F-14D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2004)

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.12.4.3

Runaway Stabilizer Trim

pressure. Failure of the lateral stick stops is indicated by the

HZ TAIL AUTH caution light. Failure of the stops in the fully

A runaway trim failure is sensed by the pilot by both

closed position does limit low−speed rolling performance,

uncommanded stick motion and by changes in aircraft pitch

but ample roll control is available for all landing conditions

and load factor. This failure state causes the horizontal tail to

and configurations. Failure in the open condition, with SAS

move along the normal stick−to−tail gearing curve for the

on, requires the pilot to manually limit stick deflection to

hands−off condition. Aircraft response to a runaway stabilizer

prevent exceeding fuselage torsional load limit.

trim, even in the high−speed configuration, is slow enough

(about 1° per second stabilizer change) to be recovered from

14.12.5.1

HZ TAIL AUTH Light

safely.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton

 Depress

The most critical steady−state trim conditions are those

(10 seconds).

for which the greatest stick force is required. A field or carrier

landing with either a full noseup or nosedown runaway stabiĆ

If light remains illuminated above 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN:

lizer trim requires an average stick force of 14 to 19 pounds

to maintain longitudinal control. If pilot fatigue becomes a

2. ROLL STAB AUG switch  OFF.

factor with full noseup trim, stick forces may be significantly

Note

reduced by placing the wings aft of 21° and lowering the

FLAP handle causing the main flaps to extend while the

ARI/SAS OUT light will illuminate.

auxiliary flaps remain retracted.

3. Restrict lateral control inputs above

400 KIAS/

This overrides the wing sweep 21° interlock and the

0.9 IMN to one−quarter throw.

FLAP light will be illuminated. This configuration is not

recommended for landing. At approach speed, the worst

nosedown trim condition requires a maximum stick pull of

27 pounds without DLC engaged and approximately 24

pounds with DLC engaged. A full noseup runaway trim

requires a maximum of 17 pounds of stick push without DLC

Above 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN there is a danger of

engaged and 23 pounds with DLC engaged.

torsional overstress to the fuselage with large

Note

lateral stick deflections.

With abnormal stabilizer trim response, continuĆ

4. Reduce airspeed and remain below

400 KIAS/

ing to trim may preclude ability to retrim to a

0.9 IMN.

neutral position.

Below 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN:

1. SPD BK/P−ROLL TRIM ENABLE cbPull

(RB2).

5. ROLL STAB AUG switch  ON.

2. Decelerate to below 300 knots.

Note

At low airspeeds, lateral control effectiveness

3. Use DFCS, if available, in cruise configuration to

reduce pilot workload.

may be reduced.

4. Minimum stick forces are achieved under the folĆ

6. Do not select OV SW after landing.

lowing conditions:

14.12.6

Spoiler Malfunction

a. Runaway nosedown  flaps up.

b. Runaway noseup  flaps down.

Spoiler monitoring and fault isolation is internal to the

DFCS. DFCS should recognize and disable any malfunctionĆ

5. Straight−in approach.

ing spoiler and permit other spoilers to operate normally.

DFCS will therefore automatically maintain greater control

Note

authority in event of a spoiler malfunction.

Force required (push or pull) may be as much as

30 pounds.

For malfunctions where failed spoilers are successfully

commanded to trail, straight−in full flap CV approaches can

be accomplished with minor degradation in handling qualiĆ

14.12.5

Horizontal Tail Authority Failure

ties. The control capability remaining with a failed up spoiler

Lateral stick input are limited by control authority

is influenced by flap position, SAS operation, and availabilĆ

stops scheduled by the CADC as a function of dynamic

ity of the remaining spoilers.

CHANGE 1

14−42

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.12.6.1

SPOILERS Caution Light/Spoiler

the critical factor. With flaps down, roll control

Malfunction/Spoiler Stuck Up

using lateral stick alone may be impossible.

However, with flaps up, adequate roll control to

regain wings level flight is available with use of

lateral stick alone. Choice of flap position for

landing and CV recovery/divert decision should

be made following a controllability check.

If the current configuration is acceptable for

landing, careful consideration should be given

4. Perform Controllability Check procedure, paraĆ

before depressing MASTER RESET when a

graph

14.12.1, using maneuvering flap/slat

spoiler actuator mechanical malfunction is susĆ

(preferred) or no flap configuration only.

pected. A deployed spoiler that resulted from

Note

DFCS computers dropping off line is not considĆ

ered a mechanical failure.

If controllability is unsuitable for landing

approach due to a complete loss of spoilers, conĆ

Note

sideration may be given to attempting a Power

D Use lateral stick as primary control and rudder

On Reset (POR) in an attempt to regain at least

only as needed to maintain balanced flight.

one spoiler set. See DFCS POR procedures

paragraph 14.12.6.3.

D Subsequent depression of the MASTER

RESET pushbutton may clear failure until

If controllability satisfactory:

spoiler is commanded to move again.

5. Perform maneuver flap/slat or no flap straight−in

approach at or above minimum control airspeed.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

If controllability still unsatisfactory:

Note

DFCS synchronization can take up to 2 seconds

following a power interrupt. If the MASTER

RESET pushbutton is depressed during the synĆ

chronization time, an additional depression of

With both INBD and OUTBD spoiler control cb’s

the MASTER RESET pushbutton will be

pulled, all opposing spoiler control will be lost.

required to restore spoiler functionality.

If failure remains/reoccurs:

2. Avoid abrupt lateral control movements and high

roll rates.

Marginal control or loss of control may be expeĆ

rienced due to removal of a spoiler set with multiĆ

ple failures present.

Note

With wings forward of 62°, excessive horizontal

If multiple failed up spoiler panels result in unsatĆ

isfactory handling qualities regardless of flap

tail differential may cause severe structural

damage.

position, an attempt may be made to fail the panels

down by removing power via the corresponding

If spoiler(s) fail down:

spoiler control cb’s. This may take as long as 60

seconds, and result in a marginal control situation

3. Perform Controllability Check procedure, paraĆ

graph 14.12.1.

or loss of control situation because power to the

other spoilers has been removed. Therefore, it

If spoiler(s) remain up or floating, or if control

should be considered only as a last resort.

unsatisfactory with flaps down:

5. SPOILER CONTR cb for affected pair Ċ Pull (8G9

Note

for INBD, 9C5 for OUTBD).

Any single, fully deflected, failed up spoiler is

If uncontrollable roll, or no improvement in

controllable even with flaps down and ROLL

controllability:

SAS OFF if the remaining spoilers are operating.

With multiple failures, aircraft configuration is

6. SPOILER CONTR cb (affected spoiler) Ċ Reset.

14−43

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

7. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

2. Evaluate flaps−down lateral control characteristics

Functionality lost from cycling spoiler control cb

at safe altitude.

will not be regained until the MASTER RESET

pushbutton is depressed.

If unacceptable:

8. If Unsuitable for landing, Perform Controlled

3. Make flaps−up landing.

Ejection.

14.12.6.3

DFCS Power On Reset (POR)

If controllability improves:

If controllability is unsuitable for landing approach due

9. Perform straight−in approach in best configuration

to complete loss of spoilers or other major flight control

with cb(s) out.

malfunction, consideration may be given to attempting a

flight control computer reset in an attempt to regain adequate

Note

controllability for landing. A POR will reinitialize the DFCS

computers, interpreting the current sensor information as

D Outboard spoiler position indicators will indiĆ

valid. This can create a potentially hazardous situation under

cate down with cb 9C5 pulled.

conditions where a dual sensor failure occurred prior to

restoring power. When the DFCS reinitializes, it is possible

D With cb’s 8G9 and 9C5 pulled, ground roll

for the failed signals to be interpreted as valid and the remainĆ

braking is not available. Reset on landing rolĆ

ing good signal to be interpreted as invalid. Therefore, careĆ

lout if desired.

ful consideration should be given before executing a POR

airborne, since it can result in erroneous DFCS commanded

14.12.6.2

Outboard Spoiler Module Malfunction

control deflections. Aircrew must be alert for erroneous

uncommanded SAS and/or spoiler control inputs following

an airborne POR.

An outboard spoiler module failure with flaps

extended, below 180 knots, and with a combined

hydraulic failure rendering the inboard spoilers

If a dual failure has been declared that will not

inoperative, can result in asymmetric spoiler

clear with a MASTER RESET, performing a

float such that the aircraft may not be flyable at

power on reset (POR) to clear the failure can

normal approach airspeeds.

result in erroneous uncommanded SAS and/or

spoiler control inputs.

Note

As with any controllability check, a POR should

be performed above 10,000 ft AGL and in the

If outboard spoilers fail with airspeed greater

cruise configuration between 250 and 300 knots

than 225 knots and wing sweep is less than 62°,

if possible to minimize the potential effects of

limit lateral stick to one−half pilot authority.

transient series servo actuator inputs.

1. OUTBD SPOILER PUMP cb  Check (2B3).

1. BOTH SPOILER CONTR cb’s ć Pull (8G9, INBD

a. If OUT  Attempt Reset.

and 9C5, OUTBD).

b. If IN and outboard spoiler module flag indicates

2. PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG switches Ċ

OFF  Pull.

OFF.

3. ROLL A DC, YAW B DC, and YAW A DC cb’s

The following important equipment is inoperative:

(8B4, 8B5, and 8B6) Ċ Cycle (RIO). Observe

PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, FCS CAUĆ

(1) Outboard SPOILERS.

TION, ARI DGR, ARI/SAS OUT, SPOILERS, HZ

(2) FLAP and SLAT BACKUP.

TAIL AUTH, RUDDER AUTH, and AUTOPILOT

caution lights illuminated.

(3) ACL.

ORIGINAL

14−44

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

If no uncommanded ROLL SAS control inputs:

Attempt to reset cb’s 8B4, 8B5, and 8B6 simultaĆ

6. Reset SPOILER CONTR cb’s.

neously to optimize DFCS power−up sequence.

7. Perform Controllability Check procedure.

4. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

14.12.7

FLAP Light

Observe all lights extinguished with the exception of

ARI/SAS OUT light due to ROLL and YAW STAB

14.12.7.1

Not After Landing/Takeoff Flap

switches OFF.

Transition

1. Airspeed  Below 225 Knots.

2. FLAP handle  Ensure Full Up.

D If the system continues to display any DFCS

3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

related caution lights following MASTER

RESET, this could be indicative of a recurring

4. While holding MASTER RESET pushbutton

flight control malfunction.

depressed, maneuver flap thumbwheel

 Full

D If a SPOILERS caution light will not extinĆ

Forward.

guish following the execution of a POR,

5. Check FLAP light out (light can take up to 10 secĆ

selection of ROLL STAB AUG switch ON

onds to reilluminate).

can result in erroneous uncommanded SAS

control inputs.

14.12.7.2

After Landing/Takeoff Flap Transition,

D When attempting to individually reset

or Reillumination After Above

PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG

Procedures

switches, be prepared to isolate the affected

STAB AUG switch OFF if any uncommanded

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

SAS inputs are observed.

2. If light still illuminated, check FLAP handle and

Note

indicator position, then proceed with appropriate

D Minimize control stick inputs during or folĆ

steps below.

lowing MASTER RESET as this can result in

the SPOILERS caution light with SPOILER

14.12.7.3

FLAP Handle Up and Flaps Not Fully

CONTR cb’s pulled.

Retracted

D More than one MASTER RESET may be

1. FLAP handle  EMER UP.

required to extinguish all caution lights.

If FLAP handle or flaps will not respond or FLAP

Individually select PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB

light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat

AUG switches ć ON.

Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.

If any uncommanded SAS control inputs:

14.12.7.4

FLAP Handle Up and Flaps Indicating

Full Up

6. Affected STAB AUG switch ć OFF.

1. Flaps  Cycle.

If FLAP handle or flaps will not respond or FLAP

light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat

Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.

If uncommanded ROLL SAS inputs are observed

following a POR, reselection of the SPOILER

14.12.7.5

FLAP Handle Down and Flaps Not Fully

CONTR cb’s can result in full spoiler deflection

Extended

and an out of control aircraft.

1. Wing sweep  Ensure at 20°.

7. If uncommanded ROLL SAS control inputs, DO

Flaps will not respond or FLAP light remains

NOT reset SPOILER CONTR cb’s.

illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat Asymmetry

8. Perform Controllabilty Check procedure.

procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.

14−45

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.12.7.6

FLAP Handle Down and Flaps Down

1. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb  Check

In (RA2).

2. Wing sweep  Ensure at 20_.

3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress (allow 10

seconds for auxiliary flaps to extend).

Note

Lack of asymmetry protection

(RA2 circuit

breaker out) may cause uncommanded roll

If FLAP handle or flaps will not respond or FLAP

and/or yaw during flap or landing gear handle

light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat

movement.

Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.

2. FLAPS  Match Handle With Flaps Position.

14.12.8

Flap and Slat Asymmetry

3. Obtain visual check if possible to ascertain position

Flap and slat asymmetry can occur with failure of an

of all flap and slat surfaces.

asymmetry sensor and subsequent failure of the flap and slat

drive mechanism for one wing. The pilot’s only indication

4. Slow−fly aircraft in approach configuration at or

will be an uncommanded roll followed by a FLAP light

above 10,000 feet AGL to determine approach charĆ

approximately 10 seconds later. The flap indicator does not

acteristics, conditions permitting.

indicate actual flap position, but the position to which the flap

and slat control box has been driven. The slat indicator shows

5. Land as soon as practicable if aircraft is controllable

up, down, or transition (barber pole) for the starboard slat

and minimum approach airspeed is within shipĆ

only. The port slat position is not monitored. Asymmetric

board arresting gear limits.

flaps cause an immediate roll. Asymmetric slats may not be

apparent until just before wing stall. Asymmetric slats can

If asymmetry is so large as to make landing impossible

cause rapid rolloff above 15 units AOA. Slat position must be

or minimum safe approach speed is above shipboard arrestĆ

monitored by the RIO during transition.

ing gear limits with no possible divert field available:

6. Climb above 10,000 feet AGL.

7. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb  Pull (8G3).

The use of lateral trim to reduce stick force will

reduce spoiler control significantly. An unconĆ

trollable situation can develop if lateral trim is

out of neutral before flap and slat asymmetry or

Failure to complete step 7 before the subsequent

if the pilot trims laterally in the neutral direction

steps can result in large uncommanded pitch trim

(opposite the roll) during flap and slat transition.

changes because of auxiliary flap movement.

This situation will be aggravated and recovery

may not be possible with ROLL SAS OFF

8. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb

 Pull

because of reduced differential tail authority.

(RA2).

Once asymmetry occurs, do not trim out stick

forces. If lateral control is marginal, trim oppoĆ

9. Slowly move FLAP handle in direction to minimize

site to the natural direction until full spoiler

asymmetry and/or lateral control requirements.

deflection is available. For example, stick to the

right, trim left.

10. Stop flap and slat travel before reaching full up or

down.

If a roll is encountered during flap and slat transition or

if RIO notes asymmetric slat extension or retraction:

11. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb  Reset

(RA2).

Note

Uncommanded roll/yaw procedures take preceĆ

dence if appropriate. Otherwise perform the proĆ

cedures below.

ORIGINAL

14−46

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.12.10

Unscheduled Wing Sweep

1. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Raise and

Hold.

Asymmetric slats may not be apparent until just

before wing stall. Asymmetric slats can cause

rapid rolloff above 15 units AOA.

12. If asymmetry has been corrected, land using 15 units

AOA.

Unscheduled wing sweep at supersonic speed

may cause structural damage.

13. If asymmetry has not been corrected, flaps and slats

did not respond to above procedure, or lateral conĆ

2. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.6 TMN or Less in 1g

trol problems exist, land using minimum safe AOA

Nonmaneuvering Flight.

if landing is elected.

3. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Full Forward.

14.12.9

WING SWEEP Lights

If wings do not move full forward:

14.12.9.1

Advisory Light Only − No Loss of

Normal Control

4. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle  Match

With Actual Wing Position.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

5. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP DR

14.12.9.2

WING SWEEP Light and W/S Caution

NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb  Pull (LD1, LE1) (refer

Legend  No Automatic or Manual

to aft wing−sweep landing).

Control

6. Land a soon as practicable.

1. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.9 Mach or Less.

Note

2. Check spider detent engaged.

D After a wing−sweep malfunction, the WING

SWEEP advisory light and the W/S legend

3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress (wait

may take 15 seconds to illuminate/display.

15 seconds to determine system status).

D FLAP light will be illuminated with cb LE1

If WING SWEEP light and W/S caution legend

pulled.

illuminate again:

14.12.11

CADC Light

4. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP DR

NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb  Pull (LD1, LE1).

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

5. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Comply with

2. CADC cb’s (LA2, LB2, LC2, LD2)  Cycle.

below schedule:

3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

≤ 0.4 Mach  20°.

b. ≤ 0.7 Mach  25°.

If light still remains illuminated:

≤ 0.8 Mach  50°.

4. Remain below 1.5 Mach.

d. ≤ 0.9 Mach  60_.

One or more of the following systems may be affected

> 0.9 Mach  68°.

by CADC malfunction that illuminates only the CADC light.

a. Maximum safe Mach.

b. Autopilot.

c. Idle lockup function of AFTC.

Avoid ACM and aerobatics.

14−47

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

d. Wing−sweep indicator.

e. Cockpit cooling less than Mach 0.25.

f. HUD Display.

With RATS enabled airborne, military power

provides 20 to 25 percent less thrust than normal,

Note

resulting in less than optimum waveoff and

bolter performance.

D Erroneous Mach inputs to the AFTC may

cause uncommanded acceleration of both

If two or more of the above anomalies are detected, the

engines to near−military values in the PRI

following action should be taken:

engine mode.

D If illumination of the CADC light is accompaĆ

14.12.13.1

In Flight Ċ Pilot

nied by other caution or advisory light(s),

refer to the appropriate procedure that will

1. Throttles  Any Position Except IDLE.

dictate the most restrictive limitation.

14.12.12

AUTOPILOT Light

5. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

Do not move both throttles to IDLE unless ANTI

SKID SPOILER BK switch is set to OFF if

14.12.13

Weight On−Off Wheels Switch

weight on−off wheels switch is suspected because

Malfunction

of loss of thrust and lift caused by nozzles openĆ

ing and spoilers deploying.

For most systems, failure of both the left and right

WOW switches is required to cause the systems to revert to

2. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch  OFF.

the on−deck mode. Should such failures occur, the following

anomalies can result:

3. Land as soon as practicable.

1. Approach indexers are inoperative.

2. APC will not engage.

3. Outboard spoiler module is inoperative (flaps up).

If weight on−off wheels switch failure is susĆ

pected, cocked up, high sink rate landing with

4. Nozzles may go full open (with LDG GEAR handle

throttles at idle can result in damage to the afterĆ

down, throttles IDLE).

burner.

5. Ground−roll spoiler braking (throttles IDLE).

14.12.13.2

In Flight Ċ RIO

6. Radar will not scan.

1. MLG SAFETY RLY NO. 1 and NO. 2 cb 

Pull (7F5, 7F4).

7. Autopilot cannot be engaged.

Note

8. BOL chaff will not dispense.

D Circuit breakers can be reset after touchdown

9. At high altitude, ground cooling fans may overĆ

to enable ground−roll braking, antiskid,

speed and shut down, causing smoke in cockpit.

nozzles open at idle, and nosewheel steering.

D Circuit breakers must be reset simultaneously

10. RATS will be enabled airborne with the hook handle

(within 0.1 sec) once on deck or a secondary

down or the hook out of the stowed position.

fault may be incurred which will inhibit

ground roll braking.

ORIGINAL

14−48

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.13 DEPARTURE/SPIN

3. If roll and/or yaw develop, wait until aircraft is in a

nosedown attitude and accelerating before correct-

Successful recovery from out−of−control flight requires

ing with rudder or lateral stick.

correct situation analysis, timely and correct application of

4. Use longitudinal control as necessary to keep nose

procedures, crew coordination, and recognition of recovery.

Departure from controlled flight should be recognized and

down and accelerating.

the appropriate recovery procedures initiated as soon as the

5. Above 100 knots, pull out, using 17 units AOA.

aircraft begins uncommanded motion. Throttles should be

immediately placed to IDLE to ensure maximum stall margin

6. Recovery to level flight from point of pitchover can

and prevent asymmetric thrust from delaying recovery. If

normally be completed in less than 10,000 feet.

recovery is not immediately apparent, instrument cues must

be cross−checked. Full departures/spins are indicated by

14.13.2

Upright Departure/Flat Spin

pegged AOA (30 units for upright, 0 units for inverted), low

airspeed (less than 150 knots), and sustained yaw rate as

*1. Stick  Forward/Neutral Lateral

indicated by the turn needle and/or spin arrow. The spin

Harness  Lock

arrow is the best indicator of yaw direction if it is available.

If the above indications are not present, neutralize the con-

*2. Throttles  Both IDLE.

trols and fly the aircraft as airspeed increases. Recovery con-

trols should be applied and maintained until recovery is indi-

*3. Rudder  Rudder−Opposite Turn Needle/Yaw/

cated, minimum altitude reached, or an increase in

Spin Arrow.

eyeball−out g threatens aircrew incapacitation. The most pos-

itive indication of recovery is a break in AOA as yaw rate is

If no recovery:

reduced, followed by an increase in airspeed and g load in the

direction commanded by longitudinal stick. To minimize

*4. Stick  Into Turn Needle.

altitude loss for recovery, pull out at 17 units AOA.

If yaw rate is steady/increasing, spin arrow is flashing, or

Crew coordination is essential. The RIO must be able

eyeball−out g is sensed:

to analyze the situation and provide timely and accurate

information and procedural backup to the pilot without

*5. ROLL SAS  ON

excess communication. The RIO should use airspeed, alti-

Stick  Full Into Turn Needle and Aft.

tude remaining, and the spin arrow as cues. Lateral stick

application can be confirmed by observing spoilers deflected

If recovery is indicated:

up on the wing pointed to by the spin arrow. Ejection in an

out−of−control flight situation can best be accomplished by

*6. Controls  Neutralize.

the RIO after consultation with the pilot. A thorough under-

*7. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as required.

standing of Chapter 11, Flight Characteristics, is required of

the aircrew when dealing with these high task emergencies.

If flat spin verified by flat attitude, increasing yaw rate,

14.13.1

Vertical Recovery

increasing eyeball−out g, and lack of pitch and roll rates:

*8. Canopy  Jettison.

1. Above 100 knots, use longitudinal stick to pitch the

nose down. At extreme nose−high attitudes, aft stick

*9. EJECT  RIO Command Eject.

facilitates recovery time and will avoid prolonged

engine operation with zero oil pressure.

2. Below 100 knots, release controls and wait for air-

craft to pitch nose down. This prevents depletion of

hydraulic pressure in the event both engines are lost

and provides quickest recovery.

Ejection guidelines are not meant to prohibit ear-

lier canopy jettison and/or ejection. If insuffi-

cient altitude exists to recover from departed

flight, the flightcrew should not hesitate to eject.

14−49

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

If recovery is indicated:

*4. Controls  Neutralize.

D At high yaw rates where eyeball−out g is

sensed, aft stick and full lateral stick into the

*5. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as required.

turn needle may arrest the yaw rate and

increase the possibility of recovery. At these

If spinning below 10,000 feet AGL:

yaw rates, the additional differential tail pro-

vided by ROLL SAS ON will also increase the

*6. EJECT  RIO Command Eject.

possibility of recovery.

D It may be necessary to center stick laterally

momentarily to engage ROLL SAS.

14.13.3

Inverted Departure/Spin

Dual compressor stalls may be expected in an

*1. Stick  Full AFT/Neutral Lateral

inverted spin.

Harness  Lock.

Note

*2. Throttles  Both IDLE.

If pedal adjustment and/or pilot positioning

*3. Rudder  Rudder−Opposite Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin

(because of negative g forces) is such that full

Arrow.

rudder pedal travel cannot be obtained, full

lateral control opposite the turn needle/yaw may

provide an alternate recovery method. Aft

longitudinal stick should be relaxed enough to

allow full lateral stick application.

CHANGE 2

14−50

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 15

Landing Emergencies

15.1

DUAL−ENGINE LANDING, ONE OR

degrade waveoff performance. The LSO should move the

BOTH ENGINES IN SECONDARY MODE

waveoff window such that only minor glideslope/lineupĆ

corrections are required from in the middle position.

With either one engine in secondary mode (the other

engine in primary) or both engines in secondary mode, a

straight−in approach should be conducted with slats and flaps

fully extended, 15 units AOA, DLC engaged, and speedĆ

brakes extended. Approaches can be accomplished safely up

to the normal gross weight limits of the aircraft. Throttle

Waveoff performance with both engines in SEC

position in secondary mode will be 5° to 10° higher than in

mode may be severely degraded. Extreme care

primary mode for the same amount of thrust. Thrust response

should be used to avoid an underpowered,

in secondary mode is nonlinear and very sluggish. Engine

high−rate−of−descent situation.

acceleration time can be as much as three times longer than

in primary mode. Secondary mode MIL power thrust levels

15.2

SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING PRIMARY MODE

can vary from as little as 65 percent to as much as 116 percent

of primary mode MIL thrust.

Perform a straight−in approach with flaps and slats

extended and speedbrakes retracted

(to reduce thrust

required). External tanks have a negligible effect on thrust

required and need to be dropped only if necessary for gross

weight considerations. If operating on the left engine, DLC

is available and is recommended. DLC can be used to aid in

the control of glideslope, thereby minimizing required power

For shipboard landing, the LSO and tower must

changes and the resultant lateral/directional deviations. The

be informed if the landing is to be made with both

engines in secondary mode to ensure wind−

8−knot increase in airspeed with DLC engaged results in more

control authority and improved waveoff and bolter perforĆ

over−deck requirements are met as RATS is not

operative in secondary mode.

mance. Flight in the power approach configuration is critical.

Turns should be made away from the failed engine using

bank angles that do not exceed 20°. Remain below 12 units

During flight tests with one engine in secondary mode,

AOA until established on final approach. Final approach

optimum results were obtained by matching the engines’

should be conducted at 15 units AOA with DLC engaged/14

rpm prior to commencing final approach and maintaining the

units with DLC stowed (DLC is not available when combined

throttle split when making power corrections. Use of DLC to

hydraulic system is pressurized by the BI−DI pump). Small

make small glideslope changes will improve lineup control

rudder inputs should be made in conjunction with power

by reducing throttle activity and the associated yaw excurĆ

changes to reduce the amount of yaw.

sions. Waveoff and bolter performance is essentially the

same as in dual−engine primary mode except for a slight yaw

into the secondary mode engine.

Waveoff and bolter (with RATS) may be accomplished

up to normal gross weight limits of the aircraft. Test results

have shown that MIL power provides satisfactory waveoff

With both engines in secondary mode, expect very

performance. Minimum AB (ATLS on) reduces altitude loss

sluggish power response and throttle positions 5° to 10° more

when waveoff occurs from a high rate of descent. The use of

forward than in primary mode. Extreme care should be taken

maximum AB is prohibited.

to avoid an underpowered condition as this will significantly

15−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

No significant difference in altitude loss during

the yaw rate and then reduce the rudder as required to track

waveoff was noted between minimum AB and maximum

centerline. If unable to control yaw rate during AB waveoff

AB. The aircraft is extremely difficult to control in maximum

(possible ATLS failure), immediately reduce power to MIL.

AB and large bank angles into the operating engine are

required to maintain centerline. Late or inadequate control

inputs during a maximum AB waveoff can result in large

lateral flightpath deviations. Waveoff technique is to select

MIL or minimum AB (ATLS on), maintain approach AOA

until a positive rate of climb is established, then accelerate

Use of maximum AB during waveoff or bolter is

and climb out at the airspeed indicated in the Climb

prohibited. If unable to control yaw rate (possible

Performance After Takeoff

(Single Engine) Charts in

ATLS failure), immediately reduce power to

NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1.

MIL.

During single−engine operations at fuel states above

Note

4,000 pounds, a fuel split will develop between the aft/left

and forward/right sides. When either cell No. 2 or cell No. 5

Altitude loss during a single−engine waveoff is

thermistor is uncovered (at approximately 2,000 pounds on

minimized by maintaining approach AOA until

either tape), or when FWD or AFT is selected on the FEED

a positive rate of climb is established. Avoid

switch, the motive flow isolation and sump tank interconnect

overrotating in close as this will increase the

valves open, making wing and fuselage fuel on both sides

chance of an in−flight engagement. Minimum

available to the operating engine. However, if the sump tank

AB (ATLS on) will improve waveoff perforĆ

interconnect valve fails to open, fuel will migrate to the wing

mance (minimize altitude loss) from high sink

and fuselage tanks on the inoperative engine side and will not

rates.

be available to the operating engine. Under these conditions,

the maximum migration rate could reach 300 ppm. If the

The bolter maneuver is affected by selecting MIL or

FUEL SHUT−OFF handle on the inoperative engine is not

minimum AB (ATLS on) and slight aft control stick until the

pulled, an additional migration path could exist through the

desired flyaway attitude is established. During a bolter

engine crossfeed valve. During single−engine operation, the

following a DLC stowed approach, nose rotation will be

following procedures will minimize fuel migration if the

more sluggish than normal (because of the slower approach

sump tank interconnect valve fails to open.

speed) requiring a slightly more aggressive aft control stick

1. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (inoperative engine) Ċ

input.

Pull.

If not on final approach:

2. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, paraĆ

graph 14.5.3.2.

If after commencing final approach or in landing pattern:

The use of excessive backstick on a bolter may

cause the tail surface to stall, delaying aircraft

2.ăATLS Ċ Check ON.

rotation and causing the aircraft to settle off the

angle deck.

As power is advanced during a waveoff or bolter,

simultaneously apply rudder (approximately two−thirds to

Use of maximum AB during waveoff or bolter is

three−fourths of full deflection) to counter the asymmetric

prohibited and provides little or no improvement

thrust and prevent lateral drift. Rudder may be supplemented

over minimum AB. If unable to control yaw rate

with small lateral stick inputs. If yaw rate develops into the

(possible ATLS failure), immediately reduce

dead engine, immediately apply full opposite rudder to arrest

power to minimum AB or MIL.

ORIGINAL

15−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

Altitude loss during waveoff is minimized by

maintaining approach AOA until positive rate of

climb is established. Avoid overrotating in close

If combined hydraulic pressure is zero, do not

as this will increase the chance of an in−flight

return to AUTO (LOW) mode once module is

engagement. Minimum AB

(ATLS on) will

selected on. If module is shut off after operation

improve waveoff performance (minimize altiĆ

commences, it may not restart.

tude loss) from high sink rates.

14. For landing pattern use 12 units AOA for pattern

3. Afterburner operation (airspeed > 170 knots, fuel

airspeed and do not attempt turns greater than 20_

permitting, and full rudder authority) (RUDDER

angle of bank.

AUTH light out) Ċ Stage to Verify Proper

Operation of ATLS.

4. Wing sweep Ċ Set at 20_ (EMER).

Extreme caution must be exercised when perĆ

forming turn into dead engine. Decaying

airspeed/increasing AOA can rapidly result in a

situation where there is not enough rudder

authority to return the aircraft to level flight, and

insufficient altitude to effect a recovery.

If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the

hydraulic system, component rupture is immiĆ

15. Final approach airspeed:

nent. Turn the HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch

DLC engaged Ċ 15 Units AOA.

(BI−DI) off.

DLC stowed Ċ 14 Units AOA.

5. Reduce gross weight/minimize lateral asymmetry

into the inoperative engine as required.

6. Speedbrakes Ċ RET (on final approach).

Military power climb performance during heavy

7. LDG GEAR handle Ċ DN (if combined hydraulic

waveoffs may not adequately arrest high−sink−

pressure zero Ċ EMERG DN).

rate conditions. Use of AB provides an increase

in climb performance. Up to full rudder may be

8. Hook Ċ As Required.

required to counter AB asymmetric thrust yawĆ

ing moment during waveoff or bolter. Do not

9. Check SAS Ċ ON.

exceed 14 units AOA during waveoff or bolter.

10. If combined pressure is zero Ċ Pull AUX FLAP/

15.3

SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING

FLAP CONT Cb (8G3).

SECONDARY MODE

11. Flaps Ċ DN.

Approaches in single−engine secondary (SEC) mode

are considered extremely hazardous. Engine military (MIL)

12. DLC (if operating on right engine) Ċ Do Not

power thrust levels can vary from as little as 65 percent to as

Engage.

much as 116 percent of primary mode MIL thrust. Although

the majority of engines produce greater than 90 percent of

If operating on the left engine and

3,000 psi combined

primary mode thrust (at MIL power), the possibility exists

pressure  Engage on Final.

that in the full−flap configuration, a low−thrust engine will not

provide enough thrust for level flight. Engine acceleration

13. EMERG FLT HYD switch Ċ HIGH (on final,

times also vary and can be as much as three times longer than

committed to landing).

15−3

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

in primary mode. Aircraft in this configuration should

The natural tendency will be to underestimate the sluggish

recover shore based. Shipboard landings should be attempted

power response resulting in an underpowered condition.

only as a last resort and only if performance is adequate. For

Waveoff capability is dependent on engine thrust, thrust

example,

72 percent of primary mode MIL thrust is

response, aircraft rate of descent, and power setting at

considered the minimum required for a safe CV approach

waveoff initiation. Waveoffs should be conducted by rotating

with a 48,000−pound aircraft with no stores.

toward 14 units (maximum) AOA until a positive rate of

climb is attained, then slowly reducing AOA to 10 units AOA

To accomplish the performance check, configure the

to achieve maximum rate of climb. Bolters should be conĆ

aircraft at 2,000 feet AGL or greater and 10 units AOA with

ducted by rotating to 10_ pitch attitude not to exceed 14 units

the maneuvering flaps down (if available) and leave the

AOA. Avoid increasing AOA, as performance will degrade

landing gear up. With the engine at MIL thrust, establish a

and wing drop will occur at 16.5 to 17.5 units AOA.

constant airspeed climb (±5 knots) at the airspeed correĆ

sponding to 10 units AOA. The minimum change in altitude

required in 30 seconds is as follows:

CHANGE IN ALTITUDE Ċ FEET

Waveoff performance from high rates of descent

MANEUVER

in SEC mode may be severely degraded.

FLAPS DN

FLAPS UP

Extreme care should be used to avoid an underĆ

powered, high rate−of−descent situation.

2,000 feet

950 feet

900 feet

4,000 feet

800 feet

750 feet

Shipboard landings in single−engine SEC mode are not

recommended and should be attempted as a last resort (divert

6,000 feet

700 feet

650 feet

not available) and if the performance check is successful.

Jettison all external stores and reduce fuel weight as much as

Note

practicable to reduce gross weight and drag. Configure the

aircraft for landing no lower than

2,000 feet AGL.

Climb performance will improve by 20 feet in a

Approaches should be conducted with the flaps and slats fully

30−second climb for every 1,000−pound gross

extended, speedbrake retracted, and DLC stowed.

weight reduction.

Conduct a straight−in approach. Any turns should be

If the test is passed based on predicted gross weight, do

made away from the dead engine using bank angles that do

not lower the landing gear and flaps until the predicted gross

not exceed 20_. Maintain 10 units AOA until established on

weight is reached. If the performance test is passed and divert

final, at which time the aircraft should be slowed to 13 units

is not possible, a CV approach may be attempted. The

(maximum) AOA. Extreme care should be used when

minimum performance is required for optimum conditions

working off a high and/or fast condition, as any large power

(day, VMC, steady deck, experienced aircrew, normal wind

reductions could result in an underpowered situation. A high

over deck, etc.). For degraded conditions, the minimum

and/or fast condition should be corrected using only small

performance should be increased based on judgment. If the

power reductions. Upon detection of a deceleration or settle,

minimum performance test is not passed, and all other

immediate selection of MIL power may be required to correct

options are exhausted

(stores jettisoned, gross weight

the situation in a timely manner. To minimize the chance of

minimized, divert not possible), eject under controlled

a hook−skip bolter, it is important to maintain aft stick

conditions.

pressure on touchdown. Waveoffs should be conducted by

rotating the aircraft to 14 units (maximum) AOA until a

For shore−based landings, conduct a straight−in

positive rate of climb is attained, then slowly reducing AOA

approach with flaps up and speedbrakes retracted. If conĆ

to 11 to 12 units to achieve a maximum rate of climb. Bolters

ditions warrant a full−flap landing, conduct a performance

should be conducted by rotating to 10_ pitch attitude not to

test and proceed as in the case of a shipboard landing. Gross

exceed 14 units AOA.

weight should be reduced as much as practicable to improve

flyaway performance. Maintain 10 units AOA in the pattern

15.3.1

Single−Engine Landing Ċ SEC Mode

slowing to 15 units AOA at touchdown when a safe landing

is assured. Use extreme caution when working off a high

1. FUEL SHUTOFF handle (inoperative engine) Ċ

and/or fast situation, avoiding any large power reductions.

Pull.

ORIGINAL

15−4

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

2. In CV environment Ċ Divert.

If configured for landing:

3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, paraĆ

4. Throttle Ċ MIL.

graph 14.5.3.2, and Engine Transfer to SEC Mode

procedures, paragraph 14.5.6.

5. Ensure a minimum of 500−fpm rate of climb at

14 units AOA available for CV approach.

If not preparing for CV approach:

See step 6.

When preparing for landing:

If divert is not possible:

Shipboard recovery in single−engine SEC mode

Engine thrust and thrust response can be severely

is considered extremely hazardous and should be

degraded such that level flight cannot be mainĆ

conducted only as a last resort and if the perforĆ

tained in the full−flap landing configuration. DO

mance check is successful.

NOT configure for landing until the performance

test has been accomplished.

6. RUDDER AUTH light Ċ Verify Out.

If not configured for landing:

7. Wing sweep Ċ Set at 20°.

4. Perform constant airspeed climb

(±5 knots) at

10 units AOA, landing gear up, maneuvering flaps

down (if possible), above 2,000 feet. Minimum

climb required in 30 seconds is as follows:

If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the

CHANGE IN ALTITUDE Ċ FEET

hydraulic system, component rupture is

imminent. Turn the HYD TRANSFER PUMP

MANEUVER

switch (BI−DI) off.

FLAPS DN

FLAPS UP

8. External stores Ċ Jettison for Shipboard Recovery.

2,000 feet

950 feet

900 feet

4,000 feet

800 feet

750 feet

9. Fuel Ċ Dump or Burn

(reduce as much as

practicable).

6,000 feet

700 feet

650 feet

10. Speedbrakes Ċ RET (on final approach).

11. LDG GEAR handle Ċ DN (if combined hydraulic

pressure zero Ċ EMERG DN).

12. Hook Ċ As Required.

If minimum performance test is passed based on

predicted gross weight, do not lower landing gear

and flaps until predicted gross weight is reached.

Note

Climb performance will improve by 20 feet in a

Shore−based landings should be conducted with

30−second climb for every 1,000−pound gross

flaps up. If conditions warrant a full−flap landing,

weight reduction. Minimum performance

conduct a performance test and proceed as in the

criteria is based on optimum conditions (day,

case of shipboard landing.

VMC, steady deck, experienced aircrew, normal

13. Check SAS Ċ ON.

wind over deck, etc.) and should be increased for

degraded conditions based on judgment.

14. If combined pressure is zero Ċ Pull AUX FLAP/

FLAP CONTR Cb (8G3).

5. If minimum performance criteria are not passed and

all options are exhausted

(stores jettisoned,

minimum gross weight, and divert not possible),

eject under controlled conditions.

15−5

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

15. Flaps  DN (shipboard recovery), As Required

15.4

LANDING GEAR EMERGENCIES

(field landing).

15.4.1

Landing Gear Emergency Lowering

16. DLC Ċ Do Not Engage.

Use emergency lowering of the landing gear only as a

17. EMERG FLT HYD switch Ċ HIGH (on final,

last resort. Once this system is used, the gear cannot be

committed to landing).

retracted; therefore, the landing must be made in whatever

configuration you have at that time. If a long flight is necĆ

essary to make a field landing, it will have to be made with

the gear down (see Figure 15−1).

1. Airspeed Ċ Less Than 280 Knots.

If combined hydraulic pressure is zero, do not

return to AUTO (LOW) mode once module is

2. LDG GEAR handle Ċ DN.

selected on. If module is shut off after operation

commences, it may not restart.

18. For landing pattern, use 10 units AOA for pattern

airspeed and do not attempt turns greater than 20_

angle of bank.

The LDG GEAR handle should be pulled with a

rapid and continuous 55−pound force until the

handle is loose (fore and aft) in its housing as an

indication of complete extension of the handle.

3. Push LDG GEAR handle in hard, turn it 90_ clockĆ

Extreme caution must be exercised when

wise, pull, and hold.

performing turns into a dead engine. Decaying

airspeed/increasing AOA can rapidly result in a

4. Gear position indication Ċ Check (12 seconds).

situation where there is not enough rudder

authority to return the aircraft to level flight and

5. Make arrested landing if available.

insufficient altitude to effect a recovery.

Note

19. Final approach airspeed Ċ 13 Units (CV), (field

landing slow to 15 units, no flaps at touchdown).

D The nosegear cannot be confirmed as locked

by visual observation. If both the indicator

and transition light indicate unsafe, assume

that the downlock is not in place.

D If there is disagreement between the indicator

Waveoff performance from high rates of descent

and light and the gear appears down, the malĆ

in SEC mode may be severely degraded.

function may be because of a faulty contact on

Extreme care should be used to avoid an underĆ

the nosegear downlock microswitch.

powered, high−rate−of−descent situation.

D Use of emergency gear extension results in

loss of nosewheel steering.

Note

D To facilitate in−flight refueling probe extenĆ

D Waveoff should be conducted by rotating to

sion when the gear has been blown down,

14 units (maximum) AOA until a positive rate

raise the LDG GEAR handle to give priority

of climb is attained.

to the refueling probe system.

D Bolters should be conducted by rotating to

If any gear does not come down:

10_ pitch attitude not to exceed 14 units AOA.

6. Increase airspeed. Do not exceed 280 Knots.

7. Apply positive and negative g to force gear down.

ORIGINAL

15−6

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

FIELD LANDING

ARRESTING

NO ARRESTING

CARRIER LANDINGS

GEAR AVAILABLE

FINAL

CONFIGURATION

NOTES

Cocked Nose

Land

1, 8, 11

Arrested Landing

6, 8, 9,

Land

6, 9, 11,

Gear

11, 12,

Side−Brace

Land

1, 2, 8,

No Arrested

3, 6, 7,

Land

3, 6, 7,

Not In Place

Landing

8, 11

Nose Gear Up/

Land

1, 2, 4,

No Arrested

4, 6, 8,

Land

6, 8, 9,

Unsafe Down

8, 11

Landing

9, 10, 11

10, 11

Stub Nose Gear

Land

1, 2, 4,

No Arrested

4, 6, 8,

Land

6, 8, 9,

8, 11

Landing

9,10,11

10, 11

Nose Gear Up,

Eject Pilot Option

1, 2, 4,

Pilot Option

6, 8, 10,

Eject

One Main Up

To Land If Tanks

8, 11

Eject Or Arrest

11, 12

Installed

One Main Up/

Land

1, 2, 8,

Arrested Landing

6, 8, 10,

Pilot Option Eject

5, 6, 8,

Unsafe Down

11, 12,

Or Land

10, 11,

Both Main Up/

Eject Pilot Option

1, 2, 8,

Pilot Option

6, 8, 10,

Pilot Option Eject

6, 8, 10,

Unsafe Down

To Land If Tanks

Eject Or Arrest

11, 12

Or Land

Installed

Mains One Or

Land

1, 2, 4,

No Arrested

4, 5, 6,

Land

5, 6, 8,

Both Stub/Mount/

8, 11

Landing

8, 11

Hyperextended/

Wheel Cocked

All Gear Up

Eject Pilot Option

1, 2, 8,

Pilot Option

4, 6, 8,

Pilot Option Eject

6, 8, 10,

To Land If Tanks

Eject Or Land

10, 11

or Land

Installed

1. Divert if possible.

2. Hook down barricade engagement.

3. Minimize skid and drift rollout.

4. Remove all arresting gear.

5. Land off center to gear down side.

6. Minimum rate of descent landing (480 fpm max).

7. Gradual symmetrical braking.

8. Retain empty drop tanks.

9. Lower nose gently prior to fail through.

10. Secure engines at airframe contact.

11. External ordnance −SEL JETT if required. Activate emerg landing gear lowering to enable raising gear

handle for SEL or ACM JETT.

12. Hold damaged gear off deck until pendant engagement.

13. Engage NWS if operable, use as required.

Figure 15Ć1.ĄLanding Gear Malfunction Emergency Landing Guide

15−7

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

8. Obtain visual in−flight check if possible.

15.4.2.2

Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe Gear

Down, Transition Light Out

If still unsafe and visually confirmed unsafe, or gear position

cannot be confirmed:

This indication means a failure in one of the dual−pole

downlock microswitches.

9. Refer to Figure 15−1 (as appropriate).

1. Transition light bulb Ċ Check (LTS TEST).

15.4.2

Landing Gear Malfunctions

1. Remain below 280 knots.

2. Combined hydraulic pressure Ċ Check.

3. If less than 3,000 psi, refer to combined hydraulic

If associated with LAUNCH BAR light, leave

failure procedures in Chapter 14.

gear down and obtain visual check.

15.4.2.1

Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe Gear Up

2. Landing gear Ċ Cycle.

or Transition Light Illuminated

If condition still exists:

1. LDG GEAR handle Ċ DN.

3. Obtain visual check if possible.

If safe gear down indication is obtained and transition light

out:

4. Make normal landing.

2. Landing gear Ċ Leave Down.

15.4.2.3

Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe, Gear

Down, Transition Light Illuminated

3. Obtain visual check of gear condition.

Nosegear unsafe indicates that the downlock pin

through the drag brace is not in place. Visual determination

of nosegear−unlocked status is assisted by a red band painted

on the landing nosegear brace oleo. However, a positive

check for locked nosegear is not possible visually. Main gear

A hyperextended main strut, whether because of

unsafe should be verified by visual inspection. If the drag

a broken piston or overextended piston barrel

brace is fully extended, the main gear should be down and

and/or main strut with a cocked wheel, will likely

locked.

result in a combined hydraulic system failure

1. Obtain visual check if possible.

while airborne and a sheared strut upon touchĆ

down. A hyperextended main strut is evident to

a wingman by full vertical extension of the

scissors and broken brake lines and to the tower

or LSO by one main gear hanging noticeably

lower than the other. When either of these situĆ

D Visual determination of nose landing gear−

ations occurs, landing procedures for a stub

unlocked status is assisted by a red band

(MLG) mount must be followed.

painted on the nose landing gear drag brace.

If red is visible, the nosegear is not locked.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

D During an airborne visual inspection of the

main landing gear (even if the paint stripe

across the drag brace knee pin appears to be

straight), the possibility exists that the downĆ

lock actuator has failed and the gear may not

If landing gear indicates unsafe after retraction

be locked in the down position.

and a down−and−locked indication can be

obtained, the brake pedals should be depressed

2. LDG GEAR handle Ċ Cycle.

for

60 seconds to ascertain whether brake

If still unsafe:

hydraulic lines have been severed. If brake

hydraulic lines are severed and a combined

3. Increase airspeed to 280 knots, pull positive g’s and

hydraulic failure occurs, refer to combined

yaw aircraft.

hydraulic system failure procedures in

Chapteră14.

If main landing gear is still unsafe go to step 5.

ORIGINAL

15−8

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

If nose landing gear indicates unsafe, transition light illu-

15.4.2.4

Landing Gear Indicates Safe Gear

minated, continue with step 4:

Down, Transition Light Illuminated

4. LDG GEAR handle — Cycle UP then DN in Less

This indication can be caused by a malfunction of the

Than 2 Seconds.

following:

a. Half of the dual-pole micro in the nosegear

downlock.

b. Half of the dual-pole micros in either of the main

gear downlocks.

Failure to place the LDG GEAR handle to DN

immediately after selecting UP may allow the

c. The proximity micros in the sidebraces.

main landing gear doors to receive the signal to

close with main gear struts extended, causing

d. Failure of the LDG GEAR handle position micro.

damage to the doors and inducing a possible

e. If a visual check confirms the gear is extended

combined hydraulic or brake system failure. Do

and both sidebraces are in place, a malfunction

not reselect UP with the LDG GEAR handle after

of one of the transition light micros is indicated.

the doors attempt to close, as indicated by an

unsafe main mount or visual inspection.

1. LDG GEAR handle — Cycle.

Note

Use of the above procedure should be done at the

intended point of landing or within range of an

acceptable divert field exercising a gear-down

bingo profile.

If associated with LAUNCH BAR light, leave

gear down and obtain visual check.

5. LDG GEAR handle — EMERG DOWN (refer to

landing gear emergency lowering).

If transition light remains on:

Note

2. Obtain visual check.

Use of the emergency gear lowering procedure

3. Gear/sidebraces appear in place

— Normal

will result in loss of nosewheel steering.

Landing.

If still unsafe and visually confirmed unsafe, or gear position

Sidebraces confirmed not in place:

cannot be confirmed:

4. Refer to Figure 15-1.

6. Refer to Figure 15-1.

15.4.3

LAUNCH BAR Light

1. Landing gear Leave Down.

2. Obtain visual inspection.

If nosegear cocked, see Figure 15-1.

D When landing with nosegear unsafe down

indication, anticipate possible nose landing

If launch bar is down or visual inspection is not available:

gear collapse. This possibility shall be

reduced by using the brake pedals to prevent

3. Request removal of arresting cables for field

rollback as the arresting gear reaches full

landing.

extension and by setting the parking brake

after the aircraft has stopped.

4. Request removal of cross-deck pendants Nos. 1 and

4 for CV landing.

D Do not attempt to tow aircraft by nosegear

until gear is secured in down position.

D Nose landing gear ground safety pin instal-

lation will not prevent nosegear collapse. The

nose landing gear strut must be restrained

against forward rotation.

15-9

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

15.5

BLOWN-TIRE LANDING

15.6

FLAP AND SLAT LANDING EMERGENCIES

Blown-tire landings should be performed into arresting

15.6.1

No-Flaps and No-Slats Landing

gear whenever possible. Rollout is extremely rough on blown

A no-flaps and no-slats landing is basically the same as

tires. If go-around is elected, do not apply full aft stick in

a normal landing except that the pattern is extended and the

attempt to rotate the aircraft before reaching flying speed.

approach speed is approximately 15 knots faster than a

The drag from full-up deflection of the stabilizers is large and

full-flap approach. Field arresting gear should be used if

significantly delays acceleration. Blown tires will frequently

necessary. CV arrestments are permitted. Consult applicable

result in damaged main landing gear hydraulic lines.

recovery bulletins for WOD requirements.

Anticipate possible combined hydraulic system failure and

attendant committal to gear-down bingo following a blown

1. Gross weight — Reduce (weight consistent with

existing runway length and conditions).

tire.

2. Flaps — UP.

Setting the FLAP handle to the DN position

D Blown tire(s) can cause engine FOD and/or

inflight may create or aggravate a flap asymme-

structural damage. Leave flaps and slats as

try condition and could make the aircraft uncon-

set. Aircraft should have ground locks

trollable.

installed and engines secured before moving

aircraft.

Note

If outboard spoilers are needed for

D Do not allow the aircraft to roll backward after

ground-roll braking, FLAP handle must be

the arrestment. The downlock actuator may

lowered at least 5_ on landing rollout.

have been damaged by tire failure and

rearward movement of the aircraft could

Fly landing pattern slightly wider than normal or

cause the gear to collapse.

make straight-in approach at 15 units AOA.

Use normal braking technique.

1. Obtain in-flight visual check if possible.

2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch — SPOILER BK

(OFF for CV).

3. HOOK — DN.

D Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake appli-

4. Make carrier or short-field fly-in arrested landing as

cation is 165 knots at a grossweight of46,000

soon as practicable.

pounds and 145 knots at 51,000 pounds.

5. HYD ISOL switch — T.O./LND (on final).

D Use of full aft stick during landing in this

configuration can result in tailpipe ground

If arresting gear is not available:

contact.

D Avoid slow approaches. Wing drop and

6. Land on centerline.

increased sink rate may occur at

16.5

17.5 units AOA.

7. Nosewheel steering — Engaged.

D Aircrew should expect hot brakes following

high speed landings. Application of the

parking brake could cause the brake assembly

to fail and result in a brake fire.

15.6.2

Auxiliary Flap Failure

Do not delay engaging nosewheel steering in

order to center rudder pedals.

A no-auxiliary-flaps landing is basically the same

as a normal landing except that the approach speed is 6 knots

faster than with auxiliary flaps extended, and the longi-

Note

tudinal stick position during the approach is further aft. CV

Antiskid will sense a constant release on a

arrestments are permitted; consult applicable recovery

dragging blown tire.

bulletin for WOD requirements.

CHANGE 1

15-10

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

1. Wing sweep Ċ Ensure at 20_.

If main flaps are inoperative:

2. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Ċ Pull (8G3).

4. Maneuvering flaps Ċ Extend.

3. Approach Ċ 15 Units AOA.

Note

With AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb pulled,

If maneuvering flaps are used, ensure that the

wings will not sweep aft.

maneuver flap thumbwheel is not actuated

during the approach.

15.7

WING−SWEEP EMERGENCIES

5. DLC and APC Ċ Do Not Engage.

15.7.1

Aft Wing−Sweep Landings

6. Slow−fly aircraft at a safe altitude to determine

approach airspeed (up to 17 units AOA for field

CV arrestments are permitted with up to 40_ of wing

landings with wings aft of

50_) and to eval−

sweep, and emergency barricade engagements are permitted

uate handling/stall characteristics and waveoff

with up to 35_ of wing sweep. Shipboard aft wing−sweep

performance.

landings should be conducted at 15 units AOA. Field aft

wing−sweep landings may be conducted at AOAs up to 17

Note

units when wings are stuck aft of 50_ to minimize approach

airspeed for normal landings or remain within published field

arresting gear limitations for short−field arrested landings.

D Refer to emergency field arrestment guide

Main flaps and slats should be utilized to reduce approach

for maximum engagement speed if field

speed with aft wing sweeps up to 50_. Maneuver flaps may

arrestment is desired.

be utilized if main flaps and slats fail to extend.

D Refer to Figure 11−9 for approach airspeeds.

If wings are determined to be stuck aft of 20_ position:

7. Fly straight−in approach at 15 units AOA (up to

17 units for field landings with wings aft of 50_).

1. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Ċ Match

Captain Bars With Actual Wing−Sweep Position

Tape.

Nozzle clearance is reduced at elevated approach

AOA. Ensure that a maximum of 17 units is

maintained at touchdown.

Closely monitor wing−sweep movement

when attempting to match handle with

Note

wing−sweep position. If abnormal moveĆ

ment is noticed, immediately return handle

Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake application is

to previous position.

165 knots at gross weight of 46,000 pounds and

145 knots at 51,000 pounds.

2. Gross weight Ċ Reduce as Required.

15.7.2

Asymmetric Wing Sweep

If wings ≤ 50_:

Refer to Chapter 11 for asymmetric wing−sweep design

3. Main flaps Ċ FULL DN.

limitations and flight characteristics.

Note

With asymmetric wing−sweep emergency condition,

divert field landing is preferable to a CV landing attempt.

Main flap/slat extension with the wings

Aircrew must fully consider approach speed and aircraft

aft of 20_ will result in a large nosedown

controllability characteristics prior to attempting CV

pitch transient.

arrestment. See Figure

15−2 for recommended approach

airspeed for 14 or 15 units AOA with asymmetric wing

configurations.

15−11

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

To preclude potential damage to aircraft, avoid

D Aircraft controllability in approach configu-

all wing-sweep commands prior to performing

ration with spoilers inoperative and a large

steps 1 through 9. Limit maneuvering envelope

wing-sweep asymmetry will range from diffi-

to 350 knots and 1.5g’s.

cult to impossible depending on split.

1. Leave wings and flaps as set.

D Upon lowering the landing gear an uncom-

manded but controllable roll transient may

2. Altitude

— Climb/Remain Above 10,000 Feet

occur because of spoiler gearing change from

AGL.

cruise to PA.

3. Airspeed — 250 Knots/Do Not Exceed 12 Units

c. Landing gear — Down.

AOA.

d. Leave flaps as set until further determinations are

4. Maneuver devices — Thumbwheel Manual Retract.

complete.

5. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP DR

NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb’s — Pull (LD1, LE1).

e. Slowly increase AOA to no more than 15 units

(attempt to maintain 0_ sideslip).

6. All SASs — ON.

f. Make small lateral stick inputs to simulate lineup

Note

corrections.

If aircraft controllability is questionable for safe landing,

If ROLL SAS will not engage, accelerate and

perform Asymmetric Wing Sweep Unacceptable for Landing

attempt to reset at approximately 20-knot inter-

procedure, paragraph 15.7.2.2.

vals. Stick may have to be released laterally in

order to reengage ROLL SAS.

If aircraft controllability is safe for landing, perform

Asymmetric Wing Sweep Acceptable for Landing proce-

7. Confirm left and right wing position.

dure, paragraph 15.7.2.1.

Note

15.7.2.1

Asymmetric Wing Sweep Acceptable

for Landing

Wing-sweep tape indicates actual right-wing

position. All other cockpit wing position indi-

Establish final landing configuration as follows:

cations may be unreliable, including wing-

sweep handle position. Visually verify left-wing

1. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb - Pull (8G3).

position.

Note

If left wing is aft of 62_ spoiler cutout and right wing is 20_,

Pulling the AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb (8G3)

perform Asymmetric Wing Sweep Unacceptable for Landing

with the emergency WING SWEEP handle at the

procedure, paragraph 15.7.2.2.

20_ position disables wingsweep commands.

8. Perform preliminary controllability check as

If both wings are forward of 50_:

follows:

a. Airspeed

Below 225 Knots.

a. Trim away from forward wing (opposite stick

force) to ensure that maximum spoiler deflection

is available.

b. Assess spoiler function by controlled left- and

right-stick inputs.

Extending the main flaps with either wing aft of

50_ could result in damage to both the flaps and

the aft fuselage.

15-13

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

b. Flaps Ċ Lower Incrementally 20_ to 25_.

Emergency WING SWEEP handle Ċ Leave

Position that

Established Satisfactory

Controllability.

Gross weight Ċ Reduce as Required.

DLC Ċ Stowed.

When flaps are set greater than 25_, lateral pilot−

induced oscillations are likely and may result in

Autothrottles (APC) Ċ Do Not Engage.

wingtip damage at touchdown and/or hard

landings.

Confirm flight characteristics by flying simulated

landing approach at safe altitude, to include lineup

Note

corrections, power changes, and waveoff.

The 25_ flap position can be established by first

noting when the spoiler position indicators

switch to the drooped position during flap

extension. An uncommanded but controllable

roll transient because of spoiler gearing change

will also occur. Upon observing either event,

Full spoiler authority will be required for

retract the flaps to just less than 25_. The roll

landing with large wing−sweep asymmetry.

transient will occur in the opposite direction as

Before attempting actual approach, trim

the flaps pass through 25_. Main flap extension

away from the forward wing (opposite

without auxiliary flaps will require greater than

stick forces) to ensure maximum spoiler

normal aft stick trim.

deflection is available.

c. Approach airspeed Ċ 15 Units AOA.

Fly straight−in approach to arrested or normal

landing.

Note

Indicated AOA is subject to a 1 to 2−unit sideslip−

induced error. Verify proper AOA at zero

sideslip.

Avoid rapid lateral stick inputs, as significant

If either wing is aft of 50°:

pitch−roll coupling may result in roll ratcheting,

pitching motion, and lateral PIO tendency; an

a. Flaps Ċ UP.

excessive descent rate may develop and/or wingĆ

tip damage at touchdown may occur.

b. Approach airspeed Ċ 14 Units AOA.

Note

D A crosswind from the swept−wing side is

favorable while a crosswind from the

Wing rock and wing stall may occur at 16 to

forward−wing side is unfavorable.

16½ units AOA during flaps−up approaches.

D To reduce lateral stick force, the landing

Rapid lateral stick inputs will result in pitch

approach can be flown with rudder trim into

coupling. Excessive descent rates may develop

the forward wing, allowing aircraft to yaw

and/or wingtip damage at touchdown may occur.

into the forward wing. Sideslip should be

Precise AOA control and smooth lateral control

reduced with rudder just prior to touchdown.

inputs are required.

Note

Indicated AOA is subject to a 1 to 2−unit sideslip−

induced error. Verify proper AOA at zero

sideslip.

ORIGINAL

15−14

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

Note

If spoilers are operational:

a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — Input a

D If desired, sideslip can be reduced to zero with

Small Forward Command.

rudder at the beginning of the approach and

held to touchdown. Lateral stick force

increases as sideslip is reduced. Method of

If spoilers are not operational:

approach is pilot’s option.

a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — Input a

D In the event of bolter or go-around, as airspeed

Small Aft Command.

increases, the aircraft will roll toward the

swept wing and yaw toward the forward wing.

3. Note movement of left and right wings and attempt

to regain wing-sweep asymmetry by using the

D Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake appli-

following wing-sweep commands.

cation is 165 knots at gross weights of 46,000

pounds and 145 knots at 51,000 pounds.

If both wings are moveable and left wing is forward of right

wing:

15.7.2.2

Asymmetric Wing-Sweep

Unacceptable for Landing

a. Airspeed — 300 Knots.

b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 68_.

c. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 20_.

Efforts to improve controllability by attempting

d. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Pull (8G3).

to minimize or eliminate wing-sweep mismatch

couldresult inanacceptable conditionbecoming

e. Repeat preliminarylandingcontrollabilitycheck

unacceptable.

(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).

Note

If both wings are moveable and right wing is forward of left

wing:

Once spoiler operation is assessed, stick forces

may be trimmed to reduce pilot workload during

a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 20_.

transit to field or CV. The use of lateral trim to

reduce stick forces during actual approach and

b. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — Pull (8G3).

landing should be avoided as this reduces the

spoiler deflection available for roll control.

c. Repeat preliminarylandingcontrollabilitycheck

(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).

1. Flaps — UP.

If right wing is jammed and left wing is moveable:

2. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — In (8G3).

a. Airspeed — 300 Knots.

Note

D At any point during the following procedures,

If right wing is jammed aft of spoiler cutout

if wing-sweep symmetry is regained at aft

wing-sweep position and runway length/

angle, matching left wing will result in loss of

spoiler control. If this reduced lateral control is

approach speed permit, aircrew may elect to

perform Aft Wing-Sweep Landing emer-

undesirable, left wing should be commanded just

gency procedure, paragraph 15.7.1.

forward of spoiler cutout to regain spoiler

control.

D If left wing is jammed, wing-sweep command

can result in right wing driving to either 19_

(forward command) or 69_ (aft command)

actuator overtravel stop. Subsequent wing-

sweep commands may not move the right

wing.

15-15

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Ċ Match

the stores−aboard switch regularly occurred during flight test

Left Wing to Right Wing Position.

and will indicate hung stores when none actually exists.

c. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Ċ Pull (8G3).

In−flight actual cg location varies as fuel is burned but

remains relatively constant at its most forward position

d. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check

between 5,000 to 10,000 pounds. Below 5,000 pounds, the cg

(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).

moves aft towards the ZFGW position. Landing should be

accomplished at 5,000 pounds of fuel or more if possible.

If left wing is jammed and spoilers are operational:

Wing−mounted AIM−7/9s move the cg location slightly

forward and have no adverse effects on flying qualities.

a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Ċ 20_.

External tanks produce no change to the cg location and also

have no adverse effects. Combinations of forward and aft

b. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Ċ Pull (8G3).

stores will produce a cg change slightly less than considering

the difference as hung on the aft stations alone (i.e., the cg

c. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check

location with 2,000 pounds forward and 4,000 pounds aft will

(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).

be slightly more forward than 2,000 pounds aft alone).

If left wing is jammed aft of spoiler cutout wing−sweep angle

Flying qualities at aft cg locations with gear and flaps

and spoilers are inoperative:

up are only slightly degraded. This degradation will probably

a. Airspeed  300 Knots.

not be apparent to the pilot. Stick force per g remains

relatively nominal even with

4,000 pounds of aft hung

b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Ċ 68_.

bombs. No change in flying qualities is noted during dive

recoveries between 400 and 500 KCAS. At 20_ of wing

c. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Ċ Pull (8G3).

sweep with the gear and flaps down and an aft cg, the aircraft

is extremely susceptible to pilot−induced oscillations during

d. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check

closely controlled tasks such as flying the ball. Loss of

(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).

control is likely.

If final wing configuration is unsafe for landing:

The transition to landing configuration should be

performed in straight−and−level flight to allow handling

a. Prepare for and execute controlled ejection.

qualities to be evaluated in benign conditions. Wings should

be swept to the desired position before the gear and flaps are

15.8

AFT HUNG ORDNANCE LANDINGS

lowered. The AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR (8G3) cb should be

pulled in case of a wing/flap interlock failure and also to

The normal NATOPS cg ZFGW limit for tunnel−

prevent the auxiliary flaps from deploying if 20_ of wing−

mounted stores is 17.0 percent. On a typical fleet aircraft, one

sweep is inadvertently selected. Sweeping the wings with

Mk 84 2,000−pound bomb placed on station No. 4 or 5 result

auxiliary flaps retracted results in significant pitch−trim

in a ZFGW cg aft of 17.0 percent MAC, possibly as far aft as

changes. A straight−in approach should be flown as power

18.5 to 19.0 percent MAC. Two aft hung Mk 84s can produce

requirements with aft wing sweep in a turn are significantly

a ZFGW cg of up to 22 percent MAC. These aft cg locations

different than normal and could produce a severely

reduce the normal static stability of the F−14, producing a

underpowered approach. Once established in the optimum

marked degradation in landing flying qualities. Aft

wing−sweep configuration appropriate for the amount of

wing−sweep can be used to restore the normal static longiĆ

ordnance hung on the aft stations, normal approach

tudinal stability margin, regaining normal flying qualities

techniques can be used. No abnormalities in aircraft response

even with extremely aft cg locations.

or performance are apparent during landing approaches at

15 units, even with 4,000 pounds of aft hung ordnance. APC

Aircrew may have difficulty detecting aft hung

is not optimized for aft wing−sweep landings and should not

ordnance following bomb release. The only cockpit indiĆ

be used. DLC should not be used as it adds 8 knots to recovery

cation of an unsuccessful release will be a hot trigger light

WOD requirements and has improper pitch trim response at

that remains illuminated following the intended release of all

aft wing−sweep. Expect onspeed airspeed for 25_ of wing−

selected stations. With MA ARM ON, individually selecting

sweep to increase 6 knots over the normal DLC on, 20_ of

stations will illuminate the HOT TRIG light when the hung

wing−sweep approach speed, and a 12−knot increase if wings

station is selected. Check SMS for hung stores. Obtain a

are at 30_. For CV arrestments, the appropriate recovery

visual check if possible to validate this check as failures of

bulletin should be consulted.

ORIGINAL

15−16

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

Ashore, a field arrestment is recommended with

spoiler brakes dearmed because of the large noseup pitch

occurring at spoiler deployment. If a field arrestment is not

possible, expect to use full forward stick to counter the

Expect a significant nose pitchup during landing

noseup pitching moment and to maintain forward stick until

below 80 KCAS with a resultant longer rollout.

rollout as spoilers deploy. Full forward stick may

be required to avoid a tail strike.

15.8.1

Landing with Aft Hung Ordnance

15.9

FIELD ARRESTMENTS

1. Determine location of hung stores. Obtain visual

check if possible.

15.9.1

Field Arresting Gear

If hung ordnance exceeds 1,000 pounds:

The types of field arresting gear in use include the

anchor chain cable, water squeezer, and Morest-type

2. Wing sweep — Set at 25_ if

2,000-Pounds Hung

equipment. All require engagement of the arresting hook in

Aft; Set at 30_ if > 2,000 Pounds Hung Aft.

a cable pendant rigged across the runway. Location of the

pendant in relation to the runway will classify the gear as

3. Perform transition to gear-down configuration in

follows:

straight-and-level flight.

1. Short-field gear — Located 1,500 to 2,000 feet past

4. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — Pull (8G3)

approach end of runway. Usually requires prior noti-

fication in order to rig for arrestment.

5. Flaps — Full DN.

2. Midfield gear — Located near the halfway point of

the runway. Usually requires prior notification in

6. Fly straight-in approach at 15 units AOA. Do not

order to rig for arrestment in the direction desired.

engage APC or DLC.

3. Abort gear — Located 1,500 to 2,500 feet short of

CV approach:

the departure end of the duty runway and usually

rigged for immediate use.

7. Perform CV arrestment in accordance with

applicable recovery bulletin.

4. Overrun gear — Located shortly past the upwind

end of the duty runway. Usually rigged for imme-

Field approach:

diate use.

Some fields will have all types of gear, others none. For

7. Spoiler brake — OFF.

this reason, it is imperative that all pilots be aware of the type,

location, and compatibility of gear in use with the aircraft,

8. Perform field arrestment.

and the policy of the local air station with regard to which

gear is rigged for use and when.

Note

As various modifications to the basic types of arresting

Refer to emergency field arrestment guide

gear are made, exact speeds will vary accordingly. Certain

(Figure 15-3) for maximum engagement speed.

aircraft service changes may also affect engaging speed and

weight limitations.

If arresting gear is not available:

8. If field arrestment is not available, spoiler brake —

BOTH.

An engagement in the wrong direction into chain

gear can severely damage the aircraft.

15-17

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

In general, arresting gear is engaged on the centerline

15.9.3

Long−Field Arrestment

at as slow a speed as possible. Burn or dump down to an

acceptable landing weight. Conditions permitting, make

The long−field−arrestment is used when a stopping

practice passes to accurately locate the arresting gear.

problem exists with insufficient runway remaining (that is,

Engagement should be made with feet off the brakes,

aborted takeoffs, icy or wet runways, loss of brakes after

shoulder harness locked, and with the aircraft in a three−point

touchdown, etc.). Lower the hook, allowing sufficient time

attitude. After engaging the gear, good common sense and

for it to extend fully before engagement (normally 1,000 feet

existing conditions dictate whether to keep the engines

before reaching the arresting gear). Do not lower the hook too

running or to shut down and egress the aircraft.

early and weaken the hook point. Line up the aircraft on the

runway centerline. Inform the control tower of your

In an emergency situation, first determine the extent of

intentions to engage the arresting gear, so that aircraft landing

the emergency by whatever means are available (instruĆ

behind you may be waved off. If leaving the runway is ineviĆ

ments, other aircraft, LSO, RDO, tower or other ground

table, secure the engines.

personnel). Next, determine the most advantageous arresting

gear available and the type of arrestment to be made under

15.9.4

Engaging Speeds

the conditions. Whenever deliberate field arrestment is

intended, notify control tower personnel as much in advance

The maximum permissible engaging speed, gross

as possible and state estimated landing time in minutes.

weight, and off−center engagement distance for field

arrestment are listed in Figure 15−3. The data in the long−field

If gear is not rigged, it will probably require 10 to

landing columns may be used for lightweight aborted takeoff

20 minutes to prepare. If foaming of the runway or area of

where applicable; data in the aborted takeoff columns may be

arrestment is required or desired, it should be requested by

used for heavy gross weight landings.

the pilot at this time.

As various modifications to the basic types of arresting

If fuel is streaming from the bottom of the aircraft, a

gear are incorporated, engaging speeds or gross−weight

field arrested landing is not recommended because of the

limitations may change. For this reason and for more detailed

high probability of sparks and heat from the arresting hook

information, the applicable aircraft recovery bulletin should

igniting the streaming fuel and air mixture. If an arrested

be consulted.

landing is mandated because of the lack of adequate braking

or runway conditions, an effort should be made to foam the

15.10 BARRICADE ARRESTMENT

runway in the runout area of the arresting gear.

1. External stores Ċ Jettison

(except AIM−7 or

AIM−54 on fuselage stations if wing is at full

15.9.2

Short−Field Arrestment

for−ward sweep).

If at any time before landing a directional control

2. External tanks Ċ Jettison (empty tanks retained

problem exists or a minimum rollout is desired, a short−field

only for landing gear malfunction).

arrestment should be made and the assistance of LSO

3. Fuel Ċ Dump or burn (reduce to 2,000 pounds).

requested. The LSO should be stationed near the touchdown

point and equipped with a radio. Inform the LSO of the

4. HOOK Ċ DN (Lower to permit engagement of a

desired touchdown point. A constant glideslope approach to

cross−deck pendant, which will minimize barricade

touchdown is permitted (mirror or Fresnel lens landing aid)

engagement speed and damage to aircraft).

with touchdown on centerline at or just before the arresting

5. Fly normal pattern and approach, on−speed, angle of

wire with the hook extended. The hook should be lowered

attack, centerline, and meatball.

while airborne and a positive hook−down check should be

made. Use midfield gear or Morest−type, whenever

available. If neither is available, use abort gear. Use an

Note

approach speed commensurate with the emergency experiĆ

Anticipate loss of meatball for a short period of

enced. Landing approach power will be maintained until

time during the approach. Barricade stanchions

arrestment is assured or a waveoff is taken. Be prepared for

may obscure the meatball.

a waveoff if the gear is missed. After engaging the gear, retard

the throttles to IDLE or secure engines and abandon aircraft,

Upon engaging the barricade:

depending on existing conditions.

6. Throttles Ċ OFF.

7. Evacuate aircraft as soon as practical.

ORIGINAL

15−18

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

MAXIMUM ENGAGING SPEED (KNOTS)(D)

GROSS WEIGHT X 1,000 POUNDS

TYPE OF

MAXIMUM

LONG−

ARRESTING

OFF−CENTER

SHORT−FIELD

FIELD

ABORTED TAKEOFF

GEAR

ENGAGEMENT

LANDING (K)(L)

LANDING

(A)

(M)

(FT)

51.8

69.8

E−28

176

180

179

178

177

176

175

174

172

171

(B)

E−28 (G)

176

160

156

145

(B)

M−21

130

125

120

115

113

BAK−9

160

155

150

144

138

131

124

122

118

BAK−12 (H)

160

159

146

137

118

(J)

DUAL BAK−12

160

(C)

BAK−13

160

(A) Data provided in aborted takeoff column may be used for emergency high gross weight arrestment.

(B) Maximum engaging speed limited by aircraft limit horizontal−drag load factor (mass item limit g").

setting, and 1,200−foot runout. No information is available regarding applicability to other configurations.

(D) Maximum engaging speed is limited by arresting gear capacity except as noted.

(E) Off−center engagement may not exceed 25 percent of the runway span.

(F) Before making an arrestment, the pilot must check with the air station to confirm the maximum engaging

speed because of a possible installation with less than minimum required rated chain length.

(G) Only for the E−28 systems at Keflavik and Bermuda with 920−foot tapes.

(H) Standard BAK−12 limits are based on 150−foot span, 1−inch cross−deck pendant, 40,000−pound weight setting,

and 950−foot runout. No information is available regarding applicability to other configurations.

(J) Engaging speed limit is 96 knots at 59,000 pounds. Because of runout limitations, it is recommended this

gear not be engaged at weights greater than 59,000 pounds.

(K) Maximum of 3.0_ glideslope.

(L) Consult appropriate section for recommended approach speed.

(M) Flared or minimum rate of descent landing.

Figure 15Ć3.ĄEmer gency Field Arrestment Guide (Sheet 1 of 2)

15−19

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

AIRCRAFT ENGAGING SPEED LIMITS

FOR E−5 EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR

AIRCRAFT: F−14 D

SHORT FIELD LANDING

LONG FIELD LANDING

ABORTED TAKEOFF

UP TO 54,000 POUNDS

UP TO 60,000 POUNDS

60,100 TO 72,000 POUNDS

ARRESTING

STANDARD

HEAVY

STANDARD

HEAVY

STANDARD

HEAVY

GEAR

CHAIN

RATING

E−5

E−5−1

E−5

E−5−1

E−5

E−5−1

E−5

E−5−1

E−5

E−5−1

E−5

E−5−1

E−5−2

E−5−3

E−5−2

E−5−3

E−5−2

E−5−3

E−5−2

E−5−3

E−5−2

E−5−3

E−5−2

E−5−3

COL. 1

COL. 2

COL. 3

COL. 4

COL. 5

COL. 6

COL. 7

COL. 8

COL. 9

COL. 10

COL. 11

COL. 12

COL. 13

300 to 349

39 (D)

40 (D)

37 (D)

38 (D)

33 (D)

34 (D)

350 to 399

45 (D)

47 (D)

43 (D)

44 (D)

39 (D)

40 (D)

400 to 449

51 (D)

54 (D)

48 (D)

51 (D)

44 (D)

47 (D)

450 to 499

57 (D)

61 (D)

54 (D)

58 (D)

49 (D)

53 (D)

500 to 549

63 (D)

68 (D)

60 (D)

65 (D)

55 (D)

59 (D)

550 to 599

69 (D)

76 (D)

65 (D)

72 (D)

60 (D)

66 (D)

600 to 649

75 (D)

84 (D)

71 (D)

79 (D)

65 (D)

73 (D)

650 to 699

81 (D)

91 (D)

77 (D)

87 (D)

71 (D)

79 (D)

700 to 749

87 (D)

99 (D)

83 (D)

94 (D)

76 (D)

86 (D)

750 to 799

93 (D)

107 (D)

89 (D)

102 (D)

82 (D)

93 (D)

800 to 849

99 (D)

115 (D)

94 (D)

109 (D)

87 (D)

100 (D)

850 to 899

105 (D)

123 (D)

100 (D)

117 (D)

93 (D)

107 (D)

900 to 949

111 (D)

131 (D)

106 (D)

125 (D)

98 (D)

114 (D)

950 to 999

117 (D)

140 (D)

112 (D)

133 (D)

104 (D)

121 (D)

1,000 to 1,049

123 (D)

148 (D)

118 (D)

140 (D)

109 (D)

129 (D)

1,050 to 1,099

129 (D)

150 (D)

156 (D)

123 (D)

148 (D)

115 (D)

136 (D)

1,100

135 (D)

150 (D)

165 (D)

129 (D)

150 (D)

156 (D)

120 (D)

143 (D)

NOTES (E) AND (F) APPLY

Figure 15−3. Emergency Field Arrestment Guide (Sheet 2 of 2)

ORIGINAL

15−20

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1

If light is illuminated and hook visually is checked down:

6. WSHLD AIR/ANTI-ICE HOOK CONT cb — Pull

(8C2).

Weight limits for barricade engagement are as

follows:

Note

a. Wings at 20_ — 51,800 pounds (maximum).

Cb 8C2 also controls windshield air and anti-ice.

b. Wing sweep

20_ < 35_ — 46,000 pounds

15.12 FORCED LANDING

(maximum).

Landing the aircraft on unprepared surfaces is not

c. Wings 35_ — Not permitted.

recommended. If it is necessary to do so, landing with the

landing gear down, regardless of the terrain, will assist in

15.11 ARRESTING HOOK EMERGENCY DOWN

absorbing the shock of ground impact and reduce possibility

of flightcrew injuries. External stores should be jettisoned in

1. HOOK handle — DN.

a safe area prior to touchdown. External tanks should be

jettisoned if they contain fuel, but retained to absorb landing

2. HOOK handle — Pull, Then Rotate.

shock if they are empty. If time permits, dump fuel to allow

touchdown at the slowest possible speed with full flaps.

Note

15.13 GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURES

Pull handle aft approximately 4 inches and turn

counterclockwise. This will mechanically

*1. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch — Check.

release the uplatch mechanism and allow hook to

extend.

*2. MASTER RESET pushbutton — Depress.

3. Hook transition light — Check OFF.

If light is illuminated and hook visually is checked up:

4. HOOK handle — Restow in Down Position.

Ground roll braking may fail to extend spoilers

5. HYD VALVE CONTR cb — Pull and Reset After 5

on touchdown due to a momentary miscompare

Seconds (8E5).

of the weight-on-wheels switches. MASTER

RESET should restore normal ground roll

braking operation.

15-21 (Reverse Blank)

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 16

Ejection

16.1

EJECTION

attempt is made during zoom, and there is no

evidence of a relight, eject at peak altitude. If no

Responsibility for the decision to eject shall be

airstart attempt is made, eject at peak altitude.

determined and briefed before flight. Thereafter the decision

to abandon the aircraft shall rest with the crewmember

3. If decision to abandon aircraft is made at high

assigned responsibility for that particular situation. The

altitude, the recommended minimum altitude for

decision should be made before sink rate, altitude, and

ejection is 10,000 feet AGL, or higher, if conditions

attitude conditions jeopardize safe ejections for both

so indicate. Under any circumstances and if at all

occupants. In flight, the aircraft must be abandoned by means

possible, ejection should be accomplished prior to

of the ejection seats since there is no provision for manual

descending below 2,000 feet AGL.

bailout. Prior to ejection from a flyable or controllable

aircraft, it is the pilot’s responsibility to do everything

16.1.1

Ejection Envelope

reasonable to ensure that the abandoned aircraft will inflict

Figure 16−1 shows minimum ejection altitude for a

the least possible damage on impact.

given airspeed and sink rate, bank angle, and dive angle. For

Ejection may be necessary as a result of fire, engine

all ejections, it is recommended that airspeed be reduced as

failure, structural failure, midair collision, or when the

much as practicable; however in uncontrolled situations, do

aircraft becomes uncontrollable. In each case, the pilot must

not delay ejection because the aircraft is not within the

decide when to eject, using the following as a guide:

published safe escape envelope. For ejection at low altitude,

it is recommended that a climb be initiated to convert excess

Ejection is mandatory under the following

airspeed into altitude. Although the escape system is capable

conditions except when unusual circumstances

of zero−zero ejection, it should be borne in mind that a

clearly indicate to the pilot that the cause of safety

combination of low airspeed and high rate of descent at low

to self and others will be better served by a flameout

altitude can present a condition more severe than zero−zero.

approach than by ejection.

Ejection sequences are shown in FO−16 and FO−17.

a. Serious, uncontrolled fire.

For details of ejection seat mechanical operation, see

paragraph 2.38.

b. If aircraft is in uncontrolled flight at 10,000 feet

AGL or below.

c. When dual−engine flameout occurs below 1,500

feet AGL and 250 knots.

During ejection seat development and testing,

d. If repeated relight attempts are not successful

the SJU−17(V)3/A and SJU−17(V)4/A were

between 30,000 and 10,000 feet, eject by 10,000

qualified for use by male aviators with nude

feet AGL.

weights from 136 pounds to 213 pounds. OperaĆ

e. If still on first or second relight attempt when

tion of the seat by personnel not within these paĆ

passing through 10,000 feet AGL and it appears

rameters subjects the occupant to an increased

that a relight is likely, airstart attempt may be

risk of injury.

continued to a minimum of 5,000 feet AGL.

1. General Injury Risks:

If dual−engine flameout occurs below 10,000 feet,

a. Ejection stability is directly related to occupant

zoom to convert excess airspeed to altitude.

restraint. All occupants should be properly

Attempt airstart as time permits. If peak altitude is

restrained in the seat by their torso harness for

above 5,000 feet AGL and airstart attempt is not

optimum performance and minimum injury risk.

successful, eject no lower than 5,000 feet AGL. If

peak altitude is below 5,000 feet AGL and airstart

16−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

b. Inertia reel performance may be degraded for ocĆ

ARMED/SAFE handle is at ARMED before trying again.

cupants outside of the qualified weight range.

Ejection through the canopy is an automatic backup. There

Lighter occupants may be injured during the

is no provision for manual bailout.

haulback, and both light and heavy occupants

may experience poor ejection positions,

16.1.2

Ejection Preparation

resulting in an increased risk of injury during

ejection.

Injury risks for aviators with nude weights less than

136 pounds:

Never pull the manual override handle before

a. The catapult was designed for the ejection seat

ejection. Pulling the handle releases the

qualified weight range. Lighter weight

crewmember from the seat and moves the

occupants are subject to a higher risk of injury

ARMED/SAFE handle to SAFE, making it

from the catapult due to greater acceleration.

impossible to initiate ejection from the seat.

Further, if ejection is initiated by the other

b. Lighter weight occupants are at a greater risk of

crewmember, results could be fatal.

injury during ejections above 300 KIAS due to

Time permitting, perform all or as much as possible of

instability during drogue deployment.

the following:

c. Lighter weight occupants are at a greater risk of

Place aircraft in safe envelope and attitude for

injury during ejections near the upper end of

ejection.

Mode 1 (approaching 300 KIAS) due to high

Warn other crewmember.

parachute opening shock.

EJECT CMD lever  Select (RIO).

Injury risks for aviators with nude weights greater

than 213 pounds:

IFF/SIF  EMERG/7700 (RIO).

Position report  Transmit.

a. Larger occupants may not attain sufficient

altitude for parachute full inflation in zero−zero

Check altimeter.

cases or at extremely low altitudes and

Assume proper ejection position (see Figure 16Ć2).

velocities.

a. Head pressed back against headrest

b. Larger occupants may not attain sufficient

b. Chin slightly elevated (10° up).

altitude to clear the aircraft tail structure.

c. Back straight.

The escape system will function up to 0.9 IMN or 600 KIAS,

d. Hips against seat back.

whichever is greater. However, human limitations are more

e. Thighs flat on seat survival kit.

restrictive as indicated below:

f. Outside of thighs pressed against side of seat.

1. Zero to

250 KIASĊSafe ejection

(injury

improbable).

g. Elbows and arms pressed firmly against body.

2. 250 to 600 KIASĊHazardous ejection (appreciable

h. Feet on rudder pedals, heels on deck.

forces are exerted on the body, making injury

i. Visor down, oxygen mask tightened, helmet

probable).

secure.

3. Above 600 KIASĊExtremely hazardous ejection

(excessive forces are exerted upon the body, making

serious injury or death highly probable).

Usually, there will be enough time to do several things

to prepare for a successful ejection prior to pulling the seat

D Positioning the legs aft prior to ejection will

firing handle. However, when the emergency condition

cause the spine to flex and will increase the

requiring ejection is such that ejection must be made without

possibility of spinal injury, and, will also

hesitation, simply grasp the handle and pull forcibly to the

increase likelihood of seat/thigh slap with

fullest extent until the seat ejects. If the seat fails to eject,

attendant leg injury.

immediately pull again. If the handle will not move, ensure

D Proper body position is a critical factor in

that the ground safety pin has been removed and that the

preventing ejection injuries.

16−5

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Figure 16Ć2.ĄProper Ejection Position

16.1.3

Ejection Initiation

Note

LPA inflation may not be desirable over land.

See Figure 16−3 for ejection initiation.

The paragraphs that follow provide procedures

After the seat firing handle is pulled:

applicable to the NACES seat. Additional post−ejection/

1. The harness retraction unit retracts the shoulder harĆ

survival procedures are to be found in the NATOPS Survival

ness pulling the occupant to an upright position. The

Manual, NAVAIR 00−80T−101.

leg garters are retracted as the seat moves up the rail.

2. Ejection through the canopy is a backup method

only; therefore, canopy is jettisoned as part of

normal ejection sequence. Ejection through the

D Ejection at low altitude allows only a matter

canopy or out of the aircraft occurs after a delay if

of seconds to prepare for landing. Over water,

the normal sequence fails.

inflation of the LPA is the most important step

3. Seats eject individually and in opposite directions

to be accomplished. Release of the parachute

(pilot right, RIO left).

quick−release fittings as the feet contact the waĆ

ter is the second most important step to prevent

entanglement in the parachute shroud lines.

16.2

MANUAL BAILOUT

D When ejection is in the immediate vicinity of

There is no provision for manual bailout. Ejection

the carrier, parachute entanglement combined

through the canopy is an automatic backup if the canopy fails

with wake and associated turbulence can rapĆ

to jettison or the safe and arm unit fails to fire.

idly pull a survivor under.

16.3

SURVIVAL/POSTEJECTION PROCEDURES

Figure

16−4 describes step−by−step procedures for

inflation of the LPA configured with beaded handles and the

35−gram CO₂ cylinder.

CHANGE 1

16−6

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Figure 16Ć3.ĄEjection Initiation

The deployed seat survival kit may contribute

Locate the manual override handle on the right side of the

to shroud−line entanglement. The survivor

seat bucket, depress the handle release button and pull handle

must be prepared to cut shroud lines that are

sharply upward as far as possible. This fires a cartridge to

dragging him down.

activate the parachute deployment rocket and release the

upper and lower harness locks. Man/seat separation occurs

D The crashed aircraft may release large

when the main parachute is extracted and deployed.

quantities of jet fuel and fumes that could

hamper breathing and create a fire hazard if

16.3.2

Survival Kit Deployment

smoke or flare marker is present. The

emergency oxygen system may be invaluable

Note

in this case and discarding the seat pan would

terminate its use. However, totally discarding

Survival kit deployment is not recommended in

the seat pan may be appropriate after

an overland ejection situation. The kit can be

considering weather, sea conditions, and

opened after landing by removing the closure

rescue potential.

pins from the cones.

Note

With either hand, locate one of the deployment handles

The variety and complexity of conditions

at the rear of the seat kit. Firmly pull on the handle until it is

free of the kit and the survival package falls away on its

encountered during the time−critical movements

following a low−altitude, overwater ejection

dropline. The package remains attached to the kit lid by the

dropline. At full dropline stretch, the liferaft is inflated

make it impossible to formulate procedures to

cover every contingency.

automatically.

16.3.1

Manual Man/Seat Separation

If below 14,000 feet and man/seat separation have not

occurred, the procedure will have to be initiated manually.

16−7

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

16.3.3

Parachute Steering

16.3.5

Raft Boarding

A gentle pull of approximately 6 inches on the left or

Note

right steering line (attached to the riser) will rotate the canopy

to enable steering. Pulling on the left line steers left. The

D If the liferaft has not inflated automatically,

canopy will continue to rotate for a time after the steering line

pull on the red operating handle on the

is released, so it is necessary to compensate for this lag by

dropline to inflate.

releasing the steering line before the desired direction is

D If the survival package has not been deployed

reached.

before water entry, first pull the yellow

deployment handle then the red operating

16.3.4

Parachute Landing Preparation

handle.

Preparations over land and over water are essentially

When clear of the canopy, retrieve the raft by locating

the same except that over land the visor should be kept down,

the dropline and pulling the raft to you. The raft retaining

the gloves worn, and the survival kit should not be deployed.

lanyard is in a pocket next to the CO₂ cylinder. Attach the end

In low−level, overwater situations, the mask and regulator

of the lanyard securely to the gated helo hoist ring on the

should be retained since they provide an underwater

harness, then ensure that the oxygen hose is disconnected

breathing capability. If there is time before a water landing,

from the kit lid and release the lapbelt quick−release fittings,

the gloves may be removed and stowed safely. This may

releasing the kit lid. Bring the raft around for entry from the

make it easier to operate the canopy releases.

small end (stem); grasp the stem, and forcibly push under

Try to determine the direction of the wind at the surface

LPA waist lobes. Using the boarding handles, pull into the

using white caps, smoke from the wreckage, or known

raft and turn into a comfortable, balanced, seated position.

surface winds in the vicinity. Note that surface winds may be

Locate the dropline and retrieve the survival package.

quite different from those at altitude. When nearing the

surface, steer into the wind and assume the proper body

position for landing:

1. Feet together, knees slightly bent, toes pointed

slightly downward.

Do not attempt to retrieve the kit lid. Any attempt

to do so could capsize the raft.

2. Eyes on the horizon.

Close the canopy and orally inflate the canopy and

3. Grasp canopy risers and tuck elbows in prior to

floor. An integral baler is provided to bale the raft as

water entry.

necessary.

4. On water entry, release the canopy manually. The

SEWARS releases will operate the canopy release

fittings on saltwater entry as a backup.

16−9 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 17

Instrument Procedures

17.1

AUTOMATIC CARRIER LANDING SYSTEM

17.1.2

Mode II

ACLS approaches apply to properly configured

The control of the aircraft remains with the pilot along

aircraft utilizing carrier or shore−based AN/SPN−10 or

the entire glideslope to touchdown. Glideslope error signals

AN/SPN−42 ACLS radar facilities. Three primary modes of

are transmitted to the aircraft for cockpit displays from the

operation and two submodes are available.

AN/SPN−41 or the AN/SPN−42. The pilot flies the aircraft to

null the error and to keep the vertical and lateral crosshairs

1. Mode I approach automatically controlled to

centered. During a Mode II T approach, the final controller

touchdown

provides a Mode III−type talkdown to assist the pilot in flying

2. Mode IA approach automatically controlled to a

his needles or for controller training.

minimum of 200 feet and one−half mile; manual

control remainder of approach

17.1.3

Mode III

3. Mode II approach manually controlled using AN/

The pilot flies the aircraft in response to voice radio

SPN−41 or AN/SPN−42 vertical display indicator

commands from the final controller to keep the aircraft on the

and/or heads−up display presentation for glideslope

proper glideslope. From the radar azimuth and elevation

and lineup information

displays, the final controller determines the aircraft position

with respect to the desired glidepath and gives guidance to

4. Mode III approach manually controlled using only

the pilot.

CCA−controller−supplied information

5. Flight director approach manually controlled using

17.1.4

Flight Director

HUD flight director presentation derived from AN/

The pilot flies the aircraft so that the FPM stays inside

SPN−42/46 information and navigation system data

the flight director symbol on the HUD. The flight director

for glidepath intercept and following.

symbol provides glideslope and centerline steering

information computed by the mission computer using

17.1.1

Mode I

navigation system parameters and data−link information

Mode I provides a fully automatic, hands−off landing

from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system. The box with the three

capability, called automatic carrier landing or all−weather

dots provides the pilot with optimal glidepath intercept and

landing. The landing radar system (AN/SPN−42) tracks the

following when the flightpath marker is inside the flight

aircraft and compares its position with the desired position.

director box and the three dots are aligned with the wings and

The aircraft position is corrected to fly the desired glidepath

the tail of the flightpath marker. The horizontal deviation of

by commands from the naval tactical data system using

the flight director symbol from the FPM represents the error

the radar computer. These commands are transmitted over

between the commanded and actual bank angle. The vertical

the UHF data link to the aircraft, where the automatic flight

deviation represents the error between the commanded

control system executes the pitch and bank commands.

vertical rate. The flight director symbol also rotates an

Additional ramp input commands tailored to each specific

amount corresponding to the error between the bank

ship or field are applied at the proper time to assist the aircraft

command and the bank attitude to give an indication of the

through the burble. In addition to control of the aircraft,

size of the bank correction required (primarily useful for

discrete words and glideslope error signals are transmitted

following large bank commands during centerline captures).

for cockpit displays to show the pilot where the aircraft is in

The vertical deviation is scaled on the HUD so that it gives

relation to the desired glideslope. Independent glideslope

an indication of the vertical flightpath angle correction

error signals from the AN/SPN−41 instrument landing system

required.

may also be displayed. The pilot may take control at any time

and continue the landing via Mode II.

17−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

17.2

AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEMS

Note

Mode I (automatic) landings are possible only if the

If a pitch parallel actuator force link disconnect

ACLS installation, including data link, DFCS, radar beacon

occurs prior to an ACLS approach, the A/P REF

and augmentor, inertial navigation system, and ACLS

advisory may go out when coupling is attempted,

displays (MFD and/or HUD) are all fully operational. The

but the aircraft will not respond to SPN−42

approach power compensator should be used during the

commands and the aircraft will uncouple when

coupled portion of the approach. Mode II (manual) landings

the first pitch commands are received.

can be made using displayed crosspointer information from

Following ACL engagement, the pilot can take control

either the data link or the AN/ARA−63 receiver decoder, or

of the aircraft by simply overriding the data−link commands

both (providing dual displays).

with his control stick. This causes immediate disengagement,

and the DFCS will again revert to STAB AUG. Refer to

17.2.1

Data Link

paragraph 2.24.4.7, Automatic Carrier Landing, for further

Data−link

(link

4A) messages are received and

information on ACL.

transmitted by a UHF frequency−shift−key−modulated radio

link. Data link receives control messages in serial form from

17.2.3

Radar Beacon (AN/APN−154)

the NTDS and processes each message as necessary. For

The radar beacon enhances aircraft tracking (range and

ACL, the position error information is furnished to the MFD

accuracy) by ship and/or ground−based I−band radars for

and/ or HUD ACL steering indicator, discrete messages

precision vectoring. Pulsed

(coded) I−band signals

appear on MFDs 1 and 3, and control information is provided

transmitted by the surface radar station are received by the

for the DFCS. Reply messages are transmitted to the NTDS

beacon and decoded; if they match the mode (six available)

with detailed information on aircraft heading, speed,

selected by the RIO, the beacon responds with a return pulse

altitude, fuel quantity, weapons, stores, and autopilot status.

to the radar site. The reply signal, considerably stronger than

The shipboard data link continuously transmits a

a normal radar echo, enhances the radar acquisition and

universal test message and a monitor control message. When

tracking capability of the surface station.

in operation, the UTM or MCM is used by the aircraft as a

self−test feature. The aircraft data−link system self−test is

17.2.4

ACLS Beacon Augmentor (R−1623)

performed by selecting AWL steering on the MFD. Only the

The beacon augmentor is a crossband receiver that

pilot can deselect AWL steering from the MFD VDI format

once selected.

extends the tracking capability of the AN/SPN−42 shipboard

radar with the capability of operating with either or both

Note

channels of the AN/SPN−42 without interference.

AWL steering is only available in the TLN mode.

The beacon augmentor eliminates radar scintillation

In A/A and A/G, the AWL pushbutton selection

by providing a large source of reply energy from one point on

on the MFD VDI format is removed.

the aircraft. The beacon augmentor receives interrogations

from the AN/SPN−42 carrier−based radar in the Ka−band at

17.2.2

Digital Flight Control System

33.0 to 33.4 GHz, processes them, and retransmits modulated

I−band pulses at 8.8 to 9.5 GHz to the AN/SPN−42, which has

The DFCS performs two functions: stability

an I−band receiving system mounted contiguous with the

augmentation and autopilot.

basic Ka−band radar transmitting antenna. The unique

Stability augmentation (STAB AUG) provides added

feature of the augmentor is that it uses the AN/ APN−154

stability to the aircraft and is, in general, necessary for

beacon as its I−band transmitter. This is accomplished by

effective aircraft control.

coupling the output of the augmentor to the AN/ APN−154

and triggering its modulator and transmitter. During the

The autopilot ACL mode can be engaged only after

landing phase, it is necessary to manually place the radar

engaging all STAB AUG axes and then by placing the AUTO

beacon MODE switch to ACLS. In this mode, the AN/

PILOT ENGAGE switch in ON. Selection of ACL on the

APN−154 receiver is disabled to ensure that I−band signals in

DFCS control panel arms the mode and displays the A/P REF

the area will not trigger the AN/APN−154 transmitter during

advisory on the pilot MFD No. 1. A/P REF indicates that an

landing.

DFCS pilot relief mode has been selected (in this case, ACL),

but not engaged. The pilot engages ACL through the

reference engage switch on the stick grip, at which time

the A/P REF advisory goes out.

ORIGINAL

17−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

17.2.4.1

Beacon Controls

degraded control on the glideslope and unacceptable

touchdown dispersion. A properly functioning APC should

The RADAR BEACON panel (Figure 17−1) is on the

hold the aircraft on−speed ±0.5 unit throughout the majority

RIO right console. POWER or STBY can be used for radar

of the approach. At tipover, the aircraft may accelerate to as

beacon warmup; to preclude response to a premature or

much as two units faster but should correct to on−speed within

unintentional interrogation, the STBY (ACLS not selected)

5 seconds. The APC should be checked for satisfactory

position should be used.

operation prior to coupling. If the performance of the APC

There are no cockpit displays for the beacon, although

does not meet the above criteria, the approach should be

the ACLS TEST button will be illuminated if the beacon is

downgraded to Mode II.

responding during an ACLS approach. A selfcheck of the

beacon ACLS mode is accomplished by depressing the

17.2.6

ACLS/ILS Displays (MFD and HUD)

ACLS TEST or performing an on−board check. Either of

ACLS and instrument landing system steering inĆ

these two use the receiver video processing circuits of the

formation can be displayed on any MFD and the HUD

augmentor in the same manner as a Ka−band input from the

(Figure 17−2). When the AWL pushbutton is depressed, final

AN/SPN−42. If operation of the receiver is normal, the ACLS

determination of the display submode is governed by the

TEST pushbutton light on the RADAR BEACON panel will

HUD and MFD pushbuttons on the MFD when in AWL

illuminate. A BAG acronym will be displayed when

steering, which provide for separate ILS and ACLS selection

performing an OBC and in the event of a beacon augmentor

for both the HUD and MFD VDI format. This enables any

failure. The radar beacon has a minimum warmup time of 5

mix of ILS

(ANN/SPN−41/AN/ARA−63), ACL

(AN/

minutes. During this time, failure indications will be

SPN−42/data link), or no displays at the pilot’s option.

displayed and self−test results should be regarded as

inconclusive. A NO GO light during OBC should be verified

The ILS and ACL displays differ in that the ILS errors

by depressing the ACLS TEST pushbutton. If the ACLS test

are displayed by needles and the ACL errors are displayed

light illuminates, the system is functioning regardless of the

with the ACL steering indicator. The ACL steering indicator

NO GO light indication.

(Figure

17−2) represents where the intersection of ACL

needles would be if presented. Azimuth and glideslope

deviation are represented by the relationship of the velocity

vector to the needles/ACL steering indicator. Two different

means of displaying ILS and ACL steering are used to allow

the option of displaying both sources of information

If the aircraft is parked on the flight deck aft

simultaneously on either display

(MFD or HUD). Both

of the island, the radar beacon should be in either

displays in the ACL mode display a command heading

OFF or STBY with ACLS not selected. With

marker. This marker, during AN/SPN−42 approaches,

ACLS selected, stray energy can trigger beacon

indicates final bearing.

response and may seriously degrade perforĆ

The ILS steering displays approach information in the

mance or preclude lockon of aircraft attempting

form of precision course vectors. A vertical vector is used for

ACLS approaches. After shipboard arrestment

azimuth steering while the horizontal vector is for elevation.

and upon clearing the landing area, the radar

The pair form a crosspointer and are displayed on the HUD

beacon power switch should be turned to OFF to

and VDI presentations simultaneously. Full−scale deflection

prevent possible beacon signal interference with

limits of the HUD and VDI vector symbols are 20 and 1.5

other aircraft.

inches, respectively. The vectors are limited to this deflection

to ensure the displayed symbol will always have an

Note

intersection. Full scale deflection limits correspond to 6° of

lateral deviation from centerline and

1.4° of vertical

Do not depress the ACLS TEST pushbutton after

coupling on a Mode I approach as it will cause the

deviation from glideslope.

ground station to break lock.

The ACL submode uses the ACL steering indicator that

is driven by the data link instead of the AN/ARA−63 receiver

17.2.5

Approach Power Compensator

decoder. Any combination of ILS needles, ACL steering

Performance

indicator, or neither is available for the HUD or VDI

presentations. Selection of each is controlled by the pushĆ

For successful Mode I and Mode IA ACLS approaches,

buttons contained on the MFD once AWL steering is

it is essential that the APC be functioning satisfactorily.

selected.

Sluggish APC performance or its inability to maintain

on−speed accurately during the approach will result in

17−3

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NOMENCLATURE

FUNCTION

Power switch

PWR Ċ

With radar beacon mode selector in ACLS, enables I−band replies

to Ka−band interrogations.

STBY Ċ

Used for warmup with radar beacon MODE switch in SINGLE or

DOUBLE.

Note

The beacon will warm up with the switch in either

position STBY or PWR. To prohibit response to

premature or unintentional interrogations, warmup

should be accomplished in STBY. For optimum

performance allow 5−minute warmup.

OFF Ċ

Turns off all power to radar beacon.

Figure 17−1. Radar Beacon Panel (Sheet 2 of 2)

Additionally, certain ACLS commands that are

The aircraft system receives and decodes glideslope

uplinked to aircraft via the data−link system are displayed to

azimuth and elevation signals that are converted into

both aircrew on MFD No. 1 and No. 3.

command fly−to indications in the CIU and displayed via VDI

and/or HUD in the TLN mode (Figure 17−2). If the ILS or

Note

ACL landing submodes selected on the pilot display control

For more detailed information on the data link

panel becomes invalid, the invalid submode symbology will

symbology, refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A.

be removed. A computer message informing the aircrew

which submode became invalid will be posted on MFD No.

The ACLS and ILS systems provide angular situation

1 and No. 3. As a backup to the display subsystem, ILS

information (ILS needles and ACLS tadpole) of glidepath

steering indications are also displayed directly on the pilot

errors that requires the pilot to determine the corrections

standby attitude indicator vertical and horizontal needles.

needed to eliminate those errors, resulting in higher workload

and possible degraded approach performance (overshoots

Note

and oscillations). The flight director display provides the

optimum glidepath steering information (as computed by the

The ILS has a minimum warmup time of 1

mission computer using navigation system parameters and

minute. During this time, a failure indication

data−link information from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system) to

should be disregarded.

intercept and follow the glideslope and centerline, which

reduces pilot workload and improves approach performance.

The ILS performs a self−test when the BIT pushbutton

The flight director symbol can be selected for display on the

on AN/ARA−63 decoder panel is depressed and held.

HUD by boxing the FLT DIR pushbutton on the pilot AWL

Response to the ILS self−test is displayed, providing ILS or

VDI MFD format.

BOTH is selected on HUD and MFD. The correct ILS

landing mode display on the HUD and VDI display during

17.2.7

Instrument Landing System (AN/ARA−63)

system checkout shows the vertical precision course vector

The aircraft ILS uses the AN/ARA−63 receiver decoder

symbol slowly oscillating on the right side of the display, then

on the left side. The horizontal precision course vector

to process AN/SPN−41 confirmation. This system is used for

manual instrument landing approaches or as an independent

symbol remains stationary in the center of the display.

monitor during final approach with the ACLS. The AN/

ARA−63 decoder panel (Figure 17−3) is located on the pilot

right−side outboard console.

17−5

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NOMENCLATURE

FUNCTION

HUD Symbology ć TLN Gear Up Basic Format

1 Command Heading

Indicates ACL data link final bearing. Where final bearing is beyond display scale

Marker

limits the marker will be pegged at the edge nearest to the final bearing.

2 ILS Precision Course

Consists of two independent vectors (vertical and horizontal) that form a cross

Vectors

pointer. The horizontal vector responds to ILS glide slope error and the vertical

vector responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications are provided to enable

the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and horizontal needles centered.

3 ACLS Tadpole

Provides ACL Steering commands driven by the SPN−42 data link.

4 Waveoff

A large X" will appear flashing in the center of the display to indicate a waveoff

data link discrete command.

5 All Weather Landing

Indicates the selection of AWL Steering.

Steering Legend

6 TACAN Range

Indicates distance to the TACAN station.

7 Clock/Timer

Indicates time−to−go to selected destination (TACAN) if selected from HSD CLK

pushbutton.

Figure 17Ć2.ĄACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 1 of 3)

ORIGINAL

17−6

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NOMENCLATURE

FUNCTION

VDI Symbology ć AWL Steering Mode

Command Heading

Positioned relative to the magnetic heading scale to indicate ACL data link final

Marker

bearing. Where final bearing is beyond display scale limits, the marker will be

pegged at the edge nearest to the final bearing.

D/L Message Window

Provides certain ACLS commands that are uplinked to aircraft via the data link

system.

ILS Precision Course

Consists of two independent vectors (vertical and horizontal) that form a cross

Vector

pointer. The horizontal vector responds to ILS glide slope error and the vertical

vector responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications are provided to

enable the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and horizontal needles

centered.

ACL Steering Indicator

Provides ACL Steering commands driven by the SPN−42 data link.

Waveoff

During carrier landings, a large X" will appear flashing in the center of the display

to indicate a waveoff data link discrete command.

Figure 17−2. ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 2 of 3)

17−7

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NOMENCLATURE

FUNCTION

Flight Director

The flight director symbol provides glide slope and centerline steering information

computed by the mission computer using navigation system parameters and Data

Link information from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system. The flight director provides the

pilot with optimal glide path intercept and following when the flight path marker is

inside the flight director box and the three dots are aligned with the wings and the

tail of the flight path marker. The same procedures are used whether the flight path

marker is caged or uncaged. The flight director symbol is removed from the HUD

when the FLT DIR pushbutton on the VDI is unboxed. The pushbutton is removed

from the VDI if the Flight director is not available for display (for example, a/c vector

or ACL data link mode is not selected).

MFD AWL Display

Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ILS, ACL, or NO STEERING

Option pushbutton

information on the MFD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the basic VDI

format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the MFD. This will be

indicated by AWL in the box adjacent to the MFD legend. Successive depression of

the pushbutton cycles AWL, ILS, ACL and NO STEERING information on the MFD

in that order.

HUD AWL Display

Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ILS, ACL, or NO STEERING

Option pushbutton

information on the HUD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the basic VDI

format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the HUD. This will be

indicated by AWL in the box adjacent to the HUD legend. Successive depression of

the pushbutton cycles AWL, ILS, ACL, and NO STEERING information on the HUD

in that order.

Note

The RIO is inhibited from deselecting AWL steering once

selected from any MFD.

Figure 17−2. ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 3 of 3)

17.3

SURFACE SUBSYSTEMS

To satisfy the system capability and landing−rate

requirements, the shipboard subsystem landing control

17.3.1

Automatic Landing System (AN/SPN−42)

central AN/SPN−42 has a dual−channel configuration. This

provides increased system reliability through redundancy. At

The AN/SPN−42 radar uses a conically scanning

full operational capability, both channels are in use, con-

antenna beam of Ka−band energy, which is received at the

trolling two aircraft on the glideslope at the same time. Two

aircraft in direct proportion to its position within the antenna

aircraft are normally spaced approximately 60 seconds apart

coverage area. This microwave energy is received as

along the glideslope. In addition, the three operating modes

amplitude modulation of the pulsed carrier and, by means of

act as backups for each other should partial system failure

the beacon augmentor, the AM is put on the I−band beacon for

occur.

retransmission back to the ship as an active radar signal. The

AM on this retransmitted signal is therefore identical to

17.3.2

Instrument Landing System (AN/SPN−41)

the AM received at the aircraft. By relating the amplitude of

the returned signal to the AN/SPN−42 antenna position within

The aircraft ILS uses carrier or shore−based AN/

its conical scanning area, the system knows the exact location

SPN−41 (C−scan) transmitters. The system operates in the

of the aircraft in relation to the axis of the conical scan, which

K−band, between 15.4 and 15.7 GHz, on any of 20 channels.

is the desired glidepath. From this information, the system

The transmitted azimuth signal produces a 2° beam, which

can generate corrections to bring the aircraft to the desired

is scanned ± 20° from the deck centerline. The transmitted

glidepath. Additional ramp input pitch commands, tailored

elevation signal produces a 1.3_ beam with a scan pattern

to each specific ship or field by the Naval Air Test Center

from 0_ to 10_ above the horizon. A proportional azimuth

during Mode I certification, are applied at the proper time to

angle for steering is 6° right or left of centerline; proportional

assist the aircraft through the burble.

elevation angle for steering is

1.4° from the reference

glideslope (above or below).

Change 2

17−8

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Operating range is approximately 20 nautical miles.

1. Data−link vector

The signal is transmitted in J−band on a carrier frequency of

15.4 to 15.7 GHz.

2. TACAN

The AN/SPN−41 can be used to guide the pilot to the

3. AWL.

window of the AN/SPN−42 radar for an ACL Mode I

All are directly selectable on the VDI format of the

approach and as an independent glideslope and azimuth

MFD. Switching between submodes requires a choice

display during a Mode I approach. Should the AN/SPN−42

between DATA LINK, TACAN, and AWL steering. If a

radar system fail, the AN/SPN−41 can be used for Mode II

submode selected becomes invalid, the steering information

approaches.

will cease. The pilot has the option of reselecting another

landing display submode. A computer message will also

17.4

ACLS PROCEDURES

inform the aircrew of invalid steering modes.

The successful completion of a Mode I or Mode IA

During the letdown from marshaling, an AN/SPN−42

ACLS approach is dependent on the proper performance and

channel is assigned to the aircraft and a computer program of

complex interaction of a variety of shipboard and aircraft

aircraft control parameters is selected. A data−link discrete

systems. It is the responsibility of the aircrew to verify that

message (the first of a series to be transmitted), LANDING

all ACLS−related aircraft systems are functioning properly

CHECK, is sent to the aircraft to initiate communications

and that proper procedures are followed in order to ensure a

with CATCC and to indicate to the pilot that an AN/SPN−42

safe coupled approach.

channel is available. The aircraft will usually already be in

a landing configuration upon receipt of LANDING CHECK.

17.4.1

Preflight

During the exterior preflight, the aircrew should ensure

17.4.3.1

Data−Link Vector Approach

that both beacon antennas are in good repair and not painted.

When DATA LINK is selected, the D/L vector display

The receive antenna is located on the lower starboard

is added to the basic landing display. Command heading

fuselage just aft of the radome and is mounted flush with the

relative to the heading tape is added to the HUD and VDI

fuselage. The transmit antenna is a blade antenna located on

display along with commanded altitude and airspeed on the

the aft portion of the chin dome (IR/TV pod). Poor condition

right and left side of the VDI display. Data−link vector

of these antennas will seriously degrade beacon performance

information is available only for the approach phase (i.e., to

and will result in degraded tracking capability by the

the radar acquisition window). When the aircraft is vectored

AN/SPN−42 system.

(D/L vector commands) to the acquisition window, the pilot

has to make a new submode selection for the descent phase.

17.4.2

Poststart Checks

This is not the case with the TACAN submode, as TACAN

Following start, the aircrew should verify proper

information is available throughout landing, from marshalĆ

operation of the beacon and data−link systems along with

ing to touchdown.

associated lights and advisories and indications by performĆ

ing the prescribed built−in tests. In addition, the pitch parallel

17.4.3.2

TACAN Approach

actuator should be checked during OBC to make sure that the

The course deviation indicator is used for TACAN

force link is not totally or partially disconnected. If any of

deviation along with a manually set command heading

these systems are not functioning properly, a coupled

indicator on both the HUD and VDI display.

approach will not be possible.

17.4.3.3

AWL Approach

17.4.3

Approach Phase

ILS information from the AN/SPN−41 is available

In ACL, the purpose of the approach phase is to get the

during both the approach and descent phase. Selection of

aircraft to the acquisition window (Figure

17−4). At the

AWL on the VDI display enables vertical and lateral

marshaling area, some 20 miles astern of the carrier, the

glideslope error display. Final determination of the AWL/

aircraft about to land are stacked according to fuel status and

PCD mode is governed by the ILS/ACL selection, which

other relevant parameters that determine landing priority, the

provides for separate HUD and VDI selection. Additionally,

ILS (AN/ARA−63) system is energized, and the proper

the pilot may independently select HUD flight director for

channel and displays are selected. The pilot, in concurrence

display by boxing the FLT DIR pushbutton on the AWL VDI.

with the controller, has the option of choosing from three

display submodes to aid him in reaching the radar acquisition

window:

ORIGINAL

17−10

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

The normal ACLS approach mode will display the

17.4.4.1

Mode I Landing Sequence

ACL tadpole situation information, the ILS needles situation

information, and the ACL flight director steering

Note

information on the HUD. If the pilot intends to make a Mode

I approach, he must advise the ground controller of his

D ACLS Mode I/IA approaches are authorized

intentions. The ground controller will then disable the flight

with AN/SPN−46 systems.

director commands and enable the autopilot commands.

Until this is done, the pilot will not have the capability to

D Refer to paragraph

2.24.4.7, Automatic

couple the autopilot to the ACLS commands. The only

Carrier Landing (ACL), for further informaĆ

information that is displayed on the HUD during Mode I

tion on ACL.

approaches is the ACLS tadpole situation information and

The landing system (CATCC) (Figure 17−4) generates

the ILS needles situation information.

a coupler available discrete that displays the A/P CPLR

advisory and indicates that the pilot has the option of

17.4.4

Landing Phase

coupling the DFCS to data−link commands of pitch and bank.

As the aircraft continues its approach and passes

At this time, the aircraft should be in a landing configuration

with APC, DLC, DFCS, and altitude hold engaged.

through the 4−nm ACLS radar acquisition window, a smooth

transition, not requiring pilot action, occurs. If TACAN

information has previously been selected (for the approach

Note

phase), the pilot could use this information to land. Assume,

The radar should be in STBY or PULSE search

however, that AWL has been selected, ILS and ACL

to avoid beacon interference problems.

information is being displayed on the HUD and VDI.

The DFCS should be armed in the ACL relief mode

At the radar acquisition window, the AN/SPN−42 radar

with the A/P REF displayed, indicating that a pilot relief

acquires the aircraft with the aid of the airborne radar beacon

mode (in this case, ACL) has been selected but not engaged.

augmentor, and the system automatically sends a discrete

The pilot can couple the DFCS to the data link by means of

indicating radar lock−on that displays the ACL RDY

the autopilot engage button on his control stick, at which

advisory. Transmission of vertical and lateral glidepath

time, if the DFCS is functioning properly and the ACL

errors and flight director commands, derived by the AN/

interlock is true, the AP REF legend will go out. The pilot

SPN−42/46 radar, commences. The glidepath error signals

should report coupled; at which time, the controller will send

drive the ACL tadpole on the VDI and HUD. The flight

a discrete command control message that displays the CMD

director symbol is selected for display by boxing the FLT DIR

CONTROL advisory. The NTDS begins transmitting

pushbutton on the AWL VDI MFD format. The flight director

data−link, pitch and bank commands to the aircraft. The

display information is computed by the mission computer

autopilot actuates the appropriate control surface to execute

using navigation system parameters and data−link informaĆ

the desired command, while the autothrottle

(APC)

tion, if desired. If the pilot intends to make a Mode I

maintains approach angle of attack by controlling the throttle

approach, he must advise the ground controller of his

setting.

intentions. The ground controller will then disable the flight

director commands and enable the autopilot commands.

Note

Until this is done, the pilot will not have the capability to

couple the autopilot to the ACLS commands. The only

Care should be taken not to couple up in even a

information that is displayed on the HUD during Mode I

slight climb. If above reference altitude when

approaches is the ACLS tadpole situation information and

initial pitch commands are sent, the resulting

the ILS needles situation information.

nose down correction is likely to cause a force

The HUD and VDI symbology has thus been

link disconnect resulting in automatic decouple

determined for the landing phase and no further pilot

and an inability to perform mode IA approaches

selection is required (unless a system malfunction occurs).

until maintenance action is performed.

The mode of operation for this phase of the landing is a

Whenever the aircraft exceeds the Mode I flightpath

function of the type of equipment used. In particular, there

control envelope, the system automatically sends a signal to

are three modes of landing applicable: Mode I, Mode II, and

uncouple the DFCS (A/P CPLR legend goes out). The

Mode III.

approach may be continued in Mode II or Mode III. If the

flightpath error increases to the point where a large maneuver

is required to bring the aircraft back on course, the controller

will send a waveoff message that is displayed on the HUD

and VDI and turns on the WAVEOFF advisory. This discrete

also disconnects the autopilot (if engaged) and the DFCS

ORIGINAL

17−12

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

reverts to stability augmentation. The controller then

D The paddle switch will illuminate the

transfers the guidance of the aircraft to the bolter/waveoff

MASTER CAUTION light.

controller, who directs the pilot back into the landing

sequences.

17.4.4.2

Mode II Landing Sequence

If the information stored in the data link is not updated

The early phases of a Mode II descent (Figure 17−5) are

within any 2−second period during the descent, the TLT

identical to a Mode I descent sequence. The aircraft to be

advisory goes on

(missed message) and the DFCS

recovered is directed through the marshaling area, receives

automatically disconnects and reverts to STAB AUG. The

LANDING CHK, and arrives at the ACLS radar acquisition

pilot can continue the descent in Mode II or Mode III.

gate. When the lock−on discrete (ACL RDY) message is

received, the pilot continues to fly the aircraft manually

12.5 seconds from touchdown

(approximately

(using APC as desired) in response to VDI and/or HUD

2,200 feet from the touchdown point), the 10 SECOND

displays.

advisory goes on, indicating deck motion data are being

added to the glidepath commands. This information is in the

If there is an equipment failure, the system (CATCC)

form of a slight increase (or decrease) in aircraft altitude to

will send a voice discrete signal that turns on the VOICE

adjust for the movement of the touchdown point caused by

advisory, and the AN/SPN−42 error information displayed

the ship’s motion (roll, pitch, and heave). Between 12.5 and

will be invalid and thus removed. The pilot then expects to

1.5 seconds from touchdown, the CATCC sends an automatic

receive standard voice commands and will probably use the

waveoff if any part of the carrier−based equipment fails and

redundant ILS information or switch to TACAN steering.

up to 5 seconds from touchdown if the aircraft exceeds the

As long as the aircraft is located within the AN/SPN−42

AN/SPN−42 flightpath control envelope. Waveoff signals

flightpath control envelope for Mode II, the descent is

also may be issued by the final controller (between lock−on

continued until visual contact is made with the Fresnel lens

and touchdown) and the landing signal officer between 1 mile

optical landing system meatball. All waveoffs in Mode II

and touchdown. Approaches must be waved off at weather

are given by the final controller or the LSO. Approaches are

minimums (200−feet altitude and ½−mile visibility) if the

terminated at weather minimums

(200−feet altitude and

pilot cannot see the meatball.

½−mile visibility) if the pilot cannot see the meatball.

At 2 seconds from touchdown, the landing system

At any time before 12.5 seconds from touchdown, the

freezes the pitch and bank commands and the DFCS holds the

pilot can switch from a Mode II manual to a Mode I automatic

aircraft’s attitude to touchdown unless the pilot elects to

flightpath control, provided the coupler available discrete is

override the DFCS either by maneuvering the control stick or

being received and the ACL interlock is true.

by manually disengaging the DFCS and assuming control.

Aircraft may also be disengaged by momentarily depressing

17.4.4.3

Mode III Landing Sequence

the A/P REF / NWS pushbutton located on the control stick

(this will not illuminate a MASTER CAUTION light). If the

Mode III descents follow the same general sequence as

aircraft bolters or if the pilot decides to go around, the DFCS

that of Modes I and II, but Mode III approaches are talkdown

is disengaged automatically by means of overriding the

landings; that is, all flightpath corrections are provided by

control stick, and the pilot enters the bolter/waveoff pattern.

voice and no computerized discrete signals are sent. The use

of APC is optional. Approaches are terminated at the weather

Note

minimums if the FLOLS (meatball) is not visible to the pilot

D The paddle switch will only disengage the

for continuing the landing.

autopilot; the DLC as well as PITCH and

ROLL SAS will remain engaged.

D The paddle switch will still revert throttles to

MANUAL mode and the engines to emergenĆ

cy SEC mode with weight−on wheels. The

paddle switch may revert the engines to the

emergency SEC mode in flight with a WOW

failure.

17−13

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 18

Extreme Weather Operations

18.1

ICE AND RAIN

be made to eliminate the ice before landing by remaining

well below the freezing level for an extended period of time.

18.1.1

Icing

Icing conditions should be avoided whenever possible.

Before flight, check freezing levels and areas of probable

icing from weather service.

The primary concern with flying in icing conditions is

Icing conditions can cause heavy ice

ice accumulation sufficient to cause engine damage. Ice

accumulation in the inlet ramp areas or on engine

accumulation on engine probes located between the engine

probes and the compressor face. Aircraft

guide vanes and above the number three inlet ramp is not

maneuvers and arrested landings may dislodge

detectable from the cockpit. Aircraft maneuvers or landing

this accumulation and cause extensive engine

impact can dislodge accumulated ice and can cause severe

FOD or failure. A straight−in field landing is

FOD to the engine. Visual detection of icing on exterior

preferred. Minimum power setting after landing

surfaces and/or illumination of the pilot’s INLET ICE

is recommended.

caution light should be treated as indications of the

potentially more serious problems described above. The

following precautionary action should be taken immediately

in known or suspected icing environments:

1. ANTI−ICE switch  ORIDE/ON.

Operation of main flaps/slats and maneuvering

devices increases the likelihood of a flap/slat

2. CABIN AIR DEFOG lever  FWD DEFOG.

lockout because of shearing of the torque tube.

Attempt to descend below the freezing level for

3. Engine instruments  Monitor Frequently.

20 to

30 minutes before operating main or

Carefully monitor rpm and EGT indications. A

maneuvering flaps/slats.

reduction of rpm or an increase in EGT accompanied by a

loss of thrust is an indication of engine icing.

18.1.2

Rain

Whenever rain is encountered, turn ANTI−ICE switch

4. Avoid clouds and other areas of visible

to AUTO/OFF.

precipitation.

5. If unable to avoid precipitation, adjust aircraft Mach

Note

or altitude as necessary to remain outside of the

In heavy rainfall, maintain a minimum engine

icing zone shown in Figure 18−1.

power setting of 70−percent rpm. This will assure

Extended operations in icing conditions should be

adequate acceleration margin and prevent posĆ

considered an emergency situation. If time and fuel permit,

sible engine speed hangup.

a descent below the freezing level is recommended. If

unable, altitudes above approximately

25,000 feet or

18.1.2.1

Takeoff in Rain

ambient temperatures below −30°C are generally free of icing

Takeoffs performed with standing water on the runway

conditions. If inadvertent or unavoidable operation in known

may result in unstable engine operation because of water

or suspected icing conditions has occurred, an effort should

ingestion.

18−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Figure 18Ć1.ĄIcing Danger Zone

18.1.2.2

Landing in Rain

18.2.1

Dynamic Hydroplaning

Selecting ON with the WSHLD AIR switch controls a

Dynamic hydroplaning is a condition in which a fluid

blast of air that blows rain off the windshield. Be aware of the

separates the tires from the runway surface. When standing

possibility of flameout in a heavy rain and of reduced braking

water on a wet runway is not displaced by the tire fast enough

action because of a wet runway.

to allow contact over the complete footprint area of the tire,

the tire rides on a wedge (or film) of water over all or part of

18.2

HYDROPLANING

the footprint area. Total dynamic hydroplaning occurs when

the pressure between the tires and the runway lifts the tires

Operations on wet or flooded runways may produce

off the runway surface to the extent that a nonrotating tire will

four conditions under which tire traction may be reduced to

not spin up (landing) or a rolling, unbraked tire will slow in

an insignificant value.

rotation and may actually stop

(takeoff). Total dynamic

hydroplaning speed (in knots) is represented by the following

1. Dynamic hydroplaning

mathematical formulas: 9 times the square root of the tire

inflation pressure (in psi) for a rotating tire (as in takeoff);

2. Viscous hydroplaning

7.7 times the square root of the tire inflation pressure for a

nonrotating tire (as in landing).

3. Reverted rubber skids

Dynamic hydroplaning is insensitive to vertical load

4. Combined viscous and dynamic hydroplaning.

changes (weight), but is greatly affected by tire inflation

pressure and tire wear. Since the fluid cushion is incapable of

Note

developing any appreciable shear force, braking and sideĆ

force coefficients become almost nonexistent.

Hydroplaning has been experienced in the F−14

at speeds down to 40 knots.

ORIGINAL

18−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

18.2.2

Viscous Hydroplaning

and dynamic hydroplaning. As speed is further increased, a

point is reached where bulk water penetrates the entire

Viscous hydroplaning occurs when the tires are

footprint; this condition is called dynamic hydroplaning. If

separated from the runway surface by a thin film. Viscous

the runway is not flooded (no bulk water), such as on a

fluid pressures in the tire−ground contact zone of rolling tires

runway covered with heavy dew, it is possible for the second

build up with speed to the danger levels required for

zone to cover the entire footprint as speed is increased or

hydroplaning only when water−covered pavements are

decreased. The pavement would have to be smooth or smooth

smooth or smooth acting, as when contaminants

acting, as in the case where contaminants are present, for this

considerably more viscous than water coat the pavements.

to take place; this is called viscous hydroplaning.

Since a tire operating on a surface with rubber deposits, paint,

fuel, or oil can only partially displace the trapped water film,

considerably higher hydroplaning pressures will be develĆ

oped in the tire footprint area with these more viscous fluids.

Even slight amounts of precipitation, for example, a heavy

dew that coats the pavement with a thin film of fluid, can

produce this effect. Because the tire footprint separates on the

runway with less fluid depth and at a lower relative

groundspeed than dynamic hydroplaning speed, viscous

hydroplaning is potentially more dangerous than dynamic

hydroplaning and is not greatly affected by changes in

vertical tire load or tire inflation pressure. Grooved tires offer

a greater advantage than smooth tires in reducing the effects

of viscous hydroplaning. The runway pavement surface

texture is also an important factor in combating viscous

hydroplaning effects.

18.2.3

Combined Dynamic and

Viscous Hydroplaning

Loss of tire friction with increasing or decreasing speed

on wet or flooded runway pavements can be caused by the

combined effects of viscous and dynamic hydroplaning.

Figure 18−2 shows a pneumatic tire rolling at medium speed

across a flooded pavement in a partial hydroplaning condiĆ

tion. The first zone shows the fraction of the tire footprint that

is supported by bulk water (dynamic); the second zone, the

fraction supported by a thin film of water (viscous); and the

third zone, the fraction essentially in dry contact with the

Figure 18Ć2.ĄCombined Viscous and Dynamic

peaks of the pavement surface texture. The length of the first

Tire Hydroplaning

zone represents the time required for a rolling tire in this

speed condition to expel bulk water from under the footprint;

18.2.4

Reverted Rubber Skids

correspondingly, the length of the second zone represents the

time required for the tire to squeeze out the residual thin

A reverted rubber hydroplaning condition (also called

water film remaining under the footprint after the bulk water

reverted rubber skid) takes place when a wheel skid has

has been removed. Since fluids cannot develop shear forces

started on a wet runway and enough heat is produced to turn

of appreciable magnitude, it is only in the third zone

the entrapped water to steam. The steam in turn melts the

(essentially dry region) that friction can be developed

rubber in the tire footprint. The molten rubber forms a seal

between the tire and the pavement for steering, decelerating,

preventing the escape of water and steam. Thus, the tire rides

and accelerating a vehicle. The ratio of the dry contact area

on a cushion of steam that greatly reduces the coefficient of

(third zone) to the total tire footprint area (zones 1, 2, and 3)

friction. On inspection of the portion of the tire involved, a

multiplied by the coefficient the tire develops on a dry

patch of rubber would show signs of reverting to its uncured

pavement, yields the friction coefficient the tire develops for

state and hence the name, reverted rubber. Once established,

this flooded pavement and speed condition. As speed is

this condition may persist to very low groundspeeds. The

increased, a point is reached where the third zone disappears

characteristic marks on a pavement for the reverted rubber

and the entire footprint is supported by either bulk water or

skid are white, as opposed to the black marks left on the

a thin film. This speed condition is called combined viscous

pavement during a dry skid. These white marks are

18−3

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

associated with the cleaning process of super−heated steam

18.3.1.1

If Necessary to Penetrate a

and high pressures that are present in the skid. The reverted

Thunderstorm:

rubber condition tends to make all runway surfaces smooth

acting. Pavement surface texture, which has a large effect on

1. Slow to between 275 to 300 KIAS.

traction losses from dynamic and viscous hydroplaning, has

but little effect for the reverted rubber case with the possible

2. ANTI−ICE switch  AUTO/OFF.

exception of grooved surfaces. NASA research confirms the

3. AUTO PILOT switch  OFF.

theory that the reverted rubber skid is the most catastrophic

for aircraft operational safety because of the low−braking

4. Loose equipment  Secured.

friction and the additional fact that tire cornering capability

drops to zero when the wheels rotation is stopped.

5. Tighten lapbelt and lock shoulder harness.

18.2.5

Landing On Wet Runway

6. Cockpit lights  On Bright.

Refer to Chapter 7 for landing discussion.

7. Fly attitude and heading indicators primarily while

in extreme turbulence, because altimeter and

18.3

TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS

airspeed will fluctuate.

Unless the urgency of the mission precludes a deviation

from course, intentional flight through thunderstorms should

Note

be avoided to preclude the high probability of damage to the

During severe icing conditions, the pilot can

airframe and components by impact of ice, hail, and

expect to lose airspeed indications even with the

lightning. Flameouts because of water ingestion or

compressor stalls caused by rapid changes in flight attitudes

pitot heat on. Ground−controlled intercept

stations, if available, can aid the pilot with

could also occur. Radar provides a means of navigating

tracking assistance through thunderstorm areas.

between or around storm cells. If circumnavigating the storm

is impossible, penetrate the thunderstorm in the lower third

Severe turbulent air at high altitudes may cause the

of the storm cell, away from the leading edge of the storm

inlet airflow distribution to exceed acceptable limits of the

cloud, if possible. It is recommended that the autopilot

engine, thereby inducing compressor stalls. To avoid

functions of DFCS be disengaged. Structural damage could

compressor stalls during flight because of turbulent air,

result with the automatic functions operating.

maintain 275 to 300 KIAS at all altitudes.

18.3.1

In the Storm

18.4

COLD−WEATHER OPERATIONS

Maintain a normal instrument scan with added

A careful preflight will eliminate many potential

emphasis on attitude displays. Attempt to maintain a constant

hazards found in cold−weather operations. Inspect engine

pitch attitude and, if necessary, accept moderate altitude and

intakes for accumulation of ice and snow. If possible, preheat

airspeed fluctuations. In heavy precipitation, a reduction in

the engine for easier engine starts. When removing ice and

engine speed may be necessary because of the increased

snow from the aircraft surfaces, be careful not to damage the

thrust resulting from water ingestion. If compressor stalls or

aircraft. Also, use precautions not to step on any no−step

engine stagnation develops, attempt to regain normal engine

surfaces that could be covered with ice or snow. Check the

operation by momentarily retarding the throttle to IDLE then

pitot−static tube for ice as well as the fuel pressurization ram/

advance to the operating range. If the stall persists, shut down

air intakes, and yaw, pitch, and angle−of−attack transducers.

the engine and attempt to relight. If the engine remains

Moisture in the fuel system greatly increases

stagnated at reduced power and the EGT is within limits,

maintain reduced power until clear of the thunderstorm.

operational problems in cold weather. At lower temperatures,

the water−dissolving capacity of fuel is greatly reduced and

While in the storm, the longitudinal feel trim, angle−of−

attack, total temperature, windshield overheat, static

will result in considerably more water accumulation

pressure correction, and cabin pressurization systems may

(as much as several gallons of water to 1,000 gallons of fuel).

If the water separation occurs at below freezing temperaĆ

experience some abnormalities because of rain, ice, or hail

damage. No difficulty should be encountered in maintaining

tures, the water will crystallize on the fuel drain and internal

valves. Any water accumulation will settle to the bottom of

control of the aircraft; however, the rapid illumination of

numerous warning lights may be somewhat distracting to the

the tanks and freeze up the fuel drains.

pilot if he is not prepared.

Normal operating procedures as outlined in Chapter 7,

Shore−Based Procedures, should be adhered to with the

following additions and exceptions.

ORIGINAL

18−4

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

18.4.1

Preflight

Note

1. Check entire aircraft to ensure that all snow, ice, or

If external transfer does not initiate or is inĆ

frost is removed.

complete, flight below the freezing level for 20

to 30 minutes will allow frozen valves to thaw

permitting external transfer.

In severely cold weather, allow a short time for warmup

before increasing rpm out of the idle range. If oil pressure is

low or fails to come up in a reasonable length of time, shut

Snow, ice, and frost on the aircraft surface are a

down. Attempt another start after heating the engines.

major flight hazard. The result of this condition

is a loss of lift and increased stall speeds.

2. Shock struts and actuation cylinders  Free of Ice

and Dirt.

If abnormal sounds or noises are present during

3. Fuel drain cocks

 Free of Ice and Drain

starting, discontinue starting and apply intake

Condensation.

duct preheating for 10 to 15 minutes.

4. Pitot tubes  Ice and Dirt Removed.

18.4.3

Taxiing

5. Exterior protective covers  Removed.

Avoid taxiing in deep or rutted snow since frozen

brakes will likely result.

18.4.2

Engine Start

To ensure safe stopping distance and prevent icing of

Be sure that the aircraft is adequately checked before

aircraft surfaces by melted snow and ice blown by jet blast

engine start.

of a preceding aircraft, increase spacing between aircraft

When operating in subfreezing temperatures, moisture

while taxiing at subfreezing temperatures.

in the air entering the aircraft from the starting unit may

freeze, causing ECS malfunctions. Starting the aircraft with

18.4.4

Takeoff

the AIR SOURCE in OFF will prevent the problem. The AIR

When operating from runways that are covered with

SOURCE in BOTH ENG should be selected after both

excessive water, snow, or slush, highspeed aborts may result

engines have been started and the starter air disconnected.

in engine flameout because of precipitation ingestion. The

ECS malfunctions after engine start may still occur because

probability of flameout is highest when throttles are chopped.

of moisture internally present in the aircraft.

With a double flameout, normal braking, anti−skid and

nosegear steering will be lost as hydraulic pressure decreases

If this occurs, select:

with engine spool down. Check applicable takeoff distance

1. TEMP mode selector switch  MAN.

charts in NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1.

2. TEMP control thumbwheel  Full Hot (14).

Thrust available will be noticeably greater in cold

temperatures during the takeoff run.

3. WSHLD AIR switch  ON.

4. With both engines at IDLE, the ECS should thaw in

about 20 minutes. During this warmup period, leave

all avionics and radar off.

If external fuel tanks are installed:

Before initial takeoff roll, ensure that all

instruments are sufficiently warmed up. After

5. MASTER TEST switch Ċ FLT GR UP.

takeoff, cycle landing gear a few times to prevent

the possibility of the gear freezing in the

Advance throttles as necessary to

80 percent

wheelwells.

maximum to check for GO light and positive

external transfer. Once airborne, external fuel

transfer should not be delayed to ensure complete

external tank transfer.

18−5

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

18.4.5

Landing

18.5.1

Taxiing

Frozen downlock microswitch actuators, because of

While taxiing in hot weather, the canopies may

moisture combined with extremely cold temperatures, can

be opened, if necessary, to augment crew

cause spurious unsafe down indications when landing gear is

comfort.

extended. Use antiskid during the landing roll.

Note

Hard braking on ice or a wet runway, even with

ANTISKID on, could result in dangerous

Do not operate the engines in a sand or dust

skidding.

storm, if avoidable. Park the aircraft crosswind

and shut down the engines to minimize damage

18.4.6

After Landing

from sand or dust.

During operations where the temperature is below

freezing with heavy rain, or expected to drop below freezing

18.5.2

Takeoff

with heavy rain, the aircraft may be parked with wings

The required takeoff distances are increased by a

forward (20°) and flaps in the full down position.

temperature increase. Check the applicable takeoff distance

charts in NAVAIR 01−F14AAP− 1.1.

18.4.7

Before Leaving Aircraft

Weather permitting, leave the canopy partially open to

allow for air circulation. This will help prevent canopy

cracking from differential cooling and decrease the

possibility of windshield and canopy frosting.

Do not attempt takeoff in a sand or dust storm, if

18.5

HOT−WEATHER AND

avoidable, to prevent sand or dirt from blowing

DESERT OPERATIONS

into the intake ducts and causing engine damage.

Check for accumulation of sand or dust in the intakes.

18.5.3

Landing

Normal starting procedures will be employed.

Anticipate a slightly longer landing distance and the

Normal operating procedures as outlined in Chapter 7,

possibility of turbulence because of thermal action of the air

Shore−Based Procedures, should be adhered to with the

close to the ground. Use the defogging system if necessary,

following additions and exceptions:

in warm, humid weather.

1. Expect higher temperatures than normally obtained

in operating ranges.

2. Engine ground operation should be minimized as

much as possible.

ORIGINAL

18−6

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 19

Communications

19.1

COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED

control panel controls antenna selection and is described in

EQUIPMENT

Chapter 21. TACAN antenna selection is completely autoĆ

matic. If a signal is lost or is too weak to maintain receiver

Figure 19Ć1 lists the CNI equipment associated with

lockup, the TACAN cycles between the upper and lower

the aircraft/weapons systems.

seeking a stronger signal. See Chapter

20 for TACAN

operation.

19.1.3

Mutual Interference

Mutual interference among the V/UHF communicaĆ

tion radios and between the V/UHF communication radios

Operation of electronic equipment for more than

and D/L can occur. In the UHF band, minimize mutual

5 minutes without adequate cooling will permaĆ

nently damage the equipment.

interference by selecting opposite antennas or a frequency

separation of at least 55 MHz between radios if both are being

used. When D/L is in use, mutual interference can be

19.1.1

Communications Antennas

minimized by using VHF channels for voice communicaĆ

Four V/UHF/L−band, dual−blade antennas provide

tions. If this is not possible, frequency separation of at least

omnidirectional coverage for V/UHF voice, JTIDS voice,

55 MHz and selection of opposite antennas for voice and D/L

UHF D/L, JTIDS Link 16, TACAN, and IFF/SIF transponder

are recommended. If necessary, V/UHF 1 or 2 can be shut off.

operation. V/UHF 2, JTIDS voice and data, and TACAN

UHF communications interference with D/L may cause the

share one set of antennas; the upper is immediately aft of the

TILT computer message to appear and the autopilot ACL or

canopy turtleback and the lower is embedded in the left

VEC/PCD mode to disengage. D/L interference with the

ventral fin. The F/UHF 1, D/L, and IFF/SIF share the second

radios may cause audible chirping at the D/L message reply

set; the upper is the second antenna aft of the canopy

rate.

turtleback and the lower is embedded in the right ventral fin.

In the VHF band, both radios should not be operated

Each system is connected to the appropriate portion of an

simultaneously at VHF frequencies.

upper and lower antenna through a coaxial switch and

diplexer. For information on the AN/ASW−27 DL (Link 4),

JTIDS will not interfere with any of the V/UHF

and JTIDS (Link 16), refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A.

communication radios or data link because it uses a higher

frequency band. TACAN compatibility, which is in the same

The APX−76 IFF interrogator antenna is an integral

frequency band (L−band) as JTIDS, is performed internally

part of the radar antenna. See FO−1 and FO−2 for antenna

by JTIDS.

locations.

19.2

INTERCOMMUNICATIONS

19.1.2

Communications Antenna Selection

The ICS provides normal, backup, or emergency

Selection of the upper or lower antenna for use by the

communications between crewmembers. It also combines

two communication radios and the D/L or JTIDS is manual

and amplifies audio signals received from other electronic

and is controlled by switches on the RIO ANT SEL panel

receiving equipment (ECM, Sidewinder tone, IFF/SIF, radar

(Figure 19−2). The D/L is always on the opposite antenna

altimeter, and voice radios, etc.).

from V/UHF 1. Antenna selection for the IFF/SIF can be

either automatic or manual. The ANT switch on the IFF

19−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

TYPE AND

LOCATION

DESIGNATION

FUNCTION

RANGE

OPERATOR

OF CONTROLS

INTERCOM

Provides voice communications

Within the aircraft

Both, and

Pilot and RIO left

(LS−460B)

between crewmembers and

and groundcrew

groundcrew

console and in

between cockpit and

personnel.

personnel

the nosewheel

groundcrew, also amplifies variĆ

well

ous warning and weapon tones,

and voice communications.

JTIDS

Provides jam−resistant,

Line of sight (LOS)

Both

Pilot left console,

(AN/URC−107)

cryptographically secure digital

up to 300 nautical

RIO right and left

voice and data, navigation, relay,

miles.

consoles

and TACAN.

TACAN

Navigation aid provides bearing

LOS up to 390 nm,

Both

Pilot and RIO left

(AN/ARN−118(V))

and distance information to local

depending on

console

(AN/URC−107)

stations.

altitude.

UHF DATA LINK

Provides two−way digital

LOS up to 180

Both

RIO right console

(AN/ASW−27C)

message communication.

nautical miles.

V/UHF 1

Provides two−way voice and tone

LOS up to 200

Both

Pilot left console

COMMUNICATIONS

communication.

nautical miles.

SET (AN/ARC−182(V))

V/UHF 2

Provides two−way voice and tone

LOS up to 200

Both

RIO left console

COMMUNICATIONS

communication.

nautical miles.

SET (AN/ARC−182(V))

V/UHF DIRECTION

Provides bearing information to

LOS up to 180

Both

Pilot and RIO left

FINDER

selected stations.

nautical miles.

console

(OA−8697/ARD)

UHF VOICE

Cryptographic encoding

Same as radio in

RIO

Left console

SECURITY

and decoding of UHF voice

use.

EQUIPMENT (KY−58)

communications.

IFF TRANSPONDER

Responds to interrogations

LOS.

RIO

Right console

(AN/APX−100)

by other aircraft or ground

stations.

IFF INTERROGATOR

Requests identification from

LOS.

RIO

DD and right

(AN/APX−76B)

other aircraft.

console

RECEIVER

Provides glideslope signals

LOS up to 20

Pilot

Right console

DECODER

for carrier landing system.

nautical miles.

(AN/ARA−63A)

RADAR ALTIMETER

Displays height above earth’s

0 to 5,000 feet.

Pilot

Pilot’s instrument

(AN/APN−194)

surface.

panel

RADAR BEACON

Aids in tracking by ship and

LOS.

RIO

Right console

(AN/APN−154)

ground−based x−band radars.

Provides down link for

automatic carrier landing system.

Figure 19Ć1.ĄCommunications and Associated Equipment

ORIGINAL

19−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NOMENCLATURE

FUNCTION

Amplifier selector

B/U Ċ

(Backup) used to bypass a fault amplifier and uses a backup

output amplifier at own station.

NORM Ċ

(Normal) used when all amplifiers are functioning properly.

EMER Ċ

(Emergency) uses the backup amplifier at own station, and

makes use of input amplifier of other station over the emergency

line. Volume is controlled by other station.

Function selector

RADIO

OVERRIDE Ċ Attenuates non critical radio audio to emphasize

intercommunication when urgent.

HOT MIC Ċ Intercommunication without keying.

COLD MIC Ċ Intercommunication only when pilot actuates COMM switch on

inboard throttle or RIO actuates keying switch on left foot rest.

RIO’s ICS button

Permits intercommunication if COLD MIC is selected on the function selector

(left foot rest)

control. Overrides V/UHF communications.

RIO’s MIC button

Permits transmission on V/UHF 1, V/UHF 2, or BOTH radios as well as JTIDS

(right foot rest)

as selected on the radio frequency channel indicator (RFCI).

Figure 19−3. Intercommunication Controls (Sheet 2 of 2)

Identical ICS control panels (Figure 19−3) are on the

pilot and RIO left−side consoles. The ICS includes four

amplifiers, two at each cockpit station, that permit duplex

operation during normal operation. If one amplifier fails, it

may be bypassed by selecting either the B/U (backup) or

With the front cockpit ICS amplifier selector

EMER (emergency) position on the ICS control panel. This

knob in the EMER position, engine stall/

permits continued ICS operation.

overtemperature and Sidewinder tones will not

be available to the pilot.

Note

If two amplifiers fail at the same station,

intercommunication is impossible.

D Selection of EMER via the ICS amplifier

The external interphone connection is in the nose

selector knob in either cockpit allows use of

wheelwell. When the pilot’s COMM switch is set to HOT

the other cockpit’s input amplifier.

MIC, ground personnel can communicate with the cockpit

stations.

D The RIO can obtain a Sidewinder and engine

stall/overtemperature tone by selecting

EMER on his ICS panel. This allows the RIO

19.2.1

Audio Warning Signals

to use the pilot’s input amplifier.

Audio warning signals from the weapon system are

Figure

19−4 provides a glossary of audio warning

available to either or both crewmen through the ICS. Each

signals available within the aircraft weapon systems. Two

signal has a distinct tone. A visual display accompanies most

28−Vdc circuit breakers, ICS NFO (7F3) and ICS PILOT

audio signals so that the flightcrew can expect the tone and

(7F2), control power to and provide circuit protection for the

interpret its meaning. Most audio signals may be attenuated

ICS. Power to both circuit breakers is from dc essential bus

or turned off if not required, allowing the flightcrew to

No. 1. Approximately 1 minute of warmup is required in

concentrate on more critical tones. Critical warning tones

order to achieve normal operating temperature.

cannot be attenuated by any mode of ICS operation.

19−5

ORIGINAL

F-14D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2004) - page 10