CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.2

Task OPSENS 2: Sense the operational deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA

4.2.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.2.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a military force or

transnational organization is preparing to conduct or is conducting an operational deployment of

CBRN/TIM weapons in the JOA. Includes information on civil and military plans related to

deployment, training conducted by military forces and civilians, and the overall CBRN/TIM

defensive preparedness of military forces.

4.2.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, ST 2.2.2.

4.2.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 2

4.2.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: OPSHA 1, OPSHA 2

4.2.1.2.3

Supporting Task: TASENS 15

4.2.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. NA

Military

1. Transnational organization

a. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

b. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

2. Nation-states

a. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

b. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

3. Common Military Conditions

a. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.2.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.2.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.2-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The OP-level J-2 is responsible for working with theater-level and component command

intelligence organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support JOA operations. Per

joint intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN

functions pertaining to adversary deployment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN

staff element. But because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J-2

personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the OP-level

commander’s main source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving the

warfighter, the OP-level CBRND staff must proactively engage the J-2 to determine the

adequacy of current and projected theater-level intelligence capabilities to sense the operational

deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA. To be proactive, the OP-level CBRND staff must be

better prepared on intelligence/CBRND fusion issues. For the purposes of this analysis, current

capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for

JRO-CBRND action.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve the ability of the OP-level staff to sense the operational deployment of CBRN weapons

in the JOA, but the overall status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering

intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve the ability of the OP-level staff to develop

intelligence indicators for sensing the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

in the JOA, but the overall status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in

gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.2-1. OPSENS 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

G⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

Y⁷

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

Deploying CBRN weapons/units in the

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to work with the J-3 and

G - Yes

JOA are detected and identified.

various OP-level organizations to detect and identify deploying CBRN weapons/units.

Y - Limited

R - No

Intelligence on deploying CBRN

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to work with intelligence

G - Yes

weapons/units is accurate.

organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on deploying CBRN weapons/units.

Y - Limited

R - No

Deployment warning is provided to JOA

Assesses efficacy of warning capability once deployment is detected and identified.

G - Yes

forces.

Y - Limited

R - No

Operational surprise does not occur.

Assesses whether adequate resources and means are applied to obviate operational

G - Yes

surprise.

Y - Limited

R - No

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. The OP-level CBRN staff is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its intelligence-related

responsibilities. The J-2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation

does not provide feedback on intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

² The OP-level J-2 works with various theater-level and component command intelligence organizations to detect and identify deploying CBRN weapons/units in the JOA.

Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not be adequate.

³ The OP-level J-2 works with various theater-level and component command intelligence organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence detecting and identifying deploying

CBRN weapons/units in the JOA. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.

⁴ Nothing precludes providing warning of operational deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA to JOA forces once the deploying units are detected and identified.

⁵ The OP-level J-2 works with various theater-level and component command intelligence organizations to ensure that operational surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and

means may not be sufficiently applied in detecting and identifying deploying CBRN weapons/units in the JOA.

⁶ DOTLPF enhancements will be made possible as a result of experimentation designed to close intelligence fusion knowledge gaps.

⁷ DOTLPF enhancements will be made possible as a result of experimentation designed to close intelligence fusion knowledge gaps.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.2.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.2.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying the operational

deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the various potential OP-

level J-2s and their typical alignment component command intelligence organizations to

develop effective JOA techniques and procedures for detecting and identifying the

operational deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA and to provide useful indicators. Each

service organization that might form the foundation of a joint task force has a different

approach to both CBRN intelligence and their CBRN staffing. Indicators to be developed

must include the means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and yields, TIMS

being considered, means by which to release TIMS, delivery modes or systems, and unit

designations, locations, routes, and formations.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on the operational

deployment of CBRN weapons in the JOA may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the various potential OP-

level J-2s and their typical alignment component command intelligence organizations to

develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure accurate JOA intelligence on countries

or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams and to develop

metrics to measure accuracy.

Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that a

nation-state or transnational organization preparing to operationally deploy CBRN weapons

in the JOA is detected.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Analyze the CBRN organization or staffing of the

various potential OP-level J-2s and their typical alignment component command intelligence

organizations from a CBRN standpoint to ensure that they can provide required CBRN

intelligence concerning CBRN hazards. These hazards need to be detected, identified, and

quantified for Shape to provide a clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN

situation to the commander. Training: Conduct a small-scaled exercise where “to identify

resources needed to detect the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons” is one of the

primary objectives. In addition, JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or theater

intelligence organizations to develop effective training for analysts as well as those managing

all means of collection. The training must allow analysts and collection managers the means

by which to determine inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make

recommendations for improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with the various

potential OP-level J-2s and their typical alignment component command intelligence

organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as those

managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and

collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or

collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or

experience. Facilities: Analyze training requirements and developed/modify special training

facilities if required.

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Enhance joint intelligence and CBRN publications to

adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles and responsibilities

are clearly delineated. Incorporate information attained from the exercise into the doctrine

and joint intelligence and CBRN publications.

Deficiency: COCOM CBRND staff is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its

intelligence-related responsibilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Each OP-level CBRND staff should have a section

dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence issues. Personnel: Each OP-level CBRND staff

should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a section dedicated to

resolving CBRN intelligence issues.

Deficiency: The J-2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable each JTF J-2 staff to

better understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is

required to support the Shape function of OP-level CBRND. Leadership: Develop an

education program that will enable each JTF J-2 staff to better understand their CBRN role

and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the Shape function

of OP-level CBRND.

Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff

officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education

programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence process

and their roles and responsibilities.

Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence

indicators for this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with both the intelligence and

CBRN communities to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN experimentation

campaign plans.

Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into JPME.

4.2.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.3

Task OPSENS 3: Sense the employment of CBRN weapons in the JOA

4.3.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.3.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a military force or

transnational organization is preparing to or is employing CBRN/TIM weapons in the JOA.

Areas of interest include when the weapons will be employed, JOA targets selected, weapons

systems involved, locations of weapons systems, and forces/personnel involved in the

employment. Extracts information from the medical, operational, intelligence, and environmental

communities to identify potential biological warfare activities. Includes intelligence assessment

of industrial sites, storage and transport means for toxic industrial chemical (TIC) threats,

hazards, and evidence of intentional or inadvertent release.

4.3.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 2.2.2).

4.3.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 3

4.3.1.2.2

Lateral Task: OPSHA 1

4.3.1.2.3

Supporting Tasks: TASENS 14, TASENS 16

4.3.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Atmospheric CBRN effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.3.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.3.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.3-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The OP-level J-2 is responsible for working with theater-level organizations to obtain

intelligence that is required to support joint OP-level operations. Per joint intelligence doctrine,

the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN functions pertaining to

adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN staff element, but because

of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2 personnel may not have a full grasp

of what needs to be coordinated. As the OP-level commander’s main source of expertise in

addressing CBRND issues involving the warfight, the OP-level CBRND staff must proactively

engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of current and projected theater-level intelligence

capabilities to sense the employment of CBRN/TIM weapons in theater. To be proactive, the OP-

level CBRND staff must be better prepared on intelligence/CBRND fusion issues. For the

purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed

and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve the ability of the OP-level staff to sense the employment of CBRN weapons in the JOA,

but the overall status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence

on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve the ability of the OP-level staff to develop

intelligence indicators for sensing the employment of CBRN weapons in the JOA, but the overall

status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on

CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.3-1. OPSENS 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

CBRN/TIM attacks are detected

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to work with the J-3 and also

G - Yes

and identified.

intelligence and OP-level organizations to detect and identify CBRN/TIM attacks

Y- Limited

R - No

Reports on CBRN/TIM attacks are

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to work with the J-3 and also

G - Yes

accurate.

intelligence and operational organizations to ensure accuracy of CBRN/TIM attack reports.

Y - Limited

R - No

Unambiguous attack warning is

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to work with the J-3 and various

G - Yes

provided.

theater-level organizations to provide unambiguous CBRN/TIM attack warning

Y - Limited

R - No

Attack assessments are accurate.

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2 to ensure accuracy of attack

G - Yes

assessments

Y - Limited

R - No

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address the issue of sensing the terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the use of TIM as a weapon, or third-party situations

where U.S. resources can not be brought to bear.

² The OP-level J-2 works with the OP-level J-3 and various theater-level organizations to detect and identify CBTN/TIM attacks. In the case of a nation-state conducting a CBRN attack

against U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. In the event of terrorist use of CBRN, it may be difficult or impossible to detect or identify the attack, and in the case of a biological

attack or attacks involving TIM, it may be difficult to determine whether it is a natural disease outbreak or an accident. In the event of use not involving U.S. forces or allies, it may be

difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it involves terrorists or non-U.S. allies and to detect or identify attacks may not be adequate.

³ Methods and procedures for accurately reporting CBRN attacks against U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and procedures for accurately reporting third-party,

terrorist, and TIM attacks may not be adequate.

⁴ The OP-level J-2 works with the OP-level J-3 and various theater-level organizations to provide unambiguous CBRN/TIM attack warning. In the case of determining whether a

nation-state has conducted a CBRN attack against U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. In the event of terrorist use of CBRN, it may be difficult or impossible to

attribute the attack, and in the case of a biological attack or attacks involving TIM, it may be difficult to determine whether it is a natural disease outbreak or an accident. In the

event of use not involving U.S. forces or allies, it may be difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it involves terrorists or

non-U.S. allies and to provide unambiguous warning may not be adequate.

⁵ Methods and procedures for providing accurate attack assessments when CBRN is used against U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and procedures providing accurate

attack assessments in third-party, terrorist, and TIM attacks may not be adequate.

⁶ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications will adequately address the issue of sensing the terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the use of TIM as a weapon, and third-party situations

where U.S. resources cannot be brought to bear.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.3.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.3.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of terrorist CBRN attacks may not

be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing the CBRN attacks of terrorists.

Issues to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing unambiguous

warning of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and assessments, and

establishing verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an experimentation/

exercise campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of CBRN attacks of terrorists

at the operational level.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of small biological attacks may

not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing of small biological attacks. Issues

to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing unambiguous warning

of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and assessments, and establishing

verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an experimentation/exercise

campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of small biological attacks at the

operational level.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of TIM attacks may not be

adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing of TIM attacks. Issues to be

resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing unambiguous warning of

attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and assessments, and establishing

verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an experimentation/exercise

campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of TIM attacks at the operational

level.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of third-party attacks may not be

adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing third-party CBRN attacks. Issues to

be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing unambiguous warning of

attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and assessments and verification

techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an experimentation/exercise campaign to

address all issues surrounding the sensing of third-party CBRN attacks at the operational

level.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.4

Task OPSENS 4: Sense JOA CBRN hazards due to employment or ROTA of

CBRN/TIM weapons or materials

4.4.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.4.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine the location and source of JOA

CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials. Areas of

interest include detecting, identifying, and quantifying those CBRN/TIM hazards in all physical

states (solid, liquid, gas located in the air, on the ground, or in water). Enables the continued

monitoring and identification of hazards in support of shaping, shielding, and sustaining.

4.4.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 2.2.2).

4.4.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 4

4.4.1.2.2

Lateral Task: OPSHA 1

4.4.1.2.3

Supporting Tasks: TASENS 1, TASENS 2, TASENS 3, TASENS 4, TASENS

5, TASENS 6, TASENS 7, TASENS 8, TASENS 9, TASENS 10, TASENS 11,

TASENS 12

4.4.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Atmospheric CBRN effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil

1. TIMs are present. (C3.3.7.5)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.4.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.4.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.4-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task to the designated

standard. There are two capabilities that exist, and no other capabilities are projected that will

accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The OP-level staffs for Intelligence and Operations are able under most circumstances to

effectively sense theater CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM

weapons or materials. The J-2 works with the J-3 and various OP-level organizations to detect

and identify CBRN/TIM hazards. In the case of a nation-state conducting a CBRN attack against

U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. While it may not be possible to attribute

CBRN/TIM hazards as attacks, it will be possible to detect and identify hazards. In the event of

use not involving U.S. forces or allies, it may be difficult to gain required information.

Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it involves non-U.S. allies or countries

that restrict information and access may not be adequate. As the OP-level commander’s main

source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving the warfighter, the OP-level

CBRND staff must proactively engage the J-2 and J-3 to determine the adequacy of current and

projected JOA operational and intelligence capabilities to sense when JOA CBRN/TIM hazards

due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials are present. For the purposes

of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and

clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capabilities are currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term

experimentation results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of

new capabilities. It is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF

enhancements will dramatically improve the ability of the OP-level staff to articulate and

improve Sense requirements. Continuing problems with information coordination and collection

in the event of use not involving U.S. forces or allies will continue to result in a capability

projection of “yellow.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capabilities are currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational

structures or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as

recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may continue to improve the ability to sense theater

CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials. It is

anticipated that problems associated with information coordination and collection in the event of

use not involving U.S. forces or allies will be rectified as a result of experimentation and permit

a capability projection of “green.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.4-1. OPSENS 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current

Operational-Level J-2

Y¹

Y²

G³

Operational-Level J-3

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Near/Mid

Operational-Level J-2

Operational-Level J-3

Far

Operational-Level J-2

G⁷

Operational-Level J-3

G⁸

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

Hazards are

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2/J-3 to work with various OP-level organizations to

G - Yes

detected and

detect and identify CBRN/TIM hazards. Recognizes inherent current delay in sensing most biological attacks and

Y - Limited

identified.

concentrates on processing of technically available data when they become available.

R - No

Reports on

Assesses techniques and procedures used by the OP-level J-2/J-3 to work with intelligence and operational

G - Yes

hazards are

organizations to ensure accuracy of CBRN/TIM hazard reports. Recognizes inherent current difficulty in

Y - Limited

accurate.

immediately sensing most biological attacks and concentrates on accuracy of data when it becomes available.

R - No

Hazard warning is

Assesses efficacy of warning capability once hazard is detected and identified.

G - Yes

provided.

Y- Limited

R- No

¹ The J-2 works with the J-3 and various OP-level organizations to detect and identify CBRN/TIM hazards. In the case of a nation-state conducting a CBRN attack against U.S.

forces, the process is mature and effective. While it may not be possible to attribute CBRN/TIM hazards as attacks, it will be possible to detect and identify hazards. In the event of

use not involving U.S. forces or allies, it may be difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it involves non-U.S. allies or

countries that restrict information and access may not be adequate.

² Methods and procedures for accurately reporting hazards involving U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and procedures for accurately reporting hazards involving non-

U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access may not be adequate.

³ Once a hazard or potential hazard is detected and identified, nothing precludes providing hazard warning to JOA forces and to the COCOM.

⁴ The J-3 is responsible for operations and command and control systems and ongoing current operations. The J-3 will coordinate all information and, in conjunction with the J-2,

deconflict and assess the hazard reports and send out taskings JOA-wide for further required detection, identification, or monitoring missions within the capabilities of operational

forces. Coordination will be required with the COCOM for detection and identification outside of JOA capabilities.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

⁵ Nothing precludes accurate reports within the operational capabilities of the combatant command. The J-3 must coordinate with the COCOM for information or requirements

outside of JOA capabilities.

⁶ Once a hazard or potential hazard is detected and identified, nothing precludes providing hazard warning to JOA forces and to the COCOM.

⁷ It is anticipated that problems associated with information coordination and collection in the event of use not involving U.S. forces or allies will be rectified as a result of

experimentation and permit a capability projection of “green.”

⁸ It is anticipated that problems associated with information coordination and collection in the event of use not involving U.S. forces or allies will be rectified as a result of

experimentation and permit a capability projection of “green.”

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.4.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.4.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: In the event of JOA CBRN/TIM hazards not involving U.S. forces or allies, it

may be difficult to detect or identify hazards and gain required information.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing theater CBRN/TIM hazards due to

employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials. Issues to be resolved include

detecting and identifying hazards when they affect non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict

information and access.

Deficiency: In the event of JOA CBRN/TIM hazards involving non-U.S. allies or countries

that restrict information and access, it may be difficult to gain accurate required information.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and exercises,

develop TTPs that address all accuracy issues surrounding sensing theater CBRN/TIM

hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials. Issues to be

resolved include determining how to accurately gain information on hazards when they affect

non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access.

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address the issue of

sensing JOA hazards in third-party situations where U.S. resources cannot be brought to bear.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Integrate all information concerning actions to be taken

when hazards affect non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access and

integrate lessons learned and procedures developed through experimentation into appropriate

joint publications.

Deficiency: Experimentation and training may not be conducted as frequently and

extensively as required to identify capability gaps and required enhancements.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Conduct experimentation and training as required to

identify capability gaps and required enhancements.

4.4.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.5

Task OPSENS 5: Monitor combatant command designated activities within the

JOA for compliance with CBRN treaties or elimination requirements

4.5.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.5.1.1

Definition

To use JTF resources to monitor COCOM-designated activities within the JOA for compliance

with CBRN treaties or elimination requirements.

4.5.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 5.7.7, OP 3.3.2).

4.5.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 5

4.5.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

4.5.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

4.5.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Cooperative nation

a. Partial preexisting arrangements (C2.1.1.2)

b. Limited military commitments from other nations (C2.1.1.7

b. Limited host nation support (C2.8.5)

2. Uncooperative nation

a. No preexisting arrangements (C2.1.1.2)

b. Negligible military commitments from other nations (C2.1.1.7)

c. No host nation support (C2.8.5)

Common Military Conditions

1. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil

1. Cooperative nation

a. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Uncooperative nation

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.6

Task OPSENS 6: Collect enemy weapons systems and new technologies for

exploitation of potential CBRN implications

4.6.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.6.1.1

Definition

To use JTF resources to exploit captured technical data on CBRN/TIM weapons and assess

enemy capabilities, intent, and probable courses of action (COAs).

4.6.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 2.3.1).

4.6.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 6

4.6.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

4.6.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

4.6.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil. N/A

4.6.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.6.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.6-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task to the designated

standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Each service component intelligence capability has captured material exploitation units that are

trained to find and exploit enemy equipment or supplies of CBRN intelligence value. This task

can be accomplished now with only minor deficiencies.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) enhancements will continue to

improve the ability of OP-level units to collect enemy weapons systems and new technologies

for exploitation of potential CBRN implications

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities and cooperative ventures with theater partners resulting from near/mid-term

experimentation results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) should continue to improve the

ability of OP-level units to collect enemy weapons systems and new technologies for

exploitation of potential CBRN implications.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.6-1. OPSENS 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Service Component Intelligence Captured Material Exploitation Units

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁷

G⁸

FAA Measure

Scale

Collected information and systems are processed in JOA.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Collected information and systems are processed within 24 hours.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Intelligence analysts are provided hard-copy formal report of information obtained in processing.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Procedures and checklists exist to help collect and evacuate enemy weapons systems and new technologies for

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

exploitation of potential CBRN/TIM implications.

Intelligence analysts are provided voice or electronic mail report of information of significance.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ CBRN specific training on exploitation is not integrated into all phases of service and joint intelligence training.

² Nothing precludes processing collected information in the JOA.

³ Nothing precludes processing collected information within 24 hours.

⁴ Nothing precludes providing hard-copy formal reports of information obtained in processing to intelligence analysts if required.

⁵ While some procedures and checklists exist to help collect enemy weapons systems, all doctrine and TTPs in this area should be reviewed, updated, and consolidated into joint

TTPs.

⁶ Nothing precludes providing intelligence analysts with immediate reports of information of significance.

⁷ CBRN specific training on exploitation will be integrated into all phases of service and joint intelligence training.

⁸ Joint experimentation and consolidation of lessons learned will allow Joint TTPs to be developed for the collection of enemy weapons systems and new technologies for

exploitation of potential CBRN implications.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.6.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.6.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: Doctrine and TTPs may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: All doctrine and TTPs in this area should be reviewed,

updated, and consolidated into joint TTPs. Incorporate information attained from the exercise

into the doctrine and joint intelligence and CBRN publications. Training: Conduct training to

test, validate, and identify gaps and inconsistencies in current doctrine and TTPs.

2. Deficiency: CBRN specific training on exploitation is not integrated into all phases of

service and joint intelligence training.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Review Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

(CJCSI) for Officer Professional Military Education (OPME)/JPME and ensure that CBRN-

related intelligence learning areas are integrated appropriately. Review CBRN integration

into intelligence tasks of all Service and joint schools and courses.

4.6.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.7

Task OPSENS 7: Collect data for determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons

in the JOA

4.7.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.7.1.1

Definition

To follow theater policy, standards, and procedures for determining employment of CBRN/TIM

weapons. Includes sampling and procedures to be followed in verifying use of CBRN/TIM

weapons in the air, on the ground, or in water.

4.7.1.2

Derivation

UJTL OP 7.5.

4.7.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 3

4.7.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

4.7.1.2.3

Supporting Tasks: TASENS 1, TASENS 2, TASENS 3, TASENS 4, TASENS

5, TASENS 6, TASENS 7, TASENS 8, TASENS 9, TASENS 10, TASENS 11,

TASENS 12

4.7.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Atmospheric CBRN effects. (C1.3.3)

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil. N/A

4.7.2

Functional Needs Assessment

4.7.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.7-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The J-3 manages the entire process of gathering data for determining employment of CBRN/TIM

weapons in the JOA. The process is mature and has been employed in the field.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will result in

improved doctrine and TTPs.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities and cooperative ventures with theater partners resulting from near/mid-term

experimentation results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) should continue to improve the

ability of OP-level units to collect data for determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons in

the JOA through continuing improvements in TTPs.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.7-1. OPSENS 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit J-3

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁵

FAA Measure

Scale

Samples are provided to lab to facilitate verification of CBRN/TIM weapon use.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the collection of data for determining employment of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM weapons in the JOA.

There are no faulty sample-handling or chain-of-custody errors.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ There is little or no doctrine to help commanders understand their roles in verification of first use. TTPs have not been developed to help guide units not assigned this mission to

accomplish sample collection if required.

² Nothing precludes providing samples to verification laboratories. The process is mature and refined.

³ Internal procedures and checklists have been developed by units that have sample collection as an assigned mission.

⁴ Chain of custody procedures are well-established for units that have sample collection as an assigned mission.

⁵ Doctrine will be developed to help commanders understand their roles in verification of first use. TTPs will be developed to help guide units not assigned this mission to

accomplish sample collection if required.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.7.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.7.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: There is little or no doctrine to help commanders understand their roles in

verification of first use.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine to help commanders and senior leaders

at all levels to understand their roles in verification of first use. Incorporate information

attained from the exercise into the doctrine and joint intelligence and CBRN publications.

Training: Conduct training to test, validate, and identify gaps and inconsistencies in current

doctrine and TTPs.

2. Deficiency: TTPs have not been developed to help guide units not assigned this mission to

accomplish sample collection if required.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop TTPs have to help guide units not assigned this

mission to accomplish sample collection if required. Developed techniques and field

expedient techniques and equipment, if required, and describe for use.

4.7.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.8

Task OPSENS 8: Provide Sense country assistance teams to support TEP

4.8.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.8.1.1

Definition

To provide Sense country assistance teams to support the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) that

has been provided by the combatant commander. Many nations that would normally support U.S.

initiatives may feel threatened by hostile neighbors or nations that possess CBRN/TIM weapons.

The TEPs for Sense considerations are executed by special teams and units that demonstrate

Sense capability or provide Sense-related training to selected countries.

4.8.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 4.7.1), CJCSM 3113.01a.

4.8.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 7

4.8.1.2.2

Lateral Task: OPSHA 9

4.8.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

4.8.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil

1. Mixed support for political policies. (C3.1)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3.)

4.8.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.8.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.8-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

Any JTF HQ has a team of operational planners and information command and control

specialists. This team of experts has the skill to provide sense country assistance teams to support

the TEP, but there are some deficiencies that negatively impact their ability to do so. The overall

current capability is assessed as “green.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will continue to

improve the ability of the JTF to provide Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs. The

overall capability will remain “green” in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities and cooperative ventures with theater partners resulting from near/mid-term

experimentation results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) should continue to improve the

ability of OP-level units to provide Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs. Specific

doctrine will be developed. The linkage of restoration operations country assistance teams will

be integrated into leader education. This task will be integrated as a standard part of training.

Teams will be organized, equipped, trained, and educated. The overall capability will improve to

“green” in the far-term.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.8-1. OPSENS 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level HQ

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

G³

G⁴

G⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

G⁷

FAA Measure

Scale

Personnel from allied/friendly nations are enrolled in United States-provided military training.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Valid requests for Sense security assistance are met.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Quick response to requests for Sense security assistance.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Employ assistance team support to/from area of responsibility area of responsibility (AOR) nations (e.g., Cooperative

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Defense Initiative (CDI).

¹ No specific doctrine has been developed. The linkage of restoration operations restoration operation country assistance teams is not integrated into leader education. This task is

not a standard part of training. Teams are not organized, equipped, trained, or educated.

² Nothing prevents personnel from allied/friendly nations from enrolling in United States-provided military training. There is currently no United States-provided military training

on Sense-related topics.

³ Once Sense country assistance teams are able to provide sense-related security assistance, nothing precludes valid requests from being met.

⁴ Once Sense country assistance teams are able to provide sense-related security assistance, nothing precludes a quick response to requests.

⁵ Nothing precludes assistance team support to/from AOR nations (e.g., CDI) from being employed once organized, equipped, trained, and educated in/on Sense-related issues.

⁶ Specific doctrine will be developed. The linkage of restoration operations restoration operation country assistance teams will be integrated into leader education. This task will be

integrated as a standard part of training. Teams will be organized, equipped, trained, and educated.

⁷ United States-provided military training on Sense-related topics will be developed and be available for presentation to applicable nations.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.8.3

Functional Solution Assessment

4.8.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: There are currently no United States-provided military TTPs or training on

Sense-related topics.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop Sense-related training for personnel from

allied/friendly nations to enroll in. Training: Develop specific doctrine to guide and suggest

Sense-related TEP opportunities.

Deficiency: No specific doctrine has been developed.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has

not developed an operational concept for Sense country assistance teams, and specific

guidance (technical or procedural) on how to approach this task has not been provided.

Develop TTPs, organizational structure, training, leadership education, and equipment for

Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs.

Deficiency: The linkage of Sense country assistance teams to TEP is not integrated into

leader education.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Develop JPME classes for Sense country assistance

teams to support TEPs.

Deficiency: This task is not a standard part of training.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training for Sense country assistance teams to

support TEPs.

Deficiency: Teams are not organized, equipped, trained, or educated.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Develop organizational table of distribution and

allowances (TDA) for Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs. Training: Develop

training for Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs Leadership: Develop leader

education for Sense country assistance teams to support TEPs.

4.8.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.9

Task OPSENS 9: Provide JOA screening for endemic disease and/or hazardous

substances in the environment

4.9.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.9.1.1

Definition

To use JTF resources to provide JOA screening for endemic diseases and/or hazardous

substances in the environment. All JOA capabilities are employed to ensure that endemic

diseases and/or hazardous substances in the environment are detected, JOA military forces are

warned, and appropriate preventive action is taken.

4.9.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 4.2.2.4, OP 2.2.1, OP 7.5).

4.9.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 8

4.9.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

4.9.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

4.9.1.3

Conditions

Perform this task under the following conditions:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

4.9.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.9.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.9-1 discusses the only capability that exists to perform the task to the designated

standard, resident within the JTF staff.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

Resources and DOTLPF exist to support JTF staff information and data collection, processing,

and correlation from a variety of sources (national, international, military, civilian, etc.) to

identify potential hazards and endemic diseases for evaluation and assessment of their probable

impact and the necessary protective measures. The DoD Global Emerging Infections

Surveillance and Response System (GEIS) and Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

(AFMIC) maintain active surveillance for infectious diseases that might affect military

personnel, readiness, and operations are resources for the JTF staff through reachback. COCOM

resources and information are also available using reachback capabilities. Information and data

within the JOA provided by coalition/partner forces, identified in JTF element reports, and

developed by medical surveillance processes—to name a few—provide the JTF staff with critical

indicators of potential and ongoing issues. Dissemination of warnings to JTF forces identifying

these potential hazards and diseases, and the associated protective measures are incorporated

within existing doctrine. Deficiencies are related to the level of automation of information and

data resources, their compatibility, and supporting reachback capabilities.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

There are no foreseeable changes in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

There are no foreseeable changes in the far term.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.9-1. OPSENS 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: JTF Staff

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

All diseases/hazards are identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical, operational, intelligence, and environmental data are correlated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Diseases/hazards are identified in time to warn forces and take appropriate preventive measures.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Diseases/hazards are identified in time to treat forces.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Adequate DOTLPF exists to conduct this task.

² Limited. Pathogens of military importance are identified. AFMIC and GEIS are resources for information on infectious diseases posing a threat to personnel or reduce medical

readiness. Other types of hazards are reviewed for their impact upon military forces, depending upon type and scope. For example, ITF-40 assesses a number of industrial

chemicals for their potential impact. However, ITF-40 does not assess all the potential industrial chemicals possibly existing within an area of interest. The COCOM is an

informational and support resource for the JTF through reachback. Information must be collected, processed, and correlated from a variety of sources (e.g., coalition/ partner

forces, JTF force reports, medical surveillance, etc.) to identify potential hazards and endemic diseases for evaluation and assessment of their probable impact and the necessary

protective measures.

³ Limited. Resources such as AFMIC, COCOM, GEIS, and others are identified as reliable sources for data and information about most areas of interest. Additionally, information

observed and reported by coalition/partner forces and JTF elements is critical to identifying and assessing ongoing or potential issues. However, much of the information and data

must be collected, processed, correlated, evaluated, and assessed manually. Reachback resources provide the JTF staff with information sources and data essential to the

assessment process. However, automated reachback capabilities for expert advice, information gathering, and information transfer are not fully developed or available necessitating

manual processes. Many resource systems are not integrated or are not automated. Information systems within DoD, Service, theater, other government agencies, and JTF elements

are frequently stovepiped, and the information must be manually transferred from one system to another. Additionally, data structures and fields are not always compatible

between systems impacting application of data transfer utilities.

⁴ Limited. Diseases and hazards within an area of interest are not static. These change over time. JTF plan implementation processes incorporate requirements for ensuring

currency of information and decisioning parameters. Adjustments are made as necessary. Identification of endemic diseases and hazards of military importance are disseminated

and are accompanied with guidance on preventive measures. Changes to this information are disseminated throughout operations. However, the largely manual nature of the

current process is time-consuming, and the potential exists for exposure prior to receipt of warning.

⁵ Limited. Ability to identify disease in time to treat is dependent on type of disease and in-country/JOA intelligence. Some countries/areas may be reluctant to assist in identifying

disease outbreaks due to quarantine and economic concerns.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.9.3

Functional Solution Analysis

4.9.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Not all potential hazards have been assessed for their military importance. For

example, ITF-40 does not assess all the potential industrial chemicals possibly existing

within an area of interest.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Ensure leadership awareness of potential gap in

existing information and potential sources for information and data.

Deficiency: Automated reachback capabilities for expert advice, information gathering, and

information transfer are not fully developed or available necessitating manual processes.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Emphasize application of automated reachback

processes, enforce existing automated system/software standards, and identify resources—

both subject matter experts (SMEs) and information/data sources—supporting JTF planning

and operations; particularly expeditionary operations. Organization: Review existing and

adjust as necessary potential SME and information/data resource organizational structures

and responsibilities for support of JTF manual and automated reachback. Training: Develop

training, institutional and unit level, on conduct and application of manual and automated

reachback for SME and information/data interchange. Leadership: Ensure leadership

emphasis upon reachback support (manual and automated) and JTF organic operational

resourcing (e.g., data libraries, tools, etc.). Personnel: Identify and develop SME resources.

Facilities: Develop infrastructure enhancements and capabilities supporting JTF automated

reachback requirements.

Deficiency: The largely manual nature of the current process is time-consuming, and the

potential exists for exposure prior to receipt of warning.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Ensure leadership awareness of issues associated with

information collection and processing and need for force preparedness and prior knowledge

of hazards/diseases of military importance in area of interest.

4.9.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

4.10

Task OPSENS 10: Develop JOA environmental background data including

climatology

4.10.1

Functional Area Analysis

4.10.1.1

Definition

To use JTF resources to obtain and assess JOA environmental background data (including

climatology) for potential CBRN/TIM implications.

4.10.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (OP 7.5, OP 2.2.3).

4.10.1.2.1

Supported Task: STSENS 9

4.10.1.2.2

Lateral Task: N/A

4.10.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

4.10.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

4.10.2

Functional Needs Analysis

4.10.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 4.10-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task to the designated

standards within the theater. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is

projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The OP-level/JTF J-3 works with various service component assets, as well as the COCOM J-3,

which can access national DoD assets that operate a military environmental service system to

provide specialized JOA meteorological, space, environmental, and oceanographic analysis and

prediction services in support of military forces.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 4. Operational Sense Tasks

Table 4.10-1. OPSENS 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level/JTF J-3

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁵

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

Environmental background data are

Assesses whether a means is available to gather environmental background data at any location.

G - Yes

available for essential JOA areas.

Does not take into account time/automation factors. If time/automation becomes a factor, a

Y - Limited

tactical-level materiel solution that speeds process may need to be considered.

R - No

Climatology data are available for

Assesses whether a means is available to gather climatology data at any location. Does not take

G - Yes

essential JOA areas.

into account time/automation factors.

Y - Limited

R - No

Available data can be accessed by

Assesses ability of JOA forces to access data once they are available. Ability to assess data for

G - Yes

JOA forces with requirements.

CBRN implications is not part of metric.

Y - Limited

R - No

¹ JOA CBRN considerations are not integrated into environmental and climatology processes, TTPs, and doctrine.

² Environmental background data are available or can be obtained for any area of the JOA.

³ Climatology data are available or can be obtained for any area of the JOA.

⁴ Total access is available through military command and control and communications systems.

⁵ JOA CBRN considerations will be integrated into environmental and climatology processes, TTPs, and doctrine.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

5.0

Tactical Sense

5.1

Task TASENS 1: Sense the atmosphere for chemical hazards

5.2

Task TASENS 2: Sense the atmosphere for biological hazards

5.3

Task TASENS 3: Sense the atmosphere for radiological hazards

5.4

Task TASENS 4: Sense surfaces for chemical hazards

5.5

Task TASENS 5: Sense surfaces for biological hazards

5.6

Task TASENS 6: Sense surfaces for radiological hazards

5.7

Task TASENS 7: Sense water for chemical hazards

5.8

Task TASENS 8: Sense water for biological hazards

5.9

Task TASENS 9: Sense water for radiological hazards

104

5.10

Task TASENS 10: Sense the presence of chemical hazards on humans, MWAs

and remains

112

5.11

Task TASENS 11: Sense the presence of biological hazards on humans, MWAs,

and remains

123

5.12

Task TASENS 12: Sense the presence of radiological hazards on humans,

MWAs, and remains

132

5.13

Task TASENS 13: Mark CBR contaminated air, surfaces, and water

140

5.14

Task TASENS 14: Observe the indigenous population for indicators of

CBRN/TIM attack

144

5.15

Task TASENS 15: Sense the tactical deployment of CBRN weapons on the

battlefield

148

5.16

Task TASENS 16: Sense the employment of tactical CBRN weapons on the

battlefield

153

5.17

Task TASENS 17: Verify completeness of decontamination operations

157

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

5.0

Tactical Sense

5.0.1

Introduction

At the tactical level of war, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish

military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the

ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the

enemy to achieve combat objectives. Seventeen tactical sense tasks were identified in the

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Functional Area Analysis (FAA).

This chapter, detailing the Tactical Sense area, restates relevant information from the CBRND

FAA, including a description of each of the 17 Tactical Sense tasks, derivation of the task, an

indication of other linked tasks, and the pertinent conditions. The Functional Needs Analysis

(FNA) section addresses the capability and deficiency analysis and provides brief descriptions of

predicted near/mid-term and far-term changes. Once all the capabilities are considered, the

assessment concludes with a separate, overarching look at the entire capability spectrum to

identify remaining gaps and/or synergies. The Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) section

addresses possible solutions for the deficiencies identified in the FNA section. These are

categorized into materiel and non-materiel solutions. The non-materiel solutions are addressed

first and reflect one or more of the six areas of DOTLPF: doctrine, organization, training,

leadership, personnel, and facilities. If there are no or only partial non-materiel solutions to the

deficiencies, then materiel solutions are considered. These encompass broad approaches that are

not system-specific. These potential materiel approaches are addressed and evaluated in the Ideas

for Materiel Approach (IMAs) section. The IMAs can potentially mitigate or resolve in the

near/mid- or far-term future.

Most of the Tactical Sense tasks involve detection of chemical, biological, and radiological

hazards in the atmosphere, in water, and on surfaces, personnel, and military working animals

(MWAs), specifically military working dogs (MWDs). The connectivity and interoperability of

detectors (i.e., the ability of detectors to report findings and system status via fully interoperable

and net-centric data links to current and programmed SHAPE systems) are key attributes that

were not considered during this analysis. The closely related ability of detectors and detection

systems to be remotely operated was also not considered. All programmed future Sense systems

include these capabilities (interoperability, connectivity, and remote operation) when practical or

required, while legacy systems and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items have limited or no

capability in these areas. Only detection capabilities that are currently fielded by one or more

units in the military or projected to be fielded by one or more military units in the future are

considered in this assessment. For each task, capabilities are categorized according to the time

period during which they are available or are projected to be available (e.g., a capability included

under a “near/mid-term” heading is not currently available but is predicted to be available

sometime during the near/mid-term future [i.e., FY2007-FY2011] and will remain available

through the far-term future [FY2012-FY2020]). Availability of individual capabilities is not

considered in task overall capability assessments. An overall capability for a task is determined

by simply calculating the arithmetic mean of all relevant individual capabilities.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

5.0.2

FNA Summary

The table below summarizes the overall current and projected capability to perform the Tactical

(TA)-level Sense (SENS) tasks identified in the CBRND FAA. The overall capability to conduct

TASENS tasks in the current time frame is assessed as “yellow.” In regards to chemical

detection, there are key deficiencies in the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) ability to

detect low-level chemical hazards, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) in general, and TICs and

chemical warfare agents (CWAs) in water. DoD also lacks adequate capabilities to detect toxic

industrial biologicals (TIBs) in general, biological warfare agents (BWAs) in time to warn, and

biological hazards in water. Currently, radiological hazards cannot easily be detected without

exposing the operator to potentially harmful radiation. Finally, DoD typically cannot quickly

identify deployed and employed CBRN weapons and units on the battlefield.

It is projected that the overall capability will improve, but remain “yellow,” at the end of the

FY2007-FY2011 program objective memorandum (POM) period as more advanced detectors

are fielded. Near/mid-term future fielding of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD), Joint

Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS), and Joint Service Lightweight

Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD), among others, is expected to mitigate major

capability gaps in the detection of chemical hazards in the atmosphere and biological hazards in

environmental samples. The projected overall status is not “green” since key deficiencies are

likely to remain in areas including chemical aerosol detection, biological and chemical standoff

detection, TIC and TIB detection, low-level chemical and biological detection, sample collection

for future analysis, detector susceptibility to interference, authentic standoff radiological

detection, radioisotope identification, and sensing tactical deployment and employment of CBRN

weapons on the battlefield.

In the foreseeable far-term future (i.e., FY2012-FY2020), the overall capability will improve

slightly over the near/mid-term future and thus will remain “yellow.” Far-term fielding of the

Joint Chemical Biological Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM), Joint Modular Chemical and

Biological Detection System (JMCBDS), and Joint Biological Standoff Detection System

(JBSDS), among others, is expected to mitigate major capability gaps in rapid detection of

chemical and biological hazards in the atmosphere and in water. Key deficiencies are likely to

remain in those areas discussed in the previous paragraph for the near/mid term.

Table 5-01. Tactical Sense Summary FNA Findings

CBRN Tactical

Capability

Sense Task

CBRN Tactical Sense Task Title

Near/Mid-

Far-

Current

Number

Term

TASENS 1

Sense the atmosphere for chemical hazards.

TASENS 2

Sense the atmosphere for biological hazards.

TASENS 3.-

Sense the atmosphere for radiological hazards.

TASENS 4

Sense surfaces for chemical hazards.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

CBRN Tactical

Capability

Sense Task

CBRN Tactical Sense Task Title

Near/Mid-

Far-

Current

Number

Term

TASENS 5

Sense surfaces for biological hazards.

TASENS 6

Sense surfaces for radiological hazards.

TASENS 7

Sense water for chemical hazards.

TASENS 8

Sense water for biological hazards.

TASENS 9

Sense water for radiological hazards.

Sense personnel and MWAs for chemical

TASENS 10

hazards.

Sense personnel and MWAs for biological

TASENS 11

hazards.

Sense personnel and MWAs for radiological

TASENS 12

hazards.

Mark CBR contaminated air, surfaces, and

TASENS 13

water.

Observe the indigenous population for

TASENS 14.

indications of CBRN/TIM attack

Sense the tactical deployment of CBRN

TASENS 15

weapons on the battlefield.

Sense the tactical employment of CBRN

TASENS 16

weapons on the battlefield.

Verify completeness of decontamination

TASENS 17

operations.

OVERALL

5.0.3

Individual Capability Descriptions

The following text briefly describes the 27 chemical, 13 biological, and 15 radiological

individual detection capabilities assessed in the FNA.

Individual Chemical Detection Capabilities

AN/KAS-1

The AN/KAS-1, a manual shipboard nerve agent standoff detector, detects vapors in the

atmosphere, does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects

¹ and

is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives). Its performance is highly

dependent on the skill level of the operator.²

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

APD2000

The APD2000, an automatic point detector, detects vapors in the atmosphere and off-gassing

from surfaces, personnel, and MWAs; does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level

(e.g., ocular) effects; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).³

ARTEMIS

The ARTEMIS, a far-term future automatic shipboard and fixed-site standoff detector, will

detect vapors and aerosols in the atmosphere; will not detect concentrations which can cause

low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; and will be susceptible to chemical interference (false positives

and negatives).⁴

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)/Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM)

The CAM/ICAM, a point detector, detects vapors in the atmosphere and off-gassing from

surfaces, personnel, and MWAs; does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g.,

ocular) effects; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).⁵

Chemical Ag0065nt Point Detector System (CAPDS) MK21 Mod I

The CAPDS, a point detector, detects certain nerve agent vapors in the atmosphere; does not

detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; and is susceptible to

chemical interference (false positives and negatives).⁶

Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS)

The CBMS, an ion trap mass spectrometer, will detect all chemical and biological warfare

agents. It will detect and identify chemical agents within 15 seconds and biological agents within

3-4 minutes. It is expected to be deployed on the Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance

Vehicle (NBCRV) Stryker and Joint NBC Reconnaissance System (JNBCRS).⁷

Gas Toxic Draeger Kit

The Gas Toxic Draeger Kit, a manual TIC point detection kit, detects, identifies, and quantifies

vapors.⁸

HAPSITE Chemical Identification System

The HAPSITE Chemical Identification System, a portable gas chromatography/mass

spectrometer (GC/MS), provides laboratory-quality analysis for volatile organic chemicals

(VOCs) in the atmosphere. With the Headspace Sampling System, it can also detect VOCs off-

gassing from water, surfaces, personnel, and MWAs. It is battery-powered and weatherproof and

weighs about 35 lbs. It requires some personnel training to operate.⁹

HazMatID Chemical Identification System

The HazMatID is a portable (23 lb.) Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectrometer that can be

used for both quantitative and qualitative material analysis of solids, powders, pastes, and

liquids. The system can identify nerve and blister warfare agents, TICs, forensic drugs, white

powders, explosives, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) precursors, and common chemicals

within 20 seconds of sample submission.¹⁰

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Improved Chemical Agent Point Detection System (IPDS)

The IPDS, a fixed shipboard/shore-based point detector, detects certain nerve agent vapors, does

not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible to

chemical interference (false positives and negatives).¹¹

Joint Chemical Agent Detector

The JCAD, a near-future automatic point detector, detects vapors only (not aerosols), does not

detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible to

chemical interference (false positives and negatives). The JCAD will sense the atmosphere for

chemical hazards. With the XM279 probe attached, it will detect vapors off-gassing from

surfaces, personnel, MWAs, and remains.¹²

Joint Chemical and Biological Agent Water Monitor¹³

The JCBAWM, a near/mid-term future portable device, will detect, identify, and quantify

chemical and biological agents in water. Its sensitivity will meet tri-service long-term

consumption standards. As an objective, it will also detect, identify, and quantify all TICs,

agricultural chemicals, and biological pathogens harmful to personnel.¹⁴

Joint Chemical Surface Detector (JCSD)

The JCSD, a near-future automatic standoff detector, will use UV laser technology to provide

standoff, real-time detection and identification of chemical liquids deposited on the ground. The

JCDS will be employed on the Interim Armored Vehicle-NBC Reconnaissance Variant (IAV-

NBCRV), NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS Fox) and JNBCRS.¹⁵

Joint Modular Chemical and Biological Detection System¹⁶

The JMCBDS, a far-term, handheld, stationary and on-the-move point chemical and biological

(CB) detector, identifier and quantifier, detects vapors (and aerosols as an objective) and is

susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).¹⁷ It will sense the

atmosphere. It will sense chemical hazards off-gassing or resuspending from surfaces.

Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector

The JSLSCAD, a near/mid-future automatic standoff detector, detects vapors only (not aerosols),

does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible

to chemical interference (false positives and negatives). It can operate while on the move.¹⁸

M18A2 Kit

The M18A2 Kit, a manual point detection kit, detects vapors in the atmosphere and off-gassing

from surfaces, personnel, and liquids on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs and is susceptible to

chemical interference (false positives and negatives). Vapor samples can also be collected in the

sample tubes and then taken to a laboratory for analysis.¹⁹

M8 Detection Paper

M8 Paper, colorimetric chemical detection paper contained within a booklet, detects liquid

(>0.02 mL) droplets on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs and is susceptible to chemical

interference (false positives).²⁰

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

M9 Detection Paper

M9 Paper, packaged as a single roll of expendable colorimetric chemical detection paper, detects

liquid (>100 ȝL) droplets on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs and is susceptible to chemical

interference (false positives).²¹

M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)

The M21, an automatic standoff detector available on tripod or the M93A1 Fox, detects vapors

only, does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is

susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives). Its performance is degraded

under precipitation, fog, extreme turbulence, high humidity, and small temperature differentials

at dusk, dawn, and periods with lots of cloud cover (P5, 8, 9, 10, 11). The M21 requires 15

minutes to set up.²² It can be used to sense the atmosphere.

M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA)

The M22 ACADA, a point detector, detects vapors in the atmosphere, does not detect

concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible to chemical

interference.²³ With the XM279 probe attached, it can detect vapors off-gassing from surfaces,

personnel, MWAs, and remains.

M256A1 Kit

The M256A1 Kit, a manual point detection kit, detects vapors at levels below ECt₅₀in the

atmosphere and off-gassing from surfaces, personnel, and MWAs and liquids at levels below

ED₅₀ on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs and is susceptible to chemical interference (false

positives and negatives).²⁴

M272 Kit

The M272 Kit, an Army portable, lightweight colorimetric kit, detects and identifies nerve,

mustard, L, and AC in treated and untreated water sources. It is susceptible to chemical

interference (false positives and negatives), it does not meet tri-service field drinking water

standards, and some of its reagents are very harmful to the human body.²⁵

M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm System

The M8A1, a point detector, detects nerve agent vapors, does not detect concentrations which

can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible to chemical interference (false

positives and negatives).²⁶

M90-D-1C

The M90-D-1C, an automatic point detector, detects vapors only, does not detect concentrations

which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects, and is susceptible to chemical interference (false

positives and negatives).²⁷

Mobile Mass Spectrometer MM-1

The MM-1, a GC/MS equipped on the M93A1 Fox, detects 60 chemical compounds, including

common CW agents and some common precursor and chemical degradation products. It can

detect these compounds as vapors in the atmosphere or as liquids on the ground. It is better at

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

detecting liquids than vapors, requires baselining in clean air, is susceptible to chemical

interference (false positives and negatives), and requires extensive personnel training.²⁸

MultiRAE Plus

The MultiRAE Plus, a portable, automatic five-gas modifiable point detector, detects vapors in

the atmosphere. It can be configured to sample diffused or pumped gases and has a data-logging

feature.²⁹

Viking SpectraTrak

The Viking SpectraTrak, a portable GC/MS, provides laboratory-quality analysis for 62,000

chemicals in the atmosphere and water and deposited on surfaces, personnel, and MWAs. It can

operate in a continuous sampling mode or be used to analyze individual samples. It is not

waterproof when operating, and it requires extensive personnel training to operate. It is current

available to specialized units (e.g., technical escort units) only.³⁰

Individual Biological Detection Capabilities

Dry Filter Unit (DFU)

The DFU, a stand-alone collector, can be used to collect internal and external ambient air

particulate samples for subsequent analysis using handheld assays (HHA) and polymerase chain

reaction (PCR) assays (e.g., Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device [RAPID].

When combined with the aforementioned assays, a DFU enables detection of low concentrations

of biological agents.³¹

DoD Biological Sampling Kit (BSK)

The DoD BSK contains a panel of eight HHAs, a blue-capped tube containing a bottle of buffer

solution and cotton tipped swabs, and a basic instruction card. It provides a presumptive

identification for biological warfare agents in environmental samples.³²

Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA)

ELISA is a laboratory method used to detect biological agents by detecting their antigens (Ag) or

their corresponding antibodies (Ab) produced by the host. The sensitivity of ELISA is 10⁶-10⁷

bacterial organisms/mL; 10-100 PFU/mL of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus; 625 pg/mL

of Staphyloccoccal Enterotoxin B (aerosol); and >5 ng/mL of ricin. ELISA typically requires 1-2

hours total in light of the processing, specimen and reagent application, and incubation times.³³

Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS)

The IBADS, a Navy afloat point detector, monitors, collects, detects, and identifies airborne

biological agents.³⁴

Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System

JBAIDS is a near-future portable, reusable, and modifiable biological agent point detection and

identification system for select environmental samples and clinical specimens (including swabs,

sera, sputum, bodily exudates, feces, aerosol diluents, autopsy tissues, and soil). It could be used

in mobile and fixed facilities, vehicles, aircraft, and ships. Block I JBAIDS will detect and

identify all BWA pathogens at concentrations of 1000 CFU/mL and 10,000 PFU/mL (100

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

CFU/mL and 1,000 PFU/mL as an objective). Block II JBAIDS will detect and identify BWA

toxins as well at concentrations of 1 ȝg/mL (1 pg/mL as an objective).³⁵ JBAIDS will require

extensive personnel training to operate.

Handheld Assays with Sample Preparation Materials

HHAs are simple, disposable, portable antibody-based devices that presumptively detect the

presence of a particular biological agent in environmental samples. With various

immunochromatography strips (e.g., Tetracore BioThreat Alert Test Strips, ANP Tech handheld

assay, Environmental Technologies Group SMART Detection tickets, and near-future

Battelle/Applied Biosystems PCR and antibody assays), all BWAs with possible exception of

VHF can be detected if present at concentrations within detection limits. One vial of buffer

solution and an instruction sheet are included with each handheld assay. Prepackaged sterile

swabs, small sealable plastic bags, and a timer or wristwatch are not included and must be

obtained separately.³⁶

M31A2 Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)

The JBPDS, a joint point detector, monitors, collects, stores, detects, and identifies airborne

biological agents. It is compatible with multiple platforms (e.g., shipboard, portable, trailer-

mounted, shelter version, STRYKER, and NBC Recon version) and is the first point detection

capability for the Marines. It is anticipated to be used by the Air Force.³⁷

Joint Biological Standoff Detection System³⁸

The JBSDS detects airborne biological clouds by shooting infrared (IR) + ultraviolet (UV) laser

beams downrange to detect, track, and discriminate potential threats. The approach is based on

LIDAR, which stands for Light Detecting and Ranging. The system will be compatible with

multiple vehicle platforms. JBSDS will detect aerosol clouds consistent with a biological

warefare (BW) release at ranges up to 5 km with a detection probability of 90% during normal

night conditions and discriminate clouds with particles of biological origin from clouds with

particles of nonbiological origin up to 1 km with a probability of 90% during normal night

conditions and sufficient line of sight.³⁹

Joint Chemical and Biological Agent Water Monitor

The JCBAWM, a far-term future portable device, will detect, identify, and quantify chemical and

biological agents in water. Its sensitivity will meet tri-service long-term consumption standards.

As an objective, it will also detect, identify, and quantify all TICs, agricultural chemicals, and

biological pathogens harmful to personnel.⁴⁰

Joint Modular Chemical and Biological Detection System

JMCBDS is a near-future handheld, stationary and on-the-move point CB detector, identifier,

and quantifier (objective). It will be employable on many platforms (e.g., individuals, vehicles,

aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], and ships). It will detect all biological agents listed in

the Joint Chiefs of Staff threat list, and it will identify and quantify detected agents as an

objective.⁴¹

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

M31 Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)

The BIDS, a vehicle-portable biological point detector, is the Army’s first biological detection

capability. It monitors, collects, stores, detects, and identifies airborne biological agents.⁴²

Portal Shield

Portal Shield is a network of a variable number of sensors for airborne biological agents mounted

around the perimeter of a fixed site, commanded and controlled by a centralized post computer.⁴³

Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device

The RAPID, a portable, field-hardened, rapid thermocycler with concurrent florescence

monitoring, detects and identifies biological agents in buffered samples through the use of real-

time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) technology. The sensitivity of RT-PCR is 15 fg-1 pg

or 20-2 million plasmid copies for bacteria and 15 fg-1 pg or 100-1 million copies of the

complementary deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA) for viruses. RAPID can test up to 32 prepared

test samples within 30 minutes.⁴⁴ JBAIDS will be based on RAPID technology.

Individual Radiological Detection Capabilities

ADM-300

The ADM-300, an Air Force portable radiation detection, identification, and computation

(RADIAC) device, detects, identifies, and quantifies in real time alpha, beta, gamma, and x-

radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces. It measures

0.1 ȝR/hour-10,000 R/hour for gamma radiation and 10 ȝR/hour-5 R/hour for beta radiation.⁴⁵

AN/PDQ-1 Multi-Function Radiation (MFR) Detector

The AN/PDQ-1, a Navy portable RADIAC device, detects and identifies in real time beta and

gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces. It also

quantifies the detected gamma, but not beta, radiation.⁴⁶

AN/PDR-27

The AN/PDR-27, a Navy portable RADIAC device, detects and identifies in real time beta and

gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces. It also

quantifies the detected gamma radiation 0-500 mR/hour.⁴⁷

AN/PDR-43

The AN/PDR-43, a Navy portable RADIAC device, detects and identifies in real time beta and

gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces. It also

quantifies the detected gamma, but not beta, radiation 0-500 R/hour.⁴⁸

AN/PDR-56

The AN/PDR-56, a Navy and Marine Corps portable RADIAC device, detects and quantifies in

real time alpha radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces.

It measures 0-1,000,000 cpm.⁴⁹

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

AN/PDR-63

The AN/PDR-63, a Marine Corps portable RADIAC device, detects, identifies, and quantifies in

real time beta and gamma radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on

surfaces. It measures 0-1 mrad/hour and 0-5000 rad/hour.⁵⁰

AN/PDR-65

The AN/PDR-65, a Navy portable RADIAC device, detects and quantifies in real time gamma

radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on surfaces. Its range is 0-

10,000 R/hour.⁵¹

AN/PDR-75

The AN/PDR-75, an Army and Marine Corps dosimeter reader (CP-696/PRD-75), and its

associated wristwatch-like dosimeter (DT-236/PDR-75) provide the capability to monitor and

record the exposure of individual personnel to gamma and neutron radiation. It measures an

individual dosimeter’s total neutron and gamma dose 0-1000 cCy.⁵²

AN/PDR-77

The AN/PDR-77, an Army portable RADIAC device, detects, identifies, and quantifies in real

time alpha, beta, gamma, and x-radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere

and on surfaces. It measures the count rate 1-999,000 cpm.⁵³

AN/UDR-13

The AN/UDR-13, an Army portable RADIAC device, detects, identifies, and quantifies in real

time gamma and neutron radiation emitted from radiological materials in the atmosphere and on

surfaces. It measures the dose rate 0.1-999 cGy/hour and the total dose 0.1-999 cGy.⁵⁴

AN/VDR-2

The AN/VDR-2, an Army and Marine Corps portable RADIAC device, measures and displays a

gamma dose rate from background to 99.9 Gy/hour. Additionally, the AN/VDR-2 measures,

stores, and displays accumulated dose from 0.01 ȝGy to 9.99 Gy.⁵⁵

Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation Surveillance & Measurement System 935

The Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation Surveillance and Measurement (SAM) System 935 is a

portable radioisotope identifier device. Its internal gamma detector enables multiple and

concurrent radionuclide identification within one second. The device measures and displays the

dose rate and dose in rem or seiverts. It has programmable audio and visual alarms. The

published minimum detectable limit for the device is 0.5 ȝR/hour. An external gamma detector

and internal neutron detector are optional.⁵⁶

CP-95/DT-60

The CP-95, a Navy dosimeter reader and its associated dosimeter (DT-60), which is about the

size of a quarter, provides the capability to monitor and record the exposure of individual

personnel to gamma radiation. It measures an individual dosimeter’s total gamma dose 10-600

Roentgens.⁵⁷

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

IM-93 and IM-143

The IM-93 and IM-143 are Navy personal self-reading pocket dosimeters that indicate the total

gamma radiation dose 0-600 Roentgens.⁵⁸ The IM-143 is also used by the Marine Corps.

Siemens EPD^® Mk2

Siemens EPD^® Mk2 is an electronic personal dosimeter that is sensitive to beta, gamma, and x-

radiation. It provides a direct readout of deep/whole body and shallow/skin doses (0 ȝSv to

>16 Sv, which is 0 mrem to >1600 rem) and dose rates (0 ȝSv to >4 Sv, which is 0 mrem/hour to

>400 rem/hour). The dosimeter includes programmable deep/whole body and shallow/skin dose

and dose rate alarms.⁵⁹

5.0.4

FSA Summary

The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential DOTMLPF (non-materiel and

materiel) solutions for the capability gaps identified in the FNA section. The materiel approaches

address both current and nondeveloped technologies for possible material solutions.

5.0.4.1

DOTMLPF

Non-materiel (DOTLPF) and materiel (M) solutions have been identified. Non-materiel solution

assessments are guided by DOTLPF (doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and

facilities) in accordance with CJCS 3170 and include solutions such as increasing training (T) on

a detector due to its sophistication, increasing the number of reconnaissance personnel (P)

required to perform a given task, or to determining the threshold contamination level for low-

level health effects (D). If non-materiel solutions do not fully address a capability gap, then a

materiel solution is sought. A materiel solution under the auspices of Sense may include a

chemical detector with greater sensitivity, a standoff chemical detector with an extended range

and higher degree of probability, a real-time biological detector, or an increased capability to

detect TICs.

5.0.4.2

IMA

The Ideas for Materiel Approaches table below summarizes possible materiel approaches that

address the remaining materiel requirements of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment. These approaches

are in various stages of development. Therefore, some are more readily applicable than others.

Of the 18 IMAs, 12 are applicable to chemical detection, 10 are applicable to biological

detection, and 6 are applicable to radiological detection.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Table 5-02. Detection/SENSE Ideas for Materiel Approaches

Idea for Materiel

Description

Approach

Mass spectrometry

Microanalytical approach that uses the difference in mass-to-charge

ratios of chemical molecules or biomolecules to separate them from

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

one another. It requires only a few nanograms of an analyte to obtain

BWAs, TIBs, (rad)

characteristic information on the analyte’s structure and molecular

weight. It requires that the sample be introduced in the gaseous phase,

Agent physical

and this can be achieved by GC, high-performance liquid

state(s): gases,

chromatography, ion chromatography, or capillary zone

aerosols, liquids

electrophoresis for chemical analytes or pyrolysis-gas

chromatography-ion mobility spectrometer, Matrix-Assisted Laser

Desorption Ionization-Time of Flight (MALDI-TOF), among others,

for biological analytes. Theoretically, all known chemical warfare

agents, TICs, bacteria, viruses, and toxins can be detected, identified,

and quantified by MS, though it is not currently possibly to achieve

this in near-real time for detect-to-warn.⁶⁰ Mass spectrometry can also

be used to help identify the chemical composition of detected and

isolated radioactive materials.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

IR, UV, and

Based on the emission and absorption of IR, UV, and microwave

microwave

radiation by chemicals and biomolecules of interest. Since

spectroscopy⁶¹

characteristic vibrational wavelengths of most CW agents (and more

specifically the phosphorus-oxygen bond on nerve agents, for

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

example) occur in the IR region of the electromagnetic spectrum, IR

BWAs, TIBs, and

spectroscopy is typically used for chemical detection. UV laser and

possibly rad

laser-induced fluorescence (LIF) have been used to detect the

presence of biological aerosols. Through IR and UV spectroscopy

Agent physical

could be used for point detection, they are usually used for standoff

state(s): gases,

detection. They can currently detect, identify, and quantify the line

aerosols, liquids

concentrations of chemicals and detect and discriminate between

biological and nonbiological aerosols. Note that microwave

spectroscopy is currently in the research and development phase.

There are many variations of IR, UV, and microwave spectroscopy.

Photoacoustic infrared spectroscopy (PIRS) is one such variation,

which is presented as a separate IMA since it is frequently assessed

separately in technical literature.⁶²

In terms of radiological detection, the Canadian CBRN Research &

Technology Initiative (CRTI) is developing a standoff radiation

detector. A laboratory prototype detector is capable of taking images

of a scene and analyzing the images for ionizing radiation signatures.

Alpha, beta, and gamma sources have been imaged under a variety of

conditions. Alpha sources of only a few millicuries have been imaged

at tens of meters with high signal-to-noise ratios.⁶³ The underlying

technical approach for the detector has not been disclosed. The

detector may be detecting fluorescence of air molecules that are being

ionized by the radiation.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Ionization/ion

Based on small differences in the velocity of ions along a cylindrical

mobility

tube across which a constant electric field is applied. An IMS detector

spectrometry (IMS)

typically operates by drawing air at atmospheric pressure into a

reaction region, where the sample constituents are ionized. The

Sensing CWAs, TICs

sample must be in the vapor or gas phase (though theoretically liquid

samples could first be volatilized). The ions travel through a charged

Agent physical

drift tube, where they collide with a detector plate, thus producing a

state(s): gases, vapors

current that can be registered. A plot of the current versus time

provides a characteristic ion mobility spectrum. The intensity of the

spectrum peaks corresponds to the agent concentration. The response

time ranges from several seconds to a few minutes.⁶⁴

By adding an additional gate to the ion drift region, Fourier transform

ion mobility spectrometry can be achieved, thus increasing sensitivity,

specificity, and reducing false alarms. Discrimination between

different organophosphate molecules may be possible; however, the

approach still requires the agent be in the gaseous or vapor phase (no

aerosols).⁶⁵

Photoacoustic

Like other infrared spectroscopy approaches, PIRS uses the selective

infrared spectroscopy

absorption of IR radiation by chemical agent vapors and gases to

identify and quantify the agent present. However, in contrast to

Sensing CWAs, TICs

traditional IR spectroscopy, PIRS typically uses a microphone to

detect acoustic waves that result from absorption of IR radiation by a

Agent physical

sample. It has been claimed that the gas-microphone method has been

state(s): gases, liquids

used for the characterization and analysis of solids and liquids in

addition to gases. It is anticipated that a large number of chemical

agents can be detected with this technology.⁶⁶

Chemiluminescence

Based on quantitative measurement of the optical emission produced

by a chemical reaction of the analyte and a reagent. Since

Sensing CWAs, TICs

chemiluminescence can take place in either the liquid or gas phase, it

can be used for detecting chemicals in water. Phosphorus

Agent physical

chemiluminescence detectors can be used to detect many chemical

state(s): gases, liquids

agents and are frequently coupled with gas chromatography.⁶⁷

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Surface acoustic

Based on piezoelectric materials (those that produce an electrical

wave (SAW)

current when subjected to pressure or mechanical stress) coated with

different absorbent polymers for chemical analytes or antibodies or

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

complementary nucleic acid sequences for biological analytes. The

BWAs, TIBs

chemical and biological analytes selectively absorb into or bind to the

coated piezoelectric materials. Most SAW detectors incorporate an

Agent physical

analytical preconcentrator (e.g., GC) to overcome absorption or

state(s): gases,

binding limitations.⁶⁸ Sensitivities on the order of 10⁵-10⁶ cells have

aerosols

been reported for SAW biological detectors.

Regarding SAW chemical detectors, the used absorbent polymers are

susceptible to damage from certain highly reactive vapors (e.g.,

hydrofluoric acid). Furthermore, they are susceptible to interference

from absorption of water and consequently must be calibrated to

account for ambient relative humidity.

Colorimetric

Based on a visible color change resulting from a chemical reaction

that occurs when particular chemicals interact with various solutions

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

and substrates. In regards to current chemical detection capabilities,

BWAs, TIBs

the colorimetric approach is typically the fastest, cheapest, lightest,

and easiest to use. Color-change detectors can detect nerve, blister,

Agent physical

and blood agents with detection tubes, papers, or tickets that are

state(s): gases,

coated with a particular substrate or reagent solutions. Responses

(aerosols), liquids

range from immediate to several minutes. In addition, colorimetric

approaches can detect VOCs, including carboxylic acids, alcohols,

amines, ethers, thioethers, and thiols, generated by microorganisms

(i.e., bacteria). Since each species of microorganism (e.g., bacteria)

emits a distinct profile of enzymatic reaction products in the form of

VOCs, biological detection and identification is possible for those

microorganisms for which volatile metabolites are known. The

ChemSensing Colorimetric Sensor uses this technological approach.⁶⁹

Currently, some colorimetric systems have semiquantitative

capabilities. Colorimetric detection tubes prove a semiquantitative

indication of the amount of agent present. Results are dependent on

the analyte being tested, its concentration, and the flow rate.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Raman spectroscopy

Based on the scattering of incident electromagnetic radiation by

chemical species present in a (transparent) medium. Though similar in

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

application to IR spectroscopy, the mechanism in Raman scattering

BWAs, TIBs

differs from infrared absorption; for this reason, it is considered as a

separate IMA. Current applications of Raman spectroscopy include

Agent physical

nondestructive evaluation of CW agents in glass ampoules and bottles.

state(s): gases,

Since surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS) has been

aerosols, liquids

demonstrated for the detection of trace levels of CWAs and bacteria

both in the vapor phase and in aqueous solution, an array of SERS

sensors may be able to rapidly analyze ambient air and drinking water

supplies. SERS requires no sample pretreatment and typically

provides a response within 30 seconds. Another technique, resonance

Raman spectroscopy using UV excitation, may be preferred over

SERS in detecting biological agents in light of its more intense

scattering and avoidance of background fluorescence.⁷⁰

Raman Spectroscopy has been considered as a potential technological

basis for standoff detection (specifically biological

detection/identification).⁷¹

Photoionization

Based on the ionization of gaseous or vaporous chemicals through UV

detection

irradiation of a particular wavelength and detection of the ions.

Specifically, a photoionization detector (PID) operates by passing an

Sensing CWAs, TICs

air sample between two charged metal electrodes in a vacuum region

irradiated with UV radiation. A current, which corresponds to the

Agent physical

concentration of the ionized molecular species, is produced as

state(s): gases

positively charged ions collect at the negative electrode. The

specificity of the PID depends on the specificity of the excitation

radiation wavelength that ionizes the molecule of interest. PIDs can be

highly sensitive and quantitative when properly calibrated, though

they have limited specificity and are highly subject to false positives

in unknown or mixed environments.⁷²

Flame photometry

Based on the emission spectrum obtained through incineration of the

sample in a hydrogen-oxygen flame. The emission spectrum allows

Sensing CWAs, TICs,

for quantitative reading of the amount of a certain element in the

BWAs, TIBs

sample. Sulfur and phosphorous flame photometry are often used to

detect mustard and nerve agents, respectively. Since flame

Agent physical

photometric detection requires separation technology for specificity, it

state(s): gases,

is commonly coupled with gas chromatography.⁷³

aerosols

Though bacteria contain the same elements (e.g., Na, K, Ca, P, and S),

the ratios of two atomic elements in two different bacteria are

different. For this reason, flame photometry is predicted to be able to

detect and identify bacterial species.⁷⁴

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Electrochemistry

Based on detection of the change of electrical potential due the

absorption of a chemical into a solution or thin film. For example, the

Sensing CWAs, TICs

most common basis for an electrochemical gas sensor uses a

conducting wire or filament that is coated with a reactive material that

Agent physical

oxidizes rapidly when it encounters a CWA. Though electrochemical

state(s): gases,

sensors are typically specific to a class of chemicals, arrays of

aerosols

different sensors may be able to provide coverage for multiple classes

of agents and/or identify specific agents. The response time of

electrochemical sensors is generally very fast (less than a minute,

often seconds). Nevertheless, they are usually less sensitive than IMS

and flame photometry approaches.⁷⁵

Immunoassay

Based on the highly specific binding of antigens (immunologically

(antibody-based),

foreign substances) to their corresponding antibodies. The formation

including biochips

of an antigen-antibody complex can be monitored through different

mechanisms: directly through interferometry, surface plasmon

Sensing BWAs, TIBs

resonance, piezoelectric crystal microbalance, waveguide coupler, and

electrical capacitance or indirectly through fluorescent evanescent

Agent physical

biosensor surface, electrochemiluminescence, light-addressable

state(s): aerosols,

potentiometric sensor immunoassay, and latex particle

liquids

agglutination/light scattering. Antibodies (or analogous peptides or

combinatorially derived molecules) specific for any bacteria, virus, or

toxin can be made if the agent can be isolated and modeled. Detection,

identification, and even quantification are possible through this

technological approach. Technologies incorporating capillary

electrophoresis can result in fast analysis times, potentially in near-

real time.⁷⁶

Nucleic acid

Based on the extreme selectivity of DNA and ribonucleic acid RNA

amplification/probing

recognition. This approach (and PCR in particular) utilizes nucleic

acid probes that bind specifically to strands of complementary nucleic

Sensing BWAs, TIBs

acids, in this case, from particular pathogens. These complementary

nucleic acid segments are amplified and detected typically through

Agent physical

luminescent tagging. The nucleic acid amplification approach is

state(s): aerosols,

highly sensitive and specific. Detection, identification, and

liquids

quantification of a pathogen of interest are possible. However, the

approach cannot detect toxins (since they do not contain nucleic acids)

and detection cannot be achieved in near-real time.⁷⁷

Tissue-based sensing

Premised on the responsiveness of living cells and tissues to particular

biological, chemical, or physical stimuli. A system may use primary

Sensing BWAs, TIBs

or transformed cells from a variety of sources including neurons,

immune cells, endothelial cells, fibroblasts, etc. For example, one

Agent physical

system in the research and development stage uses B-cells engineered

state(s): aerosols,

with recombinant antibodies that are complementary to antigens of

liquids

specific bacteria and viruses. Detection is achieved through cellular

bioluminescence, resulting from activation of a reporter molecule.

Near-real-time (<3 min.) detection, identification, and quantification

of pathogens (and possibly toxins as well) is feasible.⁷⁸

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Multiple technologies

The use of multiple, complementary technologies to broaden the

(orthogonal)

number of agents detected and increase the reliability of the response.

Examples include SAW/IMS, IMC/SAW/electrochemical/SCCell (S-

CAD), GC/IMS, IMS/MS, nucleic acid/immunoassay technologies

(e.g., PCR and immunological techniques),

electrochemiluminescence/equilibrium immunoassay, and

fluorescence correlation spectroscopy/PCR.

Gas-filled radiation

Based on detection of radiation-induced ionization of a gas contained

detectors

within a defined gas chamber. When ionizing radiation enters a gas-

filled detector, it may produce ions. These ions are detected as they

Sensing alpha, beta,

collide with energized negative and positive electrodes within the

gamma, and neutron

chamber. All three main types of gas-filled radiation detectors

radiation (possibly in

(Geiger-Mueller detectors, proportional gas detectors, and ionization

the same unit)

chambers) work through a variation of this mechanism.

Geiger-Mueller detectors can respond to gamma and neutron radiation

and, if equipped with a sufficiently thin chamber window, alpha and

beta radiation as well. Proportional gas detectors can be used to

distinguish between alpha and beta radiation. Finally, ionization

chambers are typically used for gamma radiation measurements.

Scintillation

Based on detection of light that is emitted by particular inorganic

Radiation Detectors

crystals or organic compounds when exposed to ionizing radiation.

Some of the scintillating materials include ZnS(Ag), anthracene,

Sensing alpha, beta,

trans-stilbene, para-terphenyl, phenyl oxazole, NaI(Tl), CsI(Tl),

gamma, and neutron

bismuth germinate (Bi₄Ge₃O₁₂), and barium fluoride (BaF₂).

radiation (though not

typically in a single

Scintillation detectors can be used to detect alpha, beta, gamma, and

unit)

neutron radiation depending on the scintillating material. Scintillation

detectors for alpha radiation frequently use zinc sulfide activated with

silver, ZnS(Ag), as the scintillating material. Scintillation detectors for

beta and gamma radiation often incorporate organic and inorganic,

e.g., NaI(Tl), scintillators, respectively. Some scintillation detectors,

such as modern liquid scintillation units, can identify alpha, beta,

gamma, or neutron-emitting radioisotopes in addition to detecting

them.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Semiconductor

Based on detection of free electrons that are produced by certain

Radiation Detectors

semiconductors when they are exposed to ionizing radiation. The

electrons are detected as they are collected at the electrodes by the

Sensing alpha, beta,

applied voltage. The semiconductors that have been used for radiation

and gamma radiation

detection include germanium, silicon, cadmium telluride (CdTe), and

(though not likely in a

mercuric iodide (HgI₂). Semiconductor neutron radiation detectors are

single unit)

currently in the research and development phase.

Some germanium detectors can also identify gamma-emitting

radioisotopes and they provide better energy resolution than the

NaI(Tl) scintillation detector. Some silicon detectors have been used

for alpha-emitting or beta-emitting radioisotope identification.

¹ See Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds. Also know as FM 3-11.9, MCRP 3-37.1B,

NTRP 3-11.32, AFTTP(I) 3-2.55.

² Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical Detection

Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 381-83.

³ http://194.105.117.18/products/Default.asp?Product=3

⁴ http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_artemis.htm

⁵ Required Operational Capability (ROC) for the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), TRADOC

CAN 81298.

⁶ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical Detection

Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 395-97.

⁷ http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_cbms.htm;

http://www.ornl.gov/sci/casd/lammert/publications/cbms_brochure.pdf

⁸ http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/library/dcpubs/tabdce/TABDCESecT.pdf;

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/library/dcpubs/tabdce/TABDCESecD.pdf;

http://www.afcintl.com/tubedh.htm

⁹ California EPA, Evaluation Report for HAPSITE Portable Gas Chromatograph Mass

Spectrometer. March 2004.

http://www.inficonchemicalwarfaredetectionsystems.com/HAPSITEchemident.html

¹⁰ http://www.sensir.com/Smiths/HazMatID/SD_HazMatIDMarch2005.pdf;

http://www.hazmatid.com/Referance%20Corner/SEN_HazmatID_Bro_071503.pdf;

http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/nbcds/firs/Technical_Manuals/COTS/HazMat_ID/Haz

¹¹ OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR IMPROVED (CHEMICAL

AGENT) POINT DETECTION SYSTEM (IPDS). 1 February 1994.

¹² Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) Milestone III Operational Requirements Document.

¹³ DTO CB.37 Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor is developing system concepts and

technologies to meet the service requirement for a Joint Chemical/Biological Agent Water

Monitor (JCBAWM).

¹⁴ Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD)USAF (CAF) 007-96 for a JOINT

CHEMICAL/ BIOLOGICAL AGENT WATER MONITOR ACAT LEVEL III. 27 March 1998.

¹⁵ http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_jcsd.htm

¹⁶ DTO CB.50 Lightweight Integrated CB Detection is developing technology to meet the

requirements of the Joint Modular CB Detection (JMCBD) System.

¹⁷ OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR THE JOINT MODULAR CHEMICAL

BIOLOGICAL DETECTOR (JMCBDS) REVISED DRAFT. 8 January 2002.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

¹⁸ OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR JOINT SERVICE

LIGHTWEIGHT STANDOFF CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR (JSLSCAD) MILESTONE

III REVISION(JTD J2-C002-III). 6 February 2001.

¹⁹ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 422-23;

www.acq.osd.mil/cp/nbc99/99annexa.pdf+m18a2+minutes&hl=en

²⁰ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 408-09.

²¹ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 418-19.

²² Joint Service Operational Requirement (JSOR) for the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm

(RSCAAL). 28 June 1990; http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic924.htm

²³ Joint Service Operational Requirement (JSOR) for the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector

Alarm (ACADA). 03 August 1990; http://www.edgewood.army.mil/ps/download/xm279.pdf;

www.chem-bio.com/resource/1999/issue18.pdf

²⁴ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 430-31;

http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/m256a1/; http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/m256/section_02.htm

²⁵ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 433-38.

²⁶ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment

Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 411-15; www.acq.osd.mil/cp/nbc99/99annexa.pdf

²⁷ http://www.chem-bio.com/resource/2000/md90_d1_detector.pdf;

http://www.lifesafetysys.com/osb/itemdetails.cfm/ID/506

²⁸ http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/foxnbc/n05_s03.htm;

http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/fox_vehicle_ii/fox_vehicle_ii_s04.htm#IV.%20%20OPERATING%20PROCEDURES

²⁹ http://www.skcshopping.com/ProductDetails.asp?ProductCode=730-3121-

010&Show=ExtInfo; http://www.raesystems.com/~raedocs/Data_Sheets/MultiRAE_Plus.pdf

³⁰ Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. Worldwide Chemical

Detection Equipment Handbook. Gunpowder Br. APG, Md. October 1995. pp. 446-48.

http://www.gcms.de/download/viking.pdf

³¹ CBRN Defense Program Annual Report (DRAFT) Annex A: Contamination Avoidance

Programs, A-4.

³² CBRN Defense Program Annual Report (DRAFT) Annex A: Contamination Avoidance

Programs, A-5.

³³ Analytical Laboratory System Chemical and Biological Analytical Capability Market Survey

and Technology Report. October 2003. pp. 5-27, 5-28;

http://jcm.asm.org/cgi/content/full/36/5/1338/T3;

http://dpalm.uth.tmc.edu/faculty/bios/norris/BT2002_files/Detection.htm

³⁴ Mission Need Statement for Biological Detection. 7 August 1992.

http://www.tpub.com/content/USMC/mcwp3371cd/css/mcwp3371cd_149.htm

³⁵ Operational Requirements Document for JOINT BIOLOGICAL AGENT IDENTIFICATION

AND DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM (JBAIDS) MS B ORD ACAT III, Rev. 2. 1 April 2003.

³⁶ http://www-nehc.med.navy.mil/prevmed/epi/HHA2Nov01.doc;

http://dpalm.uth.tmc.edu/faculty/bios/norris/BT2002_files/Detection.htm

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

³⁷ http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_jbpds.htm; Operational Requirements Document for JOINT

BIOLOGICAL POINT DETECTION SYSTEM, ACAT II, Prepared for MILESTONE C Block I

and MILESTONE B Block II, Date 18 Jan 02 , (Stage I, JS/J-6 Interoperability Assessment

Resolution, 11 June 2002) (Stage II, JS/J-6 Interoperability Certification, 4 October 2002),

Approved 21 Jul 04, Joint Staff Memo J-8A 00251-03

³⁸ DTO CB.35, Standoff Biological Aerosol Detection, is researching long-wave and mid-wave

infrared (LWIR and MWIR), Differential Scattering/Differential Absorption Lidar

(DISC/DIAL), and Passive LWIR spectroscopy. Technology developed under this effort is

intended to address operational requirements of the Joint Biological Standoff Detection System.

³⁹ Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY02-03 Overview; OPERATIONAL

REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) UNCLASSIFIED JOINT BIOLOGICAL STANDOFF

DETECTION SYSTEM (JBSDS) FOR Increment 1 ACAT: III, Prepared for Milestone (MS) C

Decision, Date 27 Mar 04, Approved 28 Jun 04, JROC Memo 110-04; Joint Service Chemical

and Biological Defense Program, FY 02-03 Overview

⁴⁰ Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD)USAF (CAF) 007-96 for a JOINT

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AGENT WATER MONITOR ACAT LEVEL III, 27 Mar 1998

⁴¹ OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR THE JOINT MODULAR

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DETECTOR (JMCBDS) REVISED DRAFT 08 Jan 2002

⁴² http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_bids.htm; http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/bids.htm

⁴³ http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=700;

http://www.tpub.com/content/USMC/mcwp3371cd/css/mcwp3371cd_149.htm

⁴⁴ http://www.idahotech.com/rapid/; Analytical Laboratory System Chemical and Biological

Analytical Capability Market Survey and Technology Report. October 2003. pp. 5-9.

⁴⁵http://www.canberra.com/pdf/Products/RPI_pdf/ADM-300.pdf;

http://www.canberra.com/products/585.asp

⁴⁶ CBRN Defense Program Annual Report (DRAFT) Annex A: Contamination Avoidance

Programs, A-20,21

⁴⁷ http://www.orau.org/ptp/collection/radiac/PDR27.htm;

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/nkoppts/Dose/Dose19.htm;

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/nkoppts/Dose/Dose20.htm

⁴⁸ http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/nkoppts/Dose/Dose14.htm;

http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/nkoppts/Dose/Dose15.htm

⁴⁹ http://www.tpub.com/content/USMC/mcwp3372/css/mcwp3372_150.htm;

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/text/p31508m.txt

⁵⁰http://www.torontosurplus.com/redirect.php?middleframe=http://www.torontosurplus.com/sci/

Bland_sci55.htm

⁵¹ http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/nkoppts/Dose/Dose26.htm;

http://www.tpub.com/content/combat/14057_ppr/css/14057_ppr_213.htm

⁵² http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_anpdr75.htm; http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/an-

pdr-75.htm

⁵³ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/an-pdr-77.htm;

http://www.canberra.com/products/1158.asp; http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_anpdr77.htm

⁵⁴ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/an-udr-13.htm;

http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_anudr13.htm

⁵⁵ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/an-vdr-2.htm;

http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/ca_anvdr2.htm

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

⁵⁶ http://www.berkeleynucleonics.com/resources/935_brochure_4_pages.pdf;

http:///hour.to/FAQ/935_FAQ.html#10

⁵⁷ http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/cbrd/ip/dt-60.htm

⁵⁸ http://www.tpub.com/content/USMC/mcwp3371cd/css/mcwp3371cd_144.htm;

http://www.tpub.com/content/combat/10572/css/10572_245.htm

⁵⁹ http://www.thermo.com/eThermo/CMA/PDFs/Product/productPDF_24716.pdf

⁶⁰ National Institute of Justice, Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial

Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders. 2000. pp. 22-25; National

Institute of Justice, An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency

First Responders. 2001, pp 28-29; NATIBO, Biological Detection System Technologies

Technology and Industrial Base Study. February 2001. pp. 4-7 to 4-9.

⁶¹ DTO CB.53 Wide-Area Aerial Reconnaissance for Chemical Agents is developing a wide-area

aerial reconnaissance system that will allow rapid evaluation of large areas for CW

contamination, and provide detailed information as to the position of a CW agent cloud.

⁶² Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors,” 24 November 24

2003. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al.

(eds.). Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and

Documenting Exposures. National Academy Press. 2000.

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁶³ CBRN Research and Technology Initiative. “CRTI 0203RD Standoff Detection of Radiation.”

http://www.crti.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/projects/crti_0203rd_e.html

⁶⁴ Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors,” 24 November 2003,

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the Selection

of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2000; McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the

Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures.

National Academy Press. 2000. http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁶⁵ Tarver, Edward. “External Second Gate, Fourier Transform Ion Mobility Spectrometry: FT-

IMS Parametric Optimization for Detection of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Sandia National

Laboratories, Presented at 2004 Biological-Chemical Detection Symposium, Washington, D.C.

⁶⁶ SpectroscopyNow.com, Photoacoustic Infrared Spectroscopy description,

http://www.spectroscopynow.com/Spy/basehtml/SpyH/1,1181,3-5-3-0-1-book_detail-0-

822,00.html; McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath

of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National

Academy Press. 2000. http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁶⁷ McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of

Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National

Academy Press. 2000. pp. 96-97; http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁶⁸ Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm

⁶⁹ Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. Market Survey: Biological Detectors Guide for

Selection of Detection Devices and Systems. April 2003; Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of

Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm

⁷⁰ Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; McKone, Thomas E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing and

Documenting Exposures. National Academy Press. 2000.

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/; Detection and Measurement of Chemical Agents,

http://books.nap.edu/html/terrorism/ch4.html; Farquharson, Stuart, Alan Gift, Paul Maksymiuk,

et al. “Chemical agent detection by surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy” (Abstract).

International Society for Optical Engineering,

http://bookstore.spie.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=DetailPaper&ProductId=511940&coden; Kawai,

Nancy T. and Kevin M. Spencer. “Raman Spectroscopy for Homeland Defense Applications.”

Raman Technology for Today’s Spectroscopists. June 2004, pp. 55-58.

⁷¹ Loerop, William. “Chemical Biological Defense Science and Technology Chemical Standoff

Briefing.” Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.

http://proceedings.ndia.org/dod_cb/Tuesday_PM/Zarzycki.pdf

⁷² Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 24

2003. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the

Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency

First Responders. 2000. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm; McKone, Thomas

E., Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces:

Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National Academy Press. 2000.

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁷³ Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors,” 24 November 2003,

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the Selection

of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2000. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm; McKone, Thomas E.,

Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.). Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces:

Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National Academy Press. 2000.

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁷⁴ Philippe, Adam, Damien Descroix, and Jean-Pierre Chiaroni. “Flame Photometry for

Biological Detection.” Proceedings from the 6^th CBW Protection Symposium. 1998.

⁷⁵ Kosal, Margaret E. “The Basics of Chemical and Biological Detectors.” 24 November 2003.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031124.htm; National Institute of Justice. Guide for the Selection

of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2000. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm; McKone, Thomas E.,

Beverly M. Huey, et al. (eds.) Strategies to Protect the Heath of Deployed U.S. Forces:

Detecting, Characterizing and Documenting Exposures. National Academy Press. 2000.

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309068754/html/

⁷⁶ National Institute of Justice. An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2001. pp. 29-32. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/190747.htm; NATIBO. Biological Detection

System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study. February 2001. pp. 4-9 to 4-12.

⁷⁷ National Institute of Justice. An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2001. p. 32. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/190747.htm; NATIBO. Biological Detection

System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study. February 2001. pp. 4-18 to 4-19.

⁷⁸ NATIBO. Biological Detection System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study.

February 2001. pp. 4-12 to 4-13; Harper, James. “Automated CANARY Testbed for Fast

Bioaerosol Identification.” MIT Lincoln Laboratory. Presented at 2004 Biological-Chemical

Detection Symposium, Washington, D.C.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

5.1

Task TASENS 1: Sense the atmosphere for chemical hazards

5.1.1

Functional Area Analysis

5.1.1.1

Definition

To sense the atmosphere for the presence or absence of chemical hazards (encompasses chemical

warfare agents and TICs) using sensors. Includes the functions of detection, identification, and

quantification of the hazard. Also includes collection of samples for further analysis, along with

early-warning surveillance of unforeseen hazard releases and monitoring of known hazard

locations. Encompasses “detect to warn” and “detect to treat” situations. The evaluation

encompasses all chemical hazards of military and medical importance.

5.1.1.2

Derivation

UJTL TA 7, UJTL TA 7.1, Protection Joint Functional Concept.

5.1.1.2.1

Supported Tasks: OPSENS 1, OPSENS 4, OPSENS 7

5.1.1.2.2

Lateral Task: TASHA 16

5.1.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

5.1.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical

1. Mountainous, desert, jungle, and arctic terrain. (C1.1.1)

2. Significant urbanization. (C1.1.3.1)

3. Tropical, arctic, and arid climates. (C1.3.1)

4. Summer, winter seasons. (C1.3.1.1)

5. Stormy weather. (C1.3.1.3)

6. Hot, very cold air temperature. (C1.3.1.3.1)

7. High surface-wind velocity. (C1.3.1.3.3)

8. High/low relative humidity. (C1.3.1.3.5)

9. Liquid, freezing, and frozen precipitation. (C1.3.1.3.6.1)

10. Heavy precipitation intensity. (C1.3.1.3.6.2)

11. Extreme turbulence and wind shear. (C1.3.1.3.8)

12. Negligible light. (C1.3.2.1)

13. Chemical effects. (C1.3.3.2).

Military

1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)

2. Location—ashore, afloat, airborne. (C2.1.4.1)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

3. Minimal time available. (C2.1.5)

4. Low personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

5. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Ambiguous threat existence. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. Limited or negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

3. High mission priority. (C3.1.3.2)

4. TICs present in the civilian sector. (C3.3.7.5).

5.1.2

Functional Needs Analysis

5.1.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 5.1-1 presents individual and overall current, near/mid-term, and far-term capabilities to

perform the task to the designated standards. There are 16 current capabilities used to accomplish

this task and five projected capabilities to be added in the future (three in the near/mid-term and

two in the far-term). The individual capabilities include a range of point and standoff detectors

with differing capabilities to meet the identified standards.

Current Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall current capability is assessed as “yellow.” Most current detectors detect the vapor of

multiple CWAs and no or few TICs. Detection is usually achieved within two minutes and

classification of the detected agent is typically provided. Though most detectors do not quantify

the agent concentration, some provide relative hazard indications and more sensitive detectors

(e.g., MS) provide absolute quantification capabilities. All but two current detectors are point

detectors (AN/KAS-1 and M21 RSCAAL are standoff detectors). Though some point detectors

can provide limited detect-to-warn capability, they are mainly used for detect-to-treat purposes.

There is no single capability that can perform the task to all of the designated standards. Mass

spectrometers such as the Viking SpectraTrak and HAPSITE appear to be the best overall current

capabilities, but they are costly, require substantial training to operate, and do not detect or

identify in near-real time; consequently, they do not detect-to-warn and may be unable to

identify-to-treat if high concentrations of fast-acting lethal agents are present. In addition,

HAPSITE, like most current detectors, does not detect aerosols. The M8A1 ACAA and Viking

Spectratrak are the only current detectors known to detect hazards in aerosol form. With few

exceptions, current detectors do not detect CWAs at ECt50 ocular levels (IAW: Potential

Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds. Also known as FM 3-11.9, MCRP 3-

37.1B, NTRP 3-11.32, AFTTP(I) 3-2.55). No current detector detects VX vapor below

immediately-dangerous-to-life-or-health (IDLH) levels, and most detectors detect soman (GD)

and cyclosarin (GF) at twice IDLH levels. Other deficiencies include the lack of real-time CWA

identification and TIC detection/identification capabilities, lack of agent quantification

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

capabilities, lack of a detector that also takes samples for future analysis, and detector

susceptibility to chemical interference.¹

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall projected near/mid-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” In the near/mid-term

future, the introduction of the JCAD, JSLSCAD, and integrated CBMS II will enhance the joint

forces’ ability to rapidly (i.e., within 90 seconds) detect, quantify, and identify CWAs for both

detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat purposes. JCAD and JSLSCAD will also improve the forces’

ability to determine cumulative doses of personnel exposed to CWAs and TICs. Nevertheless,

MS units (including CBMS II) will likely be the only detectors able to detect all CWAs. MS

units, gas toxic Draeger kits, JSLSCAD, and JCAD will be the main capabilities to detect TICs.

They will detect many or all high-priority TICs.

The general inability to detect aerosols and agent concentrations at or below IDLH levels, the

lack of a detector that also takes samples for future analysis, and detector susceptibility to

chemical interference are likely to remain deficiencies in the near-future.

Projected Far-Term Capabilities and Deficiencies

The overall projected far-term capability is assessed as “yellow.” In the far-term future, many

fielded detectors will detect most, if not, all CWAs and some TICs. Most detectors will quantify

and classify, if not identify, agents. MS units, gas toxic Draeger kits, JSLSCAD, and JCAD will

likely remain the main capabilities to detect TICs. The introduction of ARTEMIS will increase

the forces’ standoff detection capabilities. JMCBDS will provide an integrated chemical/

biological detection, identification, and quantification capability and is expected to rapidly and

reliably detect, identify, and quantify most CWAs and some TICs.

Many detectors will still not detect aerosols and agent concentrations that are expected to cause

low-level effects. Furthermore, there will still be a lack of a detector that also takes samples for

future analysis. The risk of chemical interference will remain, though it will be significantly

mitigated through more precise sensors, orthogonal technologies, and more advanced algorithms.

¹ Refer to the JRO Operational Impact Assessment of Non-Traditional Agents report, July 2003

(S/NF) for information on nontraditional agent detection.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

Table 5.1-1. TASENS 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

System/Measure

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

Current - Near/Mid - Far

AN/KAS-1

4 ¹

0 ²

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

N/A ⁷

5 ⁸

10 ⁹

N/A ¹⁰

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

APD2000

5 ¹⁴

10 ¹⁵

0 ³

0 ¹⁶

10 ¹⁵

0 ³

7 ¹⁷

N/A ¹⁸

5 ¹⁹

5 ²⁰

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

Unk²¹

CAM/ICAM

6 ²²

5 ²³

5 ²⁴

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

2 ²⁵

N/A ¹⁸

5 ²⁶

5 ²⁷

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

CAPDS MK21 Mod I

3 ²⁸

0 ²

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

1 ²⁹

N/A ¹⁸

5 ³⁰

N/A ¹⁰

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

Gas Toxic Draeger Kit

2 ³¹

10 ¹⁵

10 ³²

2 ³³

10 ¹⁵

10 ³²

Varies³⁴

N/A ¹⁸

Varies³⁵

Varies ³⁶

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

5 ³⁷

10¹³

HAPSITE (GC/MS)

10 ³⁸

10 ³⁹

10 ⁴⁰

9 ⁴¹

10 ³⁹

10 ⁴⁰

1 ⁴²

N/A ¹⁸

0 ⁴³

5 ⁴⁴

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

5 ³⁷

Unk²¹

IPDS

5 ⁴⁵

5 ²³

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

2 ⁴⁶

N/A ¹⁸

5 ²⁶

5 ²⁷

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

M18A2

8 ⁴⁷

7 ⁴⁸

0 ³

1 ⁴⁹

10 ⁵⁰

0 ³

1 ⁴²

N/A ¹⁸

0 ⁴³

0 ⁵¹

10 ⁵²

10 ⁵³

0 ¹²

10¹³

M21 RSCAAL

4 ⁵⁴

0 ²

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

N/A ⁵⁵

5 ⁵⁶

10 ⁹

N/A ¹⁰

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

M22 ACADA

6 ⁵⁷

7 ⁵⁸

5 ⁵⁹

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

7 ¹⁷

N/A ¹⁸

5 ⁶⁰

5 ⁶¹

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

M256A1 Kit

9 ⁶²

7 ⁶³

0 ³

1 ⁶⁴

10 ⁵⁰

0 ³

1 ⁶⁵

N/A ¹⁸

0 ⁴³

5 ⁶⁶

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

M8A1 ACAA

3 ⁶⁷

0 ²

0 ³

0 ⁴

N/A ⁵

N/A ⁶

1 ²⁹

N/A ¹⁸

5 ⁶⁸

N/A ¹⁰

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

M90-D-1C

6 ⁶⁹

5 ⁷⁰

5 ⁷¹

1 ⁷²

5 ⁷⁰

5 ⁷¹

1 ²⁹

N/A ¹⁸

5 ³⁰

5 ⁷³

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

0 ¹²

10¹³

MM-1 (GC/MS) integrated into

10 ⁷⁴

10 ¹⁵

5 ⁷⁵

1 ⁷⁶

10 ¹⁵

5 ⁷⁵

4 ⁷⁷

N/A ¹⁸

5 ⁷⁸

5 ⁷⁹

10 ⁸⁰

10 ⁵³

0 ¹²

10¹³

M93A1 Fox

MultiRAE Plus

1 ⁸¹

5 ⁸²

10 ⁸³

5 ⁸⁴

7 ⁸⁵

10 ⁸⁶

2 ⁴⁶

N/A ¹⁸

5 ²⁶

5 ⁸⁷

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

7 ⁸⁸

Unk²¹

Viking SpectraTrak (GC/MS)

10 ⁸⁹

10 ⁹⁰

10 ⁴⁰

10 ⁹¹

10 ⁹⁰

10 ⁴⁰

1 ⁴²

N/A ¹⁸

0 ⁴³

5 ⁴⁴

0 ¹¹

N/A ¹¹

7 ⁹²

10¹³

Near/Mid - Far

CBMS II integrated into NBCRV

10 ⁹³

10⁹⁴

Unk

9 ⁹⁵

N/A ⁹⁶

5 ⁹⁷

10⁹⁸

10 ⁹⁹

10 ¹⁰⁰

Unk

N/A¹⁰¹

Stryker or JNBCRS

JCAD

9 ¹⁰²

5 ¹⁰³

10 ¹⁰⁴

2 ¹⁰⁵

Unk

10 ¹⁰⁴

2 ¹⁰⁶

N/A ⁹⁶

5 ¹⁰⁷

5 ¹⁰⁸

0 ¹²²

N/A ¹²²

10 ¹⁰⁹

N/A¹⁰¹

JSLSCAD

8 ¹¹⁰

5/10 ¹¹¹

10 ¹¹²

9 ¹¹³

5/10 ¹¹¹

10 ¹¹²

N/A ¹¹⁴

5 /10¹¹⁵

10 ¹¹⁶

10 ¹¹⁷

0 ¹²²

N/A ¹²²

5 ¹¹⁸

N/A¹⁰¹

Far

ARTEMIS

10 ¹¹⁹

Unk

N/A ¹²⁰

10 ¹²¹

10 ¹¹⁶

Unk

0 ¹²²

N/A ¹²²

Unk

N/A¹⁰¹

JMCBDS

9 ¹²³

5 ¹⁰³

10 ¹⁰⁴

4 ¹²⁴

10 ¹²⁵

10 ¹⁰⁴

1 ¹²⁰

N/A ⁹⁶

5 ¹²⁶

5 ¹²⁷

0 ¹²²

N/A ¹²²

10 ¹⁰⁹

N/A¹⁰¹

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall

N/A¹⁰¹

Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

N/A¹⁰¹

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All of a potential adversary’s weaponized

Percentage of following 12 agents as

Percentages standardized to 0-10 scale

CWAs can be detected using fielded

described in FM 3-9 that are detected:

technologies/equipment, regardless of agent

Nerve agents (GA; GB; GD; GF; VX),

physical properties, states, and

vesicants (H/HD; HN-1,2,3; L; CX),

concentrations?

cyanides (AC; CK), pulmonary agent

(CG)

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

All CWAs can be identified?

Ability to classify or identify detected

10: Identify detected CWAs

CWAs.

7: Identify some detected CWAs; classify others

5: Classify detected CWAs

0: Neither identify nor classify detected CWAs

All of a potential adversary’s weaponized

Ability to provide snapshot

10: Absolute quantification

CWAs can be quantified using fielded

concentration of detected CWAs.

5: Generic quantification

technologies/ equipment?

0: No quantification capability

All TICs can be detected using fielded

Percentage of the 33 high-priority

10: 100%

technologies/equipment?

critical acutely toxic airborne TICs

9: 90%

listed in USACHPPM Report 47-EM-

8: 80%

6154-03: ITF-40. (FOUO) that are

2: 20%

detected.

1: 1%-20%

0: 0%

All TICs can be identified using fielded

Ability to classify or identify detected

10: Identify all detected TICs

technologies/equipment?

TICs.

7: Identify some detected TICs; classify others

5: Classify detected TICs

0: Neither classify nor identify detected TICs

All TICs can be quantified using fielded

Ability to provide snapshot

10: Absolute quantification

technologies/equipment?

concentration of detected TICs.

5: Generic quantification

0: No quantification capability

Time to detect chemical hazards?

Time period from CWA/TIC sampling

10: 12 sec

to analysis output. Linear scale 1-10.

7: 30 sec

Applies to point detectors only.

2: 60 sec

1: >60 sec

Distance between chemical hazard and

Linear scale 1-9. Applies to standoff

10: >9 km

detector for accurate detection?

detection only.

9: 9 km

5: 5 km

2: 2 km

1: 1 km

Chemical hazards are detected in time to

Factors include time to detect chemical

10: Complete capability

warn forces and take appropriate protective

hazards (M7), distance between

5: Partial capability

measures?

chemical hazard and detector for

0: No capability

accurate detection (M8), as well as rate-

of-action of those hazards.

M10

Chemical hazards are identified in time to

Based on capability and time required to

10: Complete capability

treat forces?

identify or classify hazards as well as

5: Partial capability

rate-of-action of those hazards.

0: No capability

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

FAA Measure

Elaboration

Scale

M11

Sampling collection procedures available for

Refers to physical sampling for future

10: Complete capability

all of a potential adversary’s weaponized

analysis.

5: Partial capability

chemical warfare agents and for all TICs

0: No capability

using fielded technologies/equipment?

M12

Procedures maintain integrity of sample?

Refers to a physical sample for future

10: Complete capability

analysis.

5: Partial capability

0: No capability

M13

Cumulative dose can be determined and

Assuming constant and defined

10: Complete capability (automatically calculated)

presented using data from currently fielded

breathing rates and lung retention

7: Moderate capability (monitoring capability + absolute

sensors/equipment?

efficiencies.

quantification)

5: Minimal capability (absolute quantification)

0: Cumulative dose cannot be determined.

M14

There is effective DOTLPF in place to

Refers to non-materiel elements

10: DOTLPF exists and is adequate for the task to be

conduct task?

associated with the execution of a task

performed with this system without limitations that cause

with the system.

significant impact upon operations.

5: Most critical aspects of DOTLPF for the task to be

performed with this system are addressed.

0: DOTLPF is inadequate or does not exist for the task to

be performed with this system.

¹ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD, GF, and VX. Does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only, and is susceptible to

chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

² Does not identify or classify detected agents or TICs.

³ Does not quantify amount of detected agents or TICs.

⁴ No TICs detected.

⁵ Does not identify or classify any TICs because it does not detect any TICs

⁶ Does not quantify TIC concentrations because it does not detect any TICs.

⁷ Based on operator skill and experience.

⁸ 5 km range.

⁹ Yes, as a standoff detector, it is assumed that range and response time are sufficient to detect-to-warn forces.

¹⁰ Does not identify or classify agents or TICs.

¹¹ Sampling collection for future analysis capability does not exist with this technology/equipment.

¹² Cumulative dose cannot be determined and presented with data from this technology/equipment (no absolute quantification capability).

¹³ There is effective DOTLPF in place to conduct task with this system.

¹⁴ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH level for GD within 30 sec.); VX (0.04 mg/m³ - 4X IDLH level within 30 sec.); HD

(2 mg/m³ - IDLH level within 15 sec.), and L (0.38 mg/m³ within 15 sec.). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting

person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), and <300 (L for eye) mg-min/m³. Does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects

vapors only; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

¹⁵ Identifies detected agents and TICs

¹⁶ Detects pepper spray and mace (but these are not included in the ITF-40 33 high-priority critical acutely toxic airborne toxic industrial chemicals.)

¹⁷ Detects in less than 30 seconds.

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 5. Tactical Sense Tasks

¹⁸ Point detector, so no standoff distance.

¹⁹ Can detect within 30 seconds and thus provides some detect-to-warn capability.

²⁰ Identifies hazards within 30 seconds.

²¹ Commercial off-the-shelf detector. Unknown if sufficient DOTLPF in place.

²² Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, and L (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH for GD/GF; 10X IDLH for VX; 1/20 IDLH for HD). According to

FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50 (VX), 150 (inhaled HD), and <300 (L for eye) mg-min/m³. Does not

detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

²³ Classifies agents as being nerve or blister agents.

²⁴ Provides relative hazard indication (relative quantification).

²⁵ Detects hazards in less than 1 minute. Note: Requires up to 8 hours to warm up after 30 days storage

²⁶ Detects within 1 minute and thus provides some detect-to-warn capability.

²⁷ Classifies agents within 1 minute.

²⁸ Detects GB, GD, and VX only (0.3 mg/m³ - 3X IDLH for GB, 6X for GD, and 30X IDLH for VX, within 2 minutes). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 75 (GB

for resting person), 75-300 (GD), and 50 (VX) mg-min/m³. Does not detect concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only; and is susceptible

to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

²⁹ Detects hazards within 2 minutes.

³⁰ Detects within 2 minutes and thus provides some detect-to-warn capability.

³¹ Detects AC (2.4 mg/m³ - 1/25 IDLH level) and CG (0.08 mg/m³) vapors only. According to FM 3-11.9, the incapacitating dose for CG is 1,600 mg-min/m³.

³² Provides absolute quantification capability for all detected agents and TICs.

³³ Limited—Detects CO, ethylene oxide, HCN, HCl, HF, NO₂, and CG.

³⁴ Detects in <1 minute to 10 minutes (depending on compound and concentration).

³⁵ Varies in detection time so detect-to-warn capability varies as well.

³⁶ Possibly identifies detected hazards in time to treat but depends on compound and concentration.

³⁷ Cumulative dose can be roughly estimated, but it cannot be precisely determined since this technology/equipment does not have a monitoring capability.

³⁸ Presumably detects all 12 CWA of interest (claims low ppb to ppt detection limits; 1 ppb = 0.01 mg/m³ for VX - IDLH level; 0.006-0.007 mg/m³ for G-agents - ~1/10 IDLH

levels; 0.007 mg/m³ for HD - 1/285 IDLH level). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), 50

(VX), 150 (inhaled HD), <300 (L for eye), 7,000 (CK), and 1,6000 (CG) mg-min/m³. Detects vapors only.

³⁹ Identifies detected agents and TICs (through mass spectrometry).

⁴⁰ Provides absolute quantification capability for all detected agents and TICs (specifically provides composition intensities, e.g., ppm).

⁴¹ Presumably detects most TICs in ITF-40. Detects vapors only.

⁴² Detects within 10 minutes.

⁴³ Does not provide any detect-to-warn capability.

⁴⁴ Hazards are not identified in time to treat, especially if lethal fast-acting agents at high concentrations are involved.

⁴⁵ Limited—Detects only GA, GB, GD, GF, VX (0.1 mg/m³ - IDLH for GA/GB, 2X IDLH for GD/GF, 10X IDLH for VX, within 60 sec.); and HD (10 mg/m³ - 5X IDLH level,

within 60 sec.). According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), and 50 (VX) mg-min/m³. Does not detect

concentrations which can cause low-level (e.g., ocular) effects; detects vapors only; and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

⁴⁶ Detects hazards in less than 1 minute.

⁴⁷ Detects GA, GB, GD, GF, VX (0.1 mg/m³- IDLH level for GA/GB, 2X IDLH for GD/GF, 10X IDLH for VX within 4 min. for GB and VX), HD (0.5 mg/m³- ¼ IDLH within

3 min.), L, CX, AC, and CK. According to FM 3-11.9, incapacitating doses are 300 (GA for resting person), 75 (GB for resting person), 75-300 (GD), and 50 (VX) mg-

min/m³.Detects vapors only and is susceptible to chemical interference (false positives and negatives).

⁴⁸ Classifies G and V agents as nerve agents; identifies HD, L, AC, and CG.

⁴⁹ Detects TICs AC and CG.

⁵⁰ Identifies detected TICs.

⁵¹ May require up to 10 minutes to classify or identify, which is generally inadequate for identify-to-treat.

For Official Use Only

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 4