F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

FLIGHT CONTROL EFFECTS DUE TO HYDRAULIC FAILURES

Flight Control

REMARKS

Failure¹

Any Surface Off

D General Limits:

D 10° AOA for flaps AUTO

D On-speed AOA for flaps HALF/FULL

D 2g max

D Minimize sideslip

D Half lateral stick

D Loss of autopilot

AIL Xs

D Expect slightly higher approach speeds. For flaps FULL, approach speed will

increase by about 8 knots. Flaps HALF, 16 knots.

D Avoid over-controlling lateral stick inputs as it can cause lateral PIO especially

when approaching touchdown.

RUD Xs

D Full opposing rudder may not be sufficient to prevent a departure when

single engine if MAX power selected. Large single engine throttle tran-

sients can cause significant yaw and roll.

D Failure to maintain AOA below 10° and balanced flight can result in a

departure in yaw and roll that is unrecoverable.

D Rudder toe-in is removed. Bolter performance degraded.

D Counter any roll-off with rudder. Countering roll-off with lateral stick alone

increases adverse yaw and aggravates roll-off.

D Line-up control is degraded. Make slow and smooth line-up corrections (espe-

cially if single engine).

LEF Xs

D With any HYD 1B or HYD 2A failure, DO NOT RESET FCS.

D Do not exceed 7° AOA if LEF extension less than 10°.

D Opposite LEF held frozen. TEFs held frozen in flaps AUTO.

D Stall margin reduced for LEF locked above 5° LED.

D Buffet likely with LEF near 0° at lower AOAs.

D Expect slight roll-off as airspeed changes during a waveoff or bolter that is eas-

ily controllable.

D Glideslope control degradations may be more pronounced depending on frozen

LEF position. Wing stores will further degrade glideslope control.

D Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of de-

scent change is noticed. This may lead to a tendency to over-control glideslope.

Anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glideslope control.

D Bolter/waveoff performance is degraded and climb-out attitude will appear flat-

ter than normal.

D If AUTO is selected after being in flaps HALF or FULL, the TEFs will not re-

tract except for loads alleviation (no higher than 17°). While in AUTO, mo-

mentary selection of GAIN ORIDE will command the TEFs to retract to 3°

TED. However, the operating LEF will also be commanded to move to 3° LED.

This may drive a controllable but undesirable left versus right LEF split if the

failed LEF is not near 3° LED. Therefore, only select GAIN ORIDE if TEF

retraction is essential for range or fuel considerations.

Note: (1) Surface inoperative due to lack of hydraulic pressure.

Figure 15-7. Flight Control Effects Due To Hydraulic Failure (Sheet 1 of 2)

V-15-13

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

FLIGHT CONTROL EFFECTS DUE TO HYDRAULIC FAILURES (CONT)

Flight Control Failure¹

REMARKS

STAB Xs

Aircraft reverted to MECH due to stab having inadequate hydraulic power.

This can be the result of excessive, simultaneous hydraulic system demands

exceeding system capacity (e.g., landing gear activation, flap movement, and

multiple flight control inputs) combined with HYD system failure. Can be

reset if HYD pressure >1,500psi. If practical, maintain engine with operat-

ing HYD system at or above 85% rpm.

TEF Xs

Slower engine response to throttle changes may result in excessive sink

rates under high WOD conditions. The recovery WOD should be kept as

close as possible to the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin recommendations.

D TEF driven to 0°.

D Approach speeds are significantly higher and on-speed power settings are

near idle.

D Expect slower engine response.

D Aircraft response to power corrections is sluggish and small in magnitude.

Power corrections will translate into an airspeed change before a rate of

descent change is noted. Expect larger, longer, and more anticipatory

power corrections to be required in order to effect a glideslope change.

Aggressive, well-timed, and anticipatory throttle inputs are key to glides-

lope control.

D There is a tendency to over-control power due to the low approach power

setting and the longer time required to effect a change.

D Time to achieve positive rate of climb is longer during a bolter/waveoff

due to sluggish throttle response. Climb-out attitude will appear flatter

than normal.

Note: (1) Surface inoperative due to lack of hydraulic pressure.

Figure 15-7. Flight Control Effects Due To Hydraulic Failure (Sheet 2 of 2)

V-15-14

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.10 FUSELAGE FUEL LEAK

The possibility of fire is normally of prime concern with any fuel leak. However, with a massive leak,

the fuel loss itself must be dealt with promptly and correctly to ensure that sufficient fuel remains to

return to base. Fuel loss rates in excess of 1000 lbs/minute have been observed from failed main fuel

lines. Since leaks may occur upstream of the throttle-operated fuel shutoff valve in the fuel control,

shutting down the throttle may not correct the problem. Depressing a FIRE light closes the

airframe-mounted fuel shutoff valve for that engine at the feed tank and stops fuel flow through the

main fuel line. Depressing the good-side FIRE light may result in flameout of both engines.

The pilot may not be able to visually determine which side is leaking. Use a wingman, when

available, and check for secondary indications to determine the side of the leak. Cockpit indications

may include any or all of the following:

D L/R BOOST LO caution

D L/R AMAD caution

D FUEL LO caution

D Rapid decrease of fuel quantity in one feed tank

D Erratic engine operation at high power settings

D Abnormal fuel flow indications

Land as soon as possible. A normal landing with light braking is recommended to prevent hot brakes.

Turn the aircraft into the wind and depress both FIRE lights before shutting down the throttles.

If a fuselage fuel leak is suspected/observed -

Use of afterburner or APU may result in an engine bay fire.

1. Afterburners - DESELECT

2. Analyze Indications:

D L/R BOOST LO caution

D L/R AMAD caution

D FEED tank fuel quantities

D Engine instruments

3. FIRE light (suspect engine) - PUSH

Pressing the good engine FIRE light may result in flameout of both

engines.

If leak continues -

4. FIRE light (suspect engine) - RESET

V-15-15

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

5. Restart dead engine.

6. FIRE light (other engine) - PUSH

If leak still continues -

7. FIRE light (other engine) - RESET

8. Restart dead engine.

9. Land as soon as possible.

Hook sparks during an arrested landing may increase the probability of

fire.

After landing -

10. Turn aircraft into the wind.

11. Secure both engines using FIRE lights.

12. Throttles - OFF

15.11 FUEL TRANSFER FAILURES

15.11.1 Aircraft 161353 THRU 161519 BEFORE AFC 039. Failure of fuel transfer from either tank

1 or 4 will result in the fuel quantity in the failed tank remaining higher than normal. Fuel from the

good transfer tank will keep both engine feed tanks near full. This prevents gravity transfer from the

failed transfer tank. When the good transfer tank empties, the failed transfer tank can gravity transfer

to its feed tank. The engine on the good side is now supplied from only its feed tank while the engine

on the bad side is supplied from both its feed tank and the associated transfer tank thru gravity

transfer. This causes the feed tank on the good side to reach the FUEL LO level first unless the throttle

on the good side is reduced. Since gravity transfer from tank 1 or 4 is less than engine demand at high

power, it is possible to have as much as 700 pounds of unusable fuel for approach and landing after

failed tank 1 transfer or 2,500 pounds after failed tank 4 transfer. With 2,500 pounds remaining in tank

4, the center of gravity may be aft of the aft limit. Since fuel dump from either tank 1 or tank 4 to

correct this condition is not possible, asymmetric thrust must be used to balance fuel in the feed tanks.

1. Use higher power on engine whose feed tank has most fuel (tank 2 feeds left engine, tank 3 feeds

right engine).

Depletion of either feed tank may result in AMAD overheat and loss of

hydraulic and electrical power supplied from that engine.

V-15-16

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.11.2 Aircraft 161353 THRU 161519 AFTER AFC 039 AND 161520 AND UP. Failure of fuel

transfer from either tank 1 or 4 will result in the fuel quantity in the failed tank remaining higher than

normal. If tank 1 transfer fails, fuel from tank 4 will keep both engine feed tanks near full. This

prevents gravity transfer from tank 1. When tank 4 empties, the right engine is supplied only from tank

3 while the left engine is supplied from both tank 2 and tank 1 through gravity transfer. This causes

tank 3 to reach the FUEL LO level first unless the right throttle is reduced.

If tank 4 transfer fails, tank 1 will not transfer, due to CG control scheduling, until the FUEL LO

warning comes on. This will initially appear to be a failure of both tank 1 and tank 4 fuel transfer. As

the fuel level in tanks 2 and 3 drops, tanks 1 and 4 will gravity transfer to their respective feed tank.

When either feed tank reaches the FUEL LO level, tank 1 will transfer cyclically to both feed tanks as

the FUEL LO comes on and goes off. As tank 1 transfers, the CG moves aft rapidly. When tank 1

empties, tank 4 continues gravity transfer to tank 3 as the tank 3 fuel level drops.

Since gravity transfer from tank 1 or 4 is less than engine demand, it is possible to have as much as

700 pounds of unusable fuel for approach and landing after failed tank 1 transfer or 2,500 pounds after

failed tank 4 transfer. With 2,500 pounds remaining in tank 4, the center of gravity may be aft of the

aft limit. Refer to CG Travel Due To Fuel Consumption charts, Chapter 11.

If tank 1 transfer failed -

1. Right throttle - REDUCE

If tank 4 transfer failed -

2. Land as soon as practical.

Depletion of either feed tank may result in AMAD overheat and loss of

hydraulic and electrical power supplied from that engine.

15.12 FEED TANK TRANSFER FAILURE

On aircraft without boost pump pressure switches installed, a feed tank imbalance may occur at low

fuel state (feed tank fuel only). If a boost pump fails on these aircraft, an imbalance results and

afterburner operation is not available. In this condition, one feed tank empties before the other tank

begins to feed. An AMAD caution comes on when cooling fuel flow is lost to the respective heat

exchanger. AMAD caution procedure should be followed.

15.13 EXTERNAL TANK TRANSFER FAILURE

1. F/A-18A/B only: HOOK handle - CONFIRM UP

2. FUEL page/Fuel Quantity indicator/IFEI - IDENTIFY EXT TANK WITH TRAPPED FUEL

Perform the following steps while monitoring fuel transfer, tank quantities, and lateral

asymmetry -

3. EXT TANKS switch(es) - ORIDE

4. EXT TANKS switch(es) - CYCLE TO STOP AND BACK TO ORIDE

V-15-17

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

5. PROBE switch - CYCLE

6. BLEED AIR knob - CYCLE THRU OFF TO NORM

7. Apply positive and negative g.

8. F/A-18C/D ONLY: FUEL PAGE/SDC - RESET

If practical -

9. Descend below freezing level and repeat steps 4 thru 8.

10. LDG GEAR and HOOK handles - DOWN

11. LDG GEAR and HOOK handles - UP

12. Perform in-flight refueling.

If/when transfer complete but prior to landing -

13. EXT TANKS switch(es) - NORM

If external wing tank fuel trapped -

14. Ensure lateral asymmetry within limits for landing.

NOTE

On F/A-18C/D aircraft, selecting ORIDE on both EXT TANKS fuel

control switches may inhibit centerline tank transfer.

FOR CARRIER LANDING -

If centerline tank is still over 500 pounds -

15. Divert or SELECT JETT tank.

15.14 UNCOMMANDED FUEL DUMP

Refer to DUMP OPEN caution.

V-15-18

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.15 EMERGENCY TANKER DISENGAGEMENT

Emergency disengagement may be required if difficulties occur in either the tanker or the receiver

aircraft. Emergency breakaway signals are by radio transmission and/or turning on the lower

anti-collision lights. If the situation allows, normal, but expeditious, disconnect procedures should be

followed to minimize the possibility of aircraft damage.

The following procedures may result in damage to the tanker and/or

receiver aircraft.

1. Throttles - IDLE

2. SPEEDBRAKE switch - AFT

15.16 CSC MUX FAILURE

The following equipment is inoperative with a CSC MUX failure:

D Radar altimeter/CFIT protection

D Voice alerts/warnings

D Radio control (channel control only thru UFC backup)

D Tacan

D Radar beacon

D SDC reset function

D IFF (and inherently M4, i.e., reply, caution, etc.)

D Lock/shoot lights

D TACTS functions

D ILS control degrade (ILS can only be selected by the ILS/DL switch on the left console.)

D EMCON control (will not be able to go into EMCON)

15.17 DOUBLE GENERATOR OR DOUBLE TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER FAILURE

Failure of both generators or both transformer-rectifiers will cause the BATT SW caution light to

come on if the battery switch is ON. Failure of both generators can be recognized by loss of all displays.

15.17.1 Double Generator Failure. Double generator failure may be caused by a fault within the

radar. In this case, the generators will not reset until the radar is turned OFF. On aircraft 163119 AND

UP, a double generator failure with WOW results in the battery switching off after 5 minutes. If a

double generator failure occurs on a catapult shot or during field takeoff that is not aborted and if the

battery switch remains ON, all electrical power is lost 5 minutes later and the flight controls revert to

MECH ON. In this case it is advisable to switch to ORIDE until commencing final approach and then

switch back to ON. The battery will then remain on for another 5 minutes. Should the battery switch

off, power can be regained for another 5 minutes by switching to OFF or ORIDE and back to ON.

Monitor the voltmeter for emergency and utility battery status.

15.17.2 Transformer-Rectifier Failure. Failure of both transformer-rectifiers can be recognized by

the loss of the HUD, bleed air system, and FCS channels 3 and 4 with an FC AIR DAT caution on the

DDIs. The loss of boosted throttles and cockpit air conditioning/pressurization provide an immediate

indication of dual transformer-rectifier failure. If the BATT SW light does not come on when the

V-15-19

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

generators or transformer-rectifiers fail, the FCS will switch to MECH ON after 7 to 10 seconds unless

the battery switch is placed to ORIDE. The utility and emergency batteries will provide limited dc

power for about 20 minutes. On aircraft 161702 AND UP with double transformer-rectifier failure,

time is not critical since the U battery and battery charging TRU will power the start and essential

buses. If either battery charge is low or the battery switch is in ORIDE, time will be less. The time may

be extended by reducing electrical load. Minimize trim actuation and UHF transmission. Consider

turning battery operated equipment off where practical. Equipment requiring ac power only will

remain operable with a double transformer-rectifier failure and need not be turned off to conserve

battery power. After setting speed between 200 to 300 knots, the FCS CHAN 1 and FCS CHAN 2

circuit breakers may be pulled. This shuts down all electrical flight control after 7 to 10 seconds and

the system reverts to MECH ON where all control is with the mechanical differential stabilators

(ailerons/rudders inoperative). Ensure FCS CHAN 1 and CHAN 2 circuit breakers are both reset prior

to landing. If system does not reset to CAS, attempt FCS reset. Higher than normal pitch attitudes

and/or high fuel consumptions results in an extremely aft CG (possibly aft of the CG limit depending

on the flight condition).

Extreme caution should be used in MECH ON with ailerons/rudders

inoperative. Flight in this configuration has not been flight tested;

however, flying qualities are significantly different from the CAS aircraft.

On aircraft 161353 THRU 161528, remaining time may be estimated as the U BATT light comes on

with about 75% of the total time remaining and the E BATT light comes on with about 25% of the

total time remaining. On aircraft 161702 AND UP, battery status is indicated on the U/E voltmeter.

External fuel does not transfer. External stores may be jettisoned. Reset FCS CHAN 1 and FCS CHAN

2 circuit breakers before landing. See Emergency Power Distribution, figure 15-8, for operative and

inoperative equipment.

If BATT SW caution light not on -

*1. BATT switch - ORIDE

2. RADAR knob - OFF

3. GEN switches - CYCLE (double generator failure)

4. Consider the following to conserve battery power:

D Minimize trim use.

D Minimize UHF transmissions (consider use of survival radio).

D If Double GEN failure on all aircraft, pull FCS CH1 and 2 (will result in MECH ON).

D If Double TR failure on aircraft 161701 and below, pull FCS CH1 and 2 (will result in MECH

ON)

D A+ aircraft - SUCURE INS

5. Land as soon as possible.

For landing -

6. If FCS CHAN 1 and 2 circuit breakers pulled - RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS SIMULTA-

NEOUSLY - WAIT 30 SECONDS - PRESS FCS RESET BUTTON.

V-15-20

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

7. Refer to Landing Gear Emergency Extension procedure.

After emergency extension of the landing gear with a good HYD 2A

system, failure of the normal brakes should be anticipated.

8. Make a Short Field Arrested Landing (if available).

9. Use emergency brakes.

15.18 LOSS OF DC ESSENTIAL BUS

The DC essential BUS receives power through the utility battery contactor from the left 28 volt DC

BUS. A defective utility battery contactor can cause loss of power to the DC essential BUS. A loss of

the DC essential BUS is indicated by disassociated failures and

warnings of the

DC essential

equipment without loss of other AC/DC equipment. This failure is characterized by the following

indications:

D FCCA 1 and 2 Xd out

D Fire extinguisher READY light on

D L and R OIL PR cautions

D UHF 1 and 2 inoperative

D Fuel dump inoperative

D Landing gear position lights inoperative

D Hook position light inoperative

D NWS caution

D SPN RCVY light on

D FC AIR DAT caution

D BINGO caution

If a loss of the DC essential BUS is suspected -

1. BATT switch - ORIDE (Battery remains charged)

If DC essential power not restored -

2. BATT switch - ON

3. Land as soon as practical.

NOTE

APU and crossbleed are not available.

V-15-21

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

BOTH GENERATORS INOPERATIVE

BATTERIES IN HIGH STATE OF CHARGE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Caution lights panel (less GEN and

FLIGHT CONTROLS

fuel level low LTS)

ENGINE

DEL (direct electrical link)

Emergency instrument light

vAfterburner ignition

CAS

Master caution light(s)

vAnti-icing

FCS CH 1 & 2

NVG floodlights

APU ready light

Flaps

Utility flood light(s)

APU start

Flap position indicator

Bleed air leak detectors

Manual flight control

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT )

vEngine ignition

mode select actuator

COMM 1 R/T

Engine monitor indicator

(ratio changer)

IFF emergency

Engine start

Pitch trim actuator

Fire detectors and

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

OTHER

extinguishers

vStandby airspeed/Mach

vArresting hook extension

Fuel dump

indicator(s)

Canopy

IFEI (RPM

vStandby altimeter(s)

Emergency air refueling

EGT, and Fuel

Front cockpit Standby attitude

Emergency jettison

quantity with MODE

reference indicator

FCS ram air selection

button pushed)

vStandby rate-of-climb

Intercom

vInternal fuel transfer

indicator(s)

vLanding gear (emergency system)

Standby turn needle(s)

Landing gear position indicator

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine

fire, bleed air

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ENGINE

Air refueling light

Anti-ice control

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

and normal probe

Bleed air system

Approach lights

extension

External fuel transfer

Caution/advisory displays

Anti-skid

FUEL LO warning light

CK ECS caution light is not

Arresting hook retraction

Fuel tank pressure light

fully functional

ATARS

Fuel quantity

Console lights

Battery charger(s)

Inlet duct doors

Flood lights

Cabin ram air selection

Inlet ice detector

Formation lights

Cockpit DDI/HIs/MPCD

Integrated Fuel Engine

GEN caution lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Indicator (all functions

Instrument lights

Data link

except RPM, EGT and Fuel quantity

Landing/taxi lights

Hook warning light

with MODE button pushed)

Lights test switch

Hydraulic pressure indicator

Internal fuel tank

Position lights

JHMCS

pressurization

Strobe lights

Landing gear (normal system)

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Landing gear warning tone

N_H lockup

Master caution tone

Throttle boost

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Nosewheel steering

Wing diverter valves

ADF

OBOGS

COMM 2 R/T

OBOGS monitor

FLIGHT CONTROLS

DMS

Oxygen gauge

Autopilot

EGI

Radar

FCS CH 3 & 4

RADAR altimeter

ALR-67 radar warning rcvr

Speedbrake

GPS

Selective jettison

Speedbrake advisory light

IFF

Voice alerts (altitude, bingo, check

ILS

gear, engine, fuel low, flight

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

INS

computer hot, flight controls,

Aft cockpit Standby reference indicator

KY-58

mode 4 reply, power, pull up,

AOA indexer lights

Radar beacon

roll out)

HUD

TACAN

Video tape recorder

Left and right pitot heaters

Weapons fire/launch/release

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

vEquipment still operative after batteries depleted.

Frequency selection lost. Will operate on

Aircraft 163985 AND UP

F/A-18A and FWD CKPT of F/A-18B

last selected frequency. Guard transmit

Aircraft 161353 THRU 164068

only

receive can be selected by COM G XMT

Aircraft 164196 AND UP

F/A-18B

switch.

Aircraft 165171 AND UP

Aircraft 161702 AND UP

Aircraft 161353 THRU 163175

Aircraft AFTER AFC 231 or AFC 232

Aircraft 163427 AND UP

Aircraft AFTER AFC 244

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 1 of 4)

V-15-22

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

BOTH TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIERS INOPERATIVE

BOTH GENERATORS OPERATIVE

BATTERIES IN HIGH STATE OF CHARGE

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

vLeft and right pitot

ENGINE

heaters

vAfterburner ignition

vStandby airspeed/Mach

vAnti-icing

indicator(s)

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

vvAPU ready light

vStandby altimeter(s)

vvCOMM I R/T

vvAPU start

vvStandby attitude

vRADAR altimeter

vvBleed air leak detectors

reference indicator(s)

vvIFF (emergency)

vEngine ignition

vStandby rate-of-climb

INS

vvEngine monitor indicator

indicator(s)

vGPS

vvEngine start

vvStandby turn needle(s)

vvFire detectors and

OTHER

extinguishers

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

vArresting hook extension

vvFuel dump

vCaution/advisory displays

Battery charger

vFuel quantity

vvCaution lights panel (less

vvCanopy

Integrated Fuel Engine

GEN and FUEL level

vCockpit DDI/HI/MPCD

vInternal fuel transfer

LO lights)

vvEmergency air refueling

CABIN light may be on but is not

vvEmergency jettison

FLIGHT CONTROLS

accurate.

vvFCS ram air selection

vvCAS

CK ECS light is not fully func-

vHydraulic pressure indicator

vvDEL (direct electrical

tional.

vvIntercom

link)

vConsole lights

JHMCS

vvCH 1 & 2

vvEmergency

vLanding gear (emergency system)

vvFlaps

instrument light

vvLanding gear position indicator

vvFlap position indicator

vFlood lights

vOxygen gauge

vvManual flight control

vvInstrument lights

vvVoice alerts (all)

mode select actuator

vvMaster caution light(s)

(ratio changer)

(and tone)

vvPitch trim actuator

NVG Floodlights

vvUtility floodlight(s)

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

AOA indexer lights

OTHER

HUD

Air refueling lights

ENGINE

and normal probe

Anti-ice control

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

extention

Bleed air system

Approach lights

Anti-skid

External fuel transfer

CK ECS caution light is not fully

Arresting hook retraction

FUEL LO warning light

functional

ATARS

Fuel tank pressure light

Formation lights

Battery charger (s)

Inlet duct doors

GEN caution lights

Cabin ram air selection

Inlet ice detector

Landing/taxi lights

CPWS pressure sensing

Internal fuel tank

Lights test switch

Data link

pressurization

Position lights

Hook warning light

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Strobe lights

Landing gear (normal system)

N_H lockup

Landing gear warning tone

Throttle boost

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Nosewheel steering

Wing diverter valves

ADF

OBOGS

COMM 2 R/T

OBOGS monitor

FLIGHT CONTROLS

DMS

Radar

Autopilot

EGI

ALR-67 Radar warning rcvr

CH 3 & 4

IFF

Selective jettison

Speedbrake

ILS

Video tape recorder

Speedbrake advisory light

KY-58

Weapons fire/launch/release

Radar beacon

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

TACAN

vEquipment still operative after batteries depleted.

vvOn 161353 THRU 161528 BEFORE AFC 049, equipment becomes inoperative with batteries depleted.

vvOn 161353 THRU 161528 AFTER AFC 049, and 161702 AND UP, equipment remains operative by action of battery charger (battery switch ON).

Back-up mode operative only.

F/A-18A and FWD CKPT of F/A-18B

Aircraft 165171 AND UP

Aircraft 161353 THRU 163175

only

Aircraft 161702 THRU 163427 AFTER

Aircraft 163427 AND UP

F/A-18B

AFC 209 AND 163985 AND UP

Aircraft 163985 AND UP

Aircraft 161702 AND UP

Aircraft AFTER AFC 231

Aircraft 161353 THRU 164068

Aircraft 161353 THRU 161528

Aircraft AFTER AFC 244

Aircraft 164196 AND UP

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 2)

V-15-23

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

LEFT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

Aircraft 162394

AND UP

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

FLIGHT CONTROLS

OTHER

Afterburner ignition

Autopilot

Anti-skid

Anti-ice control

CAS

Arresting hook extension

Anti-icing

DEL (direct electrical

and retraction

APU ready light

link)

ATARS

APU start

Flaps

Audio tones

Bleed air leak detectors

Flap position indicator

Cabin ram air selection

Bleed air system

Manual flight control

Cockpit right DDI

Canopy

Engine ignition

mode select actuator

CPWS

Engine monitor indicator

(ratio changer)

Data link

Engine start

Pitch trim actuator

ECS

External fuel transfer

Speedbrake

Emergency air refueling

Fuel quantity

Speedbrake advisory light

Emergency jettison

Fire detectors and

FCS ram air selection

extinguishers

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Hook warning light

Intercom

Fuel dump

ADF

JHMCS

Fuel tank pressure light

COMM 1 and 2 R/T

Landing gear (emergency system)

R inlet duct door

EGI

Landing gear (normal system)

Inlet ice detector

IFF (less Mode 4)

Landing gear position indicator

Integrated Fuel Engine

IFF emergency

Landing gear warning tone

Indicator

KY-58

Master caution tone

Internal fuel tank

RADAR altimeter

Nosewheel steering

pressurization

Radar beacon

OBOGS monitor

Internal fuel transfer

TACAN

Selective jettison (stations 5 thru 8

Internal wing fuel inhibit

GPS

only)

N_H lockup

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine fire

Throttle boost

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

bleed air)

Wing diverter valves

Approach lights

Video tape recorder

Caution lights panel

Weapons launch/release (stations 5

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

(less FUEL LO level LT)

thru 9 only)

AOA indexer lights

Emergency instrument light

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal)

HUD

Fwd console, flood and

Standby airspeed/Mach indicators

instrument lights

Standby altimeter(s)

Lights test switch

Standby attitude

Master caution light(s)

reference indicator(s)

NVG floodlights

Standby rate-of-climb

Utility floodlight(s)

indicator(s)

Standby turn needle(s)

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

OTHER

L inlet duct door

AFT console, flood and

Air refueling light

FUEL LO warning light

instrument lights

ALR-67 radar warning rcvr

Caution/advisory display

Cockpit left DDI/HI/MPCD

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Formation lights

OBOGS

Left AOA probe heater

Landing/taxi lights

Oxygen gauge

Left pitot heater

Position lights

Radar

Total temp probe heater

Strobe lights

Selective jettison (stations 2 thru 4)

Voice alerts (altitude, bingo, check

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

gear, engine, fuel low, flight

DMS

computer hot, flight controls, mode

ILS

4 reply, power, pull up, roll out)

INS

Weapons fire/launch; release (Gun

and stations 1 thru 4 only)

Aircraft 164196 AND UP

F/A-18A and FWD CKPT of F/A-18B

Aircraft 163427 THRU 164912 AFTER

only

Aircraft 161353 THRU 163175

AFC 175 PT2 and Aircraft 164945 AND

F/A-18B

Aircraft 163427 AND UP

Failure of stations 1 thru 4 will not be

Aircraft 163985 AND UP

161702 THRU 163427 AFTER AFC 209

indicated on DDI until SMS attempts to

Aircraft 161353 THRU 164068

AND 163985 AND UP

communicate with failed stations.

Aircraft AFTER AFC 231

Aircraft AFTER AFC 244

Figure 15-8.

Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 3)

V-15-24

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

RIGHT GENERATOR INOPERATIVE - BUS TIE OPEN

Aircraft 162394

AND UP

OPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

ENGINE

FLIGHT CONTROLS

OTHER

Afterburner ignition

Autopilot

Air refueling light and

Anti-ice control

CAS

normal probe extension

Anti-icing

DEL (direct electrical link)

ALR-67 radar warning rcvr

APU ready light

Flaps

Anti-skid

APU start

Flap position indicator

Arresting hook extension and

Bleed air leak detectors

Manual flight control

retraction

Bleed air system

mode select actuator

Audio tones (less Master Caution)

Engine ignition

(ratio changer)

Cabin ram air selection

Canopy

Engine monitor indicator

Pitch trim actuator

CPWS

Engine start

Speedbrake

Cockpit left DDI/HI/MPCD

External fuel transfer

Speedbrake advisory light

Data link

Fire detectors and

ECS (Cold cockpit, defog and

extinguishers

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

suit vent air flow)

Fuel dump

COMM 1 and 2 R/T

Emergency air refueling

FUEL LO warning light

DMS

Emergency jettison

Fuel tank pressure light

EGI

FCS ram air selection

L inlet duct door

IFF (less mode C)

Hook warning light

Intergrated Fuel Engine

IFF emergency

Intercom

Indicator

ILS

Landing gear (emergency system)

Internal fuel tank

INS

Landing gear (normal system)

pressurization

KY-58

Landing gear position indicator

Internal fuel transfer

Radar beacon

Landing gear warning tone

Internal wing fuel inhibit

Nosewheel steering

N_H lockup

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

OBOGS, OBOGS monitor

Throttle boost

Aft console, flood

Oxygen gauge

Wing diverter valves

and instrument lights

Radar

Caution lights panel

Radar coolant pump

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

Formation lights

Voice alerts (APU fire, engine

Standby airspeed/Mach

Landing/taxi lights

fire, bleed air)

indicator(s)

Lights test switch

Windshield anti-ice/rain removal

Standby altimeter(s)

Master Caution light(s)

Standby attitude reference

NVG floodlights

indicator(s)

Position lights

Standby rate-of-climb

Strobe lights

indicator(s)

Utility floodlight(s)

Standby turn needle(s)

INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT

OTHER

ATARS

ENGINE

Battery charger(s)

LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Fuel quantity

Cockpit right DDI

Approach lights

Inlet ice detector

CSC

Fwd console, flood

R inlet duct door

Interference blanker

instruments lights

Hydraulic pressure indicator

FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

JHMCS

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

Master Caution tone

ADF

AOA indexer lights

Selective jettison

GPS

Video tape recorder

HUD

Right AOA heater

RADAR altimeter

Voice alerts (altitude, bingo, check

Right pitot heater

TACAN

gear, engine, fuel low, flight

computer hot, flight controls,

mode 4 reply, power, pull up, roll out)

Weapon fire/launch/release

Aircraft 163427 THRU 164912 AFTER

F/A-18B

AFC 175 PT2 and Aircraft 164945 AND

Aircraft 163427 AND UP

Back-up mode operative only.

Aircraft 163985 AND UP

Radar cooling lost in high temp

ram

air

Aircraft 161702 THRU 163427 AFTER

Aircraft 161353 THRU 164068

flight.

AFC 209 AND 163985 AND UP

Aircraft 164196 AND UP

Aircraft 161353 THRU 163175

Aircraft with AFC 231

Aircraft with AFC 244

Figure 15-8. Emergency Power Distribution (Sheet 4)

V-15-25

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.18 AMAD CAUTION

An L AMAD or R AMAD caution indicates that the left or right AMAD oil is too hot. Low altitude

flight on a hot day with less than 4,000 pounds fuel may cause an AMAD caution. A climb to cooler air

may reduce AMAD oil temperature. An over-serviced AMAD, AMAD heat exchanger failure, hot fuel

recirculation system failure, or motive flow system failure will cause an AMAD caution. An empty feed

tank or BOOST LO caution will cause loss of AMAD cooling.

Prolonged operation of a hot AMAD may result in an engine bay fire.

Continued operation with an AMAD caution may cause loss of the associated generator. If an AMAD

caution is accompanied by generator loss, land as soon as practical. If a landing cannot be made within

15 minutes after an AMAD and GEN caution, consider shutting down the associated engine. The

engine may be restarted for landing, but should be shut down as soon as the aircraft is stopped. See

Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1.

During ground operation after flight, an AMAD caution may occur due to the lack of ram air cooling

and low fuel state. Below 1,000 pounds fuel remaining and above 30°C, an AMAD caution will appear

almost immediately. Above 3,000 pounds of fuel remaining and below 30°C, an AMAD caution should

not occur. Between these conditions, the time before an AMAD caution will appear is a function of fuel

state and ambient temperature (15 minutes at 24°C and 2,000 pounds fuel). Lower fuel quantities and

higher ambient temperatures will reduce the time before an AMAD caution will appear. Shutting down

an engine (left engine shutdown preferred) will extend the ground operating time. If the AMAD

caution appears, shut down the associated engine.

15.19 AMAD PR CAUTION

An L AMAD PR or R AMAD PR caution indicates the left or right AMAD oil pressure is low. The

AMAD can operate 30 minutes after loss of oil without a catastrophic failure but the generator will fail

shortly after loss of oil. Although it is documented the AMAD can operate for 30 minutes after loss of

oil without catastrophic failure, pilots may want to consider shutting down the affected engine even if

within 30 minutes of landing. A L/R AMAD PR caution could be an indication of an AMAD oil leak

which may result in an engine/AMAD bay fire. See Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1.

15.20 OXYGEN LEAK (Aircraft 161353 THRU 164068)

An oxygen leak can cause liquid oxygen to flow through the heat exchanger and into the cockpit. The

liquid oxygen may rapidly freeze the oxygen supply lever and prevent its use to stop the flow.

1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

NOTE

Emergency O₂ may not be delivered to the pilot if the leak is between

the seat kit and the O₂ mask.

2. OXYGEN supply lever(s) - OFF

V-15-26

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Disconnecting the oxygen hose from the console may cause LOX to leak

onto console electrical panels increasing the potential for a cockpit fire.

NOTE

If the OXYGEN supply lever does not stop flow of O₂ and/or LOX

consider use of helmet bag or suitable device to shield pilot from flow.

3. Descend below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

15.21 HYPOXIA/LOW MASK FLOW/NO MASK FLOW

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) or OXYGEN supply lever(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

D Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.) as few as 1.5 minutes (LOX Aircraft) or 3 minutes

(OBOGS Aircraft) of emergency oxygen may be available.

D LOX Aircraft: Emergency oxygen cannot be turned off after being

activated.

OBOGS Aircraft -

4. OBOGS control switch - OFF

All Aircraft -

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

If hypoxia symptoms persist -

6. Remain on emergency oxygen as long as possible.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If hypoxia symptoms removed -

6. Land as soon as practical.

LOX Aircraft -

7. Remove mask when emergency oxygen depletes.

V-15-27

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

OBOGS Aircraft -

7. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system or resuming normal OBOGS

operation if flow appears normal and donning of mask is desired once below 10,000 feet cabin

altitude.

15.22 OBOGS DEGRADE/FAILURE (Cautions of any duration)

An OBOGS DEGD caution indicates the oxygen concentration has fallen below acceptable levels.

This condition may indicate a failure of the OBOGS system. It may be accompanied by reduced

pressure and/or quantity of breathing gas and may result in hypoxia symptoms if corrective action is

not taken. OBOGS system failure may result from a bleed air leak, failure of the heat exchanger, high

pressure water separator, OBOGS concentrator, or electrical system interface. Any failure should be

corrected with the following steps:

GROUND

1. Check oxygen system integrity:

D Mask integrity

D Hose connections

D OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger unlocked and fully extended.

IN FLIGHT

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

• Good flow does not equate to good oxygen concentration. An OBOGS

DEGD caution indicates that the oxygen concentration is inadequate

and hypoxia may result.

• Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing,

loose fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may

be available.

4. Check oxygen system integrity:

D Mask integrity

D Hose connections

D OBOGS monitor pneumatic BIT plunger unlocked and fully extended.

If system integrity not compromised -

5. Maintain cabin altitude below 10,000 feet.

6. OBOGS control switch - OFF

V-15-28

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Once below 10,000 feet cabin altitude and no hypoxic symptoms present -

7. Consider removing mask and resetting emergency oxygen system or resuming normal OBOGS

operation if flow appears normal and donning of mask is desired.

8. Land as soon as practical.

If system integrity restored -

5. Resume normal OBOGS operation.

6. Reset emergency oxygen system.

15.23 COCKPIT TEMPERATURE HIGH

1. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COLD

If the CABIN TEMP knob is full HOT with the ECS mode switch in MANUAL, cockpit

temperature can reach 190°F.

2. ECS MODE switch - MAN

If temperature still high -

3. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

If temperature not reduced -

For OBOGS equipped aircraft (and altitude above 10,000 feet MSL) -

5. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

6. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

7. Descend below 10,000 feet MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion.

Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude, heavy breathing, loose

fitting mask, etc.), as few as 3 minutes of emergency oxygen may be

available.

For all aircraft, if temperature not reduced -

8. BLEED AIR knob - OFF

When bleed air secured, anticipate:

a. Loss of crossbleed start capability.

b. Loss of ECS and pressurization.

V-15-29

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

c. Loss of external tank transfer. (EXT TANKS switch(es) - STOP)

d. Illumination of TANK PRESS and AV AIR HOT lights.

9. Land as soon as practical.

15.24 COCKPIT SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE

Consider all unidentified fumes in the cockpit as toxic. Do not confuse condensation from the ECS

with smoke. The most probable source of visible smoke or fumes in the cockpit is from the engine bleed

air or residual oil in the ECS ducts. This smoke is blue gray in color, has a characteristic pungent odor,

and may cause the eyes to sting. Another source of smoke or fumes is an electrical malfunction or

overheat of equipment located in the cockpit. In the event of an electrical short or overload condition,

this equipment may generate electrical smoke (usually white or gray in color) but should not cause an

open fire since cockpit equipment uses very little electrical current. Cockpit electrical wiring insulation

may smolder and create smoke, but will not erupt into a seriously damaging fire.

OBOGS Aircraft -

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

All Aircraft -

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

*4. CABIN PRESS switch - RAM/DUMP

*5. CABIN TEMP knob - FULL COUNTERCLOCKWISE

• DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin

above 25,000 feet even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of

DCS include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis,

choking, and/or loss of consciousness.

• OBOGS Aircraft: Under less than optimal conditions (low altitude,

heavy breathing, loose fitting mask, etc.) as few as 3 minutes of

emergency oxygen may be available.

6. Airspeed - Maintain 200 to 300 KCAS

LOX Aircraft -

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

V-15-30

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

OBOGS Aircraft -

7. OBOGS control switch - OFF

8. Maintain altitude below 10,000 MSL prior to emergency oxygen depletion (10 to 20 minutes).

9. Consider resetting emergency oxygen system once below 10,000 feet MSL.

All Aircraft -

If smoke and fumes still present -

10. BLEED AIR knob - OFF (DO NOT CYCLE.)

11. AV COOL switch - EMERG

12. EXT TANK switch(es) - STOP

If smoke and fumes persist or fire present -

13. All electrical equipment - OFF

14. UFC controlled avionics - OFF (AC power is required.)

15. Required electrical equipment - ON

Restore power to equipment one at a time. If smoke/fire starts again, secure that equipment.

If still unable to clear smoke -

16. Slow and jettison canopy. Secure all loose articles and ensure helmet visor is down. In the

FA-18B/D, the rear crewmember should lower the seat and lean as far forward as possible before

jettisoning canopy.

15.25 LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION

Decompression sickness (DCS) becomes a physiological concern at exposures to cabin altitudes in

excess of 18,000 feet. The potential for DCS increases at exposures above 25,000 feet or in the case of

a rapid decompression. Aircrew exposed to these conditions should be alert for the symptoms of DCS.

is down.

OBOGS Aircraft -

*1. Emergency oxygen green ring(s) - PULL

*2. OXY FLOW knob(s) - OFF

All Aircraft -

*3. Initiate rapid descent to below 10,000 feet cabin altitude.

4. CABIN PRESS switch - CHECK NORM

5. ECS MODE switch - CHECK AUTO or MAN

V-15-31

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

DCS may be experienced when operating in an unpressurized cabin above

25,000 feet even with a working oxygen system. Symptoms of DCS

include pain in joints, tingling sensations, dizziness, paralysis, choking,

and/or loss of consciousness.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms present -

6. Maintain altitude below 10,000 feet MSL.

7. Land as soon as possible.

If DCS or hypoxia symptoms not present -

OBOGS Aircraft -

6. Reset emergency oxygen system and resume normal OBOGS operation.

All Aircraft -

7. Maintain altitude below 25,000 feet MSL.

8. Land as soon as practical.

15.26 DISPLAY MALFUNCTION

Turn off malfunctioning displays as they may overheat and cause a fire if not functioning correctly.

If all displays are flashing, turn MC1 and MC2 off alternately to see if the problem will clear. If one or

more displays are frozen with an accompanying MC1 or MC2 caution, turn off the failed MC. If all

displays then go blank, cycle the good MC, then back to OFF on the failed MC.

15.27 EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON

The emergency jettison button, labeled EMERG JETT, on the left edge of the instrument panel,

jettisons stores from the parent bomb racks on external stores stations 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8. Pressing the

button initiates jettison. Jettison is sequential by pairs starting with stations 2 and 8, then stations 3

and 7, and finally, station 5. The emergency jettison button is operational with either the weight off the

right main landing gear or the landing gear handle in the UP position. Selective jettison is provided.

On the F/A-18B/D, an emergency jettison button is installed in the rear cockpit on the upper edge of

the instrument panel between the left DDI and the upfront control. Operation is identical to the button

in the front cockpit. See External Stores Jettison Chart, figure 15-9, for jettison procedures.

V-15-32

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

JETTISON PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY JETTISON:

HOW -

1. EMERG JETT BUTTON - PUSH

REQUIREMENTS -

WEIGHT OFF WHEELS OR GEAR HANDLE UP

WHAT -

- JETTISON ALL STORES/RACKS/LAUNCHERS FROM THE FIVE PYLON WEAPONS STATIONS RELEASED

IN PAIRS 2&8, 3&7, AND 5.

- LOCATE BUTTON PRIOR TO EVERY TAKEOFF/CAT.

SELECTIVE JETTISON:

HOW -

1. LT TEST SWITCH - TEST

2. SELECT JETT KNOB - ROTATE TO DESIRED POSITION

3. JETT STATION PUSHTILE(S) - SELECT

4. SIM - UNBOXED

5. MASTER SWITCH - ARM

6. SELECT JETT BUTTON - PUSH

REQUIREMENTS - LANDING GEAR UP AND LOCKED

WHAT -

- STORES OR STORES AND RACKS/LAUNCHERS ARE EJECTED ACCORDING TO THE POSITION OF

SELECT JETT KNOB AND PUSHTILES

AUXILARY RELEASE:

HOW -

1. LT TEST SWITCH - TEST

2. AUX REL SWITCH - ENABLE

3. SELECT JETT KNOB - ROTATE TO DESIRED POSITION

4. JETT STATION PUSHTILE(S) - SELECT

5. SIM - UNBOXED

6. MASTER SWITCH - ARM

7. SELECT JETT BUTTON - PUSH

REQUIREMENTS - LANDING GEAR UP AND LOCKED

WHAT -

- HUNG STORES OR STORES AND RACKS/

LAUNCHERS ARE GRAVITY RELEASED FROM

STATION ACCORDING TO POSITION OF SEL

JETT KNOB AND PUSHTILES

AFTER TAKEOFF:

SELECT JETT KNOB - ROTATE OUT OF SAFE TO DESIRED

POSITION

JETT STATION PUSHTILES - SELECT

WITH AN ENGAGEMENT:

MASTER ARM - ON

PUSH SELECT JETT BUTTON

HARM ANTI-COMPROMISE:

PERFORM LIGHTS TEST

SELECT JETT KNOB - ROTATE TO STORES

JETT STATION PUSHTILE(S) - SELECT

SELECT JETT BUTTON - PUSH

LIMITATIONS:

AIRSPEED

EMERG

0.5 TO 5.0

SEE NATIP

JETT

SELECT

SEE NATIP

JETT

(TANKS: 1.0-2.0)

(TANKS: 575/0.95)

AUX

1.0 LEVEL

SEE NATIP

RELEASE

DEGRADED SYSTEMS : USING AUX REL, PILOT IS ABLE TO RELEASE AN ARMED HARPOON.

Figure 15-9. External Stores Jettison Chart

V-15-33

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.28 ADC FAILURE EFFECTS

An ADC failure is recognized by the BIT advisory and the BIT page indication of ADC-MUX FAIL

(C/D), NO GO (A/B) or NOT RDY. The standby instruments indicate the correct altitude and

airspeed. The HUD airspeed, barometric altitude, vertical velocity and mach information are lost. The

landing gear warning light and aural tone are activated if the landing gear handle is up. To silence the

tone push the warning tone silence button or slow below landing gear extension speed and extend the

landing gear. E bracket data is automatically provided by the flight control computer and the ATC

mode is functional. The AOA indexers will be inoperative. The INS velocity vector is adversely

impacted by the loss of ADC data and may be inaccurate after approximately 10 minutes. See BIT

advisory, figure 12-1.

15.29 FCS FAILURE INDICATIONS AND EFFECTS

FCS failures are indicated by BLIN codes and/or various cautions and when selected, the FCS status

display on the DDI (figure 15-10). The FCS status display should be used to determine the precise

failure immediately upon indication of an FCS malfunction. BLIN codes are not always accompanied

by cautions or Xs.

15.29.1 Invalid FCS Status Display

With the failure of channels 1 and 3, the FCS status display will show the word INVALID in place

of the G-LIM advisory. Subsequent FCS failures or resets will not be displayed. Diagnosis of failure

state can be made using the following:

If INVALID on the FCS and flying quality has degraded -

Check if stick moves with longitudinal trim. If stick movement occurs the stabilator has reverted to

mechanical control, and the ailerons and rudders are off. Refer to MECH ON caution. If FCES is

illuminated on the annunciator panel, channel 2 or 4 is still functioning. Ratio changer HI GAIN only

is available. If FCES is not illuminated on the annunciator panel, a four-channel or four-processor

failure has occurred. Ratio changer LO GAIN only is available. In both cases the T/O trim button is

inoperative.

The presence of the INVALID in place of the G-LIM advisory indicates that the FCS will stop using

INS provided data across the MUX; for this failure there is no significant degradation to flying

qualities, departure resistance or roll performance with these failure indications.

FCS status displays are shown in figure 15-10.

V-15-34

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.30 FCS FAILURE

The reliability of the FCS is very high and, when failures do occur, they usually occur singly. No

single failure will affect flying qualities. The flight control system has multiple redundancy and is

designed to fail to the least critical configuration. Two flight control computers each have two flight

control channels. Within each channel, each axis (pitch, roll, or yaw) is separate so that failure of one

axis does not affect the other two. If normal CAS functions fail, each computer also provides a digital

direct electrical link (DEL) between stick inputs and flight control surfaces. If roll or yaw digital DEL

fails, the computers provide an analog DEL to the ailerons and rudders. If pitch digital DEL fails, a

direct mechanical link from the stick to the differential stabilator actuators provides limited pitch and

roll control. When a rudder or aileron actuator fails, the actuator degrades to a failed/flutter damped

mode. The failed rudder or aileron will be slowly forced back to the faired position by aerodynamic

loads. This failed/flutter damped failure mode has not been flight tested. Depending on which failures

have occurred, flying qualities may be considerably degraded. Due to the variety of possible failure

combinations, exact guidance cannot be given to cover every possible circumstance. However, specific

procedures have been established for each FCS caution. See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays,

figure 12-1, for appropriate action. Each instance requires individual judgement as to the flyability of

the particular failure combination.

15.31 AOA PROBE DAMAGE

15.31.1

AOA Indications with AOA Probe Damage. Pilots should be alert for AOA probe damage

after IFR basket impact during refueling, bird strikes, or icing conditions. Damage can result in AOA

being declared invalid and AOA display inaccuracies. If AOA probe damage is ever suspected, an

AOA/airspeed crosscheck, in the landing configuration, should be made with a wingman, if possible.

Crosschecking with flaps AUTO may give a satisfactory crosscheck, but the probe can be bent in such

a way that AOA anomalies are accentuated in the landing configuration. If AOA damage is suspected,

follow the FLAP SCHED procedures. Also, with a declared AOA failure, ATC with flaps HALF or

FULL is not available and selection should not be attempted.

15.31.1.1 FCC OFP Functionality. With flaps in AUTO, the FCC uses a split of >10° true AOA

between the left and right AOA probes to declare AOA invalid. This failure in flaps-AUTO is

characterized by the following indications:

• FCS caution

• Four channels of AOA are Xd out on the FCS status display.

• HUD AOA numeric display blanked.

• L and R AOA probe values lined out.

NOTE

An AOA probe split is determined by local AOA probe measurements

and not the true AOA values provided for display on FCS status page.

True AOA values displayed on the FCS status page are approximately

0.65 times local AOA values. Therefore, a split of 15.5° between local

values approximates a 10° split between displayed true AOA values.

When flaps are HALF or FULL, there is a difference in thresholds used by the ADC and FCCs. An

AOA can be declared invalid by the FCCs for splits as low as 3.3°. The FCC’s split threshold will

increase with sideslip. However, the ADC will consistently use a split threshold of 10° before declaring

V-15-45

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

AOA invalid. As a result, HUD AOA display, E−Bracket, AOA indexer lights and approach lights will

continue to function when an AOA probe-split is less than 10°. The FCCs can still declare an AOA

failure if the split is greater than 3.3°.

In HALF or FULL, a split between the AOA probes that is >3.3° and <10° is characterized by the

following indications:

• FCS caution

• Four channels of AOA will be Xd out on the FCS status display. (Xs will latch.)

In HALF or FULL, the HUD AOA numeric display and E−bracket are normally driven by the

average of both probes but will be blanked when AOA is declared invalid by both the ADC and FCC.

This occurs when the split between the AOA probes is >10°, and is characterized by the following

indications:

• FCS caution

• Four channels of AOA will be Xd out on the FCS status display. (Xs will latch)

• HUD AOA numeric display blanked

• HUD E-bracket blanked

• AOA indexer lights and approach lights inoperative

• L and R AOA probe values lined out

Refer to figure 15−10 for a complete list of indications and effects.

15.31.1.2

ADC AOA Validity Functionality. Irrespective of flap state, the ADC will declare AOA

invalid if the AOA probes differ by >10°. Unlike FCC declared AOA failures, ADC declared AOA

failures are not latched. ADC monitored AOA values can drift in and out of validity with maneuvers

that cause the AOA probe splits to drift inside and outside the 10° threshold. As a result, the E-bracket,

AOA numeric, indexer light and approach lights may blank and re-appear as the split crosses the

threshold.

NOTE

Only when the ADC declares the AOA invalid will the indexer and

external approach lights will be blanked.

L and R AOA probe values from the ADC and the INS AOA (center) value are displayed on the FCS

status page. Whenever the ADC declares the AOA invalid, the L and R AOA values will continue to be

displayed but they will have a line through them. The INS AOA value will not be lined out and will

always be displayed irrespective of AOA anomalies.

An individual probe can be selected to drive the AOA E-bracket. Probe selection is accomplished by

selecting GAIN ORIDE and pushing the AOA pushbutton to box and select the desired probe. The

pilot can compare the INS AOA value against the L and R AOA values to determine which probe to

select. When either the L or R AOA value is boxed, the AOA DEGD caution is displayed and the

V-15-46

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

selected AOA probe drives the E-bracket. In GAIN ORIDE, the INS AOA value drives the HUD AOA

numeric value and, with Flaps HALF or FULL, the departure warning tone is inoperative.

The INS derived AOA value displayed in the center box on the FCS

status page can become inaccurate when there’s an AOA probe split.

Therefore, if the INS derived AOA value does not match either L or R

AOA value then AOA/airspeed crosscheck must be used to identify which

probe is undamaged.

NOTE

Even with one AOA probe selected, as long as the split between the

left and right AOA values is less than 10° , the ADC will continue to

drive the AOA indexer and approach lights by the average value of

both probes and will be inaccurate. Once a probe is selected, that

probe will remain selected regardless of ADC AOA validity. The HUD

E-bracket and AOA numeric will continue to be displayed as long as

GAIN ORIDE and a probe is selected. If GAIN ORIDE is not selected,

the HUD AOA numeric and E-bracket will blank when the ADC

declares AOA invalid (i.e., AOA probe splits >10°).

15.31.1.3

DAMAGED AOA PROBE PROCEDURE

The following procedure should be used for suspected AOA probe damage:

SUSPECTED AOA PROBE DAMAGE

1. FCS page - SELECT

2. Identify/confirm damaged probe.

3. Perform AOA/airspeed check before and after going dirty.

4. Refer to FLAP SCHED caution CORRECTIVE ACTION.

15.31.2 Jammed AOA Probe On Takeoff. When an AOA probe-split occurs within

seconds of

takeoff (WoffW), FCC AOA is set at a fixed value of 10° and flaps-transition is inhibited, regardless

of FLAP switch position, to prevent undesirable transients. The AOA probe-split threshold used by the

FCC can be as little as 3.3° depending on sideslip. Two to ten seconds after WoffW, the FCS caution

appears and all four AOA channels X-out on the FCS status display. The FCS will switch from using

the fixed AOA value of 10° to using an estimated AOA value, calculated by the FCC, when an FCS reset

V-15-47

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

is performed or flap blow−up speed is exceeded. If Auto flaps is selected after takeoff, within the

12-second window, the flaps will retract at the end of 12 seconds.

NOTE

If the AOA tone is heard during takeoff roll, it may be an indication of

dual stuck probes and the aircraft may not have sufficient pitch

authority to rotate.

AOA

Flaps HALF or FULL

Flaps Auto

Flaps HALF or FULL

Flaps Auto

Flaps HALF or FULL

Status

No Split

Split >3.3 and <10

Split >10

HUD AOA: displayed

HUD AOA: blanked

HUD AOA: displayed

E−bracket:

E−bracket: blanked

E−bracket: displayed

N/A

Indexers: blanked

Indexers: displayed

Indexers:

FCS AOA Xs: SET

Displays

FCS AOA Xs: not set

FCS AOA Xs: SET

N/A

FCS caution: SET

FCS caution: not set

FCS caution: SET

FCS AOA Xs: not set

FCS AOA Xs: SET

FLAP SCHED: not

FLAP SCHED: not set

FCS caution: not set

FCS caution: SET

set

L/R AOA: displayed

L/R AOA: lined out

Indexer &

External

Operative

Will be inaccurate.

Inoperative

Approach

Lights

Figure 15-11. AOA Probe Indications and Effects

15.32 PITOT STATIC PROBE DAMAGE.

Be alert for unannunciated pitot static probe damage after IFR basket impact during refueling, bird

strikes, or icing conditions. The ADC can produce erroneous signals without any cautions or advisories

if the pitot static probes sustain damage. HUD displayed airspeed may be inaccurate without error

indications. Airspeed checks with a wingman should be made in the landing configuration if a damaged

pitot static probe is suspected. Crosschecking in the cruise configuration may give a satisfactory

crosscheck, but the probe may be bent in such a way that pitot static anomalies are accentuated in

landing configuration.

The standby airspeed indicator receives signals from the left pitot static probe, so it will be accurate

if only the right probe is damaged. If the left probe is damaged, the static source selector can be used

to select the static pressure source from the right probe. The static source lever allows selection of right

(BACKUP) or left (NORMAL) secondary static pressure to be applied to the standby indicated

airspeed indicator, standby pressure altimeter, and standby vertical velocity speed indicator. With

lever in the horizontal position, the selector valve is in NORMAL, with lever in the vertical position,

the selector valve is in BACKUP.

NOTE

A detached pitot static line may cause malfunctions similar to those

caused by a damaged pitot static probe. Selection of the secondary

static source may or may not eliminate the problem.

V-15-48

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

If the GPS fails or is not available, and only ADC inputs are being used, inaccurate pitot static

information will degrade INS performance.

If inflight damage to a pitot static probe is suspected, air data may be

unreliable and FC AIR DAT procedures should be followed.

15.33 DIRECT ELECTRICAL LINK (DEL)

See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. Direct electrical link (DEL) operation

results from the lack of reliable feedback data or operation within the FCS. DEL operation will usually

occur in only one axis but yaw DEL operation forces the roll channel into roll DEL. In the DEL mode,

pilot inputs position the control surfaces as a direct function of pilot input.

15.33.1 Digital DEL - DEL ON Caution. The digital roll DEL function is activated for any one of the

following conditions: three roll rate gyro failures, reversion to digital yaw DEL, or reversion to analog

yaw DEL. The digital yaw DEL function is activated for a three yaw rate gyro failure condition. The

digital pitch DEL function is activated for any one of the following conditions:

With flaps in AUTO: three pitch rate gyro failures, or three normal accelerometer failures.

With flaps in HALF or FULL: three pitch rate gyro failures.

15.33.2 Digital DEL. If the FCS reverts to pitch DEL at transonic or supersonic speed, decelerate to

400 knots/Mach 0.8 to reduce the longitudinal PIO tendency. If the FCS reverts to roll and yaw DEL

at transonic or supersonic speeds, slowly decelerate to below 400 knots/Mach 0.8 to reduce the

uncomfortable sideforce oscillations due to weak dutch roll damping.

In pitch DEL there is very little stabilator authority available. Therefore,

the g available is extremely limited.

The use of the speedbrake in pitch DEL should be avoided, since it will normally lead to moderate

longitudinal PIO. However, the speedbrake can be used for a 1 g incremental increase if required in an

extreme situation. The trim rates are noticeably slower than in CAS, but they will allow neutral

trimmed flight throughout the airspeed envelope. Damping of aircraft motion occurs only as a result

of natural aircraft stability and is not enhanced by the FCS. Pilot inputs should be gentle at higher

airspeeds since rapid inputs may aggravate the aircraft oscillations. Rapid power changes should be

minimized as they may result in aggravation of PIO tendency due to trim changes. In roll and yaw DEL

the use of the rudder is not recommended due to control sensitivity and dutch roll excitation. In pitch

DEL, lateral stick inputs will couple into the pitch axis as a nose up rotation and will require a

corresponding pitch input to correct. Normal formation flight and air refueling is possible with any axis

V-15-49

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

in DEL; however, caution must be exercised due to the reduced damping characteristics. Minimize

in-close corrections during air refueling to prevent PIO.

Roll rates are significantly reduced at airspeeds above Mach 0.94 in roll

or roll plus yaw DEL and may be as low as 65°/second.

For carrier or field landing, fly on-speed with flaps HALF. After a bolter in pitch DEL a large pitch

up will occur which can be stopped with forward stick force. A similar pitch up will occur after a field

landing and the pilot must consciously keep the aircraft on the ground; once stabilized after touchdown

normal roll-out procedures can be used. Recommend field landings be conducted using a reduced sink

rate to minimize the pitch up tendency. During approach in roll DEL the aircraft is easily excited in

roll, resulting in a constant 2 or 3° roll oscillation. There is also no roll limiting, so lateral inputs will

produce a noticeable increase in roll rates and roll response. The increased roll response may lead to

a lateral PIO if large rapid inputs are used. Do not use more than ½ lateral stick or rudder pedal in

approach configuration in roll DEL or roll plus yaw DEL, due to excessive sideslip and dutch roll;

however, small timely rudder inputs can be used to dampen directional oscillations. Minimize

maneuvering above on-speed when in roll and yaw DEL due to magnitude of sideslip generated.

Jettison asymmetric wing stores. Minimize rapid power applications during approach in roll and yaw

DEL with asymmetric stores as they will couple into the directional axis creating uncomfortable side

forces. Do not exceed +12° AOA during approach maneuvering with asymmetric stores. Recommend a

reduced sink rate landing with a short field arrestment when landing with asymmetric stores.

If a waveoff is carried out in pitch DEL, the pilot encounters a substantial

stick force change during flap retraction. Almost full aft stick is required

to maintain level flight.

For shipboard landings fly a straight-in approach with flaps HALF at on-speed AOA. The ability to

effectively fly the aircraft with degraded flight controls increases significantly with time (steep learning

curve). Consider lowering the gear and flaps (HALF flaps) early to evaluate the approach flying

qualities. The ACLS/ILS needles would be used to ensure proper lineup by the “in the middle”

positions. The LSO waveoff window should also be moved farther out such that only small

glideslope/lineup corrections are required from the “in the middle” position.

15.33.3 Analog DEL. The FCS reverts to analog roll DEL and analog yaw DEL if there are three

digital processor failures. In addition the analog roll DEL function is activated if three channels to the

ailerons are Xd out and the analog yaw DEL function is activated if three channels to the rudders are

Xd out. If the aircraft selects yaw DEL, the control laws also activate the digital roll DEL function. The

flying qualities described for digital DEL

(DEL ON caution) may or may not apply to this

configuration. There is no analog pitch DEL mode.

If yaw analog DEL is active, the pilot’s rudder pedal provides direct rudder control. If roll analog

DEL is active, the pilot’s lateral stick provides direct aileron control. Control surfaces move at a rate

directly proportional to pilot input.

V-15-50

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

In roll analog DEL, the FCS provides no roll augmentation nor roll damping. Make shallow angle of

bank turns and minimize side to side stick movements.

In yaw analog DEL, the FCS provides no roll and yaw augmentation. The aircraft will exhibit poor

Dutch roll damping and poor turn coordination. If the aircraft selects yaw DEL, the control laws also

activate the roll DEL function. Make shallow angle of bank, rudder coordinated turns and minimize

side stick movements. Rudder pedal inputs are required to provide the direct electrical link to the

rudders.

Extreme caution should be used in analog DEL. Flight in this configu-

ration has not been flight tested.

NOTE

• No air data flight control scheduling is available in analog DEL. The

aircraft is more controllable in Full or Half flaps due to the availability

of AOA information for control surface scheduling.

• The DEL ON caution is not displayed when in the analog roll DEL

mode. The DEL ON caution is displayed when in analog yaw DEL

since digital roll DEL is activated.

15.34 UNCOMMANDED PITCH AND ROLL EXCURSIONS

A stabilator simultaneous dual or four-channel feedback failure can cause uncommanded pitch and

roll excursions. Unless pilot action is taken, the stabilator will not revert to MECH ON operation and

the pitch and roll excursions will continue. Check the FCS status display. If there are two channel

indications, a dual-channel failure has occurred. If there are no failure indications, a four-channel

failure has occurred.

For a dual-channel failure, pulling one of the operating FCS channel circuit breakers causes the

stabilators to revert to MECH ON with the ailerons, rudders and flaps operating normally in CAS. This

configuration is adequate for field and shipboard landings at half flaps and onspeed AOA.

Resetting the circuit breaker causes a return to the original failure mode

with the resulting uncommanded pitch and roll excursions.

Refer to MECH ON Caution procedure for description of flight characteristics in the MECH ON

mode.

For a four-channel failure, the only way to stop pitch and roll excursions is to pull three FCS circuit

breakers to force the stabilator to MECH ON with ailerons, rudders, and flaps inoperative. This

configuration has been safely flown at altitude but has not been flight tested. The aircraft should be

trimmed, and flown as stick free as possible. Large rapid stick inputs result in extreme overshoots.

Landing in either configuration is predicted to be hazardous.

V-15-51

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

1. Speedbrake - CHECK IN

2. Decelerate slowly below 400 knots/Mach 0.8.

3. Paddle switch - PRESS

If two channel failure indications in one stabilator -

4. Pull one operating FCS channel circuit breaker. DO NOT RESET.

5. Refer to MECH ON procedure.

If no FCS failure indications -

6. Climb to safe altitude.

7. Airspeed: below 250 knots.

8. Flaps - FULL

9. Lower gear and make Controllability Check.

10. If controllability permits landing - Short Field arrestment recommended

If control unsuitable for landing -

11. Climb to safe altitude.

12. Pull FCC circuit breakers 1, 2, and 3. DO NOT RESET.

13. Refer to MECH ON procedures.

15.34.1

Uncommanded Roll Excursion with Aileron Surface Missing/Damaged. Cracks in aileron

outboard hinges may lead to failure resulting in partial or total loss of the control surface. An aileron

hinge failure may be suspected if a sudden uncommanded roll-off combined with yaw and pitch occurs

without an AIL OFF or FCS caution, a ″Flight Controls, Flight Controls″ alert or associated FCS Xs

or BLIN codes. If the hinge has failed, it is likely that a portion of or all of the aileron surface will

detach from the wing. However, aileron actuator functionality may be unaffected. The aileron position

indicator on the FCS page will indicate the position of the actuator rod-end, even though the control

surface is no longer attached. The only way to confirm this failure is a visual check of the suspected

aileron surface to determine if the aileron surface is still attached and responding to control inputs.

Aileron surface departure may result in structural damage to the wing, empennage or fuselage. If the

failed surface remains attached to the wing it may result in wing and/or aileron oscillations. If

oscillations occur, immediately reduce airspeed by decelerating at 1g until the oscillations subside or

are minimized. Maintain AOA <10°.

If aileron or wing oscillations are present, failure to immediately reduce

airspeed until oscillations subside or are minimized may result in further

structural failure.

V-15-52

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Piloted simulation with a missing aileron has shown that flying qualities are degraded but adequate

for all flap settings below 10° AOA. Lateral stick against the roll and rudder pedal in the opposite

direction to counter side force buildup will be required for balanced flight. Aircraft response to normal

control inputs is uncoordinated and roll performance will be more sluggish when rolling away from the

detached/missing aileron. Lateral stick inputs will result in directional excursions. Lateral-directional

motion will be lightly damped. Flap transitions to AUTO at low airspeeds and high gross weights may

result in unrecoverable departure. If aileron damage occurs immediately after takeoff, selecting MAX

throttles when airspeed is less than 220 KCAS and delaying selection of flaps AUTO until the flaps

have scheduled up (above 250 KCAS) minimizes the risk of departure. Minimizing gross weight by

jettisoning stores and maximizing acceleration improves flying qualities through the flap transition

region.

Flap transition to AUTO below 250 KCAS can result in large roll and yaw

oscillations leading to unrecoverable departure, particularly at higher

gross weights. Using smooth rudder pedal and stick inputs when control-

ling roll and yaw during transition will help avoid PIO. Reducing gross

weight will reduce oscillations during transition.

Flying qualities are adequate for a shore-based landing; however, CV landings are extremely

hazardous and are not recommended.

Approaches to the ship are extremely hazardous. High rudder pedal and

lateral stick forces required to keep a nominal sight picture will increase

pilot workload and fatigue on approach. Ground loads may overstress the

landing gear on touchdown due to combined roll/yaw attitudes. Line-up

corrections in-close result in bank angle on touchdown that can result in

a wingtip engaging the arresting wire. The aircraft will tend to drift

towards the failed aileron and the LSO should expect constant line-up

corrections on approach. At touchdown, NWS will engage with WonW

and will cause large centerline excursions if rudder pedal inputs are not

removed at touchdown.

If carrier-based, divert to an appropriate airfield. When determining the divert/BINGO profile,

consider the presence of wing or aileron oscillations and flap setting and their impact on divert airspeed

and fuel management.

Bingo profile may be adversely affected due to reduced airspeed neces-

sary to avoid oscillations. Allow for a controllability check prior to

landing.

Prior to landing, conduct a Controllability Check. Consideration should be given to jettisoning stores

on failed wing to reduce lateral weight asymmetry and gross weight for landing. Determine whether

V-15-53

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Flaps - HALF or Flaps - AUTO is appropriate based on crosswinds at the landing site. If crosswinds

at the landing site are 15 knots or less, conduct Flaps - HALF Controllability Check, otherwise conduct

FLAPS - AUTO Controllability Check.

NOTE

Flap transition from AUTO to HALF may result in roll into the failed

aileron but does not result in significant transients.

Lateral weight asymmetries with heavy wing on the failed side will aggravate the roll-off and may

preclude the aircrew’s ability to zero the roll-off with trim.

Flying qualities should be adequate for a shore-based approach to landing. Flying qualities may be

degraded such that roll inputs are sluggish and aircraft response to control stick or throttle inputs may

be coupled in roll, pitch, and yaw. Line-up corrections will be sluggish and a straight-in approach is

required to avoid late corrections.

Uncommanded Roll Excursion with Aileron Surface Missing/Damaged Procedure:

1. Reduce load factor to 1g and maintain balanced flight.

2. Do not exceed 10° AOA.

Exceeding 12° AOA may result in an uncontrollable roll-off into the

missing aileron resulting in OCF. If an uncontrollable roll-off occurs,

immediately reduce AOA. If aileron or wing oscillations are present,

failure to immediately reduce airspeed until oscillations cease can result

in further structural failure.

If FLAPS FULL -

3. FLAP switch - HALF

4. Maintain airspeed below 230 KCAS.

If carrier-based -

5. DIVERT.

If FLAPS AUTO required for divert or for high crosswind landing (>15 kts) -

6. Reduce gross weight to the maximum extent practical (SEL JETT stores).

7. Throttles - MAX for Flap transition

8. Above 250 KCAS - FLAP switch - AUTO

V-15-54

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

Flap transition to AUTO below 250 KCAS can result in large roll and yaw

oscillations leading to unrecoverable departure, particularly at higher

gross weights. Using smooth rudder pedal and stick inputs when control-

ling roll and yaw during transition will help avoid PIO. Reducing gross

weight will reduce oscillations during transition.

Bingo profile may be adversely affected due to reduced airspeed neces-

sary to avoid oscillations. Allow for a controllability check prior to

landing.

For all cases -

9. Use smooth control inputs.

10. Land as soon as practical.

FOR LANDING

1. Execute Controllability Check procedure.

D If crosswinds at field are 15 knots or less - FLAPS HALF.

D If crosswinds at field are >15 knots - FLAPS AUTO. Consider maximum groundspeed for tires

and arresting gear. If groundspeed is excessive, reduce gross weight or consider flying up to 10°

AOA approach.

D If able, SEL JETT stores on the same side as the missing aileron to reduce asymmetry on failed

wing.

NOTE

Lateral weight asymmetry with the heavy wing opposite to the missing

aileron improves flying qualities. Lateral weight asymmetries greater

than 4,000 ft-lbs with heavy wing on same side as the missing aileron

severely degrade flying qualities.

2. Fly a straight-in approach.

3. Fly a crabbed approach, taking out half the crab just before touchdown.

V-15-55

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

4. Make an arrested landing (if practical).

Expect unusually large crab angles with crosswind. If possible, land with

crosswind into the missing aileron. NWS will engage with WonW and will

cause large centerline excursions on the runway if rudder pedal inputs are

not removed at touchdown. Use rudder trim to the maximum extent.

Expect directional oscillations on touchdown when pedal is required.

15.35 MECH ON CAUTION

Refer to Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. Mechanical operation (MECH ON) can

be the result of various FCS failures (with or without ailerons and rudders operative); complete

electrical failure, including the battery (without ailerons and rudders operative); or as a deliberate pilot

selection (pulling FCC channels 1 and 2 circuit breakers) to conserve battery power for landing after

a double generator/double transformer-rectifier failure (without ailerons and rudders operative).

• Extreme caution should be exercised in MECH ON with ailerons/

rudders inoperative. This configuration has not been flight-tested.

• Reversion to MECH ON has often resulted in large pitch-up or

pitch-down transients.

• Resetting the FCS while in MECH may result in large pitch-up or

pitch-down transients.

15.36 MECH ON WITH AIL AND RUD OPERATIVE

Refer to Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. If no surface hardover failures occur,

reversions into MECH ON are normally characterized by a rapidly increasing aft stick force, stabilized

at 3 to 5 pounds for flaps AUTO and 15 to 25 pounds in the landing configuration (on-speed). Use care

at all airspeeds, especially above 400 knots/Mach 0.8, to avoid over control in pitch and resulting PIO.

The stick force per g gradient is higher than a normal CAS aircraft but will allow adequate

maneuvering performance. Do not use the speedbrake, since it will lead to severe longitudinal PIO.

Rapid power changes should be minimized as this may result in aggravation of PIO tendency due to

trim changes. Lateral stick inputs couple into the pitch axis as a nose up rotation and require a

corresponding pitch input to correct. Formation flight and air refueling is possible, even with roll plus

yaw DEL; however, pilot workload greatly increases. For air refueling ensure a good lineup and keep

all inputs to a minimum when closing on the basket as a violent longitudinal PIO may result. For

carrier or field landing, fly on-speed with flaps HALF. After a bolter in pitch MECH a large pitch up

occurs which can be stopped with forward stick force. A similar pitch up occurs after a field landing and

the pilot must consciously keep the aircraft on the ground; once stabilized after touchdown normal

V-15-56

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

roll-out procedures can be used. Recommend field landings be conducted using a reduced sink rate to

minimize the pitch up tendency. A short field arrestment is also recommended.

If a waveoff is carried out with a subsequent transition to up and away

flight, ensure that the FLAP switch is set to AUTO below 250 knots, as

the aircraft is very prone to PIO if the flaps are allowed to automatically

retract.

15.37 MECH ON WITH AIL AND RUD OFF

Refer to Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. Diagnosis of specific failure condition can

be made by referring to the FCS failure indications and effects, figure 15-9. Note that the ratio changer

may be failed to the flaps AUTO setting (low gain) or HALF/FULL setting (hi gain), independent of

FLAP switch position. Flying qualities may be similar to those described in the MECH ON WITH AIL

AND RUD OPERATIVE section. If the decision is made to land, approach speeds are much higher

than normal at on-speed AOA. Nosewheel steering is inoperative.

15.38 FLAPS OFF CAUTION

See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. When a LEF failure occurs, the LEF brake

locks the LEF in response to an out-of-tolerance condition. In addition, the LEF asymmetry brake

locks the LEF when a split between the inboard and outboard LEFs (on the same wing) differ by more

than 3°. Another lock out condition can occur when the difference between the commanded and actual

position differ by more than 3° and the aircraft is maneuvering below 1.5 g. When the aircraft is

maneuvering above 1.5 g, the FLAPS SCHED criteria are used to determine LEF failures.

If a HYD 1B and the left leading edge flap fail or a HYD 2A and the right

leading edge flap fail together, do not press the FCS RESET button.

Resetting the FCS with one of the above combinations may result in a

second hydraulic circuit failure.

NOTE

LEF logic does not compare left wing LEF position to right wing LEF

position.

The inboard and outboard LEF surfaces are mechanically connected by a common drive shaft. When

a LEF failure occurs, the entire flap is locked to prevent further movement. If a mechanical failure

occurs such that the inboard and outboard are split on the same wing, it has been shown that

controllability is governed only by the position of the inboard flap. Therefore, the LEF procedures

mandate visually confirming the position of the inboard LEF and is discussed in the following

paragraphs.

V-15-57

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.38.1 LEF FAILED (WITH INBOARD POSITION FAILED UP BEYOND 4° OVER-TRAVEL STOP)

During high g maneuvering, all elements of the LEF braking system must work to stop the LEF in

a failure mode. If the LEF back up brake system does not function properly, the LEF can move rapidly

and possibly overpower the over−travel stop, resulting in a large leading edge up deflection (beyond the

over−travel stop design maximum of 4° upward deflection). The LEF braking system is not designed

to function beyond the over−travel stop. Any deflection beyond the over−travel stop could potentially

deflect to a full structural limit of approximately 55°. With only the outboard section of the LEF failed

up beyond the design limits, it has been shown that aircraft can be controllable in the landing

configuration with HALF flaps.

Failures that result in extreme inboard LEF leading edge up deflections are highly susceptible to

departure at airspeeds below 250 KCAS. The minimum controllable airspeed depends on the severity

and configuration of the LEF failure. The only way to confirm extreme LEF failures is by visual check

as the FCS indications will be inaccurate or blanked. Use care to maintain airspeed above 300 KCAS

while assessing the LEF positions. Extreme failure of the inboard section of the LEF will result in

immediate uncommanded roll and yaw that can be controlled with pilot input (lateral stick against the

roll and rudder pedal in the opposite direction, countering side force buildup) given adequate airspeed.

As airspeed decreases, roll and yaw moments will build, leading to a departure. Flight data shows that

extreme failure of the inboard LEF, with or without the failure of the outboard section, to a position

leading edge significantly up (beyond about 45°) results in an uncontrollable aircraft below approxi-

mately 250 KCAS in flaps AUTO. With flaps HALF, limited flight data indicate high buffet loads (to

the point of not being able to read the HUD) at airspeeds of approximately 190 KIAS, and an abrupt

departure at airspeeds slightly below 190 KIAS in this configuration.

The Rolling Surface to Rudder Interconnect (RSRI) in the flight control software may complicate

an inboard LEF failure by attempting to coordinate the roll commanded by the pilot input (lateral

stick) to counter roll−off. Simulation data shows that selecting GAIN ORIDE with flaps AUTO

reduces RSRI commanded input and provides additional rudder control authority, which may allow

controlled flight to slower airspeeds. Therefore, controllability checks in GAIN ORIDE with flaps

AUTO are recommended. Reduce gross weight to the maximum extent possible prior to performing

controllability checks. Landing in GAIN ORIDE with flaps AUTO with LEF failure has not been flight

tested. Expect degraded flying qualities. Only a real−time controllability check can determine whether

the individual LEF failure experienced will be controllable all the way to touchdown. Carrier landing

is not recommended. Extreme caution is recommended because there is little to no warning of

impending departure. This failure condition has never been flight tested.

Leading edge up deflections of the inboard LEF beyond the

4°

over−travel stop may result in an uncontrollable configuration below 250

KCAS. Selecting GAIN ORIDE with flaps AUTO may provide control-

lability at slower airspeeds. There may be little warning of impending

departure as airspeed decreases. Immediate ejection may be required.

Departure will be unrecoverable.

NOTE

Any deflection beyond the over−travel stop could potentially reach a

full structural limit of approximately 55° leading edge up.

V-15-58

ORIGINAL

A1-F18AC-NFM-000

15.38.2 LEF FAILED (WITH INBOARD POSITION LESS THAN 4° UP) OR TEF FAILED

If the LEFs are locked in a more up−position than the automatic flap schedule dictates, then stall

and departure AOA are lower (as low as 10° AOA if the LEFs are at 0°). Buffet with the LEFs at 0°

is moderate at about 7° AOA. Use care to prevent AOA excursions above 10°. With the LEFs locked

at 20° to 30° down, landing−configuration handling qualities are essentially normal. Even with the

outboard section of the LEF failed up beyond the design limits, the aircraft can be controllable in the

landing−configuration with HALF flaps.

With a LEF lockout/failure, upon selecting HALF−flap position, the functional LEF as well as the

functional TEFs will extend normally. However, the failed/locked−out LEF remains frozen creating an

asymmetric flight control surface condition that can be countered with lateral stick and trim. If the

AUTO flap position is then selected, after selecting HALF or FULL, the functional LEF/TEFs do not

retract until GAIN ORIDE is selected. If fuel is a concern (as with CV cyclic operation), selecting GAIN

ORIDE with FLAP switch in AUTO allows all non−failed flaps to retract to a more fuel conserving

3°/3° position. Returning GAIN ORIDE switch to normal returns functional TEFs to normal

scheduling, but as long as there is a failed/locked LEF, the functional LEF remains in the GAIN

ORIDE position. With the GAIN switch in ORIDE above 350 knots an uncontrollable divergent pitch

PIO may occur. With the FLAP switch AUTO, ORIDE provides 3°/3° flaps.

In the event of a TEF failure, the failed TEF trails to its neutral uplock position. To prevent

asymmetry, the functional TEF is also shut off and trails to its neutral uplock position as well. With

a TEF failure, if the TEFs are more up than the automatic flap schedule dictates, the aircraft attitude

is more nose−up than normal at any given airspeed in AUTO. In the landing configuration, the

approach speed is much higher at on−speed AOA. An AOA of 10° to 11° may be used for landing, but

the over−the−nose field of view is reduced.

15.39 FLAP SCHED CAUTION

See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. The FLAP SCHED caution indicates the

flaps are not scheduling properly. It is always accompanied by a Master caution and FCS caution. Air

data failures will also cause the FLAP SCHED caution to be asserted.

With an air data failure, without GAIN ORIDE selected, the rudders go

to full 30° toe in at touchdown which may result in an uncommanded

nose pitch-up.

The FLAP SCHED caution is asserted if either the left or right LEF is off schedule (difference

between the LEF position/command is greater than 10° with AOA above 12 degrees). A FLAPS

SCHED caution accompanied by BLIN 221 provides a good indication that an off−schedule LEF

caused FLAPS SCHED caution. PROM 10.7 never asserts a FLAP SCHED caution for AOA probe

splits as the FCC will continue scheduling the flaps based on an AOA estimate. The FLAP SCHED

caution remains for six seconds after the failure condition clears. AOA probe splits never assert a FLAP

SCHED caution because the FCC will continue scheduling the flaps based on an AOA estimate.

For all FLAP SCHED cautions, establish straight and level flight then check handling qualities. If

the leading edge flaps are frozen in a more up position than the scheduled position, stall and departure

will occur at a lower AOA than normal. With the GAIN switch in ORIDE above 350 knots, an

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uncontrollable divergent pitch PIO may occur. With the FLAP switch AUTO, ORIDE provides 3°/3°

flaps.

For all FLAP SCHED cautions, select GAIN ORIDE for landing. Transition to the landing

configuration at 200 knots, straight and level at a safe altitude, and check flying qualities. Aircraft

response may be sensitive near 200 knots but will probably be about normal at ON-SPEED AOA. If

AOA is failed, leading edge flaps and rudder toe-in are scheduled by an AOA approximation for 1 g

flight. Stalls occur at a lower AOA with GAIN ORIDE selected due to fixed flap positions.

15.40 NWS CAUTION

See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. The NWS caution comes on when

nosewheel steering is shut off due to detection of a failure in the system. Emergency high gain

nosewheel steering is available after an FCS channel 2 or 4 failure. To engage the emergency mode, pull

the failed channel circuit breaker, unlock the wings, and press the NWS button.

NOTE

If pressing the NWS button results in an FCS caution and single X in

the powered channel, emergency HI gain steering is not available.

The NWS remains engaged in the high gain mode after the NWS button is released. The emergency

mode can be disengaged by pressing the paddle switch. The emergency mode should be engaged only

for low speed taxi. Emergency HI gain operation prevents detection of NWS command failures so be

alert for uncommanded steering. Press the paddle switch immediately upon detection of uncom-

manded steering.

Nosewheel steering is not available with a HYD 2 failure. The NWS caution does not come on but

the NWS cue on the HUD flashes. A flashing cue does not necessarily indicate failed nosewheel

steering since the cue flashes with either an MC1 failure, or a HYD 2A and HYD 2B failure.

15.41 AILERON FAILURE/AIL OFF CAUTION

See the Warning/Caution/Advisory Displays, figure 12-1. When an aileron fails, the surface is driven

to the faired position by air loads and is damped to prevent oscillations. If the ailerons were drooped,

the functional aileron is driven to the undrooped position. With both ailerons undrooped, approach

speed will increase about 8 knots in Flaps FULL, and 16 knots in Flaps HALF. The functional aileron

continues to assist in providing control. Roll damping is noticeably less. Use care to prevent overcontrol

and resulting lateral PIO, especially when approaching touchdown.

15.42 JAMMED CONTROLS

Stick inputs are position sensed and a jammed stick prevents normal control. If the linkage to the

mechanical servo valve is jammed, an override spring cartridge allows stick motion. If the stick is

jammed, trim provides ample authority for controlled flight. The autopilot, except for control stick

steering, may also be used for aircraft control.

15.43 OUT-OF-CONTROL FLIGHT (OCF)

Departure from controlled flight can result in fully developed out−of−control flight. The basic

F/A−18 airframe exhibits four spin modes (three upright and one inverted) and two Falling Leaf modes

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(upright and inverted). The control system makes spin entry difficult (within asymmetric AOA limits)

and suppresses Falling Leaf motion.

NOTE

Violent departure may cause structural damage. A wingman visual

inspection

(if available) and a controllability check should be

performed following a violent departure.

15.43.1 Departure. The aircraft has departed when it is not properly responding to control inputs.

Releasing the controls, taking feet off rudders, and retracting the speedbrake recovers

the aircraft from most departures. Continued control inputs in this situation aggravate the

situation and delay recovery. It is imperative that a departure be recognized immediately and the

Departure Recovery procedure executed. If the aircraft does not respond to released controls after

allowing 5 to 10 seconds for post-stall gyrations to cease, it may be in a Falling Leaf or spin. Reanalyze

the situation. Execute the appropriate recovery procedures.

15.43.2 Falling Leaf. The Falling Leaf mode may be encountered during departure recovery, during

the final stages of spin recovery, or following zero airspeed (vertical) maneuvers. This mode is

characterized by repeated cycles of large, uncommanded yaw/roll motions which reverse directions

every few seconds. At each reversal, the crew will sense high side-forces accompanied by near zero g.

Repeated crew observations of this sensation on both sides of the aircraft confirm the Falling Leaf

mode. The upright/positive AOA Falling Leaf mode is the most common Falling Leaf mode. Entry into

the inverted/negative AOA Falling Leaf mode is highly unlikely. It is possible to get transient spin

arrows during the Falling Leaf mode. During controls released recovery testing, average altitude loss

prior to indications of recovery was 5,000 feet with the maximum altitude loss being 12,000 feet.

Extraordinary patience is required during recovery. Positive indications that the aircraft is recovering

are an increasingly nose low attitude and increasing peak airspeed. Recovery is normally preceded by

the presence of a strong side-force coupled with an unload in a very nose low or slightly inverted

attitude.

Chasing transient spin recovery arrows will delay recovery. Do not chase

the spin arrows.

15.43.3 Spin. The spin mode is the least often encountered out-of-control mode of the F/A-18. Spin

is confirmed by the presence of a sustained yaw rate, fluctuating AOA, pegged turn needle and airspeed

less than 150 knots. Yaw rate may be difficult to determine initially due to oscillation but should

exhibit a predominant direction as spin rotation continues. When a spin has been visually confirmed,

DDIs should be checked for a command arrow, and if present, full lateral stick should be applied in the

direction of the arrow to provide anti-spin controls. The command arrow, by itself, is not confirmation

of a spin because during the most violent departures the SRM logic is met and cycling or steady spin

arrows are presented to the pilot for up to several seconds. If a spin has been confirmed with no

command arrow present, SRM logic may not be fulfilled because of an oscillatory yaw rate and the use

of the manual spin recovery switch is required for recovery. If manual spin recovery mode is used,

exercise caution during pull-out (use smooth stick inputs) since the flight controls remain in SRM until

the airspeed increases above 245 knots or the switch is placed to NORM. While in manual SRM the

aircraft is very sensitive to control inputs in all axes until the flight controls revert to CAS. The

command arrow indicates the proper control stick position for upright or inverted spin. For upright

spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full lateral stick with the spin direction. For

inverted spins, the command arrow directs the pilot to apply full lateral stick opposite the spin

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direction. Recovery begins immediately, but may take up to one turn to become apparent. When the

yaw rate stops, smoothly neutralize lateral stick, ensure spin recovery switch is in NORM,

and

re-analyze the situation. The aircraft may enter a Falling Leaf during recovery from a spin.

NOTE

During highly oscillatory out-of-control motion, cycling of the

command arrows may occur. Under these conditions, maintaining full

lateral stick until the command arrow disappears may delay spin

recovery and lead to excessive altitude loss

(1,000

2,000

feet).

If/when the pilot has confirmed that yaw rate has decreased to zero,

anti-spin controls should be neutralized even if a sustained command

arrow is present. This minimizes altitude loss during recovery.

15.43.4 OCF Recovery Procedures

*1. Controls - RELEASE, FEET OFF RUDDERS, SPEEDBRAKE IN

If still out of control -

*2. Throttles - IDLE

*3. Altitude, AOA, airspeed and yaw rate - CHECK

If command arrow present -

*4. Lateral stick - FULL WITH ARROW

When command arrow removed -

*5. Lateral stick - SMOOTHLY NEUTRAL

When recovery indicated by AOA and YAW rate tones removed, side forces subsided, and

airspeed accelerating above 180 KCAS -

*6. Recover.

Failure to ensure all criteria are met may result in departure during

recovery.

Passing 6,000 feet AGL, dive recovery not initiated -

*7. Eject.

15.43.5 Post Departure Dive Recovery

• Recovery is indicated when AOA and YAW rate tones are removed,

side forces subside, and airspeed is accelerating above 180 knots.

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Failure to ensure all criteria are met may result in redeparture during

recovery.

• Limit AOA to 10° during a recovery from departure caused by a flap

system failure/malfunction (FCS/FC AIR DAT/FLAPS OFF cau-

tions) to avoid departing the aircraft. Departure warning is character-

ized by an uncommanded yaw/roll.

• Post departure dive recovery initiated below 6,000 feet AGL is not

assured. Delaying the ejection decision below 6,000 feet AGL while

departed may result in unsuccessful ejection.

1. One-g roll to the nearest horizon.

2. Throttles - MAX (MIL if altitude not critical)

3. Pull to and maintain 25° to 35° AOA until positive rate of climb established (AOA configuration

dependent).

A positive rate of climb requires wings level pitch attitude (waterline)

greater than indicated AOA.

If aircraft departs during dive recovery below 6,000 feet AGL -

4. Eject.

15.44 CONTROLLABILITY CHECK

Requirement: Malfunction, failure, or damage, which degrades approach and landing character-

istics.

Purpose (to determine):

• Whether to attempt an approach or a controlled ejection

• Safe landing configuration

• Safe final approach airspeed/AOA

1. Climb to and maintain a safe altitude in VMC.

• 15,000 feet AGL (recommended)

• At or above 5,000 feet AGL (if practical)

2. Coordinate a visual inspection (if possible).

3. Plan to configure aircraft and conduct controllability check as close to field/CV as possible

(avoid populated areas if able).

• In all cases, consider BINGO fuel requirements.

4. Reference the appropriate emergency procedure to plan the following:

• Normal or Emergency Landing Gear Extension

• Appropriate flap setting for controllability check and landing

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• AOA and/or airspeed limitations

• Any controllability issues that may arise from landing gear and/or flap extension

• Desired landing gross weight and fuel dump plan

5. Consider Select Jettison stores prior to gear extension if:

• Lateral weight asymmetry is over 6,000 ft-lb to establish a more symmetric configuration

• Emergency Landing Gear extension required (i.e., no HYD 2A)

• Stated in appropriate emergency procedure

If single engine -

6. Reduce gross weight. Refer to figure 16-2.

7. Maintain operating engine above 85% RPM during flap and landing gear extension.

8. Do not exceed 15° AOB in turns (if possible).

If normal landing gear extension possible (i.e., no HYD 2A caution) -

9. Slow to below 250 KCAS.

10. LDG GEAR handle - DN

If normal landing gear extension not possible -

9. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension procedure.

• Do not configure flaps during Landing Gear Emergency Extension.

• Return to Controllability Check procedure once gear extended.

Once landing gear down and locked -

10.

DO NOT TRIM until minimum controllable airspeed is determined.

11.

Crosscheck AOA and airspeed during decel.

12.

FLAP switch - AUTO/HALF/FULL based on:

• Flap setting stated in appropriate emergency procedure

• If single engine, flaps HALF

• Consideration of type landing, failure/damage, engine performance, etc.

13.

Determine minimum controllable airspeed by slowing in 10 knot increments.

• If still controllable at AOA limit stated in appropriate emergency procedure or on-speed, plan

on flying appropriate AOA for approach and landing.

• If one-half stick or rudder pedal deflection required to maintain balanced flight prior to AOA

limit stated in appropriate emergency procedure or on-speed, add 10 knots for airspeed to be

used during approach and landing.

• If lateral stick required for balanced flight, plan for turns in the direction of stick displacement

(if possible).

14.

Assess:

• Controllability in a 15° AOB turn

• Throttle response and wave-off maneuver

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If controllability unacceptable to attempt landing -

15. Consider a controlled ejection over an unpopulated area (if possible).

If controllability acceptable to attempt landing -

15. Fly a straight-in approach.

• Do not go slower than the minimum-controllable-airspeed-plus-10 knots, or equivalent AOA,

as determined during controllability check.

If single engine -

16. Execute Single Engine Approach and Landing procedure.

If dual engine -

16. Return to appropriate emergency procedure to ensure all corrective action steps are

completed prior to attempting approach to landing.

17. If arrested landing desired/required, consider effects of approach speed on max arresting

gear engagement speed.

18. If controllability changes or safe landing is not certain at any point on approach, execute

wave-off/missed approach immediately.

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16.2 SINGLE ENGINE WAVEOFF/BOLTER

During single engine operations at MIL or MAX, loss of lateral and

directional control may occur above the following AOAs:

Flaps FULL - 10° AOA

Flaps HALF - 12° AOA

NOTE

• Best rate of climb during single engine operation occurs at or near

on-speed AOA regardless of configuration or gross weight.

• Minimal reduction in altitude loss can be obtained with selection of

MAX during single engine waveoff, but this technique is not recom-

mended due to increased pilot workload attendant with higher asym-

metric thrust.

• Single engine waveoffs and bolters with F404-GE-402 (EPE) engines

installed may require full rudder and coordinated lateral stick to

control aircraft yaw and roll produced by asymmetric thrust.

• Figure 16-2 provides recommended maximum gross weight for single

engine carrier recovery for both GE-F404-400

and -402 powered

aircraft. Adjusting gross weight at or below the recommended weight

ensures less than 50 feet altitude lost during an onspeed AOA single

engine military power waveoff from an onspeed AOA/on glideslope

condition. Maximum waveoff altitude lost for two engine operation

under identical conditions is less than 30 feet. Recommended weights

are applicable to windmilling or seized condition for the failed engine.

• With left engine failure, once positive rate of climb is achieved, raise

the landing gear to improve acceleration and climb at a low angle of

attack to a safe altitude/airspeed.

16.3

SINGLE ENGINE APPROACH AND LANDING

• Use of afterburner on the good engine above on-speed AOA aggravates

directional control problems resulting in higher single engine mini-

mum control airspeed (about 8 to 10 knots).

• With F404-GE-402 (EPE) engines installed, use of afterburner on the

good engine with full flaps selected (sudden single engine waveoff or

bolter) may put the aircraft at or below single engine minimum control

airspeed depending on gross weight. Exercise caution to avoid overro-

tation. Apply rudder and lateral stick as necessary to counter yaw

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induced from asymmetric thrust until rudder control power is regained

as the aircraft accelerates.

NOTE

• In the F/A-18C/D with either engine secured, significantly lower

and/or cyclic dump rates have been experienced. When the right

engine is secured, lower dump rates follow immediately and may be

accompanied by a CG caution. When the left engine is secured, lower

dump rates are experienced as total fuel reaches 6500 pounds (when

tank 4 is empty).

• Hydraulic system capacity is dependent on respective engine rpm.

Excessive simultaneous hydraulic system demands (i.e., landing gear

activation, flap movement, and multiple flight control inputs, etc.)

combined with single engine rpm below 85% may exceed hydraulic

system capacity or result in FCS reversion to MECH. Therefore, when

practical, maintain engine with operating HYD system at or above

85% rpm.

• To prevent repeated switching valve cycling, avoid stabilized flight

where engine windmilling rpm produces hydraulic pressure fluctua-

tions between 800 to 1600 psi.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS -

1. Reduce gross weight.

NOTE

Recommended single engine recovery weight is depicted in figure 16-2.

2. If practical, maintain operating engine rpm at or above 85% rpm to preclude MECH reversion.

3. Consider crossbleed to provide HYD 2 pressure to extend the landing gear normally and to

preserve APU accumulator pressure for emergency braking and emergency nosewheel steering.

• Do not crossbleed if engine and/or AMAD related damage is sus-

pected.

• Extended crossbleeding of a failed engine traps feed tank fuel on that

side if the FIRE light has not been pushed, and may result in a

flameout.

• ATS exhaust may blister paint and cause possible door damage on the

aft underside of the fuselage.

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Starting the APU airborne may result in a BALD shutdown due to

ingestion of exhaust gases into the APU ducting.

4. Fly a straight-in approach.

5. Plan approach to make turns using shallow bank angle (≤15°).

6. Do not exceed on-speed AOA in turns.

7. Avoid turns into inoperative engine.

LEFT ENGINE FAILED -

1. FLAP switch - HALF

2. LDG GEAR handle - DN

3. Make a normal landing or a precautionary short field arrested landing (if practical).

RIGHT ENGINE FAILED -

1. FLAP switch - HALF

2. Execute Landing Gear Emergency Extension procedure.

If short field arresting gear available -

3. Make an arrested landing.

If short field arresting gear NOT available and right engine crossbleed NOT desired/required -

3. EMERG BRK handle - VERIFY PULLED TO DETENT (anti-skid is not available)

4. Make a normal landing.

5. Consider paddle switch - PRESS after touchdown to preserve APU ACCUM pressure for braking

and slow speed NWS.

6. Use emergency brakes with steady brake pressure (DO NOT PUMP). Anti-skid is not available.

Once stopped on runway -

7. Do not taxi (even if HYD 2A caution is removed).

If short field arresting gear NOT available and right engine crossbleed IS desired/required -

If APU ACCUM caution light on (i.e., landing gear emergency extended) -

3. Recharge the APU accumulator.

a. Left throttle - ADVANCE to 85%rpm minimum

b. ENG CRANK switch - R

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F18. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 10