CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 2
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
and national intelligence organizations have the responsibility to gather intelligence on CBRN
threat-related issues, they do not have the requisite understanding of CBRN issues to fully
address the requirements without assistance from JRO-CBRND. It is projected that
improvements due to coordination/doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) enhancements will dramatically improve DoD’s
ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will remain “yellow”
due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
Table 2.0-1. Strategic National Sense Summary FNA Findings
CBRN
Strategic
Capability
National
CBRN Strategic National Sense Task Title
Sense Task
Current
Near/Mid
Far
Number
SNSENS 1
Sense the decision of a nation-state or
transnational organization to initiate a
•
•
•
CBRN/TIM weapons program.
SNSENS 2
Sense the acquisition of components of a
CBRN/TIM weapons program.
•
•
•
SNSENS 3
Sense CBRN/TIM weapons program production
facility preparation.
•
•
•
SNSENS 4
Sense the production of CBRN/TIM agents and
delivery systems.
•
•
•
SNSENS 5
Sense CBRN/TIM weaponization.
•
•
•
SNSENS 6
Sense preparations to test and testing of
CBRN/TIM agents/weapons.
•
•
•
SNSENS 7
Sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM
weapons or components.
•
•
•
SNSENS 8
Sense the operational deployment of
CBRN/TIM weapons or units.
•
•
•
SNSENS 9
Sense CBRN/TIM offensive and defensive
training activities.
•
•
•
SNSENS 10
Sense the presence and identity and monitor the
movement and location of CBRN/TIM
•
•
•
expertise.
SNSENS 11
Sense the employment of CBRN/TIM weapons.
•
•
•
SNSENS 12
Sense global CBRN/TIM hazards due to
employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons
•
•
•
or materials.
SNSENS 13
Monitor treaty signatories and states that are
NA
NA
NA
eliminating their WMD for compliance.
SNSENS 14
Monitor international scientific and technology
developments for potential CBRN/TIM
•
•
•
For Official Use Only
2
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
implications.
SNSENS 15
Provide Sense Global Family of Engagement
Plan policies and guidelines to combatant
•
•
•
commanders.
SNSENS 16
Provide global screening for endemic disease
and/or hazardous substances in the environment.
•
•
•
SNSENS 17
Develop global environmental background data
including climatology.
•
•
•
OVERALL
•
•
•
2.0.3
FSA Summary
The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential DOTMLPF solutions for the
capability gaps identified in the FNA section.
2.0.3.1
DOTLPF
The DOTLPF solutions identified in this chapter include basic actions required to better prepare
the appropriate staffs. No training or experimentation has taken place to facilitate the formulation
of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed to facilitate the ability of intelligence
personnel to assess CBRND Sense requirements. It is imperative that these exercises take place
and lessons learned be integrated into doctrine, TTPs, and guidance. Other solutions include the
development of leader education programs for both CBRND and intelligence staff officers and a
detailed analysis of how the intelligence community is organized, trained, and staffed to perform
CBRN intelligence analysis and collection activities. In the case of hazards involving non-U.S.
allies or countries that restrict information, current doctrine, techniques, and procedures may not
be adequate. It is imperative that additional exercises/experimentation take place and lessons
learned be integrated into doctrine, TTPs, and guidance.
2.0.3.2
Ideas for Materiel Approaches
There are no materiel requirements.
For Official Use Only
3
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.1
Task SNSENS 1: Sense the decision of a nation-state or transnational
organization to initiate a CBRN/TIM weapons program
2.1.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.1.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine the strategic decision of a nation-
state or transnational organization (terrorists, cultists) to initiate a CBRN/toxic industrial material
(TIM) weapons program. Areas of interest include activities and situations that could indicate
that deliberations are taking place considering the initiation of a CBRN/TIM weapons program.
Of particular importance is information relating to the reasoning behind the pursuit of
CBRN/TIM weapons; therefore, it is important to collect information indicating the adversaries’
objectives for using CBRN/TIM and their concept of use to obtain those objectives. This task
includes collecting information on key foreign leadership/decision makers involved in the
CBRN/TIM weapons program deliberation process and cultural factors that may influence
decisions. Information is also collected on the nature and characteristics of theater and regional
areas of interest that would impact on CBRN/TIM programmatic decisions. This task also
includes collecting counterintelligence information, ballistic missile information that could be
related to the initiation of a CBRN/TIM weapons program, and information on terrorist
activities.
2.1.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.1.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.1.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.1.1.2.3
Supporting Tasks: STSENS 5, STSENS 6
2.1.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. NA
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
For Official Use Only
4
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
2.1.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.1.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.1-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRND issues involving the
warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of current
and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense the decision of a nation-state or
transnational organization to initiate a CBRN/TIM weapons program. For the purposes of this
analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified
are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System [JCIDS]
analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It is projected that improvements due to
coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically improve DoD’s ability to articulate and
assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent
difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the decision of a nation-state or transnational organization to initiate a CBRN/TIM
weapons program, but the overall status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent
difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
5
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.1-1. SNSENS 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
G4
Y5
Y6
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y7
Y
G
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability8
Y9
Y
G
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Warning time/indicators are provided before actual decision to initiate
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
CBRN/TIM weapons program.
M2
Transnational organizations considering CBRN/TIM weapons programs
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
are identified.
M3
Assessments of overall nation-states or transnational organizations that
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
may be considering CBRN/TIM programs are provided.
M4
Countries that have made the decision to initiate CBRN/TIM weapons
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
programs have been detected and identified.
M5
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that activities and situations that could indicate that
deliberations considering the initiation of a CBRN/TIM weapons program are taking place are identified prior to a decision to
proceed. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to identify transnational organizations that may be considering
initiating CBRN/TIM weapons programs. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators
may not be adequate.
4 Nothing precludes the providing of assessments of overall nation-states or transnational organizations that may be considering
CBRN/TIM programs once they are identified and need to know is certified.
5 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries that have made the decision to initiate
CBRN/TIM weapons programs. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not be
adequate.
6 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that the decision of a nation-state or transnational organization to initiate a
CBRN/TIM weapons program is detected.
7 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
8 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
9 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
6
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.1.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.1.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the Ideas for Materiel Approaches (IMA) section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate providing warning time and to
provide useful indicators may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to facilitate
providing warning time and to provide useful indicators. Training: JRO-CBRND must
test all techniques and procedures by integrating them into their experimentation
campaign plan and developing lessons learned and actionable recommendations.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate identifying transnational
organizations considering CBRN/TIM weapons programs and to provide useful
indicators may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to facilitate
identifying transnational organizations considering CBRN/TIM weapons programs and to
provide useful indicators.
3.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate identifying countries that have made
the decision to initiate CBRN/TIM weapons programs and to provide useful indicators
may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to facilitate
identifying countries that have made the decision to initiate CBRN/TIM weapons
programs and to provide useful indicators.
4.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
the decision of a nation-state or transnational organization to initiate a CBRN/TIM
weapons program is detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
For Official Use Only
7
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
5.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
6.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. JRO-CBRND must be
better integrated into the J-2 and through the J-2 assess the organizational capabilities of
DIA, CIA, and DTRA. Personnel: JRO-CBRND should have adequate
trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section dedicated to resolving
CBRN intelligence community issues.
7.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
8.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
9.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
10. Deficiency: Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) does not adequately cover the
fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
For Official Use Only
8
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
11. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.1.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
9
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.2
Task SNSENS 2: Sense the acquisition of components of a CBRN/TIM
weapons program
2.2.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.2.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization is acquiring components essential to a CBRN/TIM weapons program.
Areas of interest include activities and situations that could indicate that personnel with special
expertise in CBRN/TIM weapons development are being recruited. Other areas could include the
acquisition of chemicals that could be used as precursors of chemical agents, biological cultures
or organisms, radioisotopes, or radiological ores. Specialized equipment acquisitions or
development, even dual-use items that could have nonweapons application, should be identified
as applicable. Equipment and clothing required for protection during CBRN/TIM weapons
development would be of interest. Development of weapons systems or munitions that could be
used to employ CBRN/TIM weapons also should be noted. Information developed by this task
may contribute to Task SNSENS 1.
2.2.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.2.2, SN 2.2.1, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-01, 2-02).
2.2.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.2.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.2.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.2.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
10
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.2.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.2.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.2-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense the acquisition of
components of a CBRN/TIM weapons program. For the purposes of this analysis, current
capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for
JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the acquisition of components of a CBRN/TIM weapons program, but the overall
status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
11
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.2-1. SNSENS 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
R3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Countries or transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
program components are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on countries or transnational organizations performing
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
research and development or acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program
components is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to
ensure accuracy are not adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to
ensure accuracy may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program
components are detected.
5Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
12
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.2.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.2.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the (IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program components may not
be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons
program components and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must include any
and all components that could be used in a CBRN/TIM weapons program, where they can
be acquired, what dual uses (legitimate research or industry) the components might be
already serving, and signatures that might indicate the components are being acquired or
shipped.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program components may not
be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations acquiring CBRN/TIM
weapons program components and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational acquiring CBRN/TIM weapons program components is
detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
For Official Use Only
13
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
For Official Use Only
14
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with JPME. Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees
to national intelligence organizations must possess adequate skill and experience.
2.2.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
15
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.3
Task SNSENS 3: Sense CBRN/TIM weapons program production
facility preparation
2.3.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.3.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization is acquiring components for and/or preparing CBRN/TIM weapons
program production facility acquisition and preparation. Areas of interest include activities and
situations that could indicate that personnel with special expertise in CBRN/TIM weapons
production facility preparation are being recruited or that specialized materials are being
acquired.
2.3.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.3.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.3.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.3.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.3.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
16
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.3.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.3.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.3-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element. However, due to documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense CBRN/TIM weapons
program production facility preparation. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are
listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND
action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing CBRN/TIM weapons program production facility preparation, but the overall status
is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
17
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.3-1. SNSENS 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Countries or transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM weapons
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
program production facilities are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on countries or transnational organizations preparing
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
CBRN/TIM weapons program production facilities is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational preparing CBRN/TIM
weapons program production facilities. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may
not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
preparing CBRN/TIM weapons program production facilities. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure
accuracy may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM weapons program
production facilities are detected.
5 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
18
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.3.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.3.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM weapons program production facilities
may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM weapons
program production facilities and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must
include any and all types of facilities that could be used for production in a CBRN/TIM
weapons program, what features they might possess, what dual uses (legitimate research
or industry) the facilities might be already serving, and signatures that might indicate
specific construction techniques, filter or safety facilities, and construction equipment.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM weapons program production facilities
may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations preparing CBRN/TIM
weapons program production facilities and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization preparing CBRN/TIM weapons program
production facilities is detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
For Official Use Only
19
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solution: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
For Official Use Only
20
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Non-Materiel Solution: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.3.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
21
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.4
Task SNSENS 4: Sense the production of CBRN/TIM agents and
delivery systems
2.4.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.4.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization has initiated the production of CBRN/TIM weapons and delivery
systems. Areas of interest include types of agents or nuclear weapons and specific delivery
system characteristics (ranges, payload, etc.), and production rates. Other areas to consider are
numbers of production workers and their skill sets and bios on key personnel.
2.4.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.4.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.4.2.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.4.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.4.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
22
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.4.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.4.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.4-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense the production of
CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities
are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND
action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems, but the overall status is
projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
23
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.4-1. SNSENS 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Countries or transnational organizations initiating the production of
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating the
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational organizations initiating
the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide
useful indicators may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations initiating the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this
process and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations initiating the production of CBRN/TIM
agents and delivery systems are detected.
5 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
24
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.4.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.4.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations initiating the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery
systems may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations initiating the production of
CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems and to provide useful indicators. These
indicators must include the means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and
yields, TIMS being considered, means by which to release TIMS, delivery modes or
systems, and production capacities and schedules.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations initiating the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery
systems may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating the production
of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization initiating the production of CBRN/TIM agents
and delivery systems is detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
For Official Use Only
25
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequately trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
For Official Use Only
26
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.4.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
27
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.5
Task SNSENS 5: Sense CBRN/TIM weaponization
2.5.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.5.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization has initiated the integration/mating of agents or nuclear devices to
delivery systems, thus making CBRN/TIM weapons systems (CBRN/TIM weaponization).
Areas of interest include distances between production areas, weaponization areas, and storage
areas and weaponization rate and safety measures.
2.5.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.5.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.5.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.5.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.5.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
2.5.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.5.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.5-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
For Official Use Only
28
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense CBRN/TIM weaponization.
For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further
assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing imminent or actual CBRN/TIM weaponization but the overall status is projected to
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
29
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.5-1. SNSENS 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Countries or transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
weaponization are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
CBRN/TIM weaponization is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational organizations initiating
CBRN/TIM weaponization. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not be
adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations initiating CBRN/TIM weaponization. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure accuracy
may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM weaponization are
detected.
5 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
30
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.5.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.5.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM weaponization may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM
weaponization and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must include the means
to determine when mating of agents or nuclear devices to delivery systems is taking
place; special procedures used in the mating process; production schedules; procedures
for bringing together the components; distances between production areas, weaponization
areas, and storage areas; weaponization rate; and safety measures.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM weaponization may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating CBRN/TIM
weaponization and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization initiating CBRN/TIM weaponization is
detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
For Official Use Only
31
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequately trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
For Official Use Only
32
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.5.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
33
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.6
Task SNSENS 6: Sense preparations to test and testing of CBRN/TIM
agents/weapons
2.6.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.6.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that indicate a state or nonstate actor is preparing
to test or is conducting tests of CBRN/TIM agents or weapons and delivery systems. Areas of
interest include types and characteristics of agents or weapons and delivery systems, test results,
and personnel involved in test programs (skills and biographies). Also of interest are the
characteristics of the testing grids, agent/weapon transport modes, storage locations of test
materials, safety and security precautions employed, and ambient meteorological conditions as
well as those during testing.
2.6.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.6.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.6.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.6.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.6.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
34
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.6.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.6.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.6-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense preparations to test and
testing of CBRN/TIM agents/weapons. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are
listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND
action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing preparations to test and testing of CBRN/TIM agents/weapons but the overall status
is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
35
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.6-1. SNSENS 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
States or nonstate actors preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
agents/weapons and delivery systems are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on states, nonstate actors and technical personnel involved
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
with test program is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational preparing to test and
testing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and delivery systems. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide
useful indicators may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and delivery systems. Techniques and procedures to
facilitate this process and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM
agents/weapons and delivery systems are detected.
5 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
36
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.6.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.6.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and
delivery systems may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations preparing to test and testing
CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and delivery systems and to provide useful indicators. These
indicators must include the means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and
yields being tested, TIMS being tested, means by which to release TIMS in testing,
delivery modes or systems being tested, and testing capacities and schedules. Also
required is information on characteristics of the testing grids, agent/weapon transport
modes, storage locations of test materials, safety and security precautions employed, and
ambient meteorological conditions during testing.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and
delivery systems may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations preparing to test and
testing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and delivery systems and to develop metrics to
measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization preparing to test and testing CBRN/TIM
agents/weapons and delivery systems is detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
For Official Use Only
37
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
For Official Use Only
38
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.6.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
39
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.7
Task SNSENS 7: Sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or
components
2.7.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.7.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine where a nation-state or
transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Areas of interest
include storage facilities/locations in the vicinity of civilian and military populations, storage
capacities, safety precautions, prevailing meteorological conditions at sites, types of weapons or
components stored, facility entrances, facility construct (i.e., soft target, hardened bunker,
mosque, palace, hospital, etc.), and the geographical relationship of the storage facility to
neighboring borders.
2.7.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.7.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.7.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.7.1.2.3
Supporting Task: STSENS 1
2.7.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
2.7.2
Functional Needs Analysis
For Official Use Only
40
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.7.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.7-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense the storage locations of
CBRN/TIM weapons or components. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are
listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND
action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components but the overall status is
projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
41
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.7-1. SNSENS 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y5
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability6
Y7
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components are detected and
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
identified.
M2
Intelligence on activities indicating storage locations of CBRN/TIM
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
weapons or components is accurate.
M3
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to determine where a nation-state or transnational organization is
storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators
may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence determining where a nation-state or
transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process
and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.
4 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied in determining where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM
weapons or components.
5 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
6 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
7 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
42
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.7.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.7.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and where a nation-state or
transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components may not be
adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM
weapons or components and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must include
types of storage facilities, techniques for storage in unlikely locations, storage capacities,
safety and security measures, transport and agent release techniques, and storage
capacity.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on where a
nation-state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components
may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing
CBRN/TIM weapons or components and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization storing CBRN/TIM agents/weapons and
delivery systems is detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
For Official Use Only
43
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
For Official Use Only
44
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.7.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
45
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.8
Task SNSENS 8: Sense the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM
weapons or units
2.8.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.8.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization is preparing to conduct or is conducting an operational deployment of
CBRN/TIM weapons. Includes information on civil and military plans related to deployment,
training conducted by military forces and civilians, and the overall CBRN/TIM defensive
preparedness of military forces (e.g., vaccine and antidote production and solicitation).
2.8.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.8.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.8.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.8.1.2.3
Supporting Task: STSENS 2
2.8.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Transnational organization
a. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
b. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
2. Nation-states
a. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
b. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)
Common Military Conditions
1. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
For Official Use Only
46
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
2.8.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.8.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.8-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to the operational deployment of
CBRN/TIM weapons or units. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and
issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons or units but the overall status is
projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on
CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
47
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.8-1. SNSENS 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
M4
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
G4
Y5
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y6
Y
G
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability7
Y8
Y
G
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams are detected and identified.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M2
Intelligence relating to deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units is accurate.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M3
Deployment warning is provided to national authorities.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M4
Strategic surprise does not occur.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational organizations deploying
CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide useful indicators may not
be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or transnational
organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure
accuracy may not be adequate.
4 Nothing precludes providing deployment warning to national authorities once the deployment is identified, detected, and
confirmed.
5 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. Adequate resources and
means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM
weapons/units/teams are detected.
6 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
7 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
8 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
48
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.8.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.8.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams may not be
adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM
weapons/units/teams and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must include the
means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and yields, TIMS being
considered, means by which to release TIMS, delivery modes or systems, and production
capacities and schedules.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams may not be
adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM
weapons/units/teams and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.
3.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams is
detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as
well as each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint
to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards.
These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
For Official Use Only
49
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
4.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
5.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequately trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
6.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
7.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
8.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
9.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
10. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
For Official Use Only
50
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.8.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
51
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.9
Task SNSENS 9: Sense CBRN/TIM offensive and defensive training
activities
2.9.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.9.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources indicating a state or nonstate actor is preparing
to conduct or is conducting CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities. Areas of
interest include types and characteristics of simulants/agents or weapons and delivery systems
being used in the training or providing the training stimulus, types and designations of units
conducting the training, skills and biographies of trainers and administrators, offensive and
defensive techniques employed, and protective materials and equipment used by those training.
Also of interest are decontamination or medical procedures used in conjunction with the training.
2.9.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.9.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.9.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.9.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.9.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C.2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
52
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.9.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.9.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.9-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense CBRN/TIM offensive and
defensive training activities. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and
issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing CBRN/TIM offensive and defensive training activities but the overall status is
projected to remain at “yellow.”
For Official Use Only
53
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.9-1. SNSENS 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y4
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability5
Y6
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
States or nonstate actors preparing to conduct or conducting CBRN/TIM
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
offensive and/or defensive training activities are detected and identified.
M2
Intelligence on states, nonstate actors and trainers involved with
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities is complete and
accurate.
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and
organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN
staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback on
intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
2 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational organizations preparing
to conduct or conducting CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this
process and to provide useful indicators may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure completeness and accuracy of intelligence on countries or
transnational organizations preparing to conduct or conducting CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities.
Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to ensure completeness and accuracy may not be adequate.
4 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
5 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
6 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
54
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.9.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.9.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or
transnational organizations preparing to conduct or conducting CBRN/TIM offensive
and/or defensive training activities may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for detecting
and identifying countries or transnational organizations preparing to conduct or
conducting CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities and to provide
useful indicators. For offensive CBRN training, these techniques and indicators must
include the means to determine the types of individuals and units conducting training,
types and numbers of CBRN weapons systems used for training, durations and timing of
training, whether simulants or attenuated or real CBRN weapons are used, sizes and
location of training ranges, special equipment used at ranges, and safety security
measures. For defensive CBRN training, these techniques and indicators must include the
means to determine the types of individuals and units conducting training; the types of
CBRN protective equipment, clothing, and collective protection used; types of
decontamination, detection, and medical response employed; types of special CBRN
defensive units training; types and numbers of CBRN weapons systems used for training;
durations and timing of training; whether simulants or attenuated or real CBRN weapons
are used; sizes and location of training ranges; special equipment used at ranges; and
safety security measures
2.
Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that
a nation-state or transnational organization preparing to conduct or conducting
CBRN/TIM offensive and/or defensive training activities is accurately and completely
detected.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure
complete and accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations initiating
the production of CBRN/TIM agents and delivery systems and to develop metrics to
measure accuracy. Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the J2 as well as
each national intelligence organization must be analyzed from a DoD standpoint to ensure
that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN hazards. These
hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a clear
understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander. An
organization dedicated to providing CBRN technical expertise and assistance to the J2
and national-level intelligence organizations should be established. Training: JRO-
CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence organizations to develop
effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means of collection. The
training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which to determine
For Official Use Only
55
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations for
improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national intelligence
organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as well as
those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts and
collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and
collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or
collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or
experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training
facilities developed/modified if required.
3.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this
issue.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be
enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles
and responsibilities are clearly delineated.
4.
Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its
intelligence-related responsibilities.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND
should have adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section
dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues.
5.
Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the J2 staff to better
understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is
required to support the Shape function of Strategic National CBRND. Leadership:
Develop an education program that will enable the J2 staff to better understand their
CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the
Shape function of Strategic National CBRND.
6.
Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence
issues.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff
officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education
programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence
process and their roles and responsibilities.
7.
Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence
indicators for this task.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN
experimentation campaign plans.
8.
Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.
For Official Use Only
56
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into
JPME.
9. Deficiency: DoD CBRN experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations do not
receive adequate preparation, support, or debriefing for DoD lessons learned.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide
DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their
institutional CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees
they provide are prepared in every way. Leadership: CBRN DoD detailees to national
intelligence organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.
Personnel: CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations must possess
adequate skill and experience.
2.9.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
57
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.10 Task SNSENS 10: Sense the presence and identity and monitor the
movement and location of CBRN/TIM expertise
2.10.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.10.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources indicating the presence and identity of state or
nonstate actors with significant CBRN/TIM expertise. Once these personnel are located and
identified and it is determined that their contributions to CBRN/TIM programs warrant
significant scrutiny, they will be monitored and their activities, contacts, and facilities visited
reported. Personnel of interest include scientists, researchers, engineers, weapons and
employment experts, librarians, logistics personnel, safety and security personnel,
communications personnel, and any other personnel determined to be significant contributors to
offensive or defensive CBRN/TIM programs.
2.10.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.10.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.10.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.10.1.2.3
Supporting Task: N/A
2.10.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical. N/A
Military
1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)
2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)
3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C.2.9.2)
4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)
Civil
1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)
For Official Use Only
58
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.10.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.10.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.10-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense the presence and identity
and monitor the movement and location of CBRN/TIM expertise. For the purposes of this
analysis, current capabilities are listed as “green,” and issues that need to be further assessed and
clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements. The overall status will remain
“green” although there is some inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing the presence and identity and monitoring the movement and location of CBRN/TIM
expertise. The overall status is projected to remain “green” although there remains some inherent
difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
59
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.10-1. SNSENS 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
M4
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
G3
G4
G5
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y6
G
G
G
Far-Term Overall Capability7
Y8
G
G
G
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
A screening methodology exists to select those CBRN/TIM experts who
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
need to be targeted.
M2
CBRN/TIM experts who meet the screening criteria are detected and
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
identified.
M3
Detected/identified CBRN/TIM experts are monitored and significant data
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
collected.
M4
Significant data are transmitted to appropriate agencies.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 The DoD CBRN community has not developed guidelines and procedures that will facilitate the process of sensing the presence
of and identifying and monitoring the movement and location of CBRN/TIM expertise.
2 Nothing precludes the development of a screening methodology to select those CBRN/TIM experts that need to be targeted. A
methodology to select those CBRN/TIM experts that need to be targeted has not been developed.
3 Nothing precludes detecting and identifying CBRN/TIM experts who meet the screening criteria, once it is developed. Basic
methods for surveillance methods to detect and identify personnel are well established.
4 Nothing precludes monitoring and collecting significant data on CBRN/TIM experts who meet the screening criteria and have
been detected and identified. Basic methods for monitoring and collection are well established.
5 Nothing precludes transmitting significant data to appropriate agencies as long as what is significant is defined.
6 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
7 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
8 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
60
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.10.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.10.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1. Deficiency: A methodology to select those CBRN/TIM experts that need to be targeted
has not been developed.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Developing a screening methodology to select those
CBRN/TIM experts that need to be targeted will be a significant undertaking that will
require extensive input from the DoD CBRN community. A wide range of academic,
scientific, medical, and industrial engineering disciplines, all with dual-use application,
can contribute to offensive CBRN programs or using TIM for offensive/terrorism
purposes. Indicators must be developed that can link potential expertise to suspected
CBRN programs or terrorist cells. JRO-CBRND must work with the J2 to contribute to
screening methodologies to be used by the intelligence community to select those
CBRN/TIM experts that need to be targeted.
2. Deficiency: The DoD CBRN community has not developed guidelines and procedures
that will facilitate the process of sensing the presence of and identifying and monitoring
the movement and location of CBRN/TIM expertise.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with J2 and/or national
intelligence organizations to develop effective guidelines and procedures to facilitate this
task.
2.10.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
61
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.11 Task SNSENS 11: Sense the employment of CBRN/TIM weapons
2.11.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.11.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation-state or
transnational organization is preparing to or is employing CBRN/TIM weapons. Areas of interest
include when the weapons will be employed, targets selected, weapons systems involved, agents
involved, locations of weapons systems, and forces/personnel involved in the employment.
Extracts information from the medical, operational, intelligence, and environmental communities
to identify potential biological warfare activities. Includes verification of first use.
2.11.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.4.2.1, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).
2.11.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.11.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.11.1.2.3
Supporting Task: STSENS 3
2.11.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical
1. Atmospheric CBRN/TIM effects. (C1.3.3)
Military
1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)
2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)
3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)
4. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)
Civil
1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)
For Official Use Only
62
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.11.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.11.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.11-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the
designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected
that will accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level
organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint
intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN
functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN
staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2
personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving
the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of
current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to sense when a nation-state or
transnational organization is preparing to or is employing CBRN/TIM weapons. For the purposes
of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and
clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation
results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It
is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically
improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will
remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures
or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in
this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators
for sensing imminent or actual employment of CBRN weapons but the overall status is projected
to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM
proliferation activities.
For Official Use Only
63
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.11-1. SNSENS 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability: Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
Current Overall Capability1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
Y7
Y
Y
Y
Y
Far-Term Overall Capability8
Y9
Y
Y
Y
Y
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Unambiguous attack warning is provided.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M2
CBRN/TIM attacks are detected and identified.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M3
Reports of CBRN/TIM attacks are accurate.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M4
First use is verified.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M5
Accurate attack assessments are provided.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address the issue of sensing the terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the
use of TIM as a weapon, or third-party situations where U.S. resources can not be brought to bear.
2 The J-2 works with the J-3 and various national-level organizations to provide unambiguous CBRN/TIM attack warning. In the
case of determining if a nation-state has conducted a CBRN attack against U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. In the
event of terrorist use of CBRN, it may be difficult or impossible to attribute the attack and in the case of a biological attack or
attacks involving TIM it may be difficult to determine if it is a natural disease outbreak or an accident. In the event of use not
involving U.S. forces or allies it may be difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this
process when it involves terrorists or non-U.S. allies and to provide unambiguous warning may not be adequate.
3 The J-2 works with the J-3 and various national-level organizations to detect and identify CBTN/TIM attacks. In the case of a
nation-state conducting a CBRN attack against U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. In the event of terrorist use of
CBRN, it may be difficult or impossible to detect or identify the attack and in the case of a biological attack or attacks involving
TIM it may be difficult to determine if it is a natural disease outbreak or an accident. In the event of use not involving U.S. forces
or allies it may be difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it involves
terrorists or non-U.S. allies and to detect or identify attacks may not be adequate.
4 Methods and procedures for accurately reporting CBRN attacks against U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and
procedures for accurately reporting third-party, terrorist and TIM attacks may not be adequate.
5 Methods and procedures for verifying first use of CBRN against U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and procedures
for verifying first use in third-party, terrorist and TIM attacks may not be adequate.
6 Methods and procedures for providing accurate attack assessments when CBRN is used against U.S. forces are mature and
effective. Methods and procedures providing accurate attack assessments in third-party, terrorist and TIM attacks may not be
adequate.
7 Near- and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon and efficacy of experimentation
which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.
8 DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes knowledge gaps.
9 Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined, and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of
experimentation.
For Official Use Only
64
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.11.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.11.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of terrorist CBRN attacks may
not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTPs that will address all issues surrounding sensing the CBRN
attacks of terrorists. Issues to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks,
providing unambiguous warning of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate
reports and assessments and verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop
an experimentation/exercise campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of
CBRN attacks of terrorists at the strategic national level.
2.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of small biological attacks
may not be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTPs that will address all issues surrounding sensing of small
biological attacks. Issues to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks,
providing unambiguous warning of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate
reports and assessments and verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop
an experimentation/exercise campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of
small biological attacks at the strategic national level.
3.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of TIM attacks may not be
adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTPs that will address all issues surrounding sensing of TIM attacks.
Issues to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing
unambiguous warning of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and
assessments and verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an
experimentation/exercise campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of TIM
attacks at the strategic national level.
4.
Deficiency: Techniques and procedures involving sensing of third-party attacks may not
be adequate.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTP that will address all issues surrounding sensing third party CBRN
attacks. Issues to be resolved include detecting and identifying the attacks, providing
unambiguous warning of attacks or impending attacks, providing accurate reports and
assessments and verification techniques and procedures. Training: Develop an
experimentation/exercise campaign to address all issues surrounding the sensing of third
party CBRN attacks at the strategic national level.
For Official Use Only
65
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
5. Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address the
issue of sensing the terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the use of TIMs as a weapon, or
third-party situations where U.S. resources can not be brought to bear.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Integrate all lessons learned and procedures into
appropriate joint publications.
2.11.3.2
IMA Assessment Summary
N/A
For Official Use Only
66
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.12 Task SNSENS 12: Sense global CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment
or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials
2.12.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.12.1.1
Definition
To obtain information and data from all sources that determine the location and source of global
CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or release other than attack (ROTA) of CBRN/TIM
weapons or materials. Areas of interest include detecting, identifying, and quantifying those
CBRN/TIM hazards in all physical states (solid, liquid, gas). Enables the continued monitoring
and identification of hazards in support of shaping, shielding, and sustaining.
2.12.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.4.2.1), JP (2-0, 2-02, 3-11).
2.12.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.12.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.12.1.2.3
Supporting Task: STSENS 4
2.12.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical
1. Atmospheric CBRN/TIM effects. (C1.3.3)
Military
1. Stressful mission. (C2.1)
2. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)
3. Negligible personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)
Civil
1. Correct interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)
2. TIMs are present. (C3.3.7.5)
For Official Use Only
67
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.12.2
Functional Needs Analysis
2.12.2.1
Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary
Table 2.12-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task to the designated
standard. These are the only capabilities that exist and no other capabilities are projected that will
accomplish this task.
Current Capability and Deficiency
The Joint Staff Directorates for Intelligence and Operations are able under most circumstances to
effectively sense global CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM
weapons or materials. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in
addressing CBRN defense issues involving the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively
engage the J-2 and J-3 to determine the adequacy of current and projected national-level
operational and intelligence capabilities to sense when global CBRN/TIM hazards due to
employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials are present. For the purposes of this
analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified
are provided for JRO-CBRND action.
Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capabilities are currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term
experimentation results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of
new capabilities. It is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF
enhancements will dramatically improve DoD’s ability to articulate and improve Sense
requirements, but the overall assessment will remain as “green.”
Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency
No other capabilities are currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational
structures or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as
recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may continue to improve the ability to sense global
CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials.
For Official Use Only
68
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
Table 2.12-1 SNSENS 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment
Capability/Measure
M1
M2
M3
Current
J-2
Y1
Y2
G3
J-3
G4
G5
G6
Near/Mid
J-2
G7
G
G
J-3
G
G
G
Far
J-2
G
G
G
J-3
G
G
G
Current Overall Capability
G
G
G
Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability
G
G
G
Far-Term Overall Capability
G
G
G
FAA Measure
Scale
M1
Hazards are detected and identified.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M2
Reports on hazards are accurate.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
M3
Hazard warning is provided.
G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No
1 The J-2 works with the J-3 and various national-level organizations to detect and identify CBTN/TIM hazards. In the case of a
nation-state conducting a CBRN attack against U.S. forces, the process is mature and effective. While it may not be possible to
attribute CBRN/TIM hazards as attacks, it will be possible to detect and identify hazards. In the event of use not involving U.S.
forces or allies it may be difficult to gain required information. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process when it
involves non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access may not be adequate.
2 Methods and procedures for accurately reporting hazards involving U.S. forces are mature and effective. Methods and
procedures for accurately reporting hazards involving non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access may not be
adequate.
3 Once a hazard or potential hazard is detected and identified, nothing precludes providing global warning.
4 The deputy director for current operations is responsible for the National Military Command Center operations and command
and control systems, ongoing current operations, and future plans in support of the combatant commanders. The National
Military Command Center will coordinate all information, and in conjunction with the J-2, deconflict and assess the hazard
reports and send out taskings worldwide for further required detection, identification, or monitoring missions within the
capabilities of operational forces. Interagency coordination will be required for detection and identification outside of military
capabilities.
5 Nothing precludes accurate reports within the operational capabilities of the combatant commands. The J-3 must coordinate
within the interagency for information or requirements outside of military capabilities.
6 Once a hazard or potential hazard is detected and identified, nothing precludes providing global warning.
7 Processes will be developed to facilitate data collection when it involves non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information
and access.
For Official Use Only
69
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.12.3
Functional Solution Analysis
2.12.3.1
DOTLPF Assessment Summary
This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are
no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is
then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.
1.
Deficiency: In the event of global CBRN/TIM hazards not involving U.S. forces or allies,
it may be difficult to detect or identify hazards and gain required information.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTPs that address all issues surrounding sensing global CBRN/TIM
hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials. Issues to be
resolved include detecting and identifying hazards when they affect non-U.S. allies or
countries that restrict information and access.
2.
Deficiency: In the event of global CBRN/TIM hazards involving non-U.S. allies or
countries that restrict information and access it may be difficult to gain accurate required
information.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Using the results of both experimentation and
exercises, develop TTPs that will address all accuracy issues surrounding sensing global
CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials.
Issues to be resolved include determining how to accurately gain information on hazards
when they affect non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access.
3.
Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address the
issue of sensing global hazards in third-party situations where U.S. resources cannot be
brought to bear.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Integrate all information concerning actions to be
taken when hazards affect non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information and access
and integrate lessons learned and procedures developed through experimentation into
appropriate joint publications.
4.
Deficiency: Experimentation and training may not be conducted as frequently and
extensively as required in order to identify capability gaps and required enhancements.
Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Conduct experimentation and training as required in
order to identify capability gaps and required enhancements.
2.12.3.2
IMA Assessment Summery
N/A
For Official Use Only
70
For Official Use Only
CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis
Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks
2.13 Task SNSENS 13: Monitor compliance of signatories to treaties that
touch on CBRN/TIM matters (e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention) and
states that are eliminating their WMD CBRN treaty signatories and
elimination states for compliance
2.13.1
Functional Area Analysis
2.13.1.1
Definition
To use national means to determine whether CBRN treaty signatories and those states voluntarily
or involuntarily participating in CBRN elimination procedures are in compliance.
2.13.1.2
Derivation
UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.4.2.1), JP (2-0, 2-02, 3-11).
2.13.1.2.1
Supported Task: N/A
2.13.1.2.2
Lateral Task: SNSHA 1
2.13.1.2.3
Supporting Task: STSENS 5
2.13.1.3
Condition
Perform this task under conditions of:
Physical
1. CBRN threat form. (C1.3.3.1-3)
Military
1. Cooperative nation
a. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)
b. Limited military commitments from other nations. (C2.1.1.7)
c. Limited host nation support. (C2.8.5)
2. Uncooperative nation
a. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)
b. Negligible military commitments from other nations. (C2.1.1.7)
c. No host nation support. (C2.8.5)
Common Military Conditions
1. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)
For Official Use Only
71