F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

If PARK BRK released during first

engine start -

Battery Start

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

2. Operating GEN switch - CYCLE

3. Start second engine.

External Power Start

1. PARK BRK handle - SET

• Left and right 115 vac buses are isolated (bus tie open).

2. GEN TIE CONTROL switch -

• May be caused by initial engine start with the PARK BRK

CYCLE

released or by electrical fault protection circuitry.

3. Start second engine.

GEN TIE

IN FLIGHT

1. GEN TIE CONTROL switch - NORM

Caution Light

(DO NOT CYCLE.)

If the left and right buses are isolated because of a detected fault,

If both GENs operating -

cycling the GEN TIE CONTROL switch reenergizes the faulty

1. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

bus/equipment and may cause further damage or loss of the re-

2. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

maining generator.

With L or R GEN caution light -

2. GEN switch affected side - CYCLE

If GEN restored -

3. Do not attempt to reset GEN TIE.

4. Continue mission with GEN TIE on.

If GEN still failed -

3. GEN switch affected side - OFF

4. Land as soon as practical.

5. Refer to Emergency Power Distribu-

tion chart.

D Nz REF set to 7.5g regardless of gross weight.

G-limiter will not prevent an aircraft overstress at gross weights

1. Limit intentional accelerations to the

above 32,357 lb. Above 32,357 lb gross weight, pilot must limit g

following:

to prevent overstress.

G-LIM 7.5 G

GW (lb)

Acceleration (g)

≤32,357

-3.0 to +7.5

The presence of the G-LIM 7.5 caution may be an indication that

″Flight Controls,

34,000

-2.9 to +7.1

the FCC has declared MUX data failed. If this is the cause for

Flight Controls″

38,000

-2.6 to +6.4

the G-LIM 7.5 G caution, Xs will appear in CH 1/3 of the PROC

42,000

-2.3 to +5.8

row on the FCS page, as the FCS will stop using INS provided

50,000

-1.9 to +4.8

data across the MUX. There is no significant degradation to fly-

ing qualities, departure resistance or roll performance with these

failure indications.

• G-limiter overridden.

Selected by momentarily pressing the paddle switch when the

stick is near the full aft limit. Maximum allowed g-limit increased

1. Stick - Return to near neutral to dis-

G-LIM OVRD

by 33% (allows a 10g command at 7.5g Nz REF). Unless g-limiter

engage override

override is desired, control maximum g-level. If the paddle switch

has failed electrically, NWS and the autopilot may be com-

manded off without pilot action or notification.

• GPS approach flight phase and HERR exceeds 108 feet for 10

GPS DEGD

Information

seconds.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 16)

V-12-18

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Gun purge air pressure low.

1. Do not fire gun, even if caution

GUN GAS

clears.

Failure to purge cartridge combustion gases may result in a gun

bay explosion and significant aircraft damage.

HAND CNTRL

• One hand controller inoperative.

Information

• Fuel remaining sufficient to fly to HOME waypoint with 2,000

lbs reserve or less.

1. Change HOME waypoint (if appropri-

HOME FUEL

ate) or analyze configuration, fuel

HOME FUEL caution logic is disabled with WonW, the refueling

probe extended, the landing gear cycled down then up, or within

flow, and profile for BINGO.

5 seconds after a HOME waypoint change.

• Transponder failed to respond to a valid mode 4 interrogation

(failure or mode 4 not enabled).

IFF 4

• Failure in the KIT 1C.

• Mode 4 codes zeroized, or KIT 1C installed but not keyed with

Information

″Mode 4 reply,

crypto.

Mode 4 reply″

The IFF 4 caution and voice alert are disabled with the IFF

MODE 4 switch in the OFF position.

IFFAI

Some interrogator operations may not function.

Information

IFF OVRHT

• IFF overheat detected.

1. IFF - OFF (if practical)

L IN TEMP

R IN TEMP

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

2. Land as soon as practical.

″Engine Left

• Designated engine inlet temperature out of limits.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for

(Right),

Engine Left

landing.

(Right)″

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 17)

V-12-19

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION .

1. ENG ANTI ICE switch - ON

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

NO ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

D Engine inlet icing conditions detected.

3. Airspeed - Increase until INLET TEMP is at

least +5°C (10° preferred) on ENG format (if

The INLET ICE caution is designed to come on

possible).

when 0.025 inch of ice has accumulated on the inlet

4. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

ice detector, located in the left inlet. Any delay in

prevent ice accumulation on underside of LEX

activating the engine anti-ice system can result in

5. Climb or descend out of icing danger zone.

ice accumulating rapidly on the IGVs and shedding

(>25,000 feet, or below freezing level)

into the engine when the system is turned on. Ice

When clear of icing conditions and caution

accumulation on LEFs is similar to the inlet lip and

removed -

can serve as an indication of how much ice may be

6. ENG ANTI ICE switch - OFF

on the inlet. As little as 0.5 inch of ice ingested by

the engine from the inlet lip can result in compres-

ICE VISIBLE ON LEFS -

sor stalls and major FOD.

3. Throttles - Reduce below 80% N₂ (if possible).

Avoid throttle transients above 90% N₂

INLET ICE

With ice clearly visible on the LEFs, reducing

4. Airspeed - Maintain above 250 knots

throttle settings below 80% N₂ rpm while descend-

5. AOA - Maintain less than 6° (if possible) to

ing below the freezing level should generate suffi-

prevent ice accumulation on underside of

cient inlet spillage to shed inlet ice outside the inlet

LEX.

and not into the engine. Similarly, avoiding throttle

6. Avoid abrupt maneuvers and bank angles over

transients above 90% N₂ rpm, abrupt maneuvers,

20°.

and bank angles over 20° should help prevent ice

7. Descend below the freezing level.

from detaching from the inlet lip and being in-

For landing in icing conditions -

gested by the engines.

8. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

(as required)

With no ice visible on the aircraft, an INLET

9. Reduce airspeed and lower the landing gear at

TEMP of at least +5°C should provide sufficient

the last possible moment (minimizes ice accu-

aerodynamic heating to prevent ice accumulation on

mulation on the gear).

the LEFs and inlet lips.

If a missed approach is necessary -

10. Slowly advance throttles to the minimum

power required for a safe waveoff.

11. Raise landing gear and flaps as soon as pos-

sible.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 18)

V-12-20

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

HUD attitude supplied by the standby attitude

reference indicator.

W replaces O on the HUD.

GPS or EGI GPS function still operates.

1. ATT/ATTD switch - STBY

MSP codes 02F or 061 indicate that NAV data is frozen

2. Verify HUD pitch ladder coincides with standby

INS ATT

and NAV data provided to the HUD is not reliable. IFA

attitude reference indicator.

is no longer possible.

3. Attempt an in-flight alignment.

If an INS ATT caution is set or the ATT Switch is

placed to STBY, Xs will appear in CH 1/3 of the PROC

row of the FCS Page indicating FCCs will no longer use

INS data. There is no significant degradation to flying

qualities, departure resistance or roll performance with

these failure indications.

GROUND

1. Secure and realign INS.

INS DEGD

• Failure detected during periodic INS BIT.

IN FLIGHT if INS information is incorrect -

1. ATTD/ATT Switch - STBY

2. Position keeping source - ADC

3. Perform in-flight alignment.

1. Crosscheck HUD velocity vector, HUD digital

INS VEL

• INS and ADC vertical velocities do not agree.

vertical velocity readout and standby rate of

climb indicator.

IN FLIGHT

1. Reduce airspeed to the minimum practical.

• Boarding ladder unlocked.

2. Get a visual inspection (if practical).

LADDER

3. Consider shutting off left engine to prevent engine

May FOD left engine.

FOD.

4. Land as soon as practical.

• Mission computer 1 failed.

Only cautions available are AUTO PILOT,

MC 1, HYD 1A, HYD 1B, HYD 2A, HYD 2B.

1. MC switch - CYCLE to 1 OFF then NORM

If caution remains or reappears -

GPS or EGI GPS function inoperable.

2. Use no more than 1/2 lateral stick with tanks or

MC 1

A/G stores on the wings. Reduce acceleration be-

G-limiter and Roll-limiter functions disabled.

low 7.5 g above 32,357 pounds gross weight or if

unsymmetrical (rolling).

The presence of the MC 1 caution also indicates that

3. Land as soon as practical.

the FCS will stop using INS provided data across the

MUX. There is no significant degradation to flying

qualities, departure resistance or roll performance with

these failure indications.

D Mission computer 2 failed.

MC 2

1. MC switch - CYCLE to 2 OFF then NORM

Most weapon functionality lost.

MC CONFIG

• OFP loaded into either MC is incorrect.

1. Do not takeoff.

MDL LOAD

• MDL to MC loading failure.

Information

MIDS OVRHT

• MIDS overheat condition.

Information

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 19)

V-12-21

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

For MU Aircraft -

1. Verify MU is installed and seated properly.

If caution remains -

2. Do not takeoff.

MU LOAD

• MU not communicating on AVMUX.

For AMU Aircraft -

1. Verify mission/maintenance cards installed in

proper AMU slot and AMU door is closed.

2. If accompanied by a MNTCD or MSNCD advi-

sory, refer to MNTCD or MSNCD advisory.

GROUND

1. INS knob - OFF then realign (GND, CV, or

IFA)

• Indicates functional failures of the INS, GPS,

NAV FAIL

and air data functions.

IN FLIGHT

1. Use standby instruments for altitude/airspeed/

vertical velocity.

2. Refer to In-flight Alignment.

GPS not operating -

D INS and ADC velocities disagree.

1. Crosscheck velocity vector.

• Can be caused by high wind velocity.

NAV HVEL

2. Crosscheck horizontal velocities on HSI/DATA/

GPS operating -

NAVCK sublevel.

• INS and GPS, ADC and GPS, or INS and ADC

horizontal velocities do not agree.

GPS operating -

1. Crosscheck HUD velocity vector, HUD digital

• INS and GPS vertical velocities disagree.

vertical velocity, and standby rate-of-climb in-

NAV VVEL

GPS failed or inoperative -

dicator.

• INS and air data function vertical velocities dis-

2. If vertical velocities disagree, consider using

agree.

standby attitude for landing.

NFLR OVRHT

• NAVFLIR overheat detected.

1. LST/NFLR switch - OFF (if practical)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 20)

V-12-22

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

1. Check oxygen system integrity:

D Mask integrity

D Hose connections

D OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger un-

locked and fully extended.

• Oxygen concentration is below acceptable limits.

• Disconnected oxygen hose.

IN FLIGHT

• Removing oxygen mask without placing the OXY

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

FLOW knob to OFF.

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

• System gas leak (broken integrity).

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet

cabin altitude.

4. Check oxygen system integrity:

OBOGS DEGD

D Mask integrity

D Hose connections

(cautions of any

D Good flow does not equate to good oxygen con-

D OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger un-

duration)

centration. An OBOGS DEGD caution indi-

locked and fully extended.

cates that the oxygen concentration is inad-

If system integrity not compromised −

equate and hypoxia may result.

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

D Under less than optimum conditions (low alti-

Once below 10,000 feet cabin altitude and no

tude, heavy breathing, loose-fitting mask, etc.),

hypoxic symptoms present −

as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may

7. Consider removing mask and resetting emer-

be available.

gency oxygen system or resuming normal

OBOGS operation if flow appears normal and

donning of mask is desired.

8. Land as soon as practical.

If system integrity restored −

5. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

6. Reset emergency oxygen system.

• MC or SMS overlay halted due to run time.

OCS

1. Attempt to reload overlay.

Stores that require overlay may not be available.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains after 15 seconds -

L OIL PR

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R OIL PR

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

• Designated engine oil pressure out of limits.

procedure.

″Engine left (right),

If caution clears -

Engine left (right)″

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If caution remains at IDLE or engine re-

L OVRSPD

sponse is abnormal -

R OVRSPD

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

• Designated fan or compressor rpm high.

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

″Engine left (right),

procedure.

Engine left (right)″

If caution clears -

2. Land as soon as practical.

3. Consider HALF flap approach for landing.

1. Oxygen quantity - CHECK

OXY LOW

• Oxygen quantity indication below 1 liter.

If under 1 liter -

2. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 21)

V-12-23

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GROUND

• Parking brake still set when throttles are ad-

1. PARK BRK handle - RELEASE

vanced over 80% with the INS on.

IN FLIGHT

PARK BRAKE

1. PARK BRK handle - CYCLE AND CHECK

FULLY STOWED

Even if PARK BRAKE caution is extinguished in

Whether or not the caution clears -

flight, the possibility exists that the parking brake

2. Make a fly-in arrested landing with LSO assis-

may still be engaged.

tance (if available).

1. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - ON

L PITOT HT

• Designated pitot heater malfunction.

After landing -

R PITOT HT

2. PITOT ANTI ICE switch - AUTO

• EGI, GPS and INS velocity or GPS and INS un-

reliable.

1. Verify selected TCN information is loaded in

Position keeping function supplied by ADC, how-

POS/ADC

TCN Data Table on HSI/DATA/TCN page.

ever the position keeping function is unreliable.

2. Position keeping - SELECT POS/TCN

POS/ADC is not as reliable a position keeping

source as the INS or GPS.

• Air refueling probe not fully retracted with

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 knots

PROBE UNLK

PROBE switch in RETRACT.

2. PROBE switch - CYCLE

• BRU-32 rack(s) failed to lock or unlock during

rack test.

GROUND

RACK UNCPL

1. Do not takeoff.

Store may not be jettisonable.

1. Use no more than ½ lateral stick with tanks

R-LIM OFF

• Roll rate limiting failed.

or A/G stores on the wings.

FIRE EXTGH

If FIRE light unintentionally pressed -

• Fire extinguisher bottle armed.

READY

1. Identify affected light.

(FIRE light or APU FIRE light depressed.)

2. FIRE light - RESET

Light

1. BIT/CONFIG page - Identify lined out system.

• Software incompatible.

2. Turn on affected system if not already on.

S/W CONFIG

3. IBIT affected system.

Incompatible software is lined-out on the BIT/

If caution remains -

CONFIG page.

4. Do not takeoff.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 22)

V-12-24

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Engine stall detected on designated side.

Engine stalls result from conditions which exceed

the stall margin of the engine (high AOA, steam or

exhaust ingestion, etc.). Engine stalls are often indi-

* 1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

cated by an audible bang, airframe vibration, and

If stall does not clear -

L STALL

visible flames out the exhaust and/or inlet.

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

R STALL

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing

Pop or surge stalls do not result in L or R STALL

″Engine left (right),

caution and usually self-recover. Multiple pop or

procedure.

Engine left (right)″

surge stalls indicate the engine may not self-recover

If stall clears -

and are usually the result of engine or aircraft dam-

2. Check engine response at a safe altitude.

age.

3. Land as soon as practical.

Hung stalls result in a L or R STALL caution and

are indicated by a lack of throttle response, increas-

ing EGT, and steady or decreasing rpm. If engine

rpm continues to fall, the L or R FLAMEOUT cau-

tion may also be set.

GROUND

• Internal fuel tank pressure high.

1. Bleed air knob - OFF

2. Do not takeoff.

Catapult may cause structural damage.

TANK PRESS

IN FLIGHT

• Internal fuel tank pressure low above 20,000 feet

1. Bleed air knob - CYCLE

Possible fuel pump cavitation above 40,000 feet

If caution remains or reappears -

High rates of descent may damage fuel cells.

2. Do not exceed Mach 0.9 in dive.

IN FLIGHT

1. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO

IN FLIGHT

NORM

• Internal fuel tank pressure low above 20,000 feet.

TK PRES LO

If caution remains or reappears -

Possible fuel pump cavitation above 40,000 feet

2. Do not exceed Mach 0.9 in dive.

High rates of descent may damage fuel cells

3. Altitude - Maintain below 40,000 feet (if prac-

tical).

GROUND

1. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

D Internal fuel tank pressurized.

2. Do not takeoff.

Catapult may cause structural damage.

TK PRES HI

IN FLIGHT

1. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO

D Internal fuel tank pressure high.

NORM

If caution remains or reappears -

Possible exceedance of tank structural limits.

2. Maintain 0 to + 2.5g.

VEL

• INS velocity degraded or high wind velocity.

Information

• Voice alert or master caution aural tone inopera-

1. BIT page - CHECK CSC BIT status

VOICE/AUR

tive.

If CSC MUX fail -

EADI is unavailable if the cause is CSC failure.

2. Refer to CSC MUX FAILURE.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 23)

V-12-25

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Cautions and Caution Lights

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

If visible moisture not present -

1. WINDSHIELD switch -OFF

If visible moisture present (ice/rain) -

1. WINDSHIELD switch - ANTI ICE or RAIN

(use the windshield anti-ice for a maximum of

5 minutes)

D Windshield temperature high or sensor failed.

If caution remains and switch OFF -

2. Throttles - Minimum practical

If caution remains with the switch in OFF, an ECS

3. Land as soon as practical.

valve failure may be directing hot air to the wind-

Consider −

shield. In this case, securing the ECS may be the

In OBOGS equipped aircraft -

only means to stop windshield airflow.

3. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) − PULL

4. OXY FLOW knob(s) − OFF

All aircraft -

5. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

6. BLEED AIR knob − OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

7. Maintain airspeed below 325 KCAS (300 to

WDSHLD HOT

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as

325 KCAS optimum).

3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be available.

8. ECS MODE switch − OFF/RAM

9. AV COOL switch − EMERG

10. EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP

In OBOGS equipped aircraft -

11. Maintain altitude below 10,000 ft prior to

emergency oxygen depletion (10−20 minutes).

Do not operate the windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Once below 10,000 feet -

system on a dry windshield. If a WDSHLD HOT

12. Consider removing mask and resetting

caution appears, place the WINDSHIELD switch to

emergency oxygen.

OFF immediately to prevent heat damage to the

13. CABIN PRESS switch − RAM/DUMP

windshield.

14. OBOGS control switch − OFF

All aircraft -

If AV AIR HOT caution appears -

15. Non-essential avionics equipment - OFF (e.g.,

RADAR, UFC controlled avionics, ECM, sen-

sors, MC2)

16. Land as soon as possible.

If caution appears while in flight -

1. Wingfold handle - Push in to confirm fully

seated.

2. Wingfold unlock flag (Beer Cans) - CHECK

DOWN

3. Land as soon as practical.

WING UNLK

• Either wingfold unlocked.

FOR LANDING

If both beer cans down -

4. Make a normal landing.

If beer can(s) are up -

5. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 24)

V-12-26

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Aileron failures may be caused by an actuator fail-

ure (mechanical or two channel failure) or by a

switching valve failing to switch to the backup cir-

AIL OFF

cuit following a HYD circuit failure.

FCS

When an aileron fails, the surface is driven to the

1. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

faired position by air loads and is damped to pre-

FCES

vent oscillations. If the ailerons were drooped, the

FOR LANDING

functional aileron is driven to the undrooped posi-

2. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

Caution Light

tion. With both ailerons undrooped, approach speed

3. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

will increase about 8 knots in flaps FULL, and 16

4. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown.

″Flight Controls,

knots in flaps HALF. The functional aileron contin-

Flight Controls″

ues to assist in providing control. Roll damping is

noticeably less. Use care to prevent overcontrol and

resulting lateral PIO, especially when approaching

touchdown.

*1. Speedbrake - CHECK IN

*2. Decelerate slowly to below 400 knots/Mach

0.8.

3. If flaps full - RAISE TO HALF

4. Do not exceed +15° AOA (+12° AOA with

asymmetric wing stores).

5. MENU FCS - IDENTIFY FAILURE

If reset to CAS desired -

6. Climb to a safe altitude.

7. Airspeed:

160-180 KNOTS - flaps HALF

DEL ON

200-300 KNOTS - flaps AUTO

8. FCS - RESET

FCS

If RESET unsuccessful/not desired -

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure. (Do

FCES

• Any axis in DEL.

not exceed Flaps-HALF.)

v Refer to DEL ON Caution.

If pitch axis in DEL -

Caution Light

6. Do not extend speedbrake (unless required).

7. Flaps - HALF FOR LANDING

″Flight Controls,

8. Fly ON-SPEED AOA.

Flight Controls″

9. Reduce sink rate for field landings.

If yaw and/or roll axis in DEL -

6. External stores -

JETTISON ASYMMETRIC WING STORES

7. Rudder - MINIMIZE INPUTS, IF RE-

QUIRED USE SLOW INPUTS

8. Do not use more than ½ rudder pedal or

lateral stick in flight.

9. Flaps - HALF FOR LANDING

10. Fly ON-SPEED AOA.

11. Reduce sink rate for landing.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 25)

V-12-27

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• L & R pitot static probes disagree.

• Both air data sensor inputs are within an accept-

able range, but differ excessively.

Bolters in GAIN ORIDE require more aft stick

input for rotation. Half aft stick is recommended

for rotation from bolters in GAIN ORIDE to reduce

aircraft settle.

HUD OR STBY AIRSPEED MAY BE

UNRELIABLE

1. Maintain below 350 knots, minimum sideslips,

Depending on the failure, the displayed airspeed in

AOA <10°, maximum 2g.

the HUD or the standby instruments may be unre-

2. GAIN switch - ORIDE

liable. An airspeed crosscheck with AOA or with a

wingman will be your best guide.

FC AIR DAT

FOR LANDING

NOTE

3. Slow to 200 KCAS.

Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE with

In straight and level flight (if possible) -

FLAP switch HALF or FULL and amber FLAPS

light will be lit.

4. LDG GEAR handle - DN

5. FLAP switch - HALF OR FULL

With GAIN ORIDE selected, longitudinal response

6. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

is more sluggish as airspeed is reduced below the set

7. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown. (ATC is not

value and is more sensitive as airspeed is increased

above the set value. In the landing configuration

available.)

the gains are set to values which permit landing

with flaps HALF or FULL (137 KCAS and 7.6°

AOA). Remain below 200 knots and 15° AOA in

HALF and below 160 knots and 12° AOA in FULL.

At lower airspeed, aircraft response is sluggish and

takes longer to stabilize.

Flaps

Mach KCAS Feet

°AOA

AUTO

0.72

n/a

35,000

2.0

HALF n/a

137

sea level

7.6

FULL n/a

137

sea level

7.6

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 26)

V-12-28

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D If MC1 is inoperative, the FCES caution light is

the only indication of a FCES failure. The FCS

1. Speedbrake - CHECK IN

page is not available.

2. Airspeed: 250-300 knots

3. Maintain a safe altitude in VMC -

If the FCES light remains on after an FCS RESET

- At or Above 5,000 ft AGL (if practical)

attempt, an actuator is still failed or one of the fol-

- 15,000 ft AGL recommended

lowing cautions did not reset: FLAP SCHED,

4. Do not exceed +10° AOA.

FLAPS OFF, AIL OFF, RUD OFF, MECH ON, or

5. Attempt to identify the FCS failure.

DEL ON.

If failure identified -

FCES

6. Execute the appropriate procedure.

If failure not identified and DDI warnings

Caution Light

and FCS cautions still inoperative -

Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of

6. GAIN switch - ORIDE

350 KCAS (flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS (flaps

With MC1 inoperative

7. Slow below 180 KCAS at a safe altitude.

HALF), or 190 KCAS (flaps FULL) may result in

8. LDG GEAR handle - DN

an uncontrollable aircraft.

9. FLAP switch - HALF

10. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

NOTE

11. Fly on−speed AOA to touchdown.

(ATC is not available in GAIN ORIDE.)

The FCES light illuminates whenever an FCS,

FLAP SCHED, AIL OFF, RUD OFF, FLAPS OFF,

12. Make a precautionary short field arrestment (if

MECH ON, or DEL ON caution is set.

required).

v Refer to FCS Failure.

D One or more failures in flight controls.

1. MENU FCS - IDENTIFY FAILURE

″Like″ failures for STAB and TEF are defined as

2. FCS - RESET

Xs in 2 or more channels of the same row for the

If no reset and only second ″like″ failure is

same surface.

PROC Xs in CH 1/3 -

FCS

3. No action required.

″Like″ failure for any other item on the FCS page is

If no reset and second ″like″ failure exists -

defined as an X in the same row.

FCES

3. Maintain 200-300 knots, minimum sideslip,

AOA <10°, 2g maximum.

D May be a result of AOA failures.

Caution Light

4. FCS circuit breakers - CHECK

5. If CG aft of 24% or lateral asymmetry over

If Xs are present in CH 1/3 of the PROC row the

″Flight Controls,

12,000 foot-pounds, jettison external stores as

FCC has declared INS data invalid. There is no sig-

Flight Controls″

soon as practical.

nificant degradation to flying qualities, departure

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

resistance or roll performance with these failure in-

7. Land as soon as practical.

dications.

8. If 4-channel AOA failure - execute the FLAPS

v Refer to FCS Failure Indicators and Effects.

SCHED procedure.

v Refer to FCS Failure.

v Refer to Uncommanded Pitch and Roll Excur-

sions.

FCS HOT

• Flight control computer A or right transformer-

rectifier overtemperature.

1. Airspeed - SUBSONIC

Caution Light

2. AV/FCS cool switch - EMERG

FCS airscoop cannot be closed in flight.

″Flight Computer Hot,

Flight Computer Hot″

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 27)

V-12-29

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Leading and/or trailing edge flaps inoperative.

When a LEF is shutdown, the opposite LEF and both TEF

surfaces are held frozen with Flaps−AUTO.

LEF procedures are dictated by LEF INBOARD

position only (irrespective of outboard position).

When a TEF is shutdown, the failed actuator will be hy-

draulic driven to 0°.

*1. Maintain airspeed above 300 KCAS and

wings level.

2. Visually check LEF deflections.

If inboard LEF deflection extreme leading

D Leading-edge up deflections of the inboard LEF

edge up or appear nearly vertical (beyond

beyond the 4° over−travel stop may result

4° up over-travel stop) -

in an uncontrollable configuration below 250

3. Flaps - maintain AUTO

KCAS. Selecting GAIN ORIDE with flaps AUTO

FLAPS OFF

4. Maintain below 350 KCAS, minimize

may provide controllability at slower airspeeds.

There may be little warning of impending

sideslip, AOA<10°, maximum 2g.

FCES

departure as airspeed decreases. Immediate

5. GAIN switch - ORIDE

ejection may be required. Departure will be

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure at

unrecoverable.

Caution Light

safe altitude, maintaining flaps AUTO and

D Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of 350

KCAS (flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS (flaps HALF), or 190

GAIN ORIDE for remainder of flight.

FLAPS

KCAS (flaps FULL) may result in an uncontrollable air-

7. Minimize gross weight to the maximum extent

craft.

possible.

Amber

If inboard LEFs deflected less than 4° up -

3. Do not exceed 10° AOA with flaps AUTO.

″Flight Controls,

4. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

If a HYD 1B and the left leading edge flap fail or

Flight Con-

(Do not exceed flaps - HALF)

a HYD 2A and the right leading edge flap fail

trols″

5. Flaps - HALF FOR LANDING

together, do not press the FCS RESET button.

Resetting the FCS with one of the above

6. If LEF extension less than 10° down, do not

combinations may result in a second hydraulic

exceed 7° AOA for landing.

circuit failure.

If hydraulic failure or leak suspected -

7. Do not press FCS reset button if HYD 1B or

Pressing FCS RESET with failed leading

edge flaps may aggravate a split LEF condition.

HYD 2A caution is displayed.

If trailing edge flaps failed -

Selecting GAIN ORIDE will drive non−failed flaps to their

3. Execute Controllability Check procedure at safe

respective Gain Oride positions:

altitude.

- In AUTO: LEFs 3°, TEFs 3°

- In HALF: LEFs 17°, TEFs 30°

4. Flaps - FULL or HALF FOR LANDING

- In FULL: LEFs 17°, TEFs 45°

5. Use 10° - 11° AOA for landing, if required.

Depending on the position of the failed LEF, selecting

GAIN ORIDE may aggravate or reduce a LEF left/right

split condition.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 28)

V-12-30

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Flaps frozen and not scheduling properly (air data) or

leading edge flap at least 10° off schedule and AOA

over 12°.

1. Maintain below 350 KCAS, minimum sideslips,

FLAP SCHED

AOA <10°, maximum 2g.

2. GAIN switch - ORIDE

FCES

If 4-channel AOA failure -

D Bolters in GAIN ORIDE require more aft stick

3. Identify and select valid AOA probe on FCS page,

Caution Light

input for rotation due to fixed AOA feedback and

using center (INS) AOA value as guide.

zero rudder toe-in deflections. Half-aft stick is

For landing -

FLAPS

recommended for rotation from bolters in

4. Slow to 200 KCAS.

GAIN ORIDE to reduce aircraft settle.

In straight and level flight (if possible) -

Amber

D Exceeding GAIN ORIDE airspeed limitations of 350

KCAS (flaps AUTO), 200 KCAS (flaps HALF), or

5. LDG GEAR handle - DN

190 KCAS (flaps FULL) may result in an uncontrol-

6. FLAP switch - HALF or FULL

″Flight Controls,

lable aircraft.

7. Fly a straight-in approach (if practical).

Flight Con-

8. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown. (ATC is not

trols″

NOTE

available.)

Alpha tone is disabled in GAIN ORIDE with

FLAP switch HALF or FULL.

*1. Speedbrake - CHECK IN

*2. Decelerate slowly to below 400 knots/Mach 0.8.

3. If flaps full - RAISE TO HALF

4. Do not exceed 250 knots with flaps HALF.

5. Do not exceed +15°AOA (+12° AOA with asym-

metric wing stores).

6. MENU FCS - IDENTIFY FAILURE

If reset to CAS is desired -

D Stabilator has reverted to mechanical control.

7. Climb to a safe altitude.

MECH ON

8. Airspeed:

160-180 knots - flaps HALF

If aircraft experiences recurrences of MECH reversions,

200-300 knots - flaps AUTO

do not continue to reset the FCS.

FCES

9. FCS - RESET

v Refer to MECH ON Caution.

10. Takeoff trim - PUSH (recenters stick)

Caution Light

If RESET unsuccessful/not desired -

7. Fly ON-SPEED AOA.

″Flight Controls,

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Flight Con-

(Do not exceed flaps - HALF.)

trols″

9. Short field arrestment recommended.

Resetting the FCS while in MECH may result

10. Reduce sink rate for field landing.

in large pitch-up or pitch-down transients.

If RESET unsuccessful/not desired and

AIL/RUD OFF -

7. Wing stores - JETTISON

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

(Do not exceed flaps HALF.)

9. If controllability permits landing - Short Field

Arrestment recommended

10. Reduce sink rate for field landings.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 29)

V-12-31

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Steady (on DDI) - Nosewheel steering inoperative.

GROUND

If required, emergency HI gain nosewheel

Emergency high gain nosewheel steering is available

steering available on aircraft LOT 5 AND UP

after an FCS channel 2 or 4 failure. The NWS remains

engaged in the high gain mode after the NWS button is

with failed channel (2 or 4) -

released. The emergency mode can be disengaged by

1. Failed channel circuit breaker - PULL

pressing the paddle switch. The emergency mode

2. Wings - CHECK UNLOCKED

should be engaged only for low speed taxi. Emergency

NWS

3. NWS button - PRESS

HI gain operation prevents detection of NWS command

failures so be alert for uncommanded steering. Press the

If pressing the NWS button results in an FCS caution

paddle switch immediately upon detection of uncom-

and single X in the powered channel, emergency HI

manded steering.

gain steering is not available.

NOTE

If pressing the NWS button results in an FCS caution

and single X in the powered channel, emergency HI

IN FLIGHT

gain steering is not available.

1. Consider a precautionary arrested landing (if avail-

able).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 30)

V-12-32

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

FCS Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• One or both rudders inoperative.

Rudder failures may be caused by an actuator failure

(mechanical or two channel failure) or by a switching

valve failing to switch to the backup circuit following a

HYD circuit failure. (The autopilot, and rudder toe/

flare are inoperative.)

Following a rudder actuator failure, the surface is

driven to a faired position by air loads and is damped

to prevent oscillations. With one rudder failed, the roll-

ing surface to rudder interconnect (RSRI) may not have

sufficient rudder authority to coordinate lateral stick

inputs. Countering a rolloff with lateral stick alone in-

creases adverse yaw and aggravates the rolloff. The only

way to ensure balanced flight is to minimize sideslip by

the early and proper use of the operating rudder.

If a dual channel rudder actuator failure is reset, the

failure could be triggered again and reappear with se-

vere yaw, roll and pitch transients during critical flight

RUD OFF

1. Execute Controllability Check procedure. (Do not

phase(s). Transients occurring close to the ground could

exceed flaps - HALF.)

be unrecoverable. During the takeoff and landing

FCES

2. DO NOT RESET if flying qualities are acceptable

phases, any ejection decision should be made early.

for a safe recovery.

Caution Light

Once configured for landing, maintain on-speed and

FOR LANDING

balanced flight.

″Flight Controls,

3. FLAP switch - HALF

Flight Con-

4. Perform a straight-in approach (if practical).

Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced flight

trols″

5. Fly on-speed AOA to touchdown. (DO NOT EX-

may result in a departure in yaw and roll that is unre-

CEED ON-SPEED AOA.)

coverable, even with full opposite rudder and stick. Be-

cause of the rate at which AOA and sideslip buildup

can occur in this configuration, the safe ejection enve-

lope can be rapidly exceeded during the takeoff and

landing phases.

If single engine, departure is probable with the use of

afterburner.

Lineup control is degraded with left or right rudder

failed. Ensure all lineup corrections are performed

slowly and smoothly.

Minimize large, rapid throttle inputs. If single engine,

large throttle transients will cause significant yaw and

roll, making heading control difficult.

Rudder toe-in or out will not be available for takeoff or

landing. Due to a lack of rudder toe-in, bolter perfor-

mance may be degraded. The autopilot will be inopera-

tive.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 31)

V-12-33

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• HYD circuit 1A pressure low (<1,500 psi).

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

HYD 1A is the first circuit turned off during RLS

2. Land as soon as practical.

operation. If caution remains without HYD 1B, the

If right AIL Xs -

leak was successfully isolated in HYD 1A.

3. Read remarks for AIL Xs.

HYD 1A

4. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Right AIL Xs will occur if switching valve is slow/

• Flaps HALF or FULL

fails to switch.

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

• Aileron automatically recovers when hydraulic

If no Xs -

pressure restored.

3. Fly a straight-in approach.

• HYD circuit 1B pressure low (<1,500 psi).

If LEF Xs -

HYD 1B is the second circuit turned off during

1. DO NOT RESET FCS.

RLS operation. If caution remains without HYD

In all cases -

1A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD 1B.

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

3. Land as soon as practical.

Right RUD and/or left LEF Xs will occur if switch-

If right RUD and/or left LEF Xs -

HYD 1B

ing valve is slow/fails to switch.

4. Read remarks for RUD and/or LEF Xs.

D With left LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If flaps

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

are reset, a HYD 2A failure may result.

• Flaps HALF

D Rudder automatically recovers when hydraulic

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or

7°

pressure restored.

AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

If no Xs -

If practical, maintain right engine at or above 85%

4. Fly a straight-in approach.

rpm to preclude MECH reversion.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 32)

V-12-34

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

If LEF Xs -

1. DO NOT RESET FCS.

In all cases -

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

3. Land as soon as practical.

D HYD circuit 2A pressure low (<1,500 psi).

4. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

If right LEF Xs -

HYD 2A is the first circuit turned off during RLS

5. Read remarks for LEF Xs.

operation. If caution remains without HYD 2B, the

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

leak was successfully isolated in HYD 2A.

• Flaps HALF

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or 7°

With HYD 2A failed:

AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

If no Xs -

D No landing gear retraction/normal extension

5. Consider Select Jettison unwanted stores prior

D No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

to gear extension.

HYD

D No normal braking

6. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension

D No anti-skid

procedure.

D No probe retraction/normal extension

D No launch bar extension

FOR LANDING

D No gun

D No hook retraction

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

D No speedbrake

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

If arrested landing not practical -

Right LEF Xs will occur if switching valve is slow/

3. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

fails to switch.

sure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not avail-

• With right LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If

able.

flaps are reset, a HYD 1B failure may result.

4. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

slow speed NWS.

Once stopped on runway -

5. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

moved).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 33)

V-12-35

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D HYD circuit 2B pressure low (<1,500 psi).

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

HYD 2B is the second circuit turned off during

2. Land as soon as practical.

RLS operation. If caution remains without HYD

If left AIL and/or left RUD Xs -

2A, the leak was successfully isolated in HYD 2B.

3. Read remarks for AIL and/or RUD Xs.

4. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

Left AIL and/or left RUD Xs will occur if switching

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check acceptable

valve is slow/fails to switch.

if no RUD Xs)

• Aileron and rudder automatically recover when

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

hydraulic pressure restored.

If no Xs -

3. Fly a straight-in approach.

If practical, maintain left engine at or above 85%

rpm to preclude MECH reversion.

• Dual left HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

(a) Left HYD pump internal failure (needle NOT

stabilized at zero).

(b) HYD 1 leak which could not be isolated by RLS

(preceded by RLS circuit caution sequencing).

at zero).

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

(d) Left power transmission shaft failure (accompa-

If LEF Xs -

nied by L GEN, L BOOST LO cautions).

2. DO NOT RESET FCS.

In all cases -

Right AIL, right RUD, and/or left LEF Xs will oc-

3. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

cur if switching valve is slow/fails to switch.

4. Land as soon as practical.

D With left LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If flaps

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero

are reset, a HYD 2A failure may result.

D Aileron and rudder automatically recover when

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit cau-

hydraulic pressure restored.

tion sequencing -

5. Throttle LEFT engine - OFF

If practical, maintain right engine at or above 85%

6. Consider restart for landing (if required).

rpm to preclude MECH reversion.

If right AIL, right RUD, and/or left LEF Xs -

7. Read remarks for AIL, RUD and/or LEF Xs.

HYD

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check acceptable

D Prolonged use of a failed hydraulic pump without

if no RUD or LEF Xs)

the pump shaft shearing as indicated by the

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or 7°

needle not stabilized at zero will generate consid-

AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

erable heat and may result in an AMAD bay fire.

Consider restarting the engine prior to landing.

FOR LANDING

D Prolonged use of a hydraulic pump without hy-

draulic fluid as indicated by RLS circuit caution

If single engine -

sequencing will generate considerable heat and

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing

may result in an AMAD bay fire. Consider restart-

procedure.

ing the engine prior to landing.

If both engines running -

D Failure of the PTS will result in the display of the

1. FLAP switch - HALF (Flaps FULL acceptable

associated GEN, BOOST LO and both HYD cir-

if no RUD or LEF Xs)

cuit cautions. If the shaft does not fail at the de-

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

sign shear point, it could be flailing. A flailing

PTS could damage flammable fluid components in

the engine bay which could result in an engine

bay fire. Consideration should be given to shutting

down the associated engine to minimize the risk of

an engine bay fire.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 34)

V-12-36

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

If LEF Xs -

1. DO NOT RESET FCS.

Flight control surface affected:

In all cases -

• Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

3. Land as soon as practical.

With HYD 2A failed:

4. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

quired)

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

If right LEF Xs -

• No normal braking

5. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs and re-

• No anti-skid

marks for LEF Xs.

• No probe retraction/normal extension

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• No launch bar extension

• Flaps HALF

• No gun

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or

• No hook retraction

7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

• No speedbrake

If only right AIL Xs -

5. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs.

Right LEF Xs will occur if switching valve is slow/fails to

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

switch.

• Flaps HALF or FULL

HYD

• With right LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If flaps are re-

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

set, a HYD 1B failure may result.

FOR LANDING

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

If arrested landing not practical -

• 2g max

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during land-

• Minimize sideslip

ing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

• Half lateral stick

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

• Loss of autopilot

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not

available.

Remarks for AIL Xs:

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

• Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL,

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

approach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

slow-speed NWS.

HALF, 16 knots.

Once stopped on runway -

• Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

lateral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

moved).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 35)

V-12-37

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both TEFs lost

• Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

Left and/or right AIL Xs will occur if switching valve is slow/

fails to switch.

• Aileron automatically recovers when hydraulic pressure re-

stored.

If practical, maintain left engine at or above 85% rpm to pre-

clude MECH reversion.

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

• 2g max

• Minimize sideslip

• Half lateral stick

High approach speeds will likely preclude

• Loss of autopilot

CV landing. Divert if able.

Remarks for TEF Xs:

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

2. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

3. Land as soon as practical.

4. If AIL Xs, read remarks for AIL Xs.

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in

excessive sink rates under high WOD conditions. The

5. Read adjacent remarks for TEF and RUD

recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the

Xs.

Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• TEF driven to 0°.

• Flaps HALF

HYD

• Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

HYD

power settings are near idle.

• Expect slower engine response.

• Adjust gross weight to the minimum prac-

• Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small

tical.

in magnitude. Power corrections will translate into an air-

speed change before a rate of descent change is noted. Ex-

FOR LANDING

pect larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections

to be required in order to effect a glideslope change. Ag-

gressive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are

1. FLAP switch - HALF

key to glideslope control.

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

• There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

approach power setting and the longer time required to ef-

fect a change.

If arrested landing not practical -

• Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during land-

bolter/waveoff due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out

ing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

attitude will appear flatter than normal.

Remarks for RUD Xs:

• Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

a departure when single engine if MAX power se-

lected. Large single engine throttle transients can

cause significant yaw and roll.

• Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced

flight can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is

unrecoverable.

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-

off.

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

corrections (especially if single engine).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 36)

V-12-38

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

• Both LEFs frozen

• Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

• TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

With HYD 2A failed:

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

• No anti-skid

• No probe retraction/normal extension

• No launch bar extension

• No gun

• No hook retraction

• No speedbrake

If practical, maintain right engine at or above 85% rpm to

preclude MECH reversion.

Remarks for any surface off:

• General Limits:

• 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

1. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

• On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

2. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

• 2g max

• Minimize sideslip

3. Land as soon as practical.

• Half lateral stick

4. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

• Loss of autopilot

quired)

Remarks for LEF Xs -

5. Read adjacent remarks for LEF and RUD

Xs.

6. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

• Flaps HALF

Do not exceed 7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or

• Opposite LEF held frozen. TEFs held frozen in flaps

7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

AUTO.

• Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

• Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

FOR LANDING

HYD

• Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff

HYD

or bolter that is easily controllable.

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

• Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

depending on frozen LEF position. Wing stores will further

If arrested landing not practical -

degrade glideslope control.

• Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change be-

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during land-

fore a rate of descent change is noticed. This may lead to a

ing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

tendency to over-control glideslope. Anticipatory throttle

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

inputs are key to glideslope control.

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not

• Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-out atti-

tude will appear flatter than normal.

available.

• If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL,

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

the TEFs will not retract except for loads alleviation (no

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

higher than 17°). While in AUTO, momentary selection of

slow speed NWS.

GAIN ORIDE will command the TEFs to retract to 3°

TED. However, the operating LEF will also be commanded

Once stopped on runway -

to move to 3° LED. This may drive a controllable but unde-

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

sirable left versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not

moved).

near 3° LED. Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF

retraction is essential for range or fuel considerations.

Remarks for RUD Xs -

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

a departure when single engine if MAX power selected.

Large single engine throttle transients can cause sig-

nificant yaw and roll.

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced flight

can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is unre-

coverable.

• Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

• Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-

off.

• Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

corrections (especially if single engine).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 37)

V-12-39

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Dual HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

Flight control surface affected:

D Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

If LEF Xs -

Left LEF, left RUD/STAB (MECH reversion), and/or right

1. DO NOT RESET FCS.

RUD/STAB (MECH reversion) Xs will occur if switching

In all cases -

valve is slow/fails to switch.

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

D With left LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If flaps are reset,

3. Land as soon as practical.

a HYD 2A failure may result.

If any RUD and/or LEF Xs -

D Rudder automatically recovers when hydraulic pressure re-

4. Read remarks for AIL and RUD and/or LEF

stored.

Xs.

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Remarks for any surface off:

D Flaps HALF

HYD 1B

D General Limits:

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or

HYD 2B

D 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

If only left AIL Xs -

D 2g max

4. Read adjacent remarks for AIL Xs.

D Minimize sideslip

5. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

D Half lateral stick

D Flaps HALF or FULL

D Loss of autopilot

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

Remarks for AIL Xs:

FOR LANDING

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL, ap-

proach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

HALF, 16 knots.

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause lat-

eral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 38)

V-12-40

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• Dual right HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

(a) Right HYD pump internal failure (needle NOT stabi-

lized at zero).

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

(b) HYD 2 leak which could not be isolated by RLS (pre-

If LEF Xs -

ceded by RLS circuit caution sequencing).

2. DO NOT RESET FCS.

In all cases -

(d) Right power transmission shaft failure (accompanied by

3. Airspeed - Maintain below 350 KCAS

R GEN, R BOOST LO cautions).

4. Land as soon as practical.

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

With HYD 2A failed:

quired)

• No landing gear retraction/normal extension

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero

• No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

• No normal braking

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit

• No anti-skid

caution sequencing -

• No probe retraction/normal extension

6. Throttle RIGHT engine - OFF

• No launch bar extension

7. Consider restart for landing (if required).

• No gun

If left AIL, left RUD, and/or right LEF

• No hook retraction

Xs -

• No speedbrake

8. Read remarks for AIL, RUD, and/or LEF Xs.

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Left AIL, left RUD, and/or right LEF Xs will occur if switch-

• Flaps HALF (Flaps FULL check accept-

ing valve is slow/fails to switch.

able if no RUD or LEF Xs)

• With right LEF Xs, DO NOT RESET FCS. If flaps are re-

• DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA,

set, a HYD 1B failure may result.

or 7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

HYD

• Aileron and rudder automatically recover when hydraulic

If no Xs -

HYD

pressure restored.

8. Consider Select Jettison unwanted stores

prior to gear extension (if single engine, con-

If practical, maintain left engine at or above 85% rpm to pre-

sider desired max gross landing weight).

clude MECH reversion.

9. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension

procedure.

D Flaps HALF if single engine

• Prolonged use of a failed hydraulic pump without the

FOR LANDING

pump shaft shearing as indicated by the needle not

If single engine -

stabilized at zero will generate considerable heat and

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Land-

may result in an AMAD bay fire. Consider restarting

ing procedure.

If both engines running -

the engine prior to landing.

1. FLAP switch - HALF (Flaps FULL accept-

• Prolonged use of a hydraulic pump without hydraulic

able if no RUD or LEF Xs)

fluid as indicated by RLS circuit caution sequencing

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

will generate considerable heat and may result in an

If arrested landing not practical -

AMAD bay fire. Consider restarting the engine prior

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

to landing.

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not

• Failure of the PTS will result in the display of the as-

available.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

sociated GEN, BOOST LO and both HYD circuit cau-

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

tions. If the shaft does not fail at the design shear

slow speed NWS.

point, it could be flailing. A flailing PTS could damage

Once stopped on runway -

flammable fluid components in the engine bay which

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

moved).

could result in an engine bay fire. Consideration

should be given to shutting down the associated en-

gine to minimize the risk of an engine bay fire.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 39)

V-12-41

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

D Both LEFs frozen

D Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

D Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

D TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

With HYD 2A failed:

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

D No landing gear retraction/normal extension

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

D No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

4. Land as soon as possible.

D No normal braking

D No anti-skid

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if required)

D No probe retraction/normal extension

If HYD 1 needle stabilized at zero

D No launch bar extension

D No gun

If failure was NOT preceded by RLS cir-

D No hook retraction

D No speedbrake

cuit caution sequencing -

6. DO NOT secure left engine.

If practical, maintain right engine at or above 85% rpm to

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero

preclude MECH reversion.

Remarks for any surface off:

D General Limits:

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit

D 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

caution sequencing -

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

6. Consider securing LEFT engine.

D 2g max

D DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF LEFT

D Minimize sideslip

D Half lateral stick

ENGINE IS SECURED.

D Loss of autopilot

D IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

Remarks for LEF Xs:

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

BURNER .

7. Read adjacent remarks for LEF/AIL/RUD Xs.

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

HYD

Do not exceed 7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

D Flaps HALF

HYD

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or 7°

HYD

D Opposite LEF held frozen. TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO.

AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

D Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

D Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

FOR LANDING

D Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff or

bolter that is easily controllable.

D Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced

If single engine -

depending on frozen LEF position. Wing stores will further

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing

degrade glideslope control.

procedure.

D Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change be-

fore a rate of descent change is noticed. This may lead to a

If both engines running -

tendency to over-control glideslope. Anticipatory throttle

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

inputs are key to glideslope control.

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

D Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-out atti-

If arrested landing not practical -

tude will appear flatter than normal.

D If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL, the

3. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during landing

TEFs will not retract except for loads alleviation (no higher

rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

than 17°). While in AUTO, momentary selection of GAIN

4. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pres-

ORIDE will command the TEFs to retract to 3° TED. How-

sure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not avail-

ever, the operating LEF will also be commanded to move to

3° LED. This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

able.

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near 3° LED.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF retraction is es-

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

sential for range or fuel considerations.

slow speed NWS.

Remarks for AIL Xs:

Once stopped on runway -

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL, ap-

proach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

6. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

HALF, 16 knots.

moved).

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause lat-

eral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

CONTINUED

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 40)

V-12-42

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Remarks for RUD Xs:

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

a departure when single engine if MAX power selected.

HYD 1A

Large single engine throttle transients can cause sig-

HYD 1B

nificant yaw and roll.

HYD 2A

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced flight

(continued)

can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is unre-

coverable.

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-

off.

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

corrections (especially if single engine).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 41)

V-12-43

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

High approach speeds will likely preclude

CV landing. Divert if able. Aircraft will

likely become uncontrollable below 200

KCAS. Maintain flaps AUTO.

D Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

Flight control surfaces affected:

1. Throttle LEFT engine - IDLE

D Both TEFs lost

If LEF Xs -

D Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

2. DO NOT RESET FCS.

D Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

D Left stabilator lost (resulting in non-resettable MECH re-

In all cases -

version)

3. Airspeed - Maintain between 200-300 KCAS

4. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

5. Land as soon as possible.

If HYD 1 needle stabilized at zero

Maintain FLAP switch in AUTO. Aircraft will likely

become uncontrollable below 200 KCAS. Transition to

If failure was NOT preceded by RLS cir-

flaps HALF will result in uncontrollable pitch-up, from

cuit caution sequencing -

which there is no recovery.

6. DO NOT secure left engine.

Remarks for any surface off:

If HYD 1 needle NOT stabilized at zero

D General Limits:

10° AOA for flaps AUTO

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

2g max

caution sequencing -

D Minimize sideslip

6. Consider securing LEFT engine.

D Half lateral stick

D DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF LEFT

D Loss of autopilot

ENGINE IS SECURED.

HYD

Remarks for AIL Xs:

D IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

HYD

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL,

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

approach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

HYD

BURNER .

HALF, 16 knots.

7. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/ STAB/

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause

lateral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

TEF Xs.

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Remarks for RUD Xs:

D Flaps AUTO

D Maintain airspeed 220-230 KCAS until gear

extended.

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

a departure when single engine if MAX power se-

D Adjust gross weight to the minimum practi-

lected. Large single engine throttle transients can

cal.

cause significant yaw and roll.

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced

FOR LANDING

flight can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is

unrecoverable.

If single engine -

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Land-

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

ing procedure.

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-

off.

D Flaps AUTO

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

If both engines running -

corrections (especially if single engine).

1. FLAP switch - AUTO

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

CONTINUED

3. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

If arrested landing not practical -

4. Avoid longitudinal stick inputs during land-

ing rollout (e.g., aerobraking).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 42)

V-12-44

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Remarks for STAB Xs:

Aircraft reverted to MECH due to stab having inad-

equate hydraulic power. This can be the result of exces-

sive, simultaneous hydraulic system demands exceeding

system capacity (e.g., landing gear activation, flap move-

ment, and multiple flight control inputs) combined with

HYD system failure. Can be reset if HYD pressure

>1,500psi. If practical, maintain engine with operating

HYD system at or above 85% rpm.

Remarks for TEF Xs:

HYD 1A

HYD 1B

HYD 2B

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in

excessive sink rates under high WOD conditions. The

(continued)

recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the

Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

D TEF driven to 0°.

D Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed

power settings are near idle.

D Expect slower engine response.

D Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small

in magnitude. Power corrections will translate into an air-

speed change before a rate of descent change is noted. Ex-

pect larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections

to be required in order to effect a glideslope change. Ag-

gressive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are

key to glideslope control.

D There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low

approach power setting and the longer time required to ef-

fect a change.

D Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a

bolter/waveoff due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out

attitude will appear flatter than normal.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 43)

V-12-45

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

DO NOT EXCEED 10° AOA. High ap-

proach speeds will likely preclude CV

landing. Divert if able.

D Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

Flight control surfaces affected:

If LEF Xs -

D Both TEFs lost

2. DO NOT RESET FCS.

D Right aileron lost (faired and damped)

In all cases -

D Left rudder lost (faired and damped)

3. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

With HYD 2A failed:

4. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

D No landing gear retraction/normal extension

D No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

5. Land as soon as possible.

D No normal braking

6. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

D No anti-skid

quired)

D No probe retraction/normal extension

If HYD 2 needle stabilized at zero

D No launch bar extension

D No gun

D No hook retraction

If failure was NOT preceded by RLS cir-

D No speedbrake

cuit caution sequencing -

If practical, maintain left engine at or above 85% rpm to pre-

7. DO NOT secure right engine.

clude MECH reversion.

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero

Remarks for any surface off:

D General Limits:

10° AOA for flaps AUTO

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

caution sequencing -

2g max

7. Consider securing RIGHT engine.

D Minimize sideslip

D DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF RIGHT

D Half lateral stick

D Loss of autopilot

ENGINE IS SECURED.

Remarks for AIL Xs:

D IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL,

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

approach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

BURNER .

HYD

HALF, 16 knots.

8. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/TEF

HYD

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause

lateral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

Xs.

HYD

9. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

Remarks for RUD Xs:

D Flaps HALF (Transition to flaps HALF

will result in controllable nose-down pitch-

ing moment)

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA.

a departure when single engine if MAX power se-

D Adjust gross weight to the minimum practi-

lected. Large single engine throttle transients can

cal.

cause significant yaw and roll.

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced

flight can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is

FOR LANDING

unrecoverable.

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

If single engine -

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Land-

roll-off.

ing procedure.

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

If both engines running -

corrections (especially if single engine).

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

Remarks for TEF Xs:

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

If arrested landing not practical -

3. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in

available.

excessive sink rates under high WOD conditions. The

recovery WOD should be kept as close as possible to the

4. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

slow speed NWS.

CONTINUED

Once stopped on runway -

5. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

moved).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 44)

V-12-46

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D TEF driven to 0°.

D Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed

power settings are near idle.

D Expect slower engine response.

D Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small

in magnitude. Power corrections will translate into an air-

speed change before a rate of descent change is noted. Ex-

HYD 1A

pect larger, longer, and more anticipatory power corrections

HYD 2A

to be required in order to effect a glideslope change. Aggres-

HYD 2B

sive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are key to

(continued)

glideslope control.

D There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low

approach power setting and the longer time required to ef-

fect a change.

D Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a

bolter/waveoff due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out

attitude will appear flatter than normal.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 45)

V-12-47

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Triple HYD circuit failure (<1,500 psi).

DO NOT EXCEED 10° AOA. High ap-

Flight control surfaces affected:

proach speeds will likely preclude CV

D Both LEFs frozen

landing. Divert if able.

D Left aileron lost (faired and damped)

1. Throttle RIGHT engine - IDLE

D Right rudder lost (faired and damped)

2. Airspeed - Maintain below 300 KCAS

D Right stabilator lost (resulting in non-resettable MECH re-

3. AOA - MAINTAIN BELOW 10°

version)

4. Land as soon as possible.

D TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO

5. PROBE switch - EMERG EXTD (if re-

With HYD 2A failed:

quired)

D No landing gear retraction/normal extension

If HYD 2 needle stabilized at zero

D No normal NWS (flashing NWS in HUD)

D No normal braking

If failure was NOT preceded by RLS cir-

D No anti-skid

cuit caution sequencing -

D No probe retraction/normal extension

6. DO NOT secure right engine.

D No launch bar extension

If HYD 2 needle NOT stabilized at zero

D No gun

D No hook retraction

If failure was preceded by RLS circuit

D No speedbrake

caution sequencing -

6. Consider securing RIGHT engine.

D DEPARTURE IS PROBABLE IF RIGHT

ENGINE IS SECURED.

Handling qualities will be severely degraded. Abrupt aft

D IF SINGLE ENGINE, DEPARTURE IS

stick and trim may be required to counter the nose-

LIKELY WITH THE USE OF AFTER-

down pitching moments during failure transients. After-

BURNER .

wards, use trim and small stick adjustments when pos-

7. Read adjacent remarks for AIL/RUD/STAB/

sible to maintain control.

LEF Xs.

HYD

Remarks for any surface off:

Transition to flaps HALF will result in an

HYD

D General Limits:

abrupt initial pitch-up which can require

HYD

10° AOA for flaps AUTO

full forward stick. Transition to flaps

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

HALF at sufficient altitude to provide a

2g max

safety margin for transients.

D Minimize sideslip

8. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

D Half lateral stick

D Flaps HALF

D Loss of autopilot

D DO NOT EXCEED ON-SPEED AOA, or

Remarks for AIL Xs:

7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL,

approach speed will be increased by about 8 knots. Flaps

FOR LANDING

HALF, 16 knots.

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause

If single engine -

lateral PIO especially when approaching touchdown.

1. Execute Single Engine Approach and Land-

Remarks for RUD Xs:

ing procedure.

If both engines running -

1. Fly a straight-in approach.

2. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

If arrested landing not practical -

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent

3. Use emergency brakes with steady brake

a departure when single engine if MAX power se-

pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not

lected. Large single engine throttle transients can

available.

cause significant yaw and roll.

4. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touch-

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced

down to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for

flight can result in a departure in yaw and roll that is

slow speed NWS.

unrecoverable.

Once stopped on runway -

5. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is re-

CONTINUED

moved).

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 46)

V-12-48

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

HYD Cautions

INDICATOR

• CAUSE / REMARKS (continued)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with

lateral stick alone increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-

off.

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up

corrections (especially if single engine).

Remarks for STAB Xs:

Aircraft reverted to MECH due to stab having inadequate hy-

draulic power. This can be the result of excessive, simulta-

neous hydraulic system demands exceeding system capacity

(e.g., landing gear activation, flap movement, and multiple

flight control inputs) combined with HYD system failure. Can

be reset if HYD pressure >1500psi. If practical, maintain en-

gine with operating HYD system at or above 85% rpm.

Remarks for LEF Xs:

HYD 1B

HYD 2A

Do not exceed 7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

HYD 2B

(continued)

D Opposite LEF held frozen. TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO.

D Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

D Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

D Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff

or bolter that is easily controllable.

D Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced

depending on frozen LEF position. Wing stores will further

degrade glideslope control.

D Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change be-

fore a rate of descent change is noticed. This may lead to a

tendency to over-control glideslope. Anticipatory throttle

inputs are key to glideslope control.

D Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-out atti-

tude will appear flatter than normal.

D If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL, the

TEFs will not retract except for loads alleviation (no higher

than 17°). While in AUTO, momentary selection of GAIN

ORIDE will command the TEFs to retract to 3° TED. How-

ever, the operating LEF will also be commanded to move to

3° LED. This may drive a controllable but undesirable left

versus right LEF split if the failed LEF is not near 3° LED.

Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF retraction is

essential for range or fuel considerations.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 47)

V-12-49

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D An ACI configuration that is incompatible with

GPWS/TAWS is detected.

ACI

Information

CFIT voice warnings are replaced with the ″Whoop-

...Whoop″ warning tone.

Visual CFIT warnings are still available.

• Aft Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is not

connected.

1. Verify aft HMD properly connected.

• Aft QDC is not properly secured to Quick Mount-

2. Verify aft QDC is properly connected and

ing Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

AHMD

• Aft coarse alignment is invalid or has not been

3. Aft HMD - ALIGN

performed.

4. Verify aft HDU is properly connected to the

• Aft Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not connected

helmet.

to the helmet.

D INS/EGI switched to NAV without a complete

1. Complete alignment or switch to GYRO mode.

ALGN

alignment.

D Radar hardware needed to support AMRAAM

AM DL

Information

data link not installed.

A/P

D Autopilot mode selected.

Information

Refer to NTRP 3-22.2-FA18A-D (classified NATIP

ARMAMENT

volume) or NTRP 3-22.4-FA18A-D (unclassified

ADVISORIES

NATIP volume)

ATTH

D Autopilot attitude hold mode selected.

Information

BALT

D Autopilot barometric altitude hold mode selected.

Information

1. MENU BIT - CHECK

If ADC status - NOGO (A/B), MUX FAIL (C/

D), or NOT RDY -

1. Confirm airspeed box blank.

2. Confirm altitude box blank or contains radar

altitude (below 5,000 feet AGL).

D Built-in test failure.

BIT

3. During CV operations, recover early if

v Refer to ADC Failure.

practical.

4. ATT switch - STBY

5. Use AOA E bracket for AOA control.

6. Inform the LSO the indexers will be

inoperative.

7. GPWS/TAWS - Unbox

COM1H

D ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with Have

Information

COM2H

Quick time.

COM1L

D ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with presets

Information

COM2L

and EP.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 48)

V-12-50

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

COM1S

D ARC 210 COM1 or COM2 not loaded with SINC-

Information

COM2S

GARS time.

CDATA

D Unit other than MU contains classified data.

Information

D GPWS/TAWS has been deselected.

Information

CFIT

Protection against CFIT is unavailable.

• All systems have not been checked for configura-

CONFG

tion compatibility because one or more of the sys-

Information

tems is not communicating.

• Autopilot coupled to WYPT, OAP, SEQ#, or

CPLD

Information

TCN.

• GAIN switch in ORIDE and FLAP switch

AUTO.

CRUIS

Leading and trailing edge flaps about 3°.

Information

Flaps optimized for 35,000 feet, Mach 0.7, and 2°

AOA.

D-BAD

• ALE-47 indicates a misfire.

Information

DCSCS

• COMSEC failure detected.

Information

• Degrade detected with either the on-board jam-

DECM

mer (either ALQ-126B or ALQ-165) or its inter-

1. BIT/EW page - CHECK

face with the RW.

DISCH

GROUND

• FIRE EXTGH pushbutton pressed.

(FIRE EXTGH)

1. Do not takeoff.

• ALE-47 indicates an expendable Bingo level

D-LOW

Information

reached.

1. Fuel DDI display - CHECK

• Failure in fuel quantity gaging system that may

If all fuel quantities invalid -

F-QTY

affect fuel or CG display.

2. Signal data computer - RESET

3. FUEL BIT - PERFORM

• Trailing edge flaps OFF, leading edge flaps OFF,

FLAPS

SPIN mode ON, GAIN ORIDE selected, or

Information

(Amber)

FLAPS HALF/FULL over 250 knots.

• Flight Performance Advisory System is unable to

FPAS

Information

calculate HOME FUEL caution.

FUEL

• FUEL LO, BINGO, or CG caution BIT failure.

1. Fuel BIT - INITIATE

FULL

• FLAP switch FULL.

Information

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 49)

V-12-51

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• GPS NORM flight phase mode selected and

GPS

Information

EHPE exceeds 1,092 feet.

GPSLD

• GPS loading failure detected.

Information

HALF

• FLAP switch HALF.

Information

L HEAT

• Designated engine anti-ice valve open.

Information

R HEAT

• INS attitude data is not being provided to the

FCCs for sideslip and AOA estimation calculations.

May be caused by an INS failure (INS ATT

caution), by placing the ATT switch to STBY with

good INS data, or by an FCC detected failure.

Autopilot inoperative.

1. FCS RESET button − PUSH

If advisory remains −

HIAOA

Above approximately 20° AOA in flaps AUTO, the

2. Monitor any sideslip excursions above

20° AOA

FCCs use INS data for sideslip and sideslip rate

in flaps AUTO.

feedback to provide roll coordination and departure

resistance. When INS data is not available or in-

valid, the FCCs will no longer use INS data. There

is no significant degradation to flying qualities, de-

parture resistance or roll performance with this in-

dication.

• Forward Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC) is

not connected.

1. Verify forward HMD properly connected.

• Forward QDC is not properly secured to Quick

2. Verify forward QDC is properly connected and

Mounting Bracket (QMB).

mounted in the QMB.

HMD

• Forward coarse alignment is invalid or has not

3. Forward HMD - ALIGN

been performed.

4. Verify forward HDU is properly connected to

• Forward Helmet Display Unit (HDU) is not con-

the helmet.

nected to the helmet.

HSEL

Autopilot heading hold mode selected.

Information

• GAIN switch in ORIDE and FLAP switch

HALF or FULL.

LAND

Leading edge flaps 17°

Information

Leading edge flaps optimized for 8.1°AOA

Trailing edge flaps 30° or 45°

L BAR

• Launch bar extended on the deck.

Information

(Green)

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 50)

V-12-52

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

• LTD/R and/or marker degrade detected.

Laser designation/ranging and/or marking will fire

If ATFLIR installed-

due to alignment errors.

1. TAC/FLIR/SETUP page - IDENTIFY FAIL-

If ATFLIR installed-

URE

ALN DEGD - Neither LTD/R nor marker will fire

If either TFLIR or ATFLIR installed -

L DEGD

due to alignment errors.

2. FLIR IBIT - PERFORM (SUPT/BIT/

PWR DEGD - LTD/R power could be deficient for

SENSORS/FLIR or /ATFLIR)

ranging and/or designating.

If advisory remains -

RNG DEGD - Laser ranging will be invalid but des-

3. FLIR switch - CYCLE

ignating may still be possible.

MRK DEGD - Marker will either not fire or fire at

low power.

STEADY

• Left gear down and locked.

Information

LEFT

--------------------------------------------------------------

FLASHING

• Left gear planing link failed.

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure.

• Improper weapon load or codes or incompatible

LOAD

fuzing. Refer to NTRP 3-22.4-FA18A-D NATIP

1. Check SMS for proper configuration.

and NTRP 3-22.2-FA18A-D NATIP.

• ACL mode enabled and Mode 2 code differs from

M2ID

Information

Link 4 value.

M4 OK

• Mode 4 valid interrogation reply.

Information

MIDS

• MIDS function status change.

1. Select MIDS from the SUPT menu.

D AMU/maintenance card problem.

1. Verify maintenance card installed in proper

MNTCD

AMU slot and AMU door is closed.

Advisory is disabled in flight.

2. If advisory remains - Do not takeoff

D AMU/mission card problem.

1. Verify mission card installed in proper AMU

MSNCD

slot and AMU door is closed.

Advisory is disabled in flight.

2. If advisory remains - Pilot discretion

D Memory unit memory full.

MU FL

Information

Oldest stored data will be overwritten.

NOSE

• Nose gear down and locked.

Information

NOSEC

• GPS operating in non-secure mode.

Information

• Keys are incorrect.

PCODE

• Parity error detected.

Information

• Keys not loaded.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 51)

V-12-53

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

* Immediate action item

v Discussion in part V

DDI Advisories

INDICATOR

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

D Satellite communication lost.

P/INS

Information

INS not being updated with GPS data.

RALT

• Autopilot radar altitude hold mode selected.

Information

1. ATARS switch - ON

If advisory remains -

RC DL

• Data link pod installed and ATARS not powered.

2. ATARS power switch - OFF

3. CLP power knob - OFF

RCDR

• MU turned off.

Information

READY (APU)

• APU on line and ready.

Information

RSET

• Reset cleared FCS failure.

Information

RSET

• Reset did not clear FCS failure.

Information

STEADY

• Right gear down and locked.

Information

RIGHT

-------------------------------------------------------

FLASHING

• Right gear planing link failed.

1. Refer to Planing Link Failure.

SKID

• Gear down and ANTI SKID switch - OFF

Information

SPD BRK

• Speedbrake not fully retracted.

Information

• Control surfaces trimmed: roll and yaw neutral,

TRIM

Information

stabilator 12° NU; MECH stick position zero.

• GPS not accurate enough to aid HUD velocity

VVEL

Information

vector.

• Bulk data transfer error or JSOW overheat condi-

WPNS

Information

tion.

YCODE

• GPS not tracking in secure mode.

1. Select NOSEC GPS if required.

Figure 12-1. Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays (Sheet 52)

V-12-54

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

CHAPTER 13

Ground Emergencies

13.1 ENGINE FAILS TO START/HUNG START

If no EGT rise within 20 seconds after throttle advanced or rpm stabilizes below IDLE -

1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Continue cranking for 3 minutes.

3. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If still no start -

4. Throttle affected engine - OFF

After 3 minutes -

5. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

6. APU switch - OFF

13.2 HOT START

If EGT climbs rapidly thru 750°C -

*1. Throttle affected engine - OFF

2. Engine - CRANK UNTIL EGT BELOW

200°C. If starter has cut out, reengage when rpm below

30%.

If 815°C not exceeded -

3. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If 815°C exceeded or second hot start -

3. Throttle affected engine - OFF

4. Engine - CRANK FOR 3 MINUTES

If starter has cut out, reengage when rpm below 30%.

5. ENG CRANK switch - OFF

6. APU switch - OFF

13.3 GROUND FIRE

Several fire conditions exist that may be detected and signalled by ground crew without correspond-

ing cockpit FIRE indications. These may include, for example, APU exhaust torching, ignition of fuel

or other flammable liquids exposed to hot surfaces, or brake fires. Aircraft location and the nature of

V-13-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

the fire condition will determine the course of action. In most cases, if ground crew signal a fire

condition, the aircraft should be stopped and shut down immediately. If a fire occurs during hot

refueling, the pilot must decide whether to taxi clear or shut down immediately.

13.3.1 HOT BRAKES/BRAKE FIRE. Hot brakes and/or melted wheel assembly fuse plugs can be

expected any time maximum effort braking is used at heavy gross weights with or without anti-skid,

e.g., aborted takeoff or heavy weight landing with high taxi brake usage.

There are basically two types of fires related to the brake system: flash fires and fires due to

continuous hydraulic fluid leakage onto hot brakes.

Brake flash fires are normally short in duration and self-extinguish. They can occur if excess grease

or residual/leaking hydraulic fluid have built up in the wheel brake assembly or on the carbon discs.

These materials may ignite at normal post-landing brake temperatures. Visible flames may extend

from the wheel assembly while flammable material is being consumed and smoke may be visible for a

short time after the fire goes out.

Continuous hydraulic fluid leakage coming into contact with hot brakes may result in a fire which

will not immediately self-extinguish. Setting the parking brake increases the rate of heat transfer from

the brakes to the wheel assembly which may lead to continuous hydraulic fluid leakage.

• Avoid setting the parking brake with hot brakes until the brake

assembly has cooled to prevent damage by heat and/or fire to the

brakes, wheel, tire, and landing gear components.

• If fire occurs with the parking brake set, the parking brake may

become non-operational and the aircraft may need to be chocked.

If hot brakes are suspected -

1. Continue to taxi to cool brakes (if practical).

2. DO NOT set parking brake.

3. Chock nosewheel (do not chock main wheels).

4. Park into the wind (if practical).

5. Cool brake assembly with ground cooling fan (if available).

If brake fire occurs -

1. Shut down both engines.

2. Chock nosewheel or PARK BRK handle - SET

3. Egress.

4. Ensure unnecessary ground personnel remain well clear of the aircraft.

V-13-2

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

13.4 EGRESS

The canopy jettison system uses rocket thrusters to separate the canopy. These rockets produce

considerable flame directed down over the fuselage and present a hazard to the ground crew in the

immediate vicinity. The rocket flame provides an ignition source for spilled fuel or hydraulic fluid. The

canopy control switch should be used to open the canopy unless there are overriding considerations.

The jettison handle is the only means of opening the canopy from the F/A-18B/D rear cockpit.

1. Canopy - OPEN (CANOPY switch, CANOPY JETT handle, or canopy handcrank)

CANOPY JETT rocket thrusters may ignite spilled fuel or hydraulic

fluid and may injure ground crew in the immediate vicinity.

NOTE

• The CANOPY switch should be used to raise the canopy unless there

are overriding circumstances. If weight is not on the left main gear

(e.g., gear up landing), the CANOPY switch must be held to raise the

canopy.

• If electrical power is not available, the canopy must be jettisoned or

raised with the handcrank.

Harness and leg restraints - RELEASE

NOTE

Several options exist for releasing the harness and leg restraints. (1) All

four harness buckles and all four leg restraints can be manually

released. (2) The upper Koch fittings can be manually released and the

manual override handle can be pulled to release the leg restraints and

the survival kit. The survival kit will be retained and may hamper

egress. (3) All four harness buckles can be manually released, and the

manual override handle can be pulled to release the leg restraints.

Oxygen/comm lead - DISCONNECT

EXIT THE COCKPIT

NOTE

If the boarding ladder has not been lowered, aircrew have several

alternatives, i.e., jump from the LEX (an approximately 8 ft drop),

slide down an extended TEF, or step down from the wing to an

installed wing tank/store.

V-13-3

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

13.5 BRAKE FAILURE/EMERGENCY BRAKES

The emergency brake system is powered by the brake accumulator or HYD 2B. Anti-skid protection

is bypassed when emergency brakes are selected or when the ANTI SKID switch is OFF. Normally

limited by the anti-skid system, 3,000 psi hydraulic brake pressure is available and regulated only by

pilot brake pedal forces. When using emergency brakes at high speed, initially apply very light brake

pedal pressure and gradually increase as required. There is a very small margin between effective

emergency braking and blown tires. If practical, rollout speed should be as slow as possible before

applying emergency brakes. The use of emergency brakes at high speeds should be considered a last

resort.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around.

If brake failure occurs at slow speed or flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Brakes - RELEASE

*2. EMERG BRK handle - PULL TO DETENT

*3. Brakes - APPLY gradually

V-13-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

CHAPTER 14

Takeoff Emergencies

14.1

EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY

Off the catapult, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle and/or lose lateral directional

control. Aircraft settle may be the result of insufficient catapult endspeed or loss of thrust by the

engines. Lateral directional control may be degraded by FCS malfunctions or engine thrust asymmetry.

Accordingly, a single engine malfunction may be characterized by settle and reduced controllability.

Priorities during emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of aircraft, arrest settle, and

accelerate for climbout. Establishing control of the aircraft is predicated on arresting roll and yaw

rates. Full rudder pedal input opposite yaw/roll may be required to do so. Rudders are the only means

of controlling yaw, and are effective in countering roll, therefore they should be used as the initial

control input. If rudders are not sufficient to control roll, judicious lateral stick inputs can be used to

supplement the rudders and will help control bank angle. However, large lateral stick inputs may

produce adverse yaw and exacerbate controllability.

Angle of attack is critical to maintaining aircraft control and arresting settle. AOA must be high

enough to minimize altitude loss, while low enough to ensure controllability. An AOA range of 10-12°

provides the best compromise, although at the high endspeeds associated with launches at and above

49,000 lbs gross weight, momentary excursions of up to 13° do not endanger controllability. The

recommended catapult stabilator trim settings correspond to reference AOAs between 10° and 12°. For

catapult launches at or below 48,000 lbs gross weight, a ″hands off″ rotation will result in peak AOAs

of about 12° followed by a reduction toward 10° to 11°. For catapult launches at and above 49,000 lbs

gross weight, peak AOAs of about 13° will occur followed by a rapid reduction to 12°. Thus, the aircraft

will seek a desirable flyaway AOA without pilot input. In most cases, proper AOA control is

automatically provided by the flight control system, however several scenarios (mis-trimmed aircraft,

AOA system failure, flight control malfunction) require the pilot to actively set the flyaway attitude.

Pilot cues are insufficient to enable precise AOA control during flyaway, so pitch attitude becomes the

primary means to prompt longitudinal inputs. Maintaining the waterline symbol 10° above the horizon

results in acceptable AOA control. If lateral directional control effectiveness is lost at this nose

attitude, a slight reduction in pitch of approximately one degree should result in immediate recovery

of control effectiveness and restore aircraft control.

Stores jettison is crucial to emergency catapult flyaway. Timely emergency jettison minimizes

altitude loss and improves controllability by reducing weight and lateral asymmetry in many

configurations.

If flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Throttles - MAX

*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL

V-14-1

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH

*4. Maintain 10° pitch attitude with W symbol.

D Do not exceed half lateral stick.

• Inputs in excess of ½ lateral stick deflection may result in adverse yaw

departure.

• Exceeding 10° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral-

directional control.

• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle.

If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -

*5. EJECT.

Delay in determining controllability will likely place aircraft outside the

ejection envelope.

14.2 ABORT

The decision to abort or continue takeoff depends on many items specific to the emergency. No rule

can be made which fits every situation. Items to be considered include the following:

Emergency condition

Weight

Speed

Runway remaining

Braking conditions

Arresting gear availability

Wind

Weather

Normally, the abort is accomplished by placing the throttles to IDLE, extending the speedbrake, and

applying the brakes. If speed is above the computed maximum abort speed from part XI and an

arrestment must be done in order to stop, the seriousness of the emergency and good judgement will

control whether to abort or continue the takeoff. The ejection seat provides safe escape at ground level.

If a safe aborted takeoff cannot be made and takeoff is impossible, eject. Make an arrestment if there

is any stopping problem. Lower the hook in time for it to extend fully (normally 1,000 feet before wire),

tell the tower of the intention to arrest, and line up on runway centerline. At high speed, avoid large

pitch control inputs.

*1. Throttles - IDLE

V-14-2

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

*2. Speedbrake - AS DESIRED

*3. Brakes - APPLY

*4. Stick - AFT below 100 knots (if required)

*5. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

14.3

GO AROUND

Several procedures cover emergencies such as settle off the catapult and planing link failure.

However it is impossible to write procedures to cover every possibility. The go around procedure

provides a quick simple way to safely get airborne if a situation arises which requires immediate action

and is not covered by another procedure. Use military or maximum power while considering the

current configuration (asymmetry) and the time/distance available to get airborne. If large control

inputs (rudder or aileron) are used prior to liftoff, be prepared to adjust them once airborne. Jettison

of external stores may enhance single engine performance. Once airborne, follow on emergency

procedures may be required.

1. Throttles - MIL or MAX

2. Maintain ON-SPEED AOA and balanced flight

3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH (if required)

14.4 LOSS of DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF or LANDING (BLOWN TIRE, NWS

FAILURE)

A directional control problem on takeoff or landing may be caused by a NWS, brake, landing gear

component failure, planing link failure or a blown tire. Directional control problems may be

compounded by wet or icy runways, crosswinds, hydroplaning, high lateral weight asymmetries, or

single-engine operations. It may be difficult to identify the source of the problem, and time is usually

critical. The decision whether to continue a takeoff or to abort, or on landing, to continue rollout

depends on the speed at the time the directional control problem is detected, the stopping distance

required, and the availability of arresting gear.

Loss of brakes may be caused by a brake or anti-skid system failure. A brake system failure may

cause a locked brake and/or blown tire, resulting in ineffective braking and/or loss of directional

control. A blown tire may cause engine FOD or flap and gear door damage. If decision to stop is made,

the primary danger is loss of directional control. For Planing Link Failure procedures, refer to chapter

16.

If the decision to takeoff is made, nose rotation and/or takeoff may be

delayed by abnormal aircraft attitudes due to failures, increased drag,

and lack of or reduced rudder toe due to rudder deflection to counter

directional motion.

If detected after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available -

*1. Go Around

V-14-3

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

If flyaway airspeed not available -

*1. Select emergency brakes (if appropriate)

*2. HOOK handle - DOWN (if required)

If NWS failure suspected -

3. Paddle switch - PRESS

If takeoff is continued and blown tire suspected -

2. LDG GEAR handle - DO NOT CYCLE

3. Engine instruments - MONITOR FOR FOD INDICATIONS

4. ANTI SKID switch - OFF

5. Make a short field arrestment.

If decision to stop is made and blown tire suspected -

3. Do not retract flaps.

4. Do not taxi once stopped.

14.5 LOSS OF THRUST ON TAKEOFF

A loss of thrust on takeoff requires consideration of several factors. If it occurs early enough to

permit a safe abort, abort. If it occurs after committed to takeoff, consider:

•

Single engine minimum control airspeed varies significantly with configuration and

gross weight. To avoid the loss of directional control do not exceed the following AOAs:

Flaps FULL - 10° AOA

Flaps HALF - 12° AOA

•

Best rate of climb during single-engine operation occurs at or near on-speed AOA

regardless of configuration or gross weight. See figure 14-1.

•

Jettison of external stores to reduce gross weight.

V-14-4

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Exceeding 12° AOA (half flaps) or 10° AOA (full flaps) with the good

engine in MAX afterburner may lead to loss of lateral and directional

control.

When airborne, raise the landing gear to improve acceleration and climb at a low angle of attack to

a safe altitude/airspeed.

NOTE

With one engine failed, at heavy weight, hot day conditions, even the

use of maximum A/B thrust on the operating engine may not provide

sufficient rate of climb capability to safely continue the takeoff. Unless

external stores can be safely jettisoned, takeoffs at these conditions, as

determined from the adjacent charts, should be aborted.

14.6 LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT

If LDG GEAR handle cannot be moved from the DN position -

1. LDG GEAR handle - LEAVE DN (DO NOT USE OVERRIDE)

NOTE

May be an indication of a WOW system failure. Refer to WOW System

Failure for additional system effects.

If landing gear warning light and warning tone on with the LDG GEAR handle UP -

1. LG circuit breaker - CHECK IN

2. LDG GEAR handle - DN (DO NOT CYCLE)

If three down and locked indications -

3. Land as soon as practical.

4. Consider an arrested landing (normal braking and NWS may not be available).

If any gear indicates unsafe -

3. Refer to Landing Gear Unsafe/ Fails to Extend procedure.

V-14-5

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

14.7 WOW SYSTEM FAILURE

An uncommanded pitch up after takeoff may occur if a WOW system

failure results in the aircraft sensing weight on wheels while inflight.

Above 180 knots, full forward stick alone will not stop aircraft nose up

rotation, so nose down trim will be required to regain control of the

aircraft.

A WOW system failure resulting in the aircraft sensing weight on wheels while inflight may also

result in the following conditions:

• Emergency and selective store jettison may be disabled.

• The FUEL DUMP switch may have to be manually held on to dump fuel.

• NWS may be active airborne. Ensure NWS is removed from HUD and deselect for landing.

• AOA indexer lights and approach lights may be disabled.

• Automatic throttle control may be disabled.

• The internal and external fuel tanks may be depressurized. External fuel transfer can be

initiated by selecting ORIDE on the EXT TANKS switches.

• Autopilot may be disabled.

• The inflight idle throttle stop may be retracted, allowing the throttles to be moved to the

ground idle position.

• The speedbrake may not automatically retract with flaps HALF or FULL.

• Pitot-static and AOA probe heating may be disabled unless PITOT ANTI ICE is selected

ON.

• Total temperature probe heating may be disabled.

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CHAPTER 15

Inflight Emergencies

15.1 ENGINE FIRE IN FLIGHT

See FIRE light in the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. If an engine fire is indicated

by a FIRE warning light, throttle affected engine OFF. A fire may be confirmed if the FIRE warning

light stays on with the throttle OFF, or the light goes off and the system checks bad. For dual FIRE

light cases where the pilot is unable to discern which FIRE light came on first, throttle left and right

engine to as low as practical for flight and check engine instruments for engine condition. Once affected

engine is determined, throttle affected engine OFF. Prior indications of high fuel flow, high EGT,

rough running, or smoke and fumes may also confirm a fire. If engine stall is indicated, immediately

place the throttle to OFF. Do not press the FIRE light again, as this will reopen the fuel shutoff valve.

With an engine fire, lower hook as soon as possible. Excessive heat on hook release cable may make it

impossible to lower the hook. On F/A-18A/B aircraft only, external transfer can be regained by pulling

the HOOK circuit breaker and placing the HOOK handle UP. The hook will remain down and the

HOOK light will be on.

15.2 AFTERBURNER FAILURE

Afterburner failure can be recognized by nozzle position. This may be the only symptom that is

immediately recognizable. The afterburner has continuous ignition and attempts to light any time the

throttle is above 50% afterburner and the afterburner is not lit. If afterburner does not light after

selection or blowout, reduce throttle to MIL and reselect afterburner when in a better environment.

15.3 UNRESPONSIVE ENGINE

A unresponsive engine may remain at high or low power or the power may vary randomly. There may

be uncommanded throttle movement, the throttle may freeze, or throttle movement may have no

effect. In the landing pattern, be prepared for an unexpected single-engine waveoff, landing, or bolter.

If the engine fails to MIL after deselecting afterburner, the MIL power lockup system may be the

cause. Slowing to 250 knots and lowering the landing gear may allow normal engine operation.

If the cause of loss of engine control is a severed throttle cable, control may be gained via ATC. For

ATC to engage, the PLA of each engine must match within 10 °, and both throttles must be less than

MIL and greater than IDLE. Aircrew can approximate the parameters required by matching engine N₂

RPM.

If thrust is too high to permit landing, shut down the engine with the throttle. If the engine cannot

be shut down with the throttle, press the FIRE light.

15.3.1 ENGINE STUCK AT MIL (AFTER DESELECTING AFTERBURNER)

RIGHT ENGINE

1. SLOW below 250 KCAS

2. LDG GEAR handle - DOWN

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If normal engine operation is restored -

3. LDG GEAR handle - UP (if required)

4. Land as soon as practical.

If engine remains stuck at MIL -

3. Right throttle - OFF

4. Right FIRE light - PUSH

5. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

LEFT ENGINE

1. LG circuit breaker - PULL

If normal engine operation is restored, for landing -

2. Slow below 250 KCAS.

3. LDG GEAR handle - DOWN

4. LG circuit breaker - RESET

5. Land as soon as practical.

If engine remains at MIL -

2. Left throttle - OFF

3. Left FIRE light - PUSH

4. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

15.3.2 STUCK THROTTLE/ ENGINE FAILS TO RESPOND

Advancing throttle may cause engine to remain at high power with high

fuel consumption rates.

1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE (if possible)

If throttle stuck at high power setting and continued operation not desired -

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF (if possible)

3. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

4. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

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If continued engine operation is desired or required -

2. Consider use of ATC to attempt reduction of affected engine RPM.

NOTE

ATC will not engage with either RPM near MIL or IDLE.

a. Adjust good engine throttle to match RPM.

b. ATC - ENGAGE

c. Initiate descent to reduce engine RPM via ATC.

Once affected engine RPM reduced to desirable level -

d. ATC - DISENGAGE

3. Fly precautionary half-flap approach if practical.

4. Make arrested landing if practical. Refer to Arresting Gear Data Table.

If arresting gear not available or airspeed is difficult to control -

5. Consider shutting down affected engine.

a. Throttle affected engine - OFF (if possible)

b. FIRE light affected engine - PUSH

c. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

15.4 ENGINE FAILURE

If an engine fails, the corresponding generator and HYD 1 (left engine) or HYD

(right engine)

system will be lost. Either generator supplies sufficient power to operate all electrical items. A

windmilling engine can cause repeated flight control transients as the hydraulic switching valves

operate. Various FCS cautions will come on intermittently. After the rpm has decreased to near zero,

the transients will cease, the FCS cautions will go off, and FCS operation will be normal. To prevent

repeated switching valve cycling, avoid stabilized flight where engine windmilling rpm produces

hydraulic pressure fluctuations between 800 to 1,600 psi. If control of a surface is lost due to a frozen

or sticking switching valve, attempt to unstick the valve by gently cycling the flight controls, and reset

the FCS. If the failed engine core is rotating freely and rpm is below 30%, use the APU or engine

crossbleed to retain both HYD systems. If the right engine is being rotated with crossbleed to provide

normal systems operation and fuel flow on the left engine is reduced below 2,000 pph (as during

landing), the right engine hydraulic pump may not provide sufficient flow for nosewheel steering and

normal brakes. Refer to Hydraulic Failure, this chapter, for results of loss of a hydraulic system. During

engine crossbleed, the feed tank of the failed engine may not gravity transfer to the operating engine

feed tank. To prevent this, gravity transfer from the inoperative feed tank may be initiated by

discontinuing crossbleed if the failed engine AMAD operation is not required or interrupting fuel feed

to the failed engine system by pressing the failed engine FIRE button. Extended operation with the

FIRE button pressed may result in a corresponding L or R AMAD caution.

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If both engines fail, both generators will drop off line as rpm decays through 60%. Refer to Double

Generator Failure, this chapter, for results and procedures. A minimum of 12%N₂ is required for

ignition. At least 350 knots is required to maintain 12% rpm. If rpm has decayed below 12%, airspeeds

significantly greater than 350 knots may be required to regain 12% rpm especially at lower altitudes.

If conditions do not allow for a 350 knot descent, APU restart is the last alternative. Refer to Restart

procedures, this chapter.

15.5 ASYMMETRIC THRUST EFFECTS

During single engine flight with external stores, consideration should be given to dump fuel and

stores jettison to reduce gross weight, reduce drag and/or alleviate an aggravating asymmetrical

loading. Close attention to airspeeds is required in all loadings to maintain airspeed at or above single

engine maximum endurance speed (5.6 to 5.8° AOA). Maneuvering should be limited to that required

to return to base using shallow bank angles and avoiding turns into the failed engine. In straight and

level flight at zero bank angle, some amount of rudder deflection and/or trim will be required to offset

the yawing moment from asymmetrical thrust. A slight (up to 5°) bank into the good engine should

reduce this rudder requirement. A straight-in half-flap approach should be performed.

NOTE

• Failure of the variable exhaust nozzle in the full open position

adversely affects single and dual engine performance. No cautions are

available to the pilot except for VEN position indications on the

EMI/IFEI.

• Single engine waveoffs and bolters with F404-GE-402 (EPE) engines

installed may require full rudder and coordinated lateral stick to

control aircraft yaw and roll produced by asymmetric thrust.

15.6 ENGINE STALL

An engine stall is a disruption of airflow that has resulted from mechanical damage to the engine or

adverse flight conditions. Adverse flight conditions that can cause stalls include high altitude, low

airpeeds, high sideslip or high angle of attack, usually in combination with throttle transients,

especially, the throttle chop/re-advance combination. Stalls may occur in the engine fan or high

pressure compressor and are one of two types: pop or surge stalls, and hung stalls.

Pop or surge stalls - The majority of stalls are pop or surge stalls. These are usually indicated by

airframe vibration, engine surges, engine noises such as loud banging, or momentary exhaust fireballs.

The engine almost always recovers on its own within 2 seconds without any pilot corrective action.

Hung stalls - Hung stalls occur infrequently. They may initiate from a pop stall and are detectable

as a lack of response to throttle movement and/or rpm rollback and EGT increase. Without corrective

action, engine rpm may eventually stabilize near or below idle rpm.

Due to inadequate turbine cooling during the stall, a prolonged hung stall

(over 1 minute) can result in turbine overtemperature damage without

indicating an EGT overtemperature.

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Engine stalls may also be indicated by the ‘‘Engine Left (Right)’’ voice alert, L/R IN TEMP, L/R

FLAMEOUT, and/or L/R STALL

Dual engine hung stalls have occurred requiring individual engine shut-

down to regain normal engine operation. With both engines in a stalled

condition, one or both generators may be inoperative. With one generator

inoperative, shut down and restart the engine with the inoperative

generator first.

If the stall does not clear itself, a prompt chop to IDLE may clear it. Checking for stall clearing at

idle involves observing a drop in EGT with the NOZ position opening to the idle position, followed by

normal response to the throttle. If the stall cleared at idle, the likelihood of engine damage is extremely

remote, and the affected engine may be used for approach and landing as required.

*1. Throttle affected engine - IDLE

If the stall does not clear -

2. Throttle affected engine - OFF

3. Refer to Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

If the stall clears -

2. Check engine response at a safe altitude.

3. Land as soon as practical.

15.7 RESTART

Ignition is on with throttle at IDLE or above and rpm between 12% and 45% with engine flamed

out. At least 350 knots is required to maintain 12% rpm. Continuing automatic restart attempts at high

altitude or high AOA may cause the engine to overtemp. In this case, place the throttle OFF until in

a better start environment. The optimum restart envelope is below 25,000 feet. If the engine is shut

down from a high power setting and rpm decays to 0%, temporary rotor binding may occur. In this

case, engine rotation will not be regained until the engine cools evenly (about 10 to 15 minutes). If

crossbleed is not used, airspeeds significantly greater than 350 knots may be required to regain 12%

rpm especially at lower altitudes. APU restart is the last alternative.

NOTE

Windmill restart attempts made after rpm has degraded to 0% may

require up to 450 knots to obtain 12% rpm for ignition.

If APU restart is required, HYD ISOL ORIDE should first be selected for 10 seconds prior to APU

start, assuming good HYD 2B. With the APU switch ON and the green READY light on, the engine

crank switch may then be used to crank the engine for restart. The APU restart envelope is below 250

knots, below 10,000 feet. See figures 15-1 thru 15-4.

Attempting to restart an engine that has flamed out for no apparent

reason may result in an engine bay fuel leak/fire.

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15.8 POWER TRANSMISSION SHAFT (PTS) FAILURE

Failure of the PTS will result in the display of the associated GEN, BOOST LO and both HYD

circuit cautions. If the shaft does not fail at the design shear point, it could be flailing. A flailing PTS

could damage flammable fluid components in the engine bay which could result in an engine bay fire.

Consideration should be given to shutting down the associated engine to minimize the risk of an engine

bay fire.

15.9 HYDRAULIC FAILURE

Hydraulic failures are indicated by displaying HYD 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B circuit cautions either singly or

in combinations. Failure effects can be analyzed by referring to figure 15-5, Hydraulic Flow Diagram,

and figure 15-6, Hydraulic Subsystems Malfunction Guide. Failures which affect flight controls may

also cause an FCS caution. Remarks regarding the flight control effects due to hydraulic failures are

shown in figure 15-7.

Dual circuit cautions in the same system may indicate a pump failure or reservoir depletion. Refer

to the hydraulic system pressure gage to determine if pressure fluctuations are present. If system

pressure has decreased to zero with no fluctuations, the pump shaft has probably sheared from the

AMAD and no further action is required.

Stabilized system pressure below 2,000 psi or fluctuations in system pressure is indicative of a failing

hyd pump that has yet to shear. This may result in overheating the pump and a subsequent AMAD bay

fire. Securing the associated engine will minimize the potential for pump overheat.

Dual circuit cautions in the same system preceded by circuit caution sequencing is probably an

indication of a fluid leak in a part of the system not protected by reservoir level sensing (RLS). This

leak can not be isolated and all the hydraulic fluid in that system will be lost. If this occurs, the circuit

A caution comes on and, sometime later, goes off and the circuit B caution comes on. As the fluid

continues to leak, the circuit B caution goes off and for a relatively short time (less than 7% of the time

since the circuit A caution first appeared), both circuits A and B operate and hydraulic pressure

indicates normal since there is a small amount of fluid remaining in the reservoir. When pressure drops

below approximately 1,500 psi, both circuit A and B cautions come on. To summarize, the sequence of

indications during an unisolated hydraulic fluid leak is: (1) only HYD 1A (2A) on, (2) only HYD 1B

(2B) on, (3) both off, and (4) HYD 1A (2A) and HYD 1B (2B) on. Prolonged flight following display

of both cautions may result in overheating the pump and subsequent AMAD bay fire. Securing the

associated engine if prolonged flight is anticipated minimizes the potential for pump overheat.

NOTE

When an engine is secured in flight, the corresponding HYD 1 (left

engine) or HYD 2 (right engine) system is lost and the associated

hydraulic cautions HYD 1A 1B (left engine) and HYD 2A 2B (right

engine) appear as rpm decreases to near zero. If the hydraulic cautions

were not present prior to securing the engine and a failure or leak in

the associated hydraulic system is not suspected, the FCS may be reset

to attempt to regain a failed control surface and unstick a frozen or

sticking valve.

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NOTE

• Hydraulic system capacity is dependent on respective engine rpm.

Excessive simultaneous hydraulic system demands (i.e., landing gear

activation, flap movement, and multiple flight control inputs, etc.)

combined with HYD system failure may exceed system capacity or

result in FCS reversion to MECH. If practical, maintain engine with

operating HYD system at or above 85% rpm.

• With a HYD 2A and HYD 2B failure, consider disengaging nosewheel

steering (paddle switch) after touchdown to conserve APU accumula-

tor pressure. This would reserve pressure for slower speeds (less than

30 knots) where differential braking is not as effective.

• With a hydraulic leak downstream from the brake valve, the HYD 2

cautions may only appear when brakes are applied. Once brakes are

released, all cautions may disappear. If this occurs, do not taxi.

Continual use of brakes or emergency brakes will lead to total loss of

HYD 2 fluid.

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F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 9