CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Significant TIM present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

9.1.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.1.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.1-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards. The

current capability, “collection of information, items, and observation of activities among

indigenous population,” applies two components to perform this task. These are reports and

observations of regular/routine military activities such as convoys and patrols and weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) evidence collection activities performed by specialized units. The

overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are assessed “yellow.”

Current Capability and Deficiency

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is available to meet some of the needs of tactical commanders as

part of standard intelligence information processing. Credibility of human sources is always

difficult to assertain. Deficiencies include absense of ability to penetrate indigenous populations

and the adversary, need for adaptable doctrine (procedures and processes), and perishability of

training.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is currently projected for this task.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is currently projected for this task.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.1-1. TASHA 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Local Intelligence Operations

Current Overall Capability

6¹

3²

6³

8⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

There is sufficient

8-10: Confidence in accuracy and timeliness of local intelligence is high. Intelligence is collected and correlated from

confidence in the

multiple sources, and source automated information systems are interoperable.

accuracy of local

4-7: Limited confidence in accuracy and timeliness of local intelligence. Predominantly manual processes collect and

intelligence collected.

correlate local intelligence from sources and may be restricted in the number of sources assessed.

1-3: Low confidence in accuracy and timeliness of local intelligence. Predominantly manual processes collect and correlate

local intelligence from internal sources and are restricted in the number of sources assessed.

0: No confidence in accuracy and timeliness of the collected and processed local intelligence.

Mechanism exists to

8-10: Highly integrated dedicated system provides accurate, timely, and current CBRN/TIM threat intelligence.

process CBRN/TIM

4-7: Dedicated systems are in place to process CBRN/TIM threat intelligence against tactical commander priority intelligence

threat intelligence

requirements (PIRs).

rapidly to meet needs

1-3: In-place dedicated systems are inadequate to process CBRN/TIM threat intelligence against tactical commander PIRs.

of tactical commanders.

0: Dedicated CBRN/TIM threat intelligence mechanisms do not exist for processing threat intelligence.

There is sufficient

8-10: All force personnel are trained to identify CBRN/TIM threat indicators. Specialized collection functions are established

training to identify

in standard operational units for WMD investigation and evidentiary processes.

indicators.

4-7: Selected specialized personnel and functions are trained to identify CBRN/TIM threat indicators. Limited training is

provided to the general force. Temporary specialized collection functions are established as determined necessary for specific

functions.

1-3: Selected specialized personnel are trained to identify CBRN/TIM threat indicators and perform all collection functions.

0: CBRN/TIM threat indicator training is nonexistent.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations.

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Processes exist for the collection, correlation, verification, and exploitation of CBRN intelligence from diverse sources, including national means, interagencies, patrols, convoys,

drones, international and national NGOs, local authorities, and populace. These processes are largely manual and require both experience and training for effective application.

Manual skills are perishable and require continuing training and skills growth. Information source systems are either not interoperable/accessible or possess limited

interoperability/accessibility. There exist insufficient adaptable procedures and processes to support the nontraditional battlefield. Confidence in collected information is a function

of ability to penetrate adversaries and indigenous populations, source reliability, and the correlation and verification of collected information with other sources.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

² Doctrine and C4ISR systems are in place for the processing of CBRN intelligence. Process is predominantly manual, time-consuming, and labor-intensive. Information sources

are either not interoperable or possess limited interoperability. CBRN intelligence and indicators must compete for resources and processing. Availability of information may be

delayed due to lack of dedicated C4ISR capabilities for CBRN information collection, processing, and interpretation.

³ Limited training is provided to intelligence specialists for the processing and interpretation of CBRN indicators. Similarly, limited training is provided to CBRN specialists for

the processing and interpretation of CBRN intelligence indicators. However, the general force is not adequately trained on the observation, identification, and reporting of CBRN

intelligence and potential indicators. Specialized units are formed for specific WMD evidence search operations but are generally dissolved upon completion of the specific

mission. These highly mission-specific units are composed of personnel selected from pertinent specialties. Specialty personnel may also be attached to selected units for specific

missions. However, a standard operational unit does not exist that is trained and dedicated for this purpose. Consistent training and refresher training is not performed of the force

during general training in preparation and conduct of operations.

⁴ Effective doctrine, policies, and TTPs exist for the manual performance of this task with limited automated support. Consistent training and refresher training is not performed of

the force during general training in preparation and conduct of operations.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.1.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.1.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Lack of adaptable procedures and processes.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop and refine adaptable procedures and processes.

Training: Ensure adequate training programs for observation and collection skills.

Leadership: Leaders need to ensure adherence to procedures and processes. Personnel:

Develop penetration procedures and doctrine.

Deficiency: Absence of ability to obtain reliable CBRN/toxic industrial chemical (TIC)/TIM

data from local population.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure adequate personnel are assigned to tasks.

Organization: Provide liaison with civil affairs units and ensure collaboration between NBC,

intelligence, and civil affairs units. Training: Ensure training of penetration and interaction

skills. Leadership: Leaders need to be trained to address the associated issues. Personnel:

Ensure availability of personnel with the ability to work with indigenous populations or to

penetrate them.

Deficiency: Lack of ability to penetrate the adversaries.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Refine procedures and practices for interagency

coordination and collaboration. Organization: Ensure coordination collaboration with

involved agencies; joint, interagency, multinational. Training: Ensure training of penetration

skills, investigative skills. Leadership: Leaders need to be trained to address the associated

issues. Personnel: Ensure the availability of personnel with the ability to investigate and/or

penetrate the adversaries.

Deficiency: Need to ensure continued vigilance of procedures and processes.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Need to ensure doctrine is available for identifying

indicators and the information processing of those indicators. Training: Ensure training is

conducted to ensure indicator awareness and the processing of associated information.

Leadership: Leaders need to maintain vigilance and ensure training is conducted.

Deficiency: Lack of thorough training for troops conducting routine military activities

around or among indigenous population.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Ensure general training of troops to operate effectively

and intelligently among the indigenous populations with adversarial elements. Leadership:

Ensure adequate training of the troops.

9.1.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.2

Task TASHA 2: Process local or immediate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence

information and data

9.2.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.2.1.1

Definition

Includes compiling, correlating, and processing intelligence information and data gathered in the

local battlespace and from the indigenous population regarding processed CBRN/TIM threat

intelligence, including information and data from joint and coalition forces in the local or

immediate battlespace and indigenous sources on adversary CBRN intent, objectives, availability

of weapons, actual capacity to employ weapons, expected tactics, potential targets, development

efforts, and willingness or historic propensity to employ CBRN weapons. Threat assessments,

planning, and preparations are supported through this task.

9.2.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 2.4.1, TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7), Protection Joint Functional Concept.

9.2.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 1

9.2.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.2.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.2.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Abundant modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. High interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Partial joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

6. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

7. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

8. Moderate certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

9. Intelligence dissemination and receipt fully exists. (C2.4.7)

Civil

Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.2.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.2.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.2-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards. The

current capability, “Processing of Local Intelligence,” applies to the range of activities for the

compiling, correlation, and processing of local intelligence within the local battlespace.

Intelligence obtained from national means, patrols, convoys, drones, international and national

NGOs, local authorities and populace, and other sources is integrated to identify the CBRN/TIM

threat, adversary CBRN intent and objectives, WMD availability, potential targets, adversary

developmental efforts, and adversary willingness to employ WMD. The task supports threat

assessment and force planning/preparation. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far

term are assessed “yellow.”

Current Capability and Deficiency

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is available to meet some of the needs of tactical commanders as

part of standard intelligence information processing. The capability is improving as a result of

improvements resulting from current conflicts. Interoperabilty within and among services

continues to improve. Deficiencies include absense of ability to process real-time, actionable

information and pass to the “shooter;” need for adaptable doctrine (procedures and processes);

and perishability of training/skills. Overall capability is marginal.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is currently projected for this task.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No change is currently projected for this task.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.2-1. TASHA 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Processing of Local Intelligence

Current Overall Capability

6¹

5²

5³

5⁴

6¹

2⁵

8⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

There is confidence in the

8-10: Confidence in accuracy and timeliness of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is high. Intelligence is actionable/of high value.

collected CBRN/TIM

Intelligence is collected and correlated from multiple sources and source automated information systems are interoperable.

threat intelligence.

4-7: Limited confidence in accuracy and timeliness of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence. Predominantly manual processes

collect and correlate intelligence from sources and may be restricted in the number of sources assessed.

1-3: Low confidence in accuracy and timeliness of local threat intelligence. Predominantly manual processes collect and

correlate local intelligence from internal sources and are restricted in the number of sources assessed.

0: No confidence in accuracy and timeliness of the collected and processed CBRN/TIM threat intelligence.

Multiple sources are

8-10: Automated systems integrate and deconflict information from multiple sources accurately and rapidly require little

integrated and

or no manpower.

deconflicted.

4-7: Multiple sources are integrated and deconflicted using manual means, are limited to available trained resources, and

are inadequate to rapidly correlate information from a large number of multiple sources.

1-3: Limited number of sources are integrated and deconflicted using manual means, are limited to available trained

resources, and are inadequate to rapidly correlate information from multiple sources.

0: No capability to integrate and deconflict multiple sources.

Sufficient processes are

8-10: Automated systems compile and correlate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence from multiple sources accurately and

used to compile and

rapidly require little or no manpower.

correlate CBRN/TIM

4-7: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is compiled and correlated predominantly using manual means, is limited to available

threat intelligence.

trained resources, and is inadequate to rapidly compile and correlate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence from a large number

of multiple sources.

1-3: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is complied and correlated predominantly using manual means, is limited to available

trained resources, and is inadequate to rapidly compile and correlate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence from multiple sources.

0: No capability to compile and correlate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence from multiple sources.

All known CBRN/TIM

8-10: The commander’s PIRs and other known CBRN/TIM intelligence/indicators from all sources are accurately and

intelligence collection

rapidly assessed and presented on a continuing and current basis by automated systems.

requirements are met

4-7: CBRN/TIM intelligence collection requirements identified by the commander’s identified PIRs for known

CBRN/TIM are met using predominantly manual and time-intensive means, are limited to available trained resources, and

may not assess intelligence available from a large number of multiple sources.

1-3: CBRN/TIM intelligence collection requirements identified by the commander’s identified PIRs for known

CBRN/TIM are met using predominantly manual and time-intensive means, are limited to available trained resources, and

may not assess intelligence available from multiple sources.

0: CBRN/TIM intelligence collection requirements are not met.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Previously unknown and

8-10: Previously unknown and opportunistic intelligence is collected and correlated from multiple sources by automated

opportunistic intelligence

systems, including local observations and reports, and source information systems are interoperable.

is integrated into the

4-7: Predominantly manual processes collect and correlate previously unknown and opportunistic intelligence from

processing.

sources, including local observations and reports, and may be restricted in the number of sources assessed.

1-3: Predominantly manual processes collect and correlate previously unknown and/or opportunistic intelligence from

internal sources and are restricted in the number of sources assessed.

0: Local observations and reports are not included in the CBRN/TIM threat intelligence process.

Sufficient numbers of

8-10: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence analysts are trained, experienced, and available in adequate quantities to conduct

experienced analysts are

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence collection, compilation, correlation, and assessment from multiple and diverse sources in a

available for CBRN/TIM

timely and accurate manner or to perform oversight and evaluation of in place CBRN/TIM threat intelligence processing

threat intelligence

automated systems performing all these functions for all operational and routine requirements.

processing.

4-7: Limited numbers of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence analysts are trained, experienced, and available to conduct

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence processing from a significant number of sources for operational requirements.

1-3: Limited numbers of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence analysts are trained, experienced, and available to conduct

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence processing from a number of sources for operational requirements.

0: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence analysts are not trained, experienced or are in numbers insufficient to process

intelligence available from a large number of sources and meet operational requirements for the processing of CBRN/TIM

threat intelligence.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations.

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹-Processes exist for the collection, correlation, verification, and exploitation of CBRN intelligence from diverse sources, including national means, patrols, convoys, drones,

international and national NGOs, local authorities, and populace. These processes are largely manual and require both experience and training for effective application. Manual

skills are perishable and require continuing training and skills growth. Information source systems are either not interoperable or possess limited interoperability. There exist

insufficient adaptable procedures and processes to support the nontraditional battlefield. Confidence in collected information is a function of ability to penetrate adversaries and

indigenous populations; source reliability; and the correlation and verification of collected information with other sources.

² -Integration and deconfliction of information is predominantly conducted using manual processes and is time- and labor-intensive. Information is correlated based upon the value

of the information and credibility and reliability of sourcing and is dependent upon the availability and number/types of sources. Manual processes currently dictate limits upon the

level of information actually correlated and sources applied. Manual skills are perishable and require continuing training and skill growth.

³ - Compilation and correlation of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is predominantly conducted using manual processes and is time- and labor-intensive. Information is compiled and

correlated based upon the value of the information and credibility and reliability of sourcing and is dependent upon the availability and number/types of sources. Manual processes

currently dictate limits upon the level of information actually processed and sources applied. Manual skills are perishable and require continuing training and skill growth. There is

limited ability to perform combat risk assessment and for automated threat report generation and dissemination.

⁴ -Processes exist for the identification and attainment of CBRN/TIM intelligence identified in the commander’s PIRs. These processes are largely manual and time-consuming and

require both experience and training for their effectiveness. The manual processes, time constraints, and limited number of assessment processing personnel places a ceiling upon

the CBRN/TIM intelligence collection requirements which can be rapidly satisfied. Manual skills are perishable and require continuing training and skill growth.

⁵ -Sufficient numbers of trained and experienced analysts are available for CBRN/TIM threat intelligence processing. Experience obtained from ongoing operations will wane over

time. Manual skills are perishable and require continuing training and skill growth. Numbers of trained and experienced analysts are inadequate to meet most operational

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.2.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.2.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Lack of adaptable procedures and processes. Absence of ability to penetrate

indigenous populations. Limited interoperability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop penetration procedures and doctrine.

Organization: Ensure liaison with civil affairs units. Develop collaboration and systems

interoperability between NBC, medical, intelligence, and civil affairs units. Training: Ensure

training of penetration and interaction skills. Leadership: Train leaders to address the

associated issues. Personnel: Ensure availability of personnel with the ability to work with

indigenous populations or to penetrate them.

Deficiency: Lack of ability to penetrate the adversaries.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Refine procedures and practices for interagency

coordination and collaboration. Organization: Ensure coordination collaboration with

involved agencies; joint, interagency, multinational. Training: Ensure training of penetration

skills, investigative skills. Leadership: Train leaders to address the associated issues.

Personnel: Ensure the availability of personnel with the ability to investigate and/or penetrate

the adversaries.

Deficiency: Perishable skills require retraining and growth in skills. Limited ability to

automate threat report generation and dissemination. Limited ability for combat risk

assessment.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Ensure training programs for basic and refresher skill

development. Personnel: Ensure availability of personnel with skills and experience.

Deficiency: Inadequate intelligence information processing and collection activities.

Partial Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure doctrine is available for the processing of

intelligence information on the CBRN Threat. Organization: Ensure adequate units are

available to conduct collection activities.

Deficiency: Consistent training and refresher training required in general training during

preparation of operations and during the conduct of operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Ensure training is completed. Leadership: Ensure

attentiveness to training.

9.2.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.2-4 is an idea for material approach and a corresponding description of the idea

addressing the deficiency for field automated capabilities to process intelligence information.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.3

Task TASHA 3: Disseminate CBRN threat intelligence for local or immediate

battlespace use

9.3.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.3.1.1

Definition

Provide processed local or immediate battlespace CBRN threat intelligence for development of

threat assessments and for a clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation.

For elimination operations and operations in a high CBRN threat environment, the information

disseminated results in immediate action. Timely dissemination ensures effective warning and

tasking.

9.3.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 2.4.1, TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance.

9.3.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 1

9.3.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.3.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.3.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Abundant modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

2. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

3. Intelligence dissemination and receipt partially exists. (C2.4.7)

Civil. N/A

9.3.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.3.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.3-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards. The

current capability, “CBRN Threat Intelligence Dissemination,” addresses the timely

dissemination of processed CBRN threat intelligence to ensure effective warning and

implementation of associated activities. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term

are rated “yellow.” Although improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

and are reflected in the associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient

to change the overall assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Current DOTLPF adequately addresses the dissemination of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence

using existing tactical communications systems and requires manual determination and action for

accomplishment. Plans and procedures are developed during preparation for the dissemination of

CBRN threat intelligence indictors to requiring centers. Commander guidance and operational

situations dictate dissemination parameters. Existing and projected DoD information systems and

infrastructure will allow for the discovery and dissemination of intelligence information. Manual

ATP-45 format messages are created when automated warning systems are unavailable.

However, existing communications systems are not fully interoperable and are dependent upon

the systems available to elements of the Joint Task Force (JTF). Implementation and cross-

element, particularly between Service components and with coalition partners, is dependent upon

the attentiveness and awareness of the intelligence and operations centers in the mixed

communications network. CBRND exercises do not specifically challenge and evaluate the

dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers. The dissemination

of information is generally viewed as an inherent component of other criteria and is, therefore, a

subsumed function/activity.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) (Increment 1, initial operational capability

[IOC]) is projected for initial fielding in the mid term to operational units. DOTLPF must

continue to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change. Developmental “born joint” DoD

information systems will be compliant with the four elements of the Net Ready Key Performance

Parameter (NR-KPP) ensuring interoperability, information assurance, integration to the

appropriate community of interest as well as the Global Information Grid (GIG) architecture.

Substantial upgrades to legacy systems are required to include Defense Information Systems

Agency (DISA) standards and net-centric capabilities. Interoperability with coalition partners,

especially non-NATO partners, may be a continuing issue requiring maintenance of attentiveness

and awareness by the responsible centers. Further, the mix of legacy and compliant systems will

continue to require the attentiveness and awareness of intelligence and operations center staffs to

ensure effective dissemination of identified CBRN intelligence to requiring need-to-know

centers until the legacy systems are either replaced or modified for compliance. CBRND exercise

criteria and standards remain an area of concern. Interoperability barriers that limit collaboration

between the DoD and other government organizations and coalition partners must be addressed

through formalized agreements and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

Joint developmental information systems programs are scheduled to field prior to the far term.

All systems are to be in compliance with the joint staff-mandated NR-KPP and will fully support

DoD interoperability across the Services.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.3-1. TASHA 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: CBRN Threat Intelligence Dissemination

Current Overall Capability

8¹

6²

3³

8⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Means exist and

8-10: Means exist and are employed for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to all need-to-know centers.

are employed to

4-7: Limited means exist and is employed for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to most need-to-know centers.

disseminate

1-3: Existing means and employment are inadequate for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to requiring need-to-

CBRN/TIM

know centers.

intelligence to all

0: Means do not exist for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers.

concerned.

Indicator-based

8-10: Plans, procedures, and means exist for the dissemination of indicator-based warnings to all need-to-know centers.

warnings are

4-7: Plans, procedures, and means are limited for the rapid dissemination of indicator-based warnings to most need-to-know

rapidly

centers.

disseminated.

1-3: Plans, procedures, and means are limited for the dissemination of indicator-based warnings to most need-to-know centers

0: Plans, procedures, and/or means do not exist for the dissemination of indicator-based warnings to requiring need-to-know

centers.

Dissemination of

8-10: The rapid and accurate dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers is a specific and

CBRN/TIM

integral CBRN exercise challenge criteria.

intelligence

4-7: Dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers is identified in CBRN exercise challenge

challenged during

criteria but is not specifically evaluated.

exercises.

1-3: The dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers is an inherent component of selected

CBRN exercise challenge criteria but is not separately evaluated

0: The dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers is not evaluated.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place

operations.

to conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Existing DoD communication infrastructure systems and JWARN, where available, are used to disseminate CBRN intelligence and warnings. Manual ATP-45 format messages

are created when automated warning systems are unavailable. However, existing communications systems are not fully interoperable and are dependent upon systems available to

elements of the JTF. Attentiveness is required to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence and operations centers in this mixed communications environment. Net-centric

operations and mandatory DISA standards address interoperability and the interchange of information among elements. DoD systems are expected to be increasingly in compliance

with the DISA standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate, during the mid term. New DoD systems are currently required to be in compliance with DISA standards and net-

centric capable when fielded. Remaining legacy systems are projected to either be replaced by, or be fully compliant with, DISA standards and net-centric capable in the far term.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

² Plans and procedures are developed during preparation for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence indictors to requiring centers. Implementation and cross-element,

particularly between Service components and with coalition partners, is dependent upon the attentiveness and awareness of the intelligence and operations centers in the mixed

communications network. Commander guidance and operational situations will dictate dissemination parameters. Interoperable and net-centric automated systems will enhance the

interchange of information between elements. DoD systems are expected to be increasingly in compliance with the DISA standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate, during

the mid term. New DoD systems are currently required to be in compliance with DISA standards and net-centric capable when fielded. All remaining legacy systems are projected

to either be replaced by, or be fully compliant with, DISA standards and net-centric capable in the far term. Interoperability with coalition partners, especially non-NATO partners,

may be a continuing issue requiring maintenance of attentiveness and awareness by the responsible centers.

³ CBRND exercises do not specifically challenge and evaluate the dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence to requiring need-to-know centers. The dissemination of information is

generally viewed as an inherent component of other criteria and is, therefore, a subsumed function/activity. CBRN/TIM intelligence development and dissemination is not

generally exercised and evaluated. Time constraints, lack of process familiarity by evaluators, and other factors usually remove intelligence operations challenges for CBRN

exercises and evaluations and replace with scripted and prepackaged intelligence inputs provided directly by the evaluators.

⁴ Current DOTLPF adequately addresses the dissemination of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence using existing tactical communications systems and requires manual determination

and action for accomplishment. DOTLPF will need to continue to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.3.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.3.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Attentiveness required ensuring effectiveness of the intelligence and

operation centers.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Intelligence and operations centers procedures are

required to promote attentiveness and awareness for the effectiveness of CBRN/TIM

intelligence dissemination to all requiring need-to-know centers. Training: Training is

required ensuring proficiency of intelligence and operations center personnel in the

identification of requiring need-to-know centers and the dissemination of CBRN/TIM

intelligence. Leadership: Leaders must ensure training attain and maintain capabilities

and performance levels ensuring the effective dissemination of CBRN/TIM intelligence

to all requiring need-to-know centers.

Deficiency: Limited automation ability. Attentiveness required ensuring capability for

rapid dissemination.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Intelligence and operations centers procedures are

required to promote attentiveness and awareness for the effectiveness of CBRN/TIM

intelligence dissemination to all requiring need-to-know centers. Training: Training is

required ensuring proficiency of intelligence and operations center personnel in the

identification of requiring need-to-know centers and the dissemination of CBRN/TIM

intelligence.

Deficiency: Training exercises do not adequately challenge CBRN intelligence

transmission.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: CBRN exercise criteria specifically challenge and

establish evaluation standards for the dissemination of CBRN intelligence. Training:

Training exercises must include scenarios challenging CBRN intelligence dissemination.

9.3.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.4

Task TASHA 4: Conduct immediate or local battlespace threat assessment

9.4.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.4.1.1

Definition

Based on local or mission-relevant threat information, plausible adversary intent and objectives

are formulated for CBRN agents or TIM use. The threat specific to the mission, maneuver, or

site is assessed, including TIM ROTA potential. The assessment includes adversary targeting,

potential CBRN weapon configurations, employment schemes, objectives and intent. The

development of a shared common picture of the immediate threat affords the commander the

ability to maximize assessment visibility for the timely and effective preparations against any

potential adversary’s CBRN threat actions.

9.4.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 2.4, TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

Protection Joint Functional Concept.

9.4.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSHA 1, OPSHA 2

9.4.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.4.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.4.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. High interoperability. (C2.2.6)

2. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

3. Growing theater intelligence organization. (C2.4.3)

4. Intelligence dissemination and receipt fully exists. (C2.4.7)

Civil

1. Significant TIMs present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.4.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.4.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.4-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Capability is currently manual processes for local threat assessments. The overall capability for

current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.” Although improvements between the periods

occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in the associated identified values, the improved

capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Current processes are predominantly manual with limited automation. Process is labor- and time-

consuming and dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of performing

personnel as well as the quality of the assessed data. The current capability is achieved using

doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is slow and prone to human error. Data may

not always be available for newly defined threats. Although limited simulation tools are

available, these are not generally in use by operating forces. Existing DoD communication

infrastructure systems and JWARN, where available, are used to disseminate CBRN intelligence

and warnings. Manual ATP-45 format messages are created when automated warning systems

are unavailable. However, existing communications systems are not fully interoperable and are

dependent upon systems available to elements of the JTF. Attentiveness is required to ensure the

effectiveness of the intelligence and operations centers in this mixed communications

environment. Limited training is provided to intelligence, operations, and CBRN cell specialists

for the processing and conduct of CBRN threat assessment. Consistent formal and refresher

training on immediate or local battlefield CBRN threat assessment is not regularly and routinely

performed. Limited routine training is provided and often is not focused until preparation for

operations.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The mid-term fielding of JWARN (Increment 1 - IOC), the Joint Operational Effects Federation

(JOEF), and the Joint Effects Model (JEM) are envisioned as providing forces with the tools to

assess and simulate plausible adversary COAs and with the capability to refine cell specialist

skills as part of local training and exercising/evaluations. Net-centric operations and mandatory

DISA standards address interoperability and the interchange of information among elements.

New DoD systems are expected to be in compliance with DISA standards and net-centric

capable, as appropriate during the current and near term for interoperability and net-centric

operations. Substantial upgrades to legacy systems are required to include DISA standards and

net-centric capabilities. However, interoperability may not exist with coalition partner and host-

nation systems. Further, the degree of interoperability between JTF element systems is dependent

upon the extent of DISA standard and net-centric capable compliant replacement or modified

legacy systems fielded by the Services in support of operations. DOTLPF will need to continue

to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.4-1. TASHA 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Processes for Evaluating Adversary Course of Action

Current Overall Capability

4¹

3²

4¹

5³

8⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Analytical processes are

8-10: Automated systems substantially or fully perform analytical processing of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence to evaluate

used to evaluate

plausible adversary COAs, including adversary CBRN employment or TIM ROTA.

plausible adversary

4-7: Analytical processes for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs (including CBRN employment) is performed

COAs.

predominantly using manual means and is limited to available trained resources and the quality of selected assessed data.

1-3: Evaluation of plausible adversary COAs is performed using manual means and is limited to available trained resources

and the quality of selected assessed data.

0: No capability to perform analytical processes for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs.

Means exist and are

8-10: Means exist and are employed for the rapid and accurate processing and dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence.

employed to process

4-7: Limited means exist and is employed for the processing and dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence.

CBRN/TIM threat

1-3: Existing means and employment are inadequate for the dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence to requiring need-

intelligence rapidly to

to-know centers.

meet needs of

0: Means do not exist or employment is inadequate for the processing and dissemination of CBRN threat intelligence.

operational commanders.

Threat assessment is

8-10: Automated systems substantially or fully perform analytical processing of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence to evaluate

used to prepare for

plausible adversary COAs, including adversary CBRN employment or TIM ROTA.

plausible CBRN attacks

4-7: Analytical processes for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs (including CBRN employment) are performed

and TIM ROTA.

predominantly using manual means and is limited to available trained resources and the quality of selected assessed data.

1-3: Evaluation of plausible adversary COAs is performed using manual means and is limited to available trained resources

and the quality of the selected assessed data.

0: No capability to perform analytical processes for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs.

Staffs have sufficient

8-10: All intelligence, operations, and CBRN staff personnel are formally trained and receive recurring refresher training

training and experience

on the conduct of CBRN/TIM threat assessment.

to conduct the threat

4-7: Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to intelligence,

assessment.

operations, and CBRN cell specialists for the processing and conduct of CBRN threat assessment.

1-3: CBRN/TIM threat assessment training is inadequate to support operations.

0: CBRN/TIM threat assessment training to support operations is nonexistent.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations.

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

¹ JOEF and JEM will address TIM hazards listed in ITF-40 with the specific capabilities articulated in the corresponding capability document. Process is labor- and time-

consuming and dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of performing personnel as well as the quality of the assessed data. The current capability is achieved

using doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is slow and prone to human error. Data may not always be available for newly defined threats. TIM threat assessment

evaluation processes are currently nonexistent for operational forces and data are limited to civilian HAZMAT and ITF-40 sources. Although limited simulation tools are available

for CBRN, these are not generally in use by operating forces. JOEF and JEM are envisioned as providing forces with the tools to assess and simulate plausible adversary COAs.

JOEF and JEM will be initially fielded in the mid term with full fielding early in the far term. Legacy systems will continue to require significant manual extraction, review, and

reinput of information for application by JOEF and JEM. The continuing requirement for DoD systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards will gradually

provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with projected full interoperability of systems in the far term. However, the extent to which JOEF and JEM will

address TIM (and the specific agents to be included) is not as yet determined.

² Doctrine and C4ISR systems are in place for the processing of CBRN intelligence. Process is predominantly manual, time-consuming, and labor-intensive. Information sources

are either not interoperable or possess limited interoperability. CBRN intelligence and indicators must compete for resources and processing. Availability of information may be

delayed due to lack of dedicated C4ISR capabilities for CBRN information collection, processing, and interpretation.

³ Limited training is provided to intelligence, operations, and CBRN cell specialists for the processing and conduct of CBRN threat assessment. Consistent formal and refresher

training on immediate or local battlefield CBRN threat assessment is not regularly and routinely performed. Limited routine training is provided and often is not focused until

preparation for operations. The fielding of JEM and JOEF provide capability to refine cell specialist skills as part of local training and exercising/evaluations. However, supporting

and requiring DOTLPF is necessary to ensure attainment and maintenance of capability. Although current manual processes are adequate, as the availability of more sources of

data become available for use, manual process will have to be automated and will require training.

⁴ Current DOTLPF adequately addresses the conduct of CBRN/TIM threat assessment using existing largely manual processes and locally devised checklists for accomplishment.

DOTLPF instituting and supporting rapid and secure reachback capabilities for joint CBRN expert support and assistance, and CBRND information, plans, procedures, and lessons

learned does not exist DOTLPF will need to continue to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.5

Task TASHA 5: Conduct immediate or local battlespace vulnerability assessment

9.5.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.5.1.1

Definition

Local commanders perform vulnerability assessments based on adversary and threat profiles for

their respective area of operation. A vulnerability assessment is a continuous process

encompassing a local intelligence preparation of the battlespace; detailed threat assessment; and

determination of the capability to avoid or protect against contamination, sustain operations, and

restore full mission capability. Includes an evaluation of the causative impact of local adversary

COAs. Also includes identifying and assessing the impact on affected units, missions, and tasks.

Assessment results are used to plan and prepare future operations and correlate with other local

security and force protection means. Likely targets and attack means are identified via this task.

9.5.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 6.5, TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.5.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 2

9.5.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

9.5.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.5.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. High interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Poor joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

6. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

7. Moderate certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

Civil. N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.5.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.5.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.5-1 discusses individual capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards.

Current (manual) capability includes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-

shelf (GOTS) equipment with JOEF, on standard C4ISR equipment, as the future capability to

meet the identified standards. The overall capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated

“yellow.” Although improvements between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are

reflected in the associated identified values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change

the overall assessed color ratings for this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Current processes are predominantly manual with limited automation. Process is labor- and time-

consuming, and dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of performing

personnel as well as the quality of the assessed data. The current capability is achieved using

Doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is slow and prone to human error. Data may

not always be available for newly defined threats. Although limited simulation tools are

available, these are not generally in use by operating forces. Existing DoD communication

infrastructure systems and JWARN, where available, are used to disseminate CBRN intelligence

and warnings. Manual ATP-45 format messages are created when automated warning systems

are unavailable. There is insufficient visibility of CBRND in the COP. However, existing

communications systems are not fully interoperable and are dependent upon systems available to

elements of the JTF. Attentiveness is required to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence and

operations centers in this mixed communications environment. Limited training is provided to

intelligence, operations, and CBRN cell specialists for the processing and conduct of CBRN

threat assessment. Consistent formal and refresher training on immediate or local battlefield

CBRN threat assessment is not regularly and routinely performed. Limited routine training is

provided and often is not focused until preparation for operations.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The mid-term initial fielding of JWARN (Increment 1 - IOC), JOEF, and JEM are envisioned as

providing forces with the tools to assess and simulate plausible adversary COAs and provides the

capability to refine cell specialist skills as part of local training and exercising/evaluations. Net-

centric operations and mandatory DISA standards address interoperability and the interchange of

information among elements. New DoD systems are expected to be in compliance with DISA

standards and net-centric capable, as appropriate during the current and near term for

interoperability and net-centric operations. Substantial upgrades to legacy systems are required to

include DISA standards and net-centric capabilities. However, interoperability may not exist

with coalition partner and host-nation systems. Further, the degree of interoperability between

JTF element systems is dependent upon the extent of DISA standard and net-centric capable

compliant replacement or modified legacy systems fielded by the Services in support of

operations. DOTLPF will need to continue to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Table 9.5-1. TASHA 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Processes for Assessing Vulnerability

Current Overall Capability

6¹

6²

7³

4⁴

2⁵

5⁶

4⁷

8⁸

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Vulnerability assessment

8-10: Vulnerability assessment utility is high and is based upon standardized automated system processing, analysis, and

is useful.

evaluation with trained staff review and involvement.

4-7: Vulnerability assessment utility exists but widely varies between units and staffs; depends on manual processes; and

relies on the experience, training, and availability of the performing staff and the quality of selected assessed information.

1-3: Vulnerability assessment utility is low and unable to support operations.

0: Vulnerability assessment utility is nonexistent and unable to support operations.

Analytical tools are used

8-10: Automated systems substantially or fully perform analytical processing of CBRN/TIM threat intelligence to evaluate

to evaluate plausible

plausible adversary COAs, including adversary CBRN employment or TIM ROTA.

adversary COAs.

4-7: Analytical process for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs (including CBRN employment) is performed

predominantly using manual means and is limited to available trained resources and the quality of selected assessed data.

1-3: Evaluation of plausible adversary COAs are performed using manual means and is limited to available trained

resources and the quality of the selected assessed data.

0: No capability to perform analytical processes for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs.

Vulnerability assessment

8-10: Time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence is exploited in the vulnerability assessment process, and

process exploits time-

the process provides for update and assessment as new intelligence is received.

sensitive or priority

4-7: Time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence is included in the initial vulnerability assessment

actionable CBRN/ TIM

process. Update and reassessment as new intelligence is received are inadequate.

intelligence.

1-3: Time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence is included in the vulnerability assessment process.

Update and reassessment as new intelligence is received are absent.

0: Time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence is not exploited in the vulnerability assessment process.

Means available to

8-10: Electronic collaborative workspaces with automated tools exist and are predominantly applied for evaluation,

collaboratively perform

assessment, planning, and decisioning processes.

assessments.

4-7: Manual collaborative processes are predominantly applied for the evaluation, assessment, planning, and decisioning

processes.

1-3: Collaborative processes are inadequate for the conduct of evaluation, assessment, planning, and decisioning processes.

0: Collaborative processes do not exist for the conduct of evaluation, assessment, planning, and decisioning processes.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Means exist to visualize

8-10: Standardized modeling and simulation (M&S) capability exists to assess and visualize adversary COAs (both CBRN

the extent of Adversary

and TIM) and their effects, is applied by all operating forces and staffs, is integrated into the COP, and continuously

COAs on forces of

refreshes as new information is drawn from interoperable sources.

interest.

4-7: Operating force staffs possess M&S capability and resources to perform M&S visualization of adversary COAs

(CBRN or TIM) and their effects, is commonly applied by operating forces and staffs, is integrated into the COP, and

refreshes as new information is processed.

1-3: Visualization is inadequate of adversary COAs and their effects.

0: Visualization of adversary COAs and their effects are nonexistent.

Operational and

8-10: All intelligence, operations, and CBRN staff personnel are formally trained and receive recurring refresher training on

analytical/planning staffs

the conduct of CBRN COA assessment.

have the training and

4-7: Limited training is provided, is inconsistent, and/or is administered in preparation for operations to intelligence,

experience to effectively

operations, and CBRN cell specialists for the processing and conduct of adversary CBRN COA assessment.

assess adversary CBRN

1-3: Adversary CBRN COA assessment training is inadequate to support operations.

COAs.

0: Adversary CBRN COA assessment training is nonexistent.

There are sufficient

8-10: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are adequate for effective vulnerability assessments and are actively revised

doctrine and TTPs for

to exploit current, emerging, and projected technologies and changes to tactics, systems, capabilities, and situations.

effective vulnerability

4-7: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs for vulnerability assessment exist but are predominantly manual and are

assessments.

periodically revised to exploit technologies and operational changes.

1-3: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs are inadequate for the conduct of vulnerability assessments

0: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs for vulnerability assessments are nonexistent.

There is effective

8-10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with little or no direct impact upon

DOTLPF in place to

operations

conduct task.

4-7: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. Task can be performed with limitations requiring work-

arounds.

1-3: DOTLPF is inadequate for accomplishment of this task.

0: DOTLPF does not exist for this task.

¹ Utility is dependent upon the experience, training, and availability of the necessary staff, as well as the quality and accessibility of information. Current capability is achieved

using doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is predominantly manual and prone to errors and omissions. JOEF and JEM are envisioned as providing forces with the

tools to perform vulnerability assessments with higher levels of utility. These systems will be initially fielded in the mid term. The JOEF is projected to include analytical tools for

the evaluation of COAs and conduct of assessments. Refinement and development of additional analytical tools that draw information from diverse sources operating using GIG

Enterprise Services will further enhance the value and application of JOEF. Visualization through modeling and simulation is projected to be accomplished using JEM providing

rapid recognition and attainment of situational awareness. JOEF and JEM are programmed to link with the COP via GIG Enterprise Service. JOEF and JEM will require dedicated

automated resources. The efficiency and utility of JOEF and JEM will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using GIG Enterprise Services.

Legacy systems will continue to require significant manual extraction, review, and reinput of information for application by JOEF and JEM. The continuing requirement for DoD

systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards will gradually provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with projected full interoperability of

systems in the far term.

² Current processes are predominantly manual with limited automation. Process is labor- and time-consuming and dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of

performing personnel as well as the quality of the assessed data. The current capability is achieved using doctrine and locally devised checklists. The process is slow and prone to

human error and omissions. Data may not always be available for newly defined threats and possible countermeasures. TIM vulnerability assessment evaluation processes are

currently nonexistent for operational forces and data are limited to civilian HAZMAT and ITF-40 sources. Although limited simulation tools are available for CBRN, these are not

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

generally in use by operating forces. JOEF and JEM are envisioned as providing forces with the tools to assess and simulate plausible adversary COAs. Additionally, they may be

also used to assess actual events and for training. JOEF and JEM will be initially fielded in the mid term with full fielding completed early in the far term. However, the extent to

which JOEF and JEM will address TIM (and the specific agents to be included) is not as yet determined. The JOEF is projected to include analytical tools for the evaluation of

COAs. Refinement and development of additional tools for COA that draw information from diverse sources operating using GIG Enterprise Services will further enhance the

value and application of JOEF. The efficiency and utility of JOEF and JEM will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using GIG Enterprise

Services. Legacy systems will continue to require significant manual extraction, review, and reinput of information for application by JOEF and JEM. The continuing requirement

for DoD systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards will gradually provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with projected full

interoperability of systems in the far term. Visualization through modeling and simulation is projected to be accomplished using JEM. JOEF and JEM are programmed to link with

the COP via GIG Enterprise Service.

³ Effective exploitation of time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence in processing is currently dependent upon the training, experience, and availability of

performing personnel. Staff capabilities and performance will vary between units and levels of command from marginal to excellent. In all cases, exploitation in the process is

human dependent and therefore subject to errors, omissions, and subjective evaluation. JOEF is projected to include analytical tools for the evaluation of plausible adversary COAs

and the conduct of assessments. JOEF is programmed for initial fielding in the mid term with full fielding completed early in the far term. On-going collection of information and

adjustments are projected to be integral to the system. Refinement and development of additional analytical tools that draw information from diverse sources operating using GIG

Enterprise Services will further enhance the value and application of JOEF. JOEF is programmed to link with the COP via GIG Enterprise Service. The efficiency and utility of

JOEF and JEM will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using GIG Enterprise Services. Legacy systems will continue to require significant

manual extraction, review, and reinput of information for application by JOEF. The continuing requirement for DoD systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards

will gradually provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with projected full interoperability of systems in the far term. The efficiency and utility of the system

will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using the GIG Enterprise Service.

⁴ Assessments currently require collaboration using traditional means such as telephone calls, personal visits, mail routing, e-mail, and other similar means. There is an absence of

electronic collaborative workspaces within which differing functions and activities are able to cooperatively assist the evaluation, assessment, planning, and decisioning process

without time delay and the need for physical presence. Automated tools could effectively enhance and be enhanced by these electronic rooms. Collaborative workspaces support

net-centric operations. These workspaces are inevitable with the increasing utility of automation and information sharing.

⁵ Insufficient simulation capability in available automated assessment tools or completely unavailable for manual vulnerability assessment. Currently available modeling and

simulation tools are limited to HPAC- and VLSTRACK-based systems designed for graphics-enhanced systems. COTS M&S tools, such as ADASHI, provide limited capabilities

but are not DISA certified. Current M&S tools, additionally, are not interoperable and are not linked within the COP. They must be manually data entered and manipulated. JOEF

and JEM are envisioned as providing forces with the tools to assess and simulate plausible adversary COAs. Additionally, they may be also used to assess actual events and for

training. JOEF and JEM will be initially fielded in the mid term with full fielding completed early in the far term. However, the extent to which JOEF and JEM will address TIM

(and the specific agents to be included) is not as yet determined. JOEF is projected to include analytical tools for the evaluation of COAs and will draw information from diverse

sources operating using GIG Enterprise Services. The efficiency and utility of JOEF and JEM will be influenced by emerging C4ISR systems and processes residing on and using

GIG Enterprise Services. Legacy systems will continue to require significant manual extraction, review, and reinput of information for application by JOEF and JEM. The

continuing requirement for DoD systems to become and be in compliance with DISA standards will gradually provide interoperability of the systems with JOEF and JEM with

projected full interoperability of systems in the far term. Visualization through modeling and simulation is projected to be accomplished using JEM. JOEF and JEM are

programmed to link with the COP via GIG Enterprise Service.

⁶ Limited training is provided to intelligence, operations, and CBRN cell specialists for the processing and conduct of CBRN vulnerability assessment. Consistent formal and

refresher training on immediate or local battlefield CBRN vulnerability assessment is not regularly and routinely performed. Limited routine training is provided and often is not

focused until preparation for operations. The fielding of JEM and JOEF provide capability to refine cell specialist skills as part of local training and exercising/evaluations.

However, supporting and requiring DOTLPF is necessary to ensure attainment and maintenance of capability.

⁷ Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs exist and are sufficient for the manual performance of effective vulnerability assessment. The same is not true for current, emerging, and

projected automated and simulated based assessment tools. Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs must evolve to accommodate changes in tactics, systems, capabilities, and

situations.

⁸ Current DOTLPF adequately address the conduct of CBRN/TIM vulnerability assessment using existing largely manual processes and locally devised checklists for

accomplishment. DOTLPF will need to evolve as systems, tactics, and situations change.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.5.3

Functional Solution Analysis

9.5.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Absence of interactive assessment tools that work within GIG Enterprise

Services.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Current modeling and simulation do not rapidly predict CBRN and TIM

impacts to support operations and planning.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Lack of CBRN automated assessment tools within an electronic

collaborative workspace in which automated assessment tools can be applied.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Lack of a thorough simulation-based assessment tool.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Too few experienced, highly skilled personnel are available for staffs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Consistent formal and recurring refresher training

programs to attain and maintain staff proficiency is required. Personnel: Priority needs to

be given to developing and assigning adequate numbers of experienced and skilled

personnel to the appropriate battle staffs.

Deficiency: Absence of easy-to-use automated vulnerability assessment tools.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Absence of doctrine and TTPs for emergent automated and simulation based

assessment tools.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine, policies, procedures, and TTPs must

maintain relevance and currency in the changing operational environment; exploit the full

range of technologies available, emerging, and projected through the doctrine revision

and life cycle; and provide for active and timely revisions to fully take advantage of

changes in tactics, systems, and situations.

9.5.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 9.5-4 is a list of ideas for material approaches and a corresponding description of each

idea. Approaches identified point to CBRND automated tools as well as interfacing to existing

and developmental C4ISR systems and providing for active collaboration between units,

commands, services and coalitions. Table 9.5-5 identifies which of the material approaches

might address specific materiel deficiencies identified in the DOTMLPF assessment.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

9.6

Task TASHA 6: Conduct immediate or local battlespace risk assessment

9.6.1

Functional Area Analysis

9.6.1.1

Definition

Based on the vulnerability assessment of TASHA 5, plausible risks are assessed and prioritized.

Probability and likely time of occurrence, along with potential impact and persistency are salient

risk factors. This is a dynamic evaluation of the operational situation, which leads to a

determination of the potential risk to operational capabilities and mission accomplishment given

the potential CBRN/TIM threat. CBRN/TIM-based risks are correlated with all other operational

risks. Staffs at the relevant echelons assess the potential impact of the risk assessment on affected

JTF elements.

9.6.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 5, TA 5.2.1, TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

9.6.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSHA 2

9.6.1.2.2

Lateral Task: TASUST 24

9.6.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

9.6.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. High interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Partial joint staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

6. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

7. Moderate certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 9. Tactical Shape Tasks

Civil. N/A

9.6.2

Functional Needs Analysis

9.6.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 9.6-1 discusses capabilities to perform this task to the designated standards. Current

(manual) capabilities to conduct battlespace risk assessment are limited to COTS and GOTS

equipment. JWARN, JEM and JOEF, when fielded, will improve the capability. The overall

capability for current, near/mid, and far term are rated “yellow.” Although improvements

between the periods occur for specific capabilities and are reflected in the associated identified

values, the improved capabilities are not sufficient to change the overall assessed color ratings

for this task.