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CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 1

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL,

AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND)

FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS/

FUNCTIONAL SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS

FINAL REPORT

December 2005

Prepared for

Joint Requirements Office for CBRND

by

Battelle Crystal City Operations

Arlington, Virginia

Contract No. SPO700-00-D-3180

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

Capability

Operational “S” Area by Level of War

Current

Near/Mid

Far

Tactical Shield

•

•

•

Strategic National Sustain

•

•

•

Strategic Theater Sustain

•

•

•

Operational Sustain

•

•

•

Tactical Sustain

•

•

•

OVERALL

•

•

•

The CBRND FNA/FSA is split into 17 separate chapters (or volumes), as follows:

CBRND FNA/FSA Chapters

Chapter

Title

Number

1

Introduction

2

Strategic National Sense Tasks

3

Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

4

Operational Sense Tasks

5

Tactical Sense Tasks

6

Strategic National Shape Tasks

7

Strategic Theater Shape Tasks

8

Operational Shape Tasks

9

Tactical Shape Tasks

10

Strategic National Shield Tasks

11

Strategic Theater Shield Tasks

12

Operational Shield Tasks

13

Tactical Shield Tasks

14

Strategic National Sustain Tasks

15

Strategic Theater Sustain Tasks

16

Operational Sustain Tasks

17

Tactical Sustain Tasks

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

Figure 1-1. Comparative Effective Doses (mg) of Biological Warfare, Toxins, and

Chemical Warfare Agents ¹⁵

For this reason, biological agent detection systems need to exhibit an extremely high sensitivity

to biological agents (i.e., capability to detect very small amounts of biological agents).

Unfortunately, no detection system can recognize all potential agents of concern because

identification is generally limited to a preselected set of agents, which cannot be expanded

without additional equipment and/or programming. For example, the M31A2 Joint Biological

Point Detection System (JBPDS) includes immunoassay tests in which each immunoassay

recognizes one particular biological agent. The agent may remain an undetected hazard under

specific conditions.¹⁶ Line source releases from standoff distances are a prime example of attacks

that can generate aerosol concentrations below threshold sensitivity levels.¹⁷ Furthermore,

biological detection may be inhibited or defeated by modification of normally detectable agents

to render them undetectable or by interference through environmental pollution.

Biological agents are considerably more complex than chemical agents. For this reason,

detection and identification technology incorporated into chemical agent detection systems is not

easily transferred to biological agent detection systems. While IMS can be used to detect and

identify chemical agents, the technology in its current form is unable to detect or identify

biological agents.¹⁸

Since biological agents are similar in size to nonbiological particulates and in size and

composition to nonpathogenic (nontoxic) atmospheric particulates, background aerosol clutter

¹⁵ National Institute of Justice. An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2001. p. 1.

¹⁶ Danzig, Richard. “Catastrophic Bioterrorism - What is to be Done?” Center for Technology and National

Security Policy. Washington, DC. August 2003. pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Kilpatrick, William T., Mark W. Fagan, and Paul Murdock. “Deployment Analysis of Biological Point

Detectors Deployed on Fixed-site Military Installations.” Simulation Technologies, Inc. November 2001. p. 14.

¹⁸ National Institute of Justice. An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders, 2001. pp. 13-4, 17-19.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

complicates biological detection. First, nonbiological particulates, whether naturally occurring

(e.g., dust, dirt, and sand) or manmade (engine exhaust, smoke, and industrial effluents) can

interfere with the trigger, which is a particle counter and traditionally the first level of biological

detection. The trigger monitors the total atmospheric particulate concentration against

background levels without discriminating between biological and nonbiological particulates. It

activates the remaining components of the detection system if it detects an increase in the

ambient particulate concentration. After hydrating and concentrating the particulates, the

resulting sample is passed to a generic detection component that analyzes the particulates to

determine whether they are biological in origin.¹⁹ If the sample exhibits characteristics of

biological particles, it is passed to the identifier. The identifier can identify the type of biological

agent if the agent is in a preselected set.

It is true that biological attacks typically generate particle concentrations greater than the

background levels. This tendency is illustrated in Figure 1-2, which compares particle

concentrations generated by three biological weapon attacks (from backpack, submunition, and

line source) to background levels. However, the figure also shows that background dust particles

generated from nearby tank movement results in greater particulate concentrations than those

caused by biological warfare (BW) attacks. Therefore, nonbiological particulates can cause false

positives in trigger-based activating systems, consequently expending analysis consumables.

Figure 1-2. Biological Weapon Attack Aerosol Concentrations Superimposed

on Natural Bioaerosol Background at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma ²⁰

¹⁹ After determining aerosol particles to be biological, some detectors can classify the suspect aerosol by broad

category (e.g., spore, bacterium, toxin/macromolecule, or virus).

²⁰ Kilpatrick, William T., Mark W. Fagan, and Paul Murdock. “Deployment Analysis of Biological Point

Detectors Deployed on Fixed-site Military Installations.” Simulation Technologies, Inc. November 2001. p. 13.

7

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

For this reason, many newer detection systems use cueing technology, which includes a second

detector in addition to a trigger, to discriminate in real time between biological and nonbiological

particulates. The second detector is frequently based on fluorescence. For example, the JBPDS

includes a detector that analyzes the fluorescence of material illuminated by an ultraviolet (UV)

laser. A detection of biological material combined with a rise in particle count activates the

collector and initiates the identification process.²¹

Second, biological nonpathogenic (nontoxic) particles, such as naturally occurring pollen, molds,

fungi, and bacteria (many of them uncataloged), are ubiquitous in the environment and can

interfere with detection of biological agents. The presence of an aerosolized biological weapon is

generally small in comparison with that of naturally occurring biological nonpathogenic

particles. In addition, the concentration of the biological background can fluctuate significantly

according to the season, weather, time of day, and presence of human variables. Figure 1-3

shows the fluctuations in airborne bacterial concentration during a 24-hour period at an

unspecified location.

Figure 1-3. Airborne Bacterial Concentration

Fluctuation in a Single Day ²²

Thus, the variability in the biological background level can cause biological detectors, both with

or without cueing technology, to activate their identifiers and expend analysis consumables

because only the identifier can distinguish between preselected biological agents and

nonpathogenic agents.

²¹ Note that the JBPDS’s cueing technology, termed the Biological Agent Warning Sensor (BAWS), is unable

to distinguish between viable and nonviable agent-containing particles because the signatures of live agents are the

same as their nonviable counterparts. Kilpatrick, William T., Mark W. Fagan, and Paul Murdock. “Deployment

Analysis of Biological Point Detectors Deployed on Fixed-site Military Installations.” Simulation Technologies,

Inc. November 2001. p. 8.

²² National Institute of Justice. An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First

Responders. 2001. p. 14

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

Table 1-1. Pathogens and Toxins of Military Importance and Selected Properties

Persistence of Etiologic

Likely Methods of

Transmissibility

Disease (Etiologic Agent)

Agent⁶³

Dissemination⁶⁴

Man to Man⁶⁵

Bacteria and Rickettsia

Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)

Spores are highly stable

Aerosol

No

Brucellosis (Brucellae abortus, melitensis,

High in wet soil and

Aerosol, food

Via contact with

suis, and canis)

food

supply

lesions

Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) and

Stable in soil and water

Aerosol

Negligible

melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)

(B. pseudomallei)

Plague (Yersinia pestis)

Up to one year in soil;

Aerosol, infected

High

270 days in live tissue

vectors

Q Fever (Coxiella burnetii)

Months on wood and

Aerosol, food

No

sand

supply

Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)

Months in moist soil or

Aerosol

No

other media

Viruses

Smallpox (variola major)

Stable

Aerosol

High

Viral equine encephalitis (e.g., Western,

Relatively unstable

Aerosol, infected

Low

Eastern, and Venezuelan equine

vectors

encephalitis)

Viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Marburg,

Relatively unstable—

Aerosol

Moderate

Ebola)

depends on agent

Toxins

Botulism (Clostridium botulinum)

Weeks in nonmoving

Food/water supply,

No

water and food

aerosol

Ricin (Ricinus communis)

Stable

Aerosol

No

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B

Stable, resistant to

Aerosol. food/water

No

(Staphylococcus aureus)

freezing

supply

T-2 Mycotoxins

Stable

Aerosol, food/water

No

supply

1.3.5.1.3

Radiological and Nuclear Hazard Half-life

Radiological and nuclear contaminants decay at rates proportional to their half-lives, defined as

the amount of time required for half of the species’ nuclei to undergo radioactive decay.

However, many radioisotopes successively decay into other radioactive elements before

becoming stable. Though iodine-135 has a half-life of only 6.7 hours, one of its daughter

products, cesium-135, has a half-life of 2.3 million years. Following a nuclear explosion,

strontium-90 and cesium-137, two reaction by-products with half-lives of approximately 30

years, cause significant long-term fallout hazards because the radioisotopes can be ingested

⁶³ USACHPPM. The Medical NBC Handbook, USACHPPM Tech Guide 244, Table 4-F. May 2000. U.S. Army

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook. 4^th ed.

February 2001. (For glanders and melioidosis, plague, Q fever, tularemia, viral hemorrhagic fevers, botulinum

toxin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B [resistant to freezing].)

⁶⁴ USACHPPM. The Medical NBC Handbook, USACHPPM Tech Guide 244, Table 4-F. May 2000.

⁶⁵ USACHPPM. The Medical NBC Handbook, USACHPPM Tech Guide 244, Table 4-F. May 2000. Medical

Management of Biological Casualties Handbook. 4^th ed. February 2001. (For viral hemorrhagic fevers.)

20

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 1. Introduction

S-Element

Sense

Shape

Shield

Sustain

Level

of War

Strategic

National

Strategic

Specific tasks

to be performed

Theater

Operational

Tactical

Figure 1-5. CBRND FNA and FSA Architectures

1.4.2

Assumptions

Assumptions for this analysis include the following:

• FAA-developed tasks, conditions, and standards will remain relevant over the time frame of

the analysis (near, mid-, and far term).

• Threat-related technologies or applications area represented through the Initial Threat

Warning Assessment (ITWA) for CBRND (dated 14 July 2004) provided by the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) in conjunction with this effort.

• Current and planned materiel/equipment development programs will produce materiel/

equipment that performs in accordance with development requirements as stated in the

operational requirements documents and capability development documents.

1.4.3

Data Collection

Data collected during four previous study efforts, including the Contamination Avoidance,

Protection, Battle Management, and Restoration MAAs and MNAs, was leveraged for the FNA

and FSA. Additional information was requested, as needed, to complete the FNA and FSA. A

complete listing of contacts follows, organized by MAA and MNA topic area.

Contamination Avoidance

• Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), Ft. Leonard Wood, MO

• U.S. Army Chemical School, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO

• Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Edgewood, MD

• Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), FL

• Air Combat Command, United States Air Force (USAF), Langley AFB, VA

• Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Requirements, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC), Ft. Monroe, VA

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