CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005)

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Determine joint CBRND capability to meet

SNSHA 5

the global CBRN/TIM situation.

•

SNSHA 6

Ensure joint CBRND readiness.

•

Coordinate global CBRN information

SNSHA 7

systems and processes.

•

Establish national CBRND strategy, plans,

SNSHA 8

and policy.

•

Coordinate CBRND aspects of global

SNSHA 9

medical operations.

•

SNSHA 10

Coordinate global CBRND operations.

•

Provide Shape “Global Family of

SNSHA 11

Engagement Plan” policies and guidelines to

•

combatant commanders.

Establish global cooperative CBRN/TIM-

SNSHA 12

detection policies, procedures, and

•

networks.

Coordinate internationally accepted

SNSHA 13

standards and procedures for determining

•

employment of CBRN/TIM weapons.

Sense the exportation of CBRN/TIM

SNSHA 14

weapons or components.

•

OVERALL

•

6.0.3

FSA Summary

The paragraphs below summarize the assessment of all potential DOTMLPF (non-materiel and

materiel) solutions for the capability gaps identified in the FNA section. The materiel approaches

focus primarily the need for automated tools to assist analysis and the need for an integrated

detection and information network for automated warning and reporting of the CBRN hazard.

6.0.3.1

DOTLPF

The DOTLPF solutions identified in this chapter are associated primarily with staff education

and training issues. It is recommended that changes be made to the CJCSI 1800.01B, Officer

Military Education Policy. The new CJCSI 1800.01B Officer Military Education Policy is not

directive enough to ensure that CBRND considerations are included in the cradle-to-grave

educational process of all military personnel. It also does not address education/training for DoD

civilians, many of whom staff strategic national-level positions. It is imperative that all non-

CBRND subject matter expert (SME) staffs of all agencies that play a role in CBRND Shape

issues have a fundamental understanding of key CBRND focus areas required in their functional

domains. As CBRND Shape enabling concepts are proposed, they must be developed with the

active participation of all DoD and Service staffs and agencies that will play a key role in their

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

evolution. Concepts must be tested and developed through comprehensive experimentation.

Subsequent strategic national-level exercises must include all relevant DoD and interagency

players so that Shape/functional and fusion areas are tested and lessons learned captured. As

appropriate, tasks identified in the FAA must be incorporated into national-level exercises so

expert observers can identify areas that require multi-staff/agency resolution.

6.0.3.2

IMA

This section summarizes possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel

requirements of the DOTMLPF assessment. Development of cooperative linkages between

various proponent and service CBRND and CBRN/TIM information, detection, and sensing

technologies is required. Concepts must first be developed based on proposed linkages that will

provide effective, integrated CBRND and CBRN/TIM detection, warning, and shared situational

understanding capabilities. These concepts must be explored through experimentation and then

cooperative linkages established and tested. The entire package should be developed as a system

and fully integrated into a multiagency Common Operating Picture (COP). As each Service

develops detection or sensing technologies, they should be analyzed for inclusion into the

CBRN/TIM cooperative detection network, and modifications (if required) should be mandated

for the Service systems. Continued work on analysis probability tools and models is required. No

automated tools exist for assisting in the conduct of global vulnerability assessments focusing on

potential adversary courses of action (COAs). Because of the wide range of options available to

potential adversaries, tools must be available that can take as input that which is known, and then

model and forecast all potential COAs. Development of automated tools is recommended to

more adequately manage CBRN personnel, unit, and materiel, ensuring that these scarce assets

are available and fully mission capable when needed.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.1

Task SNSHA 1: Characterize the global CBRN/TIM threat and situation

6.1.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.1.1.1

Definition

To characterize the CBRN/TIM threat and situation for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS), national defense decision makers, and combatant commanders. Uses Sense data to move

from situational awareness¹ as well as shared awareness² to shared understanding.³ Allows

military leadership to develop a clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN/TIM

situation in near-real time to inform personnel; provide actual and potential impacts of

CBRN/TIM hazards; and envision critical Sense, Shield, and Sustain end states, including

preparing for operations and visualizing the sequence of events that moves the force from its

current state to those end states. Includes establishing collection priorities and coordination with

intelligence agencies to collect information on CBRN/TIM capabilities encompassing such

things as adversary intent and objectives, weapons availability and capacity, expected tactics,

potential targets, and willingness or historic propensity to employ CBRN/TIM weapons. Also

includes compiling and analyzing intelligence information and data provided by intelligence

agencies or resources satisfying the global CBRN/TIM threat intelligence collection plan.

Provides processed global CBRN/TIM threat intelligence for development of global vulnerability

assessments and for an understanding of the current and predicted CBRN/TIM situation.

Provides the basis for CBRND tasking of and warning to the combatant commanders and

Services. Appropriate collaboration occurs with interagency and international parties. Further

encompasses global medical intelligence to be collected in support of CBRN/TIM analysis.

6.1.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.5.1, SN 3.3.6, SN 3.4.6, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2,

SN 5.7.1, SN 7.5, SN 9, SN 9.1.3), Protection Joint Functional Concept.

6.1.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.1.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSENS 1, SNSENS 2, SNSENS 3, SNSENS 4, SNSENS 5,

SNSENS 6, SNSENS 7, SNSENS 8, SNSENS 9, SNSENS 10, SNSENS 11,

SNSENS 12, SNSENS 13, SNSENS 14, SNSENS 16, SNSENS 17, SNSHA 2

6.1.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 1

6.1.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

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2. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

3. Marginal or negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

4. Difficult theater intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

5. Little or no certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

Civil. N/A

6.1.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.1.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.1-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task “Characterize the

global CBRN/TIM threat and situation.” There is only one capability that exists, and no other

capability is projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

NIST’s mission is to provide national-level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the

IC to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The Joint staff J-2 is the

NIST program’s executive agent and has delegated the NIST mission to the Deputy Directorate

for Crisis Operations (J-2O). The National Intelligence Support Division (J-2O-1) manages daily

operations and interagency coordination for all NISTs. The current ability is assessed as “green”

although there are some limitations and deficiencies.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No near/mid-term initiatives are

expected to improve limitations or deficiencies.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF to support task

should improve if effective experimentation addresses organizational deficiencies and closes

knowledge gaps and training and education initiatives address deficiencies identified in this Joint

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

¹ “Situational awareness is the ability to have accurate and real-time information of friendly, enemy, neutral, and noncombatant

locations; a common, relevant picture of the battlefield scaled to specific level of interest and special needs.” (Operational

Requirements Document for Joint Effects Model)

² “Shared awareness is a state that exists in the cognitive domain when two or more entities are able to develop a similar

awareness of a situation. The degree of similarity required (or difference tolerable) will depend on the type and degree of

collaboration and synchronization needed.” (Understanding Information Age Warfare, p. 26)

³Shared understanding is when two or more entities have similar and sufficient levels of knowledge to be able to draw inferences

about the possible consequences of the situation, as well as sufficient awareness of the situation to predict future patterns.

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Table 6.1-1. SNSHA 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: National Intelligence Support Teams

M10

M11

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

Y³

Y⁴

G⁵

G⁶

G⁷

G⁸

G⁹

G¹⁰

G¹¹

G¹²

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability¹³

FAA Measure

Scale

Means exist to collect intelligence on designated adversaries.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Adversary CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is current.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Adversary CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is reliable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All CBRN/TIM threat priority intelligence requests are covered by a collection plan.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Adequate means are available for CBRND staff to influence global collection activities.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Multiple sources are integrated and deconflicted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical intelligence guidance identifies information requirements and processes.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical CBRN/TIM intelligence criteria are established and defined.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Staff has sufficient training and experience to conduct the threat assessment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is disseminated in near-real-time.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is available to the commands.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN/TIM publications do not adequately address this issue. The JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its intelligence-related

responsibilities. The NIST staff may not be adequately trained/educated in CBRN/TIM issues. CBRND staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Experimentation does not provide feedback on intelligence indicators for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN/TIM issues.

² Yes. Multiple national means of collection exist.

³ Limited. CBRN/TIM threat intelligence depends on factors that may prevent timely and current information.

⁴ Limited. CBRN/TIM threat intelligence depends on factors that may prevent reliable information.

⁵ Yes. NIST can develop collection plans for CBRN/TIM threats.

⁶ Yes. NIST has the means to provide input for theater collection activities.

⁷ Yes. All-source intelligence analysis is the process where integration and deconfliction occur.

⁸ Yes. NIST can identify medical intelligence information requirements and processes.

⁹ Yes. NIST can establish and define medical CBRN/TIM intelligence criteria.

¹⁰ Yes. NIST does have the experience to sufficiently conduct CBRN/TIM threat assessment.

¹¹ Yes. NIST Chief transmits data through the COLISEUM RFI management system.

¹² Yes. NIST Chief transmits data through the COLISEUM RFI management system.

¹³ DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation addresses organizational deficiencies and closes knowledge gaps and training and education initiatives

address deficiencies identified in this JCIDS.

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6.1.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.1.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary.

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is dependent on factors that may prevent timely

and current information. At the time of this analysis, CBRN/TIM threat intelligence was

dependent on an IC organizational model determined to be flawed by both a congressional

investigation and a special presidential commission. Factors such as problems with

interagency coordination and planning, clear delineation of lines of authority and

responsibility, and organizational effectiveness contributed to the lack of timely and current

information.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The IC has been realigned and reorganized in

concert with recommendations from both the congressional investigation and the special

presidential commission. While it is believed that this reorganization will substantially or

totally correct the deficiency, it is vital that DoD document and verify the efficacy of the

recent changes through lessons learned from training and exercises as well as focused

concept experimentation covering all aspects of CBRND battlespace awareness at the

strategic level of war.

Deficiency: CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is dependent on factors that may prevent reliable

information. At the time of this analysis, CBRN/TIM threat intelligence was dependent on an

IC organizational model determined to be flawed by both a congressional investigation and a

special presidential commission. Factors such as problems with interagency coordination and

planning, clear delineation of lines of authority and responsibility, and organizational

effectiveness contributed to the lack of reliable information.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: The IC has been realigned and reorganized in

concert with recommendations from both the congressional investigation and the special

presidential commission. While it is believed that this reorganization will correct the

deficiency, it is vital that DoD document and verify the efficacy of the recent changes

through lessons learned from training and exercises as well as focused concept

experimentation covering all aspects of battlespace awareness at the strategic level of war.

Deficiency: Joint intelligence and CBRN/TIM publications do not adequately address this

issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Joint intelligence and CBRN/TIM publications must be

enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles an

responsibilities are clearly delineated.

Deficiency: The JRO-CBRND is not adequately staffed and organized to meet its

intelligence-related responsibilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff section dedicated

to resolving CBRN intelligence community issues. Personnel: JRO-CBRND should have

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

adequate trained/experienced personnel assigned to man a staff section dedicated to resolving

CBRN intelligence community issues.

Deficiency: The NIST staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN/TIM issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training that will enable the NIST staff to better

understand their CBRN/TIM role and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is

required to support the Shape function of strategic national CBRND. Leadership: Develop an

education program that will enable the J-2 staff to better understand their CBRN/TIM role

and enhance their ability to obtain intelligence that is required to support the Shape function

of strategic national CBRND.

Deficiency: CBRND staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff

officers to better support the CBRN intelligence process. Leadership: Develop education

programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN intelligence process

and their roles and responsibilities.

Deficiency: Experimentation/red teaming does not provide feedback on intelligence

indicators for this task.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: JRO-CBRND must work with NIST and/or national

intelligence organizations to integrate this task into both intelligence and CBRN

experimentation campaign plans.

Deficiency: Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) does not adequately cover the

fusion of intelligence/CBRN/TIM issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Integrate intelligence/CBRN fusion issues into JPME.

Deficiency: DoD CBRN/TIM experts detailed to the national intelligence organizations and

the NIST do not receive adequate preparation, support, or briefing for DoD lessons learned.

Non-Material Solutions: Organization: Ensure that CBRN organizations that provide DoD

detailees to national intelligence organizations are proactive in ensuring their institutional

CBRN intelligence needs are both understood and met and that the detailees they provide are

prepared in every way. Ensure that CBRN SMEs assigned to the NIST are prepared in every

way. Leadership: Provide CBRN DoD detailees to national intelligence organizations or

those assigned to the NIST with formal educational preparation. Personnel: CBRN DoD

detailees to national intelligence organizations or those assigned to the NIST must possess

adequate skill and experience.

6.1.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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6.2

Task SNSHA 2: Conduct global CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis

6.2.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.2.1.1

Definition

To conduct continual global vulnerability assessments focusing on potential adversary’s COAs.

This global strategic assessment compares regional-based vulnerabilities and risks. Development

of a shared understanding of potential adversary’s CBRN/TIM COAs and the associated

vulnerabilities and risks enables timely and effective preparations for any potential adversary

acts. Includes the development of associated risk assessments.

6.2.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.5.1, SN 3.3.6, SN 4.3.3, SN 4.3.4, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2,

SN 5.1.3, SN 7.5, SN 9, SN 9. 1.2, SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2, SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2), Protection Joint

Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach.

6.2.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.2.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 1, SNSHA 4, SNSHA 6, SNSHA 8, SNSHA 9, SNSHA

6.2.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 2

6.2.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Limited modern military systems. (C2.2.5)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

3. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

4. Marginal or negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

5. Difficult global intelligence access. (C2.4.4)

6. Little or no certitude of data. (C2.4.6)

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Civil. N/A

6.2.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.2.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.2-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task “Conduct global

CBRN/TIM vulnerability analysis.” There is only one capability that exists, and no other

capability is projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

NMJIC has the ability to conduct global vulnerability assessments focusing on potential

adversary COAs. The current capability is assessed as “yellow” as the result of numerous

DOTMLPF limitations.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No improvements are expected

over the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. For the far term,

experimentation leading to better coordination efforts, and DOTMLPF will raise the overall

capability to “green.” The inability to discern threat CBRN/TIM intent with reliability will

continue to be a problem.

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Table 6.2-1. SNSHA 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: National Military Joint Intelligence Center

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹¹

FAA Measure

Scale

Policies and guidelines for conducting global vulnerability analysis are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policies and guidelines for conducting global risk assessment are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Analytical tools used to evaluate plausible adversary COAs are adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Vulnerability assessment process exploits time-sensitive or priority actionable CBRN intelligence.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means are available to collaboratively perform assessments.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Means exist to visualize the impact of adversary COAs on forces of interest.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively assess adversary

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM COAs.

Sufficient doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for effective vulnerability assessment are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint exercises/experimentation provides feedback on efficacy of vulnerability analysis doctrine and TTPs.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Partial. As a DoD asset, NMJIC has little influence over the CBRN assessments made by other departments and activities. DOTMLPF for generic vulnerability analysis may be

adequate, but CBRND integration into the process is inadequate.

² Limited. NMJIC has guidelines for conducting global vulnerability analyses; however, the global CBRN vulnerability analysis process is not solely within the purview of DoD.

³ Limited. NMJIC has guidelines for conducting risk assessments; however, global CBRN risk assessments are not solely within the purview of DoD.

⁴ Yes. NMJIC has analytical tools to evaluate plausible adversary COA. The standard military decision making process for evaluating COA’s has been considered adequate. But

CBRN/TIM integration of the analytical tools may not be adequate.

⁵ Partial. NMJIC has an ability to exploit time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence through netcentric means.

⁶ Yes. NMJIC has the means to perform assessments in collaboration with other agencies.

⁷ Limited. The accuracy with which NMJIC interprets adversary intent is dependent on intelligence covering many adversary capabilities, including CBRN employment doctrine,

release authority, resources, adversary forces, and rules of engagement.

⁸ Limited. The NMJIC has the trained operational and analytical/planning staff to effectively assess potential adversary CBRN/TIM COAs. However, the NMJIC may not be able

to interpret adversary intent with 100 percent accuracy.

⁹ Limited. NMJIC has TTPs for global CBRN/TIM situational awareness. Global CBRN vulnerability assessment tools are available although more extensive automation would be

desirable. There are still issues with determining threat CBRN/TIM intent.

¹⁰ Partial. The task of assessing the efficacy of global CBRN vulnerability analysis doctrine and TTPs is a multidisciplined, multinational matter that surpasses the authority of the

DoD NMJIC. This assessment activity may include feedback from joint exercises/experimentation, as well as encompass other activities such as: the Joint Interagency

Coordinating Group, other U.S. government departments and agencies, the selection of nongovernmental organizations, foreign military, intelligence and law enforcement assets.

¹¹ For the far term, experimentation leading to better coordination efforts and DOTMLPF will raise our overall capability to “green.” The inability to discern threat CBRN/TIM

intent with reliability will continue to be a problem.

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6.2.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.2.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: DoD’s global CBRN risk and vulnerability analysis processes are not fully

established.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Incorporate NMJIC input into overall IC activities.

Deficiency: Cannot routinely validate or prioritize actionable CBRN intelligence in a timely

manner.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Validity of raw intelligence is a continuing problem.

Training for CBRN issues needs to be reinforced.

Deficiency: The accuracy with which NMJIC interprets adversary intent is dependent on

intelligence covering many adversary capabilities, including CBRN employment doctrine,

release authority, resources, adversary forces, and rules of engagement.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Ability to interpret adversary intent is a continuing

problem. Continued work on analysis probability tools and models—and training—is

required. Leadership: Ability to interpret adversary intent is a continuing problem. Continued

work on analysis probability tools and models—and education—is required.

Deficiency: The current compartmentalization of the intelligence community which results in

a lack of collaboration during assessments.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: As a DoD asset, NMJIC previously had little

influence over assessments of other departments and activities of adversary CBRN capability

and intent. The recently completed federal review of intelligence capabilities provides a

multitude of recommendations and new initiatives that DoD must participate in to rectify this

problem.

Deficiency: Lack of automated means to conduct global vulnerability assessments that focus

on potential adversary COAs.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None.

6.2.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.2-2 shows possible materiel approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

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6.3

Task SNSHA 3: Coordinate international CBRND protocols, standards, and

agreements

6.3.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.3.1.1

Definition

To negotiate and coordinate the military aspects of international protocols, standards, and

agreements for CBRND with representatives of other nations and regional/international

organizations. This task promotes interoperability and integration of CBRND capabilities,

including establishing, reviewing, and modifying existing protocols, standards, and agreements

when appropriate and necessary. Includes the establishment of interoperability and common

procedures and formats for CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and reporting. Also includes

establishment and maintenance of international standards and formats for plotting and predicting

CBRN/TIM hazards.

6.3.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.5.1, SN 3.3.6, SN4.3, SN 5.1.2, SN 5.1.3, SN 9, SN

9.1.3, SN 9.2.2), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic

Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance.

6.3.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.3.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 5, SNSHA 8, SNSHLD 1, SNSHLD 2, SNSHLD 3,

SNSHLD 4, SNSHLD 5, SNSHLD 6, SNSHLD 7, SNSHLD 8, SNSHLD 9,

SNSUST 1, SNSUST 2, SNSUST 4, SNSUST 5

6.3.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

6.3.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

5. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

6. Moderate staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

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Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Uncertain international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

6.3.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.3.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.3-1 discusses three capabilities that currently exist to coordinate international CBRND

protocols, standards, and agreements. These are the only capabilities that exist, and no other

capabilities are projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program (ABCA) and North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) working groups have established mature and beneficial relationships that

allow CBRND protocols, standards, and agreements to be coordinated and reviewed. Problems

still exist with many of the nations of the world and the various international conventions that

have been established. The current assessment is “green” although there are a number of

limitations with existing international conventions.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Limited changes/improvements

are expected in the international community at large in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. Limited changes/improvements

are expected in the international community at large in the far term. Continual improvements are

expected across the board as ABCA/NATO exercises/experimentation efforts provide valuable

lessons learned at appropriate levels. U.S. CBRND experimentation efforts at the SN level of

war will be applied to ABCA/NATO applications.

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Table 6.3-1. SNSHA 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current

International Conventions Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Organisation for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological and Toxin Weapons

Y¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

G⁵

Y⁶

Convention (BTWC)

American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program (QUADRIPARTITE)

G⁷

G⁸

G⁹

G¹⁰

G¹¹

Y¹²

NATO Working Group

G¹³

G¹⁴

G¹⁵

G¹⁶

G¹⁷

Y¹⁸

Near/Mid

International Conventions CWC, OPCW, BTWC

Y¹⁹

American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program (QUADRIPARTITE)

G²⁰

NATO Working Group

G²¹

Far

International Conventions CWC, OPCW, BTWC

Y²²

American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Program (QUADRIPARTITE)

G²³

G²⁴

NATO Working Group

G²⁵

G²⁶

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Required CBRND protocols, standards, and agreements are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

International CBRND standards are current.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

U.S. and international staffs and agencies are in compliance with existing protocols, standards, and agreements.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

There is a recurring program to update or maintain currency of international practices, procedures, and formats.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND staffs and organizations have the training to effectively assess warning and reporting and hazard prediction

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

models.

International exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of standards and agreements.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. A number of efforts have been undertaken by the BTWC/CWC parties to develop and implement universal agreements and policies.

² Limited. A number of efforts have been undertaken by the BTWC/CWC parties to develop and implement international standards.

³ Limited. A number of countries are delaying compliance with protocols and agreements due to frequently changing internal political environment.

⁴ Limited. A number of countries are slow in updating and maintaining currency of international practices, procedures and formats due to frequently changing internal political

environment.

⁵ Yes. Current staff has the training and understanding of basic warning and reporting and hazard prediction modeling.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

⁶ Limited. The participation in international exercises/experimentation is voluntary. The efficacy of the feedback is limited to “openness” of participating states.

⁷ Yes. CBRND protocols, standards and agreements are established as Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs).

⁸ Yes. There are Quadripartite Working Groups that meet every two years.

⁹ Yes. The ABCA has a senior officer on duty in Washington, D.C. who regularly reviews the work of the overall program.

¹⁰ Yes. The ABCA has a senior officer on duty in Washington, D.C. who regularly reviews the work of the overall program.

¹¹ Yes. The CBRND staff has the training to assess warning and reporting and hazard prediction models as established by Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and QSTAGs.

¹² While there have been many ABCA exercises, an exercise focused exclusively on all aspects of CBRND has not been conducted.

¹³ Yes. CBRND protocols, standards and agreements are established as NATO STANAGs.

¹⁴ Yes. NATO working groups meet on a regular basis.

¹⁵ Yes. NATO ensures compliance with appropriate protocols, standards, and agreements.

¹⁶ Yes. NATO working groups meet on a regular basis.

¹⁷ Yes. The CBRND staff has the training to assess warning and reporting and hazard prediction models as established by STANAG.

¹⁸ While there have been many NATO exercises, an exercise focused exclusively on all aspects of CBRND has not been conducted.

¹⁹ Limited changes/improvements are expected in the near/mid term.

²⁰ Limited changes/improvements are expected in the near/mid term.

²¹ Limited changes/improvements are expected in the near/mid term.

²² Limited changes/improvements are expected in the international community at large.

²³ Continual improvements are expected across the board as ABCA exercises/experimentation efforts provide valuable lessons learned at appropriate levels.

²⁴ U.S. CBRND experimentation efforts at the SN level of war will be applied to ABCA applications.

²⁵ Continual improvements are expected across the board as NATO exercises/experimentation efforts provide valuable lessons learned at appropriate levels.

²⁶ U.S. CBRND experimentation efforts at the SN level of war will be applied to NATO applications.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.3.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.3.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

1. Deficiency: International CBRND protocols, standards, and agreements that promote

interoperability are not in effect.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Differences still exist over “rolling text” and the

Chairman’s text. Outreach to all nonsignatory nations must take place to encourage

participation.

2. Deficiency: Efficacy of standards and feedback has not been determined through exercises

and experimentation in all CBRND areas and is limited to countries that are open to

participate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: NATO and ABCA exercises and experimentation must

explore all aspects of CBRND. Nations outside of ABCA and NATO should be encouraged

to participate.

3. Deficiency: Additional policy and doctrine needs to be developed along with an effective

inspection regime to strengthen the BTWC/CWC.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: The Quadripartite Group and NATO need to build a

QSTAG/STANAG for considering weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related terrorism

as a causative action for establishing international procedures and mutual support agreements

for restoration operations.

6.3.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.4

Task SNSHA 4: Coordinate CBRND within the interagency process

6.4.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.4.1.1

Definition

To work with representatives of the other Executive departments and agencies to resolve issues

and ensure that CBRND responsibilities are coordinated. Includes organizations within DoD, as

well as interagency capabilities. Organizations with appropriate resources are designated and

tasked, as necessary, to support and/or provide the identified CBRND capabilities. Includes

allocating and tasking resources in accordance with established agreements with other non-DoD

national agencies.

6.4.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2, SN 5.1.3, SN 5.2.1, SN 5.2.3, SN 7.5, SN 9, SN 9.2,

SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic

Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance.

6.4.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.4.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 2, SNSHA 8, SNSHA 9, SNSHA 10, SNSHA 13

6.4.1.2.3

Supporting Task: N/A

6.4.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. Negligible military commitments from other nations. (C2.1.1.7)

4. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

5. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

6. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

7. Partial Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

8. Moderate staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.4.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.4.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.4-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task to the designated

standard. These are the only capabilities that exist, and no other capabilities are projected that

will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

JDOMS serves as the action agent for the Secretary of Defense to coordinate and direct

execution of DoD assistance to civil authorities. In addition, JDOMS serves as the action agent

for consequence management operations and plans. The J-3 Operations Directorate is responsible

for synchronizing and monitoring worldwide military operations and activities, including

coordinating the joint CBRND requirements that are within the interagency process. The current

capability assessment is “yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No near/mid-term capability

improvement is anticipated.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF should improve in

all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused interagency

experimentation. For the far term the assessment should become “green.”

For Official Use Only

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.4-1. SNSHA 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current

Joint Department of Military Support

G¹

G²

Y³

G⁴

G⁵

Joint Staff Directorate for Operations, J-3

G⁶

G⁷

Y⁸

G⁹

G¹⁰

Near/Mid

Joint Department of Military Support

Joint Staff Directorate for Operations, J-3

Far

Joint Department of Military Support)

G¹¹

Joint Staff Directorate for Operations, J-3

G¹²

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Current allocation of responsibility is adequate to satisfy current capability

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

and operational requirements.

Projected responsibilities can be determined based on changes in the

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

global CBRN/TIM situation.

Current CBRND requirements are satisfied through existing DoD

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

resources.

CBRND capabilities not available within DoD are provided through

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

agreement with non-DoD agencies.

Extent of mutual support available from other agencies or organizations

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

meets requirements.

¹ Current assignment of responsibility is adequate to satisfy current capability and operational requirements.

² Able to determine projected responsibilities based on changes in the global CBRN situation.

³ Existing DoD resources cannot completely satisfy current CBRND requirements.

⁴ CBRND capabilities not available within DoD are provided through agreement with non-DoD agencies.

⁵ Extent of mutual support available from other agencies or organizations meets requirements.

⁶ Yes. Current assignment of responsibilities is able to satisfy current capability and operational requirements.

⁷ Yes. J-3 is able to determine projected responsibilities based on changes in the global CBRN situation.

⁸ Limited. The current DoD and interagency coordination resources to support CBRND and domestic response requirements are

limited in size and scope. For example, current resources cannot handle a large scale series of simultaneous, multiple CBRN

events.

⁹ Very limited. Many CBRND capabilities available within DoD can be provided to the interagency, but both DoD and non-DoD

equipment, TTPs, and standards may not be compatible nor compliant with other agency requirements.

¹⁰ Very limited. While some CBRN mutual support exists, DoD and non-DoD capabilities are often incompatible.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused interagency

experimentation.

¹² DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused interagency

experimentation.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.4.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.4.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

1. Deficiency: The current capabilities can not handle a large scale series of simultaneous,

multiple CBRN events.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop TTPs for CBRND mutual capabilities support

between DoD and non-DoD executive agencies. Training: Develop experimentation for

interagency CBRND cooperation to provide lessons learned. Integrate lessons learned into

training and exercises for CBRND mutual capabilities support between DoD and non-DoD

executive agencies. Leadership: Develop JPME for CBRND mutual support capabilities

between DoD and non-DoD executive agencies.

2. Deficiency: DoD and non-DoD procedures and equipment may not be compatible.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop TTPs for CBRND mutual support capabilities

between DoD and non-DoD executive agencies. Training: Develop training and exercises to

enhance CBRND mutual support capabilities between DoD and non-DoD executive

agencies. Leadership: Develop JPME for CBRND mutual support capabilities between DoD

and non-DoD executive agencies.

3. Deficiency: DoD and non-DoD TTPs may not be compatible (e.g., personnel

decontamination, equipment decontamination, and facilities decontamination).

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop TTPs for DoD elements that allow equivalent

CBRND procedures when a request for assistance is received.

6.4.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.5

Task SNSHA 5: Determine joint CBRND capability to meet the global CBRN/TIM

situation

6.5.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.5.1.1

Definition

To determine joint CBRND capability requirements based on changes in the current and

projected global CBRN/TIM situation, including management of JCIDS. JCIDS defines

capability gaps, capability needs, and approaches to provide those capabilities within the

CBRND functional area. These capabilities derive from a common understanding of existing

joint force operations and DOTMLPF capabilities and deficiencies. The JCIDS analyses result in

DOTMLPF capabilities and provide the necessary information for the development of the Initial

Capabilities Document (ICD) if required. Also includes the procurement of appropriate CBRND

systems, equipment, and supplies.

6.5.1.2

Derivation

CJCSI 3170.01D, CJCSM 3170.01A, UJTL (SN 2.2.1, SN 3.3.6, SN 5.7.1, SN 7.5, SN 9.2.1),

Protection Joint Functional Concept, Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Defense,

Transformation Planning Guidance.

6.5.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.5.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 3, SNSHA 8, SNSHLD 10, SNSHLD 11, SNSHLD 12

6.5.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 3

6.5.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. High military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

2. Limited interoperability. (C2.2.6)

3. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Limited deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

5. Adequate continental United States (CONUS) resupply. (C2.8.3)

6. Slow pipeline responsiveness (C2.8.3.1)

7. Negligible commercial procurement. (C2.8.6)

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C 3.1.1.3)

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.5.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.5.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.5-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task to the designated

standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

JRO-CBRND has the ability to determine joint CBRN capability to meet the global CBRN

situation. While JRO has the basic ability to perform the task, only a small amount of data at the

operational level and above has been gathered through lessons learned in exercises or through

experimentation. There are also a number of shortfalls in materials available to guide and train

CBRND observer/controllers and to assist exercise developers in the integration of CBRND

objectives in operational-level and above exercises. The current capability assessment is

“yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

forecast for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. Realistic modeling, simulation,

exercises and experimentation will make comprehensive analysis possible at all levels of war as

a result of current ongoing efforts. Capability assessments via operational experiments,

operational/developmental test and evaluation, and lessons learned will continue to mature and

will have enough depth to allow total analysis. The capstone DOTMLPF experimentation using

UNIFIED ENDEAVOR will not take place in FY2009/FY2010. DOTMLPF to support task

should improve if effective experimentation addresses organizational deficiencies and closes

knowledge gaps and doctrine and if training and education initiatives address deficiencies

identified in this JCIDS, raising the far-term assessment to “green.”

For Official Use Only

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.5-1. SNSHA 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Requirements Office Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

G³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁶

G⁷

G⁸

FAA Measure

Scale

JCIDS analyses reflect comprehensive capability requirements at all

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

levels of war.

Non-materiel (DOTLPF) requirements are addressed per CJCSI 3170D-

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

and 3180-series procedures.

All CBRND systems and logistical support are acquired in sufficient

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

quantity and maintained to support global operations.

Capability assessments via operational experiments,

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operational/developmental test and evaluation, and lessons learned are

available.

¹ Limited. Doctrine and TTPs focusing on CBRND at the operational and strategic theater levels are very limited, even though JP

3-11 provides broad doctrinal guidance for CBRND and the new JP 3-40 provides broad doctrine for combating WMD. CBRND

staff positions and staffing positions at all levels are not consistently manned, making it difficult to apply CBRND subject matter

expertise to planning and evaluating exercises when required. CBRND staffs are not adequately trained/experienced on strategic

CBRND issues. JPME does not adequately address CBRND issues.

² No. Limited CBRND systems and logistical support are acquired and maintained in quantities based on budgetary allocation

and the program objectives memorandum.

³ Yes. The JRO-CBRND will address non-materiel (DOTLPF) requirements per CJCSI 3180-series procedures.

⁴ Yes. CBRND systems and logistical support are acquired and maintained in quantities.

⁵ Limited. Capability assessments via operational experiments, operational/developmental test and evaluation, and lessons

learned are now becoming available but do not currently have enough depth to allow total analysis. The capstone DOTMLPF

experimentation using UNIFIED ENDEAVOR will not take place until FY2009/FY2010.

⁶ DOTMLPF to support task should improve if effective experimentation addresses organizational deficiencies/closes knowledge

gaps and doctrine, training and education initiatives address deficiencies identified in this JCIDS.

⁷Capability assessments via operational experiments, operational/developmental test and evaluation, and lessons learned will

continue to mature and will have enough depth to allow total analysis. The capstone DOTMLPF experimentation using UNIFIED

ENDEAVOR will not take place in FY2009/FY2010.

⁸ Capability assessments via operational experiments, operational/developmental test and evaluation, and lessons learned will

continue to mature and will have enough depth to allow total analysis. The capstone DOTMLPF experimentation using UNIFIED

ENDEAVOR will not take place in FY2009/FY2010.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.5.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.5.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: An exercise including fully integrated objectives or focused on CBRND and

combating WMD for a strategic force has not been conducted.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish guidelines, checklists, and exercise planning

tools to integrate CBRND and combating WMD objectives into joint exercises. Training:

Facilitate the development of exercises that include fully integrated exercise objectives or are

totally focused on CBRND and combating WMD for joint strategic forces. Facilities:

Incorporate infrastructure and telemetric requirements into development of the Joint National

Training Center.

Deficiency: Relevant and comprehensive operational/strategic-level issues are virtually

nonexistent.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop guides for observer/controllers so that they are

better able to capture relevant lessons learned from exercises. Integrate captured data into

future JCIDS analysis. Organization: Ensure that organizations that conduct joint exercises

likely to reveal relevant data are adequately staffed with CBRN subject matter experts or that

external observer/controller teams (provided by JRO) can be easily integrated into the

exercise control/data collection plan. Training: Provide assistance to joint exercise

developers on CBRND and combating WMD scenarios and objectives and develop CBRN-

centric training for observer/controllers. Leadership: Integrate techniques for developing

joint exercise CBRND and combating WMD training objectives into leader training.

Personnel: Ensure that personnel chosen to be observer/controllers have requisite

combination of technical expertise, operational/exercise experience, and CBRN-centric joint

exercise observer/controller training.

Deficiency: There have been no experiments focusing on operational/strategic-level

warfighting restoration operations concepts and issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Include CBRND and combating WMD tasks and

concepts in the JRO experimentation campaign plan for FY2009/FY2010 UNIFIED

ENDEAVOR and all work-ups.

Deficiency: There is a limited capability to provide strategic-level CBRN investment

strategy.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine (partial): Develop methodology for how to

forecast/determine adequate CBRND and combating WMD capability or medical capability

for strategic forces.

Deficiency: There are very few concepts, doctrine, and TTPs focusing on CBRND and

combating WMD requirements at the operational and strategic theater levels.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop robust concepts, doctrine and TTPs focusing

on CBRND and combating WMD requirements at the operational and strategic levels.

6. Deficiency: CBRND staffs are not adequately trained/experienced on strategic CBRND

issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop guides and TTPs focusing on CBRND staff

roles, responsibilities, and procedures for planning and conducting restoration operation at

the operational and strategic theater levels. Training: Analyze training received by CBRND

specialists assigned to joint staffs. Recommend training changes, enhancements, or

alternative fixes as required. Leadership: Analyze education received by CBRND specialists

assigned to joint staffs. Recommend education changes, enhancements, or alternative fixes

as required.

7. Deficiency: JPME does not currently address this issue.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Commanders, staff directors, and leaders at all levels

require extensive education on CBRND issues. Without a complete understanding of how

CBRND issues can impact the warfight, they are unable to fully appreciate operational

implication of CBRND and therefore assess and record CBRND exercise lesson’s learned.

6.5.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.5-2 shows possible materiel approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

Table 6.5-2. SNSHA 5: IMA Assessment

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Automated tools.

Develop automated tools that take the available data and

provide a means to forecast strategic force CBRND and

combating WMD requirements

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.6

Task SNSHA 6: Ensure joint CBRND readiness

6.6.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.6.1.1

Definition

To ensure the military forces of the United States are prepared to accomplish assigned missions

in a CBRN/TIM environment. Joint CBRND training, exercises, and rehearsals are key

components to ensure unit readiness for operations in a CBRN/TIM-contaminated environment.

Operational concepts and new systems are evaluated in realistic exercises and experimental

environments. Coalition partners, allies, and nonaligned nations achieve similar capability

readiness through military assistance or engagement programs, including developing policy and

standards for CBRND training, including what is necessary for eligible civilians. This task also

ensures the availability of appropriate units and personnel in the correct quantities and locations

to support national strategy and objectives. Encompasses the management of CBRND logistical

resources for global operations. Also encompasses availability of CBRND expertise to joint

forces operating worldwide.

6.6.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 3.4.4, SN 3.4.6, SN 4, SN 4.2.2, SN 4.3.3, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2, SN

5.2.3, SN 5.2.4.1.2, SN 6.1, SN 7.4, SN 7.5, SN 8, SN 8.1, SN 9, SN 9.1.2, SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2),

Transformation Planning Guidance, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Protection

Joint Functional Concept, Training Transformation Implementation Plan.

6.6.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.6.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 2, SNSUST 9, SNSUST 10

6.6.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 4

6.6.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. Partially completed mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

3. Marginal forces assigned. (C2.2.1)

4. Multiple competing apportionments. (C2.2.2)

5. Marginal forces allocated. (C2.2.3)

6. Partial personnel capability. (C2.2.4)

7. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

8. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

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9. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

10. Poor Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

11. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

12. Limited staff expertise. (C2.3.1.3)

13. Limited to short deployed supplies. (C2.8.2)

14. Limited to negligible CONUS resupply. (C2.8.3)

15. Slow pipeline responsiveness. (C2.8.3.1)

16. Limited or no prepositioned materiel. (C2.8.4)

17. Limited commercial procurement. (C2.8.6)

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

3. Poor information management. (C3.3.7.4)

6.6.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.6.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.6-1 discusses a capability that currently exists to perform the task to the designated

standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Staff, J-3 Readiness, is the single office within DoD responsible for the planning,

coordination, and oversight of joint CBRN defense operational requirements. The current overall

assessment is “yellow” due to the facts that policies are not in place throughout the force

structure and those that are in place only pertain to immediate survivability. Scarce CBRN

experts are dispersed throughout the DoD force structure and are frequently only one or two deep

in any given organization. DOTMLPF does not adequately ensure Joint CBRN readiness.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No improvements are forecast

for the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. In the far-term the situation will

improve but remain “yellow.” Joint standards will be developed and enforced among the

services. JPME/OPME will stipulate CBRND learning areas but will take some time after these

actions to reach full capability in this area. As DOTMLPF enhancements are introduced, the

expertise of senior leaders will improve, mitigating the need for such extensive callback

capabilities. DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use

data resulting from focused experimentation.

For Official Use Only

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.6-1. SNSHA 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability:

Joint Staff, J-3

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

M16

M17

M18

Readiness

Current

Overall

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

G⁵

R⁶

Y⁷

G⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

Y¹⁴

Y¹⁵

Y¹⁶

Y¹⁷

R¹⁸

R¹⁹

Capability¹

Near/Mid-Term

Overall

Capability

Far-Term

Overall

Y²¹

Y²²

Y²³

Capability²⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

Doctrine and TTPs are adequate for operations envisioned over the next 5-10 years.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM events and defense operations are incorporated in joint and Service exercises routinely.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

National and joint exercises are held that focus on CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint- or Service-sponsored experiments focusing on CBRND operations occur annually.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policies for training of joint forces are enforced.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policies are in place to train those civilians not members of the joint force.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Standards are established for CBRND readiness.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

A training program is established for potential evacuees.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Training of CBRND specialists is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Training of CBRND units is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Training of CBRND staff cells is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

Training of joint force staffs is adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M13

Personnel assigned to diplomatic posts or employed in at-risk nations are effectively trained to respond to a

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM event.

M14

Tools and processes are available to globally manage CBRND personnel and units.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M15

Tools and processes are available to globally manage CBRND materiel resources.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M16

CBRND logistics tracking system is sufficient.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M17

CBRN expert access is readily available for all CBRND topics.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M18

Sufficient experts are available to meet peak demand.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Very limited. DOTMLPF does not adequately ensure Joint CBRN readiness.

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² Limited. As a result of the global war on terror, CBRN doctrine and TTPs are adequate for operations envisioned over the next 3-5 years, but not 7-10 years. Additional

emphasis must be placed on the full realm of threats envisioned in JV 2010 and JV 2020.

³ Very limited. CBRN events and defense operations are incorporated, but emphasis should be placed on the full spectrum of CBRND operations. This emphasis should include the

new JP 3-40, combating WMD, counterproliferation, and consequence management.

⁴ Limited. CBRN specific exercises need to occur more often and cover more topics. CBRN/TIM scenarios need to be integrated into every national and joint exercise because of

the recurring need to test capabilities in realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios, Two exercises that focus on CBRN operations are the TOPOFF exercises and the Determined Promise

exercises that are held on a recurring basis.

⁵ Advanced Technology Demonstrations and Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations have been conducted on CBRND operations. Once it is initiated, the new JRO-

CBRND-sponsored CBRND Experimentation Campaign Plan will provide an excellent plan for experimentation.

⁶ No. Training enforcement is service-, situation-, and scenario-specific even though there is joint training involving two or more services. JPME is not specific enough for

CBRND requirements.

⁷ Limited. Policies are not in place throughout the force structure, and those that are in place only pertain to immediate survivability. Individual training requirements are

established for CONUS DoD civilians and contract support personnel.

⁸ Yes. IAW JSCAP and JP 1-03.

⁹ Limited. U.S. Forces Korea does this. However, this capability does not exist across the force structure.

¹⁰ Limited. This requirement is unique to each service. Tactical-level preparation is adequate with all services. Leader training and education for operational-level and above is

nonexistent except for elective courses. Multiservice institutional training occurs with the Army as the lead Service.

¹¹ Limited. Training standards vary between Services. The number and type of exercises involving CBRND units varies. The amount of time available to Reserve Component units

restricts the level of their training to the most crucial collective tasks.

¹² Limited. Training standards are different among services. The number and types of exercises involving CBRN staff cells differs.

¹³ Limited. Training standards differ. The number and types of exercises involving CBRN training events varies as does the depth and level of expertise within joint staffs. With

few exceptions, CBRN training events do not adequately portray the level and complexity of a real-world situation.

¹⁴ Limited. Training is limited to initial survival and evacuation scenarios.

¹⁵ Limited. CBRN personnel and units are managed in the same manner as other deployable personnel and units. However, due to the unique mission of CBRN personnel and

units, tools should be developed to intensively manage them.

¹⁶ Limited. CBRN materiel is managed in the same manner as other materiel (e.g., through various classes of supply). However, due to the unique character of CBRN materiel,

tools should be developed to intensively manage and track it.

¹⁷ Limited. Currently, CBRN logistics are tracked the same as other assets. However, given the probable heavy medical and logistical requirements that would occur in a CBRN

response, a separate CBRND logistics tracking systems should be developed.

¹⁸ Very limited. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) sponsors a call-back capability. Scarce CBRN experts are dispersed throughout the DoD force structure and are

frequently only one or two deep in any given organization.

¹⁹ Very limited. In most cases, CBRN experts are readily available (e.g., from DTRA, the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious

Diseases, etc.). However, experts embedded in units are frequently only one or two deep and may not be available to meet peak demand.

²⁰ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

²¹ Joint standards will be developed and enforced among the services. JPME/Officer Professional Military Education will stipulate CBRND learning areas. It will take some time

after these actions to reach full capability in this area.

²² As DOTMLPF enhancements are introduced, the expertise of senior leaders will improve, mitigating the need for such extensive call-back capabilities. It will take some time

after these actions to reach full capability in this area.

²³ As DOTMLPF enhancements are introduced, the expertise of senior leaders will improve, mitigating the need for such extensive call-back capabilities. It will take some time

after these actions to reach full capability in this area.

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6.6.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.6.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: CBRN doctrine and TTPs are not adequate for operations envisioned over the

next 7-10 years.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Devise a system that allows for more frequent revision

and update to the CBRND doctrinal literature cycle.

Deficiency: Emphasis is not placed on the full spectrum of CBRND operations and

considerations which range from counterproliferation to consequence management in joint

and service exercises.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Implement the full range of CBRN-related activities in

doctrine: deterrence; counterproliferation; nonproliferation; interdiction; elimination;

restoration. Training: Institute the full range of CBRN options in doctrine followed

immediately by courses in the joint and Service institutional base which reflect all

considerations from counterproliferation to consequence management.

Deficiency: Training enforcement is specific to service, situation, and scenario. JPME lacks

specificity for WMD requirements.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop JPME that mandates minimum standards of

proficiency in all CBRN institutional training.

Deficiency: Policies are in place to train DoD civilians throughout the force structure but

only pertain to immediate survivability.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop policies to train DoD civilians throughout the

force structure beyond mere immediate survivability. Training: Develop training for DoD

civilians throughout the force structure beyond mere immediate survivability

Deficiency: The capability to establish training programs for potential civilian evacuees does

not exist across the force structure.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Establish standardized training programs for potential

civilian evacuees across the force structure.

Deficiency: Sustainment training for CBRND specialists (once they reach their assigned

duty stations) is probably not adequate.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop standards of proficiency for sustainment

training for CBRND specialists across the force structure.

Deficiency: Training of CBRND units is not standardized. There is a lack of realism in

training which emphasizes CBRN. Sustainment training does not adequately reinforce

perishable collective technical CBRN-related skills.

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Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Across the force structure, develop one set of standards

of proficiency for all CBRND units and staffs.

8. Deficiency: Institutional training of CBRND staffs is not standardized. Sustainment training

does not adequately reinforce perishable collective technical CBRN-related skills.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop standardized institutional training of CBRND

staffs across the force structure.

9. Deficiency: The number and type of exercises involving CBRN events differ widely. Few

involve the full spectrum of activities required in an actual CBRN event.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop exercises that more completely include the full

spectrum of activities required in multiple, simultaneous actual CBRN events.

10. Deficiency: The depth and level of CBRN expertise within various joint staff sections varies.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop TTPs and exercises to ensure staff proficiency

in the full range of CBRN considerations from interdiction and elimination operations,

through humanitarian assistance, to restoration operations. Training: Develop TTPs and

exercises to ensure staff proficiency in the full range of CBRN considerations from

interdiction and elimination operations, through humanitarian assistance, to restoration

operations.

11. Deficiency: There are no tools that can intensively manage CBRN personnel and units.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine (partial): Develop TTPs that more adequately train

CBRN personnel and units to ensure these scarce assets are available, fully mission-capable,

and able to operate in a joint and combined environment. Training (partial): Develop TTPs

that more adequately train CBRN personnel and units to ensure these scarce assets are

available, fully mission-capable, and able to operate in a joint and combined environment.

12. Deficiency: CBRN expertise is scarce throughout the force structure.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Within end-strength constraints, consideration

should be given to increasing the capabilities of CBRND units and staffs. Personnel: Within

end-strength constraints, consideration should be given to increasing the capabilities of

CBRND units and staffs.

6.6.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.6-2 shows possible materiel approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

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Table 6.6-2. SNSHA 6: IMA Assessment

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Automated Tools

Develop automated tools that more adequately manage

CBRN personnel, unit, and materiel to ensure that these

scarce assets are available and fully mission-capable when

needed. All data should be available to/through the Joint

Operational Effects Federation. The personnel component of

the tool should include projected availability, education,

experience, and special skills. The unit component of the

tool should include unit capability description, required

training for unit, last date of required training, and training

required but not completed. The unit component should also

address equipment fill data, equipment readiness data, and

special logistical requirements. The materiel component

should list all required materiel, percentage of materiel on

hand/available and availability dates, and materiel condition

descriptions.

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6.7

Task SNSHA 7: Coordinate global CBRN information systems and processes

6.7.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.7.1.1

Definition

To ensure that global CBRN/TIM information systems and processes allow joint forces to

effectively conduct operations in a CBRN/TIM environment. Establishes the standards, common

operating procedures, and formats for plotting and predicting CBRN/TIM hazards, along with

alarm, warning, and reporting of the hazards. Also includes standards and procedures for

displaying hazard information via the global COP. Ensures that interoperability procedures are

followed and adhered to for integration into the DoD classified and unclassified networks.

Includes maintaining worldwide shared awareness of the current and projected CBRN/TIM

threat and situation.

6.7.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 3.3.6, SN 4.3.3, SN 4.3.4, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2, SN 5.1.3,

SN 5.1.3, SN 5.7.1, SN 7.5, SN 8.1.6, SN 9, SN 9.1.1, SN 9.1.2, SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2, SN 9.2.1, SN

9.2.2), Protection Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,

Transformation Planning Guidance, An Operational Concept for Biological Defense, Joint

Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations.

6.7.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.7.1.2.2

Lateral Task: SNSUST 6

6.7.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 5

6.7.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Low military systems reliability. (C2.2.5.3)

2. Some or no interoperability. (C2.2.6)

3. Partial Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

4. High information volume. (C2.3.1.9)

Civil

1. Poor information management. (C3.3.7.4)

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6.7.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.7.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.7-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task to the designated

standard.

Current Capability and Deficiency

All of the capabilities listed are directly responsible for their respective aspects of global CBRN

information systems and processes. The Joint Staff Directorate for Command, Control,

Communications, and Computer Systems, the J-6, leads the C4 community. It leads in

identifying and resolving military aspects of information-based issues of national importance, to

include CBRND issues. Because of documented training, education, and experience issues, J-6

personnel may not have a full grasp of the issues that need to be resolved. As the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues

involving the warfight, the JRO-CBRND must proactively engage the J-6 to determine the

adequacy of current and projected global CBRN information systems and processes. For the

purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed

and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND/J-6 action. The current capability assessment is

“yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

expected in the near/mid term. Most near/mid-term measures will remain limited until the Joint

Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) automatically interfaces with the Global Command

and Control System (GCCS).

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. DOTMLPF should improve in

some deficient areas as a result of international and interagency initiatives that use data resulting

from focused experimentation. Most far-term measures will remain limited until JWARN

automatically interfaces with GCCS.

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Table 6.7-1. SNSHA 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

M10

Current

Defense Information Systems Agency

Y¹

R²

Y³

R⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis Center (DTRIAC)

Y¹¹

R¹²

Y¹³

R¹⁴

Y¹⁵

Y¹⁶

Y¹⁷

Y¹⁸

Y¹⁹

Y²⁰

Joint Global Command and Control System (GCCS-J)

Y²¹

R²²

Y²³

R²⁴

G²⁵

Y²⁶

Y²⁷

Y²⁸

Y²⁹

Y³⁰

Joint Program Manager for Information Systems (JPM-IS) CBRN Data

Y³¹

R³²

Y³³

Y³⁴

Y³⁵

Y³⁶

Y³⁷

Y³⁸

Y³⁹

Initiative

Near/Mid

Defense Information Systems Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis Center

Joint Global Command and Control System

Joint Program Manager for Information Systems CBRN Data Initiative

R⁴⁰

Far

Defense Information Systems Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis Center

Joint Global Command and Control System

Joint Program Manager for Information Systems CBRN Data Initiative

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

NCES is used to effectively manage and provide CBRN/TIM information.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Standardized CBRN/TIM hazard alarm, warning, and reporting formats and procedures are interoperable with

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

interagency partners.

Sense data are integrated into the COP.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Distributed sensor arrays operating within the Integrated Detection Network (IDN) provide automated warning and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

reporting of the CBRN/TIM hazard.

Nonnetworked detections and manual reports are processed into the network.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Standards for plotting and prediction of CBRN/TIM hazards are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM situational information from all global sources is communicated to the DoD and Joint Staff, as

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

appropriate.

Mechanism exists to rapidly disseminate CBRN/TIM threat intelligence.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Information on the operational impact of CBRN/TIM events is integrated into the COP.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

A CBRND operation reference information system is readily available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

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¹ Limited. Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) is dependent on subsystems, including JPM-IS’s Data Initiative. This mission will be achieved by developing a CBRN Data

Model and related CBRN extensible markup language (XML). Until all subordinate systems are fully operational, DISA’s NCES is less than fully mission-capable.

² No. Interagency partners are not operating on a COP.

³ Limited. Interfacing software for SENSE data is not fully automated.

⁴ No. An integrated detection network does not currently exist for automated warning and reporting of the CBRN hazard.

⁵ Limited. Any operator can process reports into the network, but there are still problems with interoperability that continue to hinder the flow of CBRN information across the

analysis spectrum.

⁶ Limited. Standards for plotting and prediction of CBRN hazards are established. A single standard for automated plotting and prediction CBRN hazards does not yet exist.

⁷ Limited. CBRN situational information from all global sources is not fully communicated to the DoD and Joint Staff, as appropriate.

⁸ Limited. Any authorized operator can query DTRIAC or J-2 resources. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

⁹ Limited. Any authorized operator can query DTRIAC for the COP. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

¹⁰ Limited. Interagency partners do not access DTRIAC.

¹¹ Limited. The NCES is not fully implemented. The NCES, consisting of hardware, software, policy, processes, and procedures, will eventually provide a way for DoD to

coordinate staff and allocate resources more efficiently.

¹²No. Interagency partners are not operating on a COP.

¹³ Limited. Interfacing software for Sense data is not fully automated.

¹⁴ No. An integrated detection network does not currently exist for automated warning and reporting of the CBRN hazard.

¹⁵ Limited. Any operator can process reports into the network, but there are still problems with interoperability that continue to hinder the flow of CBRN information across the

analysis spectrum.

¹⁶ Limited. Standards for plotting and prediction of CBRN hazards are established. A single standard for automated plotting and prediction CBRN hazards does not yet exist.

¹⁷ Limited. CBRN situational information from all global sources is not fully communicated to the DoD and Joint Staff, as appropriate.

¹⁸ Limited. Any authorized operator can query DTRIAC or J-2 resources. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

¹⁹ Limited. Any authorized operator can query DTRIAC for the COP. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

²⁰ Limited. Interagency partners do not access DTRIAC.

²¹ Limited. CBRND information must be manually inserted onto GCCS-J.

²² No. Interagency partners operate on different Command and Control systems.

²³ Limited. Sense data are manually input into the COP.

²⁴ No. An integrated detection network does not currently exist for automated warning and reporting of the CBRN hazard.

²⁵ Yes. Any authorized operator can manually process reports into GCCS-J.

²⁶ Limited. Standards for plotting and prediction of CBRN hazards are established through STANAG 2103 and ATP-45. But there is no single standard for automated plotting and

prediction CBRN hazards .

²⁷ Limited. CBRN situational information from all global sources is not fully automated and communicated to the DoD and Joint Staff, as appropriate.

²⁸ Limited. Any authorized operator can query GCCS-J. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

²⁹ Limited. Any authorized operator can query the COP. However, the NCES is not fully implemented.

³⁰ Limited. Interagency partners do not access GCCS-J.

³¹ Limited. JPM-IS is working to eliminate interoperability problems across the joint CBRN information spectrum.

³² No. Interagency partners operate on different Command and Control systems.

³³ Limited. Sense data can only be manually integrated into the COP. JPM-IS is working to eliminate interoperability problems across the joint CBRN information spectrum.

³⁴ Limited. JPM-IS is working to eliminate interoperability problems across the joint CBRN information spectrum.

³⁵ Limited. Current progress toward creating automation standards is encouraging but work still needs to be done. The programs within JPM have already benefited from the JPM-

IS data model and schema.

³⁶ Limited. CBRN situational information from all global sources is not fully automated and communicated to the DoD and Joint Staff. There is still a problem with data-

interoperability, but the emerging NCES includes mandates to solve this problem.

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6.7.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.7.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: Interagency partners operate on different Command and Control technical

architecture systems.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: CJCS should coordinate with interagency partners to

craft a policy that compels partners to fully integrate CBRN information management

systems. Tasks for the interagency Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) must address these

issues. Interagency partners should fully participate in the JPM-IS initiative. Training:CJCS

should continue to encourage the development of training programs and future operational

capabilities that integrate CBRN information management systems using UJTL tasks to

develop interagency training. JPM-IS CBRN Data Initiative should continue as chartered.

Deficiency: Interoperability problems with CBRN information systems continue to exist.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:JPM-IS CBRN Data Initiative should continue as

chartered. JRO-CBRND and J-6 should work together through experimentation and exercises

to identify and solve interoperability problems.

Deficiency: An integrated detection network does not currently exist for automated warning

and reporting of the CBRN hazard.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop ideas, proposals, and concepts for cooperatively

linked detection technologies. Training: Before concepts for cooperatively linked detection

technologies can be fully developed and tested, exercises and experiments will be necessary

to refine and test concept hypothesis.

Deficiency: CBRN situational information from all global sources is not fully automated.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:Automate CBRN situational information from all global

sources so that the COP portrays real-time shared situational understanding. JPM-IS CBRN

Data Initiative should continue as chartered.

Deficiency: The NCES and JPM-IS CBRN Data Initiative are not fully implemented.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: The Global Information Grid Enterprise Services and

JPM-IS CBRN Data Initiative should continue as chartered.

Deficiency: Joint standards, common operating procedures, and formats for plotting and

predicting CBRN hazards, along with alarm, warning, and reporting of the hazards do not

exist.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:JRO-CBRND should foster the development of truly

Joint (versus multi-Service) standards and formats for automated plotting and predicting

CBRN hazards and alarm and warning systems.

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7. Deficiency: Interagency partners are not all sharing a COP.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:CJCS should coordinate with interagency partners to

craft policy that compels partners to fully integrate CBRN information management systems

so that all U.S. agencies share the same CBRND COP. Tasks for the interagency UJTL must

address these issues. Interagency partners should fully participate in the JPM-IS initiative.

8. Deficiency: With the exception of STANAG 2103 and ATP-45, no standards for common

operating procedures, formats, plotting, and predicting CBRN hazards exist. Further, hazard

alarm, warning, and reporting are not standardized, automated, nor fully integrated into the

COP for use by interagency partners.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Standardize common operating procedures, and formats

for plotting and predicting CBRN hazards, along with alarm, warning, and reporting of the

hazards among interagency partners.

9. Deficiency: With the exception of STANAG 2103 and ATP-45 there are no joint (versus

multi-Service) standards for common operating procedures or for formats for plotting and

predicting CBRN hazards. Nor are alarm, warning, and reporting of the hazards standardized,

automated, and fully integrated into the COP.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:Fully integrate and automate CBRND information,

detection, and sensing technologies into the COP.

10. Deficiency: Interagency partners do not access GCCS-J.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: CJCS should coordinate with interagency partners to

craft policy that compels partners to fully integrate CBRN information management systems.

Tasks for the interagency UJTL must address these issues. Interagency partners should fully

participate in the JPM-IS initiative.

11. Deficiency: Several issues hinder the effectiveness of the J-6 and JRO-CBRND in their joint

responsibility for identifying and resolving issues involving global CBRN information

systems and processes with agencies outside of the joint staff.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine:Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and CBRN publications must be

enhanced to adequately address this issue and to interface with each other so that roles and

responsibilities are clearly delineated. Organization: JRO-CBRND should have a staff

section dedicated to resolving C4ISR community issues. Ensure that CBRN organizations

that provide DoD detailees to national C4ISR organizations are proactive in ensuring their

institutional CBRN C4ISR needs are both understood and met and that the detailees they

provide are prepared in every way. Training: Develop training that will enable the J-6 staff to

better understand their CBRN role and enhance their ability to identify and resolve CBRND

C4 issues that are required to support the Shape function of strategic national CBRND.

Develop training programs that allow CBRN staff officers to better support the CBRN

C4ISR process. JRO-CBRND must work with J-6 and/or national C4ISR organizations to

integrate this task into both C4ISR and CBRN experimentation campaign plans. Leadership:

Develop an education program that will enable the J-6 staff to better understand their CBRN

role and enhance their ability to identify and resolve CBRND C4 issues that are required to

support the Shape function of strategic national CBRND. Develop education programs that

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allow CBRN staff officers to better understand the CBRN C4ISR process and their roles and

responsibilities. Integrate C4ISR CBRN fusion issues into JPME. CBRN DoD detailees to

national C4ISR organizations must be provided with formal educational preparation.

Personnel:CBRN DoD detailees to national C4ISR organizations must possess adequate skill

and experience.

12. Deficiency: Lack of interoperable CBRN/TIM networked detection technologies.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine (partial): Develop ideas, proposals, and concepts for

cooperatively linked detection technologies. Training (partial):Before concepts for

cooperatively linked detection technologies can be fully developed and tested, exercises and

experiments will be necessary to refine and test concept hypothesis.

6.7.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.7-2 shows possible material approaches that address the remaining materiel requirements

of the DOTMLPF assessment.

Table 6.7-2. SNSHA 7. IMA Assessment

Idea for Materiel Approach

Description

Networked information,

There is a need to develop cooperative linkages between

detection, and sensing system

various proponent and service CBRND and CBRN/TIM

information, detection, and sensing technologies. Concepts

must first be developed based on proposed linkages that will

provide capabilities for effective, integrated CBRND and

CBRN/TIM detection, warning, and shared situational

understanding. These concepts must be explored through

experimentation and the cooperative linkages that result need

to be tested. The entire package should be developed as a

system and fully integrated into a multi-agency COP. As each

Service develops detection or sensing technologies, they

should be analyzed for inclusion into the CBRN/TIM

cooperative detection network and necessary modifications

should be mandated for the Service systems.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.8

Task SNSHA 8: Establish national CBRND strategy, plans, and policy

6.8.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.8.1.1

Definition

To produce and disseminate national strategy, plans, and policy providing strategic goals and end

states for CBRND capabilities. Joint, multiagency, and international considerations are included.

This task is geared to enabling the national strategies. Includes providing strategic guidance for

restoration and elimination operations.

6.8.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.5.1, SN 3.4.4, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2, SN 5.1.3, SN 5.2.3,

SN 7.5, SN 8.1.6, SN 9, SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2, SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2), Protection Joint Functional

Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Transformation Planning Guidance,

An Operational Concept for Biological Defense, Joint Enabling Concept for CBRN Operations.

6.8.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.8.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSENS 15, SNSHA 2, SNSHA 3, SNSHA 4, SNSHA 5,

SNSHA 9, SNSHA 10, SNSHA 11, SNSHA 12, SNSHA 13, SNSUST 3,

SNSUST 4

6.8.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 6

6.8.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. Partial Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.8.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.8.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.8-1 discusses the Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) ability to

establish national CBRN strategy, plans, and policy. This is the only capability that exists, and

no other capability is projected that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The current capability assessment is “yellow.” Current plans do not adequately address global

restoration operations. However, JRO-CBRND, ICW J5 and J8 have developed a Joint

Integrating Concept (JIC) for CBRND. The JEC establishes a construct to support the National

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction wherein restoration operations are part of

consequence management. These two initiatives can serve as the foundation for future plan

development. Not all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is currently

included in strategy, plans, and policy. However, once UJTL 5.0 is formally approved, all Sense,

Shape, Shield and Sustain domains must be considered and incorporated into strategy, plans, and

policy.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No capability improvement is

expected over the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. In the far term, the success of

initiatives recommended by this JCIDS and DOTMLPF enhancements across the board, made

possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all

measures to a “green” rating.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.8-1. SNSHA 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

G³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

G⁷

G⁸

Y⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

Plans are provided for global restoration operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Plans are provided for global elimination operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Plans are provided for global CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is included in strategy, plans, and policy.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Strategic planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

There are sufficient doctrine and TTPs for strategic planning.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Plans and policies are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

National and joint exercises and experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of plans and policy.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. Presidential Decision Directives 17, 39, and 62 provide national-level policy and doctrine. Additionally, doctrine found in JP 3-11 series and JP 3-40, provide adequate

baseline doctrine and TTPs for national CBRND planning. However, TTPs needs to address more specific techniques. JPME does not adequately cover the art of strategic planning

for CBRN issues.

² Limited. Current plans do not adequately address global restoration operations. However, JROCBRND, ICW J5 and J8 have developed a Joint Enabling Concept (JEC) for

CBRND. The JEC establishes a construct to support the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction wherein restoration operations are part of consequence

management. These two initiatives can serve as the foundation for future plan development.

³ Yes. Current plans for global elimination operations do exist.

⁴ Limited. Current information does not adequately address plans for global CBRND operations. Most CBRND planning is done at the combatant command level.

⁵ Limited. All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is not currently included in strategy, plans, and policy. However, once UJTL 5.0 is formally approved, all

Sense, Shape, Shield and Sustain domains must be considered and incorporated into strategy, plans and policy.

⁶ Limited. Strategic planning staffs are not adequately trained and educated in CBRN issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained and educated in planning issues. JPME

does not adequately cover the fusion of planning. CBRN CJCSI 1800.01a does not require baseline CBRND instruction in JPME. Given the complex nature of planning for CBRN

defense operations at the strategic national level, these planning staffs must include multi-disciplined CBRND experienced senior planners.

⁷ Yes. The Joint Services Capability Plan, along with the JP 3-11 series and JP 3-40, provide adequate baseline doctrine and TTPs for strategic national CBRND planning.

⁸ Yes.

⁹ Limited. There are some Senior Service College tabletop exercises that provide feedback on efficacy of plans and policy. (e.g., Solo Challenge, Joint Land, Aerospace and Sea

Simulation [JLASS]).

¹⁰ In the far term, the success of initiatives recommended by this JCIDS and DOTMLPF enhancements across the board, made possible by focused experimentation and lessons

learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green” rating.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.8.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.8.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: Current plans do not adequately address global CBRN restoration operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop plans that adequately address global restoration

operations. Considerations must include operations, logistics, medical, economic,

infrastructure, the use of nongovernmental organizations, and displaced population

relocation.

Deficiency: Not enough plans address global CBRND operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop plans that refine global CBRND and restoration

operations. Include TIM hazards, radiological hazards, novel and third-generation CB

hazards, protection, and decontamination.

Deficiency: Not all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is currently

included in strategy, plans, and policy.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Upon publication and approval of UJTL 5.0, review and

integrate the Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain domains into strategy, plans, and policy.

Deficiency: Not all CBRN scenarios and contingencies can be envisioned in the planning

process.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Employ CBRN Red Teaming in the plan development

process.

Deficiency: JPME does not adequately cover the art of strategic planning for CBRN issues.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop JPME that more adequately covers the art of

strategic planning for CBRN issues.

Deficiency: JRO-CBRND is not optimally placed within the Joint staff.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Organization: Given the unique JRO-CBRND charter for CBRN

defense, consider its optimal positioning within the Joint Staff. It is now imbedded within the

J-8 but has much broader responsibilities. Access is hampered by geographic positioning

outside of the Pentagon. Given the enormous military responsibilities (the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues),

consider the resourcing of the office and rank-structure and staffing of personnel. There is no

cooperative linkage with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Consider the

analogy of the J-2/DIA relationship. The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is a

unique organization, in that it is both a major component of the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA, a combat support agency) and a fully integrated element of the Joint Staff. Analysis of

establishing a similar arrangement with DTRA should be conducted. Consideration should be

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.9

Task SNSHA 9: Coordinate CBRND aspects of global medical operations

6.9.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.9.1.1

Definition

To coordinate CBRND aspects of global medical operations. Sets standards for personnel health

and fitness required for potential exposure to CBRN/TIM conditions. Provides guidance for the

conduct of medical CBRN/TIM health assessments. Establishes threshold criteria for medical

CBRN/TIM health assessments, which determine deployment eligibilities for sustained

operations in a CBRN/TIM threat environment. Includes the coordination of medical

surveillance across the joint force for indications of CBRN/TIM attack or release.

6.9.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.5.1, SN 3.3.6, SN 3.4.4, SN 4.3.3, SN 4.3.4, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2,

SN 5.1.3, SN 7.5, SN 9, SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2, SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2), Transformation Planning

Guidance.

6.9.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.9.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 2, SNSHA 4, SNSHA 8, SNSHA 10, SNSUST 7

6.9.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 7

6.9.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. Fair personnel nutrition and health. (C2.2.4.1)

3. Limited personnel experience. (C2.2.4.5)

4. Limited staff experience. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Uncertain international organization support. (C3.1.2.5)

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.9.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.9.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.9-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Staffs Logistics Directorate (J-4) is responsible for medical response to WMD and

nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare; consequence management; environmental health and

surveillance; interagency medical support; preventive medicine; medical information

management/information technology; and patient evacuation (DODD 6000.12).

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No foreseeable changes in capability.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No foreseeable changes in capability.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.9-1. SNSHA 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Staffs Logistics Directorate (J-4)

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

G⁵

G⁶

G⁷

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Standards for joint force health and fitness that contribute to CBRND are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Medical health assessment guidance adequately addresses personnel readiness for sustained CBRN

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations.

Medical surveillance and intelligence information are collected and analyzed.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Non-DoD sources are assessed for information.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

A global system for tracking the status of CBRND medical information exists.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Global medical threats are identified and appropriate countermeasures are instituted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Yes. There is sufficient DOTLPF to accomplish this task.

² Yes. DODD 6000.12 provides guidance for standards for joint force health and fitness.

³ Yes. DODD 6205 provides guidance for medical health assessment for personnel readiness.

⁴ Yes. DODD 6420.1 and JP 4-02 provide guidance for medical surveillance and intelligence collection and analysis.

⁵ Yes. JP 4-02 directs coordination with non-DoD medical sources.

⁶ Yes. DODD 6205 and DODD 6000.12 provide guidance for the tracking of CBRN medical information.

⁷ Yes. DODD 6420.1 and JP 4-02 provide procedures for the identification of global medical threats through surveillance and intelligence activities. Medical authority recommends

and institutes appropriate medical countermeasures based on identified threats.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.10 Task SNSHA 10: Coordinate global CBRND operations

6.10.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.10.1.1

Definition

To provide overall coordination of global CBRND operations. Multiple CBRN/TIM events could

occur in the same time frame around the globe. Rapid and effective response and mitigation

coordination is required. CBRN/TIM event information provided in the COP is used to formulate

appropriate actions and taskings. Includes the allocation and reallocation of CBRND resources to

the combatant commanders. Includes overall coordination of multitheater restoration and

elimination operations.

6.10.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 1.1.6, SN 2.2.1, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 3.4.4, SN 3.4.6, SN 4, SN 5.1.1, SN 5.1.2, SN 5.1.3, SN

5.7.1, SN 6.1, SN 7.4, SN 7.5, SN 8.1.6, SN 9, SN 9.1.3, SN 9.2, SN 9.2.1, SN 9.2.2), Protection

Joint Functional Concept, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Transformation

Planning Guidance, An Operational Concept for Biological Defense, Joint Enabling Concept for

CBRN Operations.

6.10.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.10.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 4, SNSHA 8, SNSHA 9, SNSUST 8, SNSUST 12

6.10.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 8

6.10.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Restrictive mission instructions. (C2.1.1)

2. No or partial preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

3. No mission preparation. (C2.1.3)

4. Poor or partial Joint Staff integration. (C2.3.1.1)

5. Poor multinational integration. (C2.3.1.2)

6. Limited staff experience. (C2.3.1.3)

Civil

1. Uncooperative interdepartmental/interagency relationships. (C3.1.1.3)

2. Indifferent international politics. (C3.1.2)

3. Restrictive to vague command decisions. (C3.1.3)

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.10.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.10.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.10-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task to the established

standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J3) has primary responsibility for this task. The primary

reasons why some standards were rated as deficient and limited in capability generally centered

on JPME and CBRN specialists. JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of CBRNE tasks

for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels. CBRN specialists do not receive

training as strategic planners. Also, allocation adequacy for CBRN units, personnel and CBRND

systems was considered less than fully capable. The overall current capability is assessed as

“yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. As UJTL 5.0 comes into

common usage and JRO initiatives to educate senior leaders becomes more widespread, Sense,

Shape, Shield, and Sustain considerations will start to be integrated into all areas. DOTMLPF

should begin to improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from

focused experimentation.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. In the far term, the success of

initiatives recommended by this JCIDS and DOTMLPF enhancements across the board, made

possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises, will improve all

measures to a “green” rating.

For Official Use Only

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.10-1. SNSHA 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

R⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁹

Y¹⁰

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹¹

FAA Measure

Scale

CBRND units and personnel are adequately allocated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRND systems and equipment are adequately allocated.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is considered.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Coordination for CBRND operations includes transport, logistics, communications, and employment considerations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Doctrine and TTPs for global CBRND coordination are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

DoD and Joint Staffs are adequately trained to effectively coordinate CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

International/joint exercises or experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of coordination of global CBRND

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations.

¹ No. JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of CBRNE tasks for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels. CBRN specialists do not receive training as strategic

planners.

² Limited. CBRND units and personnel are insufficient for multitheater CBRN events and subsequent restoration operations in the event interdiction should fail against multiple

adversaries with CBRN capability. Otherwise, current allocation within the force structure constraints is appropriate.

³ Limited. Current CBRND end-item systems are scarce assets. CBRND resources, especially detection and force protection systems, must be focused on most critical assets.

⁴ No. All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is not considered. UJTL 4.7 does not establish Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain as critical domains. However,.

UJTL 5.0 will establish them.

⁵ Limited. CJCS J-3 can establish coordination; however, given the fluid nature of current and future military engagement areas, precise and finite coordination must await

execution orders.

⁶ Limited. TIMs are not adequately addressed at the strategic national level. Joint Publication 3 Series (Operations) addresses CBRN coordination considerations.

⁷ Limited. The Joint Senior Leaders Course provides a limited orientation at the strategic theater and operational levels. However, JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of

CBRNE tasks for mastery at the mid and Senior Service College levels.

⁸ Limited. Coordination of global CBRN/TIM defense operations at the strategic national level is limited to national policy, deterrence, interdiction, and elimination. CBRN/TIM

defense operations occur at the strategic theater level and below.

⁹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹⁰ As UJTL 5.0 comes into common usage, and JRO initiatives to educate senior leaders becomes more widespread, Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain considerations will start to

be integrated into all areas.

¹¹ In the far term, the success of initiatives recommended by this JCIDS and DOTMLPF enhancements across the board, made possible by focused experimentation and lessons

learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green” rating.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.10.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.10.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: Given multiple CBRN capable adversaries, CBRND units and personnel are

insufficient for multitheater CBRN events and subsequent restoration operations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Given the intensive requirements for reconnaissance and

decontamination in a CBRN environment, reevaluate allocation rules for CBRND units.

Personnel: Given the intensive requirements for information management, reconnaissance

and decontamination in a CBRN environment, reevaluate allocation rules for CBRND

personnel or automated decision aides.

Deficiency: All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is not considered.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: UJTL 5.0 should effectively drive consideration of

Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain domains.

Deficiency: Given the fluid nature of current and future military engagement areas, precise

and finite CBRND logistical and operational coordination must await execution orders.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop staff planning guidance for predictive CBRND

operations and logistics.

Deficiency: Global TIM considerations are not adequately addressed at the strategic national

level.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop a global TIM assessment tool that allows staff

planners predictive capability for TIM hazards.

Deficiency: JPME does not mandate a core minimum set of CBRND tasks for mastery at the

mid and Senior Service College levels.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Conduct front-end analysis and training needs analysis

to develop and implement appropriate instruction at the mid and Senior Service College

level. Once training analysis is complete, resource manpower and time to support resident

instruction and develop distributed training.

Deficiency: Lack of automated CBRN/TIM hazard assessment capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None.

6.10.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.10-2 shows possible materiel approaches that address the remaining materiel

requirements of the DOTMLPF assessment.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.11 Task SNSHA 11: Provide Shape “Global Family of Engagement Plan” policies and

guidelines to combatant commanders

6.11.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.11.1.1

Definition

To formulate policy for Shape “Global Family of Engagement Plans” and to provide this policy,

as well as specific guidelines, to combatant commanders for execution. In conjunction with

interagency partners, CJCS establishes and develops these policy and guidelines. Because the

threat of CBRN/TIM weapons is of concern to all nations and potential allies, offering assistance

in establishing a Shape operational capability through training or equipment can help forge new

friendships and cooperation. Provision of this assistance also will make Shape operational issues

easier to address in remote or austere areas if the host nation has a Shape capability.

6.11.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.2.1, SN 8, SN 7.5, SN 5.4.3), CJCSM 3113.01a.

6.11.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.11.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSENS 15, SNSHA 8, SNSUST 11

6.11.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 9

6.11.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

Civil. N/A

6.11.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.11.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.11-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standards. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The phrase “global family of engagement plan” is used in the Theater Engagement Planning

(TEP) Joint Manual¹ to describe action to develop a process to globally integrate all military

engagement activities. This integration is mandated by Defense Planning Guidance FY 2002-

2007, 6 April 2000. The TEPs from each geographic combatant commander or designated

Executive Agent are integrated into the “Global Family of Engagement Plans.” They are

approved by the CJCS and forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for review.

This process and the review, and any guidance or support to aid the combatant command in the

initial development of the TEP, is a strategic national-level activity. TEP activities, particularly

those dealing with CBRND, should be coordinated and integrated with the Theater Security

Cooperation Plan where appropriate. Because of the requirement to Sense, Shape, Shield, and

Sustain, as embodied in the CBRND Enabling Concept, the process must be accomplished, at a

minimum, with the technical assistance and support of JRO-CBRND. The phrase “Shape Global

Family of Engagement Plans” denotes the integration of Shape CBRND Enabling Concept ideas

into any policies and guidelines that would have an impact on combatant command development

of TEPs. The overall current capability is assessed as “red.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve DoD’s ability to articulate and provide Shape Global Family of Engagement Plans and

to provide policy, as well as specific guidelines, to combatant commanders for execution. The

overall status should improve to “yellow” due to these initiatives but is not anticipated to

improve more than that due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. The overall status is likely to

remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

¹ CJCSM 3113.01a.

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CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.11-1. SNSHA 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: CJCS

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

R³

R⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

Y⁵

FAA Measure

Scale

“Shape” Global Family of Engagement Plan policies and guidelines and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Theater Security Cooperation Plan are established.

Existing policies and guidelines are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Joint exercises and experimentation provide feedback on the efficacy of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

strategic guidance development processes.

¹ No doctrine, i.e., staff guidance or JTTPs, has been established specifically for Shape initiatives.

² No. Although generic guidance exists in CJCSM 3113.01a , the “Global Family of Engagement Plans” does not include Shape

initiatives.

³ There are no polices or guidelines to update.

⁴ Joint exercises focused on restoration operations and the efficacy of Shape Global Family of Engagement Plan policies and

guidelines have not been conducted.

⁵ The overall status should improve to “yellow” due to a multitude of initiatives but is not anticipated to improve more than that

due to the inherent difficulties posed by international relations.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.11.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.11.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: CBRND Shape considerations are not included in the “Global Family of

Engagement Plan.”

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Ensure that “Global Family of Engagement Plan”

policies and guidelines include CBRND Shape considerations.

Deficiency: No exercises focused on CBRND Shape considerations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish working groups to establish policies and

guidelines that include CBRND Shape considerations into TEPs. Training: Develop

exercises that include CBRND Shape considerations and focus on gathering information of

the efficacy of global family of engagement planning. Personnel: Incorporate into Joint

National Training Capability.

Deficiency: No doctrine (i.e., Staff guidance or Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

[JTTPs]) has been established.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish doctrine, i.e. staff guidance/policies (Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual; or

JTTPs). Such policies and guidelines should be included in documents like CJCSM

3113.01A Theater Engagement Planning, Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Staff

Capabilities Plan, and any CBRN-specific publications might provide guidance on CBRND

integration into TEPs.

Deficiency: No training provides feedback.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Develop training on “Global Family of Engagement

Plan” CBRND Shape considerations so that lessons learned can be gathered.

Deficiency: No JPME education on global family of engagement planning, including

CBRND Shape considerations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Leadership: Develop JPME leader education on “Global Family

of Engagement Plan” CBRND Shape considerations. Provide materials to the Joint Forces

Staff College so it can use CBRND Shape considerations as a TEP example.

6.11.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.12 Task SNSHA 12: Establish global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies,

procedures, and networks

6.12.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.12.1.1

Definition

To link global active systems (such as satellite systems) with active and passive sensors

integration into satellite uplinks with an acceptable share-warn software/hardware protocol with

consideration to information classification. Builds a seamless web from the national capabilities

down to individual tactical detectors within the global battlespace to provide a means of

detecting both delivery vehicles and agents.

6.12.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 2.4.2.1, SN 3.5.3.3, SN 3.5.3.5), JP (2-0, 2-02).

6.12.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.12.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 8, SNSHA 14

6.12.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 10

6.12.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Partial preexisting arrangements. (C 2.1.1.2)

Civil

1. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Moderately opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

6.12.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.12.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.12-1 discusses the capability that currently exists to perform the task “Establish global

cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks” to the designated

standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected that will

accomplish this task.

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Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The current capability assessment is “yellow.” There currently are no cooperative linkages

between various global systems capabilities, even though such linkages have been proposed.

Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures and networks have not been

established with all nonadversary nations.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No substantive improvement is

expected over the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. The assessment should remain

at “yellow” in the far term. As cooperative linkages between various systems capabilities are

coordinated and established between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array

radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular embedded detectors with GPS

linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors networked to centralized data

servers, etc.) global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures and networks will be

established in limited fashion. All supporting and required DOTMLPF enhancements will be

initiated, but it will take years of experimentation, international policy debates, and exercises

before full capability is realized.

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.12-1. SNSHA 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Requirements Office for CBRND

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

Y³

Y⁴

R⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability⁸

Y⁹

G¹⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policy is established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection procedures are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection networks are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Policies and procedures have been established with all nonadversary nations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Existing policies and procedures are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

International/joint exercises or experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of coordination of global CBRN/TIM

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

defense operations.

¹ No. Effective organization, training, and doctrine cannot be established because some nonadversary nations are not parties to these proposals.

² There currently are no cooperative linkages between various global systems capabilities, even though such linkages have been proposed. No cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection

policies are required because no linkages currently exist between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors,

vehicular-embedded detectors with GPS linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors networked to centralized data servers, etc.).

³ Limited. Global cooperative detection procedures have been proposed.

⁴ Limited. Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection networks are proposed.

⁵ No. Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures and networks have not been established with all nonadversary nations.

⁶ Limited. There is no need to update policies and procedures at present because global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks are only in the

proposal stages.

⁷ Limited. Some exercises (e.g., TOPOFF, Determined Promise) can provide feedback on efficacy of coordination of global CBRN/TIM defense operations. Only real-time

warning in the virtual environment is envisioned as a potential candidate for feedback in international and joint exercises because this task pertains to global cooperative

CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks.

⁸ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁹ As cooperative linkages between various systems capabilities are coordinated and established between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array radars, standoff

motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors with GPS linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors networked to centralized data servers,

etc.) global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures and networks will be established in limited fashion. All supporting and required DOTMLPF enhancements will

be initiated, but it will take years of experimentation, international policy debates, and exercises before full capability is realized.

¹⁰ International and joint exercises will begin to yield effective lessons learned on global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.12.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.12.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: The National Military Command Authority (NMCA) could receive an

inaccurate picture of the CBRN COP.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish JTTPs and international protocols for

cooperative CBRN/TIM detection.

Deficiency: NMCA does not have a real-time view of the CBRN COP.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish JTTPs and international protocols for

cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection networks.

Deficiency: Concepts have not been refined through experimentation.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Concepts must first be developed based on proposed

linkages that will provide effective, integrated CBRN/TIM-detection capabilities. These

concepts must be explored and refined through experimentation and then cooperative

linkages established and tested.

Deficiency: Global cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies, procedures, and networks

have not been established with all nonadversary nations.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish cooperative CBRN/TIM-detection policies and

procedures with nonadversary nations.

Deficiency: Lack of global CBRN/TIM-detection network capabilities.

Non-Materiel Solutions: None.

6.12.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

Table 6.12-2 shows possible materiel approaches that address the remaining materiel

requirements of the DOTMLPF assessment.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.13 Task SNSHA 13: Coordinate internationally accepted standards and procedures for

determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons

6.13.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.13.1.1

Definition

To develop and secure approval of internationally accepted standards and procedures for

determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons. Includes standards and procedures for

determining first use of CBRN/TIM weapons by a nation state or transnational organization and

the means by which verification of attack will be confirmed. Considers information

classification.

6.13.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 7.5, SN 8.1.12)

6.13.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.13.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 4, SNSHA 8, SNSHA 14

6.13.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 11

6.13.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. No preexisting arrangements. (C 2.1.1.2)

2. Limited personnel expertise. (C2.2.4.5)

3. Restricted information exchange. (C2.3.1.8)

4. Ambiguous threat. (C2.9.3)

Civil

1. Mixed support for political policies. (C3.1)

2. Limited foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3.)

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.13.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.13.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.13-1 discusses the capabilities that currently exist to perform the task to the established

standards. These are the only capabilities that exist, and no other capabilities are projected that

will accomplish this task.

Current Capability and Deficiency

OSD and the CJCS are responsible for ensuring that military representatives are able to

coordinate with allies, allied military organizations, potential hosting nations, and coalition

partners for establishing internationally accepted standards and procedures for determining

employment of CBRN/TIM weapons. The capability to establish internationally accepted

standards and procedures for determining employment of CBRN/TIM weapons exists now

administratively. Mechanisms currently used are NATO working groups that develop

Standardization Agreements and Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) as well as ABCA Quadripartite

working groups. The current assessment is “yellow” because each nation in the international

community has its own verification protocol. Also, use of TIM poses special problems in trying

to determine whether it is an accident or an intentional attack. International recognition would

have to currently be sought on an ad hoc basis. International exercises, even with Quadripartite

and NATO partners, seldom use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios or highlight verification exercise

objectives.

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. No substantive improvement is

expected in the near/mid term.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. In the far term, international

exercises/experiments, with NATO partners, will use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios and

highlight verification exercise objectives and will result in some slight improvements. Only after

lessons are learned from these exercises/experiments can progress be made in other areas. The

far-term capability will improve to “green.”

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Table 6.13-1. SNSHA 13: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability/Measure

Current

ABCA Quadripartite Working Group

Y¹

G²

Y³

NATO Working Groups

Y⁴

G⁵

Y⁶

Near/Mid

ABCA Quadripartite Working Group

NATO Working Groups

Far

ABCA Quadripartite Working Group

G⁷

NATO Working Groups

G⁸

Current Overall Capability

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Far-Term Overall Capability

FAA Measure

Scale

Internationally accepted standards and policy for determining

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

employment of CBRN/TIM weapons are established.

Existing standards and policies are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

International exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

standards and policy.

¹ Within the Quadripartite, QSTAG 1999, the sampling and identification of biological and chemical agents (SIBCA), provides

an outline of what is to be accomplished—but each nation has its own national verification protocol. Also, use of TIM poses

special problems in trying to determine whether it is an accident or an intentional attack. International recognition would have to

currently be sought on an ad hoc basis.

² Quadripartite groups meet on a regular basis.

³ International exercises, even with Quadripartite and NATO partners, seldom use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios or highlight

verification exercise objectives.

⁴ Within NATO, STANAG 4359, the sampling and identification of biological and chemical agents and provides an outline of

what is to be accomplished, but each nation has its own national verification protocol. Also, use of TIM poses special problems in

trying to determine whether it is an accident or an intentional attack. International recognition would have to currently be sought

on an ad hoc basis.

⁵ NATO working groups meet on a regular basis.

⁶ International exercises, even with Quadripartite and NATO partners, seldom use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios or highlight

verification exercise objectives.

⁷ International exercises, with Quadripartite partners, will use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios and highlight verification exercise

objectives. Only after lessons are learned from these exercises can progress be made in other areas.

⁸ International exercises, with NATO partners, will use realistic CBRN/TIM scenarios and highlight verification exercise

objectives. Only after lessons are learned from these exercises can progress be made in other areas.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.13.3

Functional Solution Analysis

6.13.3.1

DOTLPF Assessment Summary

This section addresses the deficiencies and suggests potential non-materiel solutions. If there are

no non-materiel solutions, or they are only partial solutions, the remaining non-materiel need is

then stated. Materiel needs are assessed in the IMA Summary.

Deficiency: Each NATO/Quadripartite nation has its own national verification protocol.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop universally accepted and employed verification

protocols.

Deficiency: Nations not part of NATO or the Quadripartite must agree to use sampling and

identification of biological and chemical agents (SIBCA) or some other arrangement.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Engage nations not part of NATO and the Quadripartite

to establish formal agreements to use sampling and identification of biological and chemical

agents.

Deficiency: TIM poses special problems in trying to determine whether it is an accident or

an intentional attack.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop procedures and protocols for verification of

TIM attacks.

Deficiency: International recognition would have to currently be sought on an ad hoc basis.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Establish international verification standards.

Deficiency: Doctrine and TTPs need to be developed for collaborative verification

procedures.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Doctrine: Develop doctrine and TTPs for collaborative verification

procedures that work for the international community.

Deficiency: There are no international exercises that provide feedback on the processes

employed for determining employment of CBRN weapons and verification procedures.

Non-Materiel Solutions: Training: Ensure development of and participate in international

exercises that will provide feedback on the processes employed for determining employment

of CBRN weapons.

6.13.3.2

IMA Assessment Summary

N/A

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

6.14 Task SNSHA 14: Sense the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components

6.14.1

Functional Area Analysis

6.14.1.1

Definition

To obtain information and data from all sources that determine when a nation state or

transnational organization has initiated the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components to

other countries or transnational organizations. Areas of interest include nation states/

organizations involved and types of CBRN/TIM weapons being exported.

6.14.1.2

Derivation

UJTL (SN 9.1.3, SN 2.4.1.2, SN 8.1.10), JP (2-0, 2-02).

6.14.1.2.1

Supported Task: N/A

6.14.1.2.2

Lateral Tasks: SNSHA 2, SNSHA 12, SNSHA 13

6.14.1.2.3

Supporting Task: STSHA 8

6.14.1.3

Condition

Perform this task under conditions of:

Physical. N/A

Military

1. Negligible intelligence database. (C2.4.2)

2. Negligible theater intelligence access. (C2.4.2)

3. Conventional and terrorist threat form. (C2.9.2)

4. Prehostilities state of conflict. (C2.10.1)

Civil

1. Negative foreign government support. (C3.1.2.3)

2. Aggressively opposed foreign public opinion. (C3.1.2.4)

6.14.2

Functional Needs Analysis

6.14.2.1

Capability and Deficiency Assessment Summary

Table 6.14-1 discusses the only capability that currently exists to perform the task to the

designated standard. There is only one capability that exists, and no other capability is projected

that will accomplish this task.

For Official Use Only

CBRND Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 6. Strategic National Shape Tasks

Current Capability and Deficiency

The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, is responsible for working with national-level

organizations to obtain intelligence that is required to support joint operations. In the case of this

task, the lead federal agency for nonproliferation issues and the coordination of the associated

intelligence initiatives is the State Department. Per joint intelligence doctrine, the J-2 is

responsible for coordinating all intelligence-related CBRN functions pertaining to adversary

employment of CBRN weapons with the appropriate CBRN staff element, but because of

documented training, education, and experience issues, J-2 personnel may not have a full grasp

of what needs to be coordinated. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s single source of

expertise in addressing CBRN defense issues involving the warfight, JRO-CBRND must

proactively engage the J-2 to determine the adequacy of current and projected national-level

intelligence capabilities to sense the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components. For the

purposes of this analysis, current capabilities are listed and issues that need to be further assessed

and clarified are provided for JRO-CBRND action. The current assessment is “yellow.”

Projected Near/Mid-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the near/mid term. Near/mid-term experimentation

results (as recommended in this JCIDS analysis) may lead to development of new capabilities. It

is projected that improvements due to coordination/DOTMLPF enhancements will dramatically

improve DoD’s ability to articulate and assess Sense requirements, but the overall status will

remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on CBRN/TIM

proliferation activities.

Projected Far-Term Capability and Deficiency

No other capability is currently projected for the far-term future. New organizational structures

or other capabilities resulting from near/mid-term experimentation results (as recommended in

this JCIDS analysis) may dramatically improve DoD’s ability to develop intelligence indicators

for sensing the exportation of CBRN/TIM weapons or components, but the overall status is

projected to remain “yellow” due to the inherent difficulty in gathering intelligence on

CBRN/TIM proliferation activities.

For Official Use Only

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 7