F-14D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2004)

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

BOLDFACE PROCEDURES

ENGINE FIRE ON THE DECK

BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF; TAKEOFF

CONTINUED OR AFTER LANDING GO−AROUND

*1. Both FUEL SHUT OFF handles .

Pull

*1. Throttles

As Required

*2. Both throttles

OFF

*2. Landing gear and flaps .

Leave as Set

UNCOMMANDED ENGINE ACCELERATION

for Takeoff

ON DECK

GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURE

*1. Paddle switch .

Depress and Hold

*1. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch . .. Check

*2. Throttle(s)

As Desired

*2. MASTER RESET pushbutton . .. Depress

*3. ENG MODE SELECT

SEC

*4. THROTTLE MODE switch

MAN

FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT

BRAKE FAILURE AT TAXI SPEED

*1. Throttle (affected engine) .

IDLE

*1. ANTI SKID SPOILER

*2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton

OFF

BK switch .

SPOILER BK or OFF

*3. OBOGS master switch .

BACKUP

ABORTED TAKEOFF

If light goes off (and no other secondary

*1. Throttles

IDLE

indications):

*2. Speedbrakes

EXT

*4. MASTER TEST switch . .. FIRE DET TEST

*3. Stick

AFT

If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET test fails, or

other secondary indications:

*4. Hook .

DN (1,000 feet before wire)

*5. FUEL SHUT OFF handle

*5. Brakes

As Required

(affected engine)

Pull

*6. Right engine

OFF (if required)

*6. Throttle (affected engine)

OFF

SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE FIELD/

*7. Climb and decelerate.

CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF

*8. Fire extinguisher pushbutton . .. Depress

*1. Set 10° pitch attitude on the waterline

(14 units AOA maximum).

COMPRESSOR STALL

*2. Rudder

Opposite Roll/yaw

*1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0 g).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supplemented by

If greater than 1.1 Mach:

Lateral Stick

*2. Both throttles

MIL

*3. Both throttles

As Required for

Positive Rate of Climb

When 1.1 Mach or less:

*4. Landing gear

*3. Both throttles .

Smoothly to IDLE

*5. Jettison

If Required

If EGT above 935_C and/or engine response

abnormal:

BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF; TAKEOFF

ABORTED OR AFTER LANDING TOUCHDOWN

*4. Throttle (stalled engine)

OFF

*1. Nosewheel steering

Engaged

ENGINE FLAMEOUT

*2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK

*1. Throttle

IDLE or Above

switch

SPOILER BK

(affected engine)

*2. BACK UP IGNITION switch .

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

If hung start or no start:

UPRIGHT DEPARTURE/FLAT SPIN

*3. Throttle

Cycle OFF, Then IDLE

*1. Stick

Forward/Neutral

(affected engine)

Lateral, Harness−Lock

If still hung or no start:

*2. Throttles

Both IDLE

*4. ENG MODE SELECT

SEC

*3. Rudder

Rudder−Opposite

If one engine is operable, perform a crossbleed

Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin Arrow

airstart.

If no recovery:

If both engines flamed out/inoperative or

crossbleed not possible:

*4. Stick

Into Turn Needle

*5. Airspeed

450 Knots

(altitude permitting)

If yaw rate is steady/increasing, spin arrow

RAMPS LIGHT/INLET LIGHT

flashing, or eyeball−out g is sensed:

*1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

*5. ROLL SAS  On; Stick  Full Into Turn

Needle and Aft.

*2. Decelerate to below 1.2 TMN.

*3. Affected INLET RAMPS switch .

STOW

If recovery indicated:

ELECTRICAL FIRE

*6. Controls

NEUTRALIZE

*1. L and R generators

OFF

*7. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as

If uncommanded SAS or spoiler inputs present:

required.

*2. PITCH, ROLL, and

YAW STAB AUG switches

OFF

If flat spin verified by flat attitude, increasing Yaw

ECS LEAKS/ELIMINATION OF

rate, increasing eyeball−out g, and lack of pitch

SMOKE AND FUMES

and roll rates:

*1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton

OFF

*8. Canopy

Jettison

*2. OBOGS master switch .

BACKUP

*9. EJECT

(RIO Command Eject)

*3. If smoke or fumes present:

a. Altitude Below 35,000 Feet

INVERTED DEPARTURE/SPIN

b. CABIN PRESS switch DUMP

*1. Stick

Full Aft/Neutral

*4. RAM AIR switch

OPEN

Lateral, Harness  Lock

LAD/CANOPY LIGHT WITH RIO’S CANOPY LIGHT/

*2. Throttles

Both IDLE

CANOPY LOSS

*3. Rudder

Rudder−Opposite

*1. Canopy

BOOST CLOSE

Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin Arrow

(canopy remaining)

UNCOMMANDED ROLL AND/OR YAW

If recovery indicated:

*1. If flap transition:

*4. Controls

Neutralize

FLAP handle .

Previous Position

*2. Rudder and stick .

Opposite Roll/Yaw

*5. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as

required.

*3. AOA

Below 12 Units

*4. Downwing engine .

MAX THRUST

If spinning below 10,000 feet AGL:

(if required)

*6. EJECT

(RIO Command Eject)

*5. MASTER RESET

Depress

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

WARNING

*WARNING LIGHT AND/OR DISPLAY LEGEND

CAUTION

(HUD HUD/MFD, MFD) DISPLAY LEGEND

ADVISORY

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

AAA tracking radar detected.

As briefed.

ACLS or autopilot

Take control for manual landing approach.

disengagement.

AAI ZERO (MFD)

Improper IFF interrogator

As briefed.

operation.

Airborne interceptor tracking

As briefed.

detected.

L A/ICE

Designated engine anti−ice

If INLET ICE light on, perform appropriate procedure.

R A/ICE

is on or anti−ice valve has

If INLET ICE light off, inlet ice may be on though not

(MFD)

failed opposite commanded

commanded. Report to maintenance.

position.

A/P REF (MFD)

Selected A/P reference is not

Depress autopilot reference pushbutton to engage AP

engaged.

reference mode.

ARI DGR

Indicates degraded ARI

1. MASTER RESET Ċ Depress.

performance.

2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive

maneuvering should be terminated.

3. Remain below 1.0 TMN.

ARI/SAS OUT

Loss of ROLL or YAW SAS,

1. Ensure ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches Ċ

and all ARI functions

ON.

2. MASTER RESET Ċ Depress.

If light remains illuminated:

3. Leave STAB AUG switches Ċ ON.

To take advantage of any remaining capability

that the DFCS may be able to provide.

Terminate aggressive maneuvering and remain

below 1.0 TMN.

Improper ALQ−165 position.

As briefed.

(MFD)

ALQ−165 self−protection jamĆ

Secure ALQ−165.

mer overheated.

(MFD)

L AUG

AB is not available and oppoĆ

No immediate action required; assess operational

R AUG

site engine is limited to MIN

impact.

(MFD)

AB if ATLS is on.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 1 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

AUTOPILOT

Autopilot or reference failure.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

1. Assume manual/boost control.

Autothrottle has been

2. Satisfy APC interlocks.

disengaged.

3. Reengage APC AUTO.

AUX FIRE EXT

Low−extinguisher agent

Report to maintenance.

pressure.

(MFD)

Totalizer less than preset

Pilot option.

value.

Bleed duct overheat

*1. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

condition or ECS regulating

*2. OBOGS  BACKUP.

failure.

*3. If smoke or fumes present:

a. Altitude Below 35,000 feet.

b. CABIN PRESS  DUMP.

*4. RAM AIR  OPEN.

5. Airspeed  <300 Knots/0.8 Mach.

6. Nonessential electrical  Secure.

7. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever

CANOPY DEFOG.

8. Land as soon as possible.

If electrical fire:

9. Follow electrical fire procedures.

Operating in auxiliary brake

1. Turn antiskid off.

mode, antiskid failure, or

2. Cautious brake application.

parking brake set.

3. Release emergency brake.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 2 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Backup oxygen less than 200 psi.

B/U OXY LOW light (both cockpits):

1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

If BACKUP OXY PRESS < 200 PSI:

2. Cabin alt  Less than 10,000 Feet.

3. Oxygen supply  OFF.

4. Oxygen masks  Release One Side.

Before landing:

5. Oxygen masks and supply  ON.

6. Emergency oxygen  Activate.

If BACKUP OXY PRESS > 200 psi:

2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Monitor.

B/U OXY LOW light (pilot only):

1. BOS CONTR/B/U

OXY LOW cb  Check In (7A4).

2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only):

2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

Cabin pressure failure.

1. Oxygen mask  ON.

If below 15,000 feet.

2. CABIN PRESS  Cycle.

CADC failure.

1. MASTER RESET  Depress

2. CADC cb’s (LA2, LB2, LC2, LD2)  Cycle.

3. MASTER RESET  Depress.

If light still remains illuminated:

4. Remain below 1.5 Mach.

Canopy not locked.

*1. Canopy  BOOST CLOSE (canopy

remaining).

*2. EJECT CMD  PILOT.

3. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200

Knots/15,000 Feet.

4. Seats and visors  DOWN.

5. If canopy has departed aircraft,

perform controllability check.

6. Land as soon as possible.

Controls and displays hot.

1. Select cabin air.

2. WCS switch OFF.

Improper operation of converter−

Expect loss of CIU inputs/outputs.

interface unit.

(MFD)

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 3 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

CIU HOT

Converter−interface unit overĆ

Pull cb’s 3E7, 4E1, 4E2.

(MFD)

heated.

CLSN

RIO has collision steering

Pilot option.

(HUD)

selected.

COOLING

Indication of possible bleed duct

1. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

AIR

failure forward of the pressure

2. OBOGS  BACKUP.

(IN FLIGHT)

primary heat exchanger and

If associated with any other direct or indirect

400°F modulating valve.

indication of ECS malfunction:

3. Perform ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke

and Fumes Procedure.

If not associated with any other direct or indirect

indication of ECS malfunction and operational

requirements dictate temporary reselection of ram

to regain lost service systems:

3. AIR SOURCE  RAM.

4. RAM AIR door  FULLY OPEN.

5. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

COOLING

Inadequate cooling.

1. AIR SOURCE  Check L ENG, R ENG, or

AIR

BOTH ENG.

(ON DECK)

2. Throttles  Advance Without Closing

Nozzles.

3. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever 

CANOPY DEFOG.

4. ECS  MAN/FULL HOT (CONT).

If light goes out:

5. Throttles  IDLE.

6. ECS  As Desired.

If light remains illuminated

7. Secure systems.

Continuous−wave emitter

As briefed.

detected.

DEU HOT (MFD)

Data entry unit overheated.

Expect loss of DEU.

DP1 HOT

Display processor overheated.

Pull cb’s 1G2, 1G4, 1G6, 3F4, 4F3, 4F6.

DP2 HOT (MFD)

DSS HOT

Data storage set overheated.

Expect loss of DSS.

(MFD)

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 4 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

EMERG JETT

When depressed with weight

None.

PUSHBUTTON/

off wheels, activates emerĆ

ACK LIGHT

gency stores jettison signal

to the SMS and illuminates

light for 5 seconds. Jettison

function is disabled with

weight on wheels.

ENG

Low−extinguisher agent

Report to maintenance.

FIRE EXT

pressure.

(MFD)

Engine mode control in

If engine transfers to sec mode:

secondary.

1. Throttle  Less Than MIL.

2. ENG MODE SELECT  Cycle.

If PRI mode restored.

3. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level

flight.

4. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle.

If engine remains in SEC:

3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

4. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

Fire/overheat condition in

If HUD/MFD message:

engine nacelle.

Message is a repeat of a discrete from the fire detect

system. If FIRE warning light is off and FIRE DET

TEST checks 4.0, then assume message was incorrect

(HUD/MFD)

and keep engine on line.

If FIRE warning light and message:

*1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.

*2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

*3. OBOGS  BACKUP.

If light goes OFF and no secondary indications:

*4. MASTER TEST  FIRE DET TEST.

If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET TEST fails, or

other secondary indications:

*5. FUEL SHUT OFF  Pull.

*6. Throttle  OFF.

*7. Climb and decelerate.

*8. Fire extinguisher  Depress.

*9. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.

10. Land as soon as possible.

11. If fire persists  Eject.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 5 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

DFCS failure has

1. MASTER RESET Ċ Depress.

FCS CAUTION

occurred. With no

If light remains illuminated:

other lights, indicates

2. Airspeed Ċ Remain below 600 knots or 1.3 TMN and

loss of redundancy

adhere to the following limitations:

only.

a. Above 0.5 TMN, no cross control inputs permitted

above 10 units AOA.

b. With maneuvering devices retracted, coordinate all

lateral stick inputs above 0.6 TMN and 15 units AOA.

Flap position disparity

1. Airspeed  Below 225 Knots.

with a commanded

2. FLAP handle  Ensure Full Up.

position or flap/slat

3. MASTER RESET  Depress.

asymmetry.

4. While holding MASTER RESET pushbutton depressed,

maneuver flap thumbwheel  Full Forward.

5. Check FLAP light out.

If after landing/takeoff flap transition, or reillumination after

above procedures:

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

2. If light still illuminated, check FLAP handle and indicator

position, then proceed with appropriate steps below.

Flap handle up and flaps not fully retracted

1. Flap handle  EMER UP.

Flap handle up and flaps indicating full up:

1. Flaps  Cycle.

Flap handle down and flaps not fully extended:

1. Wing−sweep  Ensure at 20°.

Flap handle down and flaps down:

1. Wing−sweep  Ensure at 20°.

2. MASTER RESET  Depress.

Flap and slat asymmetry:

Refer to Chapter 14.

Engine flameout.

Check engine gauges.

If invalid, report anomaly to maintenance.

(MFD)

If valid, perform the following:

*1. Throttle  IDLE or Above.

*2. BACKUP IGNITION switch  ON.

If hung start or no start:

*3. Throttle  Cycle OFF, Then IDLE.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 6 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Engine flameout.

If still hung or no start:

*4. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

If one engine is operable, perform a crossĆ

(MFD)

bleed airstart.

If both engines flamed out/inoperative or

crossbleed not possible:

*5. Airspeed  450 Knots.

6. OBOGS  BACKUP.

When start complete:

7. BACKUP IGNITION  OFF.

8. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.

9. OBOGS  ON.

When primary mode restored:

10. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in

level flight.

11. Affected AICS cb  Cycle.

Usable fuel in L and AFT or R and

1. DUMP switch  OFF.

FWD fuselage tanks 1,000 pounds.

2. Fuel distribution  Check.

If wing and/or external fuel remaining:

3. WING/EXT TRANS  ORIDE.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

Sump tank boost pump discharge less

1. Both throttles  MIL Power or Less.

than 9 psi.

2. Restore aircraft to 1.0g flight.

If both lights remain on:

3. Increase positive g’s to > 1.0g.

4. Descend below 25,000 feet.

5. Maintain cruise power settings or less.

6. Land as soon as possible.

If one light remains on:

3. No afterburner above 15,000 feet.

4. Fuel distribution  Monitor.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

Generator failure and/or disconnected

1. Generator  OFF/RESET,

from its ac bus.

Then NORM.

If generator does not reset:

2. Generator  TEST.

a. GEN light off Ċ distribution system.

b. GEN light illuminated Ċ IDG or GCU.

GPS failure.

Non−GPS primary navigation modes in use

GPS FAIL

(INS navigation mode).

(MFD)

Firing logic met. Pilot’s trigger will fire

Pilot option.

weapon when squeezed.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 7 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Combined or flight pump discharge

Refer to Chapter 14 for appropriate

pressure 2,100 psi or less.

procedure.

CADC failure or failure of actuators to

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

follow schedule.

If light remains illuminated:

2. ROLL STAB AUG  OFF.

3. Above 400 knots, restrict lateral control

to one−quarter throw.

4. ROLL STAB AUG  ON for Landing.

5. Do not select OV SW after landing.

IFF

Mode 4 interrogation received; no reply

As briefed.

generated.

IFF ZERO (MFD)

Improper IFF transponder operation.

As briefed.

Inlet guide vanes off schedule.

AICS fail operation mode in use.

Stall margin may be very slightly reduced but

still remains satisfactory and greater than that

(MFD)

in SEC mode.

High−power thrust may be reduced.

IMU

Improper operation of inertial measureĆ

Secondary navigation mode is in use.

(MFD)

ment unit.

INS

Improper operation of inertial navigaĆ

Secondary navigation mode is in use.

(MFD)

tion system.

INTEG

Power loss or discrepancy between

MASTER RESET.

TRIM

input signal and position.

Computer malfunction or ramp misĆ

*1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

positioning.

*2. Decelerate below 1.2 TMN.

*3. Affected INLET RAMPS  STOW.

If RAMPS light remains illuminated:

4. Throttle  80 percent or Less.

5. Affected AICS cb  Pull.

6. Affected INLET RAMPS  AUTO.

7. Land as soon as practicable.

If INLET light only illuminated, attempt AICS

program reset:

4. Decelerate below 0.5 TMN.

5. Affected AICS cb  Cycle.

If INLET light goes off:

6. Affected INLET RAMPS  AUTO.

If INLET LIGHT remains illuminated:

6. Affected AICS cb  Pull.

7. Affected INLET RAMPS  AUTO.

8. Remain below 1.2 TMN.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 8 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Icing condition exists in inlet or ENG/

1. Select ORIDE/ON.

PROBE ANTI−ICE switch is on.

When clear of icing conditions:

2. ANTI−ICE  AUTO/OFF.

IPF

JTIDS is failed, a momentary glitch,

Select IPF RESET on JTIDS control panel.

or 20−percent duty cycle has been

exceeded.

IRSTS HOT

Infrared search and track system

Secure system.

(MFD)

overheated.

JTID HOT

Possible loss of cooling air or a high

Secure system.

(MFD)

JTIDS transmit duty cycle.

With RIO CANOPY light, canopy

*1. Canopy  BOOST CLOSE.

unlocked.

*2. EJECT CMD  PILOT.

3. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200 Knots/

15,000 Feet.

4. Seats and visors  DOWN.

5. If canopy has departed aircraft, perform

controllability check.

6. Land as soon as possible.

Without RIO CANOPY light, ladder

1. Airspeed minimum.

not stowed.

2. Obtain in−flight visual check if possible.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

LAUNCH

Launch bar unlocked, engines less

As appropriate.

BAR

than MIL thrust.

(Ground)

LAUNCH

Launch bar not locked in up position or

1. Landing gear  Leave Down.

BAR

cocked nosegear.

2. Obtain visual inspection.

If nosegear cocked, refer to Landing Gear

(Flight)

Malfunction guide.

If launch bar down or visual inspection not

available:

3. Request removal of arresting cables for

field landing.

4. Request removal of crossdeck pendants

1 and 4 for CV landing.

L LO THR

Designated engine may be producĆ

If associated with RATS check, monitor engine

R LO THR

ing less than expected thrust.

gauges and FEMS engine data for normal rpm,

FF, and temperatures. If no anomalies, message

(MFD)

is false alarm triggered by the hook.

If not associated with a RATS check, record

FEMS data and abort.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 9 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

LOCK

Radar locked on target.

Pilot option.

L MACH #

Mach number signal to designated

In flight  Remain below 1.1 TNM.

engine has failed.

Small throttle reductions below MIL at

R MACH #

high Mach can result in engine stall.

(MFD)

On deck  Assess operational impact of speed

restriction for mission.

MACH TRIM

Failure of Mach trim actuator to folĆ

1. MASTER RESET.

low program.

2. Retrim manually.

(MFD)

Actuated by any caution light on

Push to reset after discrete MSG noted.

caution panel.

Improper operation of mission

Backup operation selected automatically.

computer.

(MFD)

Mission computer overheated.

Backup operation selected automatically.

(MFD)

Engine fan rpm exceeds 106 perĆ

1. Throttle  IDLE.

cent.

Check rpm gauge for N₂ and FEMS

engine data on MFD for N₁ to determine

(MFD)

validity of overspeed message.

If overspeed continues:

2. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

If overspeed condition persists:

3. Throttle  OFF.

4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

Engine core rpm exceeds

1. Throttle  IDLE.

107.7 percent.

Check rpm gauge for N₂ and FEMS engine data

on MFD for N₁ to determine validity of overspeed

(MFD)

message.

If overspeed continues:

2. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

If overspeed condition persists:

3. Throttle  OFF.

4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 10 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Nosewheel steering is engaged.

Disengage when appropriate.

Engine oil temperature limits

On deck:

exceeded or high scavenge oil

1. Throttle  OFF.

temperature.

In flight:

1. Oil pressure  Check.

2. Throttle  85−percent rpm.

3. If after 1 minute, light still illuminated

 Throttle OFF.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

5. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.

6. Relight engine for landing if necessary.

L/R OIL LO

Designated engine oil level is

Alert ground personnel; servicing required.

approximately 2 quarts low

(MFD)

Postflight, engine at idle.

L or R oil press <11 psi.

1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.

If oil pressure below 15 psi, above 65 psi, or

engine vibration:

If shutdown feasible:

2. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operation

(Chapter 14).

If shutdown not feasible:

2. RPM  Set Minimum Rpm.

3. Avoid high−g or large throttle movements.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

Low percent oxygen.

1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

Indicates inoperative pitch channel

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

PITCH SAS

or PITCH SAS failure.

2. If light remains illuminated 

No limitations.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 11 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Computer/mechanical malfunction or

Refer to INLET light.

RAMPS ramp mispositioning.

RATS

RATS operation enabled.

1. Tailhook  DOWN.

If conditions permit:

2. ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/

WSHLD/AIR cb  Pull (8C2).

RCV

ALQ−165 is receiving threat

As briefed.

identification signal.

Airspeed >225 KIAS with flaps down.

1. Reduce speed.

Airspeed >2.4 M.

2. Check FLAP handle.

Total temperature >388° F.

3. MASTER RESET.

(HUD/MFD)

RDP FAN

Radar data processor fan failure.

Expect overheat.

Radar operation on ground is posĆ

Radar POWER switch to STBY

sible.

(as applicable).

RDR HOT

Radar system overheated.

Select STBY.

(MFD)

Warning or caution message(s) being

As appropriate to displayed message(s).

displayed on MFD.

Indicates inoperative roll channel and

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

ROLL DGR

degraded roll authority.

2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive

maneuvering should be terminated.

3. Remain below 1.0 TMN.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 12 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

CADC failure or failure of actuator

1. MASTER RESET  Depress (10 seconds).

to follow schedule.

2. If light remains illuminated  Above 250

Knots, Restrict Rudder Inputs to < 10°.

Improper ALR−67 radar warning

As briefed.

receiver operation.

(MFD)

RWR

ALR−67 overheated.

Secure ALR−67.

HOT

SAHRS

SAHRS not available.

Avoid IFR flight if INS is degraded.

Steady  Tracking radar detected.

As briefed.

Flashing  Missile launch detected.

Improper operation of KY−58,

As briefed.

JTIDS not keyed.

(MFD)

SENSOR

Overheat or pump loss in radar

1. RADAR COOLING  OFF.

COND

coolant loop.

2. RDR  OFF.

3. APG−71 PUMP PH A, B, C cb  Pull.

If other conditions exist that may indicate an ECS

malfunction, either directly or indirectly, perform

ECS leak/elimination of smoke and fumes

procedures:

4. Land as soon as practicable.

SHOOT

Target meets LAR requirements.

As briefed.

SMS HOT

Store management system (MFD)

Expect loss of SMS.

(MFD)

overheated.

Symmetric spoiler detector has

If associated with abnormal roll and/or yaw:

locked down spoilers.

1. Counter roll with at least 1 inch of lateral

stick.

2. Visually check spoiler position/operation.

Refer to Chapter 14.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 13 of 15)

ORIGINAL

ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Starter solenoid air valve open after

1. Ensure ENG CRANK  OFF.

engine start.

2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

If on deck:

3. Throttle  OFF.

If airborne:

3. ENG START cb  Pull (RF1).

4. OBOGS  BACKUP.

Engine stall and/or overtemperature.

*1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g).

If greater than 1.1 Mach:

*2. Both throttles  MIL.

(HUD/MFD)

When 1.1 Mach or less:

*3. Both throttles  Smoothly to IDLE.

Check EGT and FEMS engine data for

TBT to determine validity of stall message.

If EGT above 935°C and/or engine response

abnormal:

*4. Throttle (stalled engine)  OFF.

If EGT normal and/or airstart successful:

5. Perform engine operability check.

Turbine blade overtemperature.

1. Throttle  IDLE.

Check EGT gauge and FEMS engine data

on MFD for TBT to determine validity of

(MFD)

overtemperature message.

If still overtemperature:

2. Throttle  OFF.

TRANS/RECT

Lack of dc output from either or

1. Generator  OFF/RESET, Then NORM.

both T/R.

2. If both lights remain illuminated, select

EMERG GEN on MASTER TEST panel.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

Landing gear not down with flaps

Lower gear.

down and either throttle ≤ 85 percent.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 14 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS

LIGHT/LEGEND

CAUSE

ACTION

Failure of both wing−sweep chanĆ

Advisory light only, no loss of normal control:

nels or spider detent disengaged.

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

(MFD)

WING SWEEP light and W/S legend, no automatic

or manual control:

1. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.9 or Less.

2. Check spider detent engaged.

3. MASTER RESET  Depress.

If WING SWEEP light and W/S caution legend

illuminate again:

4. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP

DR NO. 2 MANUV FLAP cb  Pull.

5. Emergency WING SWEEP handle −

Comply With Schedule.

Refer to Chapter 14.

WING

Failure of one wing−sweep channel.

Advisory light only:

SWEEP

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

WSHLD HOT

Center windshield temperature

1. WSHLD AIR  OFF.

300_F.

If light remains illuminated:

2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

3. OBOGS  BACKUP.

4. RAM AIR  OPEN.

5. Reduce airspeed < 300 knots or 0.8 Mach.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

Indicates inoperative yaw channel

1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

YAW DGR

and degraded yaw authority.

2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive

maneuvering should terminated.

3. Remain below 1.0 TMN.

Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 15 of 15)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 12

Ground Emergencies

12.1

ON−DECK EMERGENCIES

Note

12.1.1

Engine Fire on the Deck

D If hot start on deck, windmill engine until EGT

is below 250 °C before attempting restart.

PILOT

D If wet start, continue cranking until tailpipe is

*1. Both FUEL SHUT OFF handles  Pull.

clear of fuel.

*2. Both throttles  OFF.

12.1.3

START VALVE Light After Engine Start

3. If conditions permit  Windmill Engine.

4. BACK UP IGNITION switch  Check OFF.

Ensure ENG CRANK switch  OFF.

AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

Excessive windmilling of engine with oil system

failure may increase combustion/smoking (blue/

white) and result in greater difficulty extinguish-

ing, causing further damage to engine.

D If the starter valve does not close during engine

acceleration to idle rpm, continued airflow

If FIRE light and/or other secondary indications:

through the air turbine starter could result in

5. Fire extinguisher pushbutton (affected engine) 

catastrophic failure of the starter turbine.

Depress.

D If the START VALVE caution light illumi-

6. Egress.

nates after the ENG CRANK switch is off, or

if the ENG CRANK switch does not automati-

RIO

cally return to the off position, ensure that the

1. Notify ground and/or tower.

ENG CRANK switch is off by 60−percent rpm

2. Egress.

and select AIR SOURCE to OFF to preclude

starter overspeed.

12.1.2

Abnormal Start

1. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

12.1.4

Uncommanded Engine Acceleration

2. BACK UP IGNITION switch  Check OFF.

on Deck

Uncommanded engine acceleration may or

may

not be associated with throttle movement. Uncommanded

throttle(s) are characterized by increased or decreased throttle

settings caused by failures of the throttle control system.

A catastrophic Hot Start will occur if the affected

Uncommanded engine acceleration without throttle

throttle is not immediately secured following a

movement is a result of an AFTC or MEC failure normally

loss of electrical power during an engine start

associated with one engine. Selection of either L or R ENG

with the RPM below forty percent. Air flow will

select switch to SEC may restore throttle authority.

be cut off and fuel will continue to be scheduled

to the engine with the ignitors firing, causing a

rapid and severe rise in EGT that will not be

observed on the EIG due to power loss.

12−1

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

*1. Paddle switch  Depress and Hold.

required to minimize risk of injury. Spacing of pitot static

probes along both sides of the forward fuselage will allow for

*2. Throttle(s)  As Desired.

an unobstructed egress.

*3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

Note

In SEC mode, nozzle is commanded fully closed.

D Standing and jumping from the cockpit or

attempting to slide down the nose of the airĆ

*4. THROTTLE MODE switch  MAN.

craft during ground egress can result in severe

injury.

If engine(s) still uncommanded and aircraft is not in catapult

tension:

D If the ENG/PROBE ANTI−ICE switch is in

the ORIDE position, touching the pitot probes

Throttle(s)  OFF.

with bare skin will cause burns.

FUEL SHUT OFF handle(s)  Pull.

1. Kneel aircraft (if possible).

2. Canopy  OPEN or JETTISON

Note

D Approximately 50 pounds of force must be

3. Parking brake  Pull.

applied to the throttles to override the boost

system to ensure disengagement of APC BIT

4. Ejection seat  SAFE.

self−test.

(Safe by raising the SAFE/ARMED handle)

D The quickest and most reliable method to

5. All fittings (Restraint fittings and oxygen hose) 

secure uncommanded throttles is to revert the

Release.

throttle system to the manual mode and secure

the throttle(s). Since manual is, by design, a

Note

backup mode, the throttle rigging may not be

the same as the boost mode. It may take a hard

To retain survival kit, do not release lapbelt

snapping motion to position the throttle into

restraint fittings.

OFF. If throttle(s) are misrigged in manual

mode, the OFF position may not secure fuel

12.1.6

Emergency Entrance

flow to the engine.

D Both throttles cannot be secured simultaĆ

See Figure 12Ć1 for procedures for entering the cockpit

neously; however, reverting to manual mode

for emergency rescue.

will allow both throttles to be repositioned to

IDLE simultaneously.

12.1.7

Weight On−Off Wheels Switch Malfunction

12.1.5

Ground Egress Without Parachute and

There are WOW switches on the left and right main

Survival Kit

gear that interact with many aircraft subsystems to provide

safety interlocks. The interlocks prevent operation of various

Methods and routes of ground egress will vary with the

components or systems on deck or in flight, as appropriate.

situation. In all cases, kneeling the aircraft (conditions perĆ

mitting) via the nose strut switch will facilitate a safer exit for

the aircrew. If sufficient time does not exist for ground perĆ

sonnel to deploy the boarding ladder, aircrew should egress

to the rear of the aircraft, over the horizontal stabilizers or

wings, or directly to the deck from the cockpit if the tail is

Failure of the left or right WOW switches to the

over water. In the case of fire, the location and intensity of the

in−flight mode can cause loss of engine ejector

fire will dictate the safest escape route. If electing to egress

air to the IDGs and hydraulic heat exchangers

directly from the cockpit, aircrew should grasp the canopy

causing thermal disconnect and/or heat damage

rail with both hands, hang to full body extension, and drop to

to the generators and aircraft hydraulic systems.

the ground. A parachute−landing fall maneuver may be

ORIGINAL

12−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

12.1.7.1

Failure Of Weight On−Off Wheels to

a. Radar can scan and radiate.

In−Flight Mode

b. ALQ−165 can transmit.

INDICATIONS:

c. Probe heaters will be on in AUTO.

1. WOW acronym displayed.

d. ALQ−167 can radiate (TARPS).

2. Approach indexers illuminated.

e. BOL chaff can dispense.

3. Nozzles may be partially closed at idle rpm.

4. Nosewheel steering inoperative.

12.1.8

Binding/Jammed Flight Controls On Deck

5. Launch bar light illuminated (if nosegear turned

1. Hold light pressure against binding/restriction to

>10_).

facilitate maintenance troubleshooting procedures.

6. Ground−roll braking inoperative.

7. Wing−sweep MASTER TEST disabled.

8. Oversweep disabled.

Do not attempt to free controls by force, as furĆ

9. Outboard spoiler module on with FLAP handle UP

ther damage to flight control system may result.

(wings less than 62°).

10. Aircraft will not kneel.

2. Abort mission.

If two or more of the preceding anomalies are detected,

12.1.9

Brake Failure at Taxi Speed

the following action should be taken:

*1. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER BK

or OFF.

PILOT

1. Clear runway (if applicable).

2. NWS  Verify Engaged.

2. Generators  OFF.

3. Parking brake

 PULL (if required) (applying

parking brake will lock both main wheels.)

3. Throttles  OFF (after downlocks are in place).

Normal brakes are not available with parking

Failure of the left or right WOW switches to the

brake handle pulled. If parking brake accumulaĆ

in−flight mode can cause loss of engine ejector

tor pressure is depleted, aircraft brakes are isoĆ

air to the IDGs and hydraulic heat exchangers

lated from brake pedal master cylinders. Parking

causing thermal disconnect and/or heat damage

Brake handle must be pushed in to restore normal

to the generators and aircraft hydraulic systems.

brake operation.

RIO

1. RDR switch  OFF.

Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the

wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render the parkĆ

ing brake ineffective.

With failure of the WOW switch to the in−flight

If brakes still inoperative:

mode, the following functions are enabled:

4. Hook  DN.

ORIGINAL

12−4

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 13

Takeoff Emergencies

13.1

ABORTED TAKEOFF

Emergencies during takeoff are extremely critical and

require fast analysis and quick decision by the pilot. The

decision to abort should not be delayed just because

Rolling over an arresting wire with brake presĆ

emergency arresting gear is available at the end of the

sure applied may result in blown tires.

runway. Whether to abort or continue the takeoff depends on

the length of runway remaining, refusal speed, best single−

If arresting gear is available, use it to avoid rolling off

engine climb speed, and the arresting gear available. Failure

the runway. Always inform the control tower of your

of either engine, a fire warning light or a blown tire during

intention to abort the takeoff and engage the arresting gear,

takeoff dictates an immediate abort if enough runway is

so that aircraft landing behind you can be waved off. Lower

available. The ejection seats will provide safe escape at

the hook in sufficient time for it to fully extend (normally

ground level and low airspeeds. Therefore, if a safe aborted

1,000 feet before engagement). Use nosewheel steering to

takeoff cannot be performed and takeoff is impossible, eject.

maintain directional control and aim for the center of the

runway. At night, use the taxi light to see the arresting gear.

In an aborted takeoff, aerodynamic ground−roll brakĆ

If off center just before engaging the arresting gear, do not

ing is assisted by simultaneous deflection of all spoilers (flaps

turn the aircraft but continue straight ahead, parallel to the

down) or inboard spoilers only (flaps up) to 55_ when both

centerline.

throttles are retarded to IDLE.

If aborting with a blown nosewheel tire, it is likely that

Note

either or both engines have FOD. In the event of any blown

Moving flap handle down activates outboard

tire during an aborted takeoff, the flaps should not be moved

spoilers to assist in aerodynamic ground−roll

until they can be inspected for FOD.

braking.

Aircraft control following loss of an engine during the

When securing the starboard engine, use caution to

takeoff roll is a function of thrust setting and airspeed. In most

prevent inadvertent shutdown of both engines. If both

cases, an aborted takeoff will be required. Refer to paragraph

engines are shut down, hydraulic pressure is lost along with

11.8 for additional discussion of takeoff configuration,

antiskid, nosewheel steering, spoiler braking, and normal

asymmetric thrust flight characteristics.

braking. Full aft stick is used to augment aerodynamic

braking. Care should be taken while positioning the stick aft

13.1.1

Aborted Takeoff Checklist

to avoid any nose rotation. The aircraft’s tendency to rotate

*1. Throttles  IDLE.

is accentuated with the flaps up because of increased

longitudinal control effectiveness, and aft stick must be

*2. Speedbrakes  EXT.

applied at a slower rate to avoid rotation.

*3. Stick  AFT.

Note

The stick should be positioned fully aft at a rate

that will not cause any nose rotation.

Maximum braking effort in aborts initiated near

*4. Hook  DN (1,000 feet before wire)

rotation speed at takeoff gross weights may result

in blown tires even with antiskid engaged.

*5. Brakes  As Required.

13−1

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

*6. Right engine Ċ OFF (if required).

13.2.2

Rate of Climb Consideration

Rate of climb may be increased by selecting afterburnĆ

er with ASYM LIMITER switch in ON. Only minimum AB

is available. The most adverse drag condition is with the

wings level on a constant heading, but techniques used by

traditional multiengine aircraft

(such as raising the dead

Aircrew should expect hot brakes following

engine with 5° angle of bank) are applicable for the F−14.

heavy gross weight, high speed aborts. ApplicaĆ

Airspeed and angle of bank control will also greatly affect

tion of the parking brake could cause the brake

rate of climb (refer to NAVAIR 01−F 14AAP−1.1 for all of

assembly to fail and result in a brake fire.

these effects).

Note

Under normal circumstances, 180 knots is used as the

If performing no flap/maneuvering flap takeoff,

flaps up speed. However, if during a single−engine takeoff the

lowering the flap handle slightly during an abort

aircraft has achieved a safe flying speed and a positive rate

will deploy all spoilers for ground−roll braking if

of climb but has difficulty achieving flap speed, moving the

SPOILER BRAKE or BOTH is selected, assistĆ

flaps up in increments prior to

180 knots will enhance

ing in decelerating the aircraft.

acceleration and climb capabilities.

13.2

SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE

13.2.3

Stores Jettison Considerations

FIELD/CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF

If an acceptable rate of climb cannot be maintained or

deceleration cannot be countered by thrust alone, jettison

Initial aircraft controllability is highly dependent on

should be selected. The benefits of an instantly lighter

timely and proper rudder usage. Rudder is the primary

control for countering yaw caused by asymmetric thrust since

aircraft and lower drag configuration always produce

lateral stick inputs alone will induce adverse yaw in an

positive effects on performance. Separation characteristics

already critical flight regime. Compounding the situation,

of the external tanks in this configuration, however, have

never been verified by flight tests and consequently may

visual cues for ascertaining yaw excursions may be absent at

night. While roll caused by yaw will always be apparent, yaw

result in stores−to−aircraft collision with unknown conseĆ

quences. The use of ACM jettison, which will selectively

excursions during night/IFR conditions may be first indiĆ

cated by the turn and slip indicator and heading indicator if

bypass nonselected stores, could be utilized but does not offer

the same gross weight reduction and requires the additional

in near wings−level flight. The pilot should be prepared to

apply up to and including full rudder at the first indication of

interlocks of gear handle plus ACM guard up.

an engine failure. Do not rotate aircraft below 130 knots

in any configuration. Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1,

13.2.4

Aircrew Coordination

Chapter 26 for higher rotation speeds. Additional areas for

Each launch must be made with the aircrew prepared

consideration are discussed below.

for the worst case. Even when mentally prepared to handle

this emergency the F−14 crew faces a difficult task in

13.2.1

Angle−of−Attack/Endspeed Consideration

executing a safe flyaway. Of paramount importance is a

Failure to limit AOA will place the aircraft in a regime

knowledgeable understanding by both pilot and RIO of what

to expect when confronted with an engine failure during

to reduce directional stability, rudder control, and rate of

climb. The aircraft may be uncontrollable at AOA above 20

launch. Both must have already determined during a preflight

briefing the points to be considered, that is, controllability,

units. Smoothly rotating to 10° pitch attitude on the waterline

and approximately 14 units indicated AOA provides the best

AOA/pitch attitude, engine, rate of climb, and jettison

considerations. The pilot will probably be the only one to

compromise between controllability, good initial flyaway

attitude, and adequate single−engine performance. For

know if an engine fails during launch. The RIO will probably

be the only one in a position to successfully initiate ejection

compromise, normal

15−knot excess endspeed catapult

prior to departing the ejection envelope.

launches

(mandatory from catapult No.

4 and highly

recommended from catapult No. 3) will place the aircraft in

the approximate 14−unit AOA regime. Zero excess endspeed

launches on hot days, where single−engine performance is

marginal, will place the aircraft in the approximate 18−unit

AOA regime and will require the pilot to precisely fly the

aircraft away from the water, avoiding sudden pitch control

inputs.

ORIGINAL

13−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

13.2.5

Single−Engine Failure Field/Catapult

*2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER

Launch/Waveoff

BK.

*1. Set 10° pitch attitude on the waterline (14 units

AOA maximum).

CAUTION

*2. Rudder  Opposite Roll/Yaw Supplemented By

Lateral Stick

D Do not delay engaging nosewheel steering in

*3. Both throttles  As Required for Positive Rate of

order to center rudder pedals.

Climb

D Aircraft should have ground locks installed

and engines secured before moving aircraft.

*4. Landing gear  UP.

Note

*5. Jettison  If Required.

Antiskid will sense a constant release on a dragĆ

6. If banner tow, hook Ċ DOWN.

ging blown tire.

7. If unable to control aircraft Ċ Eject.

13.3.2

Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff ContinĆ

ued or After Landing Go−Around

8. Establish 10−unit AOA climb.

*1. Throttles  As Required.

9. Climb to safe altitude.

*2. Landing gear and flaps  Leave As Set for Takeoff.

10. Flaps Ċ UP.

11. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations,

CAUTION

Chapter 14.

13.3

BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF

Blown tire(s) can cause engine FOD and/or strucĆ

tural damage.

If a tire blows during the takeoff roll and an abort is

impossible, do not raise the landing gear or flaps. Leave the

3. HYD ISOL switch Ċ FLT.

landing gear down to avoid fouling the blown tire in the

Note

wheelwell. Leave the flaps down; they may be damaged by

pieces of ruptured tire. Also, climbing with the gear and flaps

This will require bending the cam on the gear

down is an optimum flight attitude for emergency fuel

handle in order to move the HYD ISOL switch to

dumping.

FLT.

13.3.1

Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff

4. Refer to BLOWN TIRE LANDING procedures

Aborted or After Landing Touchdown

paragraph 15.5.

*1. Nosewheel steering  Engaged.

13−3 (Reverse Blank)

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

CHAPTER 14

In−Flight Emergencies

14.1

COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE

3. Attempt home base location by radar mapping or

DR to best known position. Attempt marshal pattern

1. Check mikes and earphone plugs.

location by APX−76 interrogation.

2. Check oxygen mask connections and oxygen hose

4. Drop four bundles of chaff at 2−mile intervals, then

disconnect.

complete series of four standard left−hand 360_

turns at 20−second intervals.

3. RIO check console connector adjacent to shoulder

harness control lever. Pilot check console connector

5. If no chaff, fly minimum of two triangular patterns

aft of g valve.

to left with 1−minute legs.

4. Increase ICS volume and attempt B/U and EMERG

positions.

6. Repeat patterns at 20−minute intervals.

5. Attempt intercommunications with VHF/UHF

7. Conserve fuel throughout and facilitate radar

transceiver.

pickup by maintaining highest feasible altitude conĆ

sistent with situation.

6. If cockpit altitude is safe, oxygen mask can be

removed so that when helmet earmuff is held open,

8. Be alert for aircraft attempting to join.

verbal communications can be maintained. Pilot

may need to turn off ECS briefly to effectively

9. After joining, communicate with appropriate hand

communicate.

or light signals.

14.1.1

Flightcrew Attention Signals

14.1.2.2

Lost (Without Navigation Aids But With

Radio Receiver)

When no other method of communicating exists, the

following signals should be used:

1. Same as without radio, but make turns to right.

1. Pilot will attract RIO by rocking of wings.

14.1.2.3

No Radio (With Navigation Aids)

2. RIO will attract pilot by shouting.

1. Proceed to alternate marshal.

3. Attempt to pass notes.

2. Energize ID function at least once each minute.

4. Acknowledgment will be thumbs−up, high on left−

3. Commence penetration or letdown at EAC. If not

hand side of cockpit, and future communications

will be conducted by visual hand signals using

given EAC, commence approach at estimated time

of arrival.

HEFOE code.

4. Be alert for aircraft vectored to join.

14.1.2

COMM−NAV Emergency Procedures

14.2

PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM FAILURES

14.1.2.1

Lost (Without Navigation Aids or Radio

Receiver)

If the altimeter and Mach airspeed indicators are erroĆ

1. Pilot select running lights on FLASH.

neous, pitot pressure, static pressure, and total temperature

inputs to the central air data computer may also be inaccurate.

2. RIO squawk mode 3 Code 7600.

14−1

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Placing the ANTI−ICE switch in ORIDE/ON or

AUTO/OFF may restore operation if the malfunction was

EMERG STORES JETT PUSHBUTTON

ANGLE−

 DEPRESS.

OF−

caused by icing.

ATTACK

Note

FLIGHT CONDITION

UNITS

D Pitot−static system failures because of icing

CATAPULT (15 KNOTS EXCESS)

may input an erroneous Mach number to the

Transition From Catapult

MRT

14.0

AICS programmer, which will result in

13.0

the ramps being in the wrong position for the

MILITARY POWER CLIMB

actual Mach number (engine stall may result).

If this erroneous Mach number is outside 0.3

All Drag Index

Sea Level

6.0

to 0.9 band, the AICS anti−ice positioning feaĆ

Combat Ceiling

9.5

ture will be overridden.

MAXIMUM POWER CLIMB

D With known or suspected pitot−static malĆ

All Drag Indexes

Sea Level

5.0

functions, do not exceed 0.9 TMN.

Combat Ceiling

8.0

D Pitot−static failures will generally be detected

CRUISE AT ALTITUDES BELOW

by the DFCS and may result in an FCS CAUĆ

20,000 FEET (All Gross Weights)

TION light as another secondary indication. If

Drag Index = 8

8.0

the condition causing the failure is resolved,

Drag Index = 100

9.0

the fault may be cleared with a MASTER

RESET.

CRUISE AT OPTIMUM ALTITUDE

All Drag Index

8.0

If it is apparent that icing is not the problem, use the

AOA indicator in place of airspeed for flight conditions

MAXIMUM ENDURANCE

as shown in Figure 14−1. Descend to an altitude below 23,000

All Drag Indexes, All Altitudes

10.0

feet. When cabin altitude stabilizes at 8,000 feet, aircraft

IDLE DESCENT

altitude will be approximately 23,000 feet. Below 23,000

250 KCAS

9.0

feet, aircraft altitude can be determined by dumping cabin

Maximum Range

10.0

pressure and using the cabin altitude indicator above 5,000

feet. Below 5,000 feet, use the radar altimeter.

GEAR AND FLAPS EXTENSION

Safe Gear Extension (Flaps UP) at

Reduce airspeed and set wing sweep to 20_ using the

280 KIAS

6.5

emergency wing−sweep mode. The landing should be

Safe Flap Extension (Gear DN) at

without the autothrottle engaged. If the mission computer

225 KIAS

9.0

computations are affected, the RIO can manually enter

estimated wind direction and velocity through the computer

APPROACH

address panel or the DEU.

CCA/GCA Pattern; 220 KCAS; Gear

UP; Flaps UP; 54,000 pounds.

9.0

14.3

EMERGENCY JETTISON

Final ON SPEED Approach (Gear DN):

Two Engines (All Flap Configurations)

15.0

All stores including external fuel tanks

(stations

and 7), but excluding Sidewinder missiles (AIM−9), are

Single Engine/PRI:

FULL FLAP, DLC ENGAGED

15.0

jettisoned in a fixed interval between sequenced stations to

avoid store−to−aircraft collision. See Figure 14−2 for external

FULL FLAP, DLC STOWED

14.0

stores jettison table.

NO FLAP

Single Engine/SEC:

FULL FLAP (CV ONLY)

13.0

NO FLAP (FIELD ONLY)

15.0

DRAG INDEX

CONFIGURATION

D With landing flaps and slats down, do not fire

Sidewinder missiles.

(4) AIM−7

100

(6) AIM−54

D If jettisoned during takeoff emergency, exterĆ

(2) 267−gallon external tanks

nal fuel tanks may collide with the aircraft

because of their unstable characteristics.

Figure 14Ć1.ĄAirspeed Indicator Failure

1. EMERG STORES JETT pushbutton Ċ Depress.

ORIGINAL

14−2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

TYPE OF STORES

JETTISON

EXTERNAL

SIDE−

AIR TO

MODE

TANKS

PHOENIX

SPARROW

WINDER

GROUND

REMARKS

VERIFY ON DURING

EMERGENCY

(i)

LTS CHECK

(PILOT)



PRESTART − PILOT

SEQUENCE

JETTISON

(i)

ACM

SELECTED

(PILOT)



STATIONS

SELECTIVE

(RIO)



NOTE

• FUZING SAFED IN ALL JETTISON MODES. (DOES NOT PREĆ

CLUDE INADVERTENT ARMING OF MECHANICAL FUZES.)

• SIDEWINDER CANNOT BE JETTISONED.

INTERLOCKS

(i) JETTISON SEQUENCE

STATIONS

1B, 8B, 2, 7, −4D, −5D, −4A, −5A, −4C,

WEIGHT OFF WHEELS (EITHER RIGHT OR

−5C, 4B, −5B, −3D, −6D, −3A, −6A, −3C,

LEFT MAIN GEAR)

−6C, −3B, −6B

NOTE

LANDING GEAR HANDLE UP

• THE TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN STATIONS

INDICATED BY (−) IS 100 MS.

MASTER ARM SWITCH ON

• SUBSTATIONS A, B, C, AND D OF RAIL ARE

NUMBERED CLOCKWISE, LOOKING DOWN

ACM COVER UP

AT RAIL WITH A THE LEFT REAR STATION

ON EACH RAIL.

STATION SELECT

• STATIONS 1B, 8B, 2, AND 7 ARE

JETTISONED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

Figure 14Ć2.ĄExternal Stores Jettison

14−3

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

2. Intermittent bursts of white sparks in the vicinity of

the aft edge of the overwing fairing.

D The EMERG STORE JETT function is disĆ

abled with weight on wheels.

3. Sparks turning to flames.

D The EMERG STORES JETT and ACK lights

4. Continuous yellow sparks in an area of increasing

illuminate when emergency jettison is actiĆ

size.

vated.

D A weight−off−wheels signal from the left or

5. Flames and/or smoke spreading forward to wing

right main wheel is sufficient to enable emerĆ

pivot point and encompassing the area of the overĆ

gency jettison.

wing fairing.

D A complete emergency store jettison

6. Flames, smoke, and/or heat crossing the centerline

sequence can take 1.7 seconds.

of aircraft and exiting in the other overwing fairing

area.

If step 1 fails, proceed with ACM jettison.

These indications may or may not be accompanied by

ACM jettison will release all stores selected except

a FIRE light and a HUD/MFD legend. This midship passage

Sidewinder missiles.

of heat and flames could be through the area containing the

flight control system control rods, which run fore and aft

1. LDG GEAR handle  UP.

through the back of the aircraft. Heat and flames progressing

through this area would impinge on the longitudinal and

2. Station select switches  As Required.

lateral directional control rods causing possible distortion or

failure. Loss of aircraft may follow. The flightcrew faced

3. ACM guard  UP (cover up).

with this type of fire in flight must react immediately.

4. ACM JETT

 Depress and Hold

(at least

2 seconds).

Note

If the FIRE warning light is off and a HUD/MFD

Note

legend is displayed, verify FIRE DET TEST

D ACM jettison follows the same sequence as

checks 4.0. Assume message was incorrect and

emergency jettisoning but requires individual

keep engine on line. The legend is a repeat of a

selection of stations to be released. Station not

discrete from the fire detection system.

selected is skipped.

*1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.

D When jettisoning bombs from stations 3, 4, 5,

and 6, the interval between sequenced stations

*2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

is automatically designated at 100 millisecĆ

onds to avoid store−to−store and store−to−airĆ

*3. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

craft collision.

14.4

FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT

Fire may be accompanied by other indications such as

explosion, vibration, smoke, or fumes in the cockpit, trailing

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

smoke, or abnormal engine instrument indications.

and requires immediate mission planning. See

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

A fire in flight precipitated by a failure in the engine

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

can be catastrophic in an extremely short period of time.

The shrapnel generated by the engine can rupture fuel

Note

and/or hydraulic lines, resulting in a raging fire. The seĆ

When ECS service air to the OBOGS concentraĆ

quence of events for the failure could include all or some of

tor is shut off, the aircrew has approximately 30

the following:

seconds before depleting residual OBOGS presĆ

sure and mask collapse.

1. A low−amplitude vibration and noise.

ORIGINAL

14−4

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

b. Rapid yaw or nose slice

Restoration of service air (selecting RAM) will

c. Increasing EGT

return OBOGS to operation.

d. Rpm rollback and/or thrust loss

If light goes off (and no other secondary indications):

e. Lack of throttle response

Note

f. Inlet buzz (supersonic only)

Fire detection test is not available on the emerĆ

g. Fireball emanating from the exhaust and/or

gency generator.

intake.

*4. MASTER TEST switch  FIRE DET TEST.

*1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g).

If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET test fails, or

If greater than 1.1 Mach:

other secondary indications:

*5. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (affected engine)  Pull.

*2. Both throttles  MIL.

*6. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

When 1.1 Mach or less:

*7. Climb and decelerate.

*3. Both throttles  Smoothly to IDLE.

*8. Fire extinguisher pushbutton  Depress.

Note

If above 1.1 Mach, monitor minimum rpm to

ensure proper functioning of idle lockup to avoid

Ensure BACK UP IGNITION switch is OFF.

inducing a stall.

9. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, paraĆ

If EGT is above 935°C and/or engine response is

graph 14.5.3.2.

abnormal:

10. Land as soon as possible.

*4. Throttle (stalled engine)  OFF.

11. If fire persists  Eject.

If EGT normal and/or airstart successful:

14.5

ENGINE EMERGENCIES

5. Perform engine operability check.

14.5.1

Compressor Stall

Note

A compressor stall is an aerodynamic disruption of the

After any stall, throttle movement should be miniĆ

airflow through the compressor. Compressor stalls may occur

mized until engine operability checks are perĆ

at any altitude/airspeed combination, including supersonic,

formed. Engines should be exercised at 10,000

and can be identified by any one or a combination of the

feet in cruise and then at approach speeds, one at

following indications.

a time, to ensure stall−free performance is availĆ

able for landing. If engine performance is abnorĆ

Note

mal, set power as necessary and avoid further

throttle movement. Land as soon as practical.

The loss of Mach number signal from the CADC

results in the loss of both airflow limiting and idle

Flight test operations have not produced any fully

lockup functions of the AFTC. This may result in

developed engine stalls. Pop stalls have been observed and

pop stalls at supersonic speeds (on a cold day) at

were self−clearing with no adverse operational impact.

high power and inlet buzz, resulting in pop stalls

Engine ground testing has shown that a hard stall (characterĆ

at idle power.

ized by loud bang) can result in substantial damage to the

IGV system. The damage resulted in complete detachment of

a. Loud bangs or vibrations

the IGV from the external linkage. There was no FOD.

14−5

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

When the IGV linkage breaks, the IGVs assume a fixed

Step 1:

Unload the aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g)  Unloading the

aerodynamic trailing position. This position is near normal

aircraft reduces the likelihood of a departure, while

for MIL or AB power settings, but is too far open at lower

providing a more normal engine inlet airflow. It is

throttle positions. This reduces fan stall margin with the

not intended that the pilot push full forward stick or

greatest reduction halfway between IDLE and MIL. AirĆ

induce negative g, but merely that any g load on the

borne, a hard stall may result in similar damage and will

aircraft be reduced to as near 1.0g as possible. In

likely have been the result of an AICS malfunction and/or

the nose−high, slow−airspeed case, the pilot may

fuels/engine control system failure. If a stall occurs during

temporarily lose control effectiveness. This should

AB operation, the asymmetric thrust limiting circuit should

not be cause for alarm and the pilot should be able

reduce the good engine to minimum AB. Asymmetric thrust

to expeditiously establish a wings−level, nose−low

may produce adverse flying qualities under low airspeed

attitude as long as step 2 is followed immediately.

and/or high AOA conditions.

Step 2:

If speed is 1.1 Mach or greater, both throttles 

MIL. Setting the throttles to MIL will both help

reduce the asymmetric thrust developed during the

stall and potentially help the engine recover from

the stall. It is not recommended to retard the

Do not delay securing an overtemped engine.

throttle to below MIL until the aircraft is below 1.1

Undue delay will greatly increase the likelihood

Mach. The engine may automatically switch to

of severe turbine damage and decrease the

SEC mode, and a throttle setting below MIL may

chance for a successful airstart. If both engines

result in inlet buzz (idle speed lockup is lost in SEC

are overtemped, one engine must be secured

mode) compounding the stall problem and potenĆ

immediately to provide maximum potential for

tially inducing a stall in the operating engine.

a successful airstart.

Step 3:

Throttle(s)  If speed is 1.1 Mach or less, retard

Note

smoothly to IDLE. During a departure, retarding

both throttles to IDLE will help recover the aircraft

Airspeed and altitude will determine whether

by minimizing the asymmetric thrust. In the case of

both engines can be safely shut down (with dual

a violent slicing departure involving asymmetric

compressor stalls), or whether one should be

thrust, reduction of throttles to IDLE is the most

secured and relit prior to shutting down the other.

critical step and must be done immediately. If conĆ

If airspeed is insufficient to provide windmill

trol of the aircraft is not in question, there is no

rpm for hydraulic pressure, one engine should be

need to retard the throttle on the operating engine.

left in hung stall.

Retarding only the stalled engine throttle reduces

the remote probability of inducing a dual−engine

There is a threefold danger present when one engine

stall. In addition, thrust from the operating engine

has experienced a compressor stall. The most serious danger

may be required during low−altitude emergencies.

manifests itself at slow airspeeds and high power settings,

Minimizing asymmetric thrust at high AOA and

where the sudden thrust asymmetry (a stalled engine yields

low airspeed shall be accomplished whenever posĆ

negligible thrust) will induce or aggravate a departure and

may produce sufficient yaw rate to cause a flat spin if proper

sible. Obviously, there are situations (landing patĆ

tern, catapult launch, low altitude, and airspeed)

recovery controls are not used.

where idle power is unacceptable, and emergency

procedures must be tempered by pilot judgment.

The other two dangers from a compressor stall are that

the stalled engine may suffer overtemperature damage and

Step 4:

Stalled engine, throttle off  When an engine

that the good engine might also stall. Although the emerĆ

stalls, the combustor flame does not extinguish.

gency procedures are designed to address all three dangers,

Airflow through the engine and cooling flow to the

the pilot must understand that aircraft controllability takes

turbine blades are severely reduced, and the turĆ

priority over engine considerations and involves both throttle

bine blades may suffer overtemperature damage.

position and flight controls. Reference to the engine instruĆ

Securing the stalled engine to OFF extinguishes

ments will probably be required to determine the stalled

the combustor flame, thereby reducing the turbine

engine. If the aircraft has departed controlled flight, this

blade temperature.

should not be attempted until the pilot has ensured that thrust

asymmetry has been minimized and that yaw rate and AOA

are under control. The rationale for each individual step in the

emergency procedure is as follows:

ORIGINAL

14−6

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.5.1.1

Supersonic Airspeed

stall minimizes the likelihood of total loss of hydraulic and

electrical power (emergency generator).

Supersonic compressor stalls will produce inlet buzz.

This results in a rough, bumpy ride (+2.5g to −1g at six cycles

per second). The proper technique to recover from a superĆ

sonic compressor stall is to smoothly retard throttles to MIL,

keep feet on the deck, and control any wing−drop tendencies

Leaving one engine in hung stall may catastrophĆ

with lateral stick.

ically damage the turbine. It is, therefore,

imperative that the pilot expeditiously secure

14.5.1.2

Dual Compressor Stall

and relight one engine to prevent turbine damĆ

age. Attention should be given to the remaining

stalled engine as soon as possible.

14.5.2

Airstarts

D During recovery from a dual−engine compresĆ

The most likely reasons to perform an airstart are that

sor stall (with both engine−driven generators

the engine has shut down because of control system failure,

having dropped offline), flight control inputs

hardware failure, fuel feed failure, FOD, or engine stall. The

may temporarily reduce the combined

augmenter fan temperature control contains diagnostic logic

hydraulic system pressure. If combined

to identify primary (PRI) engine mode failures and automatiĆ

hydraulic system pressure drops to between

cally transfers to secondary (SEC) mode when required. If

2,000 and 1,100 psi, the emergency generator

the shutdown was not pilot commanded, the engine may

will automatically shift to the 1−kVA mode

switch to SEC mode automatically. The first airstart attempt

and power only the essential No. 1 buses. If

should be made in the engine mode selected by the AFTC

the combined hydraulic pressure continues to

(either PRI or SEC). If an initial PRI mode airstart is unsucĆ

fall, the essential No. 1 buses will drop offline,

cessful, the ENG MODE SELECT switch should be in SEC

resulting in a total electrical failure.

for any subsequent airstart attempts.

D Complete loss of electrical power will result

in loss of ICS, OBOGS, backup oxygen

If an engine flames out, the automatic relight feature

(below

10,000 feet MSL), engine instruĆ

will attempt to restart the engine immediately; however, if

ments, spin direction indicators (spin arrow

rpm is decaying below the throttle−commanded level, spoolĆ

and turn needle), and displays.

down airstart procedures should be initiated immediately. If

engine flames out because of an automatic shutdown caused

D If combined hydraulic system pressure recovĆ

by an overspeed greater than 110 percent, there will be no

ers, the emergency generator should automatĆ

automatic relight. To regain fuel flow, the throttle must be

ically reestablish 1−kVA power to the essenĆ

cycled to OFF then to IDLE.

tial No. 1 buses. The emergency generator

switch must be cycled through OFF/RESET

Note

to NORM to regain the 5−kVA mode to the

An overspeed condition in excess of 110 percent

essential No. 2 buses.

will result in momentary loss of rpm indication

D Engine instruments are powered by the essenĆ

until N₂ rpm falls below 110 ±.5 percent. EGT

tial No. 1 bus but may not be automatically

and FF indicators will continue to function

restored with the 1−kVA mode. It may be necĆ

normally.

essary to cycle the emergency generator

switch through OFF/RE−SET to NORM to

There are three airstart phases: spooldown, crossbleed,

regain lost engine instruments.

and windmill. Spooldown is the first phase and provides the

best opportunity for a rapid start. Windmill is the last phase

If both engines are stalled after retarding throttles to

and is available only in very high−energy conditions.

IDLE, at least one engine must be immediately secured to

prevent turbine damage and provide maximum potential for

Spooldown airstarts should be initiated immediately

an airstart. If possible, secure the engine that did not initiate

when it is apparent that an engine has lost thrust and that rpm

the event (the second engine to stall). The cause of the first

will decay below the throttle−commanded level. High rpm,

engine stall may not be known at this point; however, it is

possible that the second stall may have been induced during

the throttle transient to IDLE. Leaving one engine in hung

14−7

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

high airspeed, and low altitude increase the likelihood of a

Once established at 450 knots, approximately 20_ nose

successful spooldown start. See Figure

14−3. The best

down is required to maintain constant airspeed. While

conditions for both PRI and SEC mode spooldown starts are

attempting airstarts, flight control authority is critical. As

below 30,000 feet, above 300 knots, and with rpm greater

rpm decreases, sufficient hydraulic pressure for smooth flight

than 30 percent. Spooldown airstarts that light−off with rpm

control inputs should be available with one engine windmilĆ

as low as 30 percent can take up to 90 seconds to accelerate

ling above 18 percent or two engines windmilling above 11

to idle and 20 seconds when initiated at 50 percent or greater.

percent. At 450 knots, 15_ dive, a 2g pullup should be initiĆ

ated at 2,000 feet. Once the windmill airstart is considered to

When initiating a spooldown airstart to clear a stall,

be unsuccessful, the aircraft shall be decelerated to less than

cycle the throttle OFF then to IDLE with the engine in either

350 knots and ejection performed before controllability is

PRI or SEC mode. EGT and rpm indications should rapidly

lost.

decrease when the throttle is OFF confirming throttle posiĆ

tion. If OFF is selected to clear an engine stall, the throttle

should remain in OFF for a few seconds until the stall clears.

Typically, airstarts are characterized by a rapid light−off and

initial EGT rise with a slow initial increase in rpm. In the

D When advancing both throttles from OFF,

low−rpm range, it may take up to 10 seconds to observe an

cycle the right throttle first to a position above

apparent increase in rpm. The rpm display should be flashing

IDLE, to avoid the throttle quadrant locking

if the rpm is increasing.

pin feature.

Hung starts are characterized by the rpm stagnating

D Main generators drop off at 55−percent rpm.

below idle. The current engine indicating system (EIG) will

The emergency generator will drop off at 11

stop flashing if the next higher segment is not reached within

to 12−percent rpm. Engine ignition will not be

10 seconds. A low−range (less than 45 percent) hung start can

available below 10 percent.

be overcome with the assistance of crossbleed air. A

D Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limĆ

midrange hung start at subidle rpm (50 to 60 percent) can be

ited and requires immediate mission planĆ

corrected by cycling the throttle OFF then to IDLE. Above

ning. See OBOGS emergency procedure. See

45 percent, the starter will not engage. At the completion of

Figure 2Ć84 for oxygen breathing time

the start sequence the engine corresponds to actual throttle

remaining.

position.

Note

14.5.2.1

Dual−Engine Airstart (Or Airstart of One

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

Engine With the Other Engine Secured)

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

mately 30 seconds before residual OBOGS

Dual−engine redundancy and automatic relight makes

pressure and mask collapse.

this situation extremely unlikely. Dual engine windmill airĆ

start procedures after unsuccessful automatic and manual

D Airstart can be performed on both engines

spooldown airstart attempts should be considered tertiary and

simultaneously.

performed with serious consideration given to airspeed altiĆ

tude and safe ejection limitations. Flight test data indicate

14.5.2.2

Engine Flameout

nominal windmill airstart airspeed requirements to be in the

vicinity of 450 knots. Depending on airspeed and altitude

*1. Throttle  IDLE or Above (affected engine).

available at windmill aircraft profile commencement, a dive

angle of up to 45_ may be required to achieve nominal airstart

*2. BACK UP IGNITION switch  ON.

airspeeds.

Note

Spooldown airstarts can take up to 90 seconds to

reach idle rpm if light−off occurs at low rpm, low

airspeed, and high altitude.

Dive angle should not exceed 45_. At 7,500 feet

AGL and less than 450 knots, commence a

If hung start or no start:

smooth, 2g pull converting airspeed to altitude

*3. Throttle

(affected engine)

 Cycle OFF, Then

and eject when less than 350 knots.

IDLE.

ORIGINAL

14−8

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

If still hung or no start:

9. OBOGS master switch  ON.

*4. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

If one engine is operable, perform a crossbleed airstart,

paragraph 14.5.2.3.

Ensure ECS service air is available to OBOGS

If both engines flamed out/inoperative or crossbleed

prior to selecting the OBOGS master switch ON.

not possible:

When primary mode is restored:

10. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in level flight.

11. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

right).

D A dual−engine compressor stall may result in

a total electrical failure, rendering the ICS,

OBOGS, backup oxygen (below 10,000 feet

MSL), engine instruments, spin direction

indicators (spin arrow and turn needle), and

displays inoperative.

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

D If sufficient hydraulic pressure restores the

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

1−kVA mode of the emergency generator, it

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

may be necessary to cycle the emergency gen-

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

erator switch through OFF/RESET to NORM

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

to regain lost engine instruments.

14.5.2.3

Crossbleed Airstart

D Ejection above 350 knots is hazardous; the

decision to exceed 350 knots rests with the air-

1. Throttle (bad engine)  OFF.

crew.

D Sufficient hydraulic pressure for smooth

2. FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Check In.

flight control inputs should be available with

3. Throttle

(good engine)

 80−Percent

Rpm

one engine windmilling at 18−percent rpm or

(minimum).

two engines at 11 percent.

D Dive angles should not exceed 45°. At 7,500

4. BACK UP IGNITION switch  ON.

feet AGL minimum, commence a smooth 2g

pullup to a 20° dive, maximum. At 2,000 feet

5. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.

AGL minimum, pull up to level flight. If the

6. ENG CRANK switch (bad engine)  ON.

airstart is unsuccessful, convert airspeed to

altitude and eject at 350 knots or less before

7. Throttle (bad engine)  IDLE Immediately.

controllability is lost.

*5.

Airspeed  450 Knots (altitude permitting).

Note

Quickest light−offs are achieved with throttle to

OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

IDLE at less than 10−percent rpm. Light−offs can

take as long as 45 seconds.

When start is completed:

If hung start:

7. BACK UP IGNITION switch  OFF.

8. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.

8. Throttle (bad engine)  OFF Then IDLE.

If still hung:

9. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

CHANGE 2

14−10

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

When start is completed:

Turbine failure for example, may appear only as an

apparent loss of thrust and/or the inability to obtain a success-

10. BACK UP IGNITION switch  OFF.

ful airstart. For confirmed mechanical failures, the engine

should be secured and the FUEL SHUT OFF handle pulled.

11. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.

When primary mode is restored:

12. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in level flight.

If an engine fails or a mechanical malfunction

13. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

has been determined, the respective FUEL

right).

SHUT OFF handle shall be pulled immediately

after engine shutdown to reduce the possibility of

fire or fuel migration.

Note

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

ECS service air pressure may be inadequate for

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

OBOGS when operating on a single engine at

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

idle. Increasing the throttle position for the oper-

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

ating engine above IDLE will increase pressure.

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

This will also close the nozzle, increasing

descent range.

14.5.3

Single−Engine Flight Characteristics

14.5.3.2

Single−Engine Cruise Operations

Single−engine flight characteristics are dependent on

gross weight, configuration, angle of attack, wing sweep, and

1. FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Pull (inoperative

maneuvering requirements. In the cruise configuration, with

engine).

one engine operating at military/high power settings, rudder

deflection and/or trim is required to prevent yaw toward the

2. If on final approach or landing, refer to single engine

failed engine. However, single−engine performance capabili-

landing procedures, paragraphs 15.2 and 15.3.

ties can be significantly restricted by adverse flying qualities

in approach power configuration, particularly at high gross

When either fuselage tape reaches 4,500 pounds of fuel

weights in turning flight because of the effects of thrust asym-

or less:

metry at normal approach speed. This degrades with turns

into the failed engine such that rudder requirements to main-

3. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.

tain level flight can exceed available rudder control. Flight

in this configuration should be planned to avoid turns into the

Note

failed engine with bank angles limited to 20 degrees maxi-

The WING/EXT TRANS switch automatically

mum and AOA limited to 12 units. The aircraft design is such

returns to AUTO if the REFUEL PROBE switch

that no one system (flight control, pneumatic, electrical, etc.)

is placed to ALL EXTEND, DUMP is selected,

depends on a specific engine. Therefore, loss of an engine

or there is 2,000 pounds remaining in the low

does not result in loss of any complete system as long as the

side. The WING/EXT TRANS switch can be

HYD TRANSFER PUMP is operative. Refer to NAVAIR

reselected to OFF after a 5−second delay, the

01−F14AAP−1.1 for single−engine performance data.

REFUEL PROBE is retracted, or DUMP is

secured.

14.5.3.1

Single−Engine Failure During Flight

4. FEED switch  Operating Engine Side.

It is uncommon to encounter compressor stalls that

require immediate engine shutdown. Occasionally, mechani-

When pilot workload permits close monitoring of fuel

cal failure of F110 engine components results in engine fail-

distribution:

ure. These failures may be obvious as when accompanied by

severe engine vibration or may be subtle as indicated by a

5. FEED switch  Inoperative Engine Side.

lack of engine response to throttle changes.

14−11

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

If the fuselage quantity on the inoperative engine side

14.5.5

Engine START VALVE Light

begins to increase:

1. Ensure ENG CRANK switch  OFF.

6. FEED switch  Immediately Move to Operating

Engine Side.

2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

Note

If operational necessity dictates, AIR SOURCE

L ENG or R ENG may be selected provided the

START VALVE light remains out. Crossbleed

An increase in fuel quantity on the inoperative

airstarts may not be available to the affected

engine side indicates that the sump tank interconĆ

engine after a START VALVE light illuminates,

nect valve is not open. Fuel available is limited

because of possible overspeed damage.

to the quantity on the operating engine side.

If on deck:

If the fuselage fuel quantity on the inoperative engine

side begins to decrease:

3. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

6. FEED switch  Remain On Inoperative Engine.

If airborne:

7. WING/EXT TRANSFER switch  AUTO.

3. ENG START cb  Pull (RF1).

8. Refer to appropriate hydraulic system failure.

4. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

14.5.4

Engine Overspeed (N₁ or N₂ OSP Legend)

1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.

If overspeed continues:

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

2. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC. Verify ENG SEC

and requires immediate mission planning. See

light illuminated.

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

If overspeed condition persists:

Note

3. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

Note

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

mately 30 seconds before depleting residual

D Fuel flow is automatically secured when rpm

OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.

reaches 110 percent. To regain fuel flow, the

D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)

throttle must be cycled OFF then to IDLE.

will return OBOGS to operation.

D An overspeed condition in excess of 110 perĆ

cent will result in temporary loss of rpm indiĆ

14.5.6

Engine Transfer to SEC Mode

cation until N₂ falls below 110 ±.5 percent.

EGT and FF indicators will continue to funcĆ

tion normally.

4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, paraĆ

graph 14.5.3.2.

In SEC mode, idle lockup protection is lost

Decelerate below

1.1 TMN before retarding

5. Land as soon as practicable.

throttle to IDLE to avoid supersonic inlet buzz

and possible compressor stall.

ORIGINAL

14−12

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

14.5.6.1

Transfer to SEC Mode Results

D Engine ac generator failure, indicated by loss

SEC mode transfer from AB may result in pop stalls.

of rpm and nozzle gauge indications, will shift

the engine into SEC mode without illuminatĆ

Nozzle fully closed (higher taxi thrust).

ing the SEC light. Main high−energy ignition

will be inoperative. Backup ignition is

Stall warning is inoperative (engine overtemp warnĆ

required for airstarts.

ing still available).

D SEC mode transfer while in AB may result in

No nozzle position indication.

pop stalls. Nonemergency manual selection

of SEC mode airborne should be performed in

No AB capability.

basic engine with the power set above 85−perĆ

cent rpm.

Decrease stall margin at low rpm.

If engine transfers to SEC mode:

65 to 116 percent basic engine thrust available (see

Figure 14Ć4).

1. Throttle (affected engine)  Less Than MIL.

Main engine ignition continuously energized.

2. ENG MODE SELECT  Cycle.

No idle lockup protection.

If PRI mode is restored:

10. IGV fixed full open (lower windmill airspeed).

3. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level flight.

11. RATS inoperative.

14.5.7

Uncommanded SEC Mode Rpm Decay

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

Engine will flameout if transfer is delayed to

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

below 59−percent rpm.

4. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

1. ENG MODE SELECT

 PRI (greater than

right).

59−percent rpm).

If engine remains in SEC:

If PRI mode is restored:

3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

2. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level flight.

4. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

Landing in SEC mode may increase landing roll

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

because of loss of nozzle reset. If runway length

or braking conditions warrant, make an arrested

3. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

right).

landing.

14−13

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.5.8

Uncommanded Engine Acceleration

Note

Airborne (No Throttle Movement)

In SEC mode, nozzle indicator is inoperative.

Uncommanded engine acceleration is characterized by

4. Obtain visual inspection.

an increase in thrust without throttle movement as a result of

an AFTC or MEC failure normally associated with one

If nozzle is open in SEC mode or abnormal response:

engine. Selection of the ENG MODE SELECT switch(es) to

5. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.

SEC may restore throttle authority.

6. Assume mechanical failure and land as soon as

1. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

practicable.

If dual engine uncommanded acceleration is associated

If nozzle is closed or a visual inspection is not possible:

with CADC failure, normal primary mode may be regained

5. ENG MODE SELECT  Remain in SEC.

by reselecting PRI mode with the gear handle down.

6. Assume electrical failure and land as soon as practiĆ

If engine is still uncommanded and engine shutdown is

cable.

necessary:

14.5.10

Stuck/Jammed Throttle(s)

2. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.

One or both throttles may become jammed in the

3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, paraĆ

afterburner range because of misadjustments or FOD within

graph 14.5.3.2.

the throttle quadrant. Selection of SEC mode may be required

to control rapid fuel consumption and airspeed and/or

14.5.9

Exhaust Nozzle Failed (No Nozzle

altitude. If the problem cannot be corrected, engine shutdown

Response to Throttle Movement)

with the fuel shutoff handle may be necessary to abort a

takeoff, to control a stalled engine, or to effect a safe landing.

Nozzle position is hydraulically operated by engine oil

If the afterburner detent lever is misadjusted, the right throttle

from a separate compartment in the oil storage tank. A rupĆ

may not move inboard through the AB detent into the basic

ture in this system could render the nozzles inoperative and

engine range.

would generally cause the nozzles to blow open. This could

An additional failure mode has been identified that

result in engine mislight, AB blowout, and low thrust.

may cause one or both throttles to become stuck in the basic

Exhaust nozzles failed closed could result in engine stalls if

engine range. If a large idler bearing in either electromechanĆ

afterburner is selected, and excess residual thrust will be

ical rotary actuator fails, it can jam the gear train and create

present on landing rollout. An exhaust nozzle electrically

side loads on the mechanical clutch sufficient to lock it and

failed open may be closed by selecting SEC mode.

prevent further throttle movement. Failure may occur at any

power setting between idle and military and is more likely to

1. Monitor engine oil pressure/rpm.

be observed when throttles are retarded. While failure will

prevent the affected throttle from being retarded any further,

2. Throttles

 Basic Engine Only (use minimum

it may be possible to move it forward.

power required).

Note

14.5.10.1

Stuck or Jammed Throttle(s)

in Afterburner

D SEC mode transfer while in AB may result in

Note

pop stalls. Nonemergency manual selection of

SEC mode should be performed in basic engine

D Spoiler brake will be inoperative with either

with the power set above 85−percent rpm.

throttle stuck above idle.

D If the fan speed limiter circuit has failed,

D Speedbrake and DLC will be inoperative with

engine rollback may occur with the selection

either throttle stuck above military.

of SEC mode. In the event of engine rollback,

1. L ENG MODE SELECT and/or R ENG MODE

PRI mode must be reselected above 59−percent

SELECT  SEC.

rpm or flameout will occur and an airstart will

not be possible.

2. Apply maximum inboard force on throttles and

retard as required.

3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.

14−15

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

If throttle(s) will not retard below minimum AB:

6. Affected L or R AICS cb  Pull (LF1, left or LG1,

right).

3. Match throttles.

Note

4. Relax aft pressure on throttles.

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumiĆ

5. While forcing throttles apart laterally:

nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.

Above about 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and

a. Pull throttles straight aft to MIL detent.

ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated.

b. Move throttles inboard and aft.

These should clear with a MASTER RESET folĆ

lowing a programmer reset.

6. Do not reselect afterburner.

7. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.

If right throttle will not retard:

8. Land as soon as practicable.

7. Right FUEL SHUT OFF handle

 Pull (if

required).

If INLET light only is illuminated, attempt AICS proĆ

grammer reset:

8. Right throttle  MAX AB (after shutdown).

4. Decelerate below 0.5 TMN.

Note

5. If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated:

Failure to move the right throttle full forward

Wing sweep drive cb’s Ċ Pull (LD1 and LE1).

may limit the left throttle to 88 percent or less

after it is retarded below the MIL stop.

9. Refer to single−engine procedures (Chapter 15).

If left throttle will not retard:

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

10. Left FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Pull (if required).

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

11. Refer to single−engine procedures (Chapter 15).

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

MANUV FLAP (LE 1) cb’s are pulled.

14.5.11

AICS Malfunctions

6. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

14.5.11.1

RAMPS Light/INLET Light

right).

*1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

Note

*2. Decelerate to below 1.2 TMN.

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumiĆ

nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.

*3. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  STOW.

Above about 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and

Note

ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated.

These should clear with a MASTER RESET folĆ

A RAMPS light should always be accompanied

lowing a programmer reset.

by INLET light when the landing gear handle is

UP.

If INLET light goes off:

If RAMPS light remains illuminated:

7. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.

4. Throttle (bad engine)  80 Percent or Less.

If INLET light remains illuminated:

5. If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated Ċ

Wing sweep drive cb’s Ċ Pull (LD1 and LE1).

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

pulling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

pulling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP

DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/

7. Affected L or R AICS cb  Pull (LF1, left or LG1,

MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pullled.

right).

ORIGINAL

14−16

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

14.5.13.1

OIL PRESS Light and/or

Abnormal Oil Pressure

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi-

nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.

1. Throttle (affected engine) Ċ IDLE.

Above about 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and

ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated.

If oil pressure is below 15 psi, above 65 psi, or engine

These should clear with a MASTER RESET fol-

vibration:

lowing a programmer reset.

If shutdown is feasible:

8. Affected INLET RAMPS switch Ċ AUTO.

2. Throttle (affected engine) Ċ OFF.

9. Remain below 1.2 TMN.

3. Refer to Single Engine Cruise Operations, para-

graph 14.5.3.2.

When AICS programmer reset attempts are completed:

If shutdown is not feasible:

12. Wing sweep drive cb’s Ċ Reset (LD1 and LE1).

4. Rpm Ċ Set Minimum Rpm.

14.5.12

INLET ICE Light

5. Avoid high−g or large throttle movements.

1. ANTI−ICE switch Ċ ORIDE/ON.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

When clear of known icing conditions:

14.5.13.2

L or R OIL HOT Light

2. ANTI−ICE switch Ċ AUTO/OFF.

Illumination of an OIL HOT caution light may be

Ice may form on inlet and ramp surfaces without

an indication of above normal gearbox scavenge

any other visual indications, which may cause

oil temperature or high supply temperature. Con-

compressor stalls and/or FOD.

tinuous engine operation will result in reduced

gearbox life and lubrication degradation.

Note

On deck, OIL HOT light may be caused by

The formation of ice on pitot−static sensors may

underservicing or by excessive temperature on

result in DFCS detected failures that may not

deck. In the event of OIL HOT light on deck posi-

clear with a MASTER RESET.

tion throttles to OFF.

1. Oil pressure Ċ Check.

14.5.13

Oil System Malfunction

2. Throttle (affected engine) Ċ 85−Percent Rpm.

Malfunctions in the oil system are indicated by an L or

R OIL HOT light, OIL PRESS light, or by oil pressure below

If after 1 minute light is still illuminated:

or above normal.

3. Throttle (affected engine) Ċ OFF.

If oil pressure is over 65 psi, retard power until pressure

4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para-

is within the normal range. If pressure cannot be reduced, the

graph 14.5.3.2.

engine should be shut down to avoid rupturing oil lines. If oil

5. Relight engine for landing, if necessary.

pressure is less than 15 psi, bearing wear can be minimized

by maintaining a constant throttle setting and avoiding

6. Land as soon as possible.

unnecessary aircraft maneuvers. Bearing failure is normally

If light goes out, land as soon as practicable.

characterized by vibration, increasing in intensity with

bearing deterioration. When vibration becomes moderate to

14.5.14 RATS Operation In Flight

heavy, engine seizure is imminent if engine is not shut down.

Continued operation of an engine with oil pressure less than

1. Tailhook Ċ DOWN.

15 psi is likely to result in illumination of OIL HOT light or

If conditions permit:

an engine seizure. If conditions permit it is advisable to shut

down the engine to reduce damage and to save it for

2. ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/AIR

emergency use.

cb Ċ Pull (8C2).

14−17

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

6. Land as soon as possible.

D Pulling the ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK

CONT/ WSHLD/AIR cb

(8C2) disables

D Illumination of both lights and the warning

RATS. Inform CV of increased wind−over−

tone may be indicative of a total motive−flow

deck requirements and gross weight settings

failure. Zero− or negative−g flight should be

for a non−RATS arrestment.

avoided.

D With the circuit breaker in and RATS operat-

D Complete loss of motive flow will result in the

ing, there is reduced thrust available for

sump tank interconnect and the engine feed

approach and use of afterburner may be

crossfeed valve remaining in the closed posi-

required to arrest sink rate.

tion, isolating the forward and aft systems. Con-

sequently, single−engine operation will cause

fuel on the opposite side to be unavailable.

If one light and the warning tone remains on:

3. No afterburner above 15,000 feet.

ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/

4. Fuel distribution  Monitor (balance if required).

AIR circuit breaker (8C2) must be in prior to

5. Land as soon as practicable.

hook transition. Avoid icing conditions and rain

with circuit breaker pulled.

If migration occurs after balancing, as indicated by a

100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative side or a 100 to

Note

300 PPM decrease on the operative side above expected burn

D If RATS secures when the hook is raised with

rate according to indicated fuel flow:

no other weight−on−wheels indication, failure

is internal to the RATS circuitry.

6. FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB − PULL (8F1).

D With ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/

Note

WSHLD/AIR cb (8C2) pulled, approach

Pulling the FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB will cause

indexers will flash.

the engine crossfeed valve to close and the in-

operative side fuselage motive flow shutoff valve

14.6

FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

to open. This will reduce the amount of fuel

transfer from the operative side to the inoperative

14.6.1

Fuel Pressure Caution Lights/Low Fuel

side.

Pressure Warning Tone

Note

The L or R FUEL PRESS light and warning tone

Afterburner operations place an extreme demand on the

will extinguish when the FUEL PRESS ADVSY

engine fuel feed system. Aircraft maneuvers in the zero to

CB is pulled.

negative 0.5g flight regime aggravate the effect and may gen-

erate a situation where afterburner blowout and engine flame-

7. Maintain cruise power or less.

out occur. The first indication of this condition may be a fuel

8. Fuel distribution − monitor (balance if required).

pressure light or an aural tone (engine stall warning tone).

14.6.1.1

L and/or R FUEL PRESS Light(s) and

Warning Tone

1. Both throttles Ċ MIL Power or Less.

If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed,

selecting AFT or FWD on the FEED SWITCH

2. Restore aircraft to 1.0g flight.

could result in fuel migration to the inoperative

side. If fuel migration occurs after selecting AFT

If both lights and warning tone remain on:

or FWD on the FEED SWITCH (as indicated by

3. Increase positive g’s to greater than 1.0g.

a 100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative

side), immediately return the feed switch to

4. Descend below 25,000 feet.

NORM.

5. Maintain cruise power settings or less.

9. Land as soon as possible.

CHANGE 2

14−18

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.6.2

L or R FUEL LOW Light

1. DUMP switch  OFF.

2. Fuel distribution  Check (balance if required).

CV arrestment, CV touch and go, or normal field

If wing and/or external fuel remaining:

landings with full or partial fuel in the external

tanks is not authorized because of overload of the

3. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.

nacelle backup structure. Only minimum descent

rate landings are authorized.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

14.6.3.3

Wings Do Not Accept Fuel With Switch

14.6.3

Fuel Transfer Failures

in ALL EXTD Position

1. REFUEL PROBE switch  FUS EXTD.

2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.

14.6.3.4

Wings Accept Fuel With Switch in

Wing and external fuel will not transfer with

FUS EXTD Position

refuel probe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe exten-

1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.

sion required, select FUS EXTD to enable transfer.

Note

With AIR SOURCE OFF pushbutton selected,

external fuel tanks will not transfer.

Fuel management panel will be inoperative if

FUEL MGT PNL cb (RD1) is out.

14.6.4

Uncommanded Dump

1. Fuel Management Panel cbĊCheck in (RD1).

1. DUMP switch  Check OFF.

2. FUEL FEED/DUMP cb  Pull (RE1).

14.6.3.1

Wing Fuel Fails To Transfer

If wing fuel fails to transfer:

1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.

Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker

One wing still does not transfer:

(RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It

also deactivates the function of the feed switch,

2. FEED switch  Select High Fuselage Tape Side.

the automatic balance functions, and the fuel

dump system. Should single engine operation

If wing fuel does not decrease after 2 minutes or wing

subsequently become necessary, useable fuel

fuel transfer complete:

will be limited to only what is available on the

3. FEED switch  NORM.

operating side.

14.6.5

Fuel Leak

14.6.3.2

External Tanks Fail To Transfer or

Transfer Slowly

In the absence of actual visual detection, a fuel leak

Note

resulting from a malfunction or failure of a fuel system

component will usually result in a split in the fuel quantity

Descending below freezing level may thaw

possible frozen valves.

tapes or feeds. The flightcrew must determine from available

instruments (fuel flow and total fuel quantity) whether the

1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.

aircraft is losing more fuel than the engines indicate they are

using. Corrective steps are based on confirmation of the leak.

If fuel continues to transfer improperly or does not

transfer:

Upon confirmation of abnormal decrease in fuel quantity:

1. Land as soon as possible.

2. REFUEL PROBE switch  All Extend, Then

Retract.

3. Apply cyclic positive or negative g’s.

4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF then RAM then

Use of afterburner with fuel leak should be lim-

ON (below 35,000 feet, less than 300 knots).

ited to emergency use only.

14−19

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.

Note

If abnormal fuel quantity decrease ceases, fuel leak is

With a high quantity in the FWD/RT Fuel sys-

tem, the greater static head pressure, particularly

in wing/wing pivot or attachment points for auxiliary tanks:

in nose−up attitudes, can cause overfilling of the

Note

AFT/LT fuel system. To prevent this, the feed

This cannot be determined until the fuel level has

switch should be returned to NORM before the

decreased to below the source of the leak. Do not

AFT/LT tape reaches 6,200 pounds.

proceed until the wings are empty.

1. Both throttles − MIL power or less.

If leak is not stopped, it is in engine/nacelle area, pro-

ceed immediately with next step.

2. FEED SWITCH − select high fuselage tape side.

3. FUEL FEED/DUMP cb  Pull (RE1).

Aircraft attitude will have a significant influence

Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker

on the direction of fuel movement if FWD or

(RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It

AFT is selected. A nosedown attitude will cause

also deactivates the function of the feed switch,

fuel to transfer forward, and a noseup attitude

the automatic balance functions, and the fuel

will cause fuel to transfer aft.

dump system. Should single engine operation

subsequently become necessary, useable fuel

If fuel imbalance increases:

will be limited to only what is available on the

operating side.

3. FEED SWITCH − NORM

Note

Enough time should be allowed for quantity

tapes/ feeds to develop split so that leak can be

isolated to left or right feed group. Affected side

If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed

will be low side.

closed, selecting AFT or FWD on the FUEL

4. Throttle (affected side)  OFF.

FEED SWITCH could result in rapid increase of

5. Conditions permitting, allow rpm to decelerate to

the fuel imbalance. If this occurs (as indicated by

windmill rpm.

an imbalance increase of 100 to 300 PPM) imme-

6. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (affected side)  Pull.

diately return the FEED SWITCH to NORM.

7. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para-

4. Determine useable fuel and land as soon as possible.

graph 14.5.3.2.

14.7

ELECTRICAL FAILURE

Setting the WING/EXT TRANS switch to OFF stops

motive flow to the wings and inhibits external tank transfer

14.7.1

Generator Failure

and fuselage tank pressurization. Pulling the FUEL FEED/

DUMP circuit breaker (RE1) isolates the right and forward

A mechanical generator failure or an overheating

system and the left and aft fuel system. This aids in determin-

automatically causes the CSD unit of the generator transmis-

ing the location of the leak and prevents loss of fuel from the

sion to decouple from the engine. Once disengaged, the CSD

good side via the fuel system interconnects. The circuit

cannot be reconnected in flight.

breaker also deactivates the function of the FEED switch, the

automatic balance functions, and the fuel dump system.

Either generator by itself is capable of supplying the

Securing the engine and, if necessary, pulling the FUEL

electrical requirements of the aircraft. Even double generator

SHUT OFF handle should stop most engine leaks.

failure will not cause total loss of electrical power; the 5−kVA

emergency generator will automatically pick up the load for

14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing

the essential ac and dc buses No. 1 and No. 2, and the DFCS

bus.

If the bidirectional pump is operating and pressure

drops to between 2,000 and 1,100 psi (dependent upon the

load placed on the generator), the emergency generator will

During AB operations, NORM shall be selected.

automatically shift to the 1−kVA mode and power only the

FWD or AFT could deplete the sump tanks.

CHANGE 2

14−20

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

essential ac and dc No. 1 buses. If combined system hydraulic

14.7.2

Double Generator Failure

pressure subsequently recovers, the emergency generator

switch must be cycled through OFF/RESET to NORM to

1. Both generator switches  Cycle.

regain the essential No. 2 ac and dc buses. Figure 14−5 lists

the equipment available with only the emergency generator

If operating on emergency generator, the following

operating.

important systems are inoperative:

1. Emergency flight hydraulics.

With both engines inoperative, windmilling engine(s)

provide(s) hydraulic pressure for both the flight controls and

2. Outboard spoiler module and emergency flap

the emergency generator. However, the flight controls have

activation.

first priority and may cause the emergency generator to loiter

when low airspeeds reduce engine windmilling rpm. Approx-

3. OBOGS concentrator heater (OBOGS may still

imately 450 knots must be maintained to ensure adequate

function at a reduced but adequate level).

engine windmilling rpm for hydraulic pressure.

If temporary loss of combined system pressure causes

14.7.1.1

L or R GEN Light

emergency generator to shift to 1 kVA mode (to drop No. 2

essential bus):

1. Generator

(affected generator switch)

 OFF/

RESET, Then NORM.

2. EMERG generator switch  Cycle.

Note

If the generator fault is corrected, the generator will

be reconnected and the caution light will go off.

If generator does not reset:

A shift to 1 kVA mode will cause loss of all DFCS

functions and spoilers without illumination of

2. Generator (affected generator switch)  TEST.

caution lights. If the 5 kVA mode is regained, a

MASTER RESET will be required to regain

If the light goes off with the switch in TEST, the

SAS, spoiler, authority stop, and ARI functions.

fault is in the respective electrical distribution sys-

tem. If light remains illuminated, the generator has

Note

been disconnected automatically and the fault is in

DFCS synchronization can take up to 2 seconds

IDG or generator control unit.

following a power interrupt. If the MASTER

RESET pushbutton is depressed during the syn-

14.7.1.2

L or R GEN and TRANS/RECT Lights

chronization time, an additional depression of

the MASTER RESET pushbutton will be

1. Generator

(affected generator switch)

 OFF/

RESET, Then NORM.

required to restore spoiler functionality.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

2. If L GEN and TRANS/RECT lights remain illumi-

nated, select EMERG GEN on MASTER TEST panel.

Note

With R GEN and TRANS/RECT lights illumi-

nated, ac essential power is supplied by the L

GEN. Selecting EMER GEN on the MASTER

TEST panel (with R GEN and TRANS/RECT

lights) will not provide any additional power but

may cause an interrupt as the supply is trans-

ferred from the L GEN to the EMER GEN.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

14-20a (Reverse Blank)

CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 1 (1 KVA MODE)

AICS RAMP STOW

FIRE EXTINGUISHING

PILOT LCD LIGHTS

ANGLE OF ATTACK IND

FLOOD LIGHTS

PITCH/ROLL TRIM

ALTITUDE LOW WARNING

FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR

PROBE LIGHT

BACKUP CONTR/B/U OXY LOW

HYDRAULIC PRESSURE

RADAR ALTIMETER

INDICATION

BACKUP IGNITION

RUDDER TRIM

ICS

BACKUP OXY PRESSURE IND

STANDBY ATTITUDE

IFF/SIF

BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER

STORE MANAGEMENT

INSTRUMENT BUS FEEDER

PROCESSOR

CONSOLE LIGHTS (PILOT)

INSTRUMENT LIGHTS

TAIL/RUDDER/FLAP INDICATOR

DC ESSENTIAL NO. 1 FEEDER

JETTISON (EMERGENCY)

TURN AND SLIP INDICATOR

DC TEST

MAIN LANDING GEAR SAFETY

VHF/UHF RADIO 1 & 2

ENGINE INSTRUMENT GROUP

RELAYS

VOICE SECURITY EQUIPMENT

ENGINE INSTRUMENT GROUP

OBOGS CONTR

WHITE LIGHTS

WHEELS POSITION

OBOGS CONCENTRATOR

INDICATIONS

ENGINE START

PANEL FLOODLIGHTS

WING POSITION INDICATIONS

FIRE DETECTION

ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 2

AICS

CABIN PRESSURE

ENGINE STALL TONE

AICS LOCKUP POWER

CADC

EXHAUST NOZZLE

AIR SOURCE CONTROL

CANOPY LIGHT

EXTERIOR LIGHTS CONTROL

ALPHA COMPUTER

CIU

FLAP/SLAT CONTROL SHUTOFF

ALPHA HEATER

CURSOR CONTROL

FLIGHT CONTROL AUTHORITY

ANNUNCIATOR PANEL POWER

DC ESSENTIAL NO. 2 FEEDER

FUEL DUMP

ANTI−ICE CONTROL

DEKI LIGHTS

FUEL FEED

ANTI−ICE PROBE

DFCS

FUEL MANAGEMENT PANEL

ANTI−SKID POWER

DFCS BUS FEEDER

FUEL PRESSURE LIGHT

ARMAMENT GAS

DISPLAY PROCESSOR

FUEL TRANSFER OVERRIDE

ARRESTING HOOK CONTROL

ECS TEMPERATURE CONTROL

FUEL VENT VALVE

AUTOMATIC DIRECTION

EJECTION COMMAND

FUEL LOW LIGHT

FINDER

INDICATOR

GENERATOR LIGHTS

AUXILIARY FLAP/FLAP

EMERGENCY GENERATOR TEST

GPS

CONTROL

ENGINE AFTC

GROUND ROLL BRAKING

BDHI

ENGINE ANTI−ICE

INDICATOR

BINGO POWER

ENGINE ANTI−ICE VALVES

HUD

BLEED AIR LIGHT

ENGINE OIL COOLING

BLEED DUCT

ENGINE SECONDARY MODE

Figure 14Ć5.ĄEmer gency Generator Distribution (Sheet 1 of 2)

14−21

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 2 (continued)

HYDRAULIC PUMP SPOILER

MISSION COMPUTER NO. 2

ROLL COMPUTER

CONTROL

MOTIVE FLOW ISOLATION

RUDDER TRIM

HYDRAULIC VALVE CONTROL

NOSE GEAR STRUT LAUNCH

SENSOR CONTROL

INBOARD SPOILER CONTROL

BAR LIGHT

SPEED BRAKES ENABLE

INSTRUMENT LANDING

NOSE WHEEL STEERING

SPOILER INDICATOR

SYSTEMS (ARA−63)

OIL HOT LIGHTS

STARTER VALVE LIGHT

INS

PEDAL SHAKER

TAXI/FORMATION LIGHTS

INS SYNCH

PILOT ANNUNCIATOR PANEL

TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER

JTIDS

(AUX POWER)

LIGHTS

LADDER LIGHT

PITCH COMPUTER

UTILITY LIGHTS

MACH TRIM

PITCH−ROLL TRIM ENABLE

WINDSHIELD AIR

MAIN LANDING GEAR RELAYS

PITOT HEAT

WINDSHIELD DEFOG

MFD NO. 1

RADAR BEACON

CONTROL

(AN/APN−154)

MISSILE POWER HUD TEST

YAW COMPUTER

Figure 14−5. Emergency Generator Distribution (Sheet 2 of 2)

14.7.3

Double Transformer−Rectifier Failure

transfer pump is operating and pressure drops to between

2,000 and 1,100 psi (dependent upon the load placed on the

The 5−kVA emergency generator will automatically

generator), the emergency generator will automatically shift

activate and power the essential ac and dc No. 1 and No. 2 and

to the 1−kVA mode and power only the essential ac and dc

DFCS buses. See Figure 14Ć6 for listing of inoperable

No. 1 buses. If combined hydraulic pressure subsequently

dc−powered equipment.

recovers, the EMERG generator switch must be cycled

through OFF/RESET to NORM to regain the essential ac and

14.7.4

TRANS/RECT Light

dc No. 2 and DFCS buses.

The TRANS/RECT light will illuminate if either or

both T/R malfunction. If one T/R fails, the operating T/R will

14.7.5

Electrical Fire

assume the dc load. If both T/Rs fail, the emergency

Electrical fires may be indicated by visual or audible

generator will go on the line and tie to essential dc buses

arcing or an ozone odor in the cockpit and popping circuit

No. 1 and No. 2. Land as soon as practicable.

breakers. Electrical fires produced by 400°F air leaks can

Popped circuit breakers should not be reset more than

result in any one or combination of the following:

once or be held depressed unless the associated equipment is

1. Pinballing caution/advisory lights and instrument

absolutely an operational necessity. A popped circuit breaker

indications.

indicates an equipment malfunction or an overload condiĆ

tion. Repeated resets or forced depressions of popped circuit

2. CADC associated caution/advisory lights.

breakers can result in equipment damage and/or serious

3. Uncommanded movement of electrically controlled

electrical fire.

components (SAS, spoilers, wing sweep, throttles).

The loss of one generator and/or failure to tie the ac main

4. Complete electrical failure.

buses will illuminate the affected GEN light. The TRANS/

RECT light will also illuminate because the affected generaĆ

5. Smoke, fumes, and/or heat in the cockpit.

tor’s associated T/R is not receiving ac power to convert. Upon

The most effective method to extinguish an electrical

observing a TRANS/RECT light, the pilot can check that the

fire is to secure all electrical power. However, some

aircraft is actually experiencing a T/R failure and not a bus

conditions may not permit securing the emergency generator

tie failure. If the seat adjust, white floods, or instrument lights

after both main generators are secured. Night/IFR flight or

are still operative with the R GEN light illuminated, the bus

ECS−duck−leak−induced electrical fires are cases where

is tied. If the throttles are operating on the boosted mode with

securing all electrical power is not feasible.

a L GEN light illuminated, the bus is tied.If the hydraulic

ORIGINAL

14−22

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

ACM LIGHT

EMERGENCY GENERATOR

MONITOR BUS CONTROL

AIRBORNE SELF−PROTECTION

CONTROL

MULTI−FILTER ASSEMBLY

JAMMER

FLIGHT HYDRAULIC BACKUP

MULTI−FUNCTIONAL DISPLAYS 2

AIR SOURCE CONTROL

GROUND POWER COOLING

AND 3

ALE−39 CHAFF/FLARE

INTERLOCK

NFO CONSOLE LIGHT

ALR−67

GROUND TEST

OUTBOARD SPOILER

AMC BIT

GUN POWER

CONTROL AND PUMP

AN/AWW−4

HUD CAMERA

POSITION LIGHTS

ANNUNCIATOR PANEL DIM

HV POWER SUPPLY

RADAR COMPONENTS

CONTROL

IFF AIR−TO−AIR

RECONNAISSANCE EQUIPMENT

ANTENNA HYDRAULIC SERVO

INS BATTERY POWER

RIGHT DC TEST

ANTENNA LOCK

INTERFERENCE BLANKER

RIGHT MAIN TRANSFORMER

ANTI−COLLISION LIGHT

INTEGRATED TRIM

RECTIFIER

ASW 27

INTERRUPTION FREE

SAHRS

AUTO THROTTLE

DC BUS

SEAT ADJUST

BEAM PS

IRST

SOLENOID POWER SUPPLY

BOL CHAFF DISPENSERS

JTIDS DATA PROCESSOR AND

STATION 1, 1A, AND 8 AIM−9

BRAKE ACCUMULATOR

BATTERY HEATER

COOLING POWER

SHUTOFF VALVE

LEFT/RIGHT AICS HEATER

STATION 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, AND 8

COUNTING ACCELERATOR

LEFT MAIN

DECODER RELAY POWER

DATA LINK

TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER

STEADY POSITION LIGHTS

DATA PROCESSORS

LIQUID COOLING

STORES MANAGEMENT

DATA STORAGE SET

MASTER ARM

PROCESSOR

DEHYDRATOR

MASTER TEST

STORM FLOOD LIGHTS

DEU

MDL

SUPPLEMENTAL POSITION

DIGITAL DISPLAY ENABLE

MISSILE POWER RELAY UNIT

LIGHTS

ELECTRONIC COOLING

MISSION COMPUTER NO. 1

TELEVISION CAMERA SET

Figure 14Ć6.ĄFailure of Both Transformer−Rectifiers Equipment Inoperative List

*1. L and R generators  OFF.

If conditions permit:

Note

OBOGS concentrator heater power will be lost.

OBOGS may still function at a reduced but adeĆ

quate level.

OBOGS will shut down if all electrical power is

lost. BOS will be activated above 10,000 feet MSL

If uncommanded SAS or spoiler inputs are present:

but will not be available below 10,000 feet MSL.

*2. PITCH, ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches Ċ

OFF.

If associated with any other direct or indirect indication

of ECS malfunction, perform ECS Leak/Elimination of

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

Smoke and Fumes procedure, paragraph 14.8.1.

and requires immediate mission planning. See

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

3. EMERG generator switch  OFF.

Note

An electrical fire may affect the CADC and

Securing all electrical power while airborne

AICS systems causing random movements of the

causes the ECS to go full cold.

wings and ramps.

14−23

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

If cause of fire can be isolated:

2. Attempt to contact radar facilities or other aircraft

by handheld survival radio.

4. Pull cb’s of affected equipment.

3. Make arrested landing as soon as possible.

5. All generators  NORM.

The following systems are still available:

If cause of fire cannot be isolated:

a. Airspeed indicator.

6. Secure all unnecessary equipment.

b. Altimeter (STBY mode).

7. EMERG generator switch  NORM.

c. Cabin pressure altimeter.

8. Land as soon as possible.

d. Vertical velocity indicator.

e. Arresting hook (emergency extension only).

f. Standby attitude gyro (3 minutes).

g. Emergency wing sweep.

Do not operate engines on the ground without

electrical power. Ground cooling fans are shut

h. Landing gear.

off, causing hot bleed air to cook off oil and

i. Main flaps/slats.

hydrocarbons in the ECS ducting, resulting in

smoke in the cockpit and possible damage to the

j. Standby compass.

ECS turbine compressor.

k. Backup oxygen system

(above

10,000 feet

14.7.6

Total Electrical Failure

MSL).

1. Descend or climb to known VFR conditions.

Ground engine operation without electrical

power supplied by either the generators or exterĆ

nal power may cause 20−mm ammunition detoĆ

All DFCS functions and spoilers will be lost.

nation because of excessive heat in the gun

This will have an adverse effect on flying qualiĆ

ammunition drum.

ties. Terminate aggressive maneuvering immeĆ

diately and remain subsonic. Expect minimal

damping of oscillations in pitch and yaw and

severely degraded roll control with flaps

extended. Perform controllability check.

D OBOGS will shut down if all electrical power

Note

is lost. BOS will be activated above 10,000

feet MSL but will not be available below

10,000 feet MSL.

D The standby attitude gyro is capable of providĆ

ing reliable attitude information (within 9°) for

D Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limĆ

up to 3 minutes after a complete loss of power.

ited and requires immediate mission planĆ

ning. See OBOGS emergency procedure. See

D Cabin pressure will be lost and ECS will go

Figure 2Ć84 for oxygen breathing time

full cold.

remaining.

D Do not operate engines on the ground without

electrical power. Ground cooling fans are shut

off, causing hot bleed air to cook off oil and

hydrocarbons in the ECS ducting, resulting in

smoke and possible damage to the ECS turĆ

bine compressor.

ORIGINAL

14−24

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

If warning or caution systems do not function, the first

indication of an ECS leak can vary. The presence and order

of appearance of indications depend on the size and location

D Total electrical failure will cause the sump

of the leak.

tank interconnect, engine crossfeed, and

motive flow isolation valves to close, fully

isolating both tank systems. Wing and exterĆ

Direct and indirect indications are listed below in a

representative order of appearance; however, they can appear

nal fuel will transfer into the fuselage.

in any sequence. The presence of any one direct indication or

D If possible, a section IFR descent should be

any two indirect indications shall be treated as an ECS leak.

conducted to VFR conditions for landing.

Direct indications:

All other normal system and cockpit cues are not

available.

1. BLEED DUCT caution light.

When all electrical power is shut off, the cockpit dump

2. FIRE warning light.

valve closes and the environmental control system supplies

only cold air to the cockpit and forced air cooled avionics.

3. Smoke or fumes in the cockpit.

Pressurization will slowly bleed off. If operational necessity

4. Heat emanating from behind aft right corner of RIO

prohibits immediate descent, maintain cockpit altitude at the

cockpit.

highest practicable level to conserve BOS. Otherwise,

descend to a cabin altitude less than 10,000 feet. If the system

5. Complete loss of ECS airflow.

failure occurs in the day or night VFR environment, immediĆ

ate return to base and an emergency landing shall be accomĆ

Indirect indications:

plished. In the day or night IFR environment, ascend or

descend to known VFR conditions. (Extreme care should be

6. Audible pop or squeal from ECS.

exercised because of partial panel environment.) Reduce

power setting to maximum endurance. Contact nearest

7. Rapid drop in cockpit airflow.

ground facility by handheld survival radio. Once positive

radar identification is made, follow controllers’ directions to

8. Electrical fire indications.

landing.

9. Any ECS advisory light

(SENSOR COND or

14.8

ECS MALFUNCTIONS/FAILURES

COOLING AIR).

14.8.1

ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke

When an ECS duct leak is indicated or ECS turbine

and Fumes

whine is heard, AIR SOURCE should be immediately

selected OFF. ECS leaks may melt wiring splice junctions

Bleed air leaks, hot air leaks, and ECS turbine failures

and create conditions that may induce an electrical fire. If an

have similar indications and results and shall be treated as

associated electrical fire occurs, smoke, fumes, heat, and

one failure, ECS leaks. All can cause unsurvivable damage

damage to the surrounding aircraft structure may intensify.

when not recognized and corrected expeditiously. Bleed air

Since electrical fire procedures are not compatible with meaĆ

leaks in the engine compartment illuminate the appropriate

sures to eliminate smoke and fumes, canopy jettison may

FIRE warning light, and FIRE light procedures apply. Bleed

become necessary as a last ditch procedure.

air leaks outside the engine compartment and other hot air

leaks illuminate the BLEED DUCT caution light. IlluminaĆ

tion of the appropriate caution/warning light should be the

first indication of an ECS leak. ECS turbine failures can

cause hot air leaks. After a compressor−side failure, cataĆ

strophic thermal damage can be caused by heat generated

Failure to immediately select AIR SOURCE

during turbine winddown. Wire bundles, flight control rods,

OFF upon indication of an ECS leak may result

and SMDC lines are in the vicinity of the ECS turbine and hot

in severe aircraft damage and loss of aircraft.

air manifold. Both turbine and compressor−side failures may

cause a whining noise emanating from below and behind the

right side of the RIO cockpit, and other indications of an ECS

air leak follow.

14−25

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

Ram air door may take up to 50 seconds to fully

open.

Selection of AIR SOURCE to RAM allows bleed

5. Airspeed  Below 300 knots/0.8 Mach.

air to circulate throughout the 400° F manifold

system.

6. Nonessential electrical equipment  Secure.

7. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever  CANOPY

DEFOG.

8. Land as soon as possible.

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

and requires immediate mission planning. See

If electrical fire:

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

9. Follow Electrical Fire procedures, paragraph 14.7.5.

Note

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

mately 30 seconds before depleting residual

The EMERG generator switch should be left in

OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.

NORM unless there are overriding considerations

D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)

that mandate turning the emergency generator off.

will return OBOGS to operation.

Note

*1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

D Selecting AIR SOURCE OFF eliminates

*2. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

pressurization to the service system (canopy,

g−suit, external fuel tanks, pressure/ventilaĆ

tion suit, and airbag seals). Rain removal,

defog, OBOGS, and heating systems are also

eliminated. Judicious reselection of AIR

SOURCE to BOTH or RAM to regain critical

support/ service systems is predicated on

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

severity of ECS malfunction and operational

and requires immediate mission planning. See

requirements.

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

D If ECS airflow continues, ensure AIR

SOURCE CONTROL cb (RD2) is in. If cb

Note

RD2 has popped, ECS control is lost.

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

D Securing all electrical powerwhile airborne

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

closes cockpit dump valve and cabin hot air

mately 30 seconds before depleting residual

valve, opens bleed air shutoff valves and dual

OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.

pressure regulator, and the ram air door

remains at its last commanded position (ram

D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)

air door takes up to 50 seconds to open). This

will return OBOGS to operation.

results in full cold air to the cockpit, unconĆ

trolled bleed air to circulate, and the loss of

*3. If smoke or fumes are present:

normal cabin dump capability. Minimize lowĆ

a. Altitude  Below 35,000 Feet.

speed

(less than

0.25 Mach) and ground

operations as the heat exchanger cooling fan

b. CABIN PRESS switch  DUMP.

will be inoperative and ECS overheat condiĆ

tion will result.

*4. RAM AIR switch  OPEN.

ORIGINAL

14−26

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

Elimination of smoke or fumes without electrical

power may be accomplished by ECS airflow. To

obtain maximum smoke/fume removal capabilĆ

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

ity under this condition, fly below 8,000 feet

and requires immediate mission planning. See

MSL and set the throttle to maximum practical

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

position. This will open the cabin regulator valve

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

for maximum ECS airflow. If smoke or fumes are

not eliminated, it is most probable that smoke/

Note

fumes are being regenerated by an ECS air leak.

As a last resort, jettison the canopy.

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

14.8.2

COOLING AIR Light

mately 30 seconds before depleting residual

OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.

14.8.2.1

On Deck

D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)

1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  Check L ENG, R

will return OBOGS to operation.

ENG, or BOTH ENG.

If associated with any other direct or indirect indication

2. Throttles  Advance Without Closing Nozzles.

of ECS malfunction:

3. CANOPY DEFOG−CABIN AIR lever  CANOPY

3. Perform ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke and

DEFOG.

Fumes procedure, paragraph 14.8.1.

4. ECS  MAN/FULL HOT.

If not associated with any other direct or indirect indiĆ

cation of ECS malfunction and operational requirements dicĆ

If light goes out:

tate temporary reselection of RAM to regain lost service

systems (external fuel transfer, OBOGS, cabin pressure, rain

5. THROTTLES  IDLE.

removal, engine anti−ice, etc.):

6. ECS  As Desired.

3. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  RAM.

If light remains illuminated:

4. RAM AIR door switch  Full Increase.

7. Secure systems.

5. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF (when service

system is no longer required).

14.8.2.2

In Flight

6. Land as soon as practicable.

1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

14.8.3

TARPS ECS Lights Illuminate

1. TARPS sensors  OFF.

2. SYSTEM switch  OFF.

Failure to immediately select AIR SOURCE

pushbutton OFF upon indication of an ECS leak

3. Pull TARPS cb’s:

(bleed air or hot air leak indication) or upon hearĆ

ing ECS turbine whine may result in an unconĆ

a. RECON ECS/LANTIRN POD CONT (9E1)

trollable electrical fire, catastrophic ECS comĆ

ponent failure, and/or loss of flight controls.

b. RECON ECS CONT AC (2G4)

2. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

c. RECON HTR/LANTIRN PWR 3 PH (2C3)

14−27

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

d. RECON POD (1E2)

4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  RAM (below 35,000

feet).

e. RECON CONTR/LANTIRN POD PWR (9E2)

5. RAM AIR switch  OPEN (select amount of ram

f. RECON POD DC PWR NO 2 (9E3)

air desired for flightcrew comfort).

g. RECON POD DC PWR NO 1 (9E4)

4. Ask for visual check of pod by wingman.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

High−cockpit temperature and smoke during

14.8.4

SENSOR COND Light Illuminated and/or

ground operation indicates ECS cooling fan shutĆ

down. This will occur with an external air source

PUMP Phase Circuit Breakers Popped

(start cart) without electric power on the aircraft.

or APG−71 PM Acronym

This results in an overtemperature condition

caused by operating without ground cooling fans.

1. RADAR COOLING switch  OFF.

2. RDR switch  OFF.

14.8.6

Cockpit Overpressurization on Deck

3. APG−71 PUMP PH A, B, and C cb’s  Pull (2G3,

Cockpit overpressurization is sensed by the aircrew

2G6, 2G7).

and verified by lower than normal cockpit altitude on the

cabin pressure altimeter This condition could be caused by

If other conditions exist that may indicate an ECS

a faulty cabin pressure controller or regulator.

malfunction, either directly or indirectly, perform ECS

Leak/Elimination of Smoke and Fumes procedure,

1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.

paragraph 14.8.1.

2. CABIN PRESS switch  DUMP.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

3. Canopy  OPEN (when cockpit pressure altimeter

14.8.5

Cockpit Temperature Control Malfunction

equals the field elevation).

1. TEMP mode switch  MAN.

2. TEMP thumbwheel  As Desired.

If temperature control is not regained:

The canopy may explosively leave the aircraft

upon unlocking of the canopy sill locks if cockpit

3. VENT AIRFLOW thumbwheel  OFF.

overpressure is not reduced.

14.8.7

CABIN PRESS Light

1. Oxygen mask  ON.

Reduce airspeed to

350 knots or 1.5 Mach,

If below 15,000 feet:

whichever is lower, to prevent ram air at temperĆ

2. CABIN PRESS switch  Cycle.

ature above 110°F from entering aircraft. After

ram air flow is stabilized, airspeed may be

14.8.8

WSHLD HOT Light

increased as required for flightcrew comfort or to

increase flow to electronic equipment.

1. WSHLD AIR switch  OFF.

If light remains illuminated:

2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF (below 35,000

feet).

ORIGINAL

14−28

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Note

If light remains illuminated after air source is off,

the indication is faulty. Turn ECS on and land as

soon as practicable.

The aircrew will not have any indication of a failĆ

ure of the monitor. If the aircrew suspects the

3. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.

onset of hypoxia at any time, immediately select

BACKUP. The monitor may be tested once the

aircraft has descended to a cabin altitude of

10,000 feet or less and the ON position on the

OBOGS master switch has been reselected.

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

and requires immediate mission planning. See

OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 2Ć84

for oxygen breathing time remaining.

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

Note

and requires immediate mission planning. See

Figure 2Ć84 for oxygen breathing time remaining.

D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concenĆ

trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxiĆ

14.9.1

OBOGS Light

mately 30 seconds before depleting residual

OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.

1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)

will return OBOGS to operation.

4. RAM AIR switch  OPEN.

5. Reduce airspeed to less than 300 knots or 0.8 Mach.

Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited

6. Land as soon as practicable.

and requires immediate mission planning. See

Figure 2Ć84 for oxygen breathing time remaining.

14.9

OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE

2. OBOGS concentrator and OBOGS control cb’s Ċ

Check in (3C4, 7A1).

If operational necessity prohibits immediate descent,

maintain cockpit altitude at the highest practicable level to

14.9.2

B/U OXY LOW Light (Both Cockpits)

conserve BOS. Depressurizing the cabin will increase the

duration of the backup and emergency oxygen supply. If fuel

1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

is not a problem and flight conditions permit, descend below

10,000 MSL. BOS will not be available; therefore, it will be

If BACKUP OXY PRESS is less than 200 psi:

necessary to release one side of the oxygen mask in order to

breathe unless emergency oxygen is used. Emergency oxyĆ

Note

gen can be shut off and reactivated as required. It is recomĆ

mended that emergency oxygen be reserved for final

Prepare for mask collapse. Breathing time can

approach, permitting the aircrew to refasten oxygen masks.

vary from 2 to 4 minutes, depending upon cabin

altitude.

2. Cabin altitude  Less Than 10,000 Feet.

3. OXYGEN SUPPLY valves  OFF.

4. Oxygen masks  Release One Side.

14−29

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

Before landing:

nications will probably be impossible above

200 knots,

although the pilot will be able to effectively utilize V/UHF

5. Oxygen masks and OXYGEN SUPPLY valves 

at airspeeds up to approximately 400 knots. After lowering

ON.

the seat, the RIO should lean forward to take advantage of the

wind blast protection provided by the detail data display and

6. Emergency oxygen  Activate.

instrument panel, while the pilot decelerates the aircraft by

utilizing idle power, speedbrakes, and moderate g. The RIO

If BACKUP OXY PRESS is greater than 200 psi:

should deselect HOT MIC ICS to prevent interference with

V/UHF communications caused by wind blast across the oxyĆ

Note

gen mask microphone. Helmet loss will result in severe disĆ

orientation because of a total loss of communications and

Failure of the B/U OXY LOW pressure relay will

vision impairment caused by wind blast.

illuminate both pilot and RIO B/U OXY LOW

light. BACKUP OXY PRESS indicator remains

If canopy loss is experienced at high speed, or if helmet

functional and displays true BOS reserve.

loss appears to be possible because of wind blast or buffeting,

retain the helmet by pulling down on the visor cover (keeping

2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Monitor.

arms close to the body).

Note

The pilot LAD/CANOPY caution light may be actiĆ

Emergency oxygen can be shut off and reactiĆ

vated by a mispositioning of either the boarding ladder or the

vated as required.

canopy. If both the pilot LAD/CANOPY and the RIO CANĆ

OPY lights are illuminated, then the problem is with the

14.9.3

B/U OXY LOW Light (Pilot Only)

canopy system. If the RIO CANOPY light is working but not

illuminated, then the problem is with the boarding ladder.

1. BOS CONTR/B/U OXY LOW cb  Check In

(7A4).

2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

Note

If both the pilot and RIO caution lights are illumiĆ

nated, indicating a canopy problem, a later probĆ

Failure of the BOS CONTR/B/U OXY LOW cirĆ

lem with the boarding ladder will not activate the

cuit breaker will illuminate only the pilot B/U

LAD/ CANOPY or the MASTER CAUTION

OXY LOW light. BACKUP OXY PRESS indiĆ

lights.

cator remains functional and displays true BOS

reserve.

Note

14.9.4

B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only)

If the RIO CANOPY light is not illuminated,

ensure that it is operating by selecting IND LT on

3. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.

the RIO TEST panel before assuming a boarding

ladder problem.

14.10 LAD/CANOPY LIGHT AND/OR

LOSS OF CANOPY

14.10.1

LAD/CANOPY Light With RIO

CANOPY Light/Canopy Loss

In the event of canopy loss in flight, the pilot will be

adequately shielded by the forward windscreen to maintain

*1. Canopy  Boost Close (canopy remaining).

control of the aircraft. Vision may be impaired briefly by dust

in the cockpit, and moderate head buffet may occur, which

2. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200 Knots/15,000

can be alleviated by lowering the seat and/or leaning forward.

Feet.

The RIO will be exposed to a significantly more hazardous

and disorienting environment, which will include vision

3. Seats and visors  Down.

impairment, loss of communications, wind blast injury, and

breathing difficulties. The degree to which these will be expeĆ

4. If canopy has departed aircraft, perform controlĆ

lability check.

rienced is directly related to airspeed and seat height. In addiĆ

tion, the possibility of helmet loss becomes greater as airspeed

5. Land as soon as possible.

increases above 300 knots. ICS and RIO VHF/UHF commuĆ

ORIGINAL

14−30

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.10.2

LAD/CANOPY Light Without

6. L INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.

RIO CANOPY Light

7. DLC  Do Not Engage.

1. Airspeed  Minimum Safe Operating.

8. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, comĆ

2. Obtain in−flight visual check if possible.

mitted to landing).

3. Land as soon as practicable.

9. Land as soon as possible.

14.11 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

14.11.1

Combined Pressure Approximately 2,400

to 2,600 Psi

D Loss of combined pressure may indicate

impending fluid loss. Without fluid in the

combined system return line, the in−flight

If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the

refueling probe will not extend with the handĆ

hydraulic system, component rupture is immiĆ

pump. Early extension of the refueling probe

nent. Turn the hydraulic transfer pump switch Ċ

at the first indication of a combined system

OFF.

malfunction is recommended in a carrier

1. HYD ISOL switch  FLT.

environment.

D Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure

Note

since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD

Monitor AUX BRAKE PRESSURE gauge. Tap

PRESS lights will not illuminate if the

wheelbrakes to seat priority valve if pressure is

remaining systems fail.

decreasing.

Note

2. In−flight refuel PROBE switch  EXTD (in carrier

environment).

To extend or retract the refueling probe using the

hydraulic handpump requires the landing gear

handle to be in the up position, combined system

fluid in the system return line, and essential dc

No. 2 electrical power. Extension of the in−flight

Wing and external fuel will not transfer with

refueling probe requires approximately 25 cycles

refuel probe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe

of the pump handle.

extension required, select FUS EXTD to enable

transfer.

14.11.2

Flight Pressure Approximately 2,400 to

2,600 Psi

3. Wing sweep  Set at 20_.

4. L INLET RAMPS switch  STOW (less than 1.2

Mach).

If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the

hydraulic system, component rupture is imminent.

Turn the hydraulic pump switch (BI−DI) OFF.

If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,

pulling L AICS cb (LF1) may cause unintenĆ

1. Wing sweep  Set at 20°.

tional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP DRIVE

2. R INLET RAMPS switch  STOW (less than 1.2

NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV

Mach).

FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.

5. Left AICS cb  Pull (LF1).

3. Right AICS cb  Pull (LG1).

Note

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumiĆ

nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.

Above 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and ROLL

DGR lights will also be illuminated. These

should clear with a MASTER RESET following

programmer reset.

14−31

CHANGE 1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

4. R INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.

operated in conjunction with zero combined

pressure, some backup module fluid will be

5. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, comĆ

expelled by thermal expansion. The module

mitted to landing).

will remain fully serviced and operate norĆ

mally as long as elevated temperatures are

maintained. Once operating, the module

should not be turned off in flight without comĆ

bined system pressure available to reservice

Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure

it. Doing so would result in fluid contraction

since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD PRESS

and an underserviced condition that could

lights will not illuminate if the remaining sysĆ

prevent subsequent pump operation.

tems fail.

The following important equipment is inoperative:

a. NORMAL HOOK  Restored by weight on

wheels. Hook handle restowed.

Note

D Loss of combined pressure with landing flaps

Arrested landing will require emergency hook

down may allow the auxiliary flaps to cycle,

extension.

causing moderate pitch oscillations.

6. Land as soon as possible.

D Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure

14.11.3

Combined Pressure Zero

since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD

PRESS lights will not illuminate if the

1. HYD ISOL switch  FLT.

remaining systems fail.

2. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch  SHUTOFF.

Note

3. REFUEL PROBE  EXTD (in CV environment).

Complete loss of combined hydraulic pressure

will result in the following caution lights due to

the loss of a single channel SAS actuator funcĆ

tion: PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, ARI

DGR, and SPOILERS lights.

Wing and external fuel will not transfer with refuel

probe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe extension

required, select FUS EXTD to enable transfer.

The following important equipment is inoperative:

4. Wing sweep  Set at 20°.

a. L AICS.

5. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW.

b. Nosewheel steering.

c. Gun drive.

d. Inboard spoilers.

e. Hook extend (emergency actuation available).

D If the INLET RAMPS switch is not placed in

STOW prior to the pressure reaching zero, do

f. Flaps and slats (emergency actuation available).

not place it in STOW after complete loss of

g. Landing gear (emergency actuation available).

pressure. Trapped fluid may be the only thing

holding the affected ramp in position.

h. Wheelbrakes (emergency actuation available).

D An outboard spoiler module failure with flaps

i. Refueling probe (emergency actuation available

extended, below 180 knots, and with a comĆ

if fluid remains in return line).

bined hydraulic failure rendering the inboard

j. Emergency generator.

spoilers inoperative, can result in asymmetric

spoiler float such that the aircraft may not be

k. Auxiliary flaps.

flyable at normal approach airspeeds. A small

l. DLC.

amount of spoiler float can significantly

increase approach speeds.

m. Speedbrakes.

D Do not return to AUTO (LOW) mode once

n. Normal hook.

module is selected on (HIGH or LOW) with

o. One−half authority of SAS/ARI actuators in

operating flight hydraulic system. When

pitch, roll, and yaw.

ORIGINAL

14−32

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

6. LDG GEAR  Emergency lower. Refer to Landing

The following important equipment is inoperative:

Gear Emergency Lowering, paragraph 15.4.1

a. One−half authority of SAS/ARI actuators in

7. Hook  Emergency down. Refer to Arresting Hook

pitch, roll, and yaw.

Emergency Down, paragraph 15.11.

b. ACLS.

8. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb  Pull (8G3).

c. R AICS.

9. Flaps (no auxiliary flaps)  DN.

d. Normal hook  Restored by weight on wheels.

Hook handle restowed.

10. Brake accumulator (handpump)  Check.

4. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, comĆ

11. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER BK

mitted to landing).

(OFF for CV).

5. Land as soon as possible.

12. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final comĆ

Note

mitted to landing).

Arrested landing will require emergency hook

extension.

14.11.5

Both Combined and Flight Pressure Zero

Do not return to AUTO (LOW) mode once modĆ

1. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW.

ule is selected on (HIGH or LOW) with operating

2. Do not attempt CV recovery. Divert if possible.

flight hydraulic system.

13. Make arrested landing as soon as possible.

After landing:

14. Do not taxi out of arresting gear.

D If any undesirable motions or oscillations

occur, immediately release the stick and perĆ

15. Engines  OFF.

mit the motions to dampen before resuming

14.11.4

Flight Pressure Zero

active control.

D Do not attempt IMC or close night formation

1. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch  SHUTOFF.

flight while in the LOW mode.

2. Wing sweep  Set at 20°.

D Operations of more than 8 minutes total in

3. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW.

HIGH mode may fail the BFCM motor. The

LOW mode should be selected as soon as pracĆ

ticable following a waveoff or bolter and the

HIGH mode reselected on the subsequent

approach.

If the INLET RAMPS switch was not placed in

D Inboard spoilers can be expected to float, causĆ

STOW prior to pressure reaching zero, do not

ing uncomfortable lateral stick requirements

place it in stow after complete loss of pressure.

for level flight. Do not trim out lateral forces.

Trapped fluid may be the only thing holding the

3. Reduce airspeed below 250 knots if practicable.

affected ramp in position.

Note

Airspeeds less than 250 knots while operating in

LOW mode will reduce susceptibility of exceedĆ

ing maximum stabilizer deflection rate.

Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure

The following important equipment is operative

since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD PRESS

flight:

lights will not illuminate if the remaining sysĆ

a. Horizontal stabs (significantly reduced rate, no

tems fail.

SAS/ARI).

Note

b. Rudders (slightly reduced rate, no SAS/ARI).

Complete loss of flight hydraulic pressure will

result in the following caution lights due to the

c. Main flaps and slats (reduced rate, via thumbĆ

loss of a single channel SAS actuator function:

wheel or flap handle).

PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, and ARI

d. Outboard spoilers.

DGR lights.

14−33

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

e. Hydraulic handpump.

13. Hook  EMERG DN.

f. Landing gear (emergency actuation available).

14. Brake accumulator  Check.

g. Hook extend (emergency actuation available).

Established on final, committed to landing:

h. Refuel probe (emergency actuation available, if

fluid remains in return line).

15. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH.

i. Wheelbrakes (emergency actuation available).

If in−flight refueling required:

4. Decelerate with tanker to 180 knots.

D Aggressive nose movement in close can rate

limit the stabilizers, resulting in low altitude

5. Maneuver flaps  Extend.

loss of control. Do not use APCS.

D Inboard spoilers can be expected to float, causĆ

6. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (prior to movĆ

ing uncomfortable lateral stick requirements

ing to precontact).

for level flight. Do not trim out lateral forces.

7. Avoid abrupt control inputs during contact.

D Waveoff performance from low power setĆ

tings is very poor. Carrying extra speed during

D Any abrupt control input to affect engagement

IMC approach will improve waveoff perforĆ

can rate limit the stabilizers and result in loss

mance by permitting smooth rotation to 15

of control. The pilot must resist spotting the

units AOA to break the rate of descent while

basket and rely on RIO commentary to perĆ

the engines are accelerating.

form the engagement.

D Prolonged operation of the BFCM in the

D Extended LOW operation (greater than 30

HIGH mode may cause failure of the module.

minutes) after in−flight refueling will permit

The LOW mode should be selected as soon as

several additional minutes in HIGH mode for

practicable following a waveoff or bolter and

subsequent landing.

the HIGH mode reselected on the subsequent

approach.

D Tanking from large body tankers (KC−130,

KC−10, KC−135) is hazardous and should not

If wings are 20°:

be attempted.

16. Fly straight−in approach at

15 units AOA

and

Note

180 knots.

If the air refueling store does not adequately

transfer fuel at 180 knots, once engaged, the airĆ

If wings are greater than 20°:

speed can be safely increased to 200 knots to

17. Fly straight−in approach at 15 units AOA.

improve fuel transfer rate.

Note

8. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW (immediately

Control in LOW mode is satisfactory for perĆ

once clear of tanker).

forming transition to dirty configuration. PitchĆ

ing moment because of flap transition is easily

9. Maneuver flaps  Retract.

countered with electrical trim caused by very

slow extension rate.

Field recovery:

18. Make arrested landing as soon as possible.

10. LDG GEAR handle  EMERG DN.

After landing:

11. Maneuver flaps  Extend With Thumbwheel.

19. Do not taxi out of arresting gear.

12. MANEUVER FLAPS cb  Pull (LE1).

20. Throttles  OFF.

ORIGINAL

14−34

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.11.6

Backup Flight Module Malfunction

14.12 FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURES

OR MALFUNCTIONS

There are a myriad of possible causes to binding flight

controls. Unfortunately, unless the cause is a foreign object

jammed in the cockpit controls and visible to the pilot, it may

be impossible for the aircrew to determine the true cause. If

Prolonged use of the backup flight control modĆ

the aircraft is in a controllable state, execute the ControllabilĆ

ule in the high mode may result in a failure of the

ity Checklist. If the aircraft is uncontrollable, an attempt

module.

should be made to release pressure on the flight controls so

that any potential foreign objects may be dislodged. If the

1. FLT HYD BACKUP PH A, B, and C cb’s  In

controls are still inhibited, apply negative g, flight conditions

(2A1, 2C1, 2E1).

permitting, to forcefully dislodge the object. In the low

altitude environment, applying negative g may not be

2. Land as soon as possible.

possible. As always, the aircrew must decide if such an action

will further jeopardize the aircraft. Finally, the pilot should

14.11.7

Low Brake Accumulator Pressure

use whatever force necessary in the direction of the bind in

order to break any jamming foreign object. If unsuccessful,

In flight:

the aircrew should conduct a controllability check using

alternative means to maneuver the aircraft to determine

1. HYD ISOL switch  T.O./LDG.

suitability for a safe landing. Consider using different axes to

coordinate aircraft movement. Yaw through rudder displaceĆ

If pressure does not recover:

ment or asymmetric thrust can be substituted for roll

commands via lateral stick and vice versa. Aircraft configuĆ

2. LDG GEAR handle  DN.

ration (flap setting, wing sweep), airspeed/ thrust, or sideslip

3. HYD HAND PUMP  Recharge Accumulator.

may assist in inducing pitch commands in the event of

inhibited control stick. The aircrew should thoroughly

investigate all possible alternative control methods at a

Note

sufficient altitude to allow safe ejection should the aircraft

D Monitor AUX BRAKE PRESSURE gauge.

depart controlled flight. Do not delay eject decision if

Tap wheelbrakes to seat priority valve if presĆ

approaching edge of the ejection envelope. If the aircraft is

sure is decreasing.

suitable for landing with restricted rudder pedal authority,

consider an arrested landing.

D Approximately

13 to 14 differential pedal

applications of auxiliary brakes are available.

14.12.1

Controllability Check

If accumulator cannot be recharged:

There are several malfunctions that may significantly

affect the handling characteristics in the cruise and landing

4. Make arrested landing as soon as practicable.

configurations. These malfunctions include, but are not

limited to:

5. Parking brake  Pull (to lock wheels).

1. Spoiler malfunction*

2. Flap/slat asymmetry*

3. Structural damage

Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the

4. Uncommanded SAS inputs*

wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render parking

brake ineffective.

5. Rudder malfunction (hardover)*

6. Wing−sweep asymmetry*

7. Jammed flight controls

8. ARI failure*

Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake application is

*These malfunctions, which have unique NATOPS

165 knots at a gross weight of 46,000 pounds and

procedures specific to a particular failure mode, should be

145 knots at 51,000 pounds.

performed before beginning a controllability check.

14−35

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NATOPS procedures cannot account for every potenĆ

D A controllability check requires the total

tial malfunction. It is absolutely imperative that the aircrew

attention and awareness of the aircrew. The

thoroughly and safely evaluate the degraded handling charĆ

aircrew must be prepared to encounter

acteristics of the damaged or malfunctioning aircraft prior to

unusual handling characteristics, since the

continued flight and landing. This check does not take priorĆ

aerodynamic properties of the aircraft may be

ity over existing emergency procedures.

significantly changed. Stall speed, as well as

flight and ground handling characteristics,

Upon encountering a problem that alters the handling

may be drastically different from normal.

qualities of the aircraft, the aircrew should realize that the

aircraft may no longer be a stable airframe, especially in the

Note

landing configuration. In addition, the flight characteristics

If flight control malfunction is due to uncomĆ

may rapidly degrade or even become uncontrollable when

manded stab aug transients, spoiler malfunction,

normal configuration changes are introduced or during

flap/slat asymmetry, rudder malfunction (hardĆ

airspeed changes. Increased awareness of flight parameters

over), and/or wingsweep malfunctions; perform

should prevail following a malfunction until the aircraft is

applicable emergency procedure(s) as necessary

safely on deck.

before beginning a controllability check.

Even though the aircraft may possess significantly

different or even hazardous flying qualities, the pilot and RIO

1. Climb to 10,000 feet AGL minimum.

have numerous cues available to them to warn of potential

2. Obtain visual check if possible.

problems. Some of these cues include:

1. Turn needle and ball position.

3. Decelerate gradually to 200 knots if feasible.

2. AOA.

4. Dirty aircraft  One configuration change at a time,

3. Buffet.

while flying straight and level.

4. Yaw string position.

Note

5. Flight control positions.

Landing gear should be lowered before flaps. Do

not lower arresting hook until landing gear is

6. Trim settings.

confirmed down and locked.

7. Roll−off.

If flaps are lowered, do so incrementally and be alert

8. Rate of descent.

for a flap/slat asymmetry.

All cues should be very closely monitored, since they

If maneuver flaps are used for landing approach:

tell the pilot what the aircraft is doing or is about to do.

wing sweep drive no. 1 and WG SWP DR No. 2/

Stall/departure recovery procedures and ejection

MANUV FLAP cb’s Ċ pull (LD1 and LE1).

should be discussed prior to any controllability check. In the

Note

event of a stall/departure, NATOPS procedures should be

applied immediately. If during flap/slat transition, follow

D Failure to pull wing sweep drive circuit breakĆ

uncommanded roll/yaw procedures. A rapid increase in

ers (LD1 and LE1) could result in inadvertent

airspeed can be attained through judicial use of forward stick

maneuver device retraction or wing sweep

and military power.

during approach.

After a thorough controllability check

(to include

D Wingsweep warning, wingsweep advisory,

approach and waveoff/bolter performance and flight characĆ

and flap caution lights will illuminate with

teristics), the aircrew must make the decision as to whether

both wing sweep drive circuit breakers pulled

the aircraft can be safely landed aboard the carrier or should

(LD1 and LE1).

be diverted.

Use differential thrust, if required, to achieve

acceptable flight characteristics.

Slow−fly aircraft to determine approach handling

D If aircraft stalls or departs in dirty configuraĆ

characteristics, including turns.

tion, immediately unload and place throttles

at military. Do not raise flaps until recovered.

(If during flap/slat transition, follow uncomĆ

manded roll/yaw procedures.)

ORIGINAL

14−36

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

9. Fly simulated approach to evaluate lineup correcĆ

c. Asymmetric flaps and/or slats.

tions, power changes, and waveoff/bolter perforĆ

mance and flight characteristics.

d. Uncommanded differential stabilizer and/or rudĆ

der automatic flight control system inputs caused

10. For landing, use minimum safe control speed, but no

by abnormal power transients.

slower than optimum AOA.

e. Rudder hardover.

11. If performance and flight characteristics dictate that

a CV landing is not possibledivert.

*1. If flap transition: FLAP handle  Previous Position.

12. If diverting with a flight control malfunctionĊ

*2. Rudder and stick  Opposite Roll/Yaw.

make an arrested landing, if possible.

Note

For spoiler malfunction, use lateral stick as priĆ

mary lateral control and rudder only as needed to

If normal landing rollout is attempted, flap hanĆ

maintain balanced flight.

dle should be checked down on deck with spoiler

brake selected to enable full ground roll braking

*3. AOA  Below 12 Units.

authority.

*4. Downwing engine  MAX THRUST (if required).

13. If directional controllability is in question:

*5. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

a. A shorebased arrested landing should be flown to

touchdown at or just prior to arresting gear.

Note

b. Use a landing signal officer if possible.

DFCS synchronization can take up to 2 seconds

c. If arresting gear not engaged and performance

following a power interrupt. If the MASTER

and flight characteristics permit, execute waveĆ

RESET pushbutton is depressed during the synĆ

off/touch−and−go, if possible.

chronization time, an additional depression of

the MASTER RESET pushbutton will be

d. Expect directional excursions during waveoff/

required to restore spoiler functionality.

bolter, arrested landing, or landing rollout.

6. ROLL SAS  ON.

e. Nosewheel steering should not be engaged if rudĆ

der pedal authority is restricted.

7. Roll trim  Opposite Stick (if required).

f. Use rudder, lateral stick, and/or differential brakĆ

8. Out of control below 10,000 feet  Eject.

ing to oppose any directional excursions during

normal landing rollout.

9. Control regained, climb and investigate for the

g. Brief runway departure prior to landing and idenĆ

following:

tify any obstructions in close proximity to runway.

a. Flap and slat asymmetry.

14.12.2

Uncommanded Roll and/or Yaw

b. SAS malfunction.

Note

D If uncommanded roll and/or yaw occurs durĆ

SAS failure may cause uncommanded roll and/or

ing high AOA maneuvering (above 15 unit),

yaw, even without illumination of the associated

assume departure from controlled flight and

lights.

apply appropriate departure and/or spin

recovery procedures.

c. Spoiler malfunction.

D Failures that may cause uncommanded roll

d. Hardover rudder.

and/or yaw include, but are not limited to:

e. Structural damage.

a. Engine failure.

10. Slow−fly aircraft to determine controllability at

b. Stuck up spoiler.

10,000 feet AGL minimum.

14−37

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

14.12.3

DFCS Flight Control Failures

aggressive maneuvering should be terminated. Departure

or Malfunctions

resistance and landing characteristics may be significantly

degraded. Refer to Chapter 11 for high AOA flight characterĆ

Figure of DFCS caution lights:

istics. Consideration should be given to performing a straight

in approach to a landing.

PITCH SAS

ROLL DGR

YAW DGR

In the pitch axis, it is not always possible to resolve

FCS CAUTION

ARI DGR

ARI/SAS OUT

whether the loss is partial or total. Regardless, the difference

in flying qualities is small and no flight restriction is applied

DFCS caution lights fall into 3 levels of severity.

due to PITCH SAS degrades.

Loss of redundancy Ċ The FCS CAUTION light indiĆ

14.12.3.1

FCS CAUTION Light

cates some loss of DFCS redundancy. If FCS CAUTION is

on alone, then no DFCS authority or function has been lost.

Note

It indicates that some sensor or function has been determined

faulty but that other sensors or functions are redundantly

Verify maintenance file fault reporting acronyms

providing all the input necessary to enable the DFCS to use

(RIO) to troubleshoot system for maintenance

full authority to provide all designed functions. The AFC

debrief.

acronyms in continuous monitoring (CM) will also give some

indication of which axis or sensor has been declared invalid.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress

Emergency procedures recommend limited supersonic

operations and adhering to high angle of attack maneuvering

If light remains illuminated:

limitations (Figure 4Ć8) because a subsequent sensor failure

may abruptly restrict DFCS authority at a point that it is

needed for departure resistance or supersonic stability.

Loss of some authority Ċ The failure of certain sensors

or control surface actuators will cause some loss of authority

D The DFCS has lost redundancy, but has not

in part of the DFCS. If enough sensors or actuators become

lost any authority.

faulty, then a light in addition to the FCS CAUTION light will

illuminate. The light will indicate which axis or function has

D The DFCS is potentially one failure away

become degraded. Loss of some authority will illuminate one

from losing authority and may degrade to

of the caution lights in the top row or the ARI DGR light. The

ROLL SAS OFF or YAW SAS OFF characterĆ

basic SAS and primary features of the system are operating

istics with a subsequent failure

with some loss of authority. Some failures may not be readily

apparent to the aircrew until particular parts of the envelope

2. Airspeed Ċ Remain below 600 knots or 1.3 TMN

are reached. Check of acronyms in CM can help to define the

and adhere to the following limitations:

exact nature of the degrade. For degraded authority in roll,

a. Above 0.5 TMN, no cross control inputs perĆ

yaw or ARI, aggressive maneuvering should be terminated

mitted above 10 units AOA.

and speed reduced to subsonic if the lights do not clear with

MASTER RESET.

b. With maneuvering devices retracted, coordinate

all lateral stick inputs above 0.6 TMN and 15

Complete loss of SAS in an axis or ARI Ċ A complete

units AOA.

loss of authority in the roll or yaw axis or in the ARI will be

accompanied by the ARI/SAS OUT light. Determination of

14.12.3.2

PITCH SAS degrade

which axis or function is lost depends upon what additional

lights are illuminated. For example, complete loss of ARI

PITCH SAS failures do not significantly degrade perĆ

function is indicated by illumination of both ARI lights (the

ARI DGR and ARI/SAS OUT). Selecting roll or yaw STAB

formance in the longitudinal axis, and incur no flight enveĆ

lope restrictions. It is possible that the spoilers may be inopĆ

AUG switches off will disable all ARI but will illuminate

erative with a complete failure of the pitch axis.

only the ARI/SAS OUT light. Adhere to SAS OFF limits.

14.12.3.2.1

PITCH SAS Light

Similarly in roll and yaw axis, illumination of both

lights in an axis (i.e., ROLL DGR and ARI/SAS OUT) indiĆ

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

cates complete loss of authority in the associated axis (Roll

axis). With the complete loss of ROLL or YAW SAS or ARI,

ORIGINAL

14−38

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

2. If light remains illuminated Ċ No limitations.

14.12.3.4

ROLL SAS, YAW SAS, or ARI failure

More serious failures that shut down all inputs in the

roll or yaw axis will light the ARI/SAS OUT light along with

the ROLL DGR or YAW DGR light. If all ARI functions are

lost then both ARI DGR and the ARI/SAS OUT light will

D The spoilers may be inoperative (ground roll

illuminate. Failure of both roll or yaw series actuators will

braking) with a complete failure of the pitch

also illuminate the ARI/SAS OUT light. The ROLL STAB

computer.

AUG switch will remain in the ON position. In the DFCS, the

switch is over center".

D If spoilers are inoperative the degradation in

the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow

Complete ROLL SAS failures create a very significant

flight should be conducted to determine

loss of the DFCS capabilities. CV landings with ROLL SAS

whether a CV approach should be attempted.

failures can be accomplished with moderate effort provided

Refer to spoiler failure procedure.

all spoilers are operating. If spoilers are inoperative the degĆ

radation in the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow

Note

flight should be conducted to determine whether a CV

approach should be attempted. Refer to spoiler failure proceĆ

D The PITCH SAS light will illuminate with any

dures, section 14.12.6.

degrade to authority. Additional failures or a

complete loss of SAS functions in the pitch

A second yaw series failure or a complete loss of yaw

axis may not provide any further warning.

axis authority is indicated when the ARI/SAS OUT light

D The autopilot will not be operational with a

illuminates in addition to the YAW DGR light. The YAW

complete PITCH SAS failure.

STAB switch is not automatically positioned to OFF. CV

landings with total YAW SAS failure require increased attenĆ

14.12.3.3

ROLL SAS, YAW SAS, or ARI degrade

tion to control of directional oscillations especially in turbuĆ

lence and/or during lineup corrections. Severely decreased

When the roll or yaw axes become degraded, the

yaw damping will be evident throughout the envelope.

affected axis and ARI will operate with reduced authority.

Single series actuator failure or any other degrade to authorĆ

14.12.3.4.1

ARI/SAS OUT Light (with ROLL DGR,

ity is indicated by the ROLL DGR or YAW DGR light in

YAW DGR or ARI DGR Light)

conjunction with the ARI DGR light. This indicates that

affected axis and ARI has less than normal authority. This

1. Ensure ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches

may not be readily apparent to the pilot at all flight condiĆ

Ċ ON.

tions. However, since the control system has malfunctioned

and lost authority, departure resistance may be significantly

2. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

reduced. Certain air data failures can cause the ARI to

degrade without loss of authority in either the roll or yaw

If lights remain illuminated:

axis. For all Roll, Yaw and ARI degrades, supersonic flight

and aggressive maneuvering should be terminated. PrecauĆ

3. Leave STAB AUG switches Ċ ON

tionary flight restrictions are imposed as listed below.

To take advantage of any remaining capa−

14.12.3.3.1

ROLL DGR Light, YAW DGR Light

bility that the DFCS may be able to provide.

and/or ARI DGR Light

Terminate aggressive maneuvering and remain

below 1.0 TMN.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress.

2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive maneuverĆ

ing should be terminated.

3. Remain below 1.0 TMN.

Maneuvering with YAW SAS OFF or inoperative

shall not be conducted above 15 units AOA with

Note

landing gear retracted.

Rudder pedal shakers inop if YAW B fail.

14−39

ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

4. Perform Controllability Check procedure.

14.12.4

Rudder Authority Failure

Scheduling of allowable rudder deflection is computed

in the CADC as a function of dynamic pressure. If the

command signals and position feedback do not agree, power

is removed, stopping further movement and the RUDDER

AUTH light illuminates. Directional authority is never less

D If spoilers are inoperative the degradation in

than 9.5° of rudder.

the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow

flight should be conducted to determine

14.12.4.1

RUDDER AUTH Light

whether a CV approach should be attempted.

Refer to spoiler failure procedure.

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton

 Depress

(10 seconds).

D CV landings with total YAW SAS failure

require increased attention to control of direcĆ

2. If light remains illuminated  Above 250 Knots,

tional oscillations especially in turbulence

restrict rudder inputs to less than 10°.

and/or during lineup corrections.

D Rudder pedal shakers inop if YAW B fail.

Note

D With rudder authority stops failed open,

ROLL DGR and ARI/SAS OUT lights may autoĆ

excess rudder authority is available and could

matically extinguish upon selection of gear hanĆ

result in structural damage above 250 knots.

dle down. This is indicative of a DFCS dual air

D After landing, nosewheel steering authority

data failure (AOA or Mach sensor inputs). These

may be restricted to 10° (with neutral direcĆ

failures inhibit ROLL SAS and ARI functions in

tional trim) and differential braking is

cruise configuration, but not in the landing conĆ

required coming out of the arresting gear.

figuration.

14.12.4.2

Rudder Hardover

14.12.3.5

STAB AUG Transients

A rudder hardover will result in a single fully deflected

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Ċ Depress

(over 30 degrees, pegged on cockpit indicator) inboard or

outboard rudder with possible restricted opposing good"

2. Airspeed Ċ Decelerate below 400 knots or 1.0 TMN.

rudder authority and a flight hydraulic failure. Rudder trim

and rudder pedal authority may also be restricted. This

3. STAB AUG switches Ċ All OFF.

procedure only applies to a true rudder hardover failure, not

a YAW SAS hardover failure which will be manifested by both

Note

rudders being deflected up to 9.5 degrees with mechanical

With ROLL or YAW STAB AUG OFF, the ARI/

rudder authority still available. A YAW SAS hardover should

SAS OUT light will be illuminated.

be easily controlled with rudder trim and the available

mechanical rudder. In cruise configuration above 15 units

4. STAB AUG switches Ċ Reset (reset individually to

angle of attack, a departure from controlled flight may occur

isolate failure).

with a rudder hardover. Upright departure/spin recovery

procedures may not fully recover the airplane, and it may be

5. Perform Controllability Check procedure.

necessary to perform uncommanded roll/yaw procedures.

14.12.3.6

Single PITCH or ROLL STAB Light

1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

With zero flight hydraulic pressure, ensure

hydraulic transfer pump is secured as soon as

possible. In the event of hydraulic malfunction

refer to appropriate hydraulic emergency proceĆ

dure and execute appropriate steps in parallel as

required.

ORIGINAL

14−40

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

After completion of uncommanded roll/yaw procedures:

Note

1. Confirm rudder hardover via cockpit indicator

Recommend practice approach to cv, fuel

and/or RIO/wingman visual inspection.

permitting.

6. If no suitable divert available and controlled cv

Note

approach is in question, perform a controlled ejection.

Restriction of authority, if any, of opposing

Prior to landing:

good" rudder may be determined by reference

to the cockpit indicator.

2. If carrier−based, divert to an airfield with short field

arresting gear.

Controllability of a rudder hardover airborne is

3. Perform controllability check procedure.

no indication of the ability to maintain direcĆ

tional control on deck. Upon touchdown, expect

Note

the aircraft to experience uncontrollable direcĆ

tional excursions potentially departing the landĆ

D Expect roll and yaw oscillations during

ing area/runway.

throttle and control movements. Undesirable

Note

airspeed increase may occur due to differenĆ

tial thrust. Airspeed control may also be

D Ensure familiarity with landing considerĆ

influenced by flap position and pilot workĆ

ations of controllability check procedures.

load. Specifically, evaluate the effects of any

D Simulation indicated that bank angle control

required differential thrust on lineup correcĆ

was enhanced by leading lateral stick inputs

tions, waveoff/bolter performance, and flight

with differential thrust.

characteristics.

7. Lateral trimĊNeutralize.

D Simulation has indicated that full flap setting

combined with severely restricted opposing

Note

rudder results in more pronounced roll and

The use of lateral trim to reduce stick forces durĆ

yaw oscillations.

ing actual approach and landing should be

avoided as this reduces the spoiler deflection

4. During cruise, use differential thrust, rudder, lateral

available for roll control.

stick, and rudder trim to relieve pilot workload and

control forces. Use lateral trim as necessary.

8. ASYM thrust limiter SWĊOff (if required).

If jettison is required, consideration should be

Asymmetric thrust limiter should only be disĆ

given to keeping the wing stations symmetric and

abled if required to assist/maintain control.

avoiding aft cg. conditions.

9. Perform arrested landing.

Note

It is unknown what the fuel consumption will be

in this configuration. Therefore, fuel quantity

must be closely monitored. Recommend using

Use only opposing throttle for waveoff/bolter.

gear up, flaps down, single engine bingo charts.

Fuel imbalance may occur during prolonged

flight with higher demands on one engine. Use

feed switch to minimize fuel split.

5. If no suitable divert available and aircraft suffiĆ

If rudder pedal authority is restricted, nosewheel

ciently controllable for cv approach, attempt cv

steering should not be engaged upon landing

arrested landing.

rollout.

14−41

ORIGINAL

F-14D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2004) - page 9