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CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 26

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.2-1. OPSUST 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Standing Joint Force Headquarters

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

G

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹²

G

G¹³

G¹⁴

G¹⁵

G

G¹⁶

G¹⁷

G¹⁸

G¹⁹

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Contamination reports are received within 1 hour.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Unit operational degradation is assessed within 1 hour after contamination reports are received.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Restoration operation requirements are estimated within 1 hour after unit operational degradation is assessed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Data transmitted/disseminated follow standard format.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Information is passed within established time criteria.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Unit operational degradation assessment is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Restoration operation requirements estimate is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the ability to assess component command contamination reports

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

for operation degradation implications and restoration operation requirements.

M9

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on the efficacy of assessment of component command

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

contamination reports for operational degradation implications and restoration operation requirements.

¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

² Any SJFHQ staff can receive contamination reports manually within an hour, but an automated system would ensure that reports are received even if the reporting unit is having

severe degradation or communication problems.

³ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can conduct an operational degradation assessment, but there are no TTPs or available familiarization training that specifically address making

operational degradation assessments and no automated tools to assist the process.

⁴ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can estimate restoration requirements, but there are no TTPs or available familiarization training that specifically addresses considerations and how to

estimate requirements.

⁵ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can transmit/disseminate information according to a standard format that they develop, but there are no specific formats for operational degradation

assessment requirements.

⁶ Any SJFHQ staff can pass information in a timely manner, but an automated system would ensure that reports are received even if the reporting unit is having severe degradation

or communication problems.

⁷ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can conduct an accurate unit degradation assessment, but TTPs to ensure that assessments are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must

be researched. More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. Without automation, accuracy may not be as dependable and

might be subject to human errors.

⁸ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can estimate restoration operation requirements, but TTPs to ensure that estimates are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must be

researched. More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. Without automation, accuracy may not be as dependable and

might be subject to human errors.

⁹ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that specifically address operational degradation implications.

¹⁰ Limited. Any joint exercise/ experiment can provide feedback, but few if any have been conducted that specifically address restoration operational degradation implications.

Therefore, lessons learned that would facilitate development of TTP are not available.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

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For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.3-1. OPSUST 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

G⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹²

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹³

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Contamination reports are received within 30 minutes of contamination.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Unit operational risk assessment is completed within 30 minutes after contamination reports are received.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Restoration operation priorities are determined within 30 minutes after operational risk assessments are completed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Data transmitted/disseminated follow standard format.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Information is passed within established time criteria.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Unit operational risk assessment is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Restoration operation priority determination is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Restoration operation priority determination is modified after substantive operational changes are assessed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the ability to conduct operational risk assessment of units,

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

equipment, facilities, activities, or terrain that are contaminated for restoration prioritization and timing.

M10

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on the efficacy of operational risk assessment of critical units,

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

equipment, facilities, activities, or terrain that are contaminated for restoration prioritization and timing.

¹ No doctrine has been developed. The linkage of restoration operations and operational risk assessment is not integrated into leader education. This task is not a standard part of

training.

² Any SJFHQ staff can receive contamination reports, but the current capability is manual, slowing down the process. It is unlikely that assessments can be received manually

within 30 minutes.

³ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can conduct an operational risk assessment, but there are no TTPs or formal familiarization training that specifically addresses operational risk

assessment for restoration prioritization and timing. With a manual system it is unlikely that the assessment can be made in 30 minutes.

⁴ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can determine operation priorities, but there are no TTPs or formal familiarization training that specifically addresses restoration prioritization of units,

equipment, facilities, activities, or terrain that are contaminated. With a manual system it is unlikely that the priorities can be determined within 30 minutes, particularly if there are

a large number of units.

⁵ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop and transmit/disseminate information according to a standard format, but there is no current format that specifically addresses operational

risk assessment of units, equipment, facilities, activities, or terrain that are contaminated.

⁶ Any SJFHQ staff can pass information in a timely manner once it is developed.

⁷ Limited. Any OP-level staff can perform an accurate operational risk assessment, but TTPs to ensure that assessments are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must

be researched. More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. With manual processes, accuracy may not be as dependable

and might be subject to human errors.

⁸ Limited. Any OP-level staff can perform an accurate assessment, but TTPs to ensure that priority determinations are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must be

researched. More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. With manual processes, accuracy may not be as dependable and

might be subject to human errors.

⁹ Any SJFHQ can make modifications. Manual procedures will slow down the process.

18

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.4-1. OPSUST 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit Staff

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁷

R

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability⁸

G⁹

G¹⁰

G¹¹

G¹²

G¹³

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Determination of restoration operation impact on operational objectives can be made within 1 hour.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Assessments of impact of restoration operations are accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the ability to assess the impact of required restoration activities

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

on operational objectives.

M4

Joint exercises/experimentation provide lessons learned on procedures for determining restoration operation impact on

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operational objectives.

M5

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No doctrine has been developed. The linkage of restoration operations and operational risk assessment is not integrated into leader education. This task is not a standard part of

training.

² For restoration operation issues the current capability is manual, slowing down the process. It is unlikely that assessments can be made manually within 1 hour.

³ Limited. Any OP-level staff can perform an accurate assessment, but TTPs to ensure that assessments are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must be researched.

More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. With manual processes, accuracy may not be as dependable and might be

subject to human errors.

⁴ Limited. Any OP-level staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that specifically address the impact of restoration activities on operational objectives.

⁵ Limited. Few if any restoration exercises or experiments focused on operational impacts on units, equipment, facilities, activities, or terrain that are contaminated and require

restoration operations have been conducted. A RESTOP ACTD (ongoing) has been conducted with results to be published (TBP) that may or may not provide insight into CBRND

operational impact assessment.

⁶ Limited. Depending on the extent of contamination and the decontamination means selected, the procedures may or may not be logistically supportable.

⁷ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁸ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

⁹ The process will be linked to automated systems so that routine data can be used by automated tools. An automated tool will determine the impact of contaminated units or

facilities that must undergo restoration operations on JTF operations. System will have integrated analysis tools to predict and reprioritize restoration requirements based on

interaction with JTF J3 operational priorities. This will improve speed of assessment. Human out of the loop will improve accuracy if data is reliable.

¹⁰ JTTPs to ensure that estimates are accurate will be collected or developed. More detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations will be

developed. When automated tools have been developed, accuracy will be dependable and not be subject to human errors.

¹¹ JTTPs that specifically address the impact of restoration activities on operational objectives will be developed.

¹² Experiments and exercises focused on theater restoration operations will be conducted. Lessons learned from RESTOPS ACTD will be integrated into future exercises and

experimentation that looks at issues other than fixed sites.

¹³ Development and acquisition of more efficient and less materiel-intensive decontamination systems will improve the logistical supportability in the far term.

24

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.5-1. OPSUST 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit Staff

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹³

G

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹⁴

G

G¹⁵

G

G

G

G

G

G

G¹⁶

G¹⁷

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Updated joint force situation is used.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Procedures and checklists exist to help access current situation and formulate revised plans of action.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Procedures and checklists exist to help the commander to formulate crisis assessment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Procedures and checklists exist to help adjust original plan for alternate operations (after recognizing planning

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

assumptions invalid).

M5

Commander’s situation reports (SITREPs) follow standard format.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Courses of action (COAs) are evaluated to find which are suitable, feasible, acceptable, and complete after assessing

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

capabilities of contaminated units.

M7

Milestone criteria for plan development are available and followed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

New executable operational plans and orders adequately address contamination of units.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Joint exercises/experimentation provide lessons learned on procedures for providing operational guidance to forces

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

with contaminated units.

M10

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Report/advise contaminated units of commander’s guidance within 1 hour.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No doctrine has been developed. The linkage of restoration operations and providing operational guidance is not integrated into leader education. This task is not a standard part

of training.

² Yes. Once restoration operations are required, nothing prevents a staff from updating the joint force situation.

³ Limited. Any staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that specifically address providing operational guidance to forces with contaminated units.

⁴ Limited. Any staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that help the commander to formulate a crisis assessment.

⁵ Limited. Any staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that specifically address how to adjust original plans for alternate operations (after recognizing

planning assumptions are invalid) for forces with contaminated units.

⁶ Yes. Once restoration operations are required, nothing prevents a staff from using existing standard formats.

⁷ Limited. Any staff can evaluate COAs, but there are no TTPs that specifically address evaluating the COAs after assessing capabilities of contaminated units.

⁸ Limited. Any staff can develop milestone criteria for plan development, but there are no TTPs that specifically address milestone criteria for plan development for forces with

contaminated units.

⁹ Limited. Any staff can develop generic operational plans, but there are no TTPs that specifically address developing operational plans and orders addressing issues facing

contaminated units.

¹⁰ Limited. Any joint exercise/ experiment can provide feedback, but few if any have been conducted that specifically address assessing the operational impact of restoration

activities.

¹¹ Limited. Under specific certain circumstances, any decontamination procedure may or may not be logistically supportable at the operational level. Few exercises/experiments

have been conducted at the OP level of war to determine whether decontamination operations are logistically supportable under a wide variety of conditions.

29

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.6-1. OPSUST 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability:

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

M16

M17

M18

M19

M20

M21

M22

M23

M24

M25

SJFHQ

Current

Overall

R²

Y³

R⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

G⁷

G⁸

Y⁹

G¹⁰

R¹¹

G¹²

G¹³

Y¹⁴

Y¹⁵

Y¹⁶

Y¹⁷

Y¹⁸

Y¹⁹

G²⁰

Y²¹

Y²²

G²³

R²⁴

Y²⁵

R²⁶

Capability¹

Near/Mid-

Term

R

Y

R

Y

Y

G

G

Y

G

R

G

G

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

G

R

Y

R

Overall

Capability

Far-Term

Overall

R

Y

R

Y

Y

G

G

Y

G

R

G

G

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

G

R

Y

Y²⁸

Capability²⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Mobile assessment team arrives within 1 hour after incident.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Coordination process is activated with host nation.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Mobile assessment team properly trained, staffed, and equipped.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Liaison is established with country team and other U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

(NGOs), international organizations and coalition forces.

M5

Affected joint force commander is provided with technical expertise relating to CBRN/TIM hazards.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Appropriate U.S. resources and capabilities are factored into operational plans and actions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Appropriate coalition resources and capabilities are factored into plans and actions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Affected joint force/facility is provided with guidance on how and when to commence decontamination operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Coordination is made for additional support assets to go to the incident area if required.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

A plan is in place for mobile assessment team operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

If required, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Consequence Management Advisory Team is requested.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

Determination is made of the population at risk and a CBRN/TIM casualty estimate is provided for the commander's

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

intelligence estimate.

M13

CBRN/TIM casualty management is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M14

CBRN/TIM casualties are assessed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M15

CBRN/TIM casualties are treated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M16

CBRN/TIM casualties are decontaminated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M17

Procedures are in place for movement/quarantine of CBRN/TIM casualties.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M18

Procedures are set up for tracking and follow-up procedures of contaminated personnel.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M19

Coordination is made with mortuary affairs on handling, decontaminating, and transporting human remains.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M20

Operational forces are trained to operate in a CBRN/TIM environment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M21

Operational forces are equipped to operate in a CBRN/TIM environment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M22

Facilities unavailable due to CBRN/TIM attack are reported.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

35

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.7-1. OPSUST 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

G³

R⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁶

R

G

R

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability⁷

G⁸

G

G⁹

G¹⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Restoration operation country assistance teams are properly trained and equipped.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Valid requests for restoration operation assistance are met.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the ability to provide restoration operation country assistance

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

teams to support the TEP.

M4

Joint exercises provide feedback on restoration operation country assistance teams.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No specific doctrine has been developed. The linkage of restoration operations restoration operation country assistance teams is not integrated into leader education. This task is

not a standard part of training.

² No. While any SJFHQ staff can train and equip a country assistance team, none have ever been established. There has been no training or equipment developed that specifically

addresses the training and equipment requirements for a restoration operation country assistance team.

³ Yes. Any SJFHQ staff can process and honor requests for a country assistance team. There is currently no experience base, however.

⁴ No. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklist for a country assistance team, but there are no TTPs that addresses a restoration operation country assistance team

support to theater engagement planning.

⁵ Limited. Few if any restoration exercises or experiments focused on restoration operation country assistance teams have been conducted.

⁶ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁷ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

⁸ Steps will be taken to establish and equip country assistance teams.

⁹ JTTPs that addresses a restoration operation country assistance team support to TEP will be developed.

¹⁰ Experiments and exercises focused on theater restoration operations will be conducted. Lessons learned from RESTOPS ACTD will be integrated into future exercises and

experimentation that looks at issues other than fixed sites.

41

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.8-1. OPSUST 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit Staff

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

G⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹²

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

G¹³

G¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Procedures are in place to facilitate response to SOF requests for assistance.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Procedures and checklists exist to help develop executable operational plans and orders.

G - Yes. Y - Limited. R - No.

M3

Support provided is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Decontamination and support forces have SOF restoration operation experience.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

COAs are available and selected in advance of execution.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

COAs are coordinated between JTF and SOF prior to execution.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Procedures and checklists exist to help issue commander’s estimate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Joint exercises/experimentation provide lessons learned on SOF restoration operation support provided by JTF.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ This task is not a standard part of training.

² Limited. Any OP-level unit staff can respond to SOF request for assistance, but there are no TTPs or formalized familiarization training that addresses the unique aspects of joint

forces supporting SOF restoration operation requirements.

³ Limited. Any OP-level unit staff can develop procedures and checklists for operational plans and orders, but there are no TTPs that address development of the unique

requirements of SOF restoration operational plans and orders.

⁴ Limited. Any OP-level unit staff can provide support, but there is no real way of knowing how effective this support will be without comprehensive training events.

⁵ Limited. No staff will have an experience base without comprehensive training with SOF.

⁶ Limited. Any OP-level unit staff can develop/select COAs in advance of execution of the mission. There are no TTPs that address development and selection of COAs while

supporting a SOF restoration operation.

⁷ Any OP-level unit staff can coordinate COAs between HQs.

⁸ Limited. Any OP-level staff can develop an accurate estimate, but TTPs to ensure that estimates are accurate are limited to basic, nonspecific data that must be researched. More

detailed specific information and checklists useful for time-sensitive situations are not available. With manual processes, accuracy may not be as dependable and might be subject

to human errors.

⁹ Limited. Any joint exercise/ experiment can provide feedback, but few if any have been conducted that specifically address SOF restoration operation support provided by JTF.

¹⁰ Limited. Depending on the extent of contamination and the decontamination means selected, the procedures may or may not be logistically supportable.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas, including inclusion in training, as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹² Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

¹³ Experiments and exercises focused on theater restoration operations will be conducted that specifically address SOF restoration operation support provided by JTF.

¹⁴ Development and acquisition of more efficient and less materiel-intensive decontamination systems will improve the logistical supportability in the far term.

45

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.9-1. OPSUST 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

G⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹⁰

Y

Y

Y

G

G

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹¹

G¹²

G¹³

G¹⁴

G

G

G¹⁵

G¹⁶

G¹⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Procedures and checklists exist to help facilitate the stand-up of a JTF for restoration operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Procedures exist for dissolving of the JTF (following achievement of end state).

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Joint restoration operation site areas or select fixed sites are defined.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Directive or mission is provided.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Directive contains desired effect and scope of action required.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Procedures and checklists exist to help facilitate the change in manning allocation of initial HQ required by

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

restoration operation mission.

M7

Joint exercises/experimentation provide lessons learned on restoration operation execution provided by JTF.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ There is no concept/doctrine on how to stand up a JTF for the conduct of restoration operations. Command and control of large-scale restoration operations is not integrated into

leader education.

² Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop these kinds of procedures and checklists, but there are currently no TTPs that specifically address standing up a JTF for restoration

operations.

³ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop these kinds of procedures, but there are currently no TTPs that specifically address dissolving a JTF for restoration operations following

achievement of end state.

⁴ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can select and define operation site areas or fixed sites, but there are no TTPs that specifically address selecting and defining joint restoration sites.

⁵ Nothing precludes a higher HQ from providing a directive or mission.

⁶ Nothing precludes a higher HQ from providing a directive or mission that contains desired effect and scope of action required.

⁷ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are currently no TTPs that specifically address the change in manning allocation as required by a

restoration operation mission.

⁸ No joint exercise or experiment has ever been conducted that would provide feedback on how a JTF commands and controls a restoration operation.

⁹ Limited. Depending on the extent of contamination and the decontamination means selected, the procedures may or may not be logistically supportable.

¹⁰ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹¹ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

¹² JTTPs that specifically address standing up a JTF for restoration operations will be developed.

¹³ JTTPs that specifically address dissolving a JTF for restoration operations following achievement of end state will be developed.

¹⁴ JTTPs that specifically address selecting and defining joint restoration sites will be developed.

¹⁵ JTTPs that specifically address the change in manning allocation as required by a restoration operation mission will be developed.

¹⁶ Joint exercises and experiments will be conducted that will provide feedback on how a JTF commands and controls a restoration operation.

¹⁷ Development and acquisition of more efficient and less materiel-intensive decontamination systems will improve the logistical supportability in the far term.

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Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.10-1. OPSUST 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

G⁴

G⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

R⁸

Y⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹⁰

Y

Y

G

G

G

Y

R

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹¹

G¹²

G

G

G

G

G

G¹³

G¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Procedures and checklists exist to help facilitate the stand up of a JTF for terrain/facilities decontamination mission.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Procedures exist for dissolving of the JTF (following achievement of end state).

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Areas/terrain/facilities to be decontaminated are defined.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Directive or mission is provided.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Directive contains desired effect and scope of action required.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Procedures and checklists exist to help facilitate the change in manning allocation of initial HQ required by

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

terrain/facilities decontamination mission.

M7

Joint exercises provide lessons learned on terrain/facilities decontamination mission provided by JTF.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes. Y - Limited. R - No.

¹ There is no concept/doctrine on how to stand up a JTF for the conduct of extensive or complex decontamination of significant areas/terrain or facilities. Command and control of

large-scale decontamination operations is not integrated into leader education.

² Limited. While there are generic procedures to stand up a JTF, there are no TTPs that specifically address standing up of a JTF for an extensive or complex terrain/facilities

decontamination mission.

³ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can dissolve a JTF following achievement of end state, but a JTF specifically for extensive or complex decontamination operations involving

significant areas/terrain or facilities has never been stood up and thus never been dissolved.

⁴ Nothing precludes a higher HQ from defining areas/terrain/facilities to undergo decontamination.

⁵ Nothing precludes a higher HQ from providing a directive or mission.

⁶ Nothing precludes a higher HQ from providing a directive or mission that contains desired effect and scope of action required.

⁷ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs and limited training that specifically addresses the change in manning allocation as

required by extensive or complex decontamination of significant areas/terrain or facilities.

⁸ No joint exercise or experiment has ever been conducted that would provide feedback on how a JTF commands extensive or complex decontamination of significant areas/terrain

or facilities.

⁹ Limited. Depending on the extent of contamination and the decontamination means selected, the procedures may or may not be logistically supportable.

¹⁰ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹¹ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

¹² In the far term, JTTPs will improve for all areas.

¹³ Joint exercises and experiments will be conducted to provide feedback on how a JTF commands extensive or complex decontamination of significant areas/terrain or facilities.

¹⁴ Development and acquisition of more efficient and less materiel-intensive decontamination systems will improve the logistical supportability in the far term.

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Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.11-1. OPSUST 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

G⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

R⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

Y

Y

G

Y

G

Y

R

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹²

G¹³

G

G

G

G

G

Y

G

G¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

CBRN/TIM status in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) impacts strategic deployment, sustainment, and/or

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

redeployment.

M2

Alternate and/or diversion POEs/PODs (possibly including unimproved/improvised landing strips) are established to

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

avoid contaminated areas during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations.

M3

Joint Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) is planned to avoid contaminated seaports of embarkation/debarkation

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

(SPOEs/SPODs).

M4

Uncontaminated lift platforms are limited to operations in uncontaminated ports and cargo/passenger transload site

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

have been identified for transload of deploying forces and sustainment cargo from uncontaminated to contaminated lift

assets for movement into contaminated PODs.

M5

JOA Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) is planned to avoid CBRN/TIM contaminated

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

areas.

M6

All cargo is decontaminated to internationally accepted standards (when available) prior to redeployment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Direction is provided to conduct patient evacuation including procedures for the movement of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

contagious/contaminated casualties.

M8

Direction for the protection and/or decontamination of evacuees is provided in NEO plans.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Joint exercises/experimentation are conducted to integrate restoration operations with strategic deployment,

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

sustainment, and redeployment (including NEO and AE) operations.

¹ No concepts or doctrine relating to this issue have been developed. Leader education does not address this issue.

² Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can determine how CBRN status in the JOA impacts strategic deployment, sustainment, and/or redeployment, but there are no TTPs that specifically

address issues affecting how to do this.

³ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can establish alternate PODs/POEs, but there are no TTPs that specifically address establishing PODs/POEs to avoid contaminated areas during

deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations.

⁴ Nothing precludes JLOTS planning in response to any sort of contamination and it is anticipated as a requirement for any sort of SPOE/SPOD disruption.

⁵ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop, identify, and monitor the operations of a transload site. However, there are no TTPs that specifically address moving sustainment cargo

from uncontaminated to contaminated lift assets for movement into contaminated PODs. Any such procedures are currently manual making the process slow, labor-intensive, and

subject to human error.

⁶ Nothing precludes planning of this type. Contamination reports must be immediately available to execute plans.

⁷ Any SJFHQ can coordinate with the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) to review and approve plans for the lease, transfer or disposal of DoD real

property when contamination exists or is suspected to exist. There are no internationally accepted standards for decontamination completeness.

⁸ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can coordinate patient evacuation, but there is little in the way of TTP that specifically address the movement of contagious/contaminated casualties.

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Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.12-1. OPSUST 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: JTF HQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

M16

M17

Current Overall

G²

G³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

R¹⁴

Y¹⁵

R¹⁶

Y¹⁷

Y¹⁸

Capability¹

Near/Mid-Term Overall

G

G

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

R

Y

R

Y

Y

Capability

Far-Term Overall

G¹⁹

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G²⁰

G

G

G

Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Records of contaminated deceased/missing personnel in JOA are accurately maintained.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Records of contaminated personal effects in JOA are accurately maintained.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Personal effects of contaminated deceased/missing in JOA are accurately processed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Decision on mortuary affairs policy for contaminated remains is made in a timely fashion resulting in no delay in

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

the disposition of remains.

M5

Operations include establishment of mortuary affairs decontamination collection points in theater.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Contaminated remains are correctly identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Contaminated remains are re-identified after disposition.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Temporary interment facilities for contaminated remains are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Mortuary Affairs Decontamination Collection Point (MADCP) tasks are included in planning.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Contaminated remains are recovered at the end of CBRN/TIM attacks.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Remains are recovered from temporary interment sites in the JOA and disposition determined (after end of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations in theater).

M12

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to coordinate decontamination procedures for processing

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

contaminated remains in the joint operational area.

M13

Procedures exist to facilitate personnel to search for, recover, identify, care for, and evacuate or inter deceased

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

personnel (without MADCP units).

M14

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M15

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to process contaminated remains in the JOA for air shipment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M16

Disposition policies are in effect for handling of remains in a timely fashion.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M17

Joint exercises and experimentation provide lessons learned on coordinating decontamination procedures for

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

processing contaminated remains in the JOA.

¹ Limited. MA doctrine, training, personnel, organizations, and facilities exist. However, they are limited in their ability to process mass fatalities following a CBRN attack.

² Nothing precludes a JMAO/unit staff from accurately maintaining records of contaminated deceased/missing personnel in JOA.

³ Nothing precludes a JMAO/unit staff from accurately maintaining records of contaminated personal effects in JOA.

⁴ Limited. Any JMAO/unit staff can coordinate the accurate processing of personal effects of contaminated deceased/missing in JOA, but no TTPs exist to aid the process.

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Chapter 16. Operational Sustain Tasks

Table 16.13-1. OPSUST 13: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

SJFHQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁰

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to recover and decontaminate critical items.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Procedures and exist for hazardous material that cannot be processed in accordance with appropriate regulations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to dispose of hazardous material appropriately.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to transport contaminated materials to rear areas or designated

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

sites.

M5

Procedures and checklists exist to facilitate the ability to coordinate salvage of materials that require

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

decontamination.

M6

Procedures exist to properly dispose of contaminated material.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Decontamination procedures are logistically supportable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on how a JTF would coordinate salvage of materials that require

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

decontamination

¹ Limited. There is DOTMLPF in place that addresses salvage, but there are no TTPs and limited training that specifically addresses coordinating the salvage of materials that

require decontamination.

² Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that addresses the recovery and decontamination of critical items.

³ Limited. Although there are regulations that address the processing of hazardous materials and any staff can develop TTPs to facilitate complying with regulation, there are no

TTPs that link formerly CBRN contaminated materials and address the process by which they become hazardous material defined in accordance with appropriate regulations.

⁴ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that address the ability to dispose of hazardous material appropriately.

⁵ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklist, but there are no TTPs that address the ability to transport contaminated materials to rear areas or designated

sites.

⁶ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that addresses the ability to coordinate salvage of materials that require decontamination.

⁷ Limited. Any SJFHQ staff can develop procedures and checklists, but there are no TTPs that specifically address facilitating the ability to properly dispose of contaminated

material.

⁸ Limited. Current through the mid term, decontamination procedures will remain logistically difficult to support. Improvements will be seen in the far term with the fielding of

more logistically supportable decontamination alternatives.

⁹ Limited. Few if any exercises/experiments have been conducted that specifically addresses coordinating the salvage of materials that require decontamination.

¹⁰ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board, made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green”

rating.

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