CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.11

Task TASHA 11: Correlate observations of the indigenous population for indicators

of CBRN/TIM attack or release

9.11.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.11.1.1

Definition

JTF elements can identify sick or diseased people in the conduct of their activities. As an

example, patrols, convoys, and security checkpoints can identify or observe ill health in the

indigenous population. The frequency and extent of ill health could be a radiological, toxic

chemical, or a biological agent indicator. Liaison and information are collected from indigenous

and NGO activities in the tactical operating area. Relatively rapid degradation in the indigenous

populace could indicate the presence of a CBRN agent and represent a threat to JTF elements,

potentially shifting the strategic and operational objectives of the JTF away from command or

national intentions. This task might also include observations regarding an increase of vector

populations. Daily situation reports might include these observations.

Reported observations are correlated in the operations center contributing to combat risk

assessments and the management of response and mitigation, including identification of

necessary medical countermeasures to protect the force. The information is included in medical

surveillance, and the results and response are included in the COP situational awareness. For

vector attacks and small covert attacks of communicable disease agents, the correlation and

inclusion of observations of the indigenous population within medical surveillance could be the

primary means of detecting an attack and implementing medical preventive countermeasures.

9.11.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

Transformation Planning Guidance, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

9.11.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 8

9.11.1.2.2

Lateral Task: TASENS 10

9.11.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.11.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Partially completed mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

4. Fair personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

5. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

3. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C 3.1.2.4)

4. Poor civil health. (C3.3.1.4)

5. High health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

6. Significant TIM present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

9.11.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.11.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.11-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

The capabilities include some reports provided by non-JTF activities and limited ability to assess

outbreak indicators, make accurate hazard and surveillance reports, and obtain reports of CBRN

attack indicators. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.”

Although improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in

the associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall

assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Correlating observations of CBRN/TIM attacks require special liaison with NGOs, international

agencies, indigenous civil authorities, and aid organizations. Medical surveillance operates in

isolation from the routine activities of the operational staffs. The capability is improving as a

result of improvements resulting from current conflicts. Interoperabilty within and among

Services continues to improve. Deficiencies include insufficient liaison and collaboration with

non-JTF agencies and organizations in the operating area, inadequate training, insufficient

interaction and coordination between medical staffs and operational staffs, lack of interactive

link with COP; and insufficient communication resources.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.11-1. TASHA 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Correlate Observations of the Indigenous

Population for Indicators of CBRN/TIM Attack or Release

Current Overall Capability

4¹

5²

5³

5⁴

5⁵

6⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Reports are

8-10: Secure, interoperable, and interactive processes with automated tools exist and are predominantly applied by all relevant

provided by non-

activities of the joint force, coalition partners, and other authorized entities. Inherent capabilities support connectivity to diverse

JTF activities.

systems operated and maintained by non-JTF activities.

4-7: Special liaisons are equipped and possess connectivity for interaction and reporting of information collected by non-JTF

activities and entities such as NGOs, international agencies, indigenous civil authorities, and aid organizations. In selected cases,

these agencies are provided equipment and procedures specifically for this purpose.

1-3: Information is collected from non-JTF activities and entities sporadically by JTF elements in the area of responsibility (AOR).

0: The capability to collect information from non-JTF activities and entities is nonexistent.

Outbreak

8-10: Secure, interoperable, and interactive processes with automated tools exist and are predominantly applied by all echelons and

indicators are

elements of the joint force, coalition partners, and authorized entities. Information and data are collected, collated, confirmed, and

assessed and

processed using automated tools and processes on a continuous basis.

confirmed.

4-7: Procedures, policies, techniques, and processes exist to collect, confirm, process, and report information on outbreak indicators

and are assisted by automated systems requiring manual intervention and on a periodic basis or as determined necessary.

1-3: Procedures, policies, techniques, and processes provide limited guidance for the collection, confirmation, processing, and

reporting of information on outbreak indicators and are performed manually using raw information drawn from automated systems.

0: The collection, confirmation, and reporting of outbreak indicators are nonexistent.

Reports on hazard

8-10: Hazard reporting accuracy and utility is high; based on standardized automated system processing, analysis, and evaluation

are accurate.

with trained staff review and involvement; and reliant on trained and experience observations and rapid and accurate reporting by

personnel in the field.

4-7: Hazard reporting accuracy and utility exists but widely varies between units and staffs and is dependent upon manual

processes reliant upon the experience, training, and availability of the performing staff/observing field personnel and the quality of

reports and selected assessed information.

1-3: Hazard reporting accuracy and utility are low.

0: Hazard reporting accuracy and utility are nonexistent.

Health-related

8-10: Secure, interoperable, and interactive medical surveillance systems exist and continuously interrelate with other nonmedical

surveillance

systems and CBRND information systems within the net-centric environment to provide ongoing health status of forces.

reporting system is

4-7: Procedures, policies, techniques, and processes exist to perform medical surveillance of the force and are assisted by

in place.

automated systems requiring manual intervention and on a periodic basis or as determined necessary.

1-3: Medical surveillance is performed manually from raw information drawn from automated systems

0: Medical surveillance is nonexistent.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Reports of

8-10: Integrated, interoperable, and interactive automated systems substantially or fully detect, process, and report CBRN attack

observations of

indicators in near-real time. These systems also support the collection, processing, and reporting of manually collected information

CBRN attack

and data.

indicators are

4-7: Doctrine, policies, procedures, TTPs, and formats exist and are applied and are generally performed manually for the reporting

timely.

of CBRN attack indicators. Timeliness is contingent upon operational considerations and unit/personnel capabilities.

1-3: Doctrine, policies, procedures, TTPs, and formats exist and are applied and are generally performed manually for the reporting

of CBRN attack indicators. Time to perform is extended by available communications constraints and ongoing operational demands

0: The timeliness of reporting of CBRN attack indicator observations fails to support survival and operational needs.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place

operations

to conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Special liaisons may be assigned to applicable NGOs, international agencies, indigenous civil authorities, and aid organizations for coordination and information exchange.

² Procedures, policies, and processes are established for the largely manual collection, confirmation, processing, and reporting of outbreak indicators. Medical surveillance systems

exist and assist for joint force personnel but are largely stovepiped and require manual intervention for transmission and interpretation. Further, these systems are not developed

sufficiently to adequately incorporate information from non-JTF sources. Current systems and processes are dependent upon the experience, training, and cognizance of

responsible staff.

³ Accuracy and utility of hazard reporting is dependent upon the experience, training, and availability of the necessary staff, as well as the quality and accessibility of information.

Field reporting accuracy and utility varies widely dependent upon unit training, individual attentiveness, and in-place observation reporting mechanisms. Current capability is

achieved using doctrine and locally developed processes. Limited training is provided to staff and field personnel for the identification, reporting, and processing of hazards and

related information. Consistent standardized formal and refresher training on immediate or local battlefield hazard identification and reporting is not regularly and routinely

performed. Limited and often cursory training is provided and often is not until preparation or during the conduct of operations.

⁴ Medical surveillance systems are largely stovepiped and lack integration with operations and intelligence systems. Further, these systems are not developed sufficiently to

adequately incorporate information from non-JTF sources. Current systems and processes are dependent upon the experience, training, and cognizance of responsible staff.

⁵ CBRN attack indicator observations are largely reported using standardized ATP-45 formatted messages and are prepared manually for transmission using existing and available

communications systems. Timeliness is contingent upon the experience and knowledge of the reporting personnel, ongoing operational considerations, and available

communications capabilities. However, dissemination to other units in the potentially affected area, especially if they do not share communications systems and frequencies, is

usually delayed until retransmitted by higher authority. JWARN provides the automated capability to disseminate CBRN attack indicator information in the net-centric

environment. JOEF and JEM support the collection, interpretation, and visualization of the information. This suite of systems is projected to be fielded in the near-term. JOEF and

JEM are projected for initial fielding during the mid term with full fielding completed early in the far term. Concurrent with the mid-term release of JOEF and JEM will be

JWARN Block II which will be initially fielded to operational units.

⁶ Current DOTLPF include the ability to conduct this task using largely manual processes and available communications systems. However, processes and procedures for the

immediate dissemination of information to neighboring units is not adequate. The retransmission of the information by higher echelon to all units potentially at risk or affected by

a CBRN/TIM event is performed as a work-around and assurance of notification. CBRND training ranges from in-depth and substantial for selected functions and personnel to

inadequate and haphazard for others, largely field personnel. DOTLPF will need to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.11.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.11.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Insufficient liaison and collaboration with non-JTF agencies and organizations in

the operating area.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine and TTPs requirements are needed for

liaison and collaboration with non-JTF agencies and organizations within the operating area

for the purposes of coordination and information exchange. Organization: Establish, man,

and equip specific standard units and primary-duty personnel for the conduct of liaison and

collaboration with other entities, including non-JTF agencies and organizations. Training:

Ensure ongoing training and development of experienced and qualified personnel for the

conduct of successful liaison and collaboration activities. Personnel: Ensure selection and

availability of primary-duty personnel in sufficient quantities to ensure fully mission capable

status of liaison units and elements supporting operations and mission requirements.

Deficiency: Inadequate organization within the JTF to effectively assess and confirm

CBRN/TIM events and outbreaks.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine and TTPs are required for assessment and

confirmation of CBRN/TIM events and outbreaks. Organization: Staffing and organizational

resources supporting the identification, assessment, confirmation, and reporting of

CBRN/TIM events and outbreaks are required. Training: Ensure adequate formal and

recurring refresher training of staff and personnel on their areas of responsibility for the

identification, assessment, confirmation, and/or reporting of potential CBRN/TIM events and

outbreaks.

Deficiency: Inadequate training.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Ensure adequate formal and recurring refresher training

of staff and personnel on their areas of responsibility for the identification, assessment,

confirmation, and/or reporting of potential CBRN/TIM events and outbreaks.

Deficiency: Insufficient interaction and coordination between medical, operational, and

intelligence staffs.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Refine doctrine, policies, procedures, processes, and

TTPs to support the interactive exchange of information between medical, operational, and

intelligence elements. Organization: Organizational resources and systems supporting the

interactive and collaborative exchange of information between staffs and elements are

required. Training: Ensure formal and recurring refresher training promoting information

interchange and collaborative relationships between medical, operational, and intelligence

staffs.

Deficiency: Lack of interactive link with COP.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.12

Task TASHA 12: Conduct medical surveillance based on syndromic information

and data across the battlespace

9.12.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.12.1.1

Definition

Using syndromic information and data, medical surveillance across the battlespace is conducted.

The results are collected and analyzed in the operations centers contributing to combat risk

assessments and the management of response and mitigation, including identification of

necessary medical countermeasures to protect the force. Medical surveillance results and

response are included in the COP situational awareness. Medical surveillance is a critical

capability to identify biological agents (vectored, communicable), nonimmediate casualty

chemical exposure, and emissive radiological exposures. For vector attacks and small covert

attacks of communicable disease agents, medical surveillance could be the primary means of

detecting the attack and its progression through JTF elements. Liaison and information are

collected from indigenous and NGO activities in the tactical operating area.

9.12.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.12.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 7

9.12.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASUST 5, TASUST 6, TASUST 7

9.12.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.12.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Partially completed mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Poor personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

4. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

5. Moderate staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

2. Limited international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

3. Moderate health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

9.12.2

Functional Need Analysis

9.12.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.12-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Services have a largely manual overall capability to perform medical surveillance of the

battlespace. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “red.” Although

improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in the

assessment of the measures, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall

assessed color ratings for the measures and this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The current capability to conduct medical surveillance across the battlespace consists of limited

automated assistive systems requiring substantial manual entry and manipulation such as

USTRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRCCES)/

Composite Health Care System II - Tactical (CHCS2T), Global Expeditionary Medical System

(GEMS), plus the Army Medical Surveillance Activity’s DMSS and Joint Medical Evacuation

Program (JTMEP). JTMEP does provide medical surveillance but only within the medical

community. Medical surveillance operates in isolation from the routine activities of the

operational staffs. Deficiencies include that there is no cohesive and integrated data interchange

of medical information related to CBRN via electronic means, CBRN casualty information will

require identification and supporting programming to address CBRN information issues, and

there is a considerable lag between the generation of CBRN medical information and its display

in the COP. Generally, non-U.S. personnel are not tracked in Service medical systems and

information collected from coalition partners, NGOs, and host-nation agencies must be

correlated manually by epidemiologists and command staff personnel.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The continuing development of medical systems and medical surveillance tools meeting

interoperability standards integrating the various aspects of medical care and treatment are

expected to expand the availability of surveillance information critical to effective CBRND.

Development of an integrated and interoperable medical surveillance system will provide the

command staff with information for correlation with other gathered information. Warning

information is subsequently disseminated through JWARN.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

Continued improvement as standardized, interoperable, and integrated systems replace legacy

systems.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.12-1. TASHA 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Medical Surveillance

Current Overall Capability

5¹

4²

4³

1⁴

4³

4⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Disseminated

8-10: Medical surveillance information is correlated and processed with other source information and, as a composite, is

information is accurate.

disseminated in near-real time to requiring users. The disseminated data are accurate, current, and updated as new

information is received and processed.

4-7: Medical surveillance information is predominantly manually correlated and processed with other source information

and, as a composite, is disseminated to requiring users. The disseminated data are accurate as of the last update.

1-3: Medical surveillance is not integrated with other source data or contains substantial errors.

0: Medical surveillance is nonexistent.

Specific CBRN/TIM

8-10: Automated systems accurately and rapidly correlate syndromic indications from medical treatment information and

agent and appropriate

other sources with CBRN/TIM agent symptomology, identify the appropriate causative agent, and specify the appropriate

medical countermeasures

medical countermeasures.

are identified.

4-7: Identification of the specific CBRN/TIM agent and appropriate medical countermeasures is predominantly performed

manually with the use of limited assistive automated tools and resources where available.

1-3: Medical surveillance is inadequate for the identification of CBRN/TIM agent exposure and determination of

appropriate medical countermeasures

0: Medical surveillance cannot identify and address CBRN/TIM agent exposure and appropriate medical countermeasures.

Units affected by CBRN

8-10: Interoperable and integrated automated systems identify and track both potential and known exposed personnel and

agents are identified and

units. Medical systems track exposed personnel throughout their career and identify the exposure.

tracked.

4-7: Units and personnel potentially and known to be exposed to CBRN agents are identified and tracked once known

until exposure and contamination is confirmed and/or resolved.

1-3: Units and personnel potentially and known to be exposed to CBRN agents are inadequately identified and tracked

until exposure and contamination is confirmed and/or resolved

0: Tracking of units and personnel potentially and known to be exposed to CBRN agents is not performed.

Outbreak indicators are

8-10: Automated systems accurately and rapidly correlate syndromic indications from medical treatment information and

assessed and confirmed.

other sources with CBRN/TIM agent symptomology, identify the appropriate causative agent/disease, and specify the

appropriate medical countermeasures and actions.

4-7: Identification of the specific CBRN/TIM agent or disease and appropriate medical countermeasures/activities are

predominantly performed manually with the use of limited assistive automated tools and resources where available.

1-3: Medical surveillance does not adequately identify CBRN/TIM agent exposure, disease outbreaks, and the appropriate

medical countermeasures.

0: Medical surveillance does not address CBRN/TIM agent exposure, disease outbreaks, and the appropriate medical

countermeasures.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Health-related

8-10: Interoperable and integrated automated systems continually draw current information from medical systems

surveillance, information

(including treatment, surveillance, and syndromic data). These systems correlate and process the information for the

epidemiology and

identification of issues and potential solutions and/or response actions.

symptomology

4-7: The collection and analysis of potential indicators are predominantly performed manually with the use of limited

information can be

assistive automated tools and resources where available.

collected and analyzed.

1-3: The collection and analysis of potential indicators is inadequate to prevent potential serious impact to operations

0: The collection and analysis of potential indicators is nonexistent.

Battlespace health-related

8-10: Medical surveillance of the battlespace is in place and information is correlated and processed with other source

surveillance system is in

information and, as a composite, is disseminated in near-real time to requiring users. The disseminated data are accurate,

place.

current, and updated as new information is received and processed.

4-7: Medical surveillance is performed predominantly manually. Related information is generally manually correlated and

processed with other source information and, as a composite, is disseminated to requiring users. The disseminated data are

accurate as of the last update.

1-3: Medical surveillance is not integrated with other source data and/or contains substantial errors.

0: Medical surveillance is nonexistent.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Medical surveillance is predominantly manual in performance. Limited automated medical surveillance systems exist but are generally restricted to existing medical information

systems for tracking U.S. force personnel. Epidemiologists may or may not have access to information provided to command centers by field personnel, NGOs, host-nation agency

contacts, and other sources. The accuracy of the derived medical surveillance information is dependent upon the experience, knowledge, and skill of the performing individual and

access to relevant information. Correlation of this information with other data available to the command centers is also dependent upon the experience, knowledge, skill of the

operations, intelligence, and CBRN staff and the degree to which collaboration between the command staff elements exist.

² Largely performed manually using limited assistive automated tools and resources, when available, to identify potential exposures to a CBRN/TIM agent and the affecting agent,

and to outline appropriate medical countermeasures. The accuracy of this information is dependent upon the experience, knowledge, and skill of the performing medical

practitioner and access to relevant information. Collaboration with CBRN and other staff members is often performed only after a definitive diagnosis is reached, increasing the

time before action and does not acknowledge existing assistive expertise.

³ Medical systems such as USTRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRCCES), Composite Health Care System II - Tactical (CHCS2T), Global

Expeditionary Medical System (GEMS), and DMSS are available. However, they are not interoperable. These systems must meet DISA standards when substantial upgrades are

performed or the systems are replaced. All systems must be interoperable in the far term. Information from these systems currently must be manually collected and tracked.

Although these systems must be interoperable in the far term, CBRN is not possess a specific identifier in these systems and requires knowledge and skill on the part of the

tracking medical and operations staff to identify and track affected personnel and units. Doctrine, policies, and procedures exist to assist the commander’s staff with the

identification and tracking of affected units.

⁴ Performed manually with some limited assistive automated tools. Currently requires indication of a problem before epidemiological inquiry and medical surveillance is

performed. Although limited medical surveillance tools do exist within selected stovepiped medical systems, the information must be manually interpreted and investigated

generally following a deliberate implementation of the appropriate medical surveillance tool. Interoperability between medical systems may serve to support medical surveillance

with preplanning for these activities and their information requirements. Epidemiologists may or may not have access to information provided to command centers by field

personnel, NGOs, host-nation agency contacts, and other sources.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.12.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.12.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Lack of cohesive and integrated data interchange of medical information related

to CBRN via electronic means to the COP.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Adjust doctrine to address processing of

information provided to the command center by field reports, coalition partners, host-nation

agencies, NGOs, and other sources. Organization: Ensure organizational structures are in

place for the assessment and integration of information from sources other than medical

services into medical surveillance. Training: Train staffs and medical services personnel on

CBRN and disease outbreak indicators. Include diverse source information in CBRN

exercises and evaluations for skill development and maintenance. Facilities: Establish

supporting infrastructure to enable data interchange and display on the COP.

Deficiency: Inadequate or lack of CBRN related casualty information.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Adjust medical information systems doctrinal

requirements to include CBRN identification and processing for medical surveillance and

subsequent reporting. Organization: Ensure organizational structures are in place for the

identification and collection of information from medical information systems for CBRN

medical surveillance. Training: Train appropriate medical services personnel to query

medical information systems and forward CBRN indicators and issues for medical

surveillance review. Facilities: Develop supporting infrastructure to enable data collection

and transfer.

Deficiency: Inadequate timeliness between generation of CBRN medical information and its

display in the COP.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Adjust doctrine to emphasize indicator

identification and continuing medical surveillance in coordination with command staffs.

Facilities: Establish supporting infrastructure to enable data collection and transfer.

9.12.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.12-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Approaches for this task cover the need to improve the information interchange with

medical information systems, including extracting casualty data for tactical planning and

improving the speed of medical input to the formation of the COP. Even though the medics are

gathering patient surveillance data, the analysis of these data needs to be provided to tactical

commanders to affect their decision process. Table 9.12-5 identifies which of the material

approaches might address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.13

Task TASHA 13: Conduct veterinary surveillance of MWA and indigenous animal

population throughout the battlespace

9.13.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.13.1.1

Definition

This task deals with conducting veterinary surveillance of MWAs and indigenous animal

population throughout the battlespace. Animal surveillance is a key part of force health

protection efforts since illness or death in the animal populations may be an indication that a

CBRN event has occurred.

Based on the battlespace veterinary plan, MWAs are routinely checked for potential indications

of exposure to CBRN/TIM agents. Additionally, JTF elements in the area of operations can

identify sick or diseased animals and birds in the conduct of their activities. As an example,

patrols, convoys, and security checkpoints can identify or observe ill health in the indigenous

population. The frequency and extent of ill health might be an indicator of the presence of a

radiological, toxic chemical, or a biological agent. Liaison and information are collected from

indigenous and NGO activities in the tactical operating area. Relatively rapid degradation in the

indigenous animal and/or bird population might indicate the presence of a CBRN agent and a

potential threat to JTF elements. Additionally, this task might also include observations

regarding an increase of vector populations. Daily situation reports might include these

observations. Information from these activities are compiled and correlated by veterinary

surveillance. The results including appropriate veterinary countermeasures contribute to health

and risk assessments and assist in the management of response and mitigation. Veterinary

surveillance of MWA and indigenous animal and bird population is critical to the health of the

force.

9.13.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

Transformation Planning Guidance, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

9.13.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 7

9.13.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASENS 10, TASUST 5, TASUST 6, TASUST 7

9.13.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.13.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Partially completed mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

4. Poor personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

5. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

3. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C 3.1.2.4)

4. Poor civil health. (C3.3.1.4)

5. High health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

6. Significant TIM present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

9.13.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.13.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.13-1 shows the current capability to track MWAs is limited and manual in nature. There

is no capability to track indigenous animals. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far

term are assessed “red.”

Current Capability and Deficiency

Indigenous animals are currently not included in any surveillance or reporting activities and

veterinary surveillance procedures must be updated to include the indigenous animal

populations. Non-JTF reporting and information is not addressed for establishment and

integration into veterinary surveillance activities. A need exists to develop an automated

surveillance and reporting system for MWAs and indigenous animals. Veterinary information is

currently processed and disseminated in text format using Lotus Notes. Information contained in

this system is not interoperable or transferable to other systems by other than manual extraction

and reinput.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

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Table 9.13-1. TASHA 13: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: MWA/Indigenous Animal Veterinary Surveillance System

Current Overall Capability

1¹

8²

1³

4⁴

1¹

3⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Reports are provided by

8-10: Interoperable and integrated automated systems accurately and rapidly collect, correlate, validate, and process veterinary

non-JTF activities.

surveillance information from JTF and non-JTF sources for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks. The

information is assessed and presented on the COP using automated tools and systems.

4-7: Veterinary surveillance information from JTF and non-JTF sources are accurately and rapidly collected, correlated, confirmed, and

processed manually for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks. The information is assessed and presented on the

COP.

1-3: Veterinary surveillance does not adequately collect, correlate, and process information from JTF and non-JTF sources for

CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks.

0: Veterinary surveillance does not exist.

MWA restricted by

8-10: MWAs are routinely reviewed by veterinary personnel for medical issues and concerns. MWAs are isolated/quarantined when

veterinary isolation/

determined necessary. Identification and tracking of these animals is accurately and adequately performed by supporting veterinary

quarantine are identified.

services both locally, by the owning Service, and the DoD Military Working Dog Veterinary Services Center.

4-7: MWAs are reviewed by veterinary personnel upon CBRN/TIM exposure or contamination or if sick. MWAs are

isolated/quarantined when determined necessary. Identification and tracking of these animals is performed manually and locally by

supporting veterinary services.

1-3: Identification and tracking of veterinary ordered MWA isolation/quarantine is inadequate.

0: Identification and tracking of veterinary ordered MWA isolation/quarantine nonexistent.

Outbreak indicators are

8-10: Interoperable and integrated veterinary surveillance automated systems accurately and rapidly assess potential outbreak indicators

assessed and confirmed.

reported by from JTF and non-JTF sources. The information is validated and presented on the COP using automated tools and systems.

4-7: Veterinary surveillance accurately and rapidly assesses and confirms outbreak indicators reported by from JTF and non-JTF

sources. Veterinary surveillance is performed predominantly manually and the information is validated and presented on the COP.

1-3: Veterinary surveillance does not adequately assess and confirm outbreak indicators for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-

species outbreaks reported by from JTF and non-JTF sources.

0: Veterinary surveillance does not exist.

Reports on hazard are

8-10: Veterinary hazard report utility is high and is posted directly to the COP.

accurate.

4-7: Veterinary hazard report utility exists and the information is posted on the COP after review and/or consolidation by nonveterinary

activity or authority.

1-3: Veterinary hazard report utility is low and unable to support operations.

0: Veterinary hazard report utility is nonexistent.

Veterinary surveillance

8-10: Interoperable and integrated veterinary surveillance reporting system exists and is in place. Reports are presented on the COP and

reporting system is in place.

disseminated to appropriate activities within and outside the area of operations.

4-7: Veterinary surveillance reporting system exists and is in place. Reports are performed manually and disseminated using available

communications channels to selected activities within and outside the area of operations.

1-3: Veterinary surveillance reporting is inadequate to support operations.

0: Veterinary surveillance reporting does not exist.

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Reports of observations of

8-10: Interoperable and integrated automated systems accurately and rapidly collect, correlate, validate, and process veterinary

CBRN attack indicators are

surveillance information from JTF and non-JTF sources for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks. The

timely.

information is assessed and presented on the COP using automated tools and systems.

4-7: Veterinary surveillance information from JTF and non-JTF sources are accurately and rapidly collected, correlated, confirmed, and

processed manually for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks. The information is assessed and presented on the

COP.

1-3: Veterinary surveillance does not adequately collect, correlate, and process information from JTF and non-JTF sources for

CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-species outbreaks.

0: Veterinary surveillance does not exist.

There is effective DOTLPF

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon operations

in place to conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Veterinary surveillance is inadequate for the collection, correlation, and processing of information from JTF and non-JTF sources for CBRN/TIM indications and potential cross-

species outbreaks. Field observations of indigenous animals and wildlife are not generally performed or forwarded for veterinary surveillance activities. Veterinary surveillance

reports on MWAs are generally not provided by non-JTF activities and veterinary surveillance reports on indigenous animals and wildlife are not provided by non-JTF activities.

² MWDs are routinely restricted or isolated to reduce exposure to indigenous animals. Veterinary isolation or quarantine is imposed when determined necessary by veterinary

personnel for the protection of the animal, personnel, and other MWDs. Identification and tracking is performed locally and reported to the owning Service’s veterinary service and

is viewed by the DoD MWD Veterinary Services Center. Reporting and identification is performed using veterinary services Lotus Notes-based system.

³ Veterinary surveillance does not adequately assess and confirm potential outbreak indicators among indigenous animals and wildlife. DOTLPF does exist for the conduct of

assessment and confirmation of outbreak indicators. However, field observations of indigenous animals and wildlife are not generally performed or forwarded for veterinary

surveillance activities. Veterinary surveillance reports on indigenous animals and wildlife are not generally provided by non-JTF activities.

⁴ Field veterinary services entities report on veterinary activities and identified hazards to medical services and the regional veterinary services center. The reports are generally not

directly posted to the COP, although utility of identified hazards is generally high. Veterinary services do not possess automated tools to conduct veterinary surveillance. Reporting

is generally performed using legacy Lotus Notes-based system or available communications systems.

⁵ DOTLPF is inadequate for the conduct of this task. Veterinary services DOTLPF does address most critical aspects of the conduct of veterinary surveillance within the JTF.

However, JTF functions and activities outside of the veterinary services do not possess adequate DOTLPF to support veterinary surveillance. Non-JTF sources of information are

not adequately addressed in veterinary surveillance activities and processes.

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9.13.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.13.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Lack of established reporting and integration into veterinary surveillance

activities of indigenous animal reports from non-JTF activities and routine MWA veterinary

activities.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine to establish procedures and

guidance for MWA and indigenous animal reports from non-JTF entities. Training: Train

non-JTF personnel to properly collect MWA and indigenous animal surveillance information

and forward it to JTF activities. Leadership: Have leadership at non-JTF activities support

and enable the collection and reporting of MWA and indigenous animal surveillance

information to the JTF.

Deficiency: Inability to directly place veterinary surveillance information into the COP.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Require the direct posting of veterinary surveillance

information in the COP.

Deficiency: Lack of SOPs to assess or confirm outbreak indicators in MWAs and indigenous

animals.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine to require these types of SOPs.

Deficiency: Inadequate routing of observations of indigenous animal/wildlife population

within daily SITREPs to the veterinary services.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Train personnel to routinely disseminate information on

indigenous animals to veterinary services as it is placed in the situation report (SITREP).

Veterinary services personnel should review SITREP.

Deficiency: Lack of inclusion of indigenous animals in hazard reporting.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine to include indigenous animals in

hazard reports.

9.13.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.13-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. The recommended approach to ensure completion of this task is to improve the information

exchange process between the tactical and the veterinary units so the MWA treatment

information is included in the COP.

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9.14

Task TASHA 14: Conduct surveillance of food and water supplies throughout the

battlespace

9.14.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.14.1.1

Definition

Based on the battlespace preventive health plan, all food and water supplies are checked for

contamination upon entering the supply chain, at key points in the supply chain, and before being

prepared and consumed. This task is performed by veterinary, preventive medicine, engineer,

and food service personnel. Information from these activities are collected and analyzed by

preventive health surveillance. The results including appropriate preventive activities and

medical countermeasures contribute to health and risk assessments and assist in the management

of response and mitigation. Surveillance of food and water supplies is critical to the health of the

force.

9.14.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.14.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 7

9.14.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASENS 7, TASENS 8, TASENS 9

9.14.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.14.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Partially completed mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Poor personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

4. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

5. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Limited international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

3. Moderate health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

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9.14.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.14.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.14-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Current capabilities are based on old, manual systems and surveillance data on food and water

and preventative health are not always integrated into the COP. The overall capability for

current, near/mid, and far term are assessed “yellow.”

Current Capability and Deficiency

Testing of food is performed when there is confirmed or suspected contamination. Water testing

is done by a number of groups (e.g., preventative medicine and veterinarians) based on location.

There is little capability to conduct routine surveillance of food and water supplies. Any

collected data are not always shared nor included in the COP. Current deficiencies include the

facts that reports may not be available, preventive medicine and veterinarians are not tied

together to share data, testing is performed only when there is confirmed or suspected

contamination, and the Veterinary Corps relies on e-mail to obtain and pass information.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is projected for this task.

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Table 9.14-1. TASHA 14: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Veterinary Food and Water Surveillance

Current Overall Capability

1¹

5²

5³

6⁴

3¹

2⁵

4⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Food and water surveillance

8-10: Consumable food and water surveillance information utility is high and is accurately and rapidly presented on the

information in the COP is

COP using automated tools and systems.

accurate and useful.

4-7: Consumable food and water surveillance information utility exists; information is current and accurate and is

directly posted to the COP using manual means.

1-3: Consumable food and water surveillance information utility is low, delayed, inaccurate, or not generally posted

directly to the COP.

0: Consumable food and water surveillance information utility is nonexistent.

Preventative health

8-10: Veterinary and preventative health surveillance automated systems are interoperable and integrated. Correlation of

surveillance information is

information is performed by the systems and is timely and accurate.

correlated.

4-7: Correlation of veterinary and preventative health surveillance information is predominantly performed manually.

1-3: Correlation of veterinary and preventative health surveillance information is inadequate for support of operations

0: Correlation of veterinary and preventative health surveillance information is nonexistent.

Reports on hazard are

8-10: Consumable food and water surveillance hazard report utility is high and is posted directly to the COP.

accurate.

4-7: Consumable food and water surveillance hazard report utility exists and the information is posted on the COP after

review and/or consolidation by nonveterinary activity or authority.

1-3: Consumable food and water surveillance hazard report utility is low and does not support operations.

0: Consumable food and water surveillance hazard report utility is nonexistent.

Food and water surveillance

8-10: Interoperable and integrated consumable food and water surveillance reporting system exists and is in place.

information reporting system

Reports are presented on the COP and disseminated to appropriate activities within and outside the area of operations.

is in place.

4-7: Consumable food and water surveillance reporting system exists and is in place. Reports are performed manually

and disseminated using available communications channels to selected activities within and outside area of operations.

1-3: Consumable food and water surveillance reporting is inadequate for support of operations.

0: Consumable food and water surveillance reporting does not exist.

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Reports of contamination

8-10: Interoperable and integrated automated systems accurately and rapidly collect, correlate, and surveillance

indications of food and

information of food and water supplies. The information is assessed and presented directly on the COP by veterinary

water supplies are timely.

and/or preventative health services activities using automated tools and systems.

4-7: Surveillance information on food and water supplies is accurately and rapidly collected, correlated, and processed

manually. The information is assessed and directly presented on the COP by veterinary and/or preventative health

services activities.

1-3: Food and water surveillance inadequately collects, correlates, and processes information for presentation on the

COP by veterinary and/or preventative health services activities.

0: Food and water surveillance does not exist.

Preventative activities and

8-10: Veterinary and/or preventative health surveillance automated systems are interoperable and integrated. Correlation of

medical countermeasures are

information is performed by the systems and identifies appropriate medical services COAs that are timely and accurate.

fully implemented.

Implementation of appropriate preventative activities and medical countermeasures adequately address situation.

4-7: Correlation of veterinary and/or preventative health surveillance information and identification of the appropriate

medical services COA is predominantly performed manually and is timely and accurate. Implementation and conduct of

the selected COA adequately addresses situation.

1-3: Correlation of veterinary/or and preventative health surveillance information, identification of appropriate medical

services COA, and/or implementation and conduct of the selected COA are inadequate for support of operations.

0: Correlation of veterinary and/or preventative health surveillance information, identification of appropriate medical

services COA, and/or implementation and conduct of the selected COA are nonexistent.

There is effective DOTLPF

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact

in place to conduct task.

upon operations

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring

work-arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Consumable surveillance information is generally not posted to the COP. Information collected by veterinary and/or preventative health services activities is generally posted,

when performed, to the COP by medical services authorities after review. Process is predominantly manual, time- and labor-intensive, and delays display of potentially critical

information on the COP with concurrent risk to health and well-being of the force.

² Veterinary and/or preventative health surveillance information is correlated. However, the process is predominantly manual and time- and labor-intensive.

³ Consumable food and water surveillance hazard reporting on food and water supplies is posted on the COP by medical services authorities after review. Process is predominantly

manual and time- and labor-intensive. Reporting is performed only on supplies tested. Generally, testing of food and water supplies by veterinary and/or preventative health

surveillance are performed when indications exist of a potential safety issue.

⁴ Consumable food and water surveillance information reporting processes and procedures exist and is in place. Reporting is performed manually and disseminated using available

C4ISR systems.

⁵ Cooperative relationships between veterinary, preventative health, and medical services activities in the field are largely dependent upon establishment of personal interactions,

OPTEMPO, leadership interest, and the circumstances. Medical, preventative health, and veterinary services activities often operate and perform distinctly separate with generally

inadequate coordination and cooperation.

⁶ DOTLPF is provides for the performance of most critical aspects of this task. In-place barriers and work-arounds, however, impede accomplishment. DOTLPF must evolve as

systems, tactics, and situations change and to promote net-centric operations.

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9.14.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.14.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Lack of common sharing of automated data between preventive medicine and

veterinary services.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Adjust doctrine to include address and remove

impediments to veterinary information processing and dissemination. Organization: Adjust

medical and veterinary organizations to foster sharing and exchange of data. Leadership:

Promote and maintain close cooperative and mutually participating relationships between

field medical and veterinary services activities. Training: Provide initial and recurrent

training to preventative medicine, veterinary services, and unit command staff of medical

services activities facilitating and emphasizing the appropriate sharing of information.

Deficiency: Inadequate doctrine supporting veterinary performance of testing unless there is

confirmed or suspected contamination.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Include threat-based guidance under which

veterinary services activities perform sampling tests on animals for presymptomatic

infections.

Deficiency: Inadequate automated data collection and exchange for consumable food and

potable water surveillance.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Adjust joint and Service doctrine to require

automated, interoperable data collection, analysis, and exchange systems for all units and

forces tasked with conducting consumable food and potable water surveillance.

Deficiency: Inadequate veterinary capability for response unless there exists a known

problem or suspected situation.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Include threat-based guidance under which veterinary

services activities perform sampling tests on animals for presymptomatic infections.

Personnel: Adjust veterinary staffing for additional workload involved in testing.

9.14.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.14-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Approaches focus on the need for medical/veterinary data exchange process, connecting the

veterinarians to the tactical network, and providing the needed automated tools to improve the

speed and accuracy of veterinary testing and reporting to the COP. Table 9.14-5 identifies which

of the material approaches might address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the

DOTMLPF assessment.

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9.15

Task TASHA 15: Conduct CBRND preparations

9.15.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.15.1.1

Definition

Includes collaborative preparation for joint and coalition forces CBRND operations within the

local or immediate battlespace. Includes collecting and analyzing data from assessments within

CBRND functional areas (Shape, Sense, Shield, and Sustain) to support CBRND preparations

based on plans, commander’s intent, and operational context and situation. Includes preparatory

activities with affected forces, coalition partners, and appropriate NGO and indigenous agencies.

Also includes integration of CBRN resources provided by other nations and agencies. Includes

the tracking, status, and allocation of CBRND resources and activities to assure CBRND

readiness and preparedness for sustained effective performance of CBRND tasks within a

CBRN/TIM environment. Includes the development and dissemination of taskings to achieve

defined end states. Maintains visibility and awareness in the COP of CBRND preparatory

activities and resource status.

9.15.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

Transformation Planning Guidance, Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations, Protection

Joint Functional Concept.

9.15.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 6

9.15.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASHLD 9, TASHLD 10, TASHLD 11, TASHLD 12

9.15.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.15.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Limited military commitments from other nations. (C2.1.1.7)

3. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

4. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

5. Some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

6. Full joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

7. Partial multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

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8. Moderate staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

9. Limited deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

10. Limited prepositioned materiel. (C2.8.4)

11. No host-nation support. (C2.8.5)

Civil

1. Limited major power involvement. (C3.1.2.1)

2. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

3. Uncertain international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

4. Restrictive National Command Authority decisions. (C3.1.3)

9.15.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.15.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.15-1 discusses individual capabilities to plan and prepare for CBRND operations and

activities to the designated standards. Currently fielded capabilities are adequate, but need

automating, for most operational situations. Capability includes processes and methodologies to

plan, coordinate, and conduct preparations for CBRND operations and activities. The overall

capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.” Although improvements

between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in the associated identified

values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall assessed color ratings

for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Processes exist to coordinate allocation of CBRND units, personnel, systems, and equipment.

Plans have been prepared for operations in a CBRN/TIM environment. Training of U.S. forces

for operations involving a CBRN threat is generally performed in preparation of tasked forces to

conduct operations not of a sustained nature within a CBRN environment. U.S. forces are not

trained and equipped to perform sustained operations within a CBRN environment. Although

negotiations and discussions with coalition partners and other participants establish requirements

and activities for non-U.S. forces in preparation for CBRN operations, not all potential partner

nations possess CBRND capabilities. The participation of such nations in CBRN operations will

be dependent upon the ability and willingness of the United States and/or other allies to provide

the necessary training and materiel. Deficiencies include inadequate automated processing and

assessment tools; training of coalition forces; and inadequately trained CBRND personnel.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The initial fielding of programmed Joint CBRND systems (e.g., Joint Expeditionary Collective

Protection [JECP], Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology[JSLIST], Joint Service

General Purpose Mask [JSGPM], etc.) provides additional capabilities for consideration and

application in operations planning. These systems will gradually replace Service-specific legacy

systems throughout the mid term and into the early far term. The CBRN staff cell must consider

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Table 9.15-1. TASHA 15: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Conduct CBRND Preparations

Current Overall Capability

6¹

6²

6³

4⁴

6⁵

7⁶

5⁷

5⁸

6⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Process exists to

8-10: Automated tools, processes, and systems track and display on the COP the status of CBRND units and personnel.

coordinate the allocation

Includes unit equipment and supplies status, unit capabilities, and other relevant information for review. Assists with the

of CBRND units and

allocation of these units and personnel to meet identified needs and operational requirements.

personnel.

4-7: The identification, tracking, and allocation of CBRND units and personnel is performed by predominantly manual

means. Process effectiveness is dependent upon the training, knowledge, skill, and experience of performing personnel and

the currency and accuracy of applied information.

1-3: Processes for the identification, tracking, and/or allocation of CBRND units and personnel is inadequate for effective

support of operations

0: Processes for the identification, tracking, and/or allocation of CBRND units and personnel is nonexistent.

Allocation of CBRND

8-10: Adequate quantities and types of CBRND equipment, systems, and material are available, allocated, ready, and match

systems and equipment.

JTF operations (e.g., Expeditionary, High Maneuver, etc.) and environments (e.g., jungle, extreme cold terrain, desert, etc.).

Includes support of sustained operations in a CBRN/TIM environment.

4-7: Sufficient quantities and types of CBRND equipment, systems, and material are allocated and ready for support of JTF

operations in a CBRN/TIM environment. Adjustments to planned quantities are performed when necessary for availability.

Alternatives are identified, supporting material availability determined, and appropriate allocation actions are taken.

1-3: CBRND systems and equipment allocation is inadequate to support operations.

0: CBRND systems and equipment allocation processes do not exist.

Process exists to

8-10: Automated processes, templates, and collaborative spaces ensure all relevant issues and needs are addressed. Planners

coordinate the pertinent

and CBRN specialist are highly trained, knowledgeable, and possess access to needed reference material and impacting

Sense, Shape, Shield,

information.

and Sustain factors.

4-7: Manual processes are predominantly applied to address pertinent CBRND issues and are dependent upon the training,

skill, experience, and knowledge of planning participants.

1-3: Process are inadequate for the effective identification and planning of pertinent CBRND issues, and/or planning

participants do not possess adequate training, skill, experience, and knowledge to perform the task.

0: Processes and training do not exist for the identification and planning of pertinent CBRND issues.

CBRND staff cell and

8-10: CBRN staff cell and units possess dedicated information technology resources and tools for the accomplishment and

units have access to

performance of their duties and responsibilities. These are used to support operational and training requirements.

dedicated information

4-7: CBRN staff cell and units are able to access shared information technology resources and tools for operational

technology resources to

requirements and training.

perform tasks and

1-3: CBRN staff cell and units possess limited access to shared information technology resources for operational

responsibilities.

requirements and training.

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0: CBRN staff cell and units do not possess access to information technology to support operations and training.

Plans exist for

8-10: Operational plans for sustained operations within a CBRN/TIM environment are developed and disseminated to all

operations within a

tasked elements. Plans adequately address the four CBRND areas and enable maintenance of OPTEMPO and successful

CBRN/TIM

attainment of planned end states.

environment.

4-7: Operational plans for operations within a CBRN/TIM environment are developed and disseminated to all tasked

elements. Plans adequately address the four CBRND areas and enable resumption of OPTEMPO and successful attainment

of planned end states.

1-3: Plans are inadequate for support of operations within a CBRN/TIM environment.

0: Plans are nonexistent for operations within a CBRN/TIM environment.

Non-DoD CBRND

8-10: Available CBRND resources of coalition partners and pertinent non-DoD entities are integrated into CBRND planning

resources integrated

and preparations. Secure, interoperable, and interactive processes between participants track identified CBRND resources

when available.

and display information that is current and accurate on the COP.

4-7: Available CBRND resources of coalition partners and pertinent non-DoD entities are integrated into CBRND planning

and preparations. Tracking and readiness information is performed by the owning nation/entity and status updates are

provided to the JTF staff. Tracking of CBRND resources supplied to the JTF for application is predominantly performed

manually and not integrated with existing JTF automated logistics and CBRND asset tracking systems.

1-3: Identification and tracking of available CBRND resources of coalition partners and non-DoD entities is inadequate to

support operations

0: Identification and tracking of available CBRND resources of coalition partners and non-DoD entities is nonexistent.

Forces prepared to

8-10: Forces are equipped, trained, and ready to perform sustained operations within a CBRN/TIM environment.

operate in a CBRN/TIM

4-7: Forces are equipped, trained, and ready to perform operations within a CBRN/TIM environment.

environment.

1-3: Forces are inadequately equipped, trained, or ready to perform operations within a CBRN/TIM environment

0: Forces are not equipped, trained, or prepared for operations within a CBRN/TIM environment.

CBRN staff cells have

8-10: All CBRN staff cell personnel are formally trained, receive recurring refresher training, and are experienced in the

the training an

determination of appropriate CBRND needs, planning, and the conduct of preparations.

experience to make

4-7: Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered as needed of CBRN staff cell personnel on the

effective preparations.

determination of appropriate CBRND needs, planning, and the conduct of preparations. Experience will vary between CBRN

staff cells among the performing units.

1-3: CBRN staff cell personnel training and experience is inadequate to support operations

0: CBRN staff cell personnel training and experience is nonexistent.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Allocation of CBRND units and personnel is performed using predominantly manual processes and means. Currency and accuracy of information applied in the process is

dependent upon routine reports and inquiries. Effective allocation is dependent upon the experience, skill, knowledge, and training of the staff and varies between staffs. The

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programmed fielding of JOEF and JEM in the mid term provides the staff with tools to identify and assess COAs supporting the effective allocation of CBRND units and

personnel. However, the process will remain largely unchanged.

² CBRND equipment, systems, and types are available in sufficient quantities to support JTF operations in a CBRN environment, provided there does not exist conflicting demands

to support multiple concurrent operations with CBRN threat. Protection from high-risk TIMs is minimal in current CBRND equipment, systems, and material. Further, the majority

of the types of systems do not adequately support sustained operations and require infusion of increased CBRND resources to maintain OPTEMPO. Collective protection

(COLPRO) systems, for example, are generally large-scale systems and do not adequately support expeditionary and high-maneuver operations, particularly in austere

environments at the extremes of the lines of communication. JECP is programmed to field in the mid term and will provide COLPRO flexibility to support most operations and

situations. The JSLIST is programmed to field during the mid term and is undergoing certification to meet Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Level “C”

requirements for TIMs. The JSGPM filtration system will provide a level of protection against selected TIMs and is programmed to field during the mid term. The programmed

initial fielding of JOEF and JEM in the mid term provides the staff with tools to identify and assess COAs supporting the effective allocation of CBRND resources. Full fielding of

JOEF and JEM will be completed in the early far term. However, the process will remain largely unchanged.

³ Processes to consider, coordinate, and plan for pertinent CBRND Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors, needs, and limitations are predominantly manually performed. The

effective application of these processes is dependent upon the experience, skill, knowledge, and training of the staff and varies between staffs. The programmed initial fielding of

JOEF and JEM in the mid term provides the staff with tools to identify and assess COAs supporting the planning of CBRND. JOEF and JEM will complete fielding in the early far

term.

⁴ CBRN staff cell personnel and unit personnel possess access to shared information technology resources and tools. CBRN personnel do not possess dedicated information

technology to perform training and operational requirements. Available resources are shared with other requiring activities and functions. The programmed fielding of JOEF and

JEM, although CBRND-supporting technologies, will likely reside upon resident C4ISR hardware and not dedicated CBRND hardware resources.

⁵ Operational plans do not generally address sustained operations within a CBRN/TIM environment. However, plans are developed addressing operations not of a sustained nature

within a CBRN environment. Operations within a TIM environment are generally not planned or considered. Resumption and/or maintenance of OPTEMPO is a primary

consideration of operational planning. Processes to consider coordinate, and plan for pertinent CBRND Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors, needs, and limitations are

performed for CBRN threat in the development of plans.

⁶ In coordination with coalition partner staff and pertinent non-DoD entities, the JTF staff develops a comprehensive operations plan for successful achievement of the desired end

states. Discussions and negotiations between partners determine the capabilities of each partner within the full spectrum of support. Specific tasks are assigned to elements of the

coalition force and non-DoD entities most capable of completing the task. Although the provision of CBRND equipment to national forces ultimately resides with their nations,

mutual logistics support among coalition partners is planned to complement partners’ capabilities and to minimize weaknesses. For example: U.S. Marine Corps forces were

equipped with lightweight CBRN/TIM individual protective equipment by the United Kingdom during Operation Desert Storm. The United States installed COLPRO capabilities

in Saudi critical command and control facilities for the same operation. CBRND resources availability and readiness is addressed throughout the process for CBRND. The

allocation, placement, and reallocation of protective assets is a function of the planning and operational control of the JTF, JTF staff, and combined staff. Acquisition cross-Service

agreements between coalition partners enable acquisition and cross-servicing support between the partners. The implementing arrangement, a more specific arrangement, provides

for a wide range of support exchange including consumables, sheltering, medical care, and other support activities. The allocation, operation, manning, management, and resupply

of non-U.S. force CBRND assets are generally the responsibility of the owning nation. The tracking of these assets are internal to those forces and nations. Integration of U.S. and

non-U.S. logistics systems is not currently required. Tracking of non-U.S. equipment supplied for U.S. force application is largely performed manually and not integrated with

existing component Service systems.

⁷ Planning and preparation of U.S. forces for operations involving a CBRN threat provide for the equipping, training, and preparation of tasked forces to conduct operations not of

a sustained nature within a CBRN environment. Negotiations and discussions with coalition partners and other participants establish similar requirements and activities for non-

U.S. forces. However, not all potential partner nations possess CBRND capabilities and would rely upon the United States and other allies for equipment and training.

⁸ Training in CBRN staff cell operations and processes is generally conducted by the unit. Standardized training is virtually nonexistent, although standard requirements for the

responsibilities and duties of the cell do exist. The effectiveness of the cell is dependent upon the experience, skill, knowledge, and training of the assigned staff personnel and

varies between staffs.

⁹ DOTLPF adequately addresses most of the critical aspects of this task. However, DOTLPF requires improvement to sufficiently address areas increasingly important for the

transformed force and the changing operational environment. DOTLPF will continue to need to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

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9.15.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.15.2.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Inadequate automated processing and assessment tools for the NBC staff cells.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine commensurate with advanced

information technology application.

Deficiency: Insufficient access to automated processing tools.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure TTPs and local procedures ensure access

to automated processing tools.

Deficiency: Inadequate integration and tracking of non-JTF resources applied by the JTF.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure TTPs and local procedures account for

the integration of local resources in preparations. Also include the potential impact of

chemical/biological contamination of airlift aircraft on the intertheater airlift flow and the

passive defense measures available to mitigate the threat. Organization: Ensure coordination

and collaboration with indigenous authorities. Facilities: Modification of supporting

logistical infrastructure to track “loaned” non-U.S. CBRND resources and report status.

Deficiency: Inadequate recognition and support of non-NATO capable forces in coalitions

operating in a CBRN Threat environment.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Organization: Ensure adequacy of coalitions to operate in

a CBRND environment. Training: Ensure training programs are available for coalition

partners who lack CBRND skills.

Deficiency: Insufficient trained personnel for CBRN staff cells.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Training: Ensure training programs maintained to provide

a continuous pool of capable CBRN staff cells. Personnel: Take steps to adequately provide

trained personnel to CBRN staff cells.

9.15.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.15-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. The material approaches to help accomplish this task cover developing new, more accurate

models and simulations for CBRND planning, providing reach back capability to use

information from previous lessons learned, the need for linkages to other data systems and the

need for additional C4ISR assets. Table 9.15-5 identifies which of the material approaches might

address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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9.16

Task TASHA 16: Conduct CBRN hazard prediction and effects modeling

9.16.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.16.1.1

Definition

This task encompasses hazard prediction and effects modeling for situational awareness,

response management, preparation, and planning within the immediate battlespace. Agent fate

data aid in predicting persistency and impact over the length of the operation or campaign.

Effects modeling extend to casualty prediction, effects on unit and mission capability, and

expected degradation. All of these are required for COA (adversary and joint force) evaluations,

preparations, and management. As the contaminated area matures, hazard levels fluctuate over

time, based on the specific agent, winds, terrain, vegetation, waterways, etc. Terrain data, local

or micrometeorology, and surface texture are accounted for in atmospheric modeling. Detection

data and hazard characterization data are the input for the model-based predictions for

atmospheric-driven hazards. Observations and data from the IDN are used to update the hazard

prediction.

Biological agents, which are contagious, communicable, or propagated by vectors, are modeled

to assist in locating the source, extent of population exposure, persistency in human and animal

populations, and impact on military and indigenous populations.

Results are displayed to force commanders via the COP. Computations are performed in either

stand-alone or network mode.

9.16.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 2.4, TA 7, TA 7.1), Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations, Protection Joint

Functional Concept, An Operational Concept for Biological Defense, Military Transformation:

A Strategic Approach.

9.16.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 1

9.16.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASENS 1, TASENS 2, TASENS 3

9.16.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.16.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Moderately developed land. (C1.1)

2. Temperate climate. (C1.3.1)

3. Moderate atmospheric effects. (C1.3.3)

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Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

3. Some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Partial joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

6. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

Civil

1. Limited international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

9.16.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.16.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.16-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Staffs and units have limited capability to perform CBRN hazard prediction and effects

modeling. ATP-45 provides broad-area assessments. Capability is manual and limited to the

mesolevel. Even future capabilities do not provide sufficient information technology resources to

CBRN staffs. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.”

Although improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in

the associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall

assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

There is no existing DoD approved methodology to provide common representation of WMD or

TIM hazards. The current hazard prediction models have not been tested to DoD standards.

These models lack validation, verification, and accreditation. Staffs and units currently possess

limited capabilities to perform CBRN hazard prediction and effects modeling. ATP-45 provides

broad-area assessments. Current deficiencies include lack of ability to work with urban terrain at

the micro level, limited information provided by ATP-45 reports, absence of ability to accurately

and rapidly characterize the hazard, coordination collaboration procedures required for medical

and NBC staff cells, and no common joint hazard prediction capability. JEM will address some

of these shortfalls. However, limitations remain with respect to quality control of meteorological

and oceanographic inputs to JEM, as well as assessing the accuracy of JEM plume against

ground truth. The absence of this supporting data has a significant impact during Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) development process for high-resolution hazard prediction.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The programmed initial fielding of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM during the mid term is projected to

improve the ability to perform hazard prediction and effects modeling. Overall capabilities of the

JTF will gradually increase as operational units are equipped with the systems throughout the

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mid term and into the early far term. However, this enhanced capability retains many of the

current deficiencies. Micromodeling necessary for urban and complex terrain modeling is

inadequate, a common accurate and detailed common joint hazard prediction capability is not

determined, and future capabilities do not provide sufficient information technology resources to

CBRN staffs. Although the systems do provide a level of support for an aerosolized biological

release, they are inadequate for predicting communicable disease transmission, progression, and

persistency within populations. Capabilities to detect and identify agents, including standoff

detection, are fielded sporadically and as determined operationally ready. The fielding of JEM in

the near term will markedly improve high-resolution hazard prediction throughout the

battlespace. As JEM matures through the acquisition process, difficult challenges will be

undertaken, such as urban and water dispersion. One notable shortfall with JEM is the absence of

operating concepts that highlight the most effective employment of JEM across the Joint Service.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

Interoperable medical surveillance prediction and modeling tools are reasonably expected to be

fielded in this period and should address communicable disease transmission, progression, and

persistency within populations. Agent detect and identify capabilities continue to improve as

sensor systems are determined operationally ready and fielded. Fielding of JWARN, JEM, and

JOEF is projected to be completed early in the far term.

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Table 9.16-1. TASHA 16: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Hazard Prediction and

M10

Effects Modeling

Chemical

Current

8¹

4²

4³

4⁴

4⁵

5⁶

4⁷

4⁸

Near/Mid Term

Far Term

Biological

Current

1⁹

4²

4³

4¹⁰

4⁵

4¹¹

4⁷

4⁸

Near/Mid Term

Far Term

Radiological

Current

8¹

4²

4³

4⁴

4⁵

5⁶

5⁷

7⁸

Near/Mid Term

Far Term

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid Term Overall Capability

Far Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

There is sufficient

8-10: CBRN staff cell and unit personnel possess unrestricted access to common and standardized hazard prediction models.

access to the hazard

4-7: CBRN staff cell and unit personnel possess limited access to common hazard prediction models.

prediction models.

1-3: CBRN staff cell and unit personnel have difficulty accessing hazard prediction models.

0: CBRN staff cell and unit personnel do not have access to hazard prediction models.

Terrain data input is

8-10: Microterrain data are available with required fidelity (e.g., accuracy, resolution, time latency, periodicity) and applied

adequate.

to microlevel hazard prediction.

4-7: Meso-/macroterrain data are available, accurate, and applied to meso-/macrolevel hazard prediction.

1-3: Meso-/macroterrain data are available and applied to meso-/macrolevel hazard prediction and may contain errors.

0: Terrain data are not available and/or applied to hazard prediction.

Meteorological data are

8-10: Micrometeorological, as well as high-altitude-weather, data are available with required fidelity (e.g., accurate, timely,

adequate.

of the required resolution) and applied for microlevel hazard prediction.

4-7: Meso-/macrometeorological data are available, accurate, and applied to meso-/macrolevel hazard prediction.

1-3: Meso-/macrometeorological data are available and applied to meso-/macrolevel hazard prediction and may contain

errors.

0: Meteorological data are not available and/or applied to hazard prediction.

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Agent detection and

8-10: Automated agent detection systems are integrated and interoperable with automated CBRND systems. Sensor systems

identification data are

include point, standoff, detect-to-alert, detect-and-identify, and identification sensors providing adequate detection capability

adequate.

and coverage of operations. Sensor data are correlated and processed to identify and characterize the hazard and the results

are posted on the COP in near-real time.

4-7: Agent detection systems vary between manual to automated detection systems and are predominantly point detection,

and the sensor data must be manually correlated and processed to characterize the hazard. Input to the COP is usually

performed manually.

1-3: Agent detection and identification systems and data are inadequate to support operations.

0: Agent detection and identification systems and data are nonexistent.

CBRN staff cell and

8-10: CBRN staff cell and units possess dedicated information technology resources and tools for the accomplishment and

units have access to

performance of their duties and responsibilities. These are used to support operational and training requirements.

dedicated information

4-7: CBRN staff cell and units are able to access shared information technology resources and tools for operational

technology resources to

requirements and training.

perform tasks and

1-3: CBRN staff cell and units possess limited access to shared information technology resources for operational

responsibilities.

requirements and training.

0: CBRN staff cell and units do not possess access to information technology to support operations and training.

Commanders and staffs

8-10: All commanders and staff personnel are formally trained and received recurring refresher training on the effective use

have the training to

of hazard prediction tools to include their application, interpretation, and weak and strong points.

effectively use hazard

4-7: Selected staff personnel are trained on the effective use of hazard prediction models and processes. Commanders are

prediction tools.

cognizant of the proper application of these tools.

1-3: Training on the effective use of hazard prediction tools and models is inadequate to effectively support operations

0: Training on the effective use of hazard prediction tools and models is nonexistent.

CBRND specialists

8-10: CBRND specialist are formally trained and received recurring refresher training on the effective use of hazard

have the training to

prediction tools to include their application, interpretation, and weak and strong points. Exercises and evaluations include

effectively apply

requirements for hazard prediction modeling and interpretation to maintain competencies.

hazard prediction

4-7: CBRND specialists are formally trained to perform hazard prediction using prediction models. Exercises and

models.

evaluations periodically include requirements for hazard prediction modeling and interpretation to maintain basic

competencies.

1-3: Training of CBRND specialists on the effective use of hazard prediction tools and models is inadequate to effectively

support operations

0: Training of CBRND specialists on the effective use of hazard prediction tools and models is nonexistent.

Hazard prediction

8-10: Hazard prediction utility is high for hazard assessment and decision-making. Prediction is based upon standardized

useful for assessment

automated microlevel hazard prediction tools continual drawing upon various applicable sources and updating predictions.

and decision making.

4-7: Hazard prediction utility exists for assessment and decision making. Prediction is based upon common hazard prediction

tools and is dependent upon manual processes, possibly with limited automated support, and is reliant upon the experience,

training and knowledge of performing staff and the scope and quality of influencing information.

1-3: Hazard prediction utility is low for assessment and decision making and is inadequate to effectively support operations.

0: Hazard prediction utility is nonexistent.

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Hazards effects models

8-10: Hazard effects modeling utility is high for hazard assessment and decision making. Modeling is based upon

are useful for

standardized automated microlevel hazard effects modeling tools continual drawing upon various applicable sources and

assessment and

updating hazard effects presentations.

decision making.

4-7: Hazard effects modeling utility exists for assessment and decision making. Modeling is based upon predominantly

manual modeling tools and is dependent upon manual processes, possibly with limited automated support, and is reliant upon

the experience, training, and knowledge of performing staff and the scope and quality of influencing information.

1-3: Hazard effects modeling utility is low for assessment and decision making and is inadequate to effectively support

operations.

0: Hazard effects modeling utility is nonexistent.

M10

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ CBRND staff cell personnel and unit personnel are trained in the application of and possess access to ATP-45 hazard prediction model, a NATO standard. This is a manual

process and is dependent upon the experience, skill, and knowledge of the performing individual(s). Although other prediction models, both GOTS and COTS, exist, these are not

standardized and common to the force. The mid-term programmed fielding of JEM will provide CBRN specialists with a standardized and common hazard prediction tool.

However, JEM will likely reside upon resident C4ISR systems and not dedicated CBRND hardware resources. CBRN specialists will possess shared access to these systems.

² Current hazard prediction modeling is performed at the meso-/macrolevel. Microterrain data, when available, are at greater depth of detail than required by the model. Modeling

currently uses ATP-45, which provides broad-area assessments. ATP-45 was designed for application using standard maps. Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Level 1 terrain

data adequately supports current modeling processes. The advent of computerized modeling using ATP-45 provides visualization, but generally requires terrain data to be resident.

The mid-term and far-term fielding of JOEF and JEM will expand hazard modeling capabilities. Terrain data may be accessed as needed and retained from GIS, mapping, or other

applicable and approved sources. JEM will provide a standardized and common hazard prediction tool.

³ Current hazard prediction modeling is performed at the meso-/macrolevel. Micrometeorological data, when available, are at greater depth of detail than required by the model.

Modeling currently uses ATP-45 which provides broad-area assessments. ATP-45 was designed for application using standard maps. The mid-term and far-term fielding of JOEF

and JEM will expand hazard modeling capabilities. Meteorological data from applicable and approved sources is accessed on a continuing basis and applied to the model. JEM will

provide a standardized and common hazard prediction tool.

⁴ Agent detection and identification is currently performed using predominantly point detection systems and manual reporting. Characterization of the hazard is currently time-

consuming and labor-intensive. Current sensor capabilities are limited. However, ongoing efforts are proceeding for development of enhanced sensor capabilities, including stand-

off sensors. Fielding of these systems will occur throughout the mid- and far-term. The mid-term and far-term fielding of JWARN to operational units will provide the capability to

integrate sensor data for alerting and warning. Agent identification may be achieved by sensor detection parameters, emplaced identification sensors, and/or manual identification

processes. Characterization of the hazard can be performed rapidly and accurately through an adequate sensor mix tied to the automated system.

⁵ CBRN staff cell personnel and unit personnel possess access to shared information technology resources and tools. CBRN personnel do not possess dedicated information

technology to perform training and operational requirements. Available resources are shared with other requiring activities and functions. The programmed fielding of JOEF and

JEM, although CBRND supporting technologies, will likely reside upon resident C4ISR hardware and not dedicated CBRND hardware resources.

⁶ CBRN specialists received formal training on the use and application of the ATP-45 process. Commanders are cognizant of the implications of the results and factor the

information into their decisions. CBRN specialists in operational units are periodically exercised and evaluated on the conduct of hazard prediction. However, most local

evaluators are unable to adequately assess the performance of this task.

⁷ Current hazard prediction capability is based upon ATP-45, which provides broad-area assessments and is reliant upon the training, knowledge, and experience of the performing

individual(s). ATP-45 is not designed for predictions involving urban or complex terrain. Other prediction processes exist, both GOTS and COTS, but are not common and

standard to the force. The mid-term fielding of JOEF and JEM will expand hazard prediction capabilities and their utility to operations involving other than open terrain.

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⁸ Current DOTLPF address the performance of this task using predominantly manual processes and at a meso-/macrolevel. Operations, however, are not restricted to open terrain,

and the ATP-45 methodology is inadequate for these circumstances. DOTLPF must evolve and consider changes in technology, tactics, systems, and situations.

⁹ CBRND staff cell personnel and unit personnel are trained in the application of and possess access to ATP-45 hazard prediction model, a NATO standard. This is a manual

process and is dependent upon the experience, skill, and knowledge of the performing individual(s). Although other prediction models exist, both GOTS and COTS, exist, these are

not standardized and common to the force. However, although the ATP-45 and other prediction models do provide a level of support for an aerosolized biological release, they are

inadequate for predicting communicable disease transmission, progression, and persistency within populations. The mid-term and far-term programmed fielding of JEM will

provide CBRN specialists with a standardized and common hazard prediction tool. However, JEM will likely reside upon resident C4ISR systems and not dedicated CBRND

hardware resources. CBRN specialists will possess shared access to these systems. Further, JEM will not incorporate tools to predict disease transmission, progression, and

persistency. Future medical surveillance tool development is said to include these capabilities which will be interoperable.

¹⁰ Agent detection and identification is currently performed using predominantly point detection systems and manual reporting. Characterization of the hazard is currently time-

consuming and labor-intensive. Current sensor capabilities are limited. However, ongoing efforts are proceeding for development of enhanced sensor capabilities, including

standoff sensors. Fielding of these systems will occur throughout the mid and far term. The mid-term and far-term fielding of JWARN (Increment 1 - IOC) to operational units

will provide the capability to integrate sensor data for alerting and warning. Agent identification may be achieved by sensor detection parameters, emplaced identification sensors,

and/or manual identification processes. Characterization of the hazard can be performed rapidly and accurately through an adequate sensor mix tied to the automated system. JEM,

programmed to initially field in the mid term and complete fielding in the early far term, will not incorporate tools to predict disease transmission, progression, and persistency.

Future medical surveillance tool development is said to include these capabilities which will be interoperable.

¹¹ CBRN specialists received formal training on the use and application of the ATP-45 process. Commanders are cognizant of the implications of the results and factor the

information into their decisions. CBRN specialists in operational units are periodically exercised and evaluated on the conduct of hazard prediction. However, most local

evaluators are unable to adequately assess the performance of this task. However, ATP-45 is not appropriate for a nonaerosolized release of a biological agent. Close coordination

and collaboration between medical services and CBRN staff cell personnel is essential for situations involving a communicable biological hazard.

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9.16.3

Functional Needs Analysis

9.16.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Absence of ability to accurately and rapidly characterize the hazard.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Improved TTPs required for hazard

characterization.

Deficiency: Access is limited to information technology (IT) resources.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure TTPs and local procedures

access/availability to IT resources. Organization: Ensure adequate IT resources are available.

Deficiency: Insufficient continuing training requirement to maintain proficiency.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Training: Establish continued training requirements,

recurring refresher courses, and training tools.

Deficiency: Inadequate ability for communicable disease transmission and persistency in

populations.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure doctrine addresses improved

communicable disease prediction of transmission and persistency.

Deficiency: Inadequate coordination and collaboration procedures for medical and CBRN

staff cells.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Establish doctrinal requirements for close

collaboration of medical and CBRN staffs. Training: Ensure joint training programs for

CBRN and medical staff cells.

Deficiency: Inadequate communicable biological hazard prediction.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Improve doctrine for communicable biological

hazard prediction. Training: Ensure training programs for communicable biological hazard

prediction.

9.16.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.16-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Approaches here again include the development of faster, more accurate CBRN models and

simulations; improved detection capabilities; and medical tools for predicting casualties and

collaborating with tactical units. Table 9.16-5 identifies which of the material approaches might

address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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9.17

Task TASHA 17: Operate an IDN to “detect to warn” and provide continuous

hazard status

9.17.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.17.1.1

Definition

This task encompasses deploying and establishing an IDN array of detectors and sensors to

provide synergy to the system and compensate for the technological weaknesses of any single

sensor. Includes the ability to continuously monitor the CBRN situation through the use of an

IDN. An IDN likely consists of smart standoff and point detectors as a means to “detect to warn”

and receive continuous updates. Compiled IDN data update hazard predictions and projected

impacts to achieve an understanding of the hazard. Survey and reconnaissance activities can be

directed based on the results of the IDN data. Additional IDN assets aid in monitoring persistent

CBRN hazards. Data from the IDN are displayed via the COP. Areas not covered by the IDN

need to be managed. Ideally, the IDN archives event histories. Additionally, the IDN links to the

JTF intelligence system, theater missile defense system, and other theater collection assets.

CBRN data are correlated with data from other assets at a processing node within the operations

center.

9.17.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 2.4, TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 6.5, TA 7, TA 7.1), Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN

Operations, Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic

Approach.

9.17.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 5

9.17.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.17.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.17.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Moderately developed land. (C1.1)

2. Temperate climate. (C1.3.1)

Military

1. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

2. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. Low military systems reliabilty. (C2.2.5.3)

4. Some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

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5. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

6. Intelligence dissemination and receipt fully exists. (C2.4.7)

Civil. N/A

9.17.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.17.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.17-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

There is no current capability to operate an IDN to “detect to warn” and provide continuous

hazard status. JWARN, when fielded, will provide improvement in the ability to warn units. The

overall capability for current and near/mid term are “red.” Although improvements between the

periods occur for specific supporting capabilities and are reflected in the assessment, the

improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall assessed color ratings for the

assessed measures. Improvement in task capabilities achieve an assessed “yellow” rating for the

far term.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Joint forces have extremely limited capability to “detect to warn” and provide continuous status.

Deficiencies include lack of sensor capability, inadequate networking of sensors, immature

technology, and lack of ability to differentiate between multiple releases. Doctrine and training

must mature along with the evolving systems.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

JWARN (Increment 1 - IOC), programmed for initial fielding during the mid term, will provide

a substantial improvement in the ability to notify and warn units of a hazard.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

JWARN (Increment 1 - IOC) is projected to complete fielding in the early far term. Sensors and

IDN capabilities are in development with stated fielding sometime in the far term. This effort is

dependent upon the progression of sensor technologies necessary for an IDN.

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Table 9.17-1. TASHA 17: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operate an IDN to “Detect to Warn”

and Provide Continuous Hazard Status

Current Capability

0¹

0²

0³

0⁴

0⁵

0⁶

0⁷

0⁸

0⁹

Near/Mid-Term Capability

Far-Term Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Tactical area is

8-10: IDN systems exist and provide full coverage of the tactical area for all CBRN and high-threat TIMs. IDN data are

adequately covered

integrated and interoperable with CBRN and C4ISR systems. CBRN and C4ISR systems are continuously updated with IDN

by the IDN.

information.

4-7: IDN systems exist and provide coverage of critical areas of the area of operations for all CBRN and high-threat TIMs.

IDN data are integrated and interoperable with CBRN and C4ISR systems. CBRN and C4ISR systems are updated with IDN

information.

1-3: IDN systems provide inadequate coverage of operations for all CBRN and high-threat TIMs.

0: IDN systems are nonexistent.

There is confidence

8-10: IDN detection and characterization data utility is high and supports decision making, operations, and the safety and well-

in the IDN ability to

being of the force.

detect and provide

4-7: IDN detection and characterization data utility exists for decision making, operations, and assists activities providing for

characterization data.

the safety and well-being of the force.

1-3: IDN detection and characterization data are low and unable to support decision making and operations positively

affecting the safety and well-being of the force.

0: IDN detection and characterization data are nonexistent.

Sensors are managed

8-10: All echelons networked to the IDN are able to remotely manage sensors using automated tools and C4ISR connectivity.

at all echelons

4-7: Selected entities networked to the IDN are able to remotely manage sensors using automated tools and C4ISR

networked to the

connectivity.

IDN.

1-3: IDN sensors are remotely managed by a single control point.

0: IDN sensors cannot be managed remotely.

There are sufficient

8-10: Doctrine and TTPs provide clear and concise guidance, requirements, and procedures for the effective operation of an

doctrine and TTPs

IDN.

for effective IDN

4-7: Doctrine and TTPs provide general guidance, requirements, and procedures for the operation of an IDN.

operation.

1-3: Doctrine and TTPs do not adequately address the operation of an IDN.

0: Doctrine and TTPs are nonexistent for the operation of an IDN.

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Units are adequately

8-10: All personnel performing IDN operations tasks are fully trained and receive recurring refresher training on the conduct

trained to effectively

of their tasks. Exercises and evaluations are routinely conducted and fully challenge capabilities to maintain and refine skills,

operate the IDN.

knowledge, and capabilities. IDN operations competences and experience are high and enable the rapid, accurate, and

successful completion of tasks.

4-7: Core personnel performing IDN operations tasks are fully trained and receive recurring refresher training on the conduct

of their tasks. Exercises and evaluations do not generally fully challenge capabilities. Limited training is provided, is

inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to noncore personnel for the performance of their assigned

tasks. IDN operations competencies and experience will vary, but sufficient capability exists to successfully perform tasks.

1-3: Training is inadequate for the successful performance of IDN operations.

0: Training is inadequate or nonexistent for the successful performance of IDN operations.

CBRND specialists

8-10: All CBRND personnel are fully trained and receive recurring refresher training on the conduct of IDN operations.

have the training to

Exercises and evaluations are routinely conducted and fully challenge capabilities to maintain and refine skills, knowledge,

effectively operate

and capabilities. IDN operations competences and experience are high and enable the rapid, accurate, and successful

the IDN.

completion of tasks.

4-7: Core CBRND specialists performing IDN operations tasks are fully trained and receive recurring refresher training on the

conduct of their tasks. Exercises and evaluations do not generally fully challenge capabilities. Limited training is provided, is

inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to noncore CBRND specialists for the performance of their

assigned tasks. IDN operations competencies and experience will vary, but sufficient capability exists to successfully perform

tasks.

1-3: Training is inadequate for the successful performance of IDN operations.

0: Training is nonexistent for the successful performance of IDN operations.

All operation centers

8-10: All operations centers are networked to the IDN.

networked to IDN.

4-7: Selected operations centers are networked to the IDN.

1-3: Selected operations centers possess limited access to the IDN.

0: Operations centers are not networked to the IDN.

IDN can successfully

8-10: The IDN maintains its ability to monitor the hazard, clear sensors between readings, and reset sensors throughout the full

track and monitor the

presence of the hazard without manual intervention.

hazard throughout its

4-7: The IDN requires manual intervention to maintain the ability to monitor the hazard, clear sensors between readings, and

persistency.

reset sensors through the hazard’s presence.

1-3: The IDN requires manual intervention and possesses limited capability to monitor the hazard, clear sensors between

readings, and resetting of sensors through the hazard’s presence.

0: The IDN is unable to monitor and track a hazard throughout its persistency.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations.

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

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¹ Fielded IDN systems for CBRN/TIM do not currently exist. Systems are in development and fielding is expected in the far term but are contingent upon sensor technology

progression. JWARN, to be initially fielded to operational units in the mid term with fielding projected to be completed in the early far term, includes IDN data capabilities.

² Confidence is low as IDN systems have yet to be fielded. Expectation is the systems will increase the accuracy of decision making, sustain OPTEMPO, and further promote the

safety and well-being of the force.

³ Current fielded detection systems are inadequately networked and many require manual reporting. Management of current systems is performed locally and adjustments are often

made individually. Systems are in development and fielding is expected in the far-term but are contingent upon sensor technology progression. Remote management capabilities is

an expectation for these future fielded systems.

⁴ Lack of IDN maturity prohibits doctrine and TTP development.

⁵ Units are currently trained in the operation of current non-IDN sensor systems. Training to support future fielded IDNs awaits development of associated DOTLPF and IDN

technology maturity.

⁶ CBRND specialists are currently trained in the operation of current non-IDN sensor systems. Training to support future fielded IDNs awaits development of associated DOTLPF

and IDN technology maturity.

⁷ IDN is not fielded; therefore, operations centers are not networked to the IDN. However, operations centers are increasingly evolving to handle network sensors for other

battlespace threats. Connectivity to future fielded IDNs awaits development of associated DOTLPF and IDN technology maturity.

⁸ IDN technology is currently too immature to perform this function

⁹ Lack of IDN maturity prohibits development of supporting and associated DOTLPF.

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9.17.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.17.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of sensor capability.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine supporting IDN as sensor and

IDN capability matures.

2. Deficiency: Lack of mature IDN and evolving operation center technologies/systems.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine needs to mature as IDN and sensor

capability matures. Training: Operations center training will have to adjust to maturing IDN

capability.

3. Deficiency: Lack of mature doctrine.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine supporting IDN as sensor and IDN

capability matures.

4. Deficiency: Absence of training standards.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Develop training standards supporting IDN as sensor

and IDN capability matures.

9.17.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.17-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Approaches needed to accomplish this task include the development and fielding of IDN

interfaces for detectors, collecting and processing detector data, querying detectors for status and

associated data processing and modeling. Table 9.17-5 identifies which of the material

approaches might address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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Table 9.17-4. TASHA 17: Materiel Approaches

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

IDN interface for sensors

Ensure developmental CBRN sensors include ability to

interface with an IDN. Develop adaptors to interface

existing CBRN sensors to the IDN.

Collect, exchange, and

Develop a system that collects and analyzes CBRN

disseminate information

information and sensor input, generates, edits, and

disseminates NBC reports, including downwind-hazard

plots, and overlays and verify receipt of reports and plots.

Transmission of data uses existing communication nets.

Query sensor status

Develop a system capable of automatically requesting

sensor status (health) of networked sensors.

Simulation and models

Develop a system enabling operational commanders to

display current operational picture and to efficiently

execute “what if” scenarios and facilitate the evaluation of

plausible adversary and friendly COAs, CBRN

employment, and TIM ROTA.

Database

Develop a system for obtaining information, archiving

data, accessing databases, performing information/data

queries, and exchanging data files in support of CBRN

functions and activities.

Field CBRN information

Develop a field resource system that will provide and

resource

search archived information for CBRN/TIM agents,

effects, treatments, etc.

Reachback capability

Develop a system providing the ability to rapidly and

securely reach back and contact CBRN experts and obtain

CBRND plans, procedures, information, and lessons

learned.

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9.18

Task TASHA 18: Provide CBRN tactical situational awareness throughout the

battlespace via the COP

9.18.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.18.1.1

Definition

Establishes tactical battlespace situational awareness, via the COP, to ensure units immediately

affected by the hazards are able to effectively respond, including warning units projected to be

affected by the hazard based on hazard prediction results as displayed in the COP. An NBC

Warning and Reporting System provides essential information for local staff action and

command decisions. Data from the local IDN accompanied by hazard characterizations are the

input for situational awareness. The overall operational objective is for situational awareness to

mature into shared awareness, and then shared understanding. Shared awareness and

understanding promotes synchronized response on the part of affected units.

9.18.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 6.5, TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.18.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 8

9.18.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.18.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.18.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Few modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

2. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

3. Some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

5. Restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

6. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

7. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

Civil. N/A

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9.18.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.18.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.18-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Current capability to provide CBRN tactical situational awareness is based on ATP-45

information. The mid- to far-term fielding of JWARN and JEM will provide the future

capability. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.”

Although improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in

the associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall

assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Joint forces currently have limited capability to provide CBRN tactical situational awareness via

the COP; basic ATP-45 information is currently available, and the assessment process remains

predominantly manual. Current deficiencies include the lack of visibility of CBRN information

in the COP, potential for errors and omissions related to predominant manual systems of

assessment, and inadequacy of ATP-45 information to provide detailed and specific information;

and the perishable nature of attained staff skills. Continuous training is required to update

perishable skills.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The projected initial fielding in the mid term of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM systems will enhance

the collection, processing, availability, timeliness, and accuracy of CBRN information for

display in the COP. Emerging C4ISR capabilities will enhance the CBRN threat intelligence

process. However, projected deficiencies include the impact of retained legacy systems upon the

ability to process and disseminate information; lack of operational assessment tools for CBRN

impact; and the inadequacy of ATP-45 information to provide detailed, accurate, and specific

information on the hazard. New DoD systems are expected to be in compliance with DISA

standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate during the current and near term for

interoperability and net-centric operations. Substantial upgrades to legacy systems are required to

include DISA standards and net-centric capabilities. Further, the mix of legacy and compliant

systems will continue to require the attentiveness and awareness of staffs to ensure effective

collection and integration of information until the legacy systems are either replaced or modified

for compliance. Doctrine must evolve to maximize the utility of the new systems for all phases

of operations from planning to post-operations.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

The fielding of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM are projected to be completed during the early far term.

All legacy systems are projected to either be replaced by, or be in compliance with, DISA

standards and fully support net-centric operations in the far term.

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Table 9.18-1. TASHA 18: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: CBRN Tactical Situational Awareness

Current Overall Capability

8¹

5²

3²

1³

4⁴

7⁵

2⁶

1²

4⁷

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Mechanism is in place to

8-10: Means exist and are employed to rapidly disseminate routine, essential, and critical CBRN/TIM threat intelligence

disseminate routine,

to all need-to-know centers.

essential, and critical

4-7: Limited means exist and are employed for dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to most need-to-know centers.

CBRN/TIM threat

1-3: Means employment is inadequate for dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers.

intelligence rapidly.

0: Means do not exist for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers.

Means exist to compile

8-10: Automated systems substantially or fully perform collection, compilation, and processing of CBRN/TIM events

and display information

occurring throughout the area of operations, incorporate display of the information, and provide the information to the

on CBRN/TIM events that

COP.

occurs throughout the

4-7: Collection, compilation, and processing of CBRN/TIM events occurring throughout the area of operations is

operating area.

performed predominantly using manual means, is limited to available trained resources, and the quality of the selected

assessed data.

1-3: Inadequate capability to collect, compile, and process information on CBRN/TIM events throughout the area of

operations.

0: Nonexistent capability to collect, compile, and process information on CBRN/TIM events throughout the area of

operations.

Means exist to present

8-10: Automated systems substantially or fully present operational impact information and plausible COAs for

information on the

CBRN/TIM events occurring and provide visualization of the information.

operational impact of the

4-7: Determination of the operational impact of CBRN/TIM events is performed predominantly using manual means, is

CBRN/TIM event.

limited to available trained resources, and the quality of the selected assessed data. Visualization is minimal.

1-3: Inadequate capability to assess and present the operational impacts of CBRN/TIM events. Automated visualization is

absent.

0: Nonexistent capability to assess and visually present the operational impacts of CBRN/TIM events.

There is confidence in the

8-10: Confidence in accuracy, timeliness, trustworthiness, and relevancy of CBRN information on the COP is high.

CBRN information

CBRN information is collected, correlated, and processed in high fidelity from multiple sources and source automated

available within the COP.

information systems are interoperable.

4-7: Limited confidence in accuracy, timeliness, trustworthiness, and relevancy of CBRN information on the COP.

Predominantly manual processes collect, correlated, and process CBRN information from sources and may be restricted in

the number of sources assessed.

1-3: Low confidence in accuracy, timeliness, trustworthiness, and relevancy of CBRN information on the COP.

0: No confidence in accuracy, timeliness, trustworthiness, and relevancy of CBRN information on the COP.

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There are sufficient

8-10: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are adequate for the establishment and maintenance of situation awareness

doctrine and TTPs to

and integrate CBRN information on the COP.

effectively acquire and

4-7: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs supporting the establishment and maintenance of situation awareness exist

maintain situation

and address CBRN.

awareness.

1-3: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are inadequate for the establishment and maintenance of situation

awareness.

0: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are nonexistent for the establishment and maintenance of situation awareness.

Units are adequately

8-10: All unit commanders and staff are formally trained and receive recurring refresher training including the effective

trained to effectively

acquisition and maintenance of situation awareness and emphasize CBRN as a critical component.

acquire and maintain

4-7: Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered to staffs in preparation for operations with a

situational awareness.

CBRN threat for CBRN as an important factor when acquiring and maintaining situation awareness.

1-3: Training on the inclusion of CBRN in the acquisition and maintenance of situation awareness is inadequate for

support of operations.

0: Training on the inclusion of CBRN in the acquisition and maintenance of situation awareness is nonexistent.

CBRND specialist units,

8-10: CBRN specialist units, teams, and cells possess dedicated information technology resources and tools with

teams, cells have access to

unrestricted (as applicable) access to the COP for the accomplishment and performance of their duties and responsibilities.

the COP.

These are used to support operational and training requirements.

4-7: CBRN specialist units, teams, and cells are able to access the COP using shared information technology resources

and tools for operational requirements and training.

1-3: CBRN specialist units, teams, and cells possess inadequate access to the COP to support operations and training

requirements.

0: CBRN specialist units, teams, and cells do not possess access to the COP to support operations and training

requirements.

Potentially affected or

8-10: All CBRN potentially or indirectly affected units are identified and notified in a timely manner by automated

indirectly affected units

systems and across echelons of command on the COP. Timely, accurate, and relevant information is posted on the COP

are made aware by the

and readily accessible.

COP across echelons of

4-7: Limited means exist and are employed over the COP across echelons of command for the dissemination of CBRN

command.

hazard information to known potentially affected units.

1-3: Means are inadequate to notify potentially and indirectly affected units of CBRN hazard using the COP across

echelons of command.

0: Means are nonexistent to notify potentially and indirectly affected units of CBRN hazard using the COP across

echelons of command.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations.

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

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¹ Existing DoD communication infrastructure systems and JWARN, where available, are used to disseminate CBRN intelligence and warnings. Manual ATP-45 format messages

are created when automated warning systems are unavailable. However, existing communications systems are not fully interoperable and are dependent upon systems available to

elements of the JTF. Attentiveness is required to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence and operations centers in this mixed communications environment. Net-centric

operations and mandatory DISA standards address interoperability and the interchange of information among elements. All DoD systems are expected to be in compliance with

DISA standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate, during the mid term.

² Current processes are predominantly manual with limited automation. Process is labor- and time-consuming and dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of

performing personnel as well as the quality of the collected information. The current capability is achieved using doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is slow and

prone to human error and omissions. TIM processes are currently nonexistent for operational forces and data are limited to civilian HAZMAT and ITF-40 sources. Information

currently flows vertically through the command structure and not horizontally to adjacent and nearby forces. Although limited visualization tools are available for CBRN, these are

not generally in use by operating forces. JOEF and JEM are envisioned as providing forces with the tools to assess and display CBRN information and plausible COAs. JWARN

will provide the means for collection and dissemination of CBRN information both vertically and horizontally. JWARN, JOEF, and JEM are projected for initial fielding during

the mid term. The efficiency and utility of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using GIG Enterprise Services.

Legacy systems will continue to require significant manual extraction, review, and reinput of information for application by JWARN, JOEF, and JEM. The continuing requirement

for DoD systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards will gradually provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with projected full

interoperability of systems in the far term. JOEF and JEM are programmed to link with the COP via the GIG Enterprise Service. Access needed for automated systems to post all

relevant data to the COP, as well as access to needed information from the COP.

³ Specificity of current ATP-45 processes is inadequate. ATP-45-based data are broad-based and general without the degree of detail necessary for effective decisioning. ATP-45

information does not provide fidelity of data essential for operations in complex and urban terrain. JWARN uses ATP-45 format. JEM is currently projected as macrolevel capable.

JWARN, JOEF, and JEM are projected for initial fielding in the mid term with fielding completed in the early far term. Visualization and COA determinations are supported by

these systems.

⁴ Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs supporting the establishment and maintenance of situation awareness exist and are sufficient for ATP-45-based processes. JWARN,

JOEF, and JEM are projected for initial fielding in the mid term with fielding completed in the early far term and have capabilities for connectivity with the COP. Doctrine,

policies, procedures, and TTP is not sufficient for providing CBRN information into the COP.

⁵ Limited training is provided to unit staffs on CBRN as an integral part of situational awareness. Consistent formal and refresher training including CBRN in situation awareness

attainment and maintenance is not regularly and routinely performed. Limited routine training is provided and often is not focused upon preparation for operations with a CBRN

threat. The fielding of JWARN, JEM, and JOEF provide the capability to refine staff skills as part of local training and exercising/evaluations. JWARN, JOEF, and JEM are

programmed for initial fielding during the mid term with fielding completed in the early far term. However, supporting and requiring DOTLPF is necessary to ensure attainment

and maintenance of the capability that includes CBRN.

⁶ CBRN specialist units, teams, and cells possess access to shared information technology resources and tools. CBRN personnel do not possess dedicated information technology

to perform training and operational requirements. Available resources are shared with other requiring activities and functions, which may conflict with CBRN entity connectivity

to the COP until a known threat is identified and command influence is exerted. JWARN, JOEF, and JEM are programmed for initial fielding during the mid term with fielding

completed in the early far term and possess capabilities to link with the COP via the GIG Enterprise Service.

⁷ Current DOTLFP adequately address tactical situation awareness. CBRN is discussed but is not considered critical without threat and does not currently possess a direct interface

to COP. DOTLPF will need to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

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9.18.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.18.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Inadequate DOTLPF ensuring emergent JWARN, JOEF, and JEM capabilities

provide accurate and timely information into the COP.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and TTPs for JWARN, JOEF,

and JEM and account for COP integration. Organization: Develop organization structures

and processes for the accurate, timely, and effective application of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM

in operations. Training: Incorporate into initial and recurring training the effective and timely

operation and application of JWARN, JOEF, JEM and the dissemination of information on

the COP. Incorporate into exercise and evaluation criteria requirements challenging force

application and use of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM, including posted COP information.

Leadership: Ensure awareness of criticality to operations with threat of accurate and timely

CBRND information posted on the COP. Facilities: Establish supporting infrastructure

necessary for the effective, accurate, and timely application of JWARN, JOEF, and JEM as

well as the posting and availability of resulting information on the COP.

Deficiency: Inadequate doctrine for predictions and status information being made available

by JEM, JOEF, and JWARN.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine for application of capabilities provided

by JEM, JOEF, and JWARN.

Deficiency: Inadequate basic skill training and refresher training to ensure a cadre of trained

personnel.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Ensure training programs for CBRN Information

Systems and COP.

Deficiency: Inadequate access to IT resources and the COP.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Training: Ensure access to IT systems for CBRN staff

cells and units.

9.18.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.18-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. This task—key to the ability to shape the battlespace—will require extensive materiel

improvements. These improvements include improvements in transmitting accurate information,

using existing and forthcoming C4ISR assets to their full capabilities, and automated planning

and assessment tools. Table 9.18-5 identifies which of the material approaches might address

specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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Table 9.18-4. TASHA 18: Materiel Approaches

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Information assurance

Develop a CBRND system that processes and transmits

information in accordance with Information Assurance

Defense in Depth standards including certification and

accreditation in accordance with DoD and CJCS guidance.

Collect, exchange, and

Develop a system that collects and analyzes CBRN

disseminate information

information and sensor input, generates, edits, and

disseminates NBC reports, including downwind-hazard plots,

and overlays and verify receipt of reports and plots.

Transmission of data uses existing communication nets.

Link to GIS

Develop a system resident in standard C4ISR systems with

interface to GIS to provide input to the COP.

Simulations and models

Develop a system enabling operational commanders to

efficiently execute “what if” scenarios and facilitate the

evaluation of plausible adversary and friendly COAs, CBRN

employment, and TIM ROTA.

Database

Develop a system for obtaining information, archiving data,

accessing databases, performing information/data queries, and

exchanging data files in support of CBRN functions and

activities.

Reachback capability

Develop a system providing the ability to rapidly and securely

reach back and contact CBRN experts and obtain CBRND

plans, procedures, information, and lessons learned.

Risk factor template

Develop a system merging CBRN, intelligence, and

operational data and plans into standardized automated

formats for application to effectively and rapidly accomplish

CBRN/TIM functions and activities.

Hazard status template

Develop a system that merges collected data and predictions

of agent travel to provide hazard status.

Hazard prediction tool

Develop a DoD-approved model for CBRN and TIM hazard

prediction capabilities, incorporating physics-based

functionalities. The model acquires and integrates information

from appropriate databases (i.e., terrain, structures,

environmental, meteorological, intelligence, unit, population,

etc.) to accurately predict, map, and graphically portray the

hazard in near-real time.

Data fusion

Develop a capability to automatically perform data fusion.

“Data fusion” is combining automatically correlated

information with data that refines the information or presents

it in an intuitive format. Fused data in many cases will arrive

later than real- or near-real-time data.

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9.19

Task TASHA 19: Provide CBRN warning, reporting, and alarming throughout the

local or immediate battlespace

9.19.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.19.1.1

Definition

Includes warning, reporting, and alarming to disseminate CBRN information across the tactical

area of operations. This task encompasses the warning, reporting and alarming of units and

personnel potentially affected by the hazard in time to assume protective posture. Within the

local or immediate battlespace, CBRN warning and reporting may occur multiple times, perhaps

concurrently. The various elements of command monitor the CBRN/TIM situation over their

respective areas of interest. For atmospheric and surface hazards, models portray the probable

downwind hazard and likely downwind contour pattern for each event. The fidelity of the

prediction or tracking of actual contamination depends on IDN performance. The ability to

actually detect and characterize the hazard is essential to effective warning, reporting, and

alarming. Interoperability of warning, reporting, and alarming systems is critical across Services

and between nations.

9.19.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 2.4, TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations,

Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.19.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 8

9.19.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.19.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.19.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

2. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

3. Some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Partial joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

6. Intelligence dissemination amd receipt partially exists. (C2.4.7)

Civil. N/A

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9.19.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.19.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.19-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.” Although

improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in the

associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall

assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Most CBRN warning, reporting, and alarming are performed using manual processes; little

automation exists. Current deficiencies include lack of automated detection and warning,

insufficient information for risk assessment; and stand-alone CBRND systems not integrated

with C4ISR capabilities. The ATP-45 information and related processes fail to take full

advantage of automated systems and processes to increase rapidity and accuracy.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The projected initial fielding in the mid term of JWARN will provide substantial improvement in

this capability. Emerging C4ISR capabilities will enhance the dissemination of CBRN

information to requiring force elements, both vertically and horizontally. New DoD systems are

expected to be in compliance with DISA standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate during

the current and near term for interoperability and net-centric operations. Substantial upgrades to

legacy systems are required to include DISA standards and net-centric capabilities. Further, the

mix of legacy and compliant systems will continue to require the attentiveness and awareness of

staffs to ensure effective collection, integration, and dissemination of information until the

legacy systems are either replaced or modified for compliance. Doctrine and TTPs must be

revised to accommodate new C4ISR systems as well as JWARN.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

The fielding of JWARN is projected to be completed early in the mid term. All legacy systems

are projected to either be replaced by, or be in compliance with, DISA standards and fully

support net-centric operations in the far term.

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Table 9.19-1. TASHA 19: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Provide CBRN Tactical and CBRN Warning, Reporting,

and Alarming Throughout the Local or Immediate Battlespace

Current Overall Capability

5¹

8²

6²

7³

5⁴

2⁵

5⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Tactical area

8-10: Tactical area CBRN/TIM IDN systems substantially or fully perform automated warning and reporting of CBRN/TIM

CBRN/TIM IDN

to local JTF elements (including coalition partners and other authorized entities) and all appropriate organizations and

provides automated

echelons of command and control in sufficient detail to enable effective, adequate, and rapid response specific to the incident

warning and

and involved elements. CBRN information is immediately and prominently posted on the COP.

reporting.

4-7: Tactical area CBRN/TIM IDN systems are not integrated with automated warning and reporting systems and are

managed and controlled by local centers. The local unit centers perform the required warning and reporting of CBRN/TIM

hazards using existing and primarily manual means.

1-3: Inadequate tactical CBRN/TIM IDN and/or warning and reporting capability exists.

0: Tactical CBRN/TIM IDN and/or warning and reporting capability is nonexistent.

CBRND specialists

8-10: All CBRND personnel are fully trained and receive recurring refresher training on CBRN warning and reporting.

have the training to

Exercises and evaluations are routinely conducted and fully challenge capabilities to conduct effective CBRN warning and

effectively warn and

reporting and to refine skills, knowledge, and competencies. CBRN warning and reporting competencies are high and enable

make reports.

the rapid, accurate, and successful notification of hazards.

4-7: Core CBRND specialists performing CBRN warning and reporting are fully trained and receive recurring refresher

training on the conduct of CBRN warning and reporting. Exercises and evaluations do not generally fully challenge

capabilities. Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to noncore

CBRND specialists for CBRN warning and reporting. CBRN warning and reporting competencies and experience will vary,

but sufficient capability exists to successfully perform tasks.

1-3: Training is inadequate for the successful performance of CBRN warning and reporting.

0: Training is nonexistent for the successful performance of CBRN warning and reporting.

Commanders and

8-10: All commanders and staff personnel are formally trained and receive recurring refresher training on the effective use of

staffs have the

CBRN warnings and reports to include their application, interpretation, and weak and strong points.

training to effectively

4-7: Selected staff personnel are trained on the effective use of CBRN warnings and reports. Commanders are cognizant of

use warnings and

the proper application of CBRN warnings and reports.

reports.

1-3: Training on the effective use of CBRN warnings and reports is inadequate for support of operations.

0: Training on the effective use of CBRN warnings and reports is nonexistent.

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Units are sufficiently

8-10: All personnel are formally trained and receive recurring refresher training on policies, procedures, and processes for

trained for

CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and reporting. Training is tailored to the functions, activities, and tasks of the individuals.

CBRN/TIM hazard

Exercises and evaluations are routinely conducted and fully challenge capabilities to conduct effective CBRN hazard alarm,

alarm, warning, and

warning, and reporting and to refine and maintain skills, knowledge, and competencies. CBRN hazard alerting, warning, and

reporting.

reporting competencies are high and enable the rapid, accurate, and successful dissemination of presence of hazards.

4-7: All unit personnel are fully trained on CBRN hazard alerting. Selected personnel are fully trained and receive recurring

refresher training on the conduct of CBRN warning and reporting. Exercises and evaluations do not generally fully challenge

unit capabilities. Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to other

personnel for CBRN warning and reporting. CBRN hazard alerting, warning, and reporting competencies and experience will

vary, but sufficient capability exists to successfully perform tasks.

1-3: Training is inadequate for the successful performance of CBRN hazard alerting, warning, and reporting.

0: Training is nonexistent for the successful performance of CBRN hazard alerting, warning, and reporting.

NOTE: Alerting, warning, and reporting do not strictly refer to formal ATP-45 and similar systems of information

dissemination. Immediate dissemination such as yelling, radio, etc. (e.g., “Gas! Gas! Gas!”, notifying company commander,

relaying to adjacent element by field phone, etc.) of an imminent hazard to local personnel is an essential element of alerting,

warning, and reporting.

Units transmit and

8-10: All units are linked to the COP and possess interoperable and integrated automated systems and tools to rapidly and

receive CBRN/TIM

accurately formulate and transmit, and receive and integrate CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and report information.

hazard alarm,

Potentially or indirectly affected subordinate units are simultaneously identified and notified in a timely manner by automated

warning, and

systems and the COP. Related information is posted on the COP and readily accessible.

reporting effectively.

4-7: Limited means exist, are predominantly manual, and are employed to formulate and transmit, and receive and integrate

CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and report information. The parent unit disseminates the information to potentially or

indirectly affected subordinate units using existing communications means.

1-3: Means are inadequate enabling units to formulate and transmit, and receive and integrate CBRN/TIM hazard alarm,

warning, and report information; and/or disseminate the information to potentially or indirectly affected subordinate units.

0: Means are nonexistent enabling units to formulate and transmit, and receive and integrate CBRN/TIM hazard alarm,

warning, and report information; and/or disseminate the information to potentially or indirectly affected subordinate units.

There are sufficient

8-10: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are adequate for effective response to, and restoration of operations following,

doctrine and TTPs for

a CBRN event and integrate CBRN information on the COP.

effective response and

4-7: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs supporting response to, and restoration of operations following, an event exist

the restoration of

and address CBRN.

operations.

1-3: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are inadequate for response to, and restoration of operations following, a CBRN

event.

0: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are nonexistent for response to, and restoration of operations following, a CBRN

event.

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Units warned to take

8-10: All CBRN potentially or indirectly affected units are identified and notified in a timely manner by automated systems

effective

and the COP. Related information is posted on the COP and readily accessible.

countermeasures.

4-7: Limited means exist and is employed over the COP for the dissemination of CBRN hazard and countermeasure

information to known potentially affected units.

1-3: Means are inadequate to notify potentially and indirectly affected units of CBRN hazard and required countermeasures

using the COP.

0: Means are nonexistent to notify potentially and indirectly affected units of CBRN hazard and required countermeasures

using the COP.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Current detection systems are primarily point detection systems and require manual oversight, control, signal interpretation, validation, and reporting. The initial fielding of

JWARN to operational units during the mid term provides the means to manage, integrate, and report IDN information. Fielding of JWARN is projected for completion during the

early far term. JWARN enables the dissemination of CBRN information on the COP to all units in an area (horizontal flow) as well as higher authority and subordinate units

(vertical flow , the current practice). However, full tactical IDN capabilities are dependent upon sensor technology progression and fielding.

² All personnel are trained during military basic training and periodic CBRND training on alerting nearby personnel, warning those in their area, and reporting the event as outlined

in their unit procedures. This training is reinforced during deployment preparation for operations with a threat. CBRND specialists are fully trained and receive recurring training

on the conduct of performing CBRN warning and reporting. Units not possessing primary duty CBRND specialists do assign selected staff personnel with CBRN responsibilities

and provide access to the necessary training. CBRN warning and reporting competencies of these latter personnel will vary, but sufficient capability generally exists. Selected staff

personnel are also trained using these warnings and reports to assess and recommended COAs to the commander for maintenance of OPTEMPO while providing for the safety and

well-being of the force. Exercises and evaluations do not generally challenge all areas of unit capabilities for alerting, warning, and reporting. Adjacent units, particularly non-U.S.

and often other U.S. Service, may not receive alerts, warnings, and reports until after these have been processed up through channels and then disseminated back down channels.

This procedure creates unnecessary delays with potential serious ramifications for OPTEMPO and unit survivability. Fielding of JWARN is projected for completion during the

early far term. JWARN enables the dissemination of CBRN information on the COP to all units in an area (horizontal flow) as well as higher authority and subordinate units

(vertical flow, the current practice).

³ Currently, the transmission and reception of CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and report information is performed manually predominantly using ATP-45 formats and

processes by the CBRN staff cell. Each unit is responsible for ensuring potentially or indirectly affected subordinate units are notified of the hazard. This is generally performed

using nondedicated existing and available communications systems. The mid-term initial fielding of JWARN, and its continued deployment into the early far term, to operational

units will reduce the labor and manual steps required for effective alarming, warning, and reporting of CBRN hazards. Further, JWARN supports the horizontal and vertical

dissemination of information. JWARN applies ATP-45 formats and processes for reporting and warning.

⁴ Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs outline requirements for the warning and reporting of CBRN hazards. The response to and subsequent restoration of operations

following an event are generally addressed in supporting DOTLPF.

⁵ CBRN information is not integral to the COP. DOTLPF and operational plans provide guidance and instructions for the conduct of CBRND to protect against the effects of

CBRN/TIM hazards. Units plan and prepare to perform CBRND measures during preparations to ensure required actions are performed rapidly and effectively when necessary and

required. MOPP 4 provides maximum protection and is implemented immediately upon notification of a hazard until the hazard is characterized and the risks are determined.

However, notification is not generally performed over the COP. ATP-45 format messages and other sources are usually the means of notification to take CBRND actions. Fielding

of JWARN is projected for completion during the early far term. JWARN enables the dissemination of CBRN information on the COP to all units in an area (horizontal flow) as

well as higher authority and subordinate units (vertical flow, the current practice).

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9.19.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.19.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Absence of ability to automate detection and warning reports.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and adjust TTPs to address

emergent capabilities. Training: Adapt training to account for emergent IDN, JWARN, and

COP capabilities

Deficiency: Inadequate integration of emerging capabilities.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and adjust TTPs to address

emergent capabilities.

Deficiency: Inadequate training and maintenance of proficiency of commanders and staffs.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Advanced training capabilities are required.

Deficiency: Insufficient training and refresher training of units and personnel assigned to

units.

Non-Material Solutions: Training: Advanced training capabilities are required.

Deficiency: Inadequate integration of emergent C4ISR capabilities.

Partial Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and adjust TTPs to address

emergent capabilities. Training: Advanced training capabilities required.

Deficiency: Doctrine and TTPs are inadequate to fully implement JWARN and COP

capabilities.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure doctrine and TTPs keep pace with emergent

capabilities.

Deficiency: Inadequate process of continuing adjustment for emergent C4ISR, IDN, and

organizational changes.

Non-Material Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure doctrine and TTPs keep pace with emergent

capabilities. Organization: Ensure organizational structures and operations adapt to emergent

capabilities and maximize operational capabilities.

9.19.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.19-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Material approaches here focus on focus on the dissemination of the warning and reporting

information using better automated tools and reach back to historical databases. Table 9.19-5

identifies which of the material approaches might address specific materiel deficiencies

identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

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