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CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE (CBRND) FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS. FINAL REPORT (2005) - page 9

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.1-1. OPSHA 1: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: JISE

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

R⁵

R⁶

R⁷

G⁸

G⁹

G¹⁰

R¹¹

R¹²

G¹³

G¹⁴

G¹⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹⁶

G

G

G

Y¹⁷

Y¹⁸

Y¹⁹

G

G

G

R

R

G

G

G

Far-Term Overall Capability²⁰

G

G

G

G

G²¹

G²²

G

G

G

R²³

R²⁴

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

CBRND staff cells and units have access to dedicated information technology resources to perform tasks and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

responsibilities.

M2

Means exist to formulate the collection plans for the CBRN/TIM threat.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Means are available to collect operational intelligence on adversaries’ CBRN/TIM activities.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Means exist to collect intelligence on designated theater adversaries.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

JOA CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is current.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

JOA CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is reliable.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

All CBRN/TIM threat priority intelligence requests are covered by a collection plan.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Adequate means are available for CBRN/TIM staff to influence JTF/joint force collection activities.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Multiple sources are integrated and deconflicted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Medical intelligence guidance identifies information requirements and processes.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Medical CBRN/TIM intelligence criteria are established and defined.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

Staff has sufficient training and experience to conduct the threat assessment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M13

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is disseminated in near-real-time.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M14

CBRN/TIM threat intelligence is available to all units in the JOA.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Joint intelligence and CBRN publications do not adequately address this issue. The operational-level CBRN staff is not adequately staffed and organized to interface with the

JISE. The JISE staff is not adequately trained/educated in CBRN issues. CBRN staff officers are not adequately trained/educated in intelligence issues. Experimentation does not

provide feedback on accurate characterization of the threat for this task. JPME does not adequately cover the fusion of intelligence/CBRN issues.

² Yes. The JISE has access to information technology resources that provide COP and access to national-level intelligence means.

³ Yes. The JISE has means to formulate CBRN/TIM collection plans.

⁴ Yes. Limited means are available to collect operational intelligence on adversaries’ CBRN/TIM activities and potential production/storage facilities, as well as international

trafficking in known precursor or dual-use materiel.

⁵ Although the JISE has means available to access collected intelligence on designated theater adversaries through national-level intelligence assets, recent operational experience

in S.W. Asia and congressional investigations have rendered the efficacy of national intelligence collection, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), suspect at best.

⁶ The JISE has means to update the JOA CBRN/TIM threat intelligence picture. However, currency of intelligence is dependent on the acquisition means and methods. HUMINT,

in particular, is dependent on factors that may preclude timely and current information.

⁷ The JISE CBRN/TIM intelligence reliability depends on national-level intelligence accuracy. Any national means relying on HUMINT is dependent on factors that may preclude

obtaining reliable information

⁸ Yes. The JISE has means available to ensure that CBRN/TIM threat priority intelligence requests are covered by a collection plan.

⁹ Limited. The JISE has means available for CBRN/TIM staff to influence JTF/joint force collection activities, but these activities are subject to the commander’s priority list.

Normally, CBRN intelligence ranks very high on this list.

9

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.2-1. OPSHA 2: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: JISE

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

R⁸

R⁹

R¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability¹¹

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

R

R

Far-Term Overall Capability¹²

G¹³

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Guidelines for conducting JOA vulnerability analyses are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Guidelines for conducting JOA risk assessments are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Analytical tools used to evaluate plausible adversaries’ COAs are adequate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Vulnerability assessment process exploits time-sensitive or priority-actionable CBRN/TIM intelligence.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Means are available to collaboratively perform assessments (to have immediate access to appropriate subject matter

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

experts/analysts no matter where they are physically located).

M6

Means exist to visualize the impact of adversaries’ COAs on forces of interest.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively assess adversaries’

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

CBRN/TIM COAs.

M8

Sufficient doctrine and TTPs for effective JOA vulnerability assessment are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on the efficacy of vulnerability assessment doctrine and TTPs.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No. Extremely limited. TTPs for TIM and biological warfare agent vulnerability analysis are very limited.

² Limited. The JISE either has been furnished or has developed vulnerability analysis guidelines. However, such guidelines may not adequately address a JOA-wide TIM concern.

³ Limited. The JISE and operational staff have guidelines for conducting risk assessments. However, joint exercises/experiments need to be broadened to review the adequacy.³

⁴ Limited. The JISE has analytical tools used to evaluate plausible COAs. However, adequacy of these tools depends on adequacy and accuracy of the adversary information

against which they are applied.

⁵ Limited. The JISE has the ability to exploit time-sensitive or priority-actionable intelligence activities. However, joint exercise/experiments and JPME do not adequately address

TIM considerations in the vulnerability assessment process.

⁶ Yes. The JISE has the means to collaboratively perform assessments, to include video teleconferences, phoneconferences, etc.

⁷ Limited. The JISE has means to visualize impact of adversary CBRN employment against forces of interest, but TIM hazards are not necessarily included in this visualization.

⁸ No. The JISE is the operational and analytical/planning augmentation staff to the J-2. By definition, this element has the training and experience to assess adversary COAs.

However, CBRN/TIM COA analysis is highly subjective, particularly with regard to enemy employment intent and capability in light of interdiction operations.

⁹ No. The JISE has doctrine and TTPs to conduct vulnerability assessments. However, assuming JOA TIM considerations are included in the vulnerability assessment, the JISE

must decide which safety standards apply. OSHA chemical permissible exposure guidelines are much more restrictive than those of other nations.

¹⁰ No. While joint exercises/experimentation can provide feedback on the vulnerability analysis process, TIM vulnerability analysis remains problematic.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹² Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

¹³ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green”

rating.

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For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.3-1. OPSHA 3: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Joint Force)

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

G⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

G

G

G

Y

Y

G

G

G

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability¹¹

G

G

G

G¹²

G¹³

G

G

G

G¹⁴

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

CBRND staff cells have the ability to influence the flow of resources to the JTF/JOA.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Means exist to adjust the flow of resources to the JTF/JOA based on CBRND considerations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Planning staffs have the training and experience to determine required adjustments to resources based on CBRND

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

considerations.

M4

Tools and processes are available to manage CBRND personnel and units.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Tools and processes are available to manage CBRND materiel resources.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

CBRND logistics tracking system is sufficient.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Appropriate CBRND logistics management processes are in place.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Analytical tools are used to assess logistical demand.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain factors are considered.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. Doctrine, TTPs, and organizational structures exist to manage materiel. CBRN-specific materiel and resources are not managed as a separate class of supply.

² Yes. CBRND staff cells have the ability to influence the flow of resources to the JTF/JOA through multiple operations and logistics channels.

³ Yes. CBRN considerations can be applied to adjust the priority, sequencing, and flow of resources.

⁴ Yes. Operational and logistics planning staffs are trained to determine adjustments to resources based on a number of conditions. CBRN is just one of those conditions.

⁵ Limited. Processes are available to manage CBRN personnel and units, however not all tools have real-time capability.

⁶ Limited. Tools and processes to manage materiel resources exist. CBRN materiel and resources are not handled as a separate DoD class of supply. There are no JTTPs that

specifically address management of joint CBRND materiel resources.

⁷ Yes. Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency has developed the Intelligent Road and Rail Information Server to track the real-time and near-

real-time locations of any military shipments moving over land or water. The server is currently capable of accomplishing this anywhere in the world for all types of freight.

Inventory information will be limited from a joint perspective, until the Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) program is fully functional.

⁸ Yes. Automated systems to manage requisition, location (depot to DLA), shipment, inventory management, and unit-level receipt are in place.

⁹ Limited. Demand data are tracked by Line Item Number and Unit Identifier Code and can be programmed to highlight critical command-supported items. Limited tools exist to

automatically determine CBRND resources needed based on a wide variety of scenarios and enemy COAs.

¹⁰ Limited. Aggressive application of active defensive, interdiction, and elimination measures could mitigate the requirement for a burgeoning surge demand and capability for

CBRND resources.

¹¹ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

¹² Processes available to manage CBRN personnel and units, will have real-time capability.

¹³ JTTPs that specifically address management of joint CBRND materiel resources will be developed.

¹⁴ Aggressive application of active defensive, interdiction, and elimination measures will mitigate the requirement for a burgeoning surge demand and capability for CBRND

resources.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.4-1. OPSHA 4: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁴

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Tools and processes are available to evaluate and assess CBRND capability in theater.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Units and HQ staffs are routinely evaluated and assessed in performing CBRND tasks.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

CBRND systems and concepts, both current and projected, are assessed and evaluated under realistic conditions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

CBRND operations are exercised with coalition partners.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

CBRND staff cells and units have access to dedicated information technology to support training.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

HQ/unit exercises are conducted under simulated CBRN/TIM conditions.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

Adequate training tools are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

CBRND specialists/staffs are trained to perform required CBRND tasks.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Forces/staffs of other nations are trained in CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

CBRND staff cells conduct training and rehearsals.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

An accessible, digital information repository system is available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

Information repository is available to all operating forces.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ There are few training events that specifically address training forces/staffs of other nations for anticipated CBRND operations.

² Limited. Staff has tools and processes to evaluate and assess CBRND capabilities in theater. However, the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs that specifically

addresses tools and processes to evaluate and assess joint CBRND capability.

³ Limited. Any joint force staff can routinely evaluate and assess CBRND tasks, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs and familiarization training that

specifically addresses evaluating and assessing joint CBRND tasks.

⁴ Limited. Any joint force staff can assess and evaluate systems under realistic conditions, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs or familiarization training

that specifically address assessing joint CBRND systems and concepts, both current and projected, under realistic conditions.

⁵ Limited. Any joint force staff has the ability to exercise with coalition partners, but there are few exercises that specifically address CBRND operations with coalition partners.

⁶ Limited. Any joint force staff has access to information technology to support training, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs or familiarization training

that specifically address CBRND staff cells and units having access to dedicated information technology to support training.

⁷ Limited. Any joint force staff has the ability to exercise under CBRN/TIM conditions, but there are few exercises that specifically address the full spectrum of CBRN/TIM

conditions.

⁸ Limited. Any joint force staff has the training, but the current system is Service-specific. There are no JTTPs or familiarization training that specifically address joint force

CBRND readiness.

⁹ Limited. Any joint force staff has CBRND specialists/staffs trained to perform CBRND tasks, but there are few JTTPs and familiarization training that specifically address the

CBRND specialists/staff task on joint force CBRND readiness.

¹⁰ Limited. Any joint force staff has the ability to train forces/staffs of other nations, but there are few training events that specifically address training forces/staffs of other nations

for anticipated CBRND operations. Political constraints inhibit training forces/staffs of other nations on CBRN operations.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.5-1. OPSHA 5: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Y¹⁰

Y¹¹

Y¹²

Y¹³

Y¹⁴

Y¹⁵

Y¹⁶

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁷

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Hazards effects models and tools are adequate and available at all appropriate levels for assessment.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

JOA is adequately covered by the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Sensors managed at all echelons are networked to the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Sufficient doctrine and TTPs exist for effective IDN operation.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Joint forces are adequately trained to effectively operate the IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

All operation centers are networked to IDN.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

IDN successfully tracks and monitors the hazard.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Means exist to disseminate routine, essential and critical CBRN/TIM threat intelligence rapidly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Means exist to compile and display information on CBRN/TIM events that occurs throughout the theater.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M10

Means exist to present information on the operational impact of a CBRN/TIM event.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M11

Coalition and joint CBRND IDNs provide automated warning and reporting.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M12

CBRND information is easily disseminated onto the GIG.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M13

CBRND data and information formats are interoperable across the coalition and interagency.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M14

Required participants are able to exchange information through planning, assessment and management tools.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M15

CBRND information is processed using existing C4ISR assets.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. JWARN doctrine (TTPs) and training are being developed as the different modules and blocks are being fielded.

² Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA to make assessment and decision making based on the hazards effects.

³ Limited. JWARN is not yet able within the JOA to interface with the GCCS.

⁴ Limited. JWARN is not yet able within the JOA to interface with the GCCS.

⁵ Limited. JWARN doctrine and TTPs are being developed as the different modules and blocks are being fielded.

⁶ Limited. JWARN training is being conducted (new equipment training) and developed as the different modules and blocks are being fielded.

⁷ Limited. JWARN is not yet able within the JOA to interface with the GCCS.

⁸ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and can successfully track and monitor the hazard.

⁹ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and can disseminate routine, essential, and critical CBRN threat intelligence rapidly but is not yet integrated into GCCS.

¹⁰ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and can compile and display information on CBRN events that occurs throughout the theater.

¹¹ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and to present information on the operational impact of a CBRN event.

¹² Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and can provide automated warning and reporting to the coalition and joint forces.

¹³ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA but only interfaces with the GCCS, manually.

¹⁴ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and allows CBRND data and information formats to be interoperable across the coalition and interagency environment.

¹⁵ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and is able to exchange information through planning, assessment, and management tools.

¹⁶ Limited. JWARN is available within the JOA and CBRND information is manually processed using existing C4ISR assets.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.6-1. OPSHA 6: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

G⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁹

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Process exists to formulate CBRND planning guidance.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Plans address all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield and Sustain issues.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Doctrine and TTPs are sufficient for effective CBRND planning.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M5

Standing plans are adaptable to dynamically changing CBRND situations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for restoration

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

operations.

M7

Operational and analytical/planning staffs have the training and experience to effectively plan for interdiction or

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

elimination operations.

¹ Limited. Institutional training for planning staffs is available. Institutional training that is focused on planning for restoration operations and CBRN consequence management is

limited.

² Limited. Any joint force staff has the ability to formulate planning guidance, but there are few JTTPs and education and training that specifically address formulating CBRND

planning guidance.

³ Limited. Any joint force staff has the training and experience to plan operations, but there are few JTTPs and education and training that specifically address CBRND operations.

⁴ Limited. Any joint force staff has the ability to develop plans, but there are few JTTPs that specifically address the process to select all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and

Sustain issues.

⁵ Limited. There is doctrine and JTTPs that specifically addresses JTF/JOA CBRND planning, but given the broad range of CBRN/TIM threats worldwide, each SFJHQ still needs

to develop its own TTPs for CBRN planning.

⁶ Yes. Standing plans are adaptable to dynamically changing CBRN situations.

⁷ Limited. Any joint force operational and analytical/planning staff has the training and experience to effectively plan, but there are few JTTPs and courses that specifically address

restoration operations.

⁸ Limited. Any joint force operational and analytical/planning staff has the training and experience to effectively plan, but there are few JTTPs and courses that specifically address

interdiction/elimination operations.

⁹ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green”

rating.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.7-1. OPSHA 7: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

Current Overall Capability¹

G²

G³

G⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

G⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

G¹⁰

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

G

G

G

Y

Y

G

Y

Y

G

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹¹

G

G

G

G¹²

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Personnel are screened for deployment eligibility.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Medical records are assessed for medical indicators.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Standards for personnel health and fitness are effective for potential CBRN/TIM environments.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Casualties (U.S., host nation, and third-country nationals), both human and MWA, restricted by medical/veterinary

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

isolation/quarantine are identified.

M5

System for tracking the status of CBRN medical information exists.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

JOA medical threats are identified and appropriate counter-measures are instituted.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

CBRND health risk assessment estimate is available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Units potentially or actually exposed/contaminated by CBRN/TIM or ROTA events are identified and tracked.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M9

Non-DoD sources are accessed for information.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. There are limited JTTPs to specifically address this task.

² Yes. Personnel are screened before deployment.

³ Yes. Most joint force medical staffs can sufficiently assess records.

⁴ Yes. DoD-wide standards for general military personnel health and fitness are well documented and sustained, but medical linkage to health criteria for CBRN should be developed.

⁵ Limited. Most joint force medical/veterinary personnel are proficient at quarantine protocol. However, coordination across the joint services medical community (as well as host

nations/coalition partners) for identifying, screening, isolating, and quarantining infected personnel should be improved, including the use of automated disease outbreak tracking

systems. These systems should be fed into the J-2, CBRN, and preventive-medicine experts to provide population indicators of biological weapons use in AOR.

⁶ Limited. The capability to track chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive medical information is only as good as the capability to track deployed

medical personnel information, which is a work in progress, but is far from being solved.

⁷ Yes. National medical assets can identify potential medical threats and institute limited medical countermeasures.

⁸ Limited. TIMs health risk assessment requires a broad analysis of chemical and toxic material production/storing capabilities in the area of operations. A database of global to

local TIM hazards does not currently exist. However, expertise can be made available to the joint force to conduct a health risk assessment based on regional hazards.

⁹ Limited. Most joint force staffs can track adequately those units actually or potentially exposed to CBRN/TIM. However, real-time/near-real-time understanding of the

geographical location of units on the battlefield, tied to automated plume prediction technology, is necessary.

¹⁰ Yes. Reachback capabilities exist for multiple medical need analyses.

¹¹ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green” rating.

¹² When the Theater Medical Information Program and Common Hardware/Software II are deployed and other information systems are integrated with these systems, the “green” rating for

this measure will be justified.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.8-1. OPSHA 8: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Y⁶

Y⁷

Y⁸

Y⁹

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G¹⁰

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Required CBRND units and personnel are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Required CBRND systems and equipment are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

All pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain information is considered.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Coordination of CBRND operations includes transport, logistics, communications, and CBRND unit employment

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

considerations.

M5

Doctrine and TTPs for JOA CBRND coordination are available.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

JTF/JOA staffs are adequately trained to effectively coordinate CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M7

JTF/JOA exercises or experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of coordination of JOA CBRND operations.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M8

Exercise comments are incorporated into coordinated doctrine and TTPs.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ Limited. Doctrine is based on theoretical rather than practical experience.

² Limited. joint force has the ability to determine the requirements of units and personnel to support CBRN operations. Sourcing those requirements is a TPFDD issue and is

adjusted based on capability needs. The CBRN staff provides input, but does not develop the TPFDD.

³ Limited. joint force has the ability to determine the requirement of CBRN systems and equipment to support CBRN operations. Availability of required CBRND systems and

equipment is a logistics issue and must be tracked from depot to end user. This tracking is a materiel management issue requiring designation and highlighting reportable end

items, durable, and expendable items that are critical for sourcing a CBRND capability. Asset visibility within DoD normally is limited to end items and some durables. A system

to track all CBRND-specific materiel may be required.

⁴ Limited. joint force has the ability to address all pertinent Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain issues, but until UJTL 5.0 takes effect, the Sense, Shape, Shield, Sustain domains

may not be recognized by the joint force.

⁵ Limited. joint force has the ability to coordinate CBRND operations. This coordination includes transport, logistics, communications, and CBRND unit employment

considerations, but planning factors for logistics and transportation may not support real-world requirements following a CBRN event. Therefore, the three capabilities listed in

the capabilities statement are sequential.

⁶ Limited. joint force has the ability to follow doctrine and TTPs for JOA CBRND coordination. There are limited joint exercises/experiments that address CBRN coordination

within a JOA. Limited exercises produce few lessons learned. Few lessons learned result in incomplete or hypothetical doctrine and TTPs.

⁷ Limited. Staff who maintain CBRND specializations can assist in planning and executing CBRND operations. However, these specialists are limited in number and depth.

⁸ Limited. Joint exercises/ experiments are limited in number and scope. Feedback from these CBRND exercises/experiments are limited to the data have been captured. Without

an effective data capture instrument, efficacy of JOA CBRND operations coordination is questionable.

⁹ Limited. Comments incorporated into doctrine and TTPs are restricted to those which have been captured and entered into JULLS.

¹⁰ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a

“green” rating.

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CBRN Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solution Analysis

Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.9-1. OPSHA 9: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level HQ

M1

M2

M3

M4

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

G³

R⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁶

R

G

R

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability⁷

G⁸

G

G⁹

G¹⁰

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

Shape country assistance teams are properly manned, trained, and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

equipped.

M2

Valid requests for Shape security assistance are met.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

Procedures and checklists are developed to facilitate the ability to provide

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

Shape country assistance teams to support TEPs.

M4

Joint exercises provide feedback on Shape country assistance teams.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

¹ No specific doctrine has been developed.

The linkage of Shape and Shape country assistance teams is not integrated into leader education. This task is not a standard part

of training.

² No. While any joint force staff can train and equip a country assistance team, none have ever been established. There has been

no training or equipment developed that specifically addresses the training and equipment requirements for a Shape country

assistance team.

³ Yes. Any joint force staff can process and honor requests for a country assistance team. There is currently no experience base,

however.

⁴ No. Any joint force staff can develop procedures and checklist for a country assistance team, but there are no TTPs that

addresses a Shape country assistance team support to TEPs.

⁵ Limited. Few if any restoration exercises or experiments focused on Shape country assistance teams have been conducted.

⁶ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁷ Continued DOTMLPF enhancements will result from exercise and wargame lessons learned.

⁸ Steps will be taken to establish and equip country assistance teams.

⁹ JTTPs that addresses a Shape country assistance team support to TEPs will be developed.

¹⁰ Restoration exercises and experiments focused on Shape country assistance teams will be conducted.

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Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.10-1. OPSHA 10: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: JISE

M1

M2

M3

M4

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Y⁵

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁶

Y

Y

Y

Y

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁷

G

G

G⁸

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

CBRN/TIM weapon capabilities in JOA are detected and identified.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

Intelligence on enemy CBRN/TIM weapon systems is accurate.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

CBRN/TIM weapons information is provided to the combatant

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

commander.

M4

Fidelity of information on CBRN/TIM agents and delivery means is

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

assured.

¹ This task is not integrated into experimentation and exercises. Red teaming is not adequately employed to expose

methodologies and assessments to scrutiny and alternate analysis.

² The JISE has a dedicated Terrorism/CBRN Analysis cell but is dependent on the completeness and thoroughness of the CBRN

and intelligence and exploitation data it receives.

³ The JISE has a dedicated Terrorism/CBRN Analysis cell but is dependent on the accuracy of the intelligence and exploitation

data it receives.

⁴ Nothing precludes providing CBRN weapons information to the combatant commander. Proper techniques for setting forth the

JISE’s findings in such a way as to make clear to the combatant commander what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned

judgment (and within the realm of the judgments what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key assessment) are not

available.

⁵ In the event of terrorist possession of or use of CBRN, it may be difficult or impossible to have absolute assurance about

fidelity of information concerning weapons systems or the attack. In the case of a biological attack or attacks involving TIM, it

may be difficult to determine whether it is a natural disease outbreak or an accident. In the event of use not involving U.S.

forces or allies, it may be difficult to assess fidelity of required information due to information access constraints. Techniques

and procedures to facilitate this fidelity assurance process when it involves terrorists or non-U.S. allies and to detect or identify

attacks may not be adequate. Methods and procedures for accurately reporting CBRN attacks against U.S. forces are mature and

effective, but methods and procedures for accurately reporting third-party, terrorist, and TIM attacks may not be adequate.

⁶ DOTLMPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁷ In the far term, the success of intelligence initiatives and DOTLMPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused

experimentation and lessons learned from exercises will improve all measures to a “green” rating.

⁸ In the far term, the success of intelligence and international cooperation initiatives and DOTLMPF enhancements across the

board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from operations/exercises should improve CBRN/TIM

agent and delivery means information fidelity assurance to a “green” rating.

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Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.11-1. OPSHA 11: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Joint Force

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

Current Overall Capability¹

R²

R³

R⁴

R⁵

G⁶

R⁷

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability

R

R

R

R

G

R

Far-Term Overall Capability

Y⁸

Y

Y

Y

G

Y

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection policy is established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M2

JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection procedures are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M3

JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection networks are established.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M4

Policies and procedures have been established with component

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

commands.

M5

Existing policies and procedures are updated regularly.

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

M6

Joint exercises/experimentation provide feedback on efficacy of

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

policies and procedures.

¹ Limited. Conceivably, any joint force could incorporate cooperatively linked detection technologies; however, the capability

does not currently exist, therefore, effective DOTMLPF is irrelevant.

² A joint force has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM detection policies within the JOA. However, cooperative linkages between

various systems capabilities, although proposed, have not yet been coordinated. Since no linkages currently exist between various

detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array radars, standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded

detectors with GPS linkages and automatic position reporting, individual detectors networked to centralized data servers, etc.), no

JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection policies are required.

³ Any joint force CBRN cell has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM detection procedures within the JOA. However, distributed,

cooperative CBRN/TIM detection capabilities do not currently exist, and JOA cooperative CBRN detection procedures are not

established.

⁴ Any joint force communications cell has the ability to establish networks within the JOA. However, cooperative linkages

between various system capabilities do not currently exist; therefore, cooperative CBRN/TIM detection networks need not be

established.

⁵ Any joint force has the ability to establish policies and procedures. However, cooperative linkages between various system

capabilities do not exist currently; therefore, policies and procedures need not be established.

⁶ Any joint force has the ability to update policies and procedures regularly.

⁷ Since the capability to establish cooperative linkages between various detection technologies does not currently exist, exercises

and experiments to provide feedback are not yet necessary.

⁸ A joint force has the ability to establish CBRN/TIM detection policies within the JOA. As cooperative linkages between various

systems capabilities are coordinated and established between various detection technologies (e.g., BIDS, phased-array radars,

standoff motion detectors, passive monitors, vehicular-embedded detectors with GPS linkages and automatic position reporting,

individual detectors networked to centralized data servers, etc.), JOA cooperative CBRN/TIM detection policies, procedures, and

networks will be established in limited fashion. All supporting and required DOTMLPF enhancements will be initiated, but it will

take years of experimentation and exercises before full capability is realized.

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Chapter 8. Operational Shape Tasks

Table 8.12-1. OPSHA 12: Capability and Deficiency Assessment

Capability: Operational-Level Unit Staff

M1

M2

M3

Current Overall Capability¹

Y²

Y³

Y⁴

Near/Mid-Term Overall Capability⁵

G

G

G

Far-Term Overall Capability

G⁶

G

G

FAA Measure

Scale

M1

CBRND staff, cells, and units have access to dedicated information

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

technology resources to determine/provide input on operational effects

and impacts due to CBRN/ TIM hazards.

M2

Operations staffs are able to use data developed by CBRND staffs or

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

automated systems/tools to help them determine operational impacts due

to CBRN/TIM hazards.

M3

Means are available to provide determinations of operational effects and

G - Yes, Y - Limited, R - No

impacts due to CBRN/TIM hazards to COA assessments and planners.

¹ No doctrine has been developed. The linkage of CBRN/TIM hazards and operational risk assessment is not integrated into

leader education. This task is not a standard part of exercises or training.

² Any operational-level CBRN staff cell has access to information technology to help determine/provide input on operational

effects and impacts due to CBRN/TIM hazards. There is also a callback capability to DTRA. But there will be no specific tools

until JEM (FY2006) and JEOF (FY2010) are IOC.

³ Any operations staff can use data developed by the CBRN staff, but there will be no specific tools until JEM (FY2006) and

JEOF (FY2010) are IOC.

⁴ Any operational-level staff can develop means (procedures and checklists), but there are no TTPs that specifically and

comprehensively address the impact of CBRN/TIM hazards on operational objectives.

⁵ DOTMLPF should improve in all deficient areas as a result of initiatives that use data resulting from focused experimentation.

⁶ In the far term, DOTMLPF enhancements across the board made possible by focused experimentation and lessons learned from

exercises will continue to improve all measures.

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