CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

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Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

⁶ Not relevant to this task (N/A).

⁷ Immediately identifies all detected hazards (detection requires up to 15 minutes) and thus provides complete identify-to-treat capability.

⁸ Does not collect a sample for future analysis.

⁹ Requires samples to be confirmed off site in laboratory.

¹⁰ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task, at least for bacillus bacteria (specifically anthrax). Procedures for other agents are probably similar.

¹¹ Ostensibly all BWAs can be detected by ELISA. ELISA’s sensitivity is 10⁵-10⁶ CFU/mL (B. anthracis); 10-100 PFU/mL of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus; and 625

pg/mL of Staphyloccoccal Enterotoxin B (aerosol) and greater than 5 ng/mL of ricin.

¹² Some varieties of ELISA can absolutely quantify the antigen or antibody concentration.

¹³ Theoretically, any agent (i.e., antigen or antibody) for which an ELISA has been designed can be detected through this method; however, only one particular pathogen or toxin

antigen or antibody can be tested per ELISA model.

¹⁴ A particular TIB pathogen or toxin is identified if it is detected, since ELISA is highly specific and detects a particular agent.

¹⁵ Typically requires 1-2 hours (following sample collection and preparation) for detection, identification, and if applicable, quantification, primarily because of incubation time.

¹⁶ Not designed for sample collection for future analysis.

¹⁷ RAPID may be able to detect all pathogens; PCR does not detect toxins, though the toxic material may be contaminated with source genetic material (In this assessment, it is

assumed that this is not the case). Standard PCR has a sensitivity of 10-100 CFU/mL bacteria (B. anthracis); and 15 fg-1 pg or 100-1 million copies of the complementary DNA

for viruses.

¹⁸ RAPID, through RT-PCR, may provide generic quantification.

¹⁹ Theoretically, any TIB pathogen can be detected with appropriate reagents; toxins cannot be detected unless contaminated with source genetic material.

²⁰ All detected TIBs are identified.

²¹ Detects and identifies within 30 minutes following sample preparation, but requires several hours for sample preparation.

²² Block I will detect Anthrax; Brucella; Ebola VHF virus; Marburg VHF virus; Viral Encephalitis viruses (VEE/WWW/EEE); Glanders; Meliodosis; Plague; Q Fever; Smallpox;

and Tularemia (and Typhus) as a threshold requirement; and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic virus; Dengue fever; Hantaviruses; and Rift Valley Fever Virus (and Cholera,

Cryptosporidium; E. col; Influenza; Salmonella; and Shigella) as an objective; Block II will add toxins Botulinum, microcystins, ricin, SEB, and T-2 Mycotoxins.

²³ Will identify all detected agents.

²⁴ Will quantify the concentration in the sample.

²⁵ Will not detect any TIBs.

²⁶ Will detect and identify within 40 minutes (25-minute objective) for Blocks I and II following sample preparation.

²⁷ Will immediately identify all detected hazards (detection will require 25-40 minutes) and thus will provide complete identify-to-treat capability.

²⁸ Will provide physical sample collection capability for future analysis.

²⁹ Will maintain integrity of physical sample.

³⁰ Will require samples to be confirmed off site at laboratory.

³¹ Future system(s). Thus, DOTLPF is also future and cannot be evaluated.

³² Will detect all agents listed in DIA document “Threat Environment Projection: Chemical and Biological Warfare 2000-2025” (objective).

³³ Will identify detected BWAs and TIBs.

³⁴ Will absolutely quantify hazard.

³⁵ Will detect all TIBs of interest as an objective.

³⁶ Will detect within 10 minutes.

³⁷ Will immediately identify all detected hazards (detection will require up to 10 minutes) and thus will provide complete identify-to-treat capability.

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5.8.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.8.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of TIB detection capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

2. Deficiency: Lack of real-time or near-real time detection, identification, and quantification

capability for BWAs in water.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

3. Deficiency: Lack of integrated sample collection, detection, identification, and quantification

capability for BWAs in water.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

4. Deficiency: Lack of detector that can also take samples for future analysis capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5. Deficiency: Validation of findings requires laboratory testing.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Modify doctrine to permit validation by a reliable on-

site detection/identification capability (e.g., portable PCR) as confirmatory

detection/identification is ultimately dependent upon doctrine, not materiel capabilities.

Training (partial): Train personnel in analytical techniques to ensure accuracy.

5.8.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 5.8-2 identifies seven ideas for materiel approaches that, if developed, may reduce or

eliminate the deficiencies associated with detecting biological hazards in water. Advances in MS,

electromagnetic spectroscopy, Raman spectroscopy, or orthogonal technologies may be able to

address all identified deficiencies.

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Table 5.8-2. TASENS 8: IMA Assessment

TASENS 8: Sense water for biological hazards

Ideas for Materiel

Approaches

(IMA)

Identified Gaps

Lack of real-time or near-real-time detection, identification, and

X⁶

X⁷

quantification capability for sampled BWAs.⁵

Lack of current detection, identification, and quantification capability

for TIBs in water.⁸

Lack of integrated sample collection, detection, identification, and

quantification capability for BWAs in water.

Lack of detector that also takes samples for future analysis capability.

¹ Includes GC/MS, LC/MS.

² Includes Immunological/SAW technology

³ Includes PCR and RT-PCR amplification, DNA microchip technology, SAW technology

⁴ Includes nucleic acid/immunoassay technologies (e.g., PCR and immunological techniques), electrochemiluminescence/equilibrium immunoassay, Fluorescence correlation

spectroscopy/PCR.

⁵ Reducing the sample preparation (if applicable) and response time of JCBAWM and JBAIDS is a potential solution.

⁶ Possibly through rapid separation processes (e.g., capillary zone electrophoresis).

⁷ Near real-time detection, identification, and quantification of pathogens (and possibly toxins as well) is feasible. NATIBO, Biological Detection System Technologies Technology

and Industrial Base Study, February 2001, pp. 4-12 to 4-13; Harper, James, “Automated CANARY Testbed for Fast Bioaerosol Identification,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Presented

at 2004 Biological-Chemical Detection Symposium, Washington, D.C.

⁸ JCBAWM is expected to detect, identify, and quantify all TIBs in water and thus eliminate capability gap.

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5.9

Task TASENS 9: Sense water for radiological hazards

5.9.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.9.1.1

Definition

To sense the presence of radiological hazards in water (potable and nonpotable). Includes the

functions of detection, identification, and quantification of the hazard. Also includes collection

of samples for further analysis, along with early-warning surveillance of unforeseen radiological

releases and monitoring of known radiological locations, as well as the requirement to determine

the extent and physical properties of radiological contamination. Encompasses both “detect to

warn” and “detect to treat” situations to enable appropriate protective measures. Must occur in-

situ to assist with raw water site selection and identification of soldier contact hazards, in-line

post ROWPU and permanent water distribution systems, and on-demand to spot-check potable

water distribution sites and shower points.

5.9.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.9.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSENS 1, OPSENS 4, OPSENS 7

5.9.1.2.2

Lateral Task: TASHA 14

5.9.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.9.1.3

Conditions

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Inaccessible subsurface water. (C1.1.2.3)

2. High sea state. (C1.2.1.3)

3. High shipping presence. (C1.2.6)

4. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

5. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

6. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1)

7. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

8. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

9. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

10. Moderate nuclear radiation hazards. (C1.3.3.1.2)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

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3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4),

5. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. Limited or negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

3. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

4. TIR materials present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

5.9.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.9.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.9-1 presents individual and overall current, near/mid-term, and far-term capabilities to

perform the task to the designated standards. There are 10 current capabilities used to accomplish

this task. The capabilities include a range of portable RADIAC devices and dosimeters.

Current Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Most current RADIACs detect and

identify beta radiation and detect, identify, and quantify gamma radiation. All RADIACS

perform their functions in real time (though the level of confidence increases with increased

sampling time) and thus provide a complete detect-to-warn capability. Many also automatically

calculate the cumulative dose.

There is no single capability that can perform the task to all of the designated standards.

RADIACs detect and quantify only the radiation, not the isotope. Furthermore, all RADIACs and

dosimeters must be exposed to radiation to detect it. Current overall task deficiencies include the

lack of detection capability for low-level radiological contamination in water, detection

capability for alpha-emitting contaminants in water¹, radioisotope identification capabilities,

monitors that can detect all radiation types, and detectors that take samples for future analysis².

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

No changes in capability are projected in the near/mid term for this task, so the overall projected

near/mid-term capability will remain “yellow.”

¹ Water shields alpha radiation, and thus only alpha-emitting contaminants at the water surface are likely to be

detected.

² Only the M34A1 sampling kit, which is not a detector, is capable of collecting and maintaining a radiological

sample.

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Table 5.9-1. TASENS 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

Current - Near/Mid - Far

ADM-300

8¹

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

10⁸

10⁹

AN/PDQ-1 MFR¹⁰

4¹¹

5²

5¹²

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

Unk

10¹³

AN/PDR-27

4¹¹

5²

5¹²

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

7¹³

10¹³

AN/PDR-43

4¹¹

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

7¹³

10¹³

AN/PDR-56

2¹⁴

N/A¹⁵

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10¹⁶

5⁷

7¹³

10¹³

AN/PDR-63

4¹¹

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

7¹³

10¹³

AN/PDR-65

2¹⁷

N/A¹⁵

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10¹⁶

5⁷

10¹⁸

10¹³

AN/PDR-77

8¹⁹

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

7¹³

10¹³

AN/UDR-13

4²⁰

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

10¹⁷

10¹³

AN/VDR-2

4¹¹

5²

10³

10⁴

0⁵

10⁶

5⁷

10¹⁷

10¹³

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All radiological hazards (including

Number of radiation types (i.e., alpha, beta, gamma, neutron,

10: All five types

TIR material) can be detected using

and x-radiation) detected. Note: Fielded technologies/equipment

8: Four types

fielded technologies/equipment?

detect radiological hazards by detecting the radiation emitted

6: Three types

from these hazards.

4: Two types

2: Single type

TIR material includes DU, a common battlefield hazard resulting

0: No radiological hazards detected

from certain types of ammunition and damaged armor.

All radiological hazards (including

Ability to identify type of radiation detected or the radioisotope

10: Identifies radioisotope emitting radiation

TIR material) can be identified using

emitting the radiation. Note: Fielded technologies/equipment

5: Identifies type of radiation detected

fielded technologies/equipment?

that identify radioisotope also identify the type(s) of radiation

0: No identification capability

detected.

All radiological hazards (including

Ability to quantify activity of radiological material (i.e., Cu or

10: Absolute quantification

TIR material) can be quantified

Bq), or the exposure (i.e., Roentgen or Coulomb/kg) or dose rate

5: Generic quantification (or absolute

using fielded

(rad, rem, Gy, or Sv) from emitted radiation.

quantification of one radiation type and no

technologies/equipment?

quantification of another type)

0: No quantification capability

Time to detect radiological hazard?

Time period from exposure to radiation to analysis output.

10: Near-real time

0: Not near-real time

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

Distance between radiological

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

hazard and detector for accurate

detection?

Radiological hazards are detected in

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

time to warn forces and take

appropriate protective measures?

Radiological hazards are identified

A complete capability requires both near-real-time identification

10: Complete capability (near-real-time

in time to treat forces?

of the emitted radiation type(s) and radioisotope. Identification

identification of radioisotope and emitted

of the emitted radiation type(s) enables appropriate medical

radiation type[s])

response to radiation exposure and identification of the

5: Partial capability (near-real-time

radioisotope determines to appropriate medical course of action

identification of emitted radiation type[s])

to radiological material internalization.

0: No capability (no identification capability)

Cumulative dose can be determined

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

and presented using data from

currently fielded sensors/equipment?

There is effective DOTLPF in place

Refers to non-materiel elements associated with the execution of

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for the

to conduct task?

a task with the system.

task to be performed with this system without

limitations that cause significant impact upon

operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for the

task to be performed with this system are

addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist

for the task to be performed with this system

¹ Detects most radiation types (alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation) emitted from radiological materials.

² Identifies type of radiation, but not radioisotope.

³ Absolutely quantifies radiation level.

⁴ Real-time detection. Level of confidence increases with increased sampling time and radiation levels.

⁵ Requires exposure to emitted radiation to detect hazard.

⁶ Provides complete detect-to-warn capability since detects and identifies radiation in real time.

⁷ Provides partial identify-to-treat capability since immediately identifies detected radiation type, but not the radioisotope.

⁸ Automatically calculate cumulative dose since system capable of dose and dose rate alarms across entire measurement range; also predictive algorithm provides estimate of time

in field before alarm; unknown whether cumulative dose is directly outputted.

⁹ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task with this system.

¹⁰ In combination with OA-9449/PDQ probe. The MFR alone detects gamma radiation; with the probe, it measures gamma radiation and detects beta radiation.

¹¹ Detects beta/gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials.

¹² Absolutely quantifies gamma radiation level; detects, but does not quantify, beta radiation.

¹³ Absolutely quantifies radiation level and provides monitoring capability, thus provides moderate capability to determine cumulative dose.

¹⁴ Detects alpha radiation emitted from radiological materials (particularly plutonium).

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5.9.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.9.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of detection capability for low-level radiological contamination in water.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

2. Deficiency: Lack of monitors that can detect most or all types of radiation.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on ADM-300.

3. Deficiency: Lack of detection capability for alpha-emitting contaminants in water.¹

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

4. Deficiency: Lack of radioisotope identification capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5. Deficiency: Lack of detector that can also take samples for future analysis capability.²

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5.9.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 5.9-2 identifies three ideas for materiel approaches that, if developed, may reduce or

eliminate the deficiencies associated with detecting radiological hazards in water. Advances in

scintillation or semiconductor radiation detection technologies may be able to address all

identified deficiencies.

¹ Water shields alpha radiation, and thus only alpha-emitting contaminants at the water surface are likely to be

detected.

² Only the M34A1 sampling kit, which is not a detector, is capable of collecting and maintaining a radiological

sample.

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Table 5.9-2. TASENS 9: IMA Assessment

TASENS 9: Sense water for radiological hazards¹

Ideas for Material

Approaches

(IMA)

Identified Gaps

Lack of detection capability for low-level radiological contamination in water.

Lack of detection capability for alpha-emitting contaminants in water.⁵

Lack of monitors that can detect all types of radiation.⁶

Lack of radioisotope identification capabilities.⁷

Lack of detector that also takes samples for future analysis.⁸

¹ http://hps.org/publicinformation/ate/q534.html

² Includes Geiger-Mueller detectors, proportional gas detectors, and ionization chambers.

³ Includes ZnS(Ag), anthracene, trans-stilbene, para-terphenyl, phenyl oxazole, NaI(Tl), CsI(Tl), bismuth germinate (Bi₄Ge₃O₁₂), barium fluoride (BaF₂)-based detectors.

⁴ Includes germanium, silicon, cadmium telluride (CdTe), and mercuric iodide (HgI₂)-based detectors.

⁵ Distributing more ADM-300 and AN/PDR-77 is a potential solution.

⁶ Distributing more ADM-300 is a potential solution.

⁷ Distributing gamma and/or alpha scintillation detectors with radioisotope identification capabilities is a potential solution.

⁸ All point detection IMAs could be designed to eliminate this capability gap. The collection equipment would be better maintained as an independent capability. The solution

could involve a module connected to the detector that notifies the operator to take samples or triggers an automated process to begin sampling.

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5.10

Task TASENS 10: Sense the presence of chemical hazards on humans, MWAs and

remains

5.10.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.10.1.1

Definition

To sense the presence or absence of chemical hazards (includes CWAs and TICs) on humans,

MWAs, and remains. Includes the external detection of contamination prior to the manifestation

of symptoms. Diagnosis of internal exposure is not part of this task as it is addressed in a

separate Sustain task. Includes the functions of detection, identification, and quantification of the

hazard. Also includes the requirement to determine the extent and physical properties of

contamination, monitoring of known hazard locations, and collection of samples for further

analysis. Encompasses “detect to warn” and “detect to treat” situations. The evaluation

encompasses all chemical hazards of military and medical importance.

5.10.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.10.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSENS 1, OPSENS 4, OPSENS 7

5.10.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASHA 11, TASHA 13

5.10.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.10.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Tropical, arctic, and arid climates. (C1.3.1)

2. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

3. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

4. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1

5. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

6. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

7. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

8. Chemical effects. (C1.3.3.2)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

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5. Poor personnel morale. (C2.2.4.4)

6. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

7. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

8. Limited or no host nation support. (C2.8.5)

9. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

Civil

High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

Negligible language translators. (C3.2.1.2)

Significant refugee care responsibility. (C3.3.2.3)

TICs present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

5.10.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.10.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.10-1 presents individual and overall current, near/mid-term, and far-term capabilities to

perform the task to the designated standards. There are eight current capabilities used to

accomplish this task and two projected capabilities to be added in the future (one each in the

near/mid term and one in the far term). The individual capabilities include a range of

colorimetric paper and kits, IMS detectors, and MSs with differing capabilities to meet the

identified standards.

Current Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Most current detectors do not directly

detect chemical agents on personnel and MWAs, but rather detect vapors off-gassing from the

deposited agent. The APD2000, CAM/ICAM, HAPSITE with the headspace sampling system,

and M22 ACADA with XM279 probe all work through this method. Consequently, these

detectors’ capabilities for sensing chemical agents on surfaces are generally equivalent to their

capabilities for sensing chemical agents in the atmosphere, assuming that the agent is sufficiently

volatile for a detectable amount of chemical vapor to accumulate above the contaminated

personnel or MWA.

M8 and M9 papers are the primary current capabilities for directly detecting liquid chemical

warfare agents (i.e., nerve and blister agents) deposited on personnel. M8 paper indicates

exposure to liquid agent by changing its color from tan to yellow, red, and green for G-agents,

H-agents and Lewisite, and V-agents, respectively. M9 paper does not classify or identify

detected agents, but turns pink, red, reddish-brown, or red-purple when exposed to liquid G-

agents, H-agents, V-agents, and Lewisite.

There is no single capability that can perform the task to all of the designated standards. MSs

Viking SpectraTrak and HAPSITE are sophisticated current capabilities, but they do not detect

or identify in near-real time; consequently, they may be unable to identify-to-treat high

concentrations of fast-acting lethal agents. Current overall task deficiencies include the general

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inability to detect deposited low-volatility agents, dusty agents, and off-gassing nerve agents

(i.e., VX and, to a lesser extent, GD and GF) at or below IDLH levels; lack of real-time CWA

identification and TIC detection/identification capabilities; lack of agent quantification

capabilities; lack of a detector that also takes samples for future analysis; and detector

susceptibility to chemical interference.¹

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall projected near/mid-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” In the near/mid-term

future, more detectors will quantify and classify, if not identify, agents. Nevertheless, MS units

and the JCSD will likely be the only detectors able to detect all CWAs. MS units Viking

Spectratrak and HAPSITE will remain the main capabilities to detect TICs. They will detect

many or all high-priority TICs.

The general inability to detect deposited low-volatility agents, dusty agents, and off-gassing

nerve agents (i.e., VX and, to a lesser extent, GD and GF) at or below IDLH levels; lack of real-

time CWA identification and TIC detection/identification capabilities; lack of agent

quantification capabilities; lack of a detector that also takes samples for future analysis; and

detector susceptibility to chemical interference are likely to remain deficiencies in the near-

future.

Projected Far-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall projected far-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” In the far-term future, many

fielded detectors will detect most, if not, all CWAs and some TICs. Many detectors will quantify

and classify, if not identify, agents. MS units will likely remain the main capabilities to detect

TICs. Many detectors will still not detect deposited low-volatility agents, dusty agents, and off-

gassing nerve agents at or below IDLH levels. Furthermore, there will still be a lack of a detector

that also takes samples for future analysis. Chemical interference will remain an issue.

¹ Refer to the JRO Operational Impact Assessment of Non-Traditional Agents report, July 2003 (S/NF) for

information on nontraditional agent detection.

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Table 5.10-1. TASENS 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

M10

M11

M12

M13

Current - Near/Mid - Far

APD2000

5 ¹

10 ²

0 ³

0 ⁴

10 ¹⁵

N/A ⁵

7 ⁶

N/A ⁷

5 ⁸

0 ⁹

N/A ¹¹

Unk¹⁰

CAM/ICAM

6 ¹¹

5 ¹²

5 ¹³

0 ¹⁴

N/A ¹⁵

N/A ⁶

2 ¹⁶

N/A ⁷

5 ¹⁷

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁸

HAPSITE (GC/MS) with HSS¹⁹

10 ²⁰

10 ²¹

10 ²²

9 ²³

10 ³⁹

10 ⁴⁰

1 ²⁴

N/A ⁷

0 ²⁵

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

Unk¹¹

M8 Paper

7 ²⁶

5 ²⁷

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

7 ¹⁷

N/A ⁷

5 ²⁸

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁹

M9 Paper

7 ²⁹

0 ³⁰

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

8 ³¹

N/A ⁷

N/A ³²

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁹

M22 ACADA with XM279 probe³³

6 ³⁴

7 ³⁵

5 ³⁶

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

7 ¹⁷

N/A ⁷

5 ³⁷

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁹

M256A1 Kit

9 ³⁸

7 ³⁹

0 ³

1 ⁴⁰

10 ⁴¹

N/A ⁶

1 ⁴²

N/A ⁷

5 ⁴³

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁹

Viking SpectraTrak (GC/MS)

10 ⁴⁴

10 ⁴⁵

10 ⁴⁰

10 ⁴⁶

10 ⁹⁰

10 ⁴⁰

1 ⁴²

N/A ⁷

5 ⁴⁴

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

10¹⁹

Near/Mid - Far

JCAD with XM279 probe³⁹

9 ⁴⁷

5 ⁴⁸

10 ⁴⁹

2 ⁵⁰

Unk

10 ¹⁰⁴

2 ⁵¹

N/A ⁷

5 ⁵²

0 ⁵³

N/A ⁷⁶

N/A⁵⁴

Far

JMCBDS

9 ⁵⁵

5 ¹⁰³

10 ¹⁰⁴

4 ⁵⁶

10 ⁵⁷

10 ¹⁰⁴

1 ⁵⁸

N/A ⁷

5 ⁵⁹

0 ⁷⁶

N/A ⁷⁶

N/A¹⁰¹

Current Overall Capability

N/A

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

N/A

N/A¹⁰¹

Far-Term Overall Capability

N/A

N/A¹⁰¹

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All of a potential adversary’s weaponized

Percentage of following 12 agents as

Percentages standardized to 0-10 scale

CWAs can be detected using fielded

described in FM 3-9 that are detected:

technologies/equipment, regardless of agent

nerve agents (GA; GB; GD; GF; VX),

physical properties, states, and

vesicants (H/HD; HN-1,2,3; L; CX),

concentrations?

cyanides (AC; CK), pulmonary agent

(CG)

All CWAs can be identified?

Ability to classify or identify detected

10: Identify detected CWAs

CWAs.

7: Identify some detected CWAs; classify others

5: Classify detected CWAs

0: Neither identify nor classify detected CWAs

All of a potential adversary’s weaponized

Ability to provide snapshot

10: Absolute quantification

CWAs can be quantified using fielded

concentration of detected CWAs.

5: Generic quantification

technologies/equipment?

0: No quantification capability

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All TICs can be detected using fielded

Considering only TICs listed in

10: All TICs listed in ITF-40

technologies/equipment?

USACHPPM Report 47-EM-6154-03:

9: 90% of 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne

ITF-40. (FOUO)

TICs according to ITF-40

8: 80% of 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne

TICs according to ITF-40

2: 20% of 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne

TICs according to ITF-40

1: 1%-20% of 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic

airborne TICs according to ITF-40

0: None of 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne

TICs according to ITF-40

All TICs can be identified using fielded

Ability to classify or identify detected

10: Identify all detected TICs

technologies/equipment?

TICs.

7: Identify some detected TICs; classify others

5: Classify detected TICs

0: Neither classify nor identify detected TICs

All TICs can be quantified using fielded

Ability to provide snapshot

10: Absolute quantification

technologies/equipment?

concentration of detected TICs.

5: Generic quantification

0: No quantification capability

Time to detect chemical hazards?

Time period from CWA/TIC sampling

10: 12 sec

to analysis output. Linear scale 1-10.

7: 30 sec

2: 60 sec

1: >60 sec

Distance between chemical hazard and

This measure is not relevant to this

N/A

detector for accurate detection?

task.

Chemical hazards are detected in time to warn

This measure is not relevant to this

N/A

forces and take appropriate protective

task.

measures?

M10

Chemical hazards are identified in time to

Based on capability and time required

10: Complete capability

treat forces?

to identify or classify hazards, as well

5: Partial capability

as rate-of-action of those hazards.

0: No capability

M11

Sampling collection procedures available for

Refers to physical sampling for future

10: Complete capability

all of a potential adversary’s weaponized

analysis.

5: Partial capability

CWAs and for all TICs using fielded

0: No capability

technologies/equipment?

M12

Procedures maintain integrity of sample?

Refers to a physical sample for future

10: Complete capability

analysis.

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

M13

There is effective DOTLPF in place to

Refers to non-materiel elements

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for the task to be

conduct task?

associated with the execution of a task

performed with this system without limitations that cause

with the system.

significant impact upon operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for the task to be

performed with this system are addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for the task to be

performed with this system

¹ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH level for GD within 30 sec.); VX (0.04 mg/m³ - 4X IDLH level within 30 sec.); HD (2

mg/m³ - IDLH level within 15 sec.), and L (0.38 mg/m³ within 15 sec.). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person),

75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), and <300 (L for eye) mg-min/m³. Does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only;

and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

² Identifies detected agents and TICs.

³ Does not quantify amount of detected agents or TICs.

⁴ Detects pepper spray and mace (but these are not included in the ITF-40 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne toxic industrial chemicals.)

⁵ Does not quantify TIC concentrations because it does not detect any TICs.

⁶ Detects in less than 30 seconds.

⁷ Not relevant to this task (N/A).

⁸ Identifies hazards within 30 seconds.

⁹ Sampling collection for future analysis capability does not exist with this technology/equipment.

¹⁰ COTS detector. Unknown if sufficient DOTLPF in place.

¹¹ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, and L (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH for GD/GF; 10X IDLH for VX; 1/20 IDLH for HD). According to

FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), and <300 (L for eye) mg-min/m³. Does not

detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

¹² Classifies agents as being nerve or blister agents.

¹³ Provides relative hazard indication (relative quantification).

¹⁴ No TICs detected.

¹⁵ Does not identify or classify any TICs because it does not detect any TICs

¹⁶ Detects hazards in less than 1 minute. Note: Requires up to 8 hours to warm up after 30 days storage.

¹⁷ Classifies agents within one minute.

¹⁸ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task with this system.

¹⁹ Headspace sampling system.

²⁰ Presumably detects all 12 CWA of interest (claims low ppb to ppt detection limits; 1 ppb = 0.01 mg/m³ for VX - IDLH level; 0.006-0.007 mg/m³ for G-agents - ~1/10 IDLH

levels; 0.007 mg/m³ for HD - 1/285 IDLH level). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50

(VX), 150 (inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), 7,000 (CK), and 1,6000 (CG) mg-min/m³. Detects vapors only.

²¹ Identifies detected agents and TICs (through MS).

²² Provides absolute quantification capability for all detected agents and TICs (specifically provides composition intensities, e.g., ppm).

²³ Presumably detects most TICs in ITF-40. Detects vapors only.

²⁴ Detects within 10 minutes.

²⁵ Hazards are not identified in time to treat, especially if lethal fast-acting agents at high concentrations are involved.

²⁶ Detects GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN and L liquid (>0.02 mL) droplets.

²⁷ Classifies as G-, H- (and L), and V- agents.

²⁸ Classifies agents within 30 seconds.

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²⁹ Detects GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN and L liquid (>100 ȝL) droplets.

³⁰ Does not identify or classify detected agents or TICs.

³¹ Detects within 20 seconds.

³² Does not identify or classify agents or TICs.

³³ Assuming probe does not affect system performance.

³⁴ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD, GF (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH for GD/GF within 30 sec.); VX (0.04 mg/m³ - 4X IDLH level within 90 sec.); HD,

and L (10 mg/m³ - 5X IDLH level for HD, unknown L). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD),

50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), and <300 (L for eye) mg-min/m³. Does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only; and is

susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

³⁵ Classifies detected G and V agents as nerve agents; identifies detected H and L agents.

³⁶ Relative hazard level provided through three different sensitivity levels.

³⁷ Classifies or identifies agents within 30 seconds.

³⁸ Detects GA, GB, GD, GF (0.005 mg/m³- 1/20 IDLH for GA/GB, 1/10 IDLH for GD/GF), VX (0.02 mg/m³- 2X IDLH level), HD (2mg/m³- IDLH level), HN, L (9 mg/m³),

CX (3 mg/m³), AC (9 mg/m³- below IDLH), and CK (8 mg/m³) in vapor form and is susceptible to chemical interference. According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300

(GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), and 7,000 (CK) mg-min/m³.

³⁹ Classifies G and V agents as nerve agents; identifies blood and blister agents.

⁴⁰ Detects TICs AC and CK.

⁴¹ Identifies detected TICs.

⁴² Detects within 15 minutes.

⁴³ Hazards are identified in time to treat when M8 paper is used for liquid detection. Hazards are not identified in time to treat when ampoules are used for vapor detection (delayed

response; 15-20 minutes).

⁴⁴ Presumably detects all 12 agents of interest; detects all states (claims 5 ppb detection limit for air preconcentrator = 0.05 mg/m³ for VX - 5X IDLH level, 0.030-0.035 mg/m³ for

G-agents: 1/3-2/3 IDLH levels, 0.035 mg/m³ for HD - 1/57 IDLH level). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting

person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), 7,000 (CK), and 1,6000 (CG) mg-min/m³. Degraded performance: (P5, 9, 10) Not waterproof when

operating; (M5) Negligible personnel experience

⁴⁵ Identifies sampled agents and TICs (through mass spectrometry)

⁴⁶ Presumably detects all TICs in ITF-40; detects all states.

⁴⁷ Will detect only GA, GB, GD, GF, and VX (0.1 mg/m³- IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH level for GD/GF, 10X IDLH for VX, within 30 sec.); HD, HN3, and L (2.0 mg/m³ -

IDLH level - within 120 sec.), AC (22 mg/m³ - below IDLH level, within 60 sec.), CK (20 mg/m³within 60 sec.), and CG vapors only, and will not detect concentrations which

can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects. According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150

(inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), 7,000 (CK), and 1,6000 (CG) mg-min/m³.

⁴⁸ Will classify agents as nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents.

⁴⁹ Will provide absolute quantification capability for all detected agents and TICs.

⁵⁰ Will detect Cl, HBr, HCl, AC, HF, HS, and CG as an objective.

⁵¹ Will detect hazards within 1 minute.

⁵² Will classify hazards within 1 minute.

⁵³ This technology/equipment will not have sampling collection for future analysis capability.

⁵⁴ Future system(s). Thus, DOTLPF is also future and cannot be evaluated.

⁵⁵ Will detect only GA, GB, GD, GF (0.1 mg/m³- IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH level for GD/GF within 30 sec.); VX (0.04 mg/m³- 4X IDLH level within 90 sec.); HD,

HN3, L (2.0 mg/m³- IDLH level within 120 sec.); AC (22 mg/m³- below IDLH level within 60 sec.); CK (20 mg/m³within 60 sec.); and CG in vapor and aerosol forms, and will

not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects. According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting

person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), 7,000 (CK), and 1,6000 (CG) mg-min/m³.

⁵⁶ Will detect ammonia, arsine, chlorine, diborane, fluorine, hydrogen bromide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen fluoride, nitric acid, phosgene, phosphorus trichloride, sulphur

dioxide, and sulphuric acid.

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5.10.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.10.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Lack of real-time or near-real-time TIC detection and identification capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: General inability to detect deposited low-volatility agents and dusty agents.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: General inability to detect low-volatility CWAs (e.g., VX and, to a lesser extent,

HD) at or below IDLH levels.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on portable MS

units (e.g., Viking SpectraTrak and HAPSITE).

Deficiency: Susceptibility to chemical interference.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on portable MS

units (e.g., Viking SpectraTrak and HAPSITE).

Deficiency: Lack of real-time or near-real-time CWA identification capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Lack of agent quantification capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on portable MS

units (e.g., Viking SpectraTrak and HAPSITE).

Deficiency: Lack of detector that also takes physical samples for future analysis capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5.10.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 5.10-2 identifies 12 ideas for materiel approaches that, if developed, may reduce or

eliminate the deficiencies associated with detecting chemical hazards in the atmosphere.

Advances in orthogonal technologies may be able to address all identified deficiencies.

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Table 5.10-2. TASENS 10. IMA Assessment

TASENS 10. Sense the presence of chemical hazards on humans, MWAs and remains¹

Ideas for Material

Approaches

(IMA)

Identified Gaps

Lack of real-time or near-real-time TIC

X¹⁰

detection and identification capabilities.⁹

General inability to detect deposited low-

volatility agents and dusty agents.

General inability to detect low-volatility

CWAs (e.g., VX and, to a lesser extent,

X¹²

HD) at or below IDLH levels.¹¹

Susceptibility to chemical interference.

General lack of agent quantification

capabilities.¹³

Lack of real-time or near-real-time CWA

identification capabilities.

Lack of detector that also takes samples

for future analysis capability.¹⁴

¹ McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National

Academy Press. 2000. http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/; Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; Detection and Measurement of Chemical Agents, http://books.nap.edu/html/terrorism/ch4.html; Conventional analytical methods for

chemical warfare agents, http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/2002/pdf/7412x2281.pdf; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic

Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders. 2000. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm

² Includes GC/MS, LC/MS, Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization with Time-of-Flight Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS)

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³ Examples include Thermal Infrared Spectroscopy, FTIR, long-wave IR (LWIR) Differential Scattering/Differential Absorption of Light (DISC)/Differential Absorption LIDAR

(DIAL), LWIR Polarization, mid-wave IR (MWIR) DISC/DIAL, MWIR Polarization, Near-IR Scattering, NIR Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) UV Fluorescence,

Multiband Brillouin Scattering, LWIR FTIR, LWIR Filtered Forward-Looking IR (FLIR), and Microwave (GHz and THz) Spectroscopy.

⁴ May be coupled with GC; External Second Gate, Fourier Transform Ion Mobility Spectrometry approach can improve sensitivity and selectivity.

⁵ For example, PCD.

⁶ May be coupled with GC.

⁷ Examples include SAW/IMS, IMC/SAW/Electrochemical/SCCell (S-CAD).

⁸ May be coupled with GC or reversed-phase liquid chromatography (RPLC).

⁹ Increasing the number of TICs identified by JCAD and/or JMCBDS is a potential solution.

¹⁰ Classifies, but generally does not identify, agents.

¹¹ Distributing more HAPSITEs and Viking Spectratraks is a potential solution.

¹² MS and IMS.

¹³ Distributing more HAPSITEs and Viking Spectratraks is a potential solution. JCAD and/or JMCBDS are expected to eliminate capability gap.

¹⁴ All IMAs could be designed to eliminate this capability gap. The collection equipment would be better maintained as an independent capability. The solution could involve a

module connected to the detector that notifies the operator to take samples or triggers an automated process to begin sampling.

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5.11

Task TASENS 11: Sense the presence of biological hazards on humans, MWAs, and

remains

5.11.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.11.1.1

Definition

To sense the presence or absence of biological hazards (includes biological warfare agents and

TIB material) on humans, MWAs, and remains. Includes external detection of contamination

prior to the manifestation of symptoms. Diagnosis of internal exposure is not part of this task as

it is addressed in a separate Sustain task. Includes the functions of detection, identification, and

quantification of the hazard. Also includes the requirement to determine the extent and physical

properties of contamination, monitoring of known hazard locations, and collection of samples for

further analysis. Encompasses “detect to warn” and “detect to treat” situations. The evaluation

encompasses all biological hazards of military and medical importance.

5.11.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.11.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSENS 1, OPSENS 4, OPSENS 7

5.11.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

5.11.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.11.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Tropical, arctic, and arid climates. (C1.3.1)

2. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

3. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

4. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1

5. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

6. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

7. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

8. Biological effects. (C1.3.3.3)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

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5. Poor personnel morale. (C2.2.4.4)

6. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

7. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

8. Deployment movement and maneuver—includes logistical requirements such as lift,

supply, and transportation. (C2.5)

9. Limited or no host nation support. (C2.8.5)

10. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

2. Negligible language translators. (C3.2.1.2)

3. High health risk. (C3.3.1.5)

4. Significant refugee care responsibility. (C3.3.2.3)

5. TIB materials present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

5.11.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.11.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.11-1 presents individual and overall current, near/mid-term, and far-term capabilities to

perform the task to the designated standards. There are three current capabilities used to

accomplish this task and one projected capabilities to be added in the future (JBAIDS in the

near/mid term). The individual capabilities differ in their abilities to meet the identified

standards.

Overall Capability and Deficiency Summary

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Many, if not most, BWAs can be

presumptively detected and identified by collecting samples from personnel, MWAs, and

remains through physical sampling, followed by manual sample preparation and the following

laboratory and field-deployable analytical techniques: immunochromatographic HHAs, which

are part of the BSK; ELISA; and RT-PCR, as used by RAPID. Of the 25 BWAs described in the

Medical Management of Biological Casualties, a complete set of HHAs can detect and identify

all agents with the possible exception of the viral hemorrhagic fever agents; however, the BSK

contains eight different HHAs and thus detects only eight BWAs per kit. The eight agents in the

kit may be assembled to reflect the threat.¹ A comprehensive set of ELISAs, which are

laboratory-based, can ostensibly detect and identify all 25 BWAs (as well as any TIB), assuming

that an antigen or antibody has been isolated for each agent. Like all PCR-based technologies,

RAPID can, with the appropriate reagents, detect and identify all BWA and TIB pathogens, but

none of the toxins (since the toxins, unless contaminated with the source organisms, do not

provide any genetic material). HHAs and RAPID can generically quantify detected agents

¹ The collection of surface samples to use in HHA results in a sample for further analysis. Coolers/temperature-

controlled equipment to hold and maintain the sample needs to be available if the sample is not immediately

evacuated.

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(HHAs only through the aide of a reader), whereas some varieties of ELISAs provide absolute

quantification capabilities.

Overall current task deficiencies include the lack of integrated sample collection, detection,

identification, and quantification capability for BWAs on personnel, MWAs, and remains; real-

time or near-real-time detection, identification, and quantification capability for sampled BWAs;

field analysis verification capabilities; as well as TIB detection capabilities.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall projected near/mid-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” Near/mid-term capability

JBAIDS Block I will detect 11 BWA pathogens (as a threshold requirement), whereas Block II

will detect the same 11 BWA pathogens plus the four toxins of interest (as a threshold

requirement). JBAIDS will also quantify agent concentrations in the analyzed sample. It will

require 25-40 minutes for analysis output following sample preparation, and will thus provide a

complete identify-to-treat capability.

All of the overall current task deficiencies are likely to remain deficiencies in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

No changes in capability are projected in the far term for this task, so the overall projected far-

term capability will remain “yellow.”

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Table 5.11-1. TASENS 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

Current - Near/Mid - Far

BSK

3¹

10²

0³

0⁴

N/A⁴

6⁵

N/A⁶

N/A⁷

10⁷

0⁸

N/A⁸

0⁹

5¹⁰

Physical Sampling/ELISA

10 ¹¹

10²

10¹²

10¹³

10¹⁴

1¹⁵

N/A⁷

5¹⁵

0¹⁶

N/A¹⁶

0¹¹

Unk

Physical Sampling/RAPID

8 ¹⁷

10²

5¹⁸

5¹⁹

10²⁰

5²⁰

1²¹

N/A⁷

5²¹

0¹⁶

N/A¹⁶

0¹⁰

Unk

Near/Mid - Far

JBAIDS Blocks I/II

4/6²²

10²³

10²⁴

0²⁵

N/A²⁸

0²⁶

N/A⁷

10²⁷

10²⁸

10²⁹

0³⁰

N/A³¹

Current Overall Capability

N/A

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

N/A

N/A¹⁰¹

Far-Term Overall Capability

N/A

N/A¹⁰¹

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All of a potential adversary’s

Number of the 25 biological agents described in the

10: All 25 BWAs detected

weaponized BWAs can be

Medical Management of Biological Casualties that are

8: 20 BWAs detected

detected using fielded

detected. Fourteen of the 25 agents are as follows:

6: 15 BWAs detected

technologies/equipment,

Anthrax (Bacillus Anthracis); Brucellosis (Brucellae);

4: 10 BWAs detected

regardless of agent physical

Glanders (Burkholderia mallei); Meliodosis

2: 5 BWAs detected

properties, states, and

(Burkholderia pseudomallei); Q Fever (Coxiella

1: 1 BWA detected

concentrations?

burnetii); Plague (Yersinia pestis); Tularemia

0: No BWAs detected

(Francisella tularensis); Botulinum toxin; Ricin; SEB;

T-2 Mycotoxins; Smallpox (variola major and minor);

Viral Equine Encephalities (e.g., VEE, WEE, and EEE);

and Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fever viruses.

Linear from 2-10.

All of a potential adversary’s

Ability to identify or classify (e.g., as bacteria, toxin, or

10: Identify detected BWAs

weaponized BWAs can be

virus) detected BWAs.

7: Identify some detected BWAs; classify others

identified using fielded

5: Classify detected BWAs

technologies/equipment?

3: Some detected BWAs are classified or identified

0: Neither identify nor classify detected BWAs

All of a potential adversary’s

Ability to provide snapshot concentration of detected

10: Absolute quantification

weaponized BWAs can be

BWAs.

5: Generic quantification

quantified using fielded

0: No quantification capability

technologies/ equipment?

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All TIB material can be detected

TIB material includes medical waste, raw sewage, and

10: All pathogens and toxins within TIB material,

using fielded

vaccine-related biologics. Pathogens and toxins within

including medical waste, raw sewage, and vaccine-

technologies/equipment?

TIB material are what are generally detected.

related biologics can be detected

5: All TIB pathogens or toxins within one or more

categories (i.e., medical waste, raw sewage and

vaccine-related biologics) can be detected

3: Some TIB pathogens and toxins within one category

(i.e., medical waste, raw sewage and vaccine-related

biologics) can be detected

0: No TIB pathogens and toxins can be detected

All TIB material can be identified

Ability to identify or classify (e.g., as bacteria, toxin, or

10: All pathogens and toxins within TIB material can

using fielded

virus) detected TIB material.

be identified

technologies/equipment?

7: Identify some TIB pathogens and toxins; classify

others

5: Classify detected TIB pathogens and toxins

3: Some detected TIB pathogens and toxins can be

classified or identified

0: Neither classify nor identify detected TICs

All TIB material can be

Ability to provide snapshot concentration of detected

10: Absolute quantification

quantified using fielded

TIBs.

5: Generic quantification

technologies/equipment?

0: No quantification capability

Time to detect biological

Time period from BWA/TIB sampling to analysis

10: 1 minute

hazards?

output. Linear scale 2-9. Applies to point detectors

9: 4 minutes

only.

8: 7 minutes

7: 10 minutes

4: 40 minutes

2: 60 minutes

1: >60 minutes

Distance between biological

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

hazard and detector for accurate

detection?

Biological hazards are detected in

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

time to warn forces and take

appropriate protective measures?

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

M10

Biological hazards are identified

Based on capability and time required to identify or

10: Complete capability (<1 hour)

in time to treat forces?

classify hazards, as well as rate-of-action of those

5: Partial capability

hazards. Of all considered BWAs, ricin may require the

0: No capability

most rapid response. Immunoglobulin therapy must be

administered within 1 hour of ricin exposure to be

effective.

M11

Sampling collection procedures

Refers to physical sampling for future analysis.

10: Complete capability

available for all of a potential

5: Partial capability

adversary’s weaponized BWAs

0: No capability

and for all TIB material using

fielded technologies/ equipment?

M12

Procedures maintain integrity of

Refers to a physical sample for future analysis.

10: Complete capability

sample?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

M13

Time to validate the presence of

Refers to confirmatory identification.

10: Rapidly—validation performed expeditiously by

biological hazards in the

particular technology/equipment

atmosphere?

5: Moderately delayed—mobile analysis tools can

validate onsite

0: Delayed—off-site laboratory analysis required for

validation

M14

There is effective DOTLPF in

Refers to non-materiel elements associated with the

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for the task to be

place to conduct task?

execution of the task with the system.

performed with this system without limitations that

cause significant impact upon operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for the task to be

performed with this system are addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for the task

to be performed with this system

¹ Current and near-future HHAs detect all BWAs with the possible exception of the viral hemorrhagic fevers. The HHA sensitivity is 10⁵-10⁶ CFU/mL (B. anthracis) and 50-1200

ng/mL (Botulinum toxin A and Botulinum toxin F, respectively). Degraded performance: (C6) TIB material present in civilian sector. Susceptible to interference (false positives

and negatives); (M3) Minimal time available. Requires sample preparation prior to applying sample to assay.

² All detected BWAs are identified.

³ Does not absolutely quantify agent. However, may provide relative indication of quantity, but only through the use of a reader. Soldiers will not likely have the reader.

⁴ According to specifications, does not detect any TIBs.

⁵ Detects within 15 minutes.

⁶ Not relevant to this task (N/A).

⁷ Immediately identifies all detected hazards (detection requires up to 15 minutes) and thus provides complete identify-to-treat capability.

⁸ Does not collect a sample for future analysis.

⁹ Requires samples to be confirmed off site in laboratory.

¹⁰ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task, at least for bacillus bacteria (specifically anthrax). Procedures for other agents are probably similar.

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¹¹ Ostensibly all BWAs can be detected by ELISA. ELISA’s sensitivity is 10⁵-10⁶ CFU/mL (B. anthracis); 10-100 PFU/mL of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus; and 625

pg/mL of Staphyloccoccal Enterotoxin B (aerosol) and greater than 5 ng/mL of ricin.

¹² Some varieties of ELISA can absolutely quantify the antigen or antibody concentration.

¹³ Theoretically, any agent (i.e., antigen or antibody) for which an ELISA has been designed can be detected through this method; however, only one particular pathogen or toxin

antigen or antibody can be tested per ELISA model.

¹⁴ A particular TIB pathogen or toxin is identified if it is detected, since ELISA is highly specific and detects a particular agent.

¹⁵ Typically requires 1-2 hours (following sample collection and preparation) for detection, identification, and if applicable, quantification, primarily because of incubation time.

¹⁶ Not designed for sample collection for future analysis.

¹⁷ RAPID may be able to detect all pathogens; PCR does not detect toxins, though the toxic material may be contaminated with source genetic material (In this assessment, it is

assumed that this is not the case). Standard PCR has a sensitivity of 10-100 CFU/mL bacteria (B. anthracis); and 15 fg-1 pg or 100-1 million copies of the complementary DNA

for viruses.

¹⁸ RAPID, through RT-PCR, may provide generic quantification.

¹⁹ Theoretically, any TIB pathogen can be detected with appropriate reagents; toxins cannot be detected unless contaminated with source genetic material.

²⁰ All detected TIBs are identified.

²¹ Detects and identifies within 30 minutes following sample preparation, but sample preparation requires several hours.

²² Block I will detect Anthrax; Brucella; Ebola VHF virus; Marburg VHF virus; Viral Encephalitis viruses (VEE/WWW/EEE); Glanders; Meliodosis; Plague; Q Fever; Smallpox;

and Tularemia (and Typhus) as a threshold requirement; and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic virus; Dengue fever; Hantaviruses; and Rift Valley Fever Virus (and Cholera,

Cryptosporidium; E. col; Influenza; Salmonella; and Shigella) as an objective; Block II will add toxins Botulinum, microcystins, ricin, SEB, and T-2 Mycotoxins.

²³ Will identify all detected agents.

²⁴ Will quantify the concentration in the sample.

²⁵ Will not detect any TIBs.

²⁶ Will detect and identify within 40 minutes (25-minute objective) for Blocks I and II following sample preparation.

²⁷ Will immediately identify all detected hazards (detection will require 25-40 minutes) and thus will provide complete identify-to-treat capability.

²⁸ Will provide physical sample collection capability for future analysis.

²⁹ Will maintain integrity of physical sample.

³⁰ Will require samples to be confirmed off site at laboratory.

³¹ Future system(s). Thus, DOTLPF is also future and cannot be evaluated.

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5.11.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.11.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of integrated detection, identification, and quantification capability for

BWAs on personnel and MWAs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

2. Deficiency: Lack of real-time or near-real-time detection, identification, and quantification

capability for BWAs on personnel and MWAs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

3. Deficiency: Validation of findings requires laboratory testing.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Modify doctrine to permit validation by a reliable on-

site detection/identification capability (e.g., portable PCR) as confirmatory

detection/identification is ultimately dependent upon doctrine, not materiel capabilities.

Training (partial): Train personnel in analytical techniques to ensure accuracy.

4. Deficiency: Lack of TIB detection capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5. Deficiency: Lack of detector that also takes samples for future analysis capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5.11.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 5.11-2 identifies nine ideas for materiel approaches that, if developed, may reduce or

eliminate the deficiencies associated with detecting biological hazards on personnel and MWAs.

Advances in MS; immunoassays; flame photometry; tissue-based detection; Raman, IR, UV, or

microwave spectroscopy; or orthogonal technologies may be able to address all identified

deficiencies.

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Table 5.11-2. TASENS 11: IMA Assessment

TASENS 11: Sense personnel and MWAs for biological hazards¹

Ideas for Material

Approaches

(IMA)

Identified Gaps

Lack of integrated detection, identification, and quantification capability

for BWAs on personnel and MWAs.¹⁰

Lack of real-time or near-real-time detection, identification, and

quantification capability for BWAs on personnel and MWAs.¹¹

Lack of TIB detection capability.

Lack of detector that also takes samples for future analysis capability.¹²

¹ McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National

Academy Press. 2000. http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/; Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; Detection and Measurement of Biological Agents. http://books.nap.edu/html/terrorism/ch6.html; National Institute of Justice. An

Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders. 2001. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/190747.htm

² Includes GC/MS, LC/MS, Gas Chromatography-Ion Trap Tandem Mass Spec (GC-MS-MS), Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization (MALDI) MS.

³ Includes SAW technology.

⁴ Includes PCR and RT-PCR amplification, DNA microchip technology, SAW technology.

⁵ Philippe, Adam, Damien Descroix and Jean-Pierre Chiaroni. “Flame Photometry for Biological Detection.” Proceedings from the 6^th CBW Protection Symposium. 1998.

⁶ Includes nucleic acid/immunoassay technologies (e.g., PCR and immunological techniques), electrochemiluminescence/equilibrium immunoassay, Fluorescence correlation

spectroscopy/PCR.

⁷ ChemSensing Colorimetric Sensor.

⁸ NIR Raman, Visible Light (VIS) Surface-Enhanced Raman, VIS Raman, UV Raman, Multiband Resonance-Enhanced Raman, Multiband Surface-Enhanced Raman.

⁹ Thermoluminescence/FTIR, long-wave IR Differential Scattering/Differential Absorption of Light (DISC)/Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL), LWIR Polarization, mid-

wave IR (MWIR) DISC/DIAL, MWIR Polarization, near-IR (NIR) Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) UV Fluorescence, Multiband Brillouin Scattering.

¹⁰ Sample collection, independent of the detector, is one of the main, if not the main, problem. Quantification cannot be achieved without efficient, standardized sample collection

and preparation (if needed). JBAIDS is expected to detect, identify, and quantify all BWAs on personnel and MWAs, and thus eliminate capability gap.

¹¹ Reducing the sample preparation and response times for JBAIDS is a potential solution.

¹² All IMAs could be designed to eliminate this capability gap. The collection equipment would be better maintained as an independent capability. The solution could involve a

module connected to the detector that notifies the operator to take samples or triggers an automated process to begin sampling.

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5.12

Task TASENS 12: Sense the presence of radiological hazards on humans, MWAs,

and remains

5.12.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.12.1.1

Definition

To sense the presence or absence of radiological substances on humans, MWAs, and remains.

Includes external detection of contamination prior to the manifestation of symptoms. Diagnosis

of internal exposure is not part of this task as it is addressed in a separate Sustain task. Includes

the functions of detection, identification, and quantification of the substance. Also includes the

requirement to determine the extent and physical properties of contamination, monitoring of

known radiological locations, and collection of samples for further analysis. Encompasses

“detect to warn” and “detect to treat” situations.

5.12.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.12.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSENS 1, OPSENS 4, OPSENS 7

5.12.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

5.12.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.12.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Tropical, arctic, and arid climates. (C1.3.1)

2. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

3. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

4. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1

5. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

6. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

7. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

8. Strong nuclear atmosphere weapons effects. (C1.3.3)

9. Moderate nuclear radiation effects. (C1.3.3.1.2)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

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5. Poor personnel morale. (C2.2.4.4)

6. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

7. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

8. Deployment movement and maneuver—includes logistical requirements such as lift,

supply, and transportation. (C2.5)

9. Limited or no host nation support. (C2.8.5)

10. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

2. Negligible language translators. (C3.2.1.2)

3. Significant refugee care responsibility. (C3.3.2.3)

4. TIR materials present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

5.12.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.12.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.12-1 presents individual and overall current, near/mid-term, and far-term capabilities to

perform the task to the designated standards. There are 13 current capabilities used to accomplish

this task. The capabilities include a range of portable RADIAC devices and dosimeters.

Current Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Most current RADIACS detect and

identify beta radiation and detect, identify, and quantify gamma radiation. All RADIACs

perform their functions in real time (though the level of confidence increases with increased

sampling time) and thus provide a complete detect-to-warn capability. Many also automatically

calculate the cumulative dose. Dosimeters generally measure the total dose from gamma

radiation exposure. Most are not self-indicating and need to be placed within a reader to retrieve

the dose information.

There is no single capability that can perform the task to all of the designated standards.

ADM 300 detects alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation, but like all RADIACs, it detects,

identifies, and quantifies only the radiation, not the radioisotope. Furthermore, like all RADIACs

and dosimeters, the ADM-300, must be exposed to radiation to detect it. Overall task

deficiencies include the lack of radioisotope identification capabilities, reliable alpha detection

capabilities, monitors that can detect all types of radiation, and detectors that take sample for

future analysis.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

No changes in capability are projected in the near/mid term for this task, so the overall projected

near/mid-term capability will remain “yellow.”

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Table 5.12-1. TASENS 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

Current - Near/Mid - Far

ADM-300

8¹

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁵

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDQ-1 MFR⁸

4⁹

5²

5¹⁰

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-27

4⁹

5²

5¹²

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-43

4⁹

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-56

2¹¹

N/A¹²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-63

4⁹

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-65

2¹³

N/A¹²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/PDR-75

4¹⁴

0¹⁵

10¹⁶

0¹⁷

N/A⁸

5¹⁸

10⁷

AN/PDR-77

8¹⁹

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/UDR-13

4²⁰

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

AN/VDR-2

4⁹

5²

10³

10⁴

N/A⁸

5⁶

10⁷

CP-95/DT-60

2²¹

N/A¹²

10²²

0²¹

N/A⁸

5²³

10⁷

IM-143/ IM-93

2³³

N/A¹²

10³⁴

10²⁴

N/A⁸

5³⁵

10⁷

Current Overall Capability

N/A⁸

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

N/A⁸

Far-Term Overall Capability

N/A⁸

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All radiological hazards (including TIR

Number of radiation types (i.e., alpha, beta, gamma, neutron, and

10: All five types

material) can be detected using fielded

x-radiation) detected. Note: Fielded technologies/equipment

8: Four types

technologies/equipment?

detect radiological hazards by detecting the radiation emitted

6: Three types

from these hazards.

4: Two types

2: Single type

TIR material includes DU, a common battlefield hazard resulting

0: No radiological hazards detected

from certain types of ammunition and damaged armor.

All radiological hazards (including TIR

Ability to identify type of radiation detected or the radioisotope

10: Identifies radioisotope emitting

material) can be identified using fielded

emitting the radiation. Note: Fielded technologies/equipment that

radiation

technologies/ equipment?

identify radioisotope also identify the type(s) of radiation

5: Identifies type of radiation detected

detected.

0: No identification capability

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FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All radiological hazards (including TIR

Ability to quantify activity of radiological material (i.e., Cu or

10: Absolute quantification

material) can be quantified using fielded

Bq), or the exposure (i.e., Roentgen or Coulomb/kg) or dose rate

5: Generic quantification (or absolute

technologies/ equipment?

(rad, rem, Gy, or Sv) from emitted radiation.

quantification of one radiation type and

no quantification of another type)

0: No quantification capability

Time to detect radiological hazard?

Time period from exposure to radiation to analysis output.

10: Near real time

0: Not near-real time

Distance between radiological hazard and

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

detector for accurate detection?

Radiological hazards are detected in time to

This measure is not relevant to this task.

N/A

warn forces and take appropriate protective

measures?

Radiological hazards are identified in time

A complete capability requires both near-real-time identification

10: Complete capability (near-real-time

to treat forces?

of the emitted radiation type(s) and radioisotope. Identification

identification of radioisotope and

of the emitted radiation type(s) enables appropriate medical

emitted radiation type[s])

response to radiation exposure and identification of the

5: Partial capability (Delayed

radioisotope determines to appropriate medical course of action

identification of emitted radiation

to radiological material internalization.

type[s])

0: No capability (no identification

capability)

There is effective DOTLPF in place to

Refers to non-materiel elements associated with the execution of

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for

conduct task?

a task with the system.

the task to be performed with this

system without limitations that cause

significant impact upon operation

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for

the task to be performed with this

system are addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not

exist for the task to be performed with

this system

¹ Detects alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation emitted from radiological materials.

² Identifies type of radiation, but not radioisotope.

³ Absolutely quantifies radiation level.

⁴ Real-time detection. Level of confidence increases with increased sampling time and radiation levels.

⁵ Not relevant to this task (N/A)

⁶ Provides partial identify-to-treat capability since immediately identifies detected radiation type, but not the radioisotope.

⁷ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task with this system.

⁸ In combination with OA-9449/PDQ probe. The MFR alone detects gamma radiation; with the probe, it measures gamma radiation and detects beta radiation.

⁹ Detects beta/gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials.

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¹⁰ Absolutely quantifies gamma radiation level; detects, but does not quantify, beta radiation.

¹¹ Detects alpha radiation emitted from radiological materials (particularly plutonium).

¹² Detects only one type of radiation, so identification capability is not applicable.

¹³ Detects gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials (particularly plutonium).

¹⁴ The DT-236 dosimeter records the total dose to gamma and neutron radiation. The CP-696 reader is required to retrieve the dose information.

¹⁵ Does not differentiate between dose received from gamma radiation and dose received from neutron radiation.

¹⁶ Absolutely quantifies total gamma and neutron dose absorbed by dosimeter.

¹⁷ Dose can be viewed only when dosimeter is placed within reader; therefore, radiation exposure cannot be detected in near-real time.

¹⁸ Through reader, displays total dose to penetrating (i.e., gamma and neutron) radiation, which allows for partial identify-to-treat capability.

¹⁹ Detects alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation emitted from radiological materials.

²⁰ Detects gamma/neutron radiation emitted from radiological materials.

²¹ Dosimeter indicates total dose to gamma radiation only.

²² Absolutely quantifies total gamma radiation dose absorbed by dosimeter.

²³ Provides partial identify-to-treat capability. As dosimeter only detects gamma radiation, an indication of a significant dose could suggest and help treat acute radiation syndrome,

e.g.

²⁴ As a self-indicating pocket dosimeter, possibly allows for near-real-time detection of gamma radiation; however, dose rate must be high for increase in dose to be noticeable

during a short period.

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5.12.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.12.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of reliable alpha-detection capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on ADM-300,

AN/PDR-56, and AN/PDR-77.

2. Deficiency: Lack of monitors that can detect most or all types of radiation.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training (partial): Increase training of personnel on ADM-300.

3. Deficiency: Lack of radioisotope identification capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

4. Deficiency: Lack of detector that can also take samples for future analysis capability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

5.12.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 5.12-2 identifies three ideas for materiel approaches that, if developed, may reduce or

eliminate the deficiencies associated with detecting radiological hazards in the atmosphere.

Advances in scintillation or semiconductor radiation detection technologies may be able to

address all identified deficiencies.

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Table 5.12-2. TASENS 12: IMA Assessment

Ideas for Material

Approaches

(IMA)

Identified Gaps

Lack of reliable alpha-detection capabilities.⁴

Lack of monitors that can detect all types of radiation.⁵

Lack of radioisotope identification capabilities.⁶

Lack of detector that collects contamination for low-level detection and future analysis.⁷

¹ Includes Geiger-Mueller detectors, proportional gas detectors, and ionization chambers

² Includes ZnS(Ag), anthracene, trans-stilbene, para-terphenyl, phenyl oxazole, NaI(Tl), CsI(Tl), bismuth germinate (Bi₄Ge₃O₁₂), barium fluoride (BaF₂)-based detectors.

³ Includes germanium, silicon, cadmium telluride (CdTe), and mercuric iodide (HgI₂)-based detectors.

⁴ Distributing more ADM-300 and AN/PDR-77 is a potential solution.

⁵ Distributing more ADM-300 is a potential solution.

⁶ Distributing gamma and/or alpha scintillation detectors with radioisotope identification capabilities is a potential solution.

⁷ All point-detection IMAs could be designed to eliminate this capability gap. The collection equipment would be better maintained as an independent capability. The solution

could involve a module connected to the detector that notifies the operator to take samples or triggers an automated process to begin sampling.

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5.13

Task TASENS 13: Mark CBR contaminated air, surfaces, and water

5.13.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.13.1.1

Definition

To mark contaminated air, surfaces, and water includes exterior and interior atmospheres, food,

terrain, personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and bodies of water. Objective is to identify

hazards to allies while providing no advantage to enemy forces. Marking methods could include

visual, audible, and electronic indicators depending on the requirement.

5.13.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.13.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

5.13.1.2.2

Lateral Task: TASHA 24

5.13.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.13.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Mountainous, desert, jungle, and arctic terrain. (C1.1.1)

2. Significant urbanization. (C1.1.3.1)

3. High sea state. (C1.2.1.3)

4. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

5. High surface-wind velocity. (C1.3.1.3.3)

6. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

7. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

8. Extreme turbulence and wind shear. (C1.3.1.3.8)

9. Very low visibility. (C1.3.2)

10. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

11. Dense obscurants. (C1.3.2.2)

12. Severely degraded radio frequency spectrum. (C1.3.5)

Military

1. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

2. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

3. Highly restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

4. Extreme threat. (C2.9.1)

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Civil

1. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

2. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

3. TIMs present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5)

5.13.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.13.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.13-1 discusses the individual capability of the current M274 NBC Marking Kit to

perform the task to the designated standards. No near-future capabilities have been identified for

this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The overall current capability is assessed as “green.” Under ideal conditions, the M274 NBC

Marking Kit is able to perform the task to all of the designated standards. However, its

performance may be degraded under low light or if surrounded by obscurants since it does not

provide any audible or electronic indicators of contamination. Consequently, overall task

deficiencies include the lack of audible or electronic indicators of contamination. These

deficiencies are likely to remain in the near future.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the near/mid term for this task, so the overall projected

near/mid-term capability will remain “green.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the far term for this task, so the overall projected far-

term capability will remain “green.”

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Table 5.13-1. TASENS 13: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

Current - Near/Mid - Far

M274 NBC Marking Set

10 ¹

5 ²

5 ³

10⁴

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Markings are standardized among

10: Complete capability

coalition forces?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Markings facilitate effective

10: Complete capability

contamination avoidance?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Markings are monitored and

10: Complete capability

changed in near-real time to reflect

5: Partial capability

changes in hazards?

0: No capability

There is effective DOTLPF in

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for the task to be performed with

place to conduct task?

this system without limitations that cause significant impact upon

operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for the task to be performed with

this system are addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for the task to be

performed with this system

¹ Markings are standardized among US and NATO forces.

² M274 markings may not be visible under low light or if surrounded by obscurants.

³ Markings are unlikely to be monitored and changed in near-real time. Markings would likely be monitored and changed as time

permits.

⁴ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task with this system.

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5.14

Task TASENS 14: Observe the indigenous population for indicators of CBRN/TIM

attack

5.14.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.14.1.1

Definition

To collect data from indigenous population that may indicate potential CBRN/TIM attack.

Indigenous population includes individuals, animals, and plants. Includes indicators such as

human illness and environmental abnormalities such as an unexplained absence or elevated

illness of wildlife or plants. Methods include observations as well as data obtained from local

sources or organizations.

5.14.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (TA 7, TA 7.1), Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.14.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSENS 3

5.14.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASHA 1, TASHA 9

5.14.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.14.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Significant urbanization. (C1.1.3.1)

2. Nuclear radiation effects. (C1.3.3.1.2)

3. Chemical effects. (C1.3.3.2)

4. Biological effects. (C1.3.3.3)

Military

1. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

2. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

3. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

4. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

5. Highly restricted information exchange. (2.3.1.8)

6. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

7. Little or no intelligence dissemination and receipt. (C2.4.7)

8. Extreme threat. (C2.9.1)

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Civil

1. Limited or negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

5.14.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.14.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Medical units, in the course of routine medical procedure, conduct medical surveillance to

determine whether biological warfare attacks have taken place. The task includes employing

epidemiological methods for biological attack assessment. This process is accomplished now as

part of standard medical process. They also support all types of restoration operations by

tracking the biological reactions to substances in the environment whether endemic or induced.

Coordination of medical services promotes, improves, conserves, and restores the mental or

physical well-being and performance of individuals or groups, and is performed in support of all

Services (and other nations as required). This deployment process is accomplished now as part of

standard medical processes.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” While Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01a provides guidance concerning general Theater Engagement

Plan (TEP) considerations that can be modified to include restoration operation considerations,

there is no definitive guidance for executing theater engagement restoration operation activities

at this level. Training of restoration operation country assistance teams is not conducted as part

of joint training. All Standing Joint Task Forces are proficient at restoration operation TEP.

Inclusion or restoration operation TEP is standard in all pertinent schools/courses.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

Significant DOTLPF changes in capability are projected in the near/mid term for this task, so the

overall projected near/mid-term capability will improve to “green.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the far term for this task, so the overall projected far-

term capability will remain “green.”

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Table 5.14-1. TASENS 14: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Observation of Indigenous

Population for CBRN/TIM Attack Indicators

Current Overall Capability

5¹

5²

10³

5⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Troops have been trained to recognize

10: Complete capability

abnormal events in the indigenous

5: Partial capability

population?

0: No capability

Procedures exist to gather and monitor

10: Complete capability

available indigenous population

5: Partial capability

information from local sources and

0: No capability

organizations?

Medical personnel have been trained to

10: Complete capability

recognize the early indicators of a

5: Partial capability

CBRN/TIM attack in the indigenous

0: No capability

population?

There is effective DOTLPF in place to

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be

conduct task?

effectively performed with minor limitations with little or no

direct impact upon operation

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are

addressed; task can be performed with limitations requiring

work-arounds

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for this task; task

can not be effectively accomplished

¹Nonmedical personnel (e.g., military patrols) have been trained to recognize abnormal events or indicators of abnormal activity

in the indigenous population. However, they typically have limited CBRN-awareness training. According to JP 3-40, locating,

characterizing, and tracking indicators and incidents of actual proliferation, employment, and/or use of WMD is required for joint

force counterproliferation operations, and this capability is required restoration operations as well. While CJCSM 3113.01a

provides guidance concerning general TEP considerations that can be modified to include restoration operation considerations,

there is no definitive guidance for executing theater engagement restoration operation activities at this level. Training of

restoration operation country assistance teams is not conducted as part of joint training. All Standing Joint Task Forces are

proficient at restoration operation TEP. Inclusion or restoration operation TEP is standard in all pertinent schools/courses.

² Procedures do exist to gather and monitor available indigenous population information from local sources and organizations.

However, these liaisons must establish relationships with these organizations to solicit the appropriate information, which

requires an adequate communications infrastructure. This infrastructure does not exist in all cases.

³ In the course of routine medical procedure, medical units conduct medical surveillance to determine whether biological warfare

attacks have taken place. They also support all types of restoration operations by tracking the biological reactions to substances in

the environment whether endemic or induced. Medical personnel review medical intelligence data and report observations via

disease reports and after action reports.

4 Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed. There are deficiencies related to gathering, identifying,

interpreting and disseminating (reporting) medically relevant intelligence information.

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5.14.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.14.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Nonmedical personnel have limited CBRN awareness training.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Inclusion of Joint Professional Military Education

(JPME) leader-learning areas for biological warfare considerations of medical surveillance.

2. Deficiency: Lack of definitive guidance for executing theater engagement restoration

operation activities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Integration of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)

for testing a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters’ ability to correctly correlate medical and

BW information into training center plans as plans are made for the establishment of a Joint

National Training Center (Quadrennial Defense Review Report—September 2001).

5.14.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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5.15

Task TASENS 15: Sense the tactical deployment of CBRN weapons on the

battlefield

5.15.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.15.1.1

Definition

To obtain tactical information and data from all sources that determine when a threat force is

preparing to conduct or is conducting a tactical deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons. Includes

information on civil and military plans related to deployment, training conducted by military

forces and civilians, and the overall CBRN/TIM defensive preparedness of threat forces.

5.15.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.15.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSENS 2

5.15.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

5.15.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.15.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. NA

Military

1. Minimal time available (C2.1.5)

2. Negligible to marginal intelligence database (C2.4.2)

3. Negligible to difficult theater intelligence access (C2.4.4)

4. Little or no certitude of data (C2.4.6)

5. Nuclear, chemical, and biological threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

3. No international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

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5.15.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.15.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.15-1 discusses the capability of intelligence gathering and specialized detection systems

to perform the task to the designated standards. There is no single capability that can

independently perform the task. Different intelligence-gathering methods (e.g., imagery

intelligence [IMINT] and communication intelligence [COMINT]) may be used in collaboration

with specialized detection systems (e.g., Swept Frequency Acoustic Interferometry detector) to

detect and identify tactical deployment of CBRN weapons on the battlefield.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Currently, detection and identification of

deployment is typically presumptive (indicators suggest, but do not confirm, deployment) and

not in near-real time (analysis of intelligence is required and is frequently performed by

personnel).

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The overall projected near/mid-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” The fielding of the Joint

Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) should eliminate some deficiencies, such as the

current inability to provide CBRN weapons deployment warnings to forces in near-real time.

However, in the future, detection and identification of deployment will likely remain

presumptive, and it will not likely occur in near-real time (due to analysis time).

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the far term for this task, so the overall projected far-

term capability will remain “yellow.”

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Table 5.15-1. TASENS 15: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Intelligence Gathering and Specialized

Detection Systems

Current Overall Capability

5¹

5²

5³

0⁴

0⁵

5⁶

5⁷

Near/Mid Term Overall Capability

5⁸

0⁹

10¹⁰

Far Term Overall Capability

10¹⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

Detection: Deploying CBRN weapons/units on

10: Complete capability

the battlefield can be detected?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Detection: Deploying CBRN weapons/units on

10: Complete capability

the battlefield is detected in near-real time?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Identification: Deploying CBRN weapons/units

10: Complete capability

on the battlefield can be identified?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Identification: Deploying CBRN weapons/units

10: Complete capability

on the battlefield is identified in near-real time?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

All data are correlated in near-real time?

10: Complete capability

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

CBRN weapons deployment warning to forces is

10: Complete capability

provided in near-real time?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task

task?

can be effectively performed with minor limitations

with little or no direct impact upon operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are

addressed; task can be performed with limitations

requiring work-arounds

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for this

task; task can not be effectively accomplished

¹Detection of CBRN weapon/unit deployment is primarily based on the gathering and analysis of intelligence (signals

intelligence, IMINT, measurement and signature intelligence, and human intelligence) which suggests CBRN weapon/unit

deployment. Intelligence could be obtained through COMINT and/or IMINT. Imagery could be obtained through UAV

photography or IR imaging.

² Since detection is primarily based on intelligence, it would not likely occur in near-real time. Indicators of deployment must be

detected, and compiled data must be analyzed before deployment can be concluded. Detection of CBRN weapon/unit deployment

generally takes hours, days, if not weeks. Nevertheless, it is possible that unequivocal evidence of deployment could be obtained

during deployment, which may lead to near-real time detection of deployment.

³Identification of deployed CBRN weapons/units is mainly based on visual recognition of the munitions, ancillary equipment

(e.g., decontamination teams), and/or individual protective equipment (IPE). Classification is actually more likely. Presumptive

identification of deployed chemical weapons can be achieved nonintrusively through the use of the Swept Frequency Acoustic

Interferometry (SFAI) detector (a handheld, nonintrusive instrument) that can rapidly (~20 seconds) identify CW agents within

proximal munitions, railcars, ton containers. Portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy (PINS) can also nonintrusively identify CW

agents; however, the equipment is much larger and identification takes ~1000 seconds. Biological weapon identification or

classification may be achieved through recognition of the munitions or munitions markings. Radiological and nuclear

weapons/units may be identified (and possibly confirmed) by radiation signature intelligence.

⁴ Identification is not likely to occur in near-real time. Ostensibly, presumptive identification can be achieved through IMINT

once weapons/units have been located and if the munitions can be immediately identified. Nevertheless, classification of

deployed weapons/units is more likely, though, it too will not likely occur in near-real time. Indicators of a deployed CBRN

weapon/unit through equipment and associated activities must be recognized and analyzed before identification or classification

can occur. Analysis may not even fall under tactical operations. Though the Swept Frequency Acoustic Interferometry detector

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5.15.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.15.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of near-real time, confirmatory detection of CBRN weapon deployment.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Additional training of personnel in recognizing and

analyzing indicators of CBRN weapons may decrease detection time, though it will not likely

provide confirmatory detection. Personnel: Increasing the number of reconnaissance or

intelligence personnel may decrease detection time, though it will not likely provide

confirmatory detection

2. Deficiency: Lack of near-real-time confirmatory identification of deployed CBRN weapons.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Additional training of personnel in classifying and

identifying CBRN weapons and their indicators may decrease identification time, though it

will not likely provide confirmatory identification. Personnel: Increasing the number of

reconnaissance or intelligence personnel may decrease identification time, though it will not

likely provide confirmatory identification.

5.15.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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5.16

Task TASENS 16: Sense the employment of tactical CBRN weapons on the

battlefield

5.16.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.16.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a military force or

transnational organization is preparing to or is employing CBRN/TIM weapons on the

battlefield. Areas of interest include when the weapons will be employed, joint operations area

targets selected, weapons systems involved, locations of weapons systems, and forces/personnel

involved in the employment. Extracts information from the medical, operational, intelligence,

and environmental communities to identify potential biological warfare activities.

5.16.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.16.1.2.1

Supported Task: OPSENS 3

5.16.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

5.16.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.16.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Atmospheric CBRN effects (C1.3.3)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

5.16.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.16.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

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Table 5.16-1 discusses the capability of intelligence gathering systems to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is no single capability that can independently perform the task.

Different intelligence gathering methods (e.g., IMINT and COMINT) may be collaboratively

used to detect and identify tactical employment of CBRN weapons on the battlefield.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The overall current capability is assessed as “red.” Currently, detection and identification of

CBRN weapon employment depends on timely collection and analysis of pertinent information.

Findings are typically presumptive (indicators suggest, but do not confirm, deployment) and not

provided in near-real time (analysis of intelligence is required and is frequently performed by

personnel). In the near future, findings will likely remain presumptive and not be provided in

near-real time.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the near/mid term for this task, so the overall projected

near/mid-term capability will remain “red.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No changes in capability are projected in the far term for this task, so the overall projected far-

term capability will remain “red.”

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Table 5.16-1. TASENS 16: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Intelligence Gathering

Current Overall Capability

5¹

0²

0³

0⁴

5⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

CBRN attacks can be

10: Complete capability

detected.

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

CBRN attacks can be

10: Complete capability

identified.

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Unambiguous attack

10: Complete capability

warning can be provided in

5: Partial capability

near-real time.

0: No capability

Accurate attack

10: Complete capability

assessments can be

5: Partial capability

provided in near-real time.

0: No capability

There is effective DOTLPF

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively

in place to conduct task.

performed with minor limitations with little or no direct impact upon

operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed; task can be

performed with limitations requiring work-arounds

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for this task; task cannot be

effectively accomplished

¹ Detection of CBRN weapon/unit attacks is primarily based on the gathering and analysis of intelligence which suggests CBRN

weapon/unit employment. COMINT may intercept a command for a CBRN attack, or IMINT may identify final preparations

typically made before an attack. Pertinent and credible information must be collected and analyzed for detection to be achieved.

Data collection methods and analysis capabilities for tactical commands are limited.

² Identification of a CBRN attack is more difficult than detecting it. For example, the presence of RADIACs may indicate that the

weapon is radiological or nuclear. IPE may indicate the type of attack, though the choice of IPE suggests only a particular type of

attack, as it may be simply improvised. Classification is more likely than identification. Classification and identification are

primarily based on the gathering and analysis of intelligence which suggests employment of a particular CBRN agent or class of

agents. Identifying the attack will likely require nontactical intelligence about the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. Like

detection, identification or classification requires the capability to collect and analyze pertinent information. This capability is

probably less developed than the detection capability.

³ Unambiguous attack warnings are unlikely to be provided in near-real time since data analysis by human(s) is typically

involved before issuance of a warning. Furthermore, these warnings would be presumptive, not confirmatory, since, in most

cases, they will be based on indicators which suggest a particular attack.

⁴ Attack assessments are based on the processing of gathered intelligence. The accuracy of the assessment is based on the

credibility of the gathered data and aptitude of the processor. Accurate attack assessments are unlikely to be provided in near-real

time since proper analysis typically requires a considerable amount of time.

⁵ Additional training and personnel are required to conduct task.

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5.16.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.16.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

1. Deficiency: Lack of near-real-time confirmatory detection of CBRN weapon employment.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Additional training of personnel in recognizing and

analyzing indicators of CBRN weapons may decrease detection time, though it will not likely

provide confirmatory detection. Personnel: Increasing the number of reconnaissance or

intelligence personnel may decrease detection time, though it will not likely provide

confirmatory detection.

2. Deficiency: Lack of near-real-time confirmatory identification of employed CBRN weapons.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Additional training of personnel in classifying and

identifying CBRN weapons and their indicators may decrease identification time, though it

will not likely provide confirmatory identification. Personnel: Increasing the number of

reconnaissance or intelligence personnel may decrease identification time, though it will not

likely provide confirmatory identification.

5.16.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Satellite imagery and area monitoring capabilities are in development and may prove useful in

determining whether a CBRN attack has taken place.

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5.17

Task TASENS 17: Verify completeness of decontamination operations

5.17.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.17.1.1

Definition

To confirm completeness of decontamination operations by sensing the presence or absence of

remaining CBRN/TIM hazards on humans, MWAs, and surfaces, as well as in water, following

decontamination. Involves sensing low-level CBRN/TIM hazards to ensure completion of

thorough decontamination operations.

5.17.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.17.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

5.17.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: TASHA 24, TASHA 31

5.17.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.17.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Mountainous, desert, jungle, and arctic terrain. (C1.1.1)

2. Significant urbanization. (C1.1.3.1)

3. Tropical, arctic, and arid climates. (C1.3.1)

4. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

5. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

6. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1)

7. High surface-wind velocity. (C1.3.1.3.3)

8. High/low relative humidity. (C1.3.1.3.5)

9. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

10. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

11. Extreme turbulence and wind shear. (C1.3.1.3.8)

12. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

5. Poor personnel morale. (C2.2.4.4)

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6. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil

1. Limited or no host nation support. (C2.8.5)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

3. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

4. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

5.17.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.17.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.17-1 discusses the capability of detection, identification, and quantification systems to

verify completeness of decontamination operations. Though it is possible that a single capability

could be used to confirm decontamination thoroughness for each of chemical radiological/

nuclear contamination (sensitive mass spectrometers for chemical and a sensitive multiradiation

RADIAC for radiological/nuclear), there is no single capability for all biological contamination.

Furthermore, one or more separate detectors may be used to substantiate findings.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Though there are capabilities to detect,

identify, and quantify CBRN agents on surfaces, personnel, MWAs, and in water, there are

multiple deficiencies. Most detectors, especially chemical and possibly biological as well, do not

detect low-level contamination. The lack of efficient and reliable sampling techniques

contributes to this deficiency. In addition, many detectors, particularly chemical detectors, are

susceptible to chemical interference, which may result in false positives and negatives. The

completeness of chemical and biological decontamination cannot be confirmed in near-real time.

Also, the inability to detect low-level residual contamination on and in airlift aircraft and their

cargo is a significant deficiency, due to global nature of airlift operations. Finally, there is little

or no doctrine on when thorough decontamination is complete.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

The overall projected near/mid-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” The deployment of

JCBAWM and JBAIDS is expected to reduce deficiencies in low-level chemical and biological

contamination detection. Furthermore, the question “How clean is clean?” is expected to be

answered in a thorough study to be released in the near/mid term. However, in the near future,

reliable sampling techniques are still expected to be lacking, chemical detectors will remain

susceptible to interference, and verifying completeness of decontamination operations will still

not occur in near-real time.

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Table 5.17-1. TASENS 17: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Detection, Identification, and Quantification Systems

Current Overall Capability

3¹

5²

5³

5⁴

5⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

5⁶

5⁷

5⁸

5⁹

10¹⁰

Far-Term Overall Capability

5¹¹

5¹²

5¹³

5¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

Residual CBRN hazards can be detected at

10: Complete capability

low-effect levels?

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Residual CBRN hazards can be identified?

10: Complete capability

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Residual CBRN hazards can be quantified?

10: Complete capability

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

Residual CBRN hazards can be detected,

10: Complete capability

identified, and/or quantified in near-real

5: Partial capability

time?

0: No capability

There is effective DOTLPF in place to

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for this task. Task can be effectively performed with minor

conduct task?

limitations with little or no direct impact upon operations

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for this task are addressed

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for this task; task cannot be effectively accomplished

¹ Chemical hazards: Most detectors cannot detect CWA at low levels (e.g., at Military air guideline, 1-14 days), which is required to verify thorough decontamination. MSs (e.g.,

Viking SpectraTrak, HAPSITE) can detect low levels, but efficient, reliable sampling is difficult. M8 and M9 paper can be used to detect liquid agent on surfaces. The M256A1 kit

is a sensitive detection system used before demasking and thus may be used to verify decontamination completeness. MSs and M272 kit can detect chemical hazards in water.

Adsorbed and absorbed chemical agents are extremely difficult to detect. Detection of agent vapor alone is insufficient in determining whether a surface is a potential contact

hazard. Most detectors are susceptible to interference (false positives and negatives).

Biological hazards: Biological agents are extremely potent and for decontamination to be verified there must be an ability to detect very small amounts of agent. HHAs can detect

most BWAs. There are not currently HHAs for all BWAs (particularly all viral-hemorrhagic fever agents), and there are few or no HHAs for TIBs. In addition, sampling is not

sufficiently efficient or reliable. Ostensibly, all BWAs and TIBs can be detected at low levels by ELISA if an antigen or antibody for that hazard has been identified and replicated.

PCR is even more sensitive than ELISA; however, it can detect nucleic acids only. Culturing and ELISA are typically the gold standards for pathogens and toxins, respectively.

Sampling is a problem for these capabilities as well.

Radiological and Nuclear hazards: RADIACs can be extremely sensitive, and for the most part, low-level contamination can be detected (with the exception of contamination in

water since water considerably attenuates the emitted radiation. Alpha-emitting contaminants are of primary concern since alpha particles have short ranges and are easily shielded.

Most RADIACs detect beta/gamma radiation, but not alpha radiation.

²Chemical hazards: Detected residual chemical hazards are typically classified by detectors, though mass spectrometers can identify the specific agent.

Biological hazards: Most detection systems are highly specific for a particular agent; therefore, identification can usually be achieved.

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Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs identify the type of radiation detected, but not the specific radioisotope. For gamma emitters, a gamma spectroscopy system can

identify the radioisotope.

³ Chemical hazards: At low levels, only MSs are able to quantify agent (in ppm or ppb). Sampling is insufficiently efficient and reliable.

Biological hazards: HHAs provide only a generic indication of the hazard through the use of a reader. RT-PCR can provide a generic quantification capability as well. Some

varieties of ELISA can absolutely quantify the antigen or antibody concentration. Sampling is insufficiently efficient and reliable.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs quantify the amount of radiation being emitted from the contamination, not the amount of radioactive material.

⁴ Chemical hazards: MSs take approximately 10 minutes to detect, identify, and quantify agent.

Biological hazards: HHAs take up to 15 minutes to detect, identify, and generically quantify agent. RAPID RT-PCR requires up to 30 minutes (following sample collection and

preparation) to detect, identify, and generically quantify agent. ELISA requires 1-2 hours (following sample collection and preparation) for detection, identification, and if

applicable, quantification, primarily because of incubation time.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs and gamma spectrometers generally can detect, identify (if applicable), and quantify in near-real time.

⁵ Doctrine exists for when decontamination is required. It is typically based on the amount of contamination, which is expected to incapacitate a certain percentage of personnel

(FM 3-5); though, in some cases, it is an actual contamination density. There is little to no doctrine on when decontamination is complete. Currently it is operationally, not

scientifically driven, since the question “How clean is clean?” has not yet been answered.

⁶ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM will detect low-level hazards in water. MSs (e.g., Viking SpectraTrak, HAPSITE) will continue as capabilities to detect low levels, but efficient,

reliable sampling will continue to be an issue. Nevertheless, many detectors will not be able to detect CWA at low levels (e.g., at Military air guideline, 1-14 days), which is

required in order to verify thorough decontamination. Many detectors will detect few or no TICs at any level. Adsorbed and absorbed chemical agents will remain extremely

difficult to detect. Most detectors will still be susceptible to interference (false positives and negatives).

Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to detect all low-level BWA hazards in water, and on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs. JBAIDS is not expected to detect any TIBs. Some

TIBs may be detectable by particular HHAs. JCBAWM is expected to detect low-level biological hazards in water. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue to be sensitive, and thus, for the most part, low-level contamination will be detected. More ADM-300s (which detect

most forms of radiation) are likely to be deployed. Alpha-emitting contaminants will remain a concern since alpha particles have short ranges and are easily shielded. Many

RADIACs will detect beta/gamma radiation, but not alpha radiation.

⁷ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM is expected to identify the chemical hazard. Mass spectrometers will continue to be hazard-identifying capabilities.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to identify all detected agents. Since HHAs, PCR, and ELISA are highly specific for a particular agent, they will continue to identify the

detected agent.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue to identify the type of radiation detected, but not the specific radioisotope. Thus, most detectors will not be able to

identify the radioisotope. For gamma emitters, gamma spectroscopy systems will remain radioisotope-identifying capabilities.

⁸ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM is expected to quantify low-level CWA/TIC hazards in water. Mass spectrometers will continue as capabilities to quantify CWA/TIC agent at ppm

and ppb levels. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS and JCBAWM are expected to quantify all detected agents in a sample. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue as capabilities to quantify radiation being emitted from the contamination. In general, the amount of radiation, not the

amount of radioactive material will be quantifiable.

⁹ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM is expected to detect, identify, and quantify chemical hazards within 10 minutes.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to detect, identify, and quantify BWA hazards within 25-40 minutes. JCBAWM is expected to detect, identify, and quantify biological

hazards within 10 minutes.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs and gamma spectrometers are expected to generally detect, identify (if applicable), and quantify in near-real time.

¹⁰ The question “How clean is clean?” is expected to be answered in the near/mid term. Once answered, it is predicted that doctrine will change accordingly. Doctrine will then be

scientifically, not operationally, driven.

¹¹ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM will detect low-level hazards in water. JMCBDS may be able to detect low-level hazards on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs.

MSs (e.g., Viking SpectraTrak, HAPSITE) will continue as capabilities to detect low levels, but efficient, reliable sampling will continue to be an issue. Nevertheless, many

detectors will not be able to detect CWA at low levels (e.g., at Military air guideline, 1-14 days), which is required to verify thorough decontamination. Many detectors will detect

few or no TICs at any level. Adsorbed and absorbed chemical agents will remain extremely difficult to detect. Most detectors will still be susceptible to interference (false positives

and negatives).

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Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to detect all low-level BWA hazards in water, and on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs. JBAIDS is not expected to detect any TIBs. Some

TIBs may be detectable by ELISA, PCR, and particular HHAs. JCBAWM is expected to detect low-level biological hazards in water. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue to be sensitive, and thus, for the most part, low-level contamination will be detected. More ADM-300s (which detect

most forms of radiation) are likely to be deployed. Alpha-emitting contaminants will remain a concern since alpha particles have short ranges and are easily shielded. Many

RADIACs will detect beta/gamma radiation, but not alpha radiation.

¹² Chemical hazards: JCBAWM and JMCBDS are expected to identify the chemical hazard. Mass spectrometers will continue to be hazard-identifying capabilities.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to identify all detected agents. Since HHAs, PCR, and ELISA are highly specific for a particular agent, they will remain capabilities to

identify detected agents.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue to identify the type of radiation detected, but not the specific radioisotope. Thus, most detectors will not be able to

identify the radioisotope. For gamma emitters, gamma spectroscopy systems will remain radioisotope-identifying capabilities.

¹³ Chemical hazards: JCBAWM is expected to quantify low-level CWA/TIC hazards in water. JMCBDS may be able to quantify low-level hazards on surfaces, personnel, and

MWAs. Mass spectrometers will continue as capabilities to quantify CWA/TIC agent at ppm and ppb levels. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS and JCBAWM are expected to quantify all detected agent in a sample. Sampling will likely remain an issue.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs will continue as capabilities to quantify radiation being emitted from the contamination. In general, the amount of radiation, not the

amount of radioactive material will be quantifiable.

¹⁴ Chemical hazards: JMCBDS is expected to detect, identify, and quantify chemical hazards within 2 minutes. JCBAWM is expected to detect, identify, and quantify chemical

hazards within 10 minutes.

Biological hazards: JBAIDS is expected to detect, identify, and quantify BWA hazards within 25-40 minutes. JCBAWM is expected to detect, identify, and quantify biological

hazards within 10 minutes.

Radiological and nuclear hazards: RADIACs and gamma spectrometers are expected to generally detect, identify (if applicable), and quantify in near-real time.

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5.17.3

Functional Solution Analysis

5.17.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section states the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are no

solutions or there are only partial solutions for a particular deficiency, that deficiency is then

reassessed in the IMAs section.

Deficiency: Inability of most chemical detectors to detect low-level contamination.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Susceptibility of most chemical detectors to chemical interference.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Inability to detect absorbed and adsorbed chemical agents.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Efficiency and reliability of chemical sampling insufficient for absolute

quantification.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Efficiency and reliability of biological sampling insufficient for absolute

quantification.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Detection, identification, and quantification of chemical hazards not in real time

or near-real time.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Detection, identification, and quantification of biological hazards not in real time

or near-real time.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Limited ability to detect alpha-emitting radiological contamination.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

Deficiency: Inability of most RADIACs to detect alpha radiation.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None

10. Deficiency: Inability of most RADIACs to detect neutron radiation.

Non-Material Solutions: None

11. Deficiency: Lack of doctrine on when decontamination is complete.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop scientifically based decontamination standards

that account for low-level effects of contamination.

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¹ McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National

Academy Press. 2000. http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/; Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; Detection and Measurement of Chemical Agents, http://books.nap.edu/html/terrorism/ch4.html; Conventional analytical methods for

chemical warfare agents, http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/2002/pdf/7412x2281.pdf; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic

Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders. 2000. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm; Loerop, William. Chemical Biological

Defense Science and Technology Chemical Standoff Briefing. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. http://proceedings.ndia.org/dod_cb/Tuesday_PM/Zarzycki.pdf

² Includes GC/MS, LC/MS, Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization with Time-of-Flight Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS).

³ Examples include CO₂ long-wave IR (LWIR) Differential Scattering/Differential Absorption of Light (DISC)/Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL), CO₂ conv mid-wave IR

(MWIR) DISC/DIAL, solid-state (SS) conv MWIR DISC/DIAL, FTIR, Hyperspectral LWIR, Passive MWIR, SS conv LWIR DISC/DIAL, SS conv short-wave IR (SWIR) -

LWIR, SS conv UV-LW IR, Active LWIR Polarization, Active MWIR Polarization, Passive LWIR Polarization, Filtered Forward-Looking IR (FLIR), UV Laser-Induced

Fluorescence (LIF)/FTIR, and Microwave (GHz and THz) Spectroscopy.

⁴ May be coupled with GC; External Second Gate, Fourier Transform Ion Mobility Spectrometry approach can improve sensitivity and selectivity.

⁵ For example, PCD.

⁶ May be coupled with GC.

⁷ Examples include SAW/IMS, IMC/SAW/Electrochemical/SCCell (S-CAD), GC/IMS.

⁸ May be coupled with GC or reversed-phase liquid chromatography (RPLC).

⁹ Includes SAW technology.

¹⁰ Includes PCR and RT-PCR amplification, DNA microchip technology, SAW technology, and DNA-recognition enzymes.

¹¹ Includes Geiger-Mueller detectors, proportional gas detectors, and ionization chambers.

¹² Includes ZnS(Ag), anthracene, trans-stilbene, para-terphenyl, phenyl oxazole, NaI(Tl), CsI(Tl), bismuth germinate (Bi₄Ge₃O₁₂), barium fluoride (BaF₂)-based detectors.

¹³ Includes germanium, silicon, cadmium telluride (CdTe), and mercuric iodide (HgI₂)-based detectors.

¹⁴ Distributing more Viking SpectraTraks and HAPSITEs is a potential solution.

¹⁵ Classifies, but generally does not identify, agents.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

6.0

Strategic National Shape

6.1

Task SNSHA 1: Characterize the global CBRN/TIM threat and situation

6.2

Task SNSHA 2: Conduct global CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis

6.3

Task SNSHA 3: Coordinate international CBRND protocols, standards, and agreements

6.4

Task SNSHA 4: Coordinate CBRND within the interagency process

6.5

Task SNSHA 5: Determine joint CBRND capability to meet the global CBRN/TIM

situation

6.6

Task SNSHA 6: Ensure joint CBRND readiness

6.7

Task SNSHA 7: Coordinate global CBRN information systems and processes

6.8

Task SNSHA 8: Establish national CBRND strategy, plans, and policy

6.9

Task SNSHA 9: Coordinate CBRND aspects of global medical operations

6.10

Task SNSHA 10: Coordinate global CBRND operations

6.11

Task SNSHA 11: Provide Shape “Global Family of Engagement Plan” policies and

guidelines to combatant commanders

6.12

Task SNSHA 12: Establish global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies,

procedures, and networks

6.13

Task SNSHA 13: Coordinate internationally accepted standards and procedures for

determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons

6.14

Task SNSHA 14: Sense the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

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6.0

Strategic National Shape

6.0.1

Introduction

At the strategic level of war, a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops

and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish

national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks

for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater

war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in

accordance with strategic plans. The strategic national sublevel encompasses U.S. Department of

Defense (DoD), service, and interagency tasks. Fourteen Strategic National (SN) Shape (SHA)

tasks were identified in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Functional

Area Analysis (FAA).

This chapter, which details the strategic national Shape area, restates relevant information from

the CBRN FAA, including a description of each of the 14 SNSHA tasks, derivation of the task,

an indication of other linked-tasks, and the pertinent conditions. The Functional Needs Analysis

(FNA) section addresses the capability and deficiency analysis, and a brief description of

potential near-, mid-, and far-term changes. Once all the capabilities are considered, the

assessment concludes with a separate, overarching look at the entire capability spectrum to

identify remaining gaps and/or synergies. The Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) section

addresses possible solutions for the deficiencies identified in the FNA and categorizes them into

materiel or non-materiel. The non-materiel solutions are addressed first and reflect one or more

of the six areas of DOTLPF: doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities.

If there is no non-materiel solution to the deficiencies, then materiel solutions are considered.

These encompass broad approaches that are not system-specific. These potential materiel

approaches are addressed in the Ideas for Materiel Approaches (IMA) section. The IMAs provide

a possible near-, mid-, or far-term resolution to identified deficiencies within the individual

capabilities.

Most of the SNSHA tasks involve required capabilities of major staffs or staff sections within

DoD. In those areas where a DoD staff or agency needed to interact within the interagency, the

task focused on DoD capabilities required to facilitate the interaction.

6.0.2

FNA Summary

Table 6.0-1 below summarizes the overall current and projected capability to perform the

SNSHA tasks identified in the CBRN FAA. The overall capability to conduct SNSHA tasks in

the current time frame is assessed as “yellow.” The Joint Staff Directorate for Command,

Control, Communications, and Computer Systems, J-6, leads the C4 community and leads in

identifying and resolving military aspects of information-based issues of national importance, to

include CBRN Defense (CBRND) Shape issues. Because of documented training, education, and

experience issues, however, J-6 personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be

resolved. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing

CBRN defense issues involving the warfighter, the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical,

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Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRND) must proactively engage the J-6

to determine the adequacy of current and projected global CBRN information systems and

processes to allow joint forces to effectively conduct operations in a CBRN environment. There

are key deficiencies in DoD’s ability provide shared CBRN/toxic industrial material (TIM)

situational awareness and understanding to commanders at all levels. As an example, although a

National Intelligence Support Team’s (NIST) mission is to provide national-level, all-source

intelligence support from throughout the intelligence community (IC) to commanders during

crisis or contingency operations, there are deficiencies associated with NIST’S ability to

characterize the global CBRN/TIM threat and situation. At issue is the task of providing the

NIST with current and accurate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence. The recent realignment of the IC

under the National Intelligence Director, along with new intelligence analysis techniques that

neither overstate or understate adversary CBRN/TIM capabilities, will assist in the process of

correcting recently identified deficiencies which prevent timely, current, and reliable actionable

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence/information. Other deficient areas include the CBRN/TIM

education and experience of the NIST and CBRND experts who are assigned. The pattern of

deficiencies of CBRND education, experience, training, exercises, and experimentation holds

true for all of the capabilities selected for assessment. Whether the NIST, the National Military

Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), the CJCS J-3 Operations Directorate, or Joint Director of

Military Support (JDOMS), the fundamental capability of the organization/staff is not in

question; rather, their ability to fuse CBRND considerations with their basic mission is

inadequate. Cooperative linkages between various global systems capabilities, although

proposed, have not yet been coordinated. Since no linkages currently exist between various

detection technologies (e.g., Biological Integrated Detection System [BIDS], phased-array

radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors with Global

Positioning System [GPS] linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors

networked to centralized data servers, etc.), no cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies are

required. It is projected that improvements due to coordination/ doctrine, organization, training,

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) enhancements will

dramatically improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Shape requirements, but the overall

status will remain “yellow” due to the long lead time required for training and education to be

matched by experience in CBRND issues and the current lack of detection networks.

Table 6.0-1. Strategic National Shape Summary FNA Findings

CBRN

Capability

Strategic

CBRN Strategic National Shape Task

Near/

National

Title

Current

Mid

Far

Shape Task

Number

Characterize the global CBRN/TIM threat

SNSHA 1

and situation.

•

Conduct global CBRN/TIM vulnerability

SNSHA 2

analysis.

•

Coordinate international CBRND protocols,

SNSHA 3.

standards, and agreements.

•

Coordinate CBRND within the interagency

SNSHA 4

process.

•

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