CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.14 Task SNSENS 14: Monitor international scientific and technology

developments for potential CBRN/TIM implications

2.14.1

Functional Area Analysis

2.14.1.1

Definition

To use national means to gather information on international scientific and technology

developments, assess the information for applicability to CBRN/TIM weapons use, and

distribute the information to agencies that require the information. Tracks international

developments in biology, chemistry, nuclear physics, and nanotechnologies that could affect the

development or use of CBRN/TIM weapons. Fuses this information with other intelligence and

operational and environmental data to provide guidance for planning.

2.14.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.2.5), JP (2-0, 2-02).

2.14.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

2.14.1.2.2

Lateral Task: SNSHA 1

2.14.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSENS 6

2.14.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military. N/A

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

2.14.2

Functional Needs Analysis

2.14.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 2.14-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level

organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. Per joint

intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN

functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN

staff element, but because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2

personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving

the warfighter, JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of

current and projected national-level intelligence capabilities to monitor international scientific

and technology developments for potential CBRN/TIM implications. For the purposes of this

analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified

are provided for JRO-CBRND action. The overall current assessment is “yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve DoD’s ability to monitor international scientific and technology developments for

potential CBRN/TIM implications resulting in a capability projection of “green.”

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may continue to improve DoD’s ability to monitor international scientific

and technology developments for potential CBRN/TIM implications.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

Table 2.14-1. SNSENS 14: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁴

G⁵

G⁶

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Strategic surprise does not occur due to science and technology

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

developments.

International scientific and technology developments with applicability to

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM weapons are detected and cataloged.

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue.

² The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur. There may not be

adequate linkage between the implications of international scientific and technology developments for CBRN/TIM weapons and

operational impacts.

³ The J-2 works with various national-level organizations to ensure that information relating to international scientific and

technology developments for CBRN/TIM weapons are available if required. Joint intelligence and CBRN officers may not be

fully aware of what is required or important.

⁴ In the mid term, joint intelligence and CBRN publications can be updated to adequately address this issue.

⁵ In the mid term, problems with determining appropriate and effective linkage between the implications of international

scientific and technology developments for CBRN/TIM weapons and operational impacts can be identified and corrected as a

result of experimentation.

⁶ In the mid term, intelligence/CBRND fusion issues can be identified and corrected as a result of experimentation.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.14.3

Functional Solution Analysis

2.14.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: There may not be adequate linkage between the implications of international

scientific and technology developments for CBRN/TIM weapons and operational

impacts.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop an experimentation plan to determine the

linkage between the implications of international scientific and technology developments

for CBRN/TIM weapons and operational impacts. Integrate lessons learned into TTPs

and procedures that the J2 can coordinate with the intelligence community.

2. Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN officers may not be fully aware of what is

required or important.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate TTPs developed through

experimentation into leader education for both intelligence and CBRN staff officers.

3. Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this

issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Integrate TTPs developed through experimentation

into both intelligence and CBRN joint publications.

2.14.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.15 Task SNSENS 15: Provide Sense Global Family of Engagement Plan

policies and guidelines to combatant commanders

2.15.1

Functional Area Analysis

2.15.1.1

Definition

To formulate policy for Sense “Global Family of Engagement Plans” and to provide this policy,

as well as specific guidelines, to combatant commanders for execution. The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in conjunction with interagency partners, coordinates and develops

these policy and guidelines. Because the threat of CBRN/TIM weapons is of concern to all

nations and potential allies, offering assistance in establishing Sense capabilities, through

training or equipment, can help forge new friendships and cooperation. It will also make Sense

issues easier to address in remote or austere areas if the host nation has an existing Sense

capability.

2.15.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 8, SN 7.5, SN 5.4.3), CJCSM 3113.01A.

2.15.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

2.15.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 8, SNSHA 11

2.15.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSENS 7

2.15.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C 2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil. N/A

2.15.2

Functional Needs Analysis

2.15.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 2.15-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The CJCS has numerous responsibilities to include, but not limited to, preparing and reviewing

joint policies and guidelines, etc. The “Global Family of Engagement Plans” is the phrase used

in the Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) Joint Manual (CJCSM 3113.01a) to describe action

mandated by Defense Planning Guidance FY 2002-2007, 6 April 2000 to develop a process to

globally integrate all military engagement activities. The TEPs from each geographic combatant

commander or designated Executive Agent are integrated into the “Global Family of

Engagement Plans,” which is approved by the CJCS and forwarded to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy for review. This process and the review and any guidance or support to aid

combatant commanders in the initial development of the TEPs are a strategic national-level

activity and from the standpoint of Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain, as embodied in the

CBRND Enabling Concept, must be accomplished, at a minimum, with the technical assistance

and support of JRO-CBRND. “Sense Global Family of Engagement Plans” implies the

integration of Sense CBRND Enabling Concept ideas into any policies and guidelines that would

impact on combatant command development of TEPs. Current overall assessment is “red.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve DoD’s ability to articulate and provide Sense “Global Family of Engagement Plans”

and to provide policy, as well as specific guidelines, to combatant commanders for execution.

The overall status should improve to “yellow” due to these initiatives but is not anticipated to

improve more than that due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. The overall status is likely to

remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

Table 2.15-1. SNSENS 15. Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: CJCS

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

R³

R⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y⁵

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Sense Global Family of Engagement Plan policies and guidelines are

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

established.

Existing policies and guidelines are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of policy

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

and guidelines.

¹ No doctrine, i.e., staff guidance or joint TTPs, has been established specifically for restoration operations.

² No. Although generic guidance exists in CJCSM 3113.01a, the “Global Family of Engagement Plans” does not include Sense

initiatives.

³ There are no polices or guidelines to update.

⁴ While there have been many joint exercises, an exercise focused on restoration operations and the efficacy of Sense “Global

Family of Engagement Plan” policies and guidelines has not been conducted.

⁵ The overall status should improve to “yellow” due to a multitude of initiatives but is not anticipated to improve more than that

due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.15.3

Functional Solution Analysis

2.15.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: CBRN Sense considerations are not included in the “Global Family of

Engagement Plans.”

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure that “Global Family of Engagement Plans”

policies and guidelines include CBRN Sense considerations.

Deficiency: No exercises focused on CBRN Sense considerations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish working groups to establish policies and

guidelines that include CBRN Sense considerations into TEP. Training: Develop

exercises that include CBRN Sense considerations and focus on gathering information of

the efficacy of Global Family of Engagement planning. Facilities: Incorporate into Joint

National Training Capability.

Deficiency: No doctrine, i.e., staff guidance or joint TTPs (JTTPs), has been established

in support of this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish doctrine, i.e., staff guidance/policies,

(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction [CJCSI], Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Manual [CJCSM], or JTTPs). Such policies and guidelines should be included in

documents like CJCSM 3113.01A Theater Engagement Planning, Defense Planning

Guidance, the Joint Staff Capabilities Plan, and any CBRN-specific publications might

provide guidance on CBRN defense integration into TEP.

Deficiency: No training on this task provides feedback.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training on Global Family of Engagement

Plan CBRN Sense considerations so that lessons learned can be gathered.

Deficiency: No JPME education on Global Family of Engagement Planning including

CBRN Sense considerations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Develop JPME leader education on Global Family

of Engagement Plan CBRN Sense considerations. Provide materials to the Joint Forces

Staff College so they can use CBRN Sense considerations as a TEP example.

2.15.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.16 Task SNSENS 16: Provide global screening for endemic disease and/or

hazardous substances in the environment

2.16.1

Functional Area Analysis

2.16.1.1

Definition

To use national means to provide global screening for endemic diseases and/or hazardous

substances in the environment. All interagency capabilities are employed to ensure that endemic

diseases and/or hazardous substances in the environment are detected and that national military

forces are warned and appropriate preventive action is taken.

2.16.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 4.3.3, SN 9.1.3).

2.16.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

2.16.1.2.2

Lateral Task: SNSHA 1

2.16.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSENS 8

2.16.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

2.16.2

Functional Needs Analysis

2.16.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 2.16-1 discusses the only capability that exists to perform the task to the designated

standards.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Resources and DOTMLPF exist to support CJCS staff information and data collection,

processing, and correlation from a variety of sources (national, international, military, civilian,

etc.) to identify potential hazards and endemic diseases for evaluation and assessment of their

probable impact and the necessary protective measures. The DoD Global Emerging Infections

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Surveillance and Response System (GEIS) and Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

(AFMIC) maintain active surveillance for infectious diseases that might affect military

personnel, readiness, and operations and are resources for the CJCS staff. Dissemination of

warnings to national strategic forces identifying these potential hazards and diseases, and the

associated protective measures are incorporated within existing doctrine. Deficiencies are related

to the level of automation of information and data resources and their compatibility.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No foreseeable changes in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No foreseeable changes in the far term.

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Table 2.16-3. SNSENS 16: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: CJCS

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

All diseases/hazards are identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical, operational, intelligence, and environmental data are correlated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Diseases/hazards are identified in time to warn forces and take

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

appropriate preventive measures.

Diseases/hazards are identified in time to treat forces.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Adequate DOTLPF exists to conduct this task.

² Limited. Pathogens of military importance are identified. Outbreaks of new or mutated diseases assessed by the Centers for

Disease Control and/or World Health Organization are reviewed by AFMIC for inclusion. The DoD GEIS also provides

information on infectious diseases that posse a threat to personnel or reduce medical readiness. Other types of hazards are

reviewed for their impact upon military forces, depending upon type and scope. For example, ITF-40 assesses a number of

industrial chemicals for their potential impact. However, ITF-40 does not assess all the potential industrial chemicals, possibly

existing within an area of interest. Information must be collected, processed, and correlated from a variety of sources (national,

international, military, civilian, etc.) to identify potential hazards and endemic diseases for evaluation and assessment of their

probable impact and the necessary protective measures.

³ Limited. Resources such as the Centers for Disease Control, World Health Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency,

AFMIC, GEIS, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and others are identified as reliable

sources for data and information about most areas of interest. However, much of the information and data must be collected,

processed, correlated, evaluated, and assessed manually. Many resource systems are not integrated or are not automated.

Information systems within DoD and other government agencies are frequently stovepiped and the information must be manually

transferred from one system to another. Additionally, data structures and fields are not always compatible between systems

impacting application of data transfer utilities.

⁴ Limited. Diseases and hazards within an area of interest are not static. These change overtime. National Strategic plan

implementation processes incorporate requirements for ensuring currency of information and decisioning parameters.

Adjustments are made as necessary. Identification of endemic diseases and hazards of military importance are disseminated and

are accompanied with guidance on preventive measures. Changes to this information is disseminated throughout operations.

However, the largely manual nature of the current process is time consuming and the potential exists for exposure prior to receipt

of warning.

⁵ Limited. Capability relies on in-country intelligence and data, which may be of questionable reliability.

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.16.3

Functional Solution Analysis

2.16.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: Not all potential hazards have been assessed for their military importance.

For example, ITF-40 does not assess all the potential industrial chemicals possibly

existing within an area of interest.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Expand existing doctrine to include all potential TIC

hazards. Leadership: Build leadership awareness of potential gap in existing information

and potential sources for information and data.

2. Deficiency: Data structures and fields are not always compatible between systems

impacting application of data transfer utilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine, processes, and procedures for

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)-compatible data mining of DoD and non-

DoD legacy systems.

3. Deficiency: The largely manual nature of the current process is time-consuming, and the

potential exists for exposure prior to receipt of warning.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Develop leadership awareness of issues associated

with information collection and processing and the need for force preparedness and prior

knowledge of hazards/diseases of military importance in area of interest.

2.16.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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Chapter 2. Strategic National Sense Tasks

2.17 Task SNSENS 17: Develop global environmental background data

including climatology

2.17.1

Functional Area Analysis

2.17.1.1

Definition

To use national means to obtain and assess global environmental background data (including

climatology) for potential CBRN/TIM implications. All interagency capabilities are employed to

obtain this information and to ensure that national military forces have access to processed data.

2.17.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.2.1).

2.17.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

2.17.1.2.2

Lateral Task: SNSHA 1

2.17.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSENS 9

2.17.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

2.17.2

Functional Needs Analysis

2.17.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 2.17-1 discusses the various DoD and national capabilities that currently exist to perform

the task to the designated standards. Located at the University of California’s Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)

is a national support and resource center for planning, real-time assessment, emergency response,

and detailed studies of incidents involving a wide variety of hazards, including nuclear,

radiological, chemical, biological or natural emissions. NARAC is a distributed system,

providing modeling and geographical information tools for deployment to an end user’s

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computer system, as well as real-time access to global meteorological and geographical

databases and advanced three-dimensional model predictions from the national center. DoD

operates a military environmental service system to provide specialized global meteorological,

space, environmental, and oceanographic analysis and prediction services in support of military

forces. Minor deficiencies in capability include the need to integrate CBRN considerations into

environmental and climatology processes, TTPs, and doctrine. In addition, more awareness of

the NARAC program is needed through education.

Current Capability and Deficiency

Current capabilities are robust and mature with only minor deficiencies in data currency and

program awareness.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

Capabilities will improve only as a result of improved CBRN experimentation and integration

into exercises.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

Capabilities will improve only as a result of improved CBRN experimentation and integration

into exercises.

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Table 2.17-1. SNSENS 17: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)

Y¹

G²

G³

Department of Defense Weather Programs

G⁴

G⁵

G⁶

Near/Mid

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)

G⁷

Department of Defense Weather Programs

Far

National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)

Department of Defense Weather Programs

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Environmental background data are available for critical areas.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Climatology data are available for critical areas.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Available data can be accessed by forces with requirements.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Environmental background data are available but may be dated.

² The emergency response system collects meteorological data for the region around the release location and data from other

systems.

³ Yes. More awareness of program is needed.

⁴ Environmental background data are available or can be obtained for any area of the world.

⁵ Climatology data are available or can be obtained for any area of the world.

⁶ Total access is available through military command and control and communications systems.

⁷ Environmental data should be updated in the near/mid term.

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2.17.3

Functional Solution Analysis

2.17.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

1. Deficiency: CBRN considerations need to be integrated into environmental and

climatology processes, TTPs, and doctrine.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Doctrine, TTPs, policies, and guidelines need to be

established for integrating CBRN considerations and for regular updating and centralizing

of environmental background data in critical area of operations.

2. Deficiency: More awareness of NARAC program is needed through education.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Awareness of this capability needs to be addressed

throughout the JPME education process.

2.17.3.2

IMA Assessment Analysis

N/A

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Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

3.0

Strategic Theater Sense

3.1

Task STSENS 1: Sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or

components in theater

3.2

Task STSENS 2: Sense the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons in

theater

3.3

Task STSENS 3: Sense the employment of CBRN/TIM weapons in theater

3.4

Task STSENS 4: Sense theater CBRN/TIM hazards due to employment or ROTA

of CBRN/TIM weapons or materials

3.5

Task STSENS 5: Monitor compliance of theater signatories to treaties that touch

on CBRN/TIM matters (e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention) and states that are

eliminating their WMD CBRN treaty signatories and elimination states for

compliance

3.6

Task STSENS 6: Monitor theater scientific and technology developments for

potential CBRN/TIM implications

3.7

Task STSENS 7: Develop TEPs for Sense-related issues

3.8

Task STSENS 8: Provide theater screening for endemic diseases and/or hazardous

substances in the environment

3.9

Task STSENS 9: Develop theater environmental background data including

climatology

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3.0

Strategic Theater Sense

3.0.1

Introduction

At the strategic level of war, a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops

and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish

national and multinational military objectives, sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks

for the use of military and other instruments of national power, develop global plans or theater

war plans to achieve these objectives, and provide military forces and other capabilities in

accordance with strategic plans. The strategic theater (ST) sublevel encompasses combatant

command (COCOM) tasks. Nine strategic theater sense tasks were identified in the chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Functional Area Analysis (FAA) including a task

for elimination operations. However, the detailed analysis of the elimination tasks has been

deferred to the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Defense (JRO-CBRND)-sponsored FAA/Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) of the weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) elimination and interdiction functional areas.

This chapter, detailing the Strategic Theater Sense area, restates relevant information from the

CBRND FAA, including a description of each of the nine Strategic Theater Sense tasks,

derivation of the task, an indication of other linked tasks, and the pertinent conditions. The FNA

section addresses the capability and deficiency analysis and a brief description of potential near-

term changes. Once all the capabilities are considered, the assessment concludes with a separate,

overarching look at the entire capability spectrum to identify remaining gaps and/or synergies.

The FSA section addresses possible solutions for the deficiencies identified in the FNA section.

The non-materiel solutions address one or more of the six areas of DOTLPF: doctrine,

organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Most of the Strategic Theater Sense

tasks involve required capabilities of major staffs or staff sections within the U.S. Department of

Defense (DoD). In those areas where a DoD staff or agency needed to interact within the

interagency, the task focused on DoD capabilities required to facilitate the interaction.

3.0.2

FNA Summary

The table below summarizes the overall current and projected capability to perform the Strategic

Theater Sense tasks identified in the CBRN Defense (CBRND) FAA. The overall capability to

conduct Strategic Theater Level Sense tasks (STSENSs) in the current time frame is assessed as

“yellow.” The COCOM J-2 is responsible for working with national/theater-level organizations

to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint theater operations. Per joint intelligence

doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN functions

pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN staff

element. But because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2 personnel

may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the COCOM commander’s main

source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving the warfighter, the COCOM

CBRND staff must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy of current and projected

theater-level intelligence capabilities to sense the operational deployment of CBRN weapons in

theater. To be proactive, the COCOM CBRND staff must be better prepared on

intelligence/CBRND fusion issues. For the purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are

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Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

listed, and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND

action. While the J2 and theater intelligence organizations have the responsibility to gather

intelligence on CBRN threat-related issues, they do not have the requisite understanding of

CBRN issues to fully address the requirements without assistance from the COCOM CBRND

staff. It is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will

dramatically improve the ability of the COCOM staff to articulate and assess Sense

requirements, but the overall status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in

gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

Table 3.0-1. Strategic Theater Sense Summary FNA Findings

CBRN Strategic

CBRN Strategic Theater Sense Task

Theater Sense

Capability

Title

Task Number

Near/

Current

Far

Mid

STSENS 1

Sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM

weapons or components in theater.

•

STSENS 2

Sense the operational deployment of

CBRN/TIM weapons in theater.

•

STSENS 3

Sense the employment of CBRN/TIM

weapons in theater.

•

STSENS 4

Sense theater CBRN/TIM hazards due to

employment or ROTA of CBRN/TIM

•

weapons or materials.

STSENS 5

Monitor CBRN treaty signatories and

N/A

elimination states for compliance.

STSENS 6

Monitor theater scientific and technology

developments for potential CBRN/TIM

•

implications.

STSENS 7

Develop TEPs for Sense-related issues.

•

STSENS 8

Provide theater screening for endemic

diseases and/or hazardous substances in

•

the environment.

STSENS 9

Develop theater environmental

background data including climatology.

•

OVERALL

•

3.0.3

FSA Summary

The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential solutions for the capability gaps

identified in the FNA section.

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Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.0.3.1

DOTLPF

The DOTLPF solutions identified in this chapter include basic actions required to better prepare

the appropriate staffs. No training or experimentation has taken place to facilitate the formulation

of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed to facilitate the ability of intelligence

personnel to assess CBRND “sense” requirements. It is imperative that these exercises take place

and lessons learned be integrated into doctrine, TTPs, and guidance. Other solutions include the

development of leader education programs for both CBRND and intelligence staff officers so

that they are better prepared to understand the correlation between proliferation or theater

scientific/technology developments and potential CBRN/ toxic industrial material (TIM)

operational implications. A detailed analysis of how the theater intelligence/CBRN community is

organized and staffed to perform CBRN intelligence analysis and collection activities must be

conducted. In the case of hazards involving non-U.S. allies or countries that restrict information,

it is imperative that appropriate exercises/experimentation take place and lessons learned be

integrated into doctrine, TTPs, and guidance.

3.0.3.2

IMA

There are no materiel requirements.

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Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.1

Task STSENS 1: Sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

in theater

3.1.1

Functional Area Analysis

3.1.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine where a military force or

transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Areas of interest

include storage locations, storage capacities, safety precautions, prevailing meteorological

conditions at sites, types of weapons or components stored, and facility entrances.

3.1.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 9.6, ST 2, ST 2.2.1).

3.1.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSENS 7

3.1.1.2.2

Lateral Task: STSHA 1

3.1.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSENS 1

3.1.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

3.1.2

Functional Needs Analysis

3.1.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 3.1-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

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Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The COCOM J-2 assists the commander of a combatant command by providing higher echelon,

up to and including the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), and subordinate

commands with a single, coordinated CBRN intelligence picture by fusing national and theater

intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments. The COCOM J-2 is responsible for

working with national/theater-level organizations to obtain intelligence required to support joint

theater operations. Per joint intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all

intelligence-related CBRN functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons

with the appropriate CBRN staff element, but because of documented training, education, and

experience issues, J2 personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the

COCOM commander’s main source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving

the warfighter, the COCOM CBRND staff must proactively engage the J2 to determine the

adequacy of current and projected theater-level intelligence capabilities to sense the storage

locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components. To be proactive, the COCOM CBRND staff

must be better prepared on intelligence/CBRND fusion issues. For the purposes of this analysis,

current capabilities are listed, and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are

provided for JRO-CBRND action.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System [JCIDS]

analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It is projected that improvements due to

coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will dramatically improve the ability of the COCOM staff

to sense the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components in theater. The overall

status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM

proliferation activities.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve the ability of the COCOM staff to develop

intelligence indicators for sensing the storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

in theater, but the overall status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in

gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

For Official Use Only

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

Table 3.1-1. STSENS 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Combatant Command J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁵

FAA Measure

Scale

Storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components are detected

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

and identified.

Strategic surprise does not occur.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Intelligence on storage locations of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

is accurate.

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. The COCOM CBRN staff is not adequately

staffed and organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The COCOM J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in

CBRN issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide

feedback on intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

² The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to determine where a nation-state or transnational

organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide

useful indicators may not be adequate.

³ The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur.

Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied in determining where a nation-state or transnational organization

is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components.

⁴ The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence determining where a

nation-state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components. Techniques and procedures to facilitate

this process and to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.

⁵ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.1.3

Functional Solution Analysis

3.1.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the Ideas for Materiel Approaches (IMA) section.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and where a nation-state or

transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components may not be

adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or

theater intelligence organizations to develop effective theater techniques and procedures for

detecting and identifying where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing

CBRN/TIM weapons or components and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must

include types of storage facilities, techniques for storage in unlikely locations, storage

capacities, safety and security measures, transport and agent release techniques, and storage

capacity.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on where a nation-

state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons or components may not be

adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or

theater intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure

accurate theater intelligence on where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing

CBRN/TIM weapons or components and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.

Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to accurately

determine where a nation-state or transnational organization is storing CBRN/TIM weapons

or components.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the COCOM

J2 as well as each theater intelligence organization must be analyzed from a CBRN

standpoint to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN

hazards. These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a

clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander.

Training: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or theater intelligence

organizations to develop effective training for analysts as well as those managing all means

of collection. The training must allow analysts and collection managers the means by which

to determine inadequacy of collection mechanisms and a means to make recommendations

for improvement. Leadership: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or theater

intelligence organizations to develop an effective CBRN education program for analysts as

well as those managing all means of collection. The education process must provide analysts

and collection managers with the tools they need to assess the efficacy of their analysis and

collection efforts. Personnel: Personnel should not be assigned to intelligence analysis or

collection activities vital to CBRN areas without requisite CBRN education and/or

experience. Facilities: Training requirements should be analyzed and special training

facilities developed/modified if required.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN publications must be

enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles and

responsibilities are clearly delineated.

Deficiency: COCOM CBRND staff is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its

intelligence-related responsibilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: COCOM CBRND staff should have a section

dedicated to resolving CBRN intelligence issues. Personnel: COCOM CBRND should have

adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a section dedicated to resolving

CBRN intelligence issues.

Deficiency: The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the COCOM J2 staff to

better understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is

required to support the Shape function of strategic theater CBRND. Leadership: Develop an

education program that will enable the COCOM J2 staff to better understand their CBRN

role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the Shape

function of strategic theater CBRND.

Deficiency: CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine to provide guidance and outline

interaction and exchange of information between J-2, the intelligence community, and other

participating entities. Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff officers to

better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education programs that

allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence process and their roles

and responsibilities.

Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence

indicators for this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Conduct small-scaled training sessions focused on

communications and recognizing less obvious indicators of CBRN/TIM weapons storage.

Incorporate the derived information into subsequent exercises that facilitate this and other

areas of the task.

Deficiency: Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) does not adequately cover the

fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into JPME.

3.1.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.2

Task STSENS 2: Sense the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons in

theater

3.2.1

Functional Area Analysis

3.2.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a military force or

transnational organization is preparing to conduct or is conducting an operational deployment of

CBRN/TIM weapons. Includes information on civil and military plans related to deployment,

training conducted by military forces and civilians, and the overall CBRN/TIM defensive

preparedness of military forces.

3.2.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (ST 9.6, ST 2, ST 2.2.1).

3.2.1.2.1

Supported Task: SNSENS 8

3.2.1.2.2

Lateral Task: STSHA 1

3.2.1.2.3

Supporting Task: OPSENS 2

3.2.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Transnational organization

a. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

b. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

2. Nation-states

a. Marginal intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

b. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

Common Military

1. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.2.2

Functional Needs Analysis

3.2.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 3.2-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The COCOM J-2 assists the commander of a combatant command by providing higher echelon,

up to and including the NMJIC, and subordinate commands with a single, coordinated CBRN

intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence into all-source estimates and

assessments. The COCOM J-2 is responsible for working with national/theater-level

organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint theater operations. Per joint

intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN

functions pertaining to adversary employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN

staff element. But because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J2

personnel may not have a full grasp of what needs to be coordinated. As the COCOM

commander’s main source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving the

warfighter, the COCOM CBRND staff must proactively engage the J2 to determine the adequacy

of current and projected theater-level intelligence capabilities to sense the operational

deployment of CBRN weapons in theater. To be proactive, the COCOM CBRND staff must be

better prepared on intelligence/CBRND fusion issues. For the purposes of this analysis, current

capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed and clarified are provided for

JRO-CBRND action.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve the ability of the COCOM staff to articulate and assess “sense” requirements but the

overall status will remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on

CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve the ability of the COCOM staff to develop

intelligence indicators for sensing the operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons in theater,

but the overall status is projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering

intelligence on CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

For Official Use Only

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

Table 3.2-1. STSENS 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Combatant Command J-2

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

G⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y⁷

Far-Term Overall Capability⁸

Y⁹

FAA Measure

Scale

Deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units are detected and identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Intelligence on deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Deployment warning is provided to theater forces.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Strategic surprise does not occur.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

There are indications (e.g., message traffic between potential suppliers

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

and political leaders, indications of recent purchases of CBRN/TIM or

precursors, production equipment in operation, etc.) of increased interest

in CBRN/TIM weapons.

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. The COCOM CBRN staff is not adequately

staffed and organized to meet its intelligence-related responsibilities. The J2 staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN

issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not provide feedback

on intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

² The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to detect and identify countries or transnational

organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and to provide

useful indicators may not be adequate.

³ The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to ensure accuracy of intelligence on countries or

transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams. Techniques and procedures to facilitate this process and

to ensure accuracy may not be adequate.

⁴ Nothing precludes providing deployment warning to theater forces once the deployment is identified, detected, and confirmed.

⁵ The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to ensure that strategic surprise does not occur.

Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations deploying

CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams are detected.

⁶ The COCOM J-2 works with various national/theater-level organizations to determine indications of increased interest in

CBRN/TIM weapons. Adequate resources and means may not be applied to ensure countries or transnational organizations

showing increased interest are detected.

⁷ Near and mid-term improvements for all measures will depend upon the emphasis placed upon, and efficacy of experimentation

which will be designed to close knowledge gaps.

⁸ DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation closes

knowledge gaps.

⁹ Once knowledge gaps are closed, concepts may be refined and new capabilities will be proposed and refined as a result of

experimentation.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 3. Strategic Theater Sense Tasks

3.2.3

Functional Solution Analysis

3.2.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA section.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to facilitate detecting and identifying countries or

transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or

theater intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures for

detecting and identifying countries or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM

weapons/units/teams and to provide useful indicators. These indicators must include the

means to determine agent types, nuclear weapon types and yields, TIMS being considered,

means by which to release TIMS, delivery modes or systems, and unit designations and

formations.

Deficiency: Techniques and procedures to ensure accurate intelligence on countries or

transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams may not be adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or

theater intelligence organizations to develop effective techniques and procedures to ensure

accurate intelligence on countries or transnational organizations deploying CBRN/TIM

weapons/units/teams and to develop metrics to measure accuracy.

Deficiency: Adequate resources and means may not be sufficiently applied to ensure that a

nation-state or transnational organization deploying CBRN/TIM weapons/units/teams is

detected.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The CBRN organization or staffing of the COCOM

J2 as well as each theater intelligence organization must be analyzed from a CBRN

standpoint to ensure that they can provide required CBRN intelligence concerning CBRN

hazards. These hazards need to be detected, identified, and quantified for Shape to provide a

clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation to the commander.

Training: Conduct a small-scaled exercise where “to identify resources needed to detect the

operational deployment of CBRN/TIM weapons” is one of the primary objectives. In

addition, JRO-CBRND must work with the COCOM J2 and/or theater intelligence