential stabilator with the RSRI commanding the required
rudder deflection for roll coordination. Rudder pedal inputs are summed with lateral stick inputs and
this combined input is limited to a value equal to a full lateral stick input. Therefore, applying pedal
opposite to lateral stick cancels lateral stick inputs proportional to the pedal input, i.e., full opposite
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
pedal cancels a full lateral stick command resulting in zero roll rate. Between 13° and 25° AOA, rudder
pedal deflections gradually change from pure yaw controllers to pure roll controllers. This method of
control provides enhanced departure resistance at high AOA.
Some traditional yaw control with rudder pedal is returned at low airspeed and high AOA only when
the pilot applies lateral stick and rudder in the same direction. This feature is effective only at
airspeeds below 225 KCAS and between 25° and 40° AOA. During flight tests, the most effective
pirouette initiation was found at approximately 200 KCAS and 35° AOA (18E-006 and subsequent).
Enabling this feature outside of these conditions would compromise departure resistance. When this
feature is enabled, the sum of lateral stick and rudder pedal command is no longer limited to a value
equal to a full lateral stick input. The excess roll command is fed to the directional axis to command
sideslip. For example, adding full rudder pedal with a full lateral stick input provides a maximum roll
and yaw command. Alternatively, adding lateral stick to an existing full rudder pedal input has the
same effect. The resulting aircraft motion is a highly controllable nose-high to nose-low reversal.
Small lateral trim variances may occur without significant changes in airspeed, AOA, or Mach
number. These variances result from small changes in internal or external wing tank fuel asymmetry
and may require more frequent lateral trim inputs. Lateral trim changes may also be required as flight
conditions change with asymmetric store loadings or if one or more flight control surfaces are slightly
out of rig. Additionally, small sideslip excursions (1 to 3°) are common during steep climbs and
descents, even with symmetric store loadings. These excursions are non-oscillatory in nature and are
controllable with minimal rudder pedal inputs.
In general, flying qualities are also very good with large lateral weight asymmetries. The aircraft
tends to roll toward the heavy wing at elevated g such as during a pull off target during an air-to-ground
attack; away from the heavy wing at negative g. In each case, the roll is easily countered with lateral
stick. Additionally, roll coordination may be slightly degraded with large lateral stick inputs and may
require rudder pedal to maintain balanced flight. At high AOA, the aircraft tends to yaw away from the
heavy wing. Yaw-off should be expected above 25° AOA. Opposite rudder pedal may be required to
maintain controlled flight.
11.1.4 FLIR Carriage Handling Qualities. Flight characteristics with a single ATFLIR or TFLIR pod
produce roll-off in the direction of the pod of up to 12°/second at transonic (Mach 0.90 to Mach 1.05)
Mach numbers. Above Mach 1.05, the roll-off becomes less and eventually reverses direction above
Mach 1.15. Above Mach 0.90, sizable lateral and directional trim settings are required when changing
Mach number, when greater than Mach 0.90, to reduce roll-off and large side forces. Additionally,
lateral inputs are required under elevated load factor in order to maintain the same roll attitude. This
roll-off phenomenon is dominated by the aerodynamic asymmetry, not the lateral weight asymmetry.
Carriage of the following reduces or eliminates the roll-off tendency. During flight test, empty
inboard SUU-79 pylons reduced the aerodynamic asymmetry by 50%. Carriage of symmetric pods
(ATFLIR or TFLIR on station 5 and NAVFLIR on station 7) effectively canceled the aerodynamic
asymmetry. A 480-gallon external fuel tank on the centerline also reduced the aerodynamic asymmetry
to nearly zero. The influence of an ARS was not flight tested but is expected to reduce the roll-off
tendency. Empty SUU-79 pylons on the midboard stations displayed a slight improvement. An
AIM-120 on the opposite fuselage station was ineffective in reducing the roll-off.
The magnitude of the roll-off at peak conditions (Mach 0.95) can be trimmed out, however, slight
variations in Mach require large variations in both lateral and directional trim settings to maintain
balanced flight. This additional pilot workload should be considered during low altitude flight where
mission crosscheck time is critical.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
During flight simulation, level bomb deliveries (using the ATFLIR for target identification and
refinement) were flown in a simulated night environment with no outside visual reference. Uncom-
manded roll-off appeared as a rotating FLIR image similar to what is displayed during over flight of
the designated target. It is possible that uncommanded aircraft bank angle changes, seen as a rotating
FLIR image through the sensor, may be confused with the rotating image that results from target over
flight.
Uncommanded roll-off during heads down sensor operation may result in
an unusual aircraft attitude, disorientation, altitude loss, and possible
CFIT.
11.1.5 5-Wet (4-EFT and ARS) Loading Handling Qualities. The 5-Wet tanker loading handling
characteristics are unique given the very high aircraft gross weight and considerable aerodynamic
influence (in particular, drag) of the external stores.
Ground handling qualities are excellent although higher throttle settings can be expected to initiate
aircraft movement. Additionally, heavy gross weights require noticeable long braking distances even
during routine taxi evolutions.
Throughout most of the 5-Wet envelope, aircraft handling characteristics are excellent. The heavy
gross weight and aerodynamic influence of the external fuel tanks result in a more sluggish aircraft
response to control inputs in all axes. This characteristic is the most noticeable during in-flight
refueling as a receiver. Control inputs during receiver tanking should be small and deliberate. High
frequency, ″last ditch″ inputs should be avoided. Larger throttle inputs are required to initiate aircraft
closure; however, the heavier aircraft weight requires considerable power reductions to arrest closure
rates. In-flight tanking engagements should target 2-3 KCAS closure (see NATOPS Flight Manual
Performance Data, A1-F18EA-NFM-200, Chapter 7, In-flight Refueling). As fuel is received, the
change in gross weight may be dramatic. The 5-wet loading has the largest fuel fraction (ratio of fuel
weight to total weight) of all loadings. As the total aircraft weight increases, the power required for level
flight will increase. When operating at high gross weights (>64,000 lb) and slow 1 g flight conditions
(<200 KCAS), AOA approaches the 15° limit. In this flight regime, the aircraft response may be more
sluggish, but still safe. Taking into account the human factors associated with the refueling task and
ARS operations (e.g. increased head-in-cockpit demands), difficulty of flying near the AOA limit is
compounded. Pay particular attention to the task in this flight regime. Small momentary excursions
above the AOA limit (15°) will not cause departure from controlled flight.
11.1.5.1 5-Wet Loading with 5-Wet FCC Gains not Set. Flying the aircraft with fuel tanks on the
midboard stations causes the mission computer to request that the flight control system use 5-Wet
control law gains to optimize flying qualities. The logic for this determination is absent from
H1E−031U/032U MC OFP and therefore causes the aircraft to always fly without the 5-Wet control
laws even if there are tanks on the midboard stations. For this case, where midboard tanks are installed
and H1E−031U/032U is installed, there may be some looseness in the flaps AUTO longitudinal flying
qualities at certain localized flight conditions, but this is not considered to be a safety of flight issue and
will not interfere with in−flight refueling operations. There are no NATOPs restrictions for this
loading/gain set ″mismatch″ condition. The degradation, if any, may become apparent for CGs aft of
approximately 30% MAC. Flaps AUTO lateral/directional and all flaps HALF or FULL flying
qualities are unaffected by this issue.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
The H2E−MC OFPs have incorporated an FCCGN advisory that is annunciated when the 5-Wet
loading information is declared invalid. The advisory is designed to notify the pilot that 5-Wet FCC
control law gains are no longer being applied. The consequence of the gains changing while still in the
5-Wet loading is identical to the H1E software build discussion above. That is, there may be some
longitudinal looseness while in AUTO flaps, but this will only be noticeable for aft CGs. Within the
NATOPS approved 5-Wet loading airspeed envelope (430 KCAS/0.8M), the degradation in flying
qualities stemming from the mismatched gain set is not considered to be a safety of flight issue.
11.1.6
Dual Midboard with Outboard Stores Handling Qualities.
NOTE
Loadings with dual carriage stores on stations 3 or 9 and an adjacent
store on stations
2
or
10
may experience uncommanded pitch
transients of ±1/2g to ±1g, roll transients of up to 20°/second, and/or
slight PIO at Mach 0.88−0.95 and less than 4° AOA. Roll-offs are more
likely during negative-g maneuvers. Transient severity may worsen at
lower altitude. Transients may increase pilot workload.
11.2 AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING.
11.2.1 Air-to-Air Gun Tracking. The flight characteristics described above combine to provide a very
agile fighter throughout the flight envelope. Excellent pitch pointing capabilities and lift vector
placement allow rapid acquisition and excellent fine tracking of air-to-air targets with little fear of
departure from controlled flight, especially at high AOA. However, the high airspeed bleed rate
associated with continued maneuvering at high AOA requires additional pilot attention to energy
management. Also, the presence of airframe buffet at elevated-g and high subsonic Mach numbers may
induce small pitch and roll transients and require increased workload to maintain precise pipper
placement.
11.2.2 Over-the-Top Maneuvering. The aircraft exhibits excellent slow speed over-the-top maneu-
verability. Aft stick is required near the top of looping maneuvers to keep the nose tracking until the
nose is below the horizon and airspeed is increasing. If aft stick is not maintained, AOA feedback
results in nose-down stabilator which eventually reduces AOA below 22°. Once below 22° AOA, neutral
longitudinal stick results in an inverted, nose-high attitude with only a small amount of pitch rate as
the FCS attempts to maintain 1g. If airspeed is allowed to decay in this attitude, or is insufficient to
complete the maneuver, a tailslide may result (see Departure Characteristics).
11.2.3 Slow Speed Maneuvering. The excellent controllability and maneuverability at high AOA
provided by FCS control laws result in very precise nose pointing and gun tracking at extremely low
airspeeds. When large and abrupt heading reversals are required during offensive or defensive
maneuvering at high AOA and low airspeed, two features discussed earlier allow the pilot to accelerate
aircraft motion without compromising departure resistance. The first is the enhanced nose-down pitch
rate capability below 200 KCAS which allows very rapid nose-down pitch pointing to acquire the target
at the end of a flat scissors engagement or to rapidly reduce AOA to maximize energy addition. The
second is the ″pirouette″ turning capability at high AOA and low airspeed which allows very rapid and
controllable nose-high to nose-low heading reversals. These two features combine to significantly
enhance maneuverability at high AOA, allowing the pilot to quickly bring the nose to bear on air-to-air
opponents.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
11.3 OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT (OCF)
11.3.1 Departure Resistance. A departure is defined by aircraft motion that is contrary to flight
control inputs. Flight test has shown the F/A-18E/F is very resistant to departure from controlled
flight with symmetric loadings. No departure tendencies were found for single-axis control inputs and
for the majority of multi-axis inputs. A few departure tendencies exist with multi-axis inputs, but these
were usually found to occur beyond the 360° bank angle change limitation (two exceptions are
described in 11.3.2.1). Nose high, slow speed maneuvers that result in insufficient maneuvering
airspeed or a tailslide will cause a departure. Overall, the aircraft is very departure resistant when flown
within NATOPS limits. Additionally, clean and multiple store loadings (including aft CG), have shown
no self-sustaining falling leaf mode in the F/A-18E/F. For all known departure modes, following
NATOPS out-of-control (OCF) recovery procedures result in rapid recovery.
11.3.2 Departure Characteristics. The typical F/A-18E/F departure occurs as a yaw divergence
(nose-slice) followed by an uncommanded roll in the same direction. Usually, a departure is preceded
by a buildup in sideforce. This sideforce is often accompanied by ″vortex rumble″ generated from
excessive sideslip. ″Vortex rumble″ may not be noticeable during aggressive maneuvering; therefore,
excessive sideforce provides the most reliable departure warning cue. The initial phase of the departure
is not particularly violent or disorienting unless it occurs at high airspeed or Mach number. The yaw
rate warning tone may not provide sufficient departure warning. Post-departure gyrations self-recover
with controls released. Application of controls during post-departure gyrations may delay recovery.
11.3.2.1 Maneuvering within NATOPS Limits. There are three typical departure cases found for
flight within NATOPS limits.
1. Forward corner inputs below 300 KCAS.
Lateral stick and/or pedal combined with forward inputs at low airspeed may cause a departure prior
to reaching 360° bank angle change limit if AOA transitions from positive to zero or negative during
the roll. The departure is characterized by a dwell at 0 g, followed by a sideslip build-up and
subsequent moderate yaw rate spike (40 to 50 °/sec) and AOA increase. Subtle differences in roll rate
and nose-down pitch rates being generated by such inputs make it difficult to predict whether a
departure or favorable (faster than normal) roll rates will occur.
Lateral stick and/or pedal combined with forward inputs at low airspeed
may cause a departure.
2. Lateral stick with pedal and forward stick at high altitude and supersonic speeds.
This input is predicted to cause a departure that could result in aircraft damage. This departure is
possible at supersonic airspeed above 40,000 ft MSL and within 360° of bank angle change.
3. Tailslides and over-the-top maneuvering with insufficient airspeed.
NATOPS prohibits zero airspeed tailslides and intentional departures or spins. The obvious
consequence of over-the-top maneuvering with insufficient airspeed is departure from controlled
flight. In general, tailslides that are purely vertical induce departures that are benign and quick to
recover. Tailslides with large yaw angle (nose vertical but 3 to 9 line off the horizon) or over-the-top
maneuvering with sizable bank angle and insufficient airspeed usually result in a ″sideslide″ type
motion. The resulting sideslide departure motion is similar to vertical but typically is accompanied
by an abrupt roll snap before the aircraft settles nose low. If the sideslide motion yields excessive
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
gravity-induced sideslip at relatively slow airspeed (<90 KCAS), the resulting yawing motion from
the growing aerodynamic forces can quickly develop into a spin. If the aircraft falls inverted, then the
AOA will simultaneously build negative and may result in an inverted spin. Inverted spins from
sideslides are slower to recover than upright sideslide recoveries.
11.3.2.2 Maneuvering Outside of NATOPS Limits.
NOTE
The following describe the known departure characteristics of the
aircraft if flown outside of the NATOPS limits.
11.3.2.2.1 Exceeding 360° Roll Limit. Certain airspeed and control input combinations held for
greater than the NATOPS bank angle change limit of 360° can lead to departures. Lateral stick with
pedal and forward stick from high g near 300 KCAS may result in a severe departure, with yaw rates
reaching above 100°/sec a possibility. Another severe departure is possible when slowly pulling aft stick
(less than 1 inch/sec) while rolling with a full lateral stick input below 210 KCAS, if initiated near 1g.
This departure can generate yaw rates briefly in excess of 120°/sec and negative g spikes from -2 to -3
g. Each of these departures was found only to occur when controls were held beyond the 360° bank
angle change limit.
11.3.2.2.2 Exceeding Asymmetric Loading AOA Limits. Exceeding NATOPS limits for asymmetric
store loadings can also lead to departures. Aggressive longitudinal maneuvers that result in AOA
beyond NATOPS limits can lead to a benign departure that begins as a slow roll toward the heavy wing
and yaw away from the heavy wing that cannot be controlled with lateral stick or rudder pedal.
Recovery is immediate as soon as AOA is reduced to within limits. Large sideslips create a greater risk
of a more violent departure. At higher speeds, aggressive maneuvering at elevated-g above AOA limits
can result in sudden departures with little or no warning. If limits are exceeded and a departure does
occur, post departure gyrations rapidly transition to an upright spin away from the heavy wing.
Recovery from this type of departure has been demonstrated with up to a 24,000 ft-lb lateral weight
asymmetry following NATOPS OCF recovery procedures (see Spin Characteristics).
11.3.2.3 Maneuvering with Flight Control System Failures. Continued maneuvering with flight
control system failures such as surfaces failed off (X’s in all channels of that actuator), air data, or other
sensor failures can also lead to departure. The flight control system is designed to provide adequate
flying qualities with actuator and other FCS failures as long as AOA and load factor are maintained
within NATOPS limits. In the event of FCS failures, reducing AOA and load factor to wings level 1g
flight as soon as possible minimizes the possibility of a departure. If a departure does occur, following
OCF procedures results in the most rapid recovery.
11.3.3 Spin Characteristics. Entry into a spin is rare for symmetrically loaded F/A-18E/F. On a few
occasions, moderate yaw rate spins have developed from departures experiencing large gravity-induced
sideslip excursions (e.g. sideslips or nose-high slow airspeed flight while banked near 90°). If AOA is
simultaneously negative, the spin will be inverted.
For high lateral weight asymmetry loadings, the aircraft is extremely departure resistant within
NATOPS AOA limits. Exceeding AOA limits for high lateral weight asymmetries will most likely result
in an upright spin away from the heavy wing. Spin recoveries for less common upright spins into the
heavy wing, and inverted spins, can be delayed due to the oscillatory nature of the spin. Spin recovery
has been extensively proven for lateral asymmetries up to 14,000 ft-lb for both spins into and away
from the heavy wing with positive recoveries demonstrated in all cases.
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ORIGINAL
A1-F18EA-NFM-000
Spin characteristics and recovery with asymmetries greater than 14,000 ft-lb have not been fully
tested. A departure with 24,000 ft-lb of asymmetry resulted in a high yaw rate spin (greater than
100°/sec) within 3 to 5 seconds. Recovery occurred within two to three turns and about 10,000 feet of
altitude loss after applying NATOPS OCF recovery procedures. High yaw rate spins typically result in
longitudinal accelerations at the pilot seat as high as -3.5g (eyeballs out). Consequently, accomplishing
spin recovery procedures can be difficult with an unlocked seat harness.
Spin recovery is straightforward and reliable if the OCF procedures are followed and sufficient
altitude remains. If a spin is encountered (Spin recovery display on the DDI), recovery occurs very
shortly after initiating NATOPS OCF recovery procedures, particularly from inverted spins. Recovery
from spins with high lateral weight asymmetry may require an additional turn or two.
Selection of manual spin recovery mode (SPIN switch in RCVY) seri-
ously degrades controllability, prevents recovery from any departure or
spin, and is prohibited.
NOTE
During highly oscillatory spins or spins that transform from upright to
inverted or from inverted to upright, the spin recovery display may
disappear momentarily.
11.4 DEGRADED MODE HANDLING QUALITIES.
The reliability of the FCS is very high and when failures do occur, usually occur singly. No single
electrical failure affects flying qualities and multiple FCS failures are required to degrade flying
qualities. Depending on which combination of failures has occurred, flying qualities may be consider-
ably degraded. Degraded flying qualities associated with some of the more serious or more common
FCS failures are described here. Appropriate corrective action is presented in the Warning/Caution/
Advisory Displays, figure 12-1.
11.4.1 Single Engine Operation.
11.4.1.1 Flaps AUTO. Engine failure or shutdown with flaps AUTO results in no degradation in
handling qualities under most circumstances at low AOA. A small amount of yaw trim may be required
to counter asymmetric thrust effects. At high AOA, engine failure results in a yaw toward the failed
engine that is controllable by quickly reducing AOA and countering the yaw with rudder. During hard
maneuvering, a slight degradation in handling qualities may be noticeable at less than Mach 1.0
between approximately 400 to 500 KCAS where the hydraulic system normally operates at 5,000 psi.
At these conditions 5,000 psi operation is inhibited by the FCS to maintain a windmill air-start
capability. When 5,000 psi operation is inhibited, flying qualities may be degraded during aggressive
maneuvers since there may not be enough hydraulic power to fully deflect numerous flight control
surfaces. A reduction in departure resistance can also be expected anytime normal 5,000 psi hydraulic
system operation is inhibited.
11.4.1.2 Flaps HALF or FULL. Single engine minimum control speed (Vmc) is defined as the
minimum airspeed required to maintain controlled flight with one engine operating. Vmc airspeeds
were determined at 14° AOA for catapult launches, and 12° AOA for all other circumstances. Vmc
airspeed varies depending on AOA, lateral asymmetry, altitude, and day temperature. For an engine
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ORIGINAL
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