CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.14-1. SNSHA 14: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y⁵

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

Y⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

Countries or transnational organizations initiating the exportation of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries or transnational

organizations are detected and identified.

Intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries or

transnational organizations is accurate.

Strategic surprise does not occur.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and

organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J-2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN

staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on

intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

² The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational organizations initiating

the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries or transnational organizations. Techniques and

procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not be adequate.

³ The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational

organizations initiating the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries or transnational organizations.

Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.

⁴ The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and

means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations initiating the exportation of CBRN/TIM

weapons or components to other countries or transnational organizations are detected.

⁵ Near/mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon, and efficacy of experimentation

which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.

⁶ DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.

⁷ Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of

experimentation.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.14.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.14.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or

transnational organizations initiating the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

to other countries or transnational organizations may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J-2 and/or national

intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques, procedures, and indicators for

detecting and identifying countries/transnational organizations initiating the exportation of

CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries/transnational organizations. These

indicators must include the means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and

yields, TIMs being considered, means by which to release TIMs, delivery modes or systems,

countries and transnational organizations involved, business interests or industrial

organizations involved, shipping mechanisms, techniques used to avoid detection and enter

nation states, and routes.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or

transnational organizations initiating the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

to other countries or transnational organizations may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J-2 and/or national

intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure accurate

intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating the exportation of

CBRN/TIM weapons or components to other countries or transnational organizations and to

develop metrics to measure accuracy.

Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that a

nation state or transnational organization initiating the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons

or components to other countries or transnational organizations is detected.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J-2 as

well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint to

ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards. These

hazards need to be detected, identified and quantified in order for Shape to provide a clear

understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An

organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J-2 and

national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-CBRND must

work with J-2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop effective training for

analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The training must allow analysts

and collection managers the means by which to determine inadequacy of collection

mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for improvement. Leadership: JRO-

CBRND must work with J-2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop an

effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as those managing all means of

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

collection. The education process must provide analysts and collection managers with the

tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and collection efforts. Personnel:

Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or collection activities vital to

CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or experience. Facilities: Training

requirements should be analyzed and special training facilities developed/modified if

required.

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be

enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles and

responsibilities are clearly delineated.

Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its intelligence-

related responsibilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section dedicated

to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND should have

adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section dedicated to

resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.

Deficiency: The J-2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J-2 staff to better

understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to

support the Shape function of strategic national CBRND. Leadership: Develop an education

program that will enable the J-2 staff to better understand their CBRN role and enhance their

ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the Shape function of strategic

national CBRND.

Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff

officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education

programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence process

and their roles and responsibilities.

Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence

indicators for this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J-2 and/or national

intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN

experimentation campaign plans. Interagency experimentation and exercises must also be

developed to cover nonproliferation issues.

Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into JPME.

10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not

receive adequate preparation, support, or briefing for DoD lessons learned.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

7.0

Strategic Theater Shape

7.1

Task STSHA 1: Characterize the theater CBRN/TIM threat and situation

7.2

Task STSHA 2: Conduct theater CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis

7.3

Task STSHA 3: Determine CBRND resources required to meet the theater

CBRND situation

7.4

Task STSHA 4: Ensure theater CBRND readiness

7.5

Task STSHA 5: Coordinate theater CBRND information systems and processes

7.6

Task STSHA 6: Provide theater CBRND strategy, plans, and policy

7.7

Task STSHA 7: Coordinate CBRND aspects of theater medical operations

7.8

Task STSHA 8: Coordinate theater CBRND operations

7.9

Task STSHA 9: Develop TEPs for Shape considerations and activities for

assigned theater or designated countries

7.10

Task STSHA 10: Establish theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies,

procedures, and networks

7.11

Task STSHA 11: Develop theater policies, standards, and procedures for

determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.0

Strategic Theater Shape

7.0.1

Introduction

At the strategic level of war, a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and develops

and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish

national and multinational military objectives, sequence initiatives, define limits and assess risks

for the use of military and other instruments of national power, develop global plans or theater

war plans to achieve these objectives, and provide military forces and other capabilities in

accordance with strategic plans. The strategic theater sublevel encompasses combatant command

tasks. Eleven strategic theater shape tasks were identified in the chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Functional Area Analysis (FAA).

This chapter, detailing the Strategic Theater (ST) Shape (SHA) area, restates relevant

information from the CBRN Defense (CBRND) FAA, including a description of each of the 11

STSHA tasks, derivation of the task, an indication of other linked-tasks, and the pertinent

conditions. The Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) section addresses the capability and

deficiency analysis and gives a brief description of potential near-term changes. Once all the

capabilities are considered, the assessment concludes with a separate, overarching look at the

entire capability spectrum to identify remaining gaps and/or synergies. The Functional Solutions

Analysis (FSA) section addresses possible solutions for the deficiencies identified in the FNA

section. These are categorized into materiel or non-materiel. The non-materiel solutions are

addressed first and reflect one or more of the six areas of DOTLPF: doctrine, organization,

training, leadership, personnel, and facilities. If there is no non-materiel solution to the

deficiencies, then materiel solutions are considered. These encompass broad approaches that are

not system-specific. These potential materiel approaches are addressed and in the Ideas for

Materiel Approaches (IMA) section. The IMAs provide a possible near- or far-term resolution to

identified deficiencies within the individual capabilities.

7.0.2

FNA Summary

Table 7.0-1 summarizes the overall current and projected capability to perform the STSHA tasks

identified in the CBRND FAA. The overall capability to conduct these tasks in the current time

frame is assessed as “yellow.” From a readiness point of view, any combatant command

(COCOM) staff has a team of operational planners and information command and control

specialists to include CBRND subject matter experts. This team of experts forms the backbone of

the COCOM staff and command structure. The COCOM staff is responsible for readiness, to

include CBRN issues and concerns. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTPs) and tools

to evaluate and assess CBRND staffs, capabilities, systems, and concepts within an Area of

Responsibility (AOR) are limited. Forces and staffs of other nations may or may not have

training, equipment, or experience to effectively conduct CBRND operations. The theater

CBRN/toxic industrial material (TIM) vulnerability analysis and risk assessments process

surpasses the sole purview of DoD. Actionable CBRN intelligence is only as valid as its source

and the time it takes to process. Possible and plausible CBRN employment and TIM hazards are

not necessarily also included in visualizing the impact of adversary Courses of Action (COAs)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

on forces of interest. TIM vulnerability assessment tools are limited; TIM vulnerability analysis

must be conducted manually on a region-by-region basis. There are also deficiencies associated

with a COCOM’s ability to coordinate theater CBRND information systems and processes

required to meet the theater CBRN/TIM situation. As programmed, the Joint Warning and

Reporting Network (JWARN) is a suite of hardware and software that should, once fully

operational, provide adequate coverage to each of the measures listed in Table 7.0-1. Until

JWARN is fully operationally capable, limitations to CBRN information systems and processes

include manual data receipt and entry, limited interface with the Common Operating Picture

(COP), restricted information flow into the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and

limitations to real-time situational awareness. JWARN is available within the theater and

interfaces with the GCCS but is currently limited to manual input and retrieval. Capability will

improve dramatically with the anticipated fielding initial operational capability (IOC) of the Joint

Effects Model (JEM) Block I in FY2006 and the IOC of the Joint Operational Effects Federation

(JOEF) Block I, Increment I in FY2008. JOEF will provide a significant CBRN-adaptive

planning capability. The JEM will provide a single, validated capability to predict and track

CBRN and TIM events and effects. The JOEF will provide an operational requirements

modeling and simulation system which accurately predicts CBRN effects on personnel,

equipment, and operations.

Despite continuing improvements in all of these areas, STSHA is projected only to “yellow”

over the mid term. The overall projected assessment remaining the same for ST-level Shape

tasks is based on anticipated extrapolated results of current and programmed doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)

initiatives. There are no major technological barriers to be overcome, but major emphasis in

future budgeting and programming of resources will be required to initiate or enhance

recommended DOTMLPF solutions. The estimated pace of change reflected in this assessment

could be accelerated or slowed based on decisions to accelerate or slow the implementation of

recommended solutions. An additional assessment challenge is to anticipate and incorporate the

contribution that an educated, trained, and experienced leadership base will make to

improvements in CBRND Shape capability. Integration of CBRND capability improvements and

enhancements into the fabric of all DoD functions will be possible only when leaders at every

level have a foundational and practical understanding of the impacts of CBRN effects on their

functional areas. Leaders must be able to assess these impacts and to develop solutions within

their functional domains that will mitigate or eliminate these impacts.

Many of the current DOTMLPF solution recommendations have been made to correct

deficiencies in leader CBRND education and training. A CBRND-experienced leadership base

will be realized only when future education and training initiatives have been established long

enough to produce educated and trained leaders. As of October 2004 a new CJCSI 1800.01B,

Officer Professional Military Education Policy has been produced with no CBRND learning

areas or objectives. Lack of inclusion of CBRND learning areas/objectives has in the past been

cited by academic deans as a justification for why more emphasis could not be placed on

CBRND issues in their curricula. One of the 10 special areas of emphasis approved and proposed

for 2005 by the July 2004 Joint Faculty Education Conference Initial Assessment is combating

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). But even if this proposal is accepted, special areas of

emphasis are nonbinding. Until this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

provides definitive and directive guidance for providing CBRND integration into Joint

Professional Military Education (JPME) curricula, this problem will continue.

Table 7.0-1. Strategic Theater Shape Summary FNA Findings

CBRN Strategic

CBRN Strategic Theater Shape Task Title

Capability

Theater Shape

Near/

Task Number

Current

Far

Mid

Characterize the theater CBRN/TIM threat and

STSHA 1

situation.

•

Conduct theater CBRN/TIM vulnerability

STSHA 2

analysis.

•

Determine CBRN resources required to meet

STSHA 3

the theater CBRN situation.

•

STSHA 4

Ensure theater CBRND readiness.

•

Coordinate theater CBRND information

STSHA 5

systems and processes.

•

STSHA 6

Provide theater CBRND plans and policy.

•

Coordinate CBRND aspects of theater medical

STSHA 7

operations.

•

STSHA 8

Coordinate theater CBRND operations.

•

STSHA 9

Develop TEPs for Shape-related issues.

•

Establish Theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-

STSHA 10

detection policies, procedures, and networks.

•

Develop theater policies, standards, and

STSHA 11

procedures for determining employment of

•

CBRN/TIM weapons.

OVERALL

•

7.0.3

FSA Summary

The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential DOTMLPF (non-materiel and

materiel) solutions for the capability gaps identified in the FNA section.

7.0.3.1

DOTLPF

The DOTLPF solutions identified in this chapter are associated primarily with training and

doctrinal issues and include the development of JTTPs. Before a CBRN/TIM attack, the

combatant commander will need to be proactive in determining and shaping the theater

CBRN/TIM situation. In large measure, this shaping will be conducted in a virtual and simulated

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

environment. Although some CBRN-related training and evaluation may be conducted, such

events at the theater level are frequently stovepiped and compartmentalized. Therefore, an

accurate assessment of true capabilities is difficult to obtain. JTTPs, training, and exercises must

be developed to facilitate assessing theater CBRND readiness. Means and methods must be

developed to ensure currency and accuracy of intelligence throughout the intelligence acquisition

community. Incorporate Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) queries into overall intelligence

community (IC) capabilities. Develop formal JTTPs which address TIM hazards and their impact

on friendly and adversary COAs. Develop JTTPs to address regional TIM and biological warfare

agent vulnerability analysis. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) 5.0 should be approved and

published at the earliest opportunity after being vetted. Staff planning guidance that provides

factors for CBRN resources under varying threat levels should be developed. Resource materiel

management positions with qualified logistics-CBRN experts are needed. JTTPs that specifically

address a joint CBRND logistic tracking system and JTTPs that specifically address joint

CBRND materiel resources, below the wholesale level, should be developed. The COCOM

commander will need to have a dedicated staff cell within the HQ to provide theater CBRND,

plans, policies, and guidance. JTTPs and joint training and education courses need to be

developed to focus planners on the complex nature of planning for CBRND operations,

restoration and elimination operations, and the development of planning guidance. Other

solutions include improvement in environmental health and safety training of deploying forces

and JTTPs for medical management of TIM casualties. International exercises must be held to

identify capability gaps in international CBRN/TIM employment verification procedures. New

doctrine and TTPs need to address procedures for all of the international community and

approaches to verifying TIM employment.

7.0.3.2

IMA

This paragraph summarizes possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel

requirements of the DOTLPF assessment. Continued work on analysis probability tools and

models is required. No automated tools exist for assisting in the conduct of global vulnerability

assessments focusing on potential adversary COAs. Because of the wide range of options

available to potential adversaries, tools must be available that can take as input that which is

known, and then model and forecast all potential COAs. Formal automated analytical processes

to facilitate TIM vulnerability analysis must be developed. Development of cooperative linkages

between various proponent and service detection and sensing technologies is required. Other

materiel needs include an automated global database/software program of CBRN/TIM hazards

and an automated plume-prediction technology tied to real-time geospatial unit location such as

JEM and JOEF.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.1

Task STSHA 1: Characterize the theater CBRN/TIM threat and situation

7.1.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.1.1.1

Definition

To characterize the CBRN/TIM threat and situation for the combatant commanders and theater

component commanders. Uses Sense data to move from situational awareness as well as shared

awareness to shared understanding. Allows military leadership to develop a clear understanding

of the current and predicted CBRN/TIM situation and its impact on theater operations in near-

real time. Informs personnel; provides actual and potential impacts of CBRN/TIM hazards; and

envisions critical Sense, Shield, and Sustain end states, including preparing for operations and

visualizing the sequence of events that moves the theater force from its current state to those end

states. Includes establishing collection priorities and coordination with intelligence agencies to

collect information on CBRN/TIM capabilities encompassing such things as adversary intent and

objectives, weapons availability and capacity, expected tactics, potential targets, and willingness

or historic propensity to employ CBRN/TIM weapons. Also includes compiling and analyzing

intelligence information and data provided by intelligence agencies or resources satisfying the

theater CBRN/TIM threat intelligence collection plan. Provides processed theater CBRN/TIM

threat intelligence for development of regional vulnerability assessments and for an

understanding of the current and predicted CBRN/TIM situation. Provides the basis for CBRND

tasking of and warning to the combatant commanders and Services. Appropriate collaboration

occurs with interagency and international parties. This task further encompasses theater medical

intelligence to be collected in support of CBRND analysis.

7.1.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.5, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.3, ST 5.4.1, ST 6, ST 8.1.4, ST 8.2, ST

9, ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A

Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance.

7.1.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 1

7.1.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSENS 1, STSENS 2, STSENS 3, STSENS 4, STSENS 5,

STSENS 6, STSENS 8, STSENS 9, STSHA 2

7.1.1.2.3

Supporting Tasks: OPSHA 1, OPSHA 10

7.1.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

2. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. No or outlined mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

4. Few modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

5. Few modern military simulation systems. (C2.2.5.5)

6. Poor Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

7. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

8. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

9. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

10. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

11. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

12. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

13. Little or no certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

14. Negligible deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

3. Uncertain international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

4. Restrictive Presidential and/or Secretary of Defense decisions. (C3.1.3)

5. Low internationalism. (C3.2.6.5)

6. High health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

7. Unspecified TIM present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

7.1.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.1.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.1-1 discusses the proposed capability to perform the task to the designated standard.

There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will accomplish

this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Intelligence Center of the joint force headquarters is responsible for providing and

producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components,

task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community (Joint Publication 1-02). Joint

intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address characterizing the theater

CBRN/TIM threat and situation. The theater-level CBRN staff is not adequately staffed and

organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately

trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in

intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on the accurate characterization

of the threat for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN

issues. Therefore, the current overall assessment is “yellow.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.1-1. STSHA 1: Overall Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force HQ JIC

M10

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

R³

R⁴

G⁵

G⁶

G⁷

G⁸

G⁹

Y¹⁰

G¹¹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹²

Y¹³

Y¹⁴

Y¹⁵

G¹⁶

Far-Term Overall Capability¹⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

Means exist to collect intelligence on designated theater adversaries.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is current.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is reliable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All CBRN/TIM threat priority intelligence requests are covered by a collection plan.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Adequate means are available for CBRND staff to influence theater collection activities.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Multiple sources are integrated and deconflicted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical intelligence guidance identifies information requirements and processes.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical CBRN/TIM intelligence criteria are established and defined.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Staff has sufficient training and experience to conduct the threat assessment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is disseminated in near-real time.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Although multiple national means of collection exist and can be requested by the COCOM staff, recent operational experience in S.W. Asia and congressional investigations have

rendered the efficacy of national intelligence collection, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), suspect at best.

² CBRN threat intelligence, particularly that relying on HUMINT, is dependent on factors that may prevent timely and current information.

3 CBRN threat intelligence, particularly that relying on HUMINT, is dependent on factors that may preclude obtaining reliable information.

⁴ Limited. CBRN threat intelligence is dependent on factors that may prevent reliable information.

⁵ Yes. The COCOM JIC staff can develop collection plans for CBRN threats.

⁶ Yes. The COCOM JIC has the means to provide input for theater collection activities.

⁷ Yes. All source intelligence analysis is the process where integration and deconfliction occurs.

⁸ Yes. The COCOM medical staff identifies intelligence information requirements and processes.

⁹ Yes. The COCOM medical staff has the means to establish and define medical CBRN/TIM intelligence criteria.

¹⁰ The JIC has the experience to conduct threat assessment but may be limited in CBRN training education and experience.

¹¹ CBRN threat intelligence is disseminated in near-real time, via COLISEUM.

¹² DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹³ New national intelligence initiatives should provide enhanced means to collect intelligence on theater adversaries. Difficulties with HUMINT will continue to be a limiting

factor.

¹⁴ New national intelligence initiatives should provide enhanced means to ensure currency of intelligence. Difficulties with HUMINT will continue to be a limiting factor.

¹⁵ New national intelligence initiatives should provide enhanced means to ensure reliability of intelligence. Difficulties with HUMINT will continue to be a limiting factor.

¹⁶ CBRN training and exercises will benefit from JRO-sponsored enhancements. Staff members within the JIC will coordinate better with CBRND staffs and have more

experience.

¹⁷ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.1.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.1.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Currency of intelligence is dependent on the acquisition means and methods.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop means and methods to ensure currency of

intelligence throughout the intelligence acquisition and collection community.

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be

enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles and

responsibilities are clearly delineated.

Deficiency: COCOM CBRND staff is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its

intelligence-related responsibilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Each theater-level CBRND staff should have a

section dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence issues. Personnel: Each theater-level

CBRND staff should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a section

dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence issues.

Deficiency: COCOM J2/JIC staffs are not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable each JIC staff to better

understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to

support the Shape function of theater-level CBRND. Leadership: Develop an education

program that will enable JIC staff to better understand their CBRN role and enhance their

ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the Shape function of theater-level

CBRND.

Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff

officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education

programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence process

and their roles and responsibilities.

Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on accurate

characterization of the threat for this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO CBRND must work with both the intelligence and

CBRN communities to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN experimentation

campaign plans.

Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into JPME.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.2

Task STSHA 2: Conduct theater CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis

7.2.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.2.1.1

Definition

To conduct theater vulnerability assessments focusing on potential adversaries’ courses of action

(COAs). This theater strategic assessment compares regional-based vulnerabilities and risks.

Development of a shared understanding of potential adversaries’ CBRN/TIM COAs and the

associated vulnerabilities and risks enables timely and effective preparations for any potential

adversary acts. Includes the development of associated risk assessments.

7.2.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.4.1.2, ST 2.5, ST 5, ST 5.1, ST 5.1.1, St 5.1.3,

ST 5.1.4, St 5.1.6, ST 5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.1.1, ST 5.3.1.2, ST 5.3.1.3, ST 5.3.3, ST 6, ST 6.2, ST

6.1.6, ST 8.1.4, ST 8.2, ST 8.3.2, ST 9, ST 9.3, St 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint Functional

Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

7.2.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 2

7.2.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 1, STSHA 3, STSHA 4, STSHA 6, STSHA 7

7.2.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 2

7.2.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No or outline mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

2. Few modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. Few modern military simulation systems. (C2.2.5.5)

4. No or some interoperability. (C2.2.6)

5. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

6. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

7. Little or no certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Civil. N/A

7.2.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.2.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.2-1 discusses the J2 JIC at the COCOM level: the only capability that currently exists to

perform the task “Conduct theater CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis.” The J2 JIC is the only

capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The JIC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint

force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence

community (Joint Publication 1-02). The current capability for the JIC to perform vulnerability

and risk assessments is “yellow.” The primary reason for this assessment is that the vulnerability

and risk assessment process requires information beyond organic DoD means. Also, there are

deficiencies in the validity of intelligence and availability of vulnerability and risk assessment

tools, particularly for TIM and biological warfare agents.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Little capability improvement is

forecasted for the near/mid term. DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of

initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far term. The assessment will improve to

“green.” Vulnerability analysis guidelines will be enhanced to adequately address AOR-wide

TIM concerns. TIM vulnerability assessment tools will be enhanced. Continued DOTMLPF

enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.2-1. STSHA 2. Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: J-2 JIC

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

Far-Term Overall Capability¹²

G¹³

G¹⁴

G¹⁵

G¹⁶

G¹⁷

G¹⁸

G¹⁹

FAA Measure

Scale

Policies and guidelines for conducting theater vulnerability assessment are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policies and guidelines for conducting theater risk assessment are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Analytical tools used to evaluate plausible adversary’s COAs are adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Vulnerability assessment process exploits time-sensitive or priority actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means are available to collaboratively perform assessments.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means exist to visualize the impact of adversary’s COAs on forces of interest.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively assess adversary’s

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM COAs.

Sufficient doctrine and TTPs for effective theater vulnerability and risk assessments are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of vulnerability assessment doctrine and TTPs.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No. Extremely limited. JTTPs for regional TIM and biological warfare agent vulnerability analysis are very limited.

² Limited. The JIC either has been furnished or has developed vulnerability analysis guidelines. However, such guidelines may not adequately address an AOR-wide TIM concern.

³ Limited. The JIC has guidelines for conducting risk assessments. However, AOR-wide CBRN risk assessments surpass the sole purview of DoD.

⁴ The JIC has analytical tools used to evaluate plausible COAs. The military decision making process - classically used to evaluate COAs - has been considered adequate—but

CBRN/TIM integration into these tools may not be adequate.

⁵ Partial. The JIC has an ability to exploit time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence through net-centric means; however, actionable CBRN intelligence is only

as valid as its source and the time it takes to process.

⁶ Limited. The JIC has the means to collaboratively perform assessments with other agencies.

⁷ Limited. The JIC has the means to visualize the impact of adversary COAs. However, possible and plausible CBRN employment and TIM hazards are not necessarily also

included in this visualization.

⁸ By definition, the JIC has the training and experience to assess adversary COAs. However, the JIC may not have the training and experience to assess adversary CBRN/TIM

COAs.

⁹ Limited. The JIC has doctrine and JTTPs for AOR CBRN/TIM situational awareness. However, TIM vulnerability assessment tools are limited.

¹⁰ Limited. While joint exercises/experimentation can provide feedback on the vulnerability analysis process, TIM vulnerability analysis must be conducted manually on a region-

by-region basis.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹² Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

¹³ Vulnerability analysis guidelines will be enhanced to adequately address AOR-wide TIM concerns.

¹⁴ CBRN/TIM considerations will be integrated into JIC analytical tools.

¹⁵ Experimentation designed to discover required enhancements to interagency CBRND coordination issues will improve

collaborative efforts.

¹⁶ Possible/plausible CBRN and TIM hazards will be adequately represented in JIC COA visualization products.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.2.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.2.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: AOR-wide CBRN risk assessments surpass the sole purview of DoD.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Incorporate JIC queries into overall IC capabilities.

Deficiency: There is a lack of sophisticated and validated techniques and procedures

developed to assist collectors and collector managers in the acquisition of raw WMD

information.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) need to be

developed to cover all of the unique aspects of intelligence collecting on WMD issues across

the spectrum. Training: Discovery experimentation should be employed to investigate/

validate new ways of fusing CBRN/intelligence issues. Training needs to be developed to

assist collectors and collector managers in the acquisition of raw WMD information. This

training needs to be developed in collaboration with both the intelligence and the CBRND

communities. Leader Education: Learning areas and objectives covering CBRN/intelligence

fusion issues should be institutionalized in Officer Professional Military Education

(OPME)/JPME. These learning areas and objectives should be required at all

intermediate/senior-level colleges and in the Joint Forces Staff College.

Deficiency: Possible and plausible CBRN employment and TIM hazards are not necessarily

included in visualizing the impact of adversary COAs on forces of interest.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop formal JTTPs that address CBRN employment/

TIM hazards and their impact on friendly and adversary COA.

Deficiency: Lack of automated tools exists for conducting global vulnerability assessments

focusing on potential adversary COAs of CBRN, including use of TIMs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: JTTPs for regional TIM and biological warfare agent vulnerability analysis are

limited.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop JTTPs to address regional TIM and biological

warfare agent vulnerability analysis.

7.2.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 7.2-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.3

Task STSHA 3: Determine CBRND resources required to meet the theater CBRND

situation

7.3.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.3.1.1

Definition

To determine CBRND unit, personnel, equipment, and logistics resources required for a specific

theater of operations. Determines the required allocation, provisioning, positioning, tracking, and

sustaining of CBRND units and personnel throughout the theater, ensuring the availability of

appropriate units as well as personnel in the correct quantities and positions. Includes required

allocation of CBRND equipment, supplies, and consumables throughout the theater of operations

to include prepositioning and stockpiling. CBRND logistics are managed for extended

operations. Also includes adjustments to TPFDD to ensure timely arrival and employment of

CBRND resources.

7.3.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 1.1.2, ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.4.1.2, ST 4.2.6, ST 5, ST 5.1, ST 5.1.1, ST 5.1.2, ST

5.1.3, ST 5.1.4, ST 5.1.6, ST 5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.3, ST 5.4.1, ST 6, ST 6.2, ST 6.2.1, ST 7.1.1, ST

8.2.3, ST 9, ST 9.3, ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military

Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance.

7.3.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 5

7.3.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 2, STSHA 6, STSHA 7, STSHA 8, STSHLD 1, STSHLD

2, STSHLD 9

7.3.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 3

7.3.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Immediate, delayed, or potential long-term atmospheric weapons effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. Limited military commitments from other nations. (C2.1.1.7)

2. No or outline mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

4. Multiple competing apportionments. (C2.2.2)

5. Marginal forces allocated. (C2.2.3)

6. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

7. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

8. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

9. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

10. No or partial time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) availability. (C2.5.1.1)

11. Negligible or short deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

12. Unresponsive or slow pipeline responsiveness. (C2.8.3.1)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Limited international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

7.3.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.3.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.3-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task: determine CBRND

resources required to meet the theater CBRND situation to the designated standard. There is only

one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The capability to execute this task resides in the COCOM HQ staff, and the current capability

assessment is “yellow.” The primary reason for this assessment centers around the mechanics of

logistics for CBRND materiel. The current system is Service-specific, and there are no JTTPs

that specifically address influences the flow of joint CBRN resources. The CBRND materiel

management process is manual, requiring a dedicated individual in the supporting materiel

management center (MMC). Training and experience are situation-dependent. CBRN

considerations include a wide array of threat-based tasks that require visibility from the tactical

to strategic theater level. Other concerns include tools and processes to manage CBRND

personnel and units.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Some capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term, raising the assessment to “green.” Planning staffs will have been

provided the training and will acquire the experience necessary to determine required

adjustments to the TPFDD based on CBRN considerations. UJTL 5.0 will be fully implemented,

and Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors will be consistently considered as a result of

training, education and experience.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF should continue to

improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused

experimentation.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.3-1. STSHA 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM HQ

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

G⁸

G⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

G¹²

G¹³

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

CBRND staff cells have the ability to influence the TPFDD.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means exist to adjust the TPFDD based on CBRND considerations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Planning staffs have the training and experience to determine required adjustments to the TPFDD based on CBRND

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

considerations.

Tools and processes are available to manage CBRND personnel and units.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Tools and processes are available to manage CBRND materiel resources.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND logistics tracking system is sufficient.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Appropriate CBRND logistics management processes are in place.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Analytical tools are used to assess logistical demand.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors are considered.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. There are no JTTPs that specifically address joint CBRND materiel resources below the wholesale level.

² Yes. Operational staffs to include CBRND experts, have the ability to provide input to the TPFFD process.

³ Yes. The force mix can be adjusted given adequate time and strategic lift capabilities.

⁴ Limited. The force mix can be adjusted given adequate time and strategic lift capabilities. However, training and experience are situation-dependent. CBRN considerations

include a wide array of threat-based tasks that require visibility from the tactical to strategic theater level.

⁵ Limited. Processes exist to manage CBRND personnel and units, but allocation of those assets is subject to availability and in the case of units, readiness and deployability.

⁶ Limited. Processes are available to manage CBRND materiel resources. However, the process is manual, requiring a dedicated individual in the supporting MMC.

⁷ Limited. Any COCOM staff can track logistics. However, there is no dedicated system to track CBRND -related materiel.

⁸ Yes. CBRND-related materiel spans five separate classes of supply. The concept of focused-logistics allows the operational level logistician to track and ship assets and deliver

tailored packages and sustainment items. However, this process does not differentiate CBRND-specific items.

⁹ Yes. GSORTS has the capability to monitor specified materiel. However, CBRN equipment does not maintain its own class of supply, therefore, each item must be manually

tracked.

¹⁰ Limited. Until UJTL 5.0 is fully implemented, Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors may not be fully considered.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹² Planning staffs will have been provided the training and will acquire the experience necessary to determine required adjustments to the TPFDD based on CBRN considerations

¹³ UJTL 5.0 will be fully implemented and Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors will be consistently considered as a result of training, education, and experience.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.3.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.3.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: The current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs that specifically

address adjusting the flow of joint CBRN resources, personnel, and units.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop staff planning guidance that provides factors

for CBRN resources under varying threat levels.

Deficiency: Training and experience are situation-dependent. CBRN considerations include a

wide array of threat-based tasks that require visibility from the tactical to strategic theater

level.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop staff training that provides factors for CBRN

resources under varying threat levels.

Deficiency: The CBRND materiel management process is manual, requiring a dedicated

individual in the supporting MMC.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Personnel: Resource materiel management positions with

qualified logistics-CBRN experts.

Deficiency: The current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs that specifically

address a joint CBRND logistic tracking system.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop JTTPs that specifically address a joint CBRND

logistic tracking system.

Deficiency: Until UJTL 5.0 is fully implemented, Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors

may not be fully considered.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Approve and publish UJTL 5.0 at the earliest

opportunity after being vetted.

Deficiency: There are no JTTPs that specifically address joint CBRND materiel resources,

below the wholesale level.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop JTTPs that specifically address joint CBRND

materiel resources, below the wholesale level.

7.3.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 7.3-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.4

Task STSHA 4: Ensure theater CBRND readiness

7.4.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.4.1.1

Definition

To ensure theater forces are prepared to accomplish assigned missions in a CBRN/TIM

environment. Joint CBRND training, exercises, and rehearsals are key components to ensure

force readiness for operations in a CBRN/TIM environment. Operational concepts and new

systems are evaluated in realistic exercises and multinational environments. Forces are evaluated

and assessed for effective CBRND task performance across the range of military operations and

in a variety of physical environments. CBRND systems are evaluated for operational

effectiveness and performance utility. Includes the effective documentation and management of

lessons learned information to provide a historical record for trend analysis and a repository for

the warfighting staffs to examine during development of integrated priority lists.

7.4.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 1.1.2, ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.4.1.2, ST 4.2.4, ST 4.2.6, ST 5.1, ST 5.1.3, ST

5.1.4, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.1.1, ST 5.3.1.2, ST 5.3.1.4, ST 5.4.3, ST 6, ST 6.1.16, ST 6.2, ST 6.2.2, ST

9, ST 9.3, ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation:

A Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance, Training Transformation

Implementation Plan.

7.4.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 6

7.4.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 2, STSHA 6, STSHLD 4, STSHLD 8, STSHLD 9,

STSHLD 11

7.4.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 4

7.4.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Immediate, delayed, or potential long-term atmospheric weapons effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. No or outline mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

2. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

3. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

4. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

5. Few modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

6. Few modern military simulation systems. (C2.2.5.5)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7. Poor Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

8. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

9. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

10. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

11. Little or no intelligence dissemination and receipt. (C2.4.7)

Civil. N/A

7.4.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.4.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.4-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The current assessment is “yellow.” Any COCOM staff has a team of operational planners and

information command and control specialists to include CBRND subject matter experts. This

team of experts forms the backbone of the COCOM staff and command structure. The COCOM

staff is responsible for readiness, to include CBRN issues and concerns. JTTPs and tools to

evaluate and assess CBRND staffs, capabilities, systems, and concepts within an AOR are

limited. Forces and staffs of other nations may or may not have training, equipment, or

experience to effectively conduct CBRND operations.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF should improve in

all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

Joint TTPs, training and exercises, and education will all improve leading to a far-term

assessment of “green.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.4-1. STSHA 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM J-3

M10

M11

M12

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

Tools and processes are available to evaluate and assess CBRND capability in theater.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Units and HQ staffs are routinely evaluated and assessed in performing CBRND tasks.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND systems and concepts, both current and projected, are assessed and evaluated under realistic conditions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND operations are exercised with coalition partners.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND staff cells and units have access to dedicated information technology to support training.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

HQ/unit exercises are conducted under simulated CBRN/TIM conditions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Adequate training tools are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND specialists/staffs are trained to perform required CBRND tasks.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Forces/staffs of other nations are trained in CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

CBRND staff cells conduct training and rehearsals.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

An accessible, digital information repository system is available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

Information repository is available to all operating forces.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ There are few training events that specifically address training forces/staffs of other nations for anticipated CBRND operations.

² Limited. COCOM staff has tools and processes to evaluate and assess CBRND capabilities in theater. However, the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs that

specifically addresses tools and processes to evaluate and assess joint CBRND capability.

³ Limited. Any COCOM staff can routinely evaluate and assess CBRND tasks, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training that

specifically addresses evaluating and assessing joint CBRND tasks.

⁴ Limited. Any COCOM staff can assess and evaluate systems under realistic conditions, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training

that specifically addresses assessing joint CBRND systems and concepts, both current and projected, under realistic conditions.

⁵ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the ability to exercise with coalition partners, but there are few exercises that specifically address CBRND operations with coalition partners.

⁶ Limited. Any COCOM staff has access to information technology to support training, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training

that specifically addresses CBRND staff cells and units having access to dedicated information technology to support training.

⁷ The current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically addresses CBRND staff cells and units having access to dedicated

information technology to support training.

⁸ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the training, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically addresses the joint force

CBRND readiness.

⁹ Limited. Any COCOM staff has CBRND specialists/staffs trained to perform CBRND tasks, but there are few JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically addresses the

CBRND specialists/staff task on joint force CBRND readiness.

¹⁰ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the ability to train forces/staffs of other nations, but there are few training events that specifically address training forces/staffs of other nations

for anticipated CBRND operations. Political constraints inhibit training forces/staffs of other nations on CBRN operations.

¹¹ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the tools to conduct training and rehearsals, but there are limited JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically addresses joint force

CBRND readiness.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

¹² Limited. Any COCOM staff has access to digital information repository, but the units must know how to access it, through the Global Information Grid (GIG). There are limited

JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically addresses accessing the digital information repository.

¹³ Limited. Any COCOM staff has access to digital information repository, but the units must know how to access it, through the GIG. There are limited JTTPs and familiarization

training that specifically addresses accessing the digital information repository.

14 DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas (for all measures in this row) as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation. Joint TTPs,

training and exercises, and education will all improve.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.4.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.4.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary.

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Limited JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically address joint

CBRND readiness.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop JTTP on joint CBRN readiness requirements to

meet the Joint Task Force/Joint Operations Area CBRN situation. JTTP must address

processes to evaluate and assess joint CBRND capability, tasks, systems, and concepts (both

current and projected, under realistic conditions). JTTP must also address procedures to

evaluate and assess CBRND specialists/staff in major units and headquarters. Training:

Develop joint training on joint CBRN readiness requirements to meet the theater CBRN

situation. Leadership: Expand joint leadership education course(s) on the joint CBRN

readiness requirements to meet the theater CBRN situation.

2. Deficiency: There are few exercises that specifically address CBRND operations with

coalition partners or the full spectrum of CBRN/TIM conditions.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop exercises that specifically address CBRND

operations with coalition partners and introduce the full spectrum of CBRN/TIM conditions.

7.4.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.5

Task STSHA 5: Coordinate theater CBRND information systems and processes

7.5.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.5.1.1

Definition

To ensure that theater CBRND information systems and processes allow joint forces to

effectively conduct operations in a CBRN/TIM environment. Establishes theater standards,

common operating procedures, and formats for plotting and predicting CBRN/TIM hazards,

along with alarm, warning, and reporting of the hazards. Establishes standards and procedures

for displaying CBRN/TIM hazard information via the theater COP. Includes maintaining theater

shared awareness of the current and projected CBRN/TIM threat and situation. Includes

establishing an interoperable CBRND Integrated Detection Network (IDN) to detect,

characterize, and warn of CBRN/TIM hazards. Ensures the smooth integration and rapid

dissemination of CBRND information across the GIG. Ensures that planners and staffs possess

the appropriate tools to collaboratively plan, assess, and manage CBRND processes. This task

includes access to automated collaborative workspace tools that are integrated/interoperable with

existing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

7.5.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 2.2.1, ST 2.2.3, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.5, ST 5.1, ST 5.1.1, ST 5.1.3, ST 5.1.4, ST 5.1.6, ST

5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.1.1, ST 5.3.1.2, ST 5.3.1.3, ST 6, ST 6.1.6, ST 6.2, ST 6.2.1, ST 6.2.2, ST

7.1.1, ST 7.5, ST 8.1.4, ST 8.2, ST 8.2.3, ST 9, ST 9.3, ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint

Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning

Guidance, Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations, An Operational Concept for

Biological Defense, DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, DODI 8500.2.

7.5.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 7

7.5.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

7.5.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 5

7.5.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Immediate, delayed, or potential long-term atmospheric weapons effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

3. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

4. Few modern military simulation systems. (C2.2.5.5)

5. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

6. Partial Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

7. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

8. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

9. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

10. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

11. Little or no intelligence dissemination and receipt. (C2.4.7)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Limited international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

3. Poor information management. (C3.3.7.4)

7.5.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.5.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.5-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task. The COCOM HQ was assessed in light of current limited staff use

of JWARN and the anticipated fielding IOC of the Joint Effects Model (JEM) Block I in FY 06

and the IOC of the JOEF Block I, Increment I in FY2008. JOEF will provide a significant

CBRN-adaptive planning capability. The JEM will provide a single, validated capability to

predict and track CBRN and TIM events and effects. The JOEF will provide an operational

requirements modeling and simulation system which accurately predicts CBRN effects on

personnel, equipment, and operations.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The COCOM HQ was assessed in light of fielding of Block I of the JEM and JOEF. Since

JEM/JOEF IOC will not be met until FY2006/FY2008, respectively, all standards were assessed

as “yellow.” JWARN provides limited capability within the theater.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The COCOM will benefit from JEM and JOEF Block I, which will be IOC for the near/mid

term. All near/mid-term measures will be assessed as “green” if the IOC is met.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

JOEF will provide the COCOM with enhanced capabilities and algorithms as block II/III are

IOC in FY2010.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.5-1. STSHA 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM Staff

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

Current Overall Capability

Y¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

Y¹⁴

Y¹⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁶

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

Hazards effects models and tools are adequate and available at all appropriate levels for assessment and decision

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

making.

Theater is adequately covered by the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Sensors managed at all echelons are networked to the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Sufficient doctrine and TTPs exist for effective IDN operation.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint forces are adequately trained to effectively operate the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All operation centers are networked to IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

IDN successfully tracks and monitors the hazard.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means exist to disseminate routine, essential and critical CBRN/TIM threat intelligence rapidly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means exist to compile and display information on CBRN/TIM events that occurs throughout the theater.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Means exist to present information on the operational impact of a CBRN/TIM event.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Coalition and joint CBRND IDN provide automated warning and reporting.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

CBRND information is easily disseminated onto the GIG.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M13

CBRND data and information formats are interoperable across the coalition and interagency.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M14

Required participants are able to exchange information through planning, assessment and management tools.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M15

CBRND information is processed using existing C4ISR assets.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater to make assessment and decision making based on the hazards effects, but JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not

be IOC until FY2008.

² Limited. JWARN provides no capability, JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

³ Limited. JWARN provides no capability, JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

⁴ Limited. Doctrine and TTP are being developed as the different modules and blocks are being fielded.

⁵ Limited. Training is being conducted (new equipment training) and developed as the different modules and blocks are being fielded.

⁶ Limited. JWARN provides no capability, JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

⁷ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and can be used to basically track and monitor the hazard, but JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until

FY2008.

⁸ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and can disseminate routine, essential and critical CBRN threat intelligence rapidly, but JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and

JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

⁹ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and can compile and display information on CBRN events that occurs throughout the theater, but JEM will not be IOC until

FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

¹⁰ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater to basically present information on the operational impact of a CBRN event, but JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF

will not be IOC until FY2008.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

¹¹ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and can provide automated warning and reporting to the Coalition and joint forces, but JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and

JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

¹² Limited. JWARN is available within the theater but interfaces with only the GCCS, manually. JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

¹³ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and allows CBRND data and information formats to be interoperable across the coalition and interagency environment but is

labor-intensive. JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

¹⁴ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and is able to exchange information manually through planning, assessment and management tools. JEM will not be IOC until

FY2006, and JOEF will not be IOC until FY2008.

¹⁵ Limited. JWARN is available within the theater and CBRND information is manually processed using existing C4ISR assets. JEM will not be IOC until FY2006, and JOEF will

not be IOC until FY2008.

¹⁶ All near/mid-term measures will improve dramatically with the IOC of JEM Block I in FY2006 and the IOC of JOEF Block I, Increment I in FY2008.

¹⁷ All far-term measures will improve even more with JOEF Block II/III IOC in FY2010.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.5.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.5.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: JWARN is available but is currently limited to manual input and retrieval.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JWARN doctrine (TTPs) will need to be developed and

updated as each module is fielded. Training: JWARN training will need to be developed and

updated as each module is fielded. Exercises and experiments could provide valuable insight

and feedback on JWARN capabilities. Leadership: JWARN leadership education will need

to be developed and updated as each module is fielded.

7.5.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.6

Task STSHA 6: Provide theater CBRND strategy, plans, and policy

7.6.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.6.1.1

Definition

To provide theater strategy, plans, and policy providing goals and end states for CBRND

capabilities. Includes joint, multiagency, and international considerations. This task is geared to

enabling the national strategies. Includes providing strategic theater guidance for restoration and

elimination operations. Considers all Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors. Staff action in

deliberate and crisis planning modes is supported. Includes providing strategic guidance for

theater restoration and elimination operations.

7.6.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 1.3.4, ST 1.3.7, ST 2.2.1, ST 2.2.3, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.4.1.2, ST 4.2.4, ST 5, ST

5.1, ST 5.1.1, ST 5.1.2, ST 5.1.3, ST 5.1.4, ST 5.1.6, ST 5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.1.3, ST 5.3.3, ST

5.4.1, ST 5.4.3, ST 6, ST 6.1.6, ST 6.2, ST 6.2.1, ST 7.1.1, ST 8.1.4, ST 8.2, ST 8.3.2, ST 9, ST 9.3,

ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A

Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance, Combatant Commander’s Planning

Guide for WMD Elimination Operations.

7.6.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 8

7.6.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 2, STSHA 3, STSHA 4, STSHA 7, STSHA 8, STSHA 9,

STSHA 10, STSHA 11, STSHLD 5, STSHLD 6, STSUST 1, STSUST 2,

STSUST 3, STSUST 4, STSUST 5, STSUST 6, STSUST 14

7.6.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 6

7.6.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

5. Poor Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

6. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

7. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

Civil. N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.6.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.6.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.6-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Any COCOM HQ has a team of operational planners and information command and control

specialists to include a CBRN staff cell. This team of experts forms the backbone of the theater

command structure. Restoration and interdiction/elimination operations are concepts that

planning staffs will continue to mature given specific threats within their respective AORs and

therefore could not be rated fully capable. The Military Decision-Making Process is a formal

concept that is universally accepted, and therefore plans and planning guidance should

incorporate considerations for all eventualities. However, as recent operations have shown,

CBRND-specific considerations had shortfalls. No specific means is available at this time to

identify and track CBRND resources or contaminated items that are required to be redirected,

removed, or disposed of. Institutional training that is focused on planning for restoration

operations and CBRN consequence management is limited. Therefore, the measures concerning

CBRND plans and planning guidance were rated as “yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF should improve in

all deficient areas (for all measures in this row) as a result of initiatives that use data resulting

from focused experimentation. Joint TTPs, training and exercises, and education will all

improve, raising the far-term forecast to “green.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.6-1. STSHA 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM Staff

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹¹

FAA Measure

Scale

Means exist to formulate CBRND planning guidance.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Plans address all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain issues.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Doctrine and TTPs are sufficient for effective CBRND planning.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Standing plans are adaptable to dynamically changing CBRND situations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for restoration

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations.

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for elimination

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations.

Joint, multiagency, and international considerations are included.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means are established to identify and track CBRND resources or contaminated items that are required to be redirected,

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

removed, or disposed of.

¹ Limited. Institutional training for planning staffs is available. Institutional training that is focused on planning for restoration operations and CBRN consequence management is

limited.

² Limited. Any COCOM staff has the ability to formulate planning guidance, but there are few JTTPs and education and training that specifically address formulating CBRND

planning guidance.

³ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the training and experience to plan operations, but there are few JTTPs and education and training that specifically address CBRND operations.

⁴ Limited. Any COCOM staff has the ability to develop plans, but there are few JTTPs that specifically address the process to select all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain

issues.

⁵ Limited. There are doctrine and JTTPs that specifically address theater CBRND planning, but given the broad range of CBRN/TIM threats worldwide, each COCOM still needs

to develop its own TTPs for CBRN planning.

⁶ Yes. Standing plans are adaptable to dynamically changing CBRN situations.

⁷ Limited. Any COCOM operational and analytical/planning staff has the training and experience to effectively plan, but there are few JTTPs and courses that specifically address

restoration operations.

⁸ Limited. Any COCOM operational and analytical/planning staff has the training and experience to effectively plan, but there are few JTTPs and courses that specifically address

interdiction/elimination operations.

⁹ Limited. Joint, multiagency, and international considerations are infrequently included in plans at this time.

¹⁰ Limited. No specific means is available at this time to identify and track CBRND resources or contaminated items that are required to be redirected, removed, or disposed of.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas (for all measures in this row) as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation. Joint TTPs, training

and exercises, and education will all improve.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.6.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.6.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Few JTTPs specifically address formulating CBRND planning guidance.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop joint doctrine on formulating CBRND planning

guidance for the theater. Training: Expand joint training on formulating CBRND plans and

policy for the theater.

Deficiency: Few JTTPs specifically address CBRND operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop joint doctrine on planning CBRND restoration

and interdiction/elimination operations for the theater. Training: Develop joint training on

planning CBRND restoration and interdiction/elimination operations for the theater.

Leadership: Develop joint leader education course(s) on CBRND restoration and elimination

operations for the theater.

Deficiency: Few JTTPs specifically address the process to select all pertinent Sense, Shape,

Shield, and Sustain issues and incorporate them into plans.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop joint doctrine on the process to select and

incorporate into plans all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain issues. Training:

Develop joint training on the process to select all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain

issues. Leadership: Develop joint educations course(s) on the process to select all pertinent

Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain issues.

Deficiency: Given the broad range of CBRN/TIM threats worldwide, each COCOM still

needs to develop its own TTPs for CBRN planning.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Each COCOM HQ must develop procedures to

incorporate theater-specific CBRN/TIM threats into plans and policy.

Deficiency: Joint, multiagency, and international considerations are seldom included in plans

at this time.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Include joint, multiagency, and international

considerations into all theater plans and policy.

Deficiency: No specific means is available at this time to identify and track CBRND

resources or contaminated items that are required to be redirected, removed, or disposed of.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop specific TTPs or means to identify and track

CBRND resources or contaminated items that are required to be redirected, removed, or

disposed of.

7.6.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary. N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.7

Task STSHA 7: Coordinate CBRND aspects of theater medical operations

7.7.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.7.1.1

Definition

To coordinate CBRND aspects of theater medical operations. Sets standards for personnel health

and fitness required for potential exposure to CBRN/TIM conditions (e.g., immuno-competency,

lung capacity, cholinesterase levels). Provides theater guidance for the conduct of medical

CBRND health assessments ensuring compliance with nationally established threshold criteria

for medical CBRND health assessments. Includes the coordination of medical surveillance

throughout the theater for indications of CBRN/TIM attack or release. Also includes pre- and

post-deployment medical evaluation to determine exposure to CBRN/TIM agents. Includes

developing medical courses of action for inclusion in theater planning. Includes all aspects of

CBRND medical logistics.

7.7.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.4.1.1, ST 2.4.1.2, ST 4.2.6, ST 5, ST 5.1.1, ST 5.1.2, ST 5.1.3, ST

5.1.4, ST 5.1.6, ST 5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.4.1, ST 5.4.3, ST 6, ST 6.2, ST 7.1.1, ST 8.1.4, ST 8.2.3, ST

8.3.2, ST 9.3, ST 9.4, ST 9.5, ST 9.6), Transformation Planning Guidance, Protection Joint

Functional Concept.

7.7.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 9

7.7.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 2, STSHA 3, STSHA 6, STSHA 8, STSHLD 3

7.7.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 7

7.7.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. No or outline mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

4. Poor personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

5. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

7. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Limited international organzation support. (C3.1.2.5)

3. High health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

4. Insignificant science and technology. (C3.3.7)

7.7.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.7.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.7-1 discusses the only capability to coordinate CBRND aspects of theater medical

operations to perform the task to the designated standard.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Medical screening is adequate and appropriate for this capability. Automated disease outbreak

tracking systems are generally available at the strategic national level and therefore, the theater-

level medical health care providers need a reachback capability. Personnel and record screening

are assessed as adequate. Procedures to isolate/quarantine casualties are assessed as limited

because the caveat included host nation individuals, a task outside the realm of the COCOM HQ.

Health risk assessment for TIM hazards are limited because a broad analysis of chemical and

toxic material production/storing capabilities has not been accomplished globally. The task

concerning units that were potentially or actually exposed to CBRN/TIM was rated limited

because a real-time/near-real-time geospatial understanding of units on the battlefield has not

been realized. The overall current assessment is on the low side of “yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

JEM and JOEF are projected to be fielded in the near/mid-term future. JOEF will support real-

time decision making that will allow the commander to assess and react to actual and potential

impacts on the warfighting mission due to NBC hazards, logistical concerns, medical support

needs (e.g. casualty estimation, troop exposures, casualty care and treatment, etc.) and

deployment of NBC defense equipment. The project overall near/mid-term capability is “green.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in the foreseeable future. The project overall far-term capability is “green.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.7-1. STSHA 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM Medical Staff/Unit

M10

M11

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

G⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

G¹²

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

G¹³

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Personnel are screened for deployment eligibility.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical records are assessed for medical indicators.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Standards for personnel health and fitness are effective for potential CBRN/TIM environments.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Casualties (US, host nation, and third country nationals), both human and MWA, restricted by medical/veterinary

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

isolation/quarantine, are identified.

A theater-wide system for tracking the status of CBRND medical information exists.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater medical threats are identified and appropriate counter-measures are instituted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND health risk assessment estimate is available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Units, potentially or actually exposed/contaminated by CBRN/TIM or ROTA event, are identified and tracked.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND medical courses of action are integrated into theater planning.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Logistics requirements and deficiencies are identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Non-DoD sources are accessed for information.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. There is limited JTTPs to specifically address this task.

² Yes. Personnel are screened before deployment.

³ Yes. Medical staffs can sufficiently assess records.

⁴ DoD-wide standards for general military personnel health and fitness are well documented and sustained. However, medical linkage to health criteria for CBRN should be

developed. Drawing of baseline cholinesterase levels needs to be standardized across the services.

⁵ Limited. Most theater medical/veterinary personnel are proficient at quarantine protocol. However, coordination across the joint services medical community (as well as host

nations/coalition partners) for identifying, screening, isolating, and quarantining infected personnel should be improved, to include the use of automated disease-outbreak tracking

systems. These systems should be fed into the J-2, CBRN, and preventive medicine experts to provide population indicators of biological weapons use in AOR.

⁶ There is a current limited capability to track the status of CBRND medical information, which will increase with the fielding of JEM and JOEF.

⁷ Yes. National medical assets can identify potential medical threats and institute limited medical countermeasures.

⁸ Limited. TIMs health risk assessment requires a broad analysis of chemical and toxic material production/storing capabilities in the area of operations. A database of global to

local TIM hazards does not currently exist. However, expertise can be made available to the COCOM to conduct a health risk assessment based on regional hazards.

⁹ Limited. Most COCOM staffs can track adequately those units actually or potentially exposed to CBRN/TIM. However, real-time/near-real-time understanding of the

geographical location of units on the battlefield, tied to automated plume prediction technology is necessary.

¹⁰ Unless specifically requested, medical COAs for CBRND are not typically included in theater plans, particularly for TIMs.

¹¹ Logistics requirements are identified for some medical issues, but CBRND medical issues are typically not addressed.

¹² Yes. Reachback capabilities exist for multiple medical need analyses.

¹³ JEM and JOEF increases the capability from partial to full.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.7.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.7.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Coordination across the joint services medical community (as well as host

nations/coalition partners) for identifying, screening, isolating, and quarantining infected

personnel should be improved.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine for early identification for nonstandard and

novel chemical/biological threats needs to be developed. Training: Training on early

identification for nonstandard and novel chemical/biological threats needs to be

implemented.

Deficiency: A global database of local CBRN/TIM hazards does not currently exist.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Real-time/near-real-time understanding of the geographical location of units on

the battlefield tied to automated plume prediction technology does not exist.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: There is limited JTTPs to specifically address coordinating CBRND/TIM

aspects of theater medical operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Improvement in environmental health and safety

training of deploying forces is needed, JTTPs for medical management of CBRND/TIM

casualties needs to be improved or some form of reachback capability needs to be

implemented for health care professionals to conduct adequate assessments, diagnoses, and

treatment.

7.7.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 7.7-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

Table 7.7-2. STSHA 7: IMA Assessment

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Automated database

Development of an automated global database/software

program of CBRN/TIM hazards or development of a theater

medical personnel reachback capability to national medical

and occupational safety and health databases.

Automated tool

Development of automated plume prediction technology tied

to real-time geospatial unit location is necessary.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.8

Task STSHA 8: Coordinate theater CBRND operations

7.8.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.8.1.1

Definition

To provide overall coordination of theater CBRND operations. Preparatory activities are

coordinated with affected joint forces, coalition partners, and appropriate nongovernmental

organizations and indigenous agencies. Preparations are extended to cooperative nonaligned

nations to reduce their CBRN/TIM vulnerability and enhance collaborative operating potential.

CBRND resources provided by other nations and agencies, including resources identified under

agreements and treaties, are integrated into preparations. Multiple CBRN/TIM events could

occur in the same time frame throughout the theater. Rapid and effective response and mitigation

coordination is required. CBRN/TIM event information provided in the COP is used to formulate

appropriate actions and taskings. Includes the allocation and reallocation of CBRND resources to

joint commanders throughout the theater. Includes overall coordination and tracking of theater

restoration and elimination operations.

7.8.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 1.1.2, ST 2.2.1, ST 2.4.1, ST 2.5, ST 5, ST 5.1, ST 5.2, ST 5.2.1, ST 5.3.1, ST 5.4.1, ST

5.4.3, ST 6, ST 7.1.1, ST 8.1, ST 8.2, ST 8.3.2, ST 9), Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN

Operations, Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic

Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance, An Operational Concept for Biological Defense.

7.8.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: SNSHA 10, SNSHA 14

7.8.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 3, STSHA 6, STSHA 7, STSUST 7, STSUST 11,

STSUST 12, STSUST 14

7.8.1.2.3

Supporting Tasks: OPSHA 8, OPSHA 12

7.8.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Immediate, delayed, or potential long-term atmospheric weapons effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements (C2.1.1.2)

2. No or outline mission preparation (C2.1.3)

3. Few modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

4. Few modern military simulation systems. (C2.2.5.5)

5. Poor Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

6. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

7. Limited staff experience. (C2.3.1.3)

8. Negligible deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

Civil

1. Correct interdepartmental/interagnecy relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Negative foreign government support (C3.1.2.3)

3. Uncertain international organization support (C3.1.2.5)

4. Restrictive Presidentail and/or Secretary of Defense decisions. (C3.1.3)

7.8.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.8.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.8-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The COCOM operations directorate (J-3) provides the capability to perform this task. The

current capability is assessed as “yellow,” primarily centering on the JPME (does not mandate a

core minimum set of CBRNE tasks for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels) and

CBRN specialists (do not receive training as strategic planners). Also, allocation adequacy for

CBRN units, personnel, and CBRND systems was considered limited.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Little capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term with the exception that UJTL 5.0 will be fully implemented and

Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors will be consistently considered as a result of training,

education, and experience.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. Little capability improvement is

forecast for the far term with the exception that DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas

as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.8-1. STSHA 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM J-3

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

R⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁹

G¹⁰

Far-Term Overall Capability¹¹

FAA Measure

Scale

CBRND units and personnel are adequately allocated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND systems and equipment are adequately allocated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is considered.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Coordination for CBRND operations includes transport, logistics, communications, and CBRND unit employment

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

considerations.

Doctrine and TTPs for theater CBRND coordination are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater staffs are adequately trained to effectively coordinate CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater exercises or experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of coordination of theater CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No. JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of CBRNE tasks for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels. CBRN specialists do not receive training as strategic

planners.

² Limited. Current apportionment to theaters within force structure constraints is appropriate. However, should interdiction fail, given multiple CBRN capable adversaries,

CBRND units and personnel are insufficient for multitheater CBRN events and subsequent restoration operations.

³ Limited. Current CBRND end-item systems are scarce assets. CBRND resources, especially detection and force protection systems, must be focused on most critical assets.

⁴ No. Not all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is considered. UJTL 5.0 will establish Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain as critical domains. However, UJTL

4.7 does not.

⁵ Limited. COCOM J-3 can establish coordination; however, given the fluid nature of current and future military engagement areas, precise and finite coordination must await

execution orders.

⁶ Limited. Joint Publication 3 Series (Operations) addresses CBRND coordination considerations. However, TIM are not adequately addressed at the Strategic Theater level.

⁷ Limited. Joint Senior Leaders Course provides a limited orientation at the Strategic Theater and Operational levels. However, JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of

CBRNE tasks for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels.

⁸ Limited. Few exercises or experimentation adequately incorporate appropriate CBRN/TIM issues.

⁹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹⁰ UJTL 5.0 will be fully implemented, and Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors will be consistently considered as a result of training, education, and experience.

¹¹ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.8.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.8.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Given multiple CBRN capable adversaries, CBRN units and personnel are

insufficient for multitheater CBRN events and subsequent restoration operations and

individual theater resources will be constrained.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Given the intensive requirements for

reconnaissance and decontamination in a CBRN environment, reevaluate allocation rules for

CBRN units. Personnel: Given the intensive requirements for information management,

reconnaissance and decontamination in a CBRN environment, reevaluate allocation rules for

CBRN personnel.

Deficiency: Lack of automated CBRN/TIM hazard assessment capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Few exercises or experimentation adequately incorporate appropriate

CBRN/TIM issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: UJTL 5.0 should effectively drive consideration of

Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain domains. Training: Incorporate appropriate CBRN/TIM

issues into all theater-level exercises and experimentation.

Deficiency: Given the fluid nature of current and future military engagement areas, precise

and finite CBRN logistical and operational coordination must await execution orders.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop staff planning guidance for predictive CBRN

operations and logistics.

Deficiency: Theater TIM considerations are not adequately addressed at the Strategic

Theater level.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop a process and plan to address TIMs at the

Strategic Theater level.

Deficiency: JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of CBRNE tasks for mastery at the

mid and Senior Service College levels.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Conduct front-end analysis and training needs analysis

to develop and implement appropriate instruction at the intermediate and Senior Service

College level. Once training analysis is complete, resource manpower and time to support

resident instruction and develop distributed training.

7.8.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 7.8-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.9

Task STSHA 9: Develop TEPs for Shape considerations and activities for assigned

theater or designated countries

7.9.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.9.1.1

Definition

To develop Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) that will develop cooperation and trust through a

combination of restoration operations exercises, training, equipment exchange, and other

cooperative efforts. Many nations that would normally support U.S. initiatives may feel

threatened by hostile neighbors or nations that possess CBRN/TIM weapons. To ensure

cooperation and interoperability, the combatant commander develops TEPs for assigned theater

or designated countries. TEPs that include Shape considerations and activities can help to

mitigate reluctance to support the United States. If countries are provided with the means to

achieve situational understanding after CBRN/TIM attacks or if they are assured of U.S.

assistance, they will feel less threatened.

7.9.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 9.4, ST 8.2.1, ST 8.1.2), CJCSM 3113.01A.

7.9.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 11

7.9.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSENS 7, STSHA 6, STSUST 8

7.9.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 9

7.9.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C 2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil

1. Mixed support for political policies. (C3.1)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3.)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.9.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.9.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.9-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The combatant command develops TEPs for Shape considerations and activities for assigned

theater or designated countries. Nothing precludes the COCOM staff from establishing these

TEPs now, but there is very little in the way of existing doctrine or TTPs to help guide them.

Theater engagement planning is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link

COCOM-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. TEPs are

based on defense planning guidance. COCOM-planned and -supported operations and activities

produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and engagement. However, peacetime

military engagement activities must be prioritized to ensure efforts are focused on those that are

of greatest importance, without sacrificing warfighting capability. Because weapons of mass

destruction represent the most significant threat to global security, it is an ideal candidate for

theater engagement planning, which identifies the synchronization of these activities on a

regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from regional COCOM engagement

activities that support national strategic objectives. Nothing precludes a COCOM staff from

initiating theater engagement planning for Shape-related considerations. No guidance has been

provided and no doctrine exists specifically addressing for Shape-related consideration

integration into TEPs. No Shape-related exercises/experimentation have been conducted to

provide feedback on efficacy of TEPs for specific countries. No doctrine has been developed.

Leader education does not address this issue.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System [JCIDS]

analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It is projected that improvements due to

coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will dramatically improve the ability of the COCOM staff

to develop TEPs for Shape-related issues, but the overall status will remain “yellow” due to the

inherent difficulty in initiating and developing new theater engagement planning programs.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. The overall status is likely to

remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.9-1. STSHA 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM HQ

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

G³

Y⁴

R⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

Y⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

Shape TEPs are established for designated countries.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

TEPs are modified after substantive changes are recommended and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

approved.

TEPs meet guidelines of CJCSM 3113.01A.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of TEPs for

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

specific countries.

¹ No doctrine has been developed. Leader education does not address this issue.

² Nothing precludes a COCOM staff from initiating TEP for Shape-related considerations. No guidance has been provided, and

no doctrine exists specifically addressing Shape integration into TEP.

³ Nothing precludes meeting this standard once Shape-related TEPs are established.

⁴ CJCSM 3113.01A does not address integration of Shape-related considerations into TEP.

⁵ No Shape-related exercises/experimentation have been conducted to provide feedback on efficacy of TEPs for specific

countries.

⁶ Doctrine will be developed. Leader education will begin to address this issue.

⁷ Results of experimentation and feedback from insertion in training exercises will begin to provide valuable data on TEP-related

issues.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.9.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.9.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: No guidance has been provided, and no doctrine/TTPs exists specifically

addressing Shape integration into TEPs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish policies, TTPs, and guidelines that include

practical ways to enhance Shape-related consideration integration into TEPs.

2. Deficiency: No Shape exercises/experimentation have been conducted to provide feedback

on efficacy of TEPs for specific countries.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop exercises to include Shape-related

considerations with TEP countries to determine efficacy of policy once established.

3. Deficiency: Leader education does not address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: At the urging of the Joint Forces Staff College

(JFSC), and as part of a Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRND) joint education initiative, a team began to investigate

ways to develop CBRN defense initiatives as part of theater engagement planning. The

subject matter experts at the JFSC felt that in the current global environment, CBRND was

an ideal platform for military engagement, enhancing a common global defense capability

against weapons of mass destruction. The team plans to present these JCIDS tasks to the

JFSC as a foundation for the development of TEP education materials when they are

finalized.

7.9.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.10 Task STSHA 10: Establish theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies,

procedures, and networks

7.10.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.10.1.1

Definition

To link theater active systems (such as Air Defense Radar) with passive detectors (such as

Biological Integrated Detection System [BIDS]) to produce a theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-

detection network. Builds a seamless web from the theater capabilities down to individual

tactical detectors within the theater battlespace to provide a means of detecting both delivery

vehicles and agents.

7.10.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 2.2.2).

7.10.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 12

7.10.1.2.2

Lateral Task: STSHA 6

7.10.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSHA 11

7.10.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

7.10.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.10.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.10-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

While any theater-level staff can develop policies and procedures specific and unique to its

operational circumstances, this task is asking much more. This task is not normally a function of

a theater commander. This capability must be developed and facilitated by Strategic National

assets and passed to the field commander as a vetted operational capability package. Because of

this current deficiency, the capability is assessed as “red.” The capability to incorporate

cooperatively linked detection technologies does not currently exist; therefore, effective

DOTMLPF has not yet been developed.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. In the far term the capability

assessment should improve to “yellow.” A COCOM HQ has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM-

detection policies within the theater. As cooperative linkages between various systems

capabilities are coordinated and established between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS,

phased-array radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors

with Global Positioning System (GPS) linkages and automatic position reporting, individual

detectors networked to centralized data servers, etc.) theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection

policies, procedures, and networks will be established in limited fashion. All supporting and

required DOTMLPF enhancements will be initiated, but it will take years of experimentation and

exercises before full capability is realized.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.10-1. STSHA 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM HQ

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

R³

R⁴

R⁵

G⁶

R⁷

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

Y⁸

FAA Measure

Scale

Theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policy is established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection procedures are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection networks are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policy and procedures have been established with theater allies.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Existing policy and procedures are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Multinational exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of policies and procedures.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. Conceivably, any COCOM HQ could incorporate cooperatively linked detection technologies; however, the capability does not currently exist, therefore, effective

DOTMLPF is irrelevant.

² A COCOM HQ has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM-detection policies within the theater as outlined in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. However, cooperative linkages

between various systems capabilities, although proposed, have not yet been coordinated. Since no linkages currently exist between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS,

phased-array radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors with GPS linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors

networked to centralized data servers, etc.), no theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies are required.

³ Any COCOM HQ CBRN cell has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM-detection procedures within the theater. However, distributed, cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection

capabilities do not currently exist, and theater cooperative CBRN detection procedures are not established.

⁴ Any COCOM HQ communications cell has the ability to establish networks within the theater. However, cooperative linkages between various system capabilities do not

currently exist; therefore, cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection networks need not be established.

⁵ Any COCOM HQ has the ability to establish policies and procedures. However, cooperative linkages between various system capabilities do not exist currently; therefore,

policies and procedures need not be established.

⁶ Any COCOM HQ has the ability to update policies and procedures regularly.

⁷ Since the capability to establish cooperative linkages between various detection technologies does not currently exist, exercises and experiments to provide feedback are not yet

necessary.

⁸ A COCOM HQ has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM-detection policies within the theater. As cooperative linkages between various systems capabilities are coordinated and

established between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors with GPS linkages

and automatic position reporting, individual detectors networked to centralized data servers, etc.) theater cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks will

be established in limited fashion. All supporting and required DOTMLPF enhancements will be initiated, but it will take years of experimentation and exercises before full

capability is realized.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.10.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.10.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Lack of a networked CBRN/TIM-detection capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Since the capability to establish cooperative linkages between various detection

technologies does not currently exist, proposals and concepts must be tested in exercises and

experiments to provide feedback and test hypotheses.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop ideas, proposals, and concepts for

cooperatively linked detection technologies. Training: Before concepts for cooperatively

linked detection technologies can be fully developed and tested, exercises and experiments

will be necessary to refine and test concept hypotheses.

Deficiency: The capability of cooperatively linked detection technologies does not currently

exist; therefore, effective DOTLPF has not been established.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Before cooperatively linked detection technologies reach

IOC, effective doctrine and JTTPs should be developed. Organization: Before cooperatively

linked detection technologies reach IOC, organizational requirements and changes should be

developed and executed. Training: Before cooperatively linked detection technologies reach

IOC, effective training for theater-level staffs should be developed. Leadership: Before

cooperatively linked detection technologies reach IOC, leader education should be developed

and integrated into the Joint Forces Staff College. Personnel: Before cooperatively linked

detection technologies reach IOC, personnel requirements need to be identified. Facilities:

Before cooperatively linked detection technologies reach IOC, facility needs must be

identified.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.10.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 7.10-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel

requirements of the DOTMLPF assessment.

Table 7.10-2. STSHA 10: IMA Assessment

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Networked detection system

Development of cooperative linkages between various

proponent and service detection and sensing technologies is

required. Concepts must first be developed based on

proposed linkages that will provide effective, integrated

CBRN/TIM-detection capabilities. These concepts must be

explored through experimentation and then cooperative

linkages established and tested. The entire package should

be developed as a system. As each Service develops

detection or sensing technologies, they should be analyzed

for inclusion into the CBRN/TIM cooperative detection

network and modifications (if required) be mandated for the

Service systems.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.11 Task STSHA 11: Develop theater policies, standards, and procedures for

determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons

7.11.1

Functional Area Analysis

7.11.1.1

Definition

To develop theater policy, standards, and procedures for verifying compliance with

internationally accepted standards and procedures. Includes standards and procedures to be used

by theater forces for determining first use of CBRN/TIM weapons by a nation-state or

transnational organization and the means by which verification of attack will be confirmed.

7.11.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 9.6, ST 7.1.5, ST 7.2.3, ST 8.2.10).

7.11.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSHA 13

7.11.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: STSHA 6, STSHLD 7

7.11.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

7.11.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C 2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

3. Restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

4. Ambiguous threat. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. Mixed support for political policies. (C3.1)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3.)

7.11.2

Functional Needs Analysis

7.11.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 7.11-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task to the designated

standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

Any COCOM HQ has the basic ability to develop specific theater policies, standards, and

procedures for determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons for its assigned theater or with

designated countries. In many cases national-level policy, standards, and procedures will already

be established and should be observed. However, in those cases where national-level policy,

standards, and procedures do not apply or where theater-specific situations require that they be

augmented, the COCOM staff has the capability. Additionally, the capability to establish

internationally accepted standards and procedures for determining employment of CBRN/TIM

weapons exists now administratively. Mechanisms currently used are NATO working groups

that develop Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) as

well as American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program Quadrapartite working

groups. Theater exercises, even with close and traditional partners, seldom use realistic

CBRN/TIM scenarios or highlight verification exercise objectives. Doctrine and TTPs have not

yet been developed for collaborative verification procedures and for TIM. The capability is rated

on the low side of “green.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. The far-term outlook is “green,”

however, as theater exercises will begin to use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios and highlight

verification exercise objectives. Comprehensive doctrine and TTPs will be developed for

collaborative verification procedures and for TIM. International verification protocol will be

established.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

Table 7.11-1. STSHA 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: COCOM HQ

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

Y⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁵

FAA Measure

Scale

Theater policy and standards for determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons are

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

established.

Existing policy and standards are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of policy and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

standards.

¹ Although basic guidelines exist, more comprehensive doctrine and TTPs needs to be developed for collaborative verification

procedures and for TIM. Every nation has its own national verification protocol.

² Standards and policies have been developed at the national level that can be used by any COCOM. COCOMs have established

policies, standards, and procedures that can be used within the command and with traditional theater allies. When new

international partners join a COCOM-sponsored coalition, they must be integrated into the determination process and provided

with policies, standards, and procedures.

³ Any COCOM staff can update standards and policies as required.

⁴ Theater exercises, even with close and traditional partners, seldom use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios or highlight verification

exercise objectives.

⁵ Theater exercises will begin to use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios and highlight verification exercise objectives. Lessons

learned will provide data for DOTMLPF enhancements.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 7. Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

7.11.3

Functional Solution Analysis

7.11.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Doctrine and TTPs need to be developed for collaborative verification

procedures.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and TTPs for collaborative

verification procedures that work for the international community.

2. Deficiency: There are no theater exercises that provide feedback on the processes employed

for determining employment of CBRN weapons and verification procedures.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Insure development of and participate in theater

exercises that will provide feedback on the processes employed for determining employment

of CBRN weapons.

7.11.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

8.0

Operational Shape

8.1

Task OPSHA 1: Characterize the JOA CBRN/TIM threat and situation

8.2

Task OPSHA 2: Conduct JOA CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis

8.3

Task OPSHA 3: Determine CBRND resources required to meet the JTF/JOA

CBRND situation

8.4

Task OPSHA 4: Ensure JTF or joint force CBRND readiness

8.5

Task OPSHA 5: Coordinate JTF/JOA CBRND information systems and processes

8.6

Task OPSHA 6: Provide JTF/JOA CBRND plans and policy

8.7

Task OPSHA 7: Coordinate CBRND aspects of JOA medical operations

8.8

Task OPSHA 8: Coordinate JTF/JOA CBRND operations

8.9

Task OPSHA 9: Provide Shape country assistance teams to support TEP

8.10

Task OPSHA 10: Provide JOA CBRN/TIM weapons information to the

combatant commander

8.11

Task OPSHA 11: Establish JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection policies,

procedures, and networks

8.12

Task OPSHA 12: Determine operational effects and impacts due to CBRN/TIM

hazards

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

8.0

Operational Shape

8.0.1

Introduction

The Operational (OP) level of war is where campaigns and major operations are planned,

conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of

operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational

objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the

logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical

successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. Twelve Operational Shape (SHA) tasks

were identified in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Functional Area

Analysis (FAA).

This chapter, detailing the Operational Shape (OPSHA) area, restates relevant information from

the CBRND Defense (CBRND) FAA including a description of each of the 12 OPSHA tasks,

derivation of the task, an indication of other linked tasks, and the pertinent conditions. The

Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) section addresses the capability and deficiency analysis, and a

brief description of potential near-term changes. Once all the capabilities are considered, the

assessment concludes with a separate, overarching look at the entire capability spectrum to

identify remaining gaps and/or synergies. The Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) section

addresses possible solutions for the deficiencies identified in the FNA section. These are

categorized into materiel or non-materiel. The non-materiel solutions are addressed first and

reflect one or more of the six areas of DOTLPF: doctrine, organization, training, leadership,

personnel, and facilities. If there is no non-materiel solution to the deficiencies, then materiel

solutions are considered. These encompass broad approaches that are not system-specific. These

potential materiel approaches are addressed and in the Ideas for Materiel Approaches (IMAs)

section. The IMAs provide a possible near or far term resolution to identified deficiencies within

the individual capabilities.

8.0.2

FNA Summary

Table 8.0-1 summarizes the overall current and projected capability to perform the OPSHA tasks

identified in the CBRND FAA. The overall capability to conduct these tasks in the current time

frame is assessed as “red.” Before a CBRN/TIM attack, the joint force commander will need to

be proactive in determining and shaping the Joint Operations Area (JOA) CBRN/toxic industrial

material (TIM) situation. CBRND assets will be required to meet surge demands, and these

demands could potentially outstrip the current logistical philosophy of just-in-time delivery.

During the analysis, a conundrum for the planning staff was noticed. Active defense,

interdiction, and elimination measures applied effectively under the Sense, Shape, and Shield

domains could mitigate or even preclude the requirements for the extreme CBRND logistical and

medical burden imposed under the Sustain domain. However, a failure to apply appropriate

CBRND logistical planning and management factors early in the Shape domain could prove

catastrophic, should more aggressive active defense measures fall short or be precluded by other

restrictive criteria. Any operational-level HQ has a team of operational planners and information

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

command and control specialists to include CBRND subject matter experts. This team of experts

will form the backbone of any joint task force command structure. Restoration and elimination

operations are concepts that planning staffs will continue to develop given specific threats within

their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and therefore could not be rated fully capable.

The Military Decision-Making Process is a formal concept that is universally accepted, and

therefore plans and planning guidance should incorporate considerations for all eventualities.

However, as recent operations have shown, CBRND-specific considerations had shortfalls.

Therefore, the measures concerning CBRND plans and planning guidance were not rated fully

capable. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTPs) and tools to evaluate and assess

CBRND staffs, capabilities, systems, and concepts within an AOR are limited. There are no

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that specifically and comprehensively address the

impact of CBRN/TIM hazards on operational objectives. Forces and staffs of other nations may

not have training, equipment, or experience to effectively conduct CBRND operations. The

organizational structure of a subordinate joint force’s intelligence element is determined by the

Joint Force Commander (JFC) based on the situation and mission. All subordinate joint force

J-2s, however, will at a minimum require a core element of analytical and administrative

capabilities. Most situations will require augmentation of joint force intelligence capabilities

through the deployment and integration of theater intelligence elements into a joint intelligence

support element (JISE). Capabilities of the JISE include order of battle analysis; identification of

adversary centers of gravity (COGs); analysis of adversary command, control, communications,

and computers; targeting support; collection management; and maintenance of a 24-hour watch.

The biggest deficiency from a CBRN/TIM aspect is currency and reliability of intelligence data

and products. There are major deficiencies associated with an operational-level staff’s ability to

coordinate JOA/JTF CBRND information systems and processes required to meet the JTF/JOA

CBRN/TIM situation. As programmed, the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) is a

suite of hardware and software that should, once fully operational, provide adequate capability

from a CBRND Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) standpoint. Until JWARN is fully operationally capable (FOC),

limitations to CBRN information systems and processes include manual data receipt and entry,

limited interface with the Common Operating Picture (COP), restricted information flow into the

Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and limitations to real-time situational

awareness. Anticipated improvements over the near/mid term will raise the projected capability

rating to “yellow.”

Table 8.0-1. Operational Shape Summary FNA Findings

CBRN

Capability

Operational

CBRN Operational Shape Task Title

Shape Task

Near/

Current

Far

Number

Mid

Characterize the JOA CBRN/TIM threat and

OPSHA 1

situation.

•

OPSHA 2

Conduct JOA CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis.

•

Determine CBRND resources required to meet the

OPSHA 3

JTF/JOA CBRND situation.

•

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

OPSHA 4

Ensure JTF or joint force CBRND readiness.

•

Coordinate JTF/JOA CBRND information systems

OPSHA 5

and processes.

•

OPSHA 6

Provide JTF/JOA CBRND plans and policy.

•

Coordinate CBRND aspects of JOA medical

OPSHA 7.

operations.

•

OPSHA 8

Coordinate JTF/JOA CBRND operations.

•

Provide Shape country assistance teams to support

OPSHA 9

TEP.

•

Provide JOA CBRN/TIM weapons information to the

OPSHA 10

combatant commander.

•

Establish JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection

OPSHA 11

policies, procedures, and networks.

•

Determine operational effects and impacts due to

OPSHA 12

CBRN/TIM hazards.

•

OVERALL

•

8.0.3

FSA Summary

The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential doctrine, organization, training,

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF, non-materiel and

materiel) solutions for the capability gaps identified in the FNA section.

8.0.3.1

DOTLPF

The DOTLPF solutions identified in this chapter are associated primarily with training and

doctrinal issues and include the development of JTTPs. DOTMLPF recommendations include

the development of doctrine for active defense, interdiction, and elimination measures.

Development of joint training on determining joint CBRN resources required to meet the

JTF/JOA CBRN situation is suggested, as well as development of joint leadership education

course(s) on determining joint CBRN resources required to meet the JTF/JOA CBRN situation.

It would also be advisable to develop JTTPs that address the following:

• Adjusting the flow of resources based specifically on CBRN conditions.

• Determining adjustment of resources based on joint CBRND considerations.

• Influencing the flow of joint CBRN resources.

• Determining joint CBRN resources required to meet the JTF/JOA CBRN situation.

• Addressing a truly joint CBRND logistics management process.

• Developing JTTPs that address joint analytical tools to assess CBRND logistical demands.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Proposed solutions to deficiencies associated with the J2’s ability to conduct JOA CBRN/TIM

vulnerability analysis and potential DOTMLPF solutions include a need to develop joint

exercise/experiments that portray the JOA TIM threat and situation.

DOTMPLF solutions also suggest the following steps:

•

Develop Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) courses that address JISE functions

and CBRN/TIM threat and vulnerability analysis.

•

Develop doctrine and TTPs for vulnerability assessments that include near- and far-term TIM

hazard effects, mitigation, and remediation.

•

Develop formalized courses which instruct intelligence and CBRN specialists in TIM

vulnerability assessment processes and which include Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards in CBRN

JPME.

•

Develop standardized U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) TIM vulnerability analysis and

risk assessment processes.

•

Develop formal analytical processes to evaluate adversary courses of action (COA)s in

relation to TIM considerations.

•

Develop formal TTPs and JPME courses which address TIM hazards and their impact on

friendly and adversary COA.

•

Deconflict TIM permissible exposure limits between OSHA, deployed military, and host

nation guidelines, and standardize CBRN/TIM COA analysis process.

•

Exercise and capture lessons learned concerning the efficacy of TIM vulnerability analysis

processes.

•

The Office of the Command Surgeon should promulgate TIM health hazard effects,

mitigation techniques, and remediation processes for use by U.S. forces deployed abroad.

•

Review force structure.

•

Within end strength constraints, consider adjusting force structure as a result of lessons

learned from joint exercises/experiments.

•

Develop training support packages that incorporate lessons learned from joint exercises/

experiments.

•

Develop leadership education and JPME course(s) that incorporate lessons learned from

CBRND issues in joint exercises/experiments.

•

Review available data and lessons learned from historical wide area events, to validate

logistical planning factors. Such events could include natural disasters, large TIM releases,

terrorist activity, and testing historically conducted by the United States and the former

Soviet Union.

•

Develop a Joint Master Scenario Events List (JMSEL) and training for joint exercises/

experiments that address coordination of CBRND operations within a JOA.

•

Develop courses and JTTPs that address CBRND coordination within the JOA.

•

Actively pursue a joint lessons learned program that captures CBRND lessons from

exercises/experiments and real-world events.

•

Incorporate all lessons into the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS).

For Official Use Only

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 8