SH-60B HELICOPTER. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008)

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.2 Internal Engine Fire

Internal Engine Fire

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Internal

An Internal Engine Fire is

*1. Starter — Engage. Motor Engine.

Engine Fire

indicated by a rise in TGT above

2. Portable Fire Extinguisher — As Required.

540 ºC after engine shutdown.

3. Starter — Secure (once TGT decreases below

540 ºC).

12.13.3 APU Fire

APU exhaust fires are most commonly the result of pooled fuel in the combustion chamber priorto start (a wet start).

This often occurs when attempting to restart following an APU failure. Since the exhaust fire is confined to the

exhaust section, activation of the fire extinguishing system without an illuminated APU fire T--handle may be

ineffective. In most cases, continued operation of the APU will extinguish the flame.

APU Fire

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

FIRE (APU)

Indicates that a fire detector

*1. APU T--Handle — PULL.

(APU) has actuated a fire warning

*2. Confirm Fire.

circuit. The safety of the

*3. FIRE EXT switch — RESERVE (MAIN if required

helicopter’s occupants is the

and available).

primary consideration when a fire

occurs. If airborne, the most

airborne and fire continues:

important single action can be

*4. LAND IMMEDIATELY.

taken by the pilot is to land the

helicopter safely as soon as

fire appears extinguished:

possible.

*5. Land As Soon As Possible.

on ground:

*6. Fire extinguisher — As required.

Severity of the fire and

7. FUEL PUMP switch — OFF.

conditions present will

8. APU CONTR switch — OFF.

dictate

whether

immediate landing/ditching

is required.

Note

HF transmissions, sunlight

filtered through smoke,

haze, water, or at sunrise or

sunset may trigger the fire

detectors and cause a false

fire indication.

ORIGINAL

12-70

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.4 Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire

Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Cockpit Fire/

source is known:

Cabin Fire

*1. Affected power switches and CBs — Secure.

*2. Portable Fire Extinguisher — As required.

Severity of the fire and

conditions present will

fire continues or source is unknown:

dictate

whether an

*3. Cabin/doors/vents/ECS — CLOSE/OFF,

immediate

landing/

as required.

ditching is required.

*4. Unnecessary electrical equipment and

Vapors from the portable

CBs — SECURE.

fire extinguisher agent,

fire continues:

although not poisonous,

*5. Land As Soon As Possible.

can cause asphyxiation

by displacement of

oxygen in a confined

space. The cabin should

Without AC power, the engine and inlet anti--ice valves

be ventilated as soon as

are automatically opened. With an improperly

practical.

operating engine inlet anti--ice system, a loss of up to

It may not be advisable

49 percent power available per engine is possible.

to secure all electrical

6. Stabilator — Manually slew to zero.

power, thus losing

AFCS, ICS, and flight

7. NO. 1 and NO. 2. GENERATOR switches — OFF,

instruments prior to

as required.

achieving

VMC or

8. BATT switch — OFF, as required.

landing/ditching.

fire is extinguished:

9. Smoke and Fumes Elimination emergency

CAUTION

procedure — Perform.

10. Land as soon as practical.

source of fire is unknown,

consideration should

given to securing Mission

Power immediately when

securing

unnecessary

electrical

equipment to

prevent system damage.

12-71

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.5 Sonobuoy Lithium Battery Venting

Sonobuoy Lithium Battery Venting

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Sonobuoy

Lithium battery failure can result

If the pungent odor and rusty metallic taste characteristic

Lithium

in the release of sulfur dioxide

of SO₂ fumes are detected, execute the following

Battery

gas.

procedure:

Venting

Portable fire extinguishers shall not be used to

extinguish burning lithium fires since a violent

reaction may occur.

*1. Alert crew; sonobuoys — Jettison.

Note

If jettison of weapon pylon stores is not desired,

sonobuoys must be launched manually.

*2. Smoke and Fumes Elimination emergency

procedure — Perform.

Sulfur dioxide exposure in low concentrations can

result in lightheadedness, dizziness, headache,

difficulty in breathing, and possible loss of

consciousness. An indication of the presence of a

venting sonobuoy may be an acidic taste in the mouth

or a distinct odor similar to that of an electrical fire.

12.13.6 Smoke and Fumes Elimination

Smoke and Fumes Elimination

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Smoke and

*1. Airspeed — Adjust, as required.

Fumes

*2. Doors/windows/vents — Open.

Elimination

*3. Aircraft — Yaw, as required.

ORIGINAL

12-72

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.7 Immediate Landing/Ditching

The sequence of events necessary to successfully conduct an immediate landing/ditching demand prior coordination

and briefing. After a water landing, the aircraft tends to sink nose down and roll unpredictably to either side within

10 seconds. Depending on available power and rotor speed, the PAC may not be able to arrest these motions with

collective or cyclic application. The aircraft may maintain some degree of buoyancy in the fuel cell transition section

(approximately 2 to 5 minutes) after water landing.

Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the aircraft fills with water. For minimum

loads on impact and to minimize the possibility of immediate rollover on touchdown, a ditching should be made into

the prevailing winds and into or just past the crest on the backside of a wave.

Activate the jettison handle, then push out, down, and forward on the lower forward corner of the window to free

it from the upper retention pins. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry and, if time permits, the cabin

doors should be opened to optimize safe crew egress.

For overland flights, terrain along the route should be considered in an immediate landing scenario. Consideration

should be given to closing cabin doors and windows prior to landing to maximize aircrew survivability.

Emergency exit from or entrance into the helicopter is provided through jettisonable windows and cabin doors. Emergency

exits are shown in Figure 12-7.

D During any emergency egress, particular care must be taken to avoid being

struck by the rotor blades

D Remain strapped in until rotors and all violent motion have stopped.

12-73

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.8 Planned Ditching

When an emergency situation dictates a water landing, the crew shall execute the Immediate Landing/Ditching

procedures.

Note

D Time permitting, crew and passengers should check survival gear and

jettison all unnecessary equipment/cargo, especially articles that may

impede egress.

D Priorto ditching, consideractivating theADHEELS manually.ADHEELS

will remain on for approximately 45 minutes.

Theselection ofditching heading should bedetermined by evaluation ofsea and wind conditions. It is recommended

that the aircraft ditch parallel to and near the crest of the swell, if there is a crosswind of 25 knots or less.

If there is a strong crosswind, ditch into the wind, making contact on the upslope of the swell near the top. Wave

motionisindicativeofwinddirection,butswelldoesnotnecessarilymovewiththewind.Conditionsofwatersurface

are indicative of wind speed. If visibility is restricted, ditch heading may be determined from forecast data.

12.13.9 Emergency Crash Position

The risk of personal injury during an autorotative landing or ditching can be significantly reduced by properly

positioning oneself for the landing. All aircrew should position their seats up and aft in order for the seat stroke to

absorb more of the crash loads. Aircrew should sit erect with head firmly against the headrest, elbows tucked in

tightly, arms crossed in front of body, and feet flat on the deck.

The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed

for egress. Extended handles, hatches, and controls within the cockpit will

notbelocatedinthesamefamiliarplaces.Keeplegsclearofunderseatarea.

Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.

12-77

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.10 Immediate Landing/Ditching (Pilot)

Immediate Landing/Ditching (Pilot)

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate

Emergency exit from or entrance into

*1. Crew and passengers — Alert.

Landing/Ditching

the helicopter is provided through

*2. Shoulder harness — Locked.

(Pilot)

jettisonable windows and cabin doors.

*3. External cargo/stores/fuel — JETTISON/

Emergency exits are shown in Figure

DUMP as required.

12-7.

*4. Searchlight — As required.

*5. MAYDAY/IFF — TRANSMIT/EMER.

In order to minimize the

CAUTION

potential for serious injury,

instructor seat occupant

should

assume crash

Time permitting, consideration should be

position and lower head until

given to executing APU Emergency Start

their chin touches their chest

procedure to maintain electrical and hydraulic

prior to an emergency

power upon rotor disengagement.

landing or ditching.

In the flare:

Stores jettisoned at descent

rates greater than those

*6. Windows — Jettison, as required.

listed in the NATIP have not

been tested. Aircraft/rotor

system

impact

from

jettisoned stores may be

possible.

After actuation, the position of the emergency

jettison window lever may cause snagging of

personal survival gear, impeding egress.

Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the

aft position prior to egress.

After landing:

*7. PCLs — OFF.

*8. Rotor Brake — ON.

*9. ATO Collective — STOW.

After all violent motion stops:

*10. EGRESS.

Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all

violent motion or inrushing water stops may

result in injury or incapacitation.

ORIGINAL

12-78

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.11 Immediate Landing/Ditching (Aircrewmen)

Immediate Landing/Ditching (Aircrewmen)

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate

Emergency exit from or entrance

*1. Harness — Locked.

Landing/

into the helicopter is provided

*2. Seat — Up and aft.

Ditching

through jettisonable windows and

*3. Windows — Jettison, as required.

(Aircrewmen)

cabin doors. Emergency exits are

shown in Figure 12-7.

*4. ASO Table — UP AND LOCKED.

*5. Assume crash position.

In order to minimize the

potential for serious injury,

Attaining and maintaining a proper crash position in

instructor seat occupant

a seat is the most critical step that can be taken prior

should assume crash

to impact. Aircrew shall not delay in assuming a

position and lower head until

seated crash position or leave a seated crash

their chin touches their

position to accomplish other tasks on this checklist.

chest

prior

and

emergency landing or

ditching.

12.13.12 Lost Aircraft Procedures (Open Ocean)

Lost Aircraft Procedures (Open Ocean)

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Lost Aircraft

Note

1. Confess.

Procedures

Remain calm.

2. Climb.

(Open Ocean)

3. Conserve fuel.

4. Communicate.

5. Maintain adequate fuel to allow for landing or

controlled ditch.

6. Utilize the following aircraft sensors as

appropriate:

a. TACAN.

b. Radar.

c. IFF.

d. ESM.

e. Data link.

f. UHF Homer.

12-79

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.13.13 Underwater Egress

Underwater Egress

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Underwater

*1. HABD — As required.

Egress

*2. ICS Cords — Disconnect.

*3. Door/Window — Open/Jettison.

The downward stroke of the seat

*4. Place hand on known reference point.

will change the frame of reference

*5. Harness — RELEASE.

needed for egress. Extended

handles, windows, and controls

*6. Exit Helicopter.

will not be located in the same

After egress:

relative position. Keep legs clear

from under seat area. Downward

*7.

Swim clear of helicopter and inflate

travel of seat may cause injury or

LPU.

entrapment.

Do not inflate LPU until outside

helicopter.

Water pressure may prevent

opening the emergency egress

windows until the cabin fills with

water. The windows should be

jettisoned prior to water entry to

optimize the ability of the crew to

safely egress.

Failure to disconnect ICS cord

can impede egress. Personal

gear may snag during egress,

notably on collectives, FLIR

HCUs, Parking Brake and RAST

release

handles,

PCLs/Fuel

Selector Levers/Fire T--Handles,

or extended Emergency Jettison

Window handles.

If entanglement or disorientation

delays egress, hold onto a

reference point with one hand.

Using the other hand, place

HABD in your mouth, clear water

from your mouthpiece, and

continue with egress.

To prevent injury while ascending

to the surface and breathing from

the HABD, continually exhale to

vent the expanding air from your

lungs.

ORIGINAL

12-80

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14 MISSION EQUIPMENT/WEAPON SYSTEM EMERGENCIES

12.14.1 Cargo Hook Emergency Release

Cargo Hook Emergency Release

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Cargo Hook

1. RESCUE HOIST — OFF.

Emergency

2. RAST MASTER — OFF.

Release

3. MAD reeling machine POWER — OFF.

Use of emergency release may cause injury to

crewman.

4. Cyclic stick EMER REL — Press.

12.14.2 RAST Main Probe Messenger Failure

RAST Main Probe Messenger Failure

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

RAST Main

If the messenger cable winch should fail/jam while raising

Probe

or lowering and sufficient cable is deployed to attach the

Messenger

hauldown cable or cable is attached, proceed as follows:

Failure

Injury to crewmen may result if RAST power is

applied during the following procedure.

1. RAST MASTER — OFF.

2. Remove the quick release pin from the messenger

light and remove the messenger light assembly.

3. Pull in messenger cable until the haul-down cable

is locked in the main probe and the messenger is

disconnected.

4. Secure messenger cable.

5. RAST MASTER — ON.

6. H-DOWN LKD and MESSGR IN lights — ON.

Note

If thehaul downcable cannot be attachedand theRA

landing must be made, proceed with RAST

Messenger Jettison and Back-up Messenger Cable

Employment.

12-81

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.3 RAST Messenger Jettison

RAST Messenger Jettison

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

RAST

1. RAST MASTER — ON.

Messenger

2. CARGO HOOK ARMING — SAFE.

Jettison

3. RESCUE HOIST — OFF.

4. MAD reeling machine power — OFF.

5. Cyclic stick EMER REL — PRESS.

12.14.4 RAST Backup Messenger Cable Employment

RAST Backup Messenger Cable Employment

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

RAST Backup

Note

Messenger

The RAST hauldown cable--

Cable

normal release and the

Employment

RAST messenger cable

Injury to crewmen may result if RAST

power

emergency shear

(EMER

applied during the following procedure.

REL) are disabled when the

1. RAST MASTER — OFF.

RAST MASTER switch is

2. Remove the quick release pin from the

OFF.

messenger light and remove the messenger

light assembly.

3. Messenger cable — Remove from probe.

4. Secure line to a point on the probe.

5. Insert backup assembly adapter into main probe

from top. Guide with tube assembly.

6. Push messenger adapter through detents on

probe and pay out line until instructed to stop.

7. Deck crew will connect RA cable.

8. Pull in line until hauldown cable is locked in the

main probe and the backup messenger cable is

disconnected.

9. RAST MASTER — ON.

ORIGINAL

12-82

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.6 RAST Main Probe Fails to Extend

RAST Main Probe Fails to Extend

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

RAST Main

Note

the main probe fails to extend electrically:

Probe Fails to

Ensure cable release is

Extend

in the up position before

attempting manual ex-

tension of main RAST

Injury to crewmen may result if RAST power is

probe.

applied prior to manual main probe extension.

Inadvertent extension

1. RAST MASTER — OFF.

of the RAST main probe

2. Pull pip pin from under the manual cable tension

is possible when the

release. Lower the manual cable tension release

adapter is inserted into

arm to relieve cable tension.

the shaft hole.

3. Remove ratchet with adapter from its stowed

When retrieving cable

position.

into hoist manually, two

positive clicks will be

felt. Do not retract any

further. This indicates

messenger in and

Inserting the adapter with the ratchet attached while

hauldown cable locked.

the main probe is in the up position may cause

serious injury to crewman.

4. Remove adapter from ratchet, slide shaft lock

away from shaft hole. Insert adapter shaft and lock

into place with shaft lock slide.

5. Raise the manual cable tension release arm and

replace pip pin.

Check area beneath the aircraft to be sure it is clear

of personnel and obstructions.

6. Push down on the release lever to unlock probe.

Probe will extend rapidly to extended position.

7. Remove ratchet adapter from shaft hole and

attempt normal RAST procedures.

If unsuccessful:

8. Insert ratchet and pay out cable to ship deck.

The full 90 feet of cable can be extended in one

minute.

9. After hauldown cable has been connected,

retrieve by reversing ratchet and reel up until

cable is locked in probe.

10. RAST MASTER — ON.

11. H’DOWN LKD and MSGR IN lights — ON.

ORIGINAL

12-84

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.8 MAD Reel Failure with Towed Body Deployed

ASQ--81 MAD Reel Failure with Towed Body Deployed

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

ASQ--81 MAD Reel

Failure with Towed

CAUTION

Body Deployed

With less than 12 feet of cable unrecoverable,

maintain 50 to 55 KIAS until on final approach.

Day or night VMC recovery procedure:

a. Coordinate assistance with ground

personnel.

b. MAD reeling machine POWER — ON.

c. MAGNETIC DETECTING SET PWR — OFF.

d. Position crewman in cargo door to inform

pilot of towed body position and altitude.

e. Establish hover so as to keep MAD towed

body clear of deck.

f. Lower aircraft until towed body is on deck.

g. Ground personnel maintain tension on cable,

land aircraft on prepared surface.

h. Recover cable, proceed with mission or to

aircraft parking area.

Night/IMC jettison procedure:

a. CARGO HOOK ARMING — SAFE.

b. RESCUE HOIST — OFF.

c. RAST MASTER — OFF.

d. MAD reeling machine POWER — ON.

e. Cyclic stick EMER REL — Press.

If the MAD bird is lost in flight, the MAD cable shall

be cut immediately.

ORIGINAL

12-86

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.9 ASQ--81 Towed Body Down Limit Switch Malfunction

ASQ--81 Towed Body Down Limit Switch Malfunction

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

ASQ--81 Towed

Note

Body Down Limit

If the MAD towed body

Switch

stops at an intermediate

Malfunction

position during deploy--

ment, the CABLE LIMIT

Towed body jettison is possible. Avoid populated

MAD LIMIT

light on the MAD reeling

areas.

machine control panel

*1. if no cable limit light within 61 seconds —

and the MAD LIMIT light

Cease MAD reeling operations.

on the caution/advisory

panel should flash

*2. Alert crew.

continuously.

3. REEL — IN.

12.14.10 ASQ--81 Towed Body Fails to Seat Properly

ASQ--81 Towed Body Fails to Seat Properly

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

ASQ--81 Towed

1. REEL — Out (5 seconds).

Body Fails to Seat

a. Deploy towed body approximately 20 feet

Properly

from the pylon.

CAUTION

Do not attempt to reseat if the Unit 3 FAIL light has

illuminated as a result of a failure to seat properly.

2. REEL — IN.

3. Pilot observe proper seating of the MAD towed

body.

4. Land as soon as practical, and avoid

populated areas.

12-87

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.11 Rescue Hoist Failure

Rescue Hoist Failure

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Rescue Hoist

*1. Cease hoisting.

Failure

*2. Visually inspect hoist.

*3. Verify:

b. HYDRAULIC BACKUP PUMP caution

lights — OFF.

c. HYDRAULIC BACKUP PUMP switch — ON.

d. RESCUE HOIST switch — ALL.

e. RESCUE HOIST circuit breakers — IN.

a RESCUE HOIST CTRL (SO OVHD,

NO. 2 DC PRI, ROW 6, CB 13).

(1) RESCUE HOIST CTRL (SO OVHD,

NO. 1 DC PRI, ROW 6, CB 2).

(2) RSQ HOIST POWER (SO OVHD,

NO. 2 AC PRI, ROW 2, CB 3).

If a bird’s nest or Lucas Western, proceed to step 6.

If a bird’s nest is suspected, do not attempt to raise

or lower the hoist to avoid further damage to the

rescue hoist/cable or cable separation.

*4. Check normal raise/lower at all stations.

*5. BACKUP CONTROL — Select.

D Operation of rescue hoist in BACK-UP

CONTROL mode will bypass limit switches.

Cable separation may occur.

D If hoist jams, do not attempt to RAISE/LOWER

any further as this could shear the cable.

6. Attempt to set personnel/cargo on deck/water.

If unable:

7. Cable grip — Rig.

ORIGINAL

12-88

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.12 Cable Grip Rigging Procedures

Cable Grip Rigging Procedures

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Cable Grip

1. Attach cable grip shackle to crewman safety

Rigging

belt.

Procedures

2. Attach crewman safety belt to rescue hoist

boom.

3. Connect cable grip to hoist cable by placing the

cable between the jaws of the cable grip,

shackle end up.

4. Pull up on crewman safety belt to slacken hoist

cable.

Ensure altitude is sufficient to keep

survivor/swimmer clear of the water.

5. Report ready for forward flight.

12.14.12.1 Runaway Hoist

Runaway Hoist

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Runaway

*1. BACKUP CONTROL. — Select.

Hoist

CAUTION

Operation of rescue hoist using BACKUP CONTROL

inhibits limit switches.

If payout continues:

*2. Hydraulic pump — Secure.

3. Attempt to set person/cargo on deck/water.

If unable:

4. Cable grip — Rig.

12.14.12.2 Rescue Hoist Fouled Cable

Rescue Hoist Fouled Cable

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Rescue Hoist

*1. Pay out cable and attempt to free hangup.

Fouled Cable

If unable:

*2. Cut/shear cable — As required.

12-89

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.14.12.3 Rescue Hoist Cable Cut

Rescue Hoist Cable Cut

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Rescue Hoist

*1. Emergency shear switch — SHEAR.

Cable Cut

If unable:

*2. Direct pilot to press EMER REL button.

12.14.12.4 Rescue Hoist Cable Separation

Rescue Hoist Cable Separation

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Rescue Hoist

Note

1. Quick Splice procedure — Perform.

Cable

For proper Quick Splice pro-

Separation

cedures, refer to NTTP

3--50.1 series.

12.15 MISCELLANEOUS CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS

12.15.1 IFF Flashing Caution

IFF Flashing Caution Light

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

IFF Flashing

Indicates IFF mode

is not

1. MODE 4 TEST/ON/OUT switch — TEST.

Caution Light

responding to interrogation.

2. Observe GO indicator light ON.

If GO indicator light does not illuminate or TEST/MON

IFF

NO GO or a STATUS light illuminates:

3. MODE 4 TEST/ON/OUT switch — OUT.

The helicopter may be viewed as a potential foe.

Proceed in accordance with local directives.

12.15.2 LEFT or RIGHT RACK FAN Caution Light On

LEFT or RIGHT RACK FAN Caution Light On

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Check applicable circuit breaker — RH RACK, LH

LEFT RACK

RACK BLOWER (SO circuit breaker panel).

FAN

2. Acoustic paneling — Remove.

RIGHT RACK

FAN

ORIGINAL

12-90

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.3 WOW Advisory Light On In Flight

WOW Advisory Light On In Flight

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

WOW

Illumination of the WOW light in

flight indicates that the aircraft

Weight on Wheels switch is stuck

or malfunctioning.

Flying with a stuck Weight on Wheels (WOW) switch

will disable WOW functions including emergency

jettison circuits, radar altitude low altitude aural

warning. Engine Out and Low Rotor RPM lights.

Pulling the WOW circuit breaker will not restore

proper operation of some WOW functions in the air.

Pulling the WOW circuit breaker in flight may disable

the Low Rotor RPM lights and the #1 and #2 Engine

Out warning lights.

If the light is illuminated in flight:

1. Land as soon as practical.

12.15.4 Hellfire Missile Emergencies

12.15.5 Hellfire Missile Aborted Launch

This condition exists if the ATO depresses the HCU RELEASE CONSENT button but the system subsequently

aborts the launch before a firing pulse is sent to any of the Hellfire missile squibs. An ACRT BIT status word for

the affected Hellfire missile will be set stating the launch was aborted. If that occurs, perform the following steps:

Hellfire Missile Aborted Launch

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hellfire

Note

1. Alert crew.

Missile

If the RELEASE CONSENT

If a new Hellfire priority missile is selected by the ACRT:

Aborted

button is depressed within

Launch

2. Proceed with the AGM-114 Hellfire Missile

2 seconds following an

Launch checklist.

attempted launch, the ACRT

will ignore any attempts to

If a new Hellfire priority missile is not selected:

launch another Hellfire

3. PWR/ARM — OFF.

missile and will display an

4. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

“INV TRIG” alert on the MPD.

5. LAUNCHER RESET — INITIATE.

No special recovery or

Hellfire

missile handling

6. ACRT BIT status words — CHECK.

procedures are required.

If no critical faults:

7. Proceed with the AGM-114 Hellfire Missile

Launch checklist.

If critical BIT status exists or Hellfire missile launch

portion of the mission is complete:

8. PWR/ARM — OFF.

9. WPN SELECT — OFF.

10. MASTER ARM — Verify SAFE.

11. FLIR OPERATIONAL PAGE — SELECT.

12. HELLFIRE PWR — OFF.

12-91

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.5.1 Hellfire Missile Hangfire

This condition exists if the ATO depresses the RELEASE CONSENT button but the Hellfire missile remains on the

rail after the squib firing pulses have been sent to both the Hellfire missile and rocket motor squibs. The rocket motor

may or may not ignite. A Hellfire missile hangfire condition is noted on the MPD by displaying the text HNG beneath

the Hellfire missile fail symbol.

Note

Normal rocket motor burn time is less than 3 seconds. A rocket motor

failure may cause the motor to slow burn or smolder and smoke for more

than 3 seconds.

Hellfire Missile Hangfire

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hellfire Missile

Note

If rocket motor ignites and aircraft yaws:

Hangfire

The missile thermal

1. Adjust controls as required to maintain straight

battery does not provide

and level flight.

the voltage for the rocket

2. Alert crew.

motor fire train. Aircraft

power via the Signal

Data Converter

(AH

SDC) is required to fire

The Hellfire missile thermal battery produces

the rocket motor squibs.

voltage for up to 30 minutes after the Hellfire

If motor squibs have not

missile squib is automatically fired during the

fired within 1.5 seconds

launch sequence. If continued flight is possible,

after launch attempt, the

the aircraft should remain airborne with Hellfire

missile Safe and Arm

missile pointed in a safe direction for a minimum

Device

(SAD) will

30 minutes to allow the thermal battery to

mechanically return to

become inert.

the safe condition. This

If a new priority Hellfire missile is selected by the

will disconnect the firing

ACRT:

circuit from the rocket

motor squibs.

3. Proceed with the AGM--114 Hellfire Missile

Launch checklist.

If a new priority Hellfire missile is not selected:

4. PWR/ARM — OFF.

5. WPN SELECT — OFF.

6. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

7. LAUNCHER RESET — Initiate.

8. ACRT BIT status words — Check.

If no critical faults:

9. Proceed with the AGM--114 Hellfire Missile

Launch checklist.

If critical BIT status exists or Hellfire missile launch

portion of the mission is complete:

10. FLIR OPERATION PAGE — Select.

11. HELLFIRE PWR — OFF.

ORIGINAL

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A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.5.2 Hellfire Missile Misfire

Hellfire Missile Misfire

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hellfire

Note

1. Alert crew.

Missile

The missile thermal battery

Misfire

does not provide the voltage

for the rocket motor fire

train. Aircraft power via the

Signal Data Converter (AH

The Hellfire missile thermal battery produces voltage

SDC) is required to fire the

for up to 30 minutes after the Hellfire missile squib is

rocket motor squibs. If

automatically fired during the launch sequence. If

motor squibs have not fired

continued flight is possible, the aircraft should remain

within

1.5

seconds after

airborne with Hellfire missile pointed in a safe

launch attempt, the missile

direction for a minimum of 30 minutes to allow the

Safe and Arm Device (SAD)

thermal battery to become inert.

will mechanically return to

a new priority Hellfire missile is selected by the ACRT:

the safe condition. This will

disconnect the firing circuit

2. Proceed with the AGM--114 Hellfire Missile Launch

from the rocket motor

checklist.

squibs.

a new priority Hellfire missile is not selected:

3. PWR/ARM — OFF.

4. WPN SELECT — OFF.

5. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

6. LAUNCHER RESET — Initiate.

7. ACRT BIT status words — Check.

no critical faults:

8. Proceed with the AGM--114 Hellfire Missile Launch

checklist.

critical BIT status exists or Hellfire missile launch

portion of the mission is complete:

9. FLIR OPERATION PAGE — Select.

10. HELLFIRE PWR — OFF.

If fuel/time permits:

11. Keep Hellfire missile pointed in safe direction for 30

minutes.

ORIGINAL

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A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.5.3 Hellfire Missile Unlatched

Hellfire Missile Unlatched

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hellfire

If this occurs, an AOP alert message “XXX MISSILE

Missile

UNLATCHED” will be displayed.

Unlatched

1. Inform the crew.

2. Slow helicopter (70 to 80 KIAS preferable),

reduce/limit maneuvering. Avoid flying over

populated areas.

3. Perform visual inspection of launcher/missiles.

a. If the missile appears uploaded normally, land

as soon as practical.

b. If missile does not appear to be properly seated,

land as soon as practical and only fly over

uninhabited areas.

12.15.6 FLIR Uncommanded Lasing

FLIR Uncommanded Lasing

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

FLIR

If the FLIR/LRD continues to lase after the SO or ATO

Uncommanded

releases the Laser Trigger and LASING alert is visible on

Lasing

the MPD without operator command:

*1. WEAPON SELECT (AN/ASQ-198) — OFF.

*2. MASTER ARM — Verify SAFE.

*3. LASER — DISABLE.

If lasing continues:

*4. FLIR PWR — OFF.

*5. FLIR circuit breakers — Pull (SO circuit breaker

panel, SO OVHD: FLIR AC, FLIR/HFSAC,

FLIR/HFS AC) .

12.15.7 Torpedo Emergencies

12.15.7.1 Hung Torpedo

Hung Torpedo

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hung Torpedo

If a torpedo launch is initiated, and the torpedo remains

attached to the BRU--14/A:

1. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

2. Point aircraft in a safe direction.

3. Land as soon as practical.

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ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.8 Stores Emergencies

12.15.8.1 Selective Jettison of M299 Launcher

Selective Jettison of M299 Launcher

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Selective

1. HELLFIRE PWR — OFF.

Jettison of

2. WPN SELECT — PORT FWD.

M299 Launcher

3. MASTER ARM — ARM.

4. PWR/ARM — ON.

5. MISSILE MODE/JETT — MAN.

6. Verify the WEAPON LAUNCH switch

indicates RDY.

Note

Missile Ready indicator light will illuminate.

7. WEAPON LAUNCH — Depress.

8. Verify the WEAPON LAUNCH switch

indicates AWAY.

9. WPN SELECT — OFF.

10. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

11. PWR/ARM — OFF.

12. Record aircraft position (latitude/longitude).

13. Land as soon as practical.

12.15.8.2 Hung Sonobuoy/SLC

Hung Sonobuoy/SLC

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Hung

Note

1. Airspeed — Adjust to 80 KIAS.

Sonobuoy/

If a hung SLC is experienced,

2. Visually inspect spider assembly and plumbing for

SLC

manual refiring will only move

damage.

the SLC assembly slightly

3. Attempt to dislodge by manually refiring sonobuoy

and bleed down the launcher

tube.

pressure, thereby losing

emergency capability to

If sonobuoy fails to launch:

jettison all sonobuoys.

4. Avoid autorotative flight.

5. Sono Launcher safety valve — SAFE.

6. MASTER ARM — SAFE.

7. Maintain balanced flight and avoid steep turns to

the left.

8. Land as soon as practical and avoid populated

areas.

ORIGINAL

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A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.15.8.3 LAUNCH/JETT FAIL Caution Light On

LAUNCH/JETT FAIL Caution Light On

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

LAUNCH/

1. Armament circuit breakers — Pull:

JETT FAIL

a. NO. 1 DC PRIMARY BUS marked ARMAMENT

JETT A (ATO, ROW 3, CB 11).

b. NO. 2 DC PRIMARY BUS marked ARMAMENT

JETT B (ATO, ROW 3, CB 21).

c. NO. 2 DC PRIMARY BUS marked ARMAMENT

SYS (ATO, ROW 3, CB 19).

d. NO. 2 DC PRIMARY BUS marked ARMAMENT

JETT, JETT D (ATO, ROW 3, CB 22)

(BuNo 162349 and subsequent only).

2. Armament circuit breakers — Reset.

12.16 CREW--SERVED WEAPONS

12.16.1 M60D/M240D Emergencies

A malfunction or stoppage is any interruption in the cycle of operation caused by the faulty action of the gun or

ammunition. These malfunctions/stoppages can be further defined as:

1. Hangfire: A delay in the functioning of the cartridge propelling charge.

2. Misfire: A complete failure to fire.

12.16.1.1 M60D/M240D Cook--Off

M60D/M240D Cook--Off

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

M60D/M240D

*1. Barrel — SAFE DIRECTION.

Cook--Off

*2. Weapon — ALLOW TO COOL (min 5 minutes).

*3. Chamber — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

CAUTION

A barrel is considered hot if the gunner has fired 200

or more rounds within 2 minutes (rapid rate of fire).

The barrel will become hot enough to cause a

cook--off.

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A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.16.1.2 M60D/M240D Failure to Fire/Jammed Gun

M60D/M240D Failure to Fire/Jammed Gun

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

M60D/M240D

*1. Barrel — SAFE DIRECTION.

Failure to

*2. Wait 5 Seconds.

Fire/Jammed

*3. Charging Handle — RETRACT AND LOCK.

Gun

*4. Safety — TO SAFE.

*5. Chamber — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

If chamber cannot be cleared in 10 seconds a

possibility for cook--off exists, close feed tray cover

and allow to cool for 5 minutes then re--inspect and

clear.

Note

Gun will jam if collection bag is not emptied often.

12.16.1.3 M60D/M240D Runaway Gun

M60D/M240D Runaway Gun

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

M60D/M240D

*1. Barrel — SAFE DIRECTION.

Runaway Gun

*2. Ammo Belt — BREAK BY TWISTING.

If weapon does not stop firing:

*3. Continue pointing in safe direction until ammo is

expended.

*4. Chamber — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

To avoid further damage, continued firing of weapon

shall not be conducted until weapon is inspected.

*5. Weapon status — REPORT.

ORIGINAL

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A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.16.1.4 M60D/M240D Clear Weapon Procedures

M60D/M240D Clear Weapon Procedures

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

M60D/M240D

1. Charging Handle — RETRACT AND LOCK.

Clear Weapon

2. Safety — TO SAFE.

Procedures

3. Feed tray cover — OPEN.

4. Ammo — REMOVE.

5. Chamber — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

Failure to ensure no live/expended cartridges remain

in the chamber, feed tray, or receiver may result in

accidental discharge. Utilize a flashlight if necessary

to ensure weapon is clear.

6. Weapon status — REPORT.

12.16.2 GAU-16/A Emergencies

12.16.2.1 GAU--16/A Cook--Off

GAU--16/A Cook--Off

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GAU--16/A

*1. Barrel — SAFE DIRECTION.

Cook--Off

*2. Weapon — ALLOW TO COOL (min 5 minutes).

Avoid opening the feed cover of a hot gun. If cook--off

occurs, there may be a pause between firings. Allow

to cool for 5 minutes after last round has fired.

*3. Chamber/T--slot — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

12.16.2.2 GAU--16/A Jammed Gun

GAU--16/A Jammed Gun

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GAU--16/A

*1. Barrel — SAFE DIRECTION.

Jammed Gun

*2. Wait 5 seconds.

*3. Charging handle — CHARGE ONCE.

*4. Attempt to fire.

If weapon does not fire:

*5. Chamber/T--slot — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

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ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

12.16.2.4 GAU--16/A Clear Weapon Procedures

GAU--16/A Clear Weapon Procedures

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

GAU--16/A

1. Safety — SAFE.

Clear Weapon

2. AN/PEQ--3 — OFF.

Procedures

3. AN/PEQ--3 lens covers — ON.

4. Feed tray cover — OPEN.

5. Ammo — REMOVE FROM FEED TRAY.

6. Feed tray cover — CLOSE.

7. Charging handle — CHARGE ONCE.

8. Feed tray cover — OPEN.

9. Chamber/T--slot — INSPECT AND CLEAR.

D Chamber may be hot. Use caution while

inspecting T--slot.

D If chamber is not clear, repeat steps

6. through 9. once and remove any remaining

rounds. If unable to clear weapon, execute hung

ordnance procedures IAW local directives.

CAUTION

Do not disassemble the GAU--16 while attempting to

clear weapon in flight.

10. Weapon status — REPORT.

12.16.2.5 AN/PEQ-3 Uncommanded Lasing

AN/PEQ--3 UNCOMMANDED LASING

LEGEND

CAUSE/REMARKS

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AN/PEQ-3

*1. AN/PEQ--3 — OFF.

Uncommanded

*2. AN/PEQ--3 lens covers — ON.

Lasing

*3. Batteries — REMOVE.

The AN/PEQ--3 Laser is a

class 3B non--eyesafe laser

with a NOHD of 263 meters.

12-101/(12-102 blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

CHAPTER 13

Instrument Procedures

13.1

INSTRUMENT FLIGHT PROCEDURES

With the exception of some repetition necessary for continuity, the procedures and techniques contained in this

chapter are only those that differ or are in addition to normal operating procedures. Prior to conducting instrument

flying, careful preflight planning is necessary. Refer to the NATOPS Instrument Flight Manual for detailed

instrument flight procedures.

13.1.1 Instrument Takeoff (ITO)

During a full ITO (no external visual reference), the hover bars will provide the only indication of stability over the

ground.

The following general procedures are recommended:

1. Select hover bars.

2. Smoothly increase collective to takeoff power and maintain a hover attitude by referencing the AI. Allow

AFCS to maintain heading (feet off pedal trim microswitches once airborne).

3. Smoothlyincreasecollectivetoclimboutpower.Asthehelicopterpassesthrough20feetontheradaraltimeter,

position the cyclic forward to establish a 5º nose down attitude and accelerate into forward climbing flight.

4. As the helicopter accelerates, crosscheck radar altimeter and VSI for positive rates of climb. Rate of climb

should be 500 fpm or greater.

5. Maintain a smooth acceleration up to 90 KIAS, referencing the AI and airspeed indicator.

13.1.2 Instrument Crew Coordination

In order to prevent possible pilot task saturation, the flight crew shall discuss and assign cockpit responsibilities prior

to instrument flight. The responsibilities shall include complying with clearances, making radio calls, switching

navigation aids and radios, monitoring navigation, reviewing approach procedures, maintaining a visual/instrument

scan during an approach, and landing procedures. Prior to commencing an instrument approach, the pilots should

review approach publication information. The PAC shall comply with clearances and should make radio calls. The

PNAC should notify thePAC ofdeviations from published orassigned procedures, call thefield in sight, and backup

the PAC during visual transition following an approach. The aircrewmen should monitor the radios and maintain a

good lookout.

13.1.2.1 Instrument Climbs and Descents

The PAC shall verbalize his intentions to vacate one altitude for another. The PNAC shall monitor flight instruments

and provide “100 FEET PRIOR” (or as briefed) call. Upon reaching intended altitude, the PNAC shall verbally note

that RDRALT/BARALT pushbutton is latched/steady.

13.1.3 Instrument Approach Procedure

Two methods for ensuring cockpit coordination and instrument scan responsibility are recommended: change of

scans or change of controls. Instrument scan responsibility shall be specifically briefed.

Note

Pilots shall verbally acknowledge a change ofscan responsibility by useof

phrases such as “I’M ON INSTRUMENTS,” or “I’M VISUAL”.

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ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

13.1.3.1 Change of Scans

In this procedure, the PAC flies the instrument approach and makes the landing. The PAC maintains an instrument

scan until the landing phase commences. The PNAC backs up the PAC on instruments and scans outside for the

landing environment. Once the PNAC has the landing environment in sight, and can safely continue the approach,

the PACE will provide the PAC with a brief description of the visual approach (e.g., glideslope, line--up) and then

assume instrument scan responsibilities. The PAC shall commence a visual scan outside and continue the approach

to a landing. The PNAC maintains an instrument scan until landing is assured. If a missed approach is initiated, the

PAC will ensure obstacle clearance and then assume instrument scan responsibilities. The PNAC will provide backup

instrument scan.

13.1.3.2 Change of Controls

In this procedure, the PAC flies the instrument approach and switches controls to the PNAC for landing. Once the

PNAC has the landing environment in sight, and can safely continue the approach visually, the PNAC shall inform

the PAC, take the flight controls and continue the approach to landing. The initial PAC continues an instrument scan

until landing is assured. If a missed approach is initiated, the initial PAC reassumes control of the aircraft and the

initial PNAC provides backup instrument scan and obstruction clearance.

13.2

SIMULATED INSTRUMENT FLIGHTS

13.2.1 Lookout Procedures

Thepossibilityofamidaircollisionrequirescontinuouscautionwhenengagedin simulatedinstrument flights.When

the PAC’s attention is directed toward controlling the aircraft on instruments, the area of surveillance for which the

PAC is responsible shall be covered by a lookout familiar with aviation, instructed in specific duties, and provided

with direct communication to the pilots.

13.2.2 Safety Precautions

Since the PAC will be devoting total attention to instrument flying, the PNAC will operatethe navigation equipment

and assume lookout responsibility. When engaged in simulated instrument flights, the crew is responsible for

knowledge of and compliance with the following safety precautions:

1. The lookout shall be indoctrinated thoroughly in the nature and importance of specific duties and shall not be

distracted from the assigned duties.

2. ICS shall be operable between both pilots and lookout during simulated instrument flight.

13.3

UNUSUAL ATTITUDES

13.3.1 Unusual Attitudes

Unusual attitudes are considered to be pitch attitudes in excess of 30° and/or roll attitudes in excess of 60°. Unusual

attitudes will mostly likely be encountered following an AFCS malfunction, AI degradation, vertigo or poor

instrument scan.

13.3.2 Unusual Attitude Recovery

If the pilot uses information presented by the AI correctly, a recovery from an unusual attitude can be executed

quickly. If AI degradation is suspected, the importance of crosschecking the operable AI must be stressed. If both

AI indications are erroneous, the PAC shall immediately switch to a partial panel instrument scan and commence

recovery.

While reducing airspeed during recovery from an unusual attitude is important, the recovery can be expedited by

decreasing the angle of bank while simultaneously applying aft cyclic. As soon as the angle of bank is corrected, the

airspeed indicator and altimeter become the primary pitch instruments. Airspeed should be crosschecked with the

AI to obtain an instant indication of pitch attitude. High sink rates can be experienced with no change in attitude.

ORIGINAL

13-2

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

CHAPTER 14

Extreme Weather Operations

14.1

COLD--WEATHER OPERATIONS

14.1.1 General

Extreme cold temperatures and conditions cause adverse effects on aircraft materials. Rubber, plastic, and fabric

material stiffen, and may crack or even shatter, when loads are applied. Oils congeal and grease hardens. Dissimilar

metals contract differentially. Moisture, usually from condensation or melted ice, freezes in critical areas. Tire,

landing gear strut, and accumulator air pressures decrease as the temperature decreases. Refer to Chapter 3 for specific

cold--weather servicing requirements. Extreme diligence on the part of both ground and flight crews is required to

ensure successful cold weather operations. Since it is not usually practical to completely cover an unhangared aircraft,

thoseparts not protected by covers requireparticularattention. Ifhangarspaceis available, theaircraftshould bekept

in a heated hangar when OAT is forecast below 0 °C (32 °F).

For cold--weather flights, use the normal procedures in Chapter 7, with the exceptions or additions in the following

paragraphs.

14.1.2 Cold--Weather Preflight Check

14.1.2.1 Exterior Inspection

1. Check the fuel drains for ice. Blockage of the drains may be an indication of water in the fuel tanks.

2. Check engine inlets for ice or snow, specifically at the lowest point up to the front swirl vanes. If ice or snow

is found, remove as much as possible by hand and then thaw the engine out with heated air or deicing fluid

before attempting start.

CAUTION

D Ice removal shall never be done by scraping or chipping. Remove ice by

applying heat or approved de--icing fluids.

D Failure to remove ice and snow will cause engine damage.

3. Check main rotor head and blades, tail rotor, and flight controls for ice and snow.

CAUTION

Failure to remove snow and ice accumulations can result in serious

aerodynamic and structural effects in flight.

4. Check the following vents/ports for ice blockage:

CAUTION

Failure to ensure vents/ports are free from ice can cause false and erratic

instrument indications and equipment malfunctions.

14-1

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

a. Fuel tank vents.

b. Engine oil tank vents.

c. Transmission vents.

d. Battery vent.

e. Pitot--static tubes and ports.

5. Check that tires are not frozen to the ground.

6. Check landing gear struts and hydraulic accumulator for proper servicing.

7. Apply preheat if available.

14.1.2.2 Interior Inspection

1. Check PCL’s for freedom of movement before engine start.

CAUTION

A PCL that is difficult to move may be indicative of a frozen power

available spindle (PAS) or PAS cable. Do not force PCL movement as this

may damage the PAS cable.

2. Flight controls may be difficult to move after the aircraft has been cold soaked. If the controls are not

sufficiently free for a safe start and low power warm--up, heat the affected controls.

3. Install THPs in the MTMU just prior to engine start.

14.1.3 Engine Oil System Characteristics

1. It is normal to observe high engine oil pressure during initial starts when oil is cold. Run engine at IDLE until

oilpressureiswithinlimits.Oilpressureshouldreturntothenormalrangeafteroperating 5 minutes.However,

time required for warm--up will depend on temperature of the engine and lubrication system before start.

2. During starts in extreme cold weather (near --40 °C), the following oil pressure characteristics are typical:

a. Oil pressure may remain at zero for about the first 20 to 30 seconds after initiating the start. Abort the start

if there is no oil pressure within l minute after initiating a start.

b. Once oil pressure begins to indicate, it will increase rapidly and exceed the prescribed 100--psi limit. The

pressure will decrease below 100 psi as oil temperature rises . This condition is considered normal. The time

for oil pressure to decrease to 100 psi or below will depend on the severity of the ambient temperature, but

it should occur within 5 minutes after starting the engine. Do not advance the PCL to FLY until engine oil

pressure is indicating normal.

c. Oil pressure may increase above the maximum pressure limit if the engine is accelerated above idle while

oil temperature is below normal operating range. The pressurewill decreaseto within the normal operating

range as the oil temperature increases. The impending bypass indicator has a thermal lockout below 38 °C

to prevent thePDIbutton from popping. TheOIL FILTER BYPASS caution may appearduring cold starts.

When engine oil temperature reaches approximately 38 °C, the caution should disappear.

14.1.4 Engine Starting

Although cold weather does not generally affect normal engine operation, it may result in problems such as ice in

fuel lines, control valves and fuel sumps, possibly preventing a successful cold weather start. Consideration should

be given to preheating fuel components prior to flight operations.

ORIGINAL

14-2

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

CAUTION

When starting an engine that has been exposed to low temperatures overnight,

watch for a rise in TGT within 40 seconds. If no TGT rise is evident, abort the

start. Prime the engine and attempt another engine start. If there is no

overboard fuel flow during prime, inspect for ice in the sumps and filters.

During cold weather operation, allow longer warm--up period to bring

transmission oil temperature up to desired operating range. Monitor oil

pressure and temperature closely.

Note

When on an icy surface, it is advisable to utilize No--Rotor Brake Start

Procedures to prevent possible aircraft rotation caused by the rapid increase

in torque experienced during a Rotor Brake Start Procedure and

engagement.

14.1.4.1 Engine Warmup and Control Exercise

1. At temperatures between --17 °C and --31 °C, warm up engine at IDLE for 3 minutes. During engine warm--up,

position cyclic control 1 inch forward of neutral and move tail rotor pedals alternately 3/8 inch.

2. At temperatures between --31° and --40 °C, warm up engine at IDLE for 3 minutes. During engine warm--up,

position cyclic control 5/8 inch forward, gradually increasing cyclic movement to 2 inches. Move each tail

rotor pedal 1/8 inch, and gradually increase movement to 1/2 inch.

Note

Consideration should be given to using the ROTOR BRAKE START

procedure during engine warm--up.

14.1.4.2 Taxiing

The helicopter should not be taxied until all engine temperatures and system pressures are within normal limits.

Taxiing in soft snow or on ice offers special problems. All taxiing should be done at low speeds, with wide--radius

turns. The distance from obstructions and other aircraft should be as large as possible. Taxiing in snow usually

requires higher than normal taxi power, which reduces visibility from blowing snow. If this should occur, taxi at a

slowerground speed orhavethehelicoptertowed to a takeoffposition. A buildup ofsnow may occur in front oftires;

after passing snow buildup, taxiing will be normal. Do not exceed 15 KGS.

14.1.4.3 Takeoff

Cold weather presents no particular takeoff problems unless the cold weather is accompanied by snow. A slight

yawing motion, induced by light pedal application, should break the tires free when they are frozen to the surface.

The problem of restricted visibility, due to blowing or swirling snow (from the rotor wash) can be acute and may

require use of ITO procedures. Minimum time should be spent in a hover prior to transition to forward flight. If the

takeoff area is surrounded by a large expanse of smooth, unbroken snow, there is danger that the pilots may become

disoriented because of the absence of visible ground reference objects. In this case, use any available fixed objects

for reference. The distances used will depend on the size and color of the objects and the type of takeoff.

14.1.4.4 Cruise

During cruise, use the APU for ECS operation, as required. If the flight is over large, unbroken expanses of snow, the

helicopter should be flown entirely on instruments at a safe altitude. Another important factor that should not be

overlooked is the effect of low temperatures upon true airspeeds, DA, and fuel consumption.

14-3

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

With ECS on, maximum torque available is reduced by approximately 7 percent per engine. Fuel flow will increase

by approximately 45 pounds per hour per engine. With engine anti--ice on, maximum torque available is reduced by

up to 18 percent perengineand can bereduced by upto 49percent iftheinletanti--icevalvehas malfunctioned.Using

the APU to power the ECS will increase fuel consumption by approximately 150 pounds per hour.

14.1.4.5 Landing

During normal operations, helicopters are often required to land or maneuver in areas other than prepared airfields.

During cold--weather operations, this frequently involves landing and taking off from snow--covered terrain. The

snow depth is usually less in open areas where there is little or no drift effect. The snow depth is usually greater on

the downward side of ridges and wooded areas. Whenever possible, the crew should familiarize themselves with the

type of terrain under the snow (tundra, brush, marshland, etc.). Running landings are recommended when landing

on loose snow. Maintain enough ground speed to remain ahead of a snow cloud, but not over 15 KGS on touchdown.

On all snow landings, anticipate the worst conditions; restricted visibility due to loose swirling snow and an unfirm

ice crust under the snow. When loose or powdery snow is expected, make an approach and landing with little or no

hovertominimizetheeffectoftherotorwashonthesnow.Ifpossible,useprominentground--referenceobjectsduring

theapproachandlanding.Ifnosuchobjectsareavailable,areferencemarkerdroppedfrom thehelicopterwillsuffice.

After contacting the surface, slowly decrease collective until the aircraft is firmly on the ground. Be ready to take

off immediately. If, while decreasing collective, one wheel should hang up or break through the crust; do not reduce

power until it is positively determined that the aircraft will not settle. If possible, have a crewmember visually check

the surface before reducing power.

Note

When shutting down on an icy surface, it is advisable to allow the rotor to

coast down to prevent possible aircraft rotation caused by a rapid

application of the rotor brake.

14.1.5 Before Leaving the Helicopter

1. Protect the wheels from freezing to the ground by towing/taxiing on to planks or sandbags.

2. Leave the parking brake off.

3. Open the scuppers on cockpit windows. This will permit sufficient air circulation to retard frost formation and

reduce cracking of transparent areas due to differential contraction.

4. Drain moisture accumulations from sumps and strainers as soon as possible.

5. Install engine inlet plugs after shutdown to prevent accumulation of ice and snow in engines.

6. Remove the THPs from the MTMU to prevent them from freezing. Keep them in a heated space until needed.

14.2

SNOW PRECAUTIONS

The problems encountered when operating from covered surfaces are significant. The restricted visibility caused by

blowingsnowcanbepartiallyovercomebyplacingsmokegrenadesorcoloredobjects,suchaspineboughs,apainted

drum, or a panel marker in the landing area for visual reference. The smoke grenade will indicate the wind direction

and allow an estimate of the wind direction and velocity. The pilot should be aware of the fact that there is no horizon

reference when flying over large, unbroken expanses of snow. If this situation exists, fly at a safe instrument altitude

and use the attitude indicator for a horizon reference. When preparing to land, select an area devoid of loose or

powdery snow to minimize the restrictions to visibility from blowing snow. Takeoffs into fog or low clouds when

the temperature is at or near freezing could result in engine air inlet icing. Climb speeds should be higher than normal

under such conditions.

ORIGINAL

14-4

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

Running takeoffs arepermitted ifgroundspeed is held to 60 knotsorbelowon levelterrain beforeleaving theground.

Running landings are recommended when landing on loose snow. Maintain enough groundspeed to remain ahead

of a snow cloud but not to be over approximately 15 knots at touchdown.

14.3

ICE PRECAUTIONS

Icing conditions will affect aircraft in numerous different manners dependent on the OAT and level of the icing

conditions encountered. If unanticipated icing conditions are encountered, your first consideration should be to exit

the icing environment. If unable to exit the icing environment, it is necessary to have an understanding of the icing

severity levels and factors that affect ice accumulation rates in addition to the possible degradations that may occur in

aircraft performance.

D Flightintoknownicing conditionswithout de--iceequipment isprohibited.

D Flight into forecasted or known moderate or severe icing conditions is

prohibited.

D OAT gauges are not calibrated instruments and may provide false information.

D Ice shed from the rotor blades and/or other rotating components presents

a hazard to personnel during landing and shutdown.

CAUTION

D Ice shed from the main rotor may strike the tail rotor during rapid descents

following flight in icing conditions.

D Ice formation on the lower hub assembly of the main rotor head may

prevent droop--stop engagement on shutdown.

14.3.1 Engine/Inlet Anti--Icing

The engine inlet has a tub area forward of the swirl vanes with no provision to drain water which may collect. Water

pooled in the intake ducting will freeze in cold weather and may result in foreign object damage (FOD). Since it can

only be removed using approved de--ice fluid or hot air, pooled water must be removed prior to freezing. Intakes shall

also be checked for ice on preflight.

When the engines are operating and the OAT reaches 5 °C or below in visible moisture, the engine inlet guide vanes

and the inlet are susceptible to icing. The ENG ANTI--ICE switches shall be turned on when OAT is 5 °C or below

in visible moisture.

CAUTION

Ice damage to the T700 engine may be characterized by a high pitched noise

with no associated power loss or secondary indication.

14-5

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

Note

Significant power available losses and increased fuel consumption can be

expected as a result of the actuation of the engine and engine inlet anti--ice

systems.

14.3.2 Helicopters Not Equipped with Blade De--Ice

If icing conditions are encountered or the ICE DETECTED caution appears due to suspected icing conditions,

immediatelyturnonallanti--icingequipment,seekaconditionwhereicingisnotpresent,andlandassoonaspractical

(Refer to Chapter 12 for emergency procedure). Initial ice accumulation will be noted on the windshield wiper arms,

mirrorsupport brackets, main landing gearand externalstores. Themain rotorblades mayundergo periodicshedding

of ice that will result in light to moderate vibrations felt through the controls and the airframe. Ice shedding from the

main and tail rotor may strike each other and the fuselage causing dents in the blades and the airframe.

Ground personnel should remain well clear of the helicopter during landing and shutdown, and passengers and

crewmembers should not exit the helicopter until the rotor has stopped. The aircraft should be closely inspected

following flight in icing conditions.

14.3.3 Ice Rate Detector

The ice rate detector, mounted on the NO. 2 engine cowling, senses the accumulation of ice and activates the ICE

DETECTED caution. Correspondingly, an aspirate heater on the probe is activated to heat the probe and shed the ice.

As the ice melts, the ICE DETECTED caution will disappear. The frequency at which the ICE DETECTED caution

cycles on and off may give an indication of the icing severity level.

14.3.4 Helicopters Equipped with Blade De--Ice

Flight is permitted in forecast or known trace or light icing conditions. All anti--ice/de--ice systems shall be turned

on prior to entering visible moisture (including clouds) at ambient temperatures of 5 °C or less. When icing is

unexpectedly encountered, turn on all anti--icing and de--ice equipment immediately.

Refer to Chapter 22 for torque available. An additional torque increase up to 14 percent per engine may be experienced

due to ice build--up during normal operation of the blade de--ice system. The crew should closely monitor engine

instruments to prevent exceeding limits and/or rotor droop.

Ice accumulation resulting in a 20 percent torque increase indicates that

normal autorotational rotor rpm may not be attainable should dual--engine

failure occur.

The main rotor hub and blades may accumulate ice prior to initiation of a de--ice cycle. Moderate vibration levels

of short duration can be expected in the controls and airframe during normal de--ice cycles. The torques should be

carefully monitored for any constant torque increase over clear air torque. An increase of over 10 percent matched

torque should result in urgent consideration to vacate the environment, unless the task is considered essential.

Should unacceptable vibration levels and excessive torque requirements persist, the pilot should leave the icing

environment as soon as possible.

If torque required increases 20 percent above that required for level flight, at the airspeed being maintained prior to

entering icing, exit the icing environment or land the aircraft as soon as possible. Some impact damage to the aircraft

can be expected during flight into icing conditions.

If the blade de--ice system is not operating, asymmetric shedding of ice may cause imbalances, which may result in

severe vibrations. These vibrations will normally subside after 30--60 seconds when ice from other blades is shed.

Some impact damage to the aircraft can be expected during flight into icing conditions.

ORIGINAL

14-6

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

Icing of the droop stops and anti--flapping restrainers during extended flight in icing conditions may prevent their

normal operation during rotor shutdown. When the droop stops fail to engage, the main rotor blades may droop to

within four feet of the ground during shutdown. Strong, gusty winds may also cause excessive flapping of the main

rotor blades, presenting the additional hazard of potential contact with the aft fuselage. If the droop stops are suspected

to be stuck in the flight position, caution must be exercised during shutdown to ensure personnel remain clear and

flight controls are positioned to avoid excess main rotor blade flapping. Refer to Chapter 12 for the appropriate

emergency procedure.

CAUTION

D The potential exists for incomplete blade fold following flight in icing

conditions. Visually ensure all blade fold micro--switch contact surfaces are

free of ice accumulations prior to attempting a blade fold sequence.

D The potential exists for the anti--flapping devices to remain in the open

position following flight in icing conditions.

14.3.5 Pitot--Static Tube Heater

Pitot heat shall be turned on when OAT is 5 °C or below and/or visible moisture is present.

Failure to turn on pitot heat in icing conditions may cause erroneous

airspeed indications, which may lead to downward programming of the

stabilator and loss of control of the aircraft.

14.4

THUNDERSTORMS AND TURBULENCE

14.4.1 Thunderstorms

Avoid flight through or near thunderstorms. If thunderstorms are encountered during flight, consider the option of

landing and waiting for the storm to pass, if possible.

A severe lightning strike to the aircraft is likely to result in the loss of all electrical power sources, except the battery

(including the APU generator even if it is not operating at the time), and in damage to a majority of electronic circuits.

Due to electrical system design, battery power may only be available for operation of components associated with

thebatteryutilitybusfollowingalightningstrike.Withthelossofallelectricalpower,theonlyremaininginstruments

still availableto thepilots foran emergencylanding wouldbethestandby instruments.Alightningstrikethatinduces

voltagesin theenginewiringharness wouldsignificantly damagetheDECUsand possiblyotherrelatedcomponents.

14.4.2 Turbulence

The aircraft should not be flown in a manner that will result in deviations from the normal limitations. Use the

following techniques when operating in turbulent air.

14-7

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

14.4.2.1 When Encountering Turbulent Air

The following procedures are recommended:

1. Crew — Alert.

2. Airspeed — Adjust as follows:

a. For moderate turbulence, limit airspeed to blade stall speed minus 15 knots.

b. For light turbulence, limit airspeed to blade stall speed minus 10 knots.

3. Loose equipment — Secure.

14.4.2.2 In Turbulent Air

The collective position, when adjusted for the airspeeds mentioned above, should not be adjusted and the AI should

be used as the primary pitch instrument. The pitot static instruments may vary excessively in turbulence and should

not berelied upon. Airspeed indications may vary as much as 40KIAS. Bymaintaining aconstant collectiveposition

and a level flight attitude on the AI, airspeed will remain relatively constant even when erroneous readings are

presented by the airspeed indicator.

14.4.2.3 Starting Rotors

Position thehelicopterinto thewind. Hold thecyclicinto thewind and increase therotor rpm immediately to prevent

excessive flapping of the blades. (Refer to Chapter 4 for maximum wind velocities for engaging rotors).

14.4.2.4 Descending

A long, fairly flat approach with power on will afford better handling characteristics than will a steep, slow, or

low--power approach.

14.4.2.5 Stopping Rotors

Position the helicopter into the wind. Use the normal procedure for stopping rotors. Hold the cyclic into the wind

to reduce the tendency of blades to bump against the droop stops. Apply the rotor brake when the rotor speed is

reduced below 40 percent.

14.5

RAIN PRECAUTIONS

Pitot heat shall be turned on when visible moisture is present to reduce water accumulation in the pitot static system.

Note

Water intrusion into nose bay avionics compartment can lead to AFCS

computer failure.

14.6

HOT WEATHER AND DESERT OPERATIONS

More power will be required to hover during hot weather than on a standard day. Hovering altitude will be lower for

the same gross weight and power settings on a hot day. Plan the flight thoroughly to compensate for existing

conditions by using the Performance Charts in Part XI. When weather conditions permit, leave scupper vents and

cabin doors open on the ground to ventilate the helicopter.

Note

D Fuel densities will decrease as the ambient temperature rises, resulting in

a decrease in operating range.

D High humidity increases the DA and effectively reduces the efficiency of

the rotor system. For every 10 percent increase in relative humidity the DA

increases approximately 100 feet. Thus a high relative humidity, close to

100 percent, can effectively increase the DA by as much as 1,000 feet.

ORIGINAL

14-8

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

During ground operations, if engine oil pressure falls into the red range when the PCL lever is in the IDLE position

and/or the ENGINE OIL PRESS caution light comes on when the PCL lever is in the idle position, slightly advance

the PCL lever. If the engine oil pressure returns to the yellow range and the ENGINE OIL PRESS caution light

extinguishes, engine oil pressure is acceptable.

14.6.1 Desert Procedures

Desert operations generally involve operating in a very hot, dry, dusty, often windy atmosphere. Under such

conditions, sand and dust will often be found in vital areas. Severe damage may be caused by sand and dust. Consider

towing the helicopter into takeoff position. If possible, takeoff should be on a hard, clean surface, free from sand and

dust.

Note

Operations in extremely dusty conditions for extended periods may cause

the ICE DETECTED caution light to illuminate due to particle buildup on

the detector.

14.6.2 Preflight Inspection

Plan the flight thoroughly to compensate for existing conditions by using the Performance Charts in Part XI. Check

for sand and dust in control hinges, actuating linkages, and inspect tires for proper inflation. High temperatures may

cause over--inflation. Check oleo struts for sand and dust, especially in the area next to the cylinder seal, and remove

any accumulation with a clean, dry cloth. Inspect for and remove any sand and dust deposits on the instrument panel,

switches, flight controls, and the engine control quadrant.

14.6.3 Engine Starting

If possible, engine starting and ground operations should be made from a hard, clean surface with aircraft positioned

into the wind.

14.6.4 Taxi

When it is absolutely necessary to taxi in sand and dust, get the helicopter airborne as quickly as possible to lessen

sand and dust intake by the engines and erosion of the main rotor blades.

14.6.5 Takeoff

Execute takeoff and climb as rapidly as possible.

14.6.6 Cruise

Avoid flying through sand or dust storms, when possible. Excessive dust and grit in the air will cause considerable

damage to internal engine parts and erosion of the main rotor blades.

14.6.7 Landing

The best procedure to lessen blowing sand and dust during landing is a steep approach with a no--hover landing.

14.6.8 Engine Shutdown

Shut down the engine as soon as practical, to lessen the intake of sand and dust.

14.6.9 Postflight Inspection

Install all protective covers and shields. Except when sand and dust are blowing, leave scupper vents and cabin doors

open to ventilate the helicopter.

14-9/(14-10 blank)

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

CHAPTER 15

Communication Equipment

and Procedures

15.1

COMMUNICATIONS

15.1.1 Introduction

The communication subsystem handles the transfer of sensor and tactical data between the helicopter and ship and

also routes internal communication among helicopter crewmembers. The communication subsystem has the

following capabilities:

Note

D Aircraft BuNo through 162990 are equipped with ARC--159 UHF radio

sets. Aircraft BuNo 162991 and subsequent are equipped with ARC--182

UHF/VHF radio sets. VHF and UHF FM are additional capabilities

provided by the ARC--182 UHF/VHF radio sets.

D To prevent hot mike of other selected transmitters and loss of VOX ICS,

ensure the ANDVT (USC--43/KYV--5) HF SECURE toggle switches are

OFF when not in use. The toggle switches are mounted on the side of the

center console, one on the pilot side and one on the ATO side.

1. Two--way clear or secure voice (UHF or UHF/VHF) between the helicopter and other units (KY--58 and

ARC--159 or ARC--182).

2. Two--way clear or secure, over--the--horizon voice (HF) between the helicopter and other units (KYV--5 and

ARC--174).

3. Two--way secure computer--to--computer data link for data and voice transfer (KG--45 and ARQ--44).

4. Transmission of sonobuoy command tones.

5. Communications relay (UHF or UHF/VHF).

6. IFF/SIF interrogation and identification of friendly or hostile targets and response to interrogations from

friendly forces. THP 21 permits IFF interrogation from ATO and SO keysets.

The communication subsystem performs five major functions:

1. Communications control.

2. Data link between ship and helicopter.

3. Voice communications.

4. IFF.

5. Intercommunications.

15-1

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

15.1.1.1 Communications System Control Group

The communications system control group (CSCG) provides a central control and interface capability for internal

and external communications in the LAMPS MK III System.

The CSCG consists of:

1. Audio--converter processor (ACP).

2. Communications control panel (COMM CONTR).

3. Radio control panels (remote switching control (RSC)) for pilot, ATO, SO, and observer.

4. Hoist operator position and maintenance interconnecting boxes (IB).

Communication signals are routed through the CSCG in order to provide a single point of control for selection and routing

of radio and intercommunications signals. The ATO or pilot controls the operating mode and tuning of UHF or UHF/VHF

radios, selection of clear or secure--voice communications, and IFF interrogation from the COMM CONTR. The CSCG

collects equipment status information from communications units and displays failures by means of status lights located

on the COMM CONTR Panel. CSCG reports overall status over the 1553 data bus to digital data computer 1 (AYK--14)

(SAC--1). The CSCG also receives and distributes audible warning tones as follows:

1. Low altitude:

a. High index (250 feet) — Approximately 6 tone pulses at both pilot stations.

b. Variable index (set on the RAD ALT) — Approximately 6 tone pulses and a steady red light at each pilot

station corresponding to the individually set variable index.

c. Low index (35 feet with coupler engaged) — Continuous tone and light pulses at both pilot stations.

2. RAD ALT failure — A continuous beeping tone at both pilot stations indicating a loss of track.

3. Helicopter threat warning — Three tones which may be initiated by the AOP are addressable via the 1553 bus

(for use on BuNo 162991 and subsequent only).

Note

The aural alert will occur only if the aircraft is equipped with a --29 Audio

Converter--Processor.

4. Stabilator failure — A unique beeping tone at both pilot stations.

5. Missile warning — A unique audible warning can be heard at each pilot station when a missile plume is

detected or the system is tested.

The CSCG also performs automatic UHF radio switching under software control to send signals to command

activated sonobuoys. The actual sonobuoy commands are generated by the acoustic subsystem.

Power is supplied from the NO. 2 DC primary, NO. 1 AC primary, and AC essential buses through three circuit

breakers, all marked CONV PROCR AUDIO. They are located on the ATO and center circuit breaker panels.

15.1.1.1.1 Audio Converter-Processor

TheACPislocatedunderthelowerconsoleandperformsswitching,processing, androuting ofcommand andcontrol

data for the following:

1. UHF or UHF/VHF receiver/transmitters.

2. Speech security equipment.

3. Direction finder group.

4. Data link.

5. IFF interrogator.

6. Sonobuoy receivers.

7. ICS.

ORIGINAL

15-2

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

If the frequency display on the COMM CONTR Panel goes to all zeros (0) and does not return, this may be cleared

utilizing the following procedure:

1. Set CSCG AUTO/MAN to MAN.

2. Depress and release TEST.

3. After approximately 5 seconds, depress and release TEST again.

4. System should now be in normal operation. If not, cycle PWR to the affected UHF radio. (Radio NO. 1 R/T

UHF on DC ESS BUS; radio NO. 2 R/T UHF on NO. 2 DC PRI BUS.)

5. If the problem is still not cleared, cycle CONV PROCR AUDIO (NO. 1 AC PRI BUS). System should now

be in normal operation. Return AUTO/MAN to AUTO.

Note

In an emergency, selection of BKUP will allow immediate use, following

backup procedures.

15.1.2 Communications Control Panel

Primary control of the communication subsystem is through the communications control (COMM CONTR) panel,

located on the cockpit lower console. Individual controls and indicators are described in Figure 15-1 for ARC--159

radio sets or Figure 15-2 for ARC--182 radio sets. The COMM CONTR panel provides control for UHF--1, UHF--2,

HF Secure, DataLink, intercommunication,and IFFInterrogator, alongwith certainassociated navigationfunctions.

The primary functions of the COMM CONTR panel are:

1. UHF and VHF mode, channel, and frequency selection.

2. UHF, VHF, and HF clear/secure mode selection.

3. IFF interrogator mode and code selection.

4. CSCG automatic or manual mode selection.

5. OTPI selection and tuning.

6. Self--test initiation.

Note

All aircraft communications will be interrupted for approximately 45 seconds

during a CSCG self--test. If initiated while airborne by inadvertent depression

of the CSCG TEST pushbutton, selection of test from the equipment status

table of the data handling/data display subsystem or reinitialization of the

CSCG, place the CSCG mode switch to manual and press the CSCG self--test

pushbutton to abort the test.

7. Status display.

15-3

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

COMM CONTR

The communications control panel allows manual or computer control of

the communications subsystem.

AUTO

Indicates software control of CSCG functions. Not currently implemented

in the SH-60B.

UHF-1, UHF 2

Four pushbutton switches, two switches for each UHF/VHF radio. Upper

(Channel

switch increases channel number by one for each actuation; lower switch

Select-up/down)

decreases the channel number by one for each actuation.

CHAN

Channel, two-digit, numeric display indicating UHF or OTPI channel being

used. Two displays, one for UHF-1 and one for UHF-2. Displays 00 to 20

for normal UHF; 01 to 31 for OTPI. Channel selection accomplished by

operating UHF-1, UHF-2 pushbuttons. If G T/R is selected, CHAN is

blanked.

TOP ANT

Top antenna, two-position, left-right toggle switch.

ON (Right)

UHF-2 assigned to top antenna; UHF-1 to bottom antenna.

ON (Left)

UHF-1 assigned to top antenna; UHF-2 to bottom antenna.

FREQ

Two, six-digit, numeric displays, one for UHF-1 and one for UHF-2.

Indicates active frequency corresponding to channel selected, frequency

spans 225.000 to 399.975 MHz in 25 kHz steps. 243.000 MHz displayed,

if G T/R ON is selected. Not affected by OTPI selection.

VALID

Two-position, magnetic flag indicator which indicates OTPI strength.

Black

Data not valid. Indicates weak OTPI signal.

Green

Data valid. Indicates OTPI is receiving signal of sufficient strength to

provide reliable pointing.

Red/White

Indicates control indicator switch settings conflict.

SET

Two white-illuminated momentary pushbutton switches, one for each

UHF/VHF radio. Used to change the frequency of the selected channel.

VOL

Volume, 12 position rotary switch.

INC

Increase, clockwise rotation increases audio output (30 db range). Two

switches, one for each UHF radio. Inoperative while in secure voice.

Mode selector switch

Seven-position rotary switch selects UHF-1 and UHF-2 radio modes.

RELAY

Receipt/retransmission, reception on one UHF radio will automatically key

and modulate the other radio. (Frequencies must be at least 50 MHz apart

for BuNos prior to 162106 and at least 10 MHz apart for BuNo 162106

and subsequent.)

ADF

Automatic direction finding mode on the selected UHF/VHF radio.

OTPI

On-top position indicator (OTPI) is activated. OTP channel is displayed in

the corresponding UHF CHAN display.

T/R

Both radios in transmit/receive mode (normal position).

G T/R

Guard transmit/receive two-position toggle. Two switches, one for each

UHF radio.

OFF

UHF radio is tuned by normal channel selection.

Respective UHF radio is automatically tuned (main receiver and

transmitter) to guard frequency (243.000 MHz) and clear voice. Overrides

all other UHF modes including secure voice, OTPI, ADF, RELAY, and

sonobuoy commands.

Figure 15-1. Communications Control Panel (BuNo through 162990) (Sheet 2)

15-5

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

G REC

Guard receiver, two-position toggle switch. Two switches, one for each

UHF radio.

OFF

Allows monitoring of main receiver only.

Allows simultaneous monitoring of main and auxiliary guard receivers.

SECURE

Three-position, lever-lock, left-right throw, center-off toggle switch.

ON (left)

Secure voice operation of UHF-1 radio. Inhibits plain reception.

ON (right)

Secure voice operation of UHF-2 radio. Inhibits plain reception.

SQL

Squelch, alternate action, non-illuminated pushbutton switch. Successive

depression causes release to inactivated state. Two switches, one for

each UHF radio.

TONE

Tone, momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch. Commands UHF

radio to transmit 1020 Hz audio tone for the duration of the depression.

Two switches, one for each UHF radio.

ZERO CODE

Pushbutton with spring-loaded guard, illuminated when activated. Used to

zeroize HF and UHF Speech Security Equipment.

HF SECURE/ON

Two-position, lever-lock toggle switch. Locked in ON position, all HF

transmissions are encrypted, reception can be either plain or secure. The

ARC-182 VHF Radio, installed in ESP Mod Aircraft as an aftermarket kit,

is inoperable with this switch in the ON position.

UHF TD/ON

UHF Time Delay, two-position, lever-lock toggle switch. Commands KY-58

to insert a time delay prior to transmission or retransmission of UHF

signals.

Magnetic Flag

When data link mode selector switch is in AUTO, indicator is driven by

data bus software. Two-position, magnetically actuated flag annunciator,

edge light illuminated.

ASW

Data link is in ASW mode. Acoustic data and ESM is downlinked.

ASST

Data link is in ASST mode. RADAR data and ESM is downlinked.

SYNC LOCK

Synchronization locked, two-position flag annunciator. Red color indicates

sync loss. Green indicates sync lock.

Note

Sync Lock does not indicate valid data transfer or proper crypto

keying.

Data link RF signal from ship to helicopter.

DOWN

Data link RF signal from helicopter to ship.

MODE

Data link mode selector three-position rotary switch (intended for

maintenance/troubleshooting).

AUTO

Enables data bus control of data link ASST/ASW mode.

ASST

Commands data link operation in ASST mode, link channel 01.

ASW

Commands data link operation in ASW mode, link channel 01.

Display

Six-digit numeric display. Used for setting UHF/VHF channel frequency

and IFF Interrogator code. As number is keyed, it appears in the right

display position. Subsequent keyings cause selected digits to shift to the

left.

Figure 15-1.

Communications Control Panel (BuNo through 162990) (Sheet 3)

ORIGINAL

15-6

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9

Numeric keyboard, 10 momentary pushbuttons. Proper number of digits

Keyboard

MUST be entered (i.e., 6 for UHF, 2 or 4 for IFF).

CLR

Clear momentary pushbutton, clears display of any selected series of

digits so that a new series of digits can be selected. Set must be pressed

again to reenter.

ENTR

Enter momentary pushbutton, enters displayed frequency or code into

system, display returns to an all blank state.

M4 ALARM

Mode 4 Alarm two-position toggle switch.

ORIDE

Override, IFF interrogator computer overrides the Mode 4 (M4) alarm and

allows the ATO to force a challenge. Using this feature may compromise

the M4 code.

TEST

Momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch commands a

transponder/interrogator loop test. Transponder must be in NORMAL.

DECODE

Six-digit numeric display. The four digits on the left display interrogator

code. Two characters on the right display IFF mode (1,2,3,4a, and 4b),

set via sequential pushes of the MODE pushbutton. In M4 all digits in the

left display area are blanked.

SET

White-illuminated, momentary pushbutton switch, allows changing of code

by the keyboard display.

MODE

White-illuminated, momentary pushbutton switch, causes the IFF mode

and code to advance.

AUTO

Two-position, magnetic status flag annunciator IFF control modes.

GREEN

IFF interrogator is being controlled by software.

BLACK

IFF interrogator is being controlled manually by the CSCG panel.

CHAL

Three-position, magnetic status flag annunciator, indicates interrogator

status when CHAL switch is activated.

GREEN

CHAL switch activated signals being transmitted from the interrogator.

BLACK

CHAL switch released.

RED

CHAL switch activated, interrogator ‘no go’ is received by the CSCG ACP

indicating challenge may be unsuccessful. ORIDE activation may change

the flag to green. If the annunciator remains red after ORIDE activation,

M4 challenges are disabled.

Challenge Switch

Three-position toggle switch momentary in up-and-down positions.

Causes interrogator to transmit an interrogation with the mode of

interrogation determined by the mode display setting.

CHAL

Challenge, momentary up position. ACP sends a challenge-enable

command to the Interrogator to accept a correct mode reply. Correct

mode replies will display a single bar. Correct mode and code will display

a double bar.

STBY

Standby, normal inactive position.

CHAL CC

Challenge correct code momentary down position. ACP sends a challenge

command which enables interrogator to accept only a correct code and

mode reply. A double bar will be displayed.

Figure 15-1. Communications Control Panel (BuNo through 162990) (Sheet 4)

15-7

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

INT

Intensity, 10 position variable potentiometer.

INC

Increase, clockwise rotation increases luminous intensity of all COMM

CONTROL numeric displays from minimum intensity upward. Full

counterclockwise position is a LAMP test. All ‘8s will be displayed and all

fault lights except ACP.

CI BIT

Control indicator built-in test black and white magnetic flag annunciator.

White indicates that the COMM CONTR panel has failed.

CSCG

Communications system control group ACP two-position, lever-lock,

toggle switch.

MAN

Manual, COMM CONTR panel controls CSCG units.

AUTO

Automatic, COMM CONTR functions are controlled by software, via data

bus interface.

TEST

CSCG self-test momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch. Pressing of

button starts an interruptive self-test only when AUTO/MAN switch is in

MAN position. TEST is aborted if the TEST button is pressed again. In

AUTO, TEST may be initiated through software.

Status Annunciators

Eight yellow-illuminated annunciators that display non-availability of

CSCG and other units. Illuminates when equipment is not available

because of failure or power off. Lack of coding of security equipment

controlled by CSCG (KY-58) will cause the ACP annunciator to illuminate.

The annunciator legends in left to right sequence are defined as follows:

SR1

Sonobuoy receiver, NO. 1.

SR2

Sonobuoy receiver, NO. 2.

INT

IFF interrogator.

UHF 1

UHF, NO. 1 radio.

UHF 2

UHF, NO. 2 radio.

RS1 2

Pilot and ATO Radio panels.

RS3 4

SO and observer Radio panels.

ACP

Audio converter-processor (light is not tested when Lamp Test is selected

but tested when CSCG TEST is initiated).

Figure 15-1. Communications Control Panel (BuNo through 162990) (Sheet 5)

ORIGINAL

15-8

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

COMM CONTR

The communications control panel allows manual or computer control of

the communications subsystem.

AUTO

Indicates software control of CSCG functions. Not currently implemented

in the SH-60B.

UHF-1, UHF-2

Four pushbutton switches, two switches for each UHF/VHF radio. Upper

(Channel

switch increases channel number by one for each actuation; lower switch

Select-up/down)

decreases the channel number by one for each actuation.

CHAN

Channel, two-digit, numeric display indicating UHF, VHF, or OTPI channel

being used. Two displays, one for UHF-1 and one for UHF-2. Displays 00

to 20 for normal UHF/VHF; 01 to 31 for OTPI. Channel selection

accomplished by operating UHF-1, UHF-2 pushbuttons. If G T/R is

selected, CHAN is blanked.

TOP ANT

Top antenna, two-position, left-right toggle switch.

ON (Right)

UHF-2 assigned to top antenna; UHF-1 to bottom antenna. (Except when

in OTPI or ADF modes.)

ON (Left)

UHF-1 assigned to top antenna; UHF-2 to bottom antenna. (Except when in

OTPI, ADF, or BACKUP modes.)

FREQ

Two, six-digit, numeric displays, one for UHF-1 and one for UHF-2. Indicates

active frequency corresponding to channel selected, frequency spans of

30.000 to 87.975 MHz FM, 108.000 to 155.975 MHz AM, 156.000 to

173.975 MHz FM, and 225.000 to 399.975 MHz AM/FM in 25 kHz steps. If

G T/R ON is selected, the display will indicate the guard frequency of the

frequency band in operation. Not affected by OTPI selection.

VALID

Two-position, magnetic flag indicator that indicates OTPI strength.

Black

Data not valid. Indicates weak OTPI signal.

Green

Data valid. Indicates OTPI is receiving signal of sufficient strength to

provide reliable pointing.

Red/White

Indicates control indicator switch settings conflict.

SET

Two white-illuminated momentary pushbutton switches, one for each

UHF/VHF radio. Used to change the frequency of the selected channel.

VOL

Volume, 12-position rotary switch.

INC

Increase, clockwise rotation increases audio output (30 db range). Two

switches, one for each UHF radio. Inoperative while in secure voice.

Mode selector switch

Seven-position rotary switch selects UHF-1 and UHF-2 radio modes. For

software versions THP-20 and subsequent, OTPI operation is

accomplished by rotating the Mode Selector Switch to OTPI and tuning

the desired sonobuoy using the TUNE OTPI pushbuttons on the ATO

keyset. For this configuration, the OTPI channel displayed in the UHF

CHAN display does not correspond to the sonobuoy tuned on the MPD.

RELAY

Receipt/retransmission, reception on one UHF/VHF radio will automatically

key and modulate the other radio (Note 1).

Figure 15-2. Communications Control Panel (BuNo 162991 and Subsequent) (Sheet 2)

ORIGINAL

15-10

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

ADF

Automatic direction finding mode, in the UHF band, on the selected

UHF/VHF radio.

OTPI

On-top position indicator (OTPI) is activated. OTPI channel is displayed in

the corresponding UHF CHAN display.

T/R

Both radios in transmit/receive mode (normal position).

AM/FM

Two-position toggle switch. For the UHF-band (225.000 to 399.975 MHz)

only. FM mode will be selected in the lower position. AM mode will be

selected in the upper position. One toggle switch each is provided for

UHF-1 and UHF-2.

G T/R-OFF-G REC

Three position toggle switch. In the lower position, G REC, it will allow

monitoring of the main and guard receiver outputs. In the upper position (G

T/R), the radio unit will be automatically tuned (main receiver and transmitter)

to the guard frequency of the band in operation and the clear voice. It

overrides all other modes including secure voice, OTPI, ADF, Relay, and

sonobuoy commands. In the center position, OFF, the radio shall be tuned

by channel selection for the voice mode and allow monitoring of the main

receiver only. One toggle switch each is provided for UHF-1 and UHF-2.

SECURE

Three-position, lever-lock, left-right throw, center-off toggle switch.

ON (left)

Secure voice operation of UHF-1 radio.

ON (right)

Secure voice operation of UHF-2 radio.

SQL

Squelch, alternate action, pushbutton switch. Enables/disables radio

squelch circuits. Two switches, one each for UHF-1 and UHF-2.

TONE

Tone, momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch. Commands

UHF/VHF radio to transmit 1020 Hz audio tone for the duration of the

depression. Two switches, one for each UHF/VHF radio. UHF-1 TONE

pushbutton is hardwired to allow operation in case of failure of the ACP

and/or the backup radio control.

ZERO CODE

Pushbutton with spring-loaded guard, illuminated when activated. Used to

zeroize HF and UHF/VHF speech security equipment.

HF SECURE/ON

Two-position, lever-lock toggle switch. Locked in ON position. All HF

transmissions are encrypted; reception can be either plain or secure. These

HF secure toggle switches are inoperative on aircraft with ANDVT

incorporated.

UHF TD/ON

UHF/VHF Tone Delay, two-position, lever-lock toggle switch (Note 2).

Commands KY-58 to insert a time delay prior to transmission or

retransmission of UHF/VHF signals.

Magnetic Flag

When data link mode selector switch is in AUTO, indicator is driven by data

bus software. Two-position, magnetically actuated flag annunciator, edge light

illuminated.

ASW

Data link is in ASW mode. Acoustic data and ESM is downlinked.

ASST

Data link is in ASST mode. RADAR data and ESM is downlinked.

Figure 15-2. Communications Control Panel (BuNo 162991 and Subsequent) (Sheet 3)

15-11

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

SYNC LOCK

Synchronization locked, two-position flag annunciator. Red color indicates

sync loss. Green indicates sync lock.

Note

Sync Lock does not indicate valid data transfer of proper crypto

keying.

Data link RF signal from ship to helicopter.

DOWN

Data link RF signal from helicopter to ship.

MODE

Data link mode selector three-position rotary switch (intended for

maintenance/troubleshooting).

AUTO

Enables data bus control of data link ASST/ASW mode.

ASST

Commands data link operation in ASST mode, link channel 01.

ASW

Commands data link operation in ASW mode, link channel 01.

Display

Six-digit numeric display. Used for setting UHF/VHF channel frequency

and IFF Interrogator code. As number is keyed, it appears in the right

display position. Subsequent keyings cause selected digits to shift to the

left.

0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9

Numeric keyboard, 10 momentary pushbuttons. Proper number of digits

keyboard

(leading and trailing 0s) MUST be entered (i.e., 6 digits for UHF, 6 for

VHF, and 2 or 4 for IFF. (Note: Leading and trailing 0s are required)).

CLR

Clear momentary pushbutton, clears display of any selected series of

digits so that a new series of digits can be selected.

ENTR

Enter momentary pushbutton, enters displayed frequency or code into

system, display returns to an all blank state.

M4 ALARM

Mode 4 Alarm two-position toggle switch.

ORIDE

Override, IFF interrogator computer overrides the Mode 4 (M4) alarm and

allows the ATO to force a challenge. Using this feature may compromise the

M4 code.

TEST

Momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch commands a

transponder/interrogator loop test. Transponder must be in NORMAL.

Interrogator challenges Mode 3, Code 0000.

DECODE

Six-digit numeric display. The four digits on the left display interrogator

code. Two characters on the right display IFF mode (1,2,3,4a, and 4b),

set via sequential pushes of the MODE pushbutton. In M4 all digits in the

left display area are blanked.

SET

White-illuminated, momentary pushbutton switch, allows changing of code

by the keyboard display.

MODE

White-illuminated, momentary pushbutton switch, causes the IFF mode

and code to advance.

AUTO

Two-position, magnetic status flag annunciator IFF control modes.

GREEN

IFF interrogator is being controlled by software.

BLACK

IFF interrogator is being controlled manually by the CSCG panel.

Figure 15-2.

Communications Control Panel (BuNo 162991 and Subsequent) (Sheet 4)

ORIGINAL

15-12

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

CHAL

Three-position, magnetic status flag annunciator, indicates interrogator status

when CHAL switch is activated.

GREEN

CHAL switch activated signals being transmitted from the interrogator.

BLACK

CHAL switch released.

RED

CHAL switch activated, interrogator ‘no go’ is received by the CSCG ACP,

indicating challenge may be unsuccessful. ORIDE activation may change

the flag to green. If the annunciator remains red after ORIDE activation,

M4 challenges are disabled.

Challenge Switch

Three-position toggle switch momentary in up-and-down positions.

Causes interrogator to transmit an interrogation with the mode of

interrogation determined by the mode display setting.

CHAL

Challenge, momentary up position. ACP sends a challenge-enable

command to the interrogator to accept a correct mode reply. Correct

mode replies will display a single bar. Correct mode and code will display

a double bar.

STBY

Standby, normal inactive position.

CHAL CC

Challenge correct code momentary down position. ACP sends a challenge

command which enables interrogator to accept only a correct code and

mode reply. A double bar will be displayed.

INT

Intensity, 10 position variable potentiometer.

INC

Increase, clockwise rotation increases luminous intensity of all COMM

CONTROL numeric displays from minimum intensity upward. Full

counterclockwise position is a LAMP test. All ‘8s will be displayed and all

fault lights except ACP.

CI BIT

Control indicator built-in test black and white magnetic flag annunciator.

White indicates that the COMM CONTR panel has failed.

CSCG

Communications system control group ACP two-position, lever-lock,

toggle switch.

MAN

Manual, COMM CONTR panel controls CSCG units.

AUTO

Automatic, COMM CONTR functions are controlled by software, via data

bus interface.

TEST

CSCG self-test momentary, non-illuminated pushbutton switch. Pressing of

button starts an interruptive self-test only when AUTO/MAN switch is in MAN

position and the remote switching controls are not in the CALL mode. TEST

is aborted if the TEST button is pressed again. In AUTO, TEST may be

initiated through software.

Figure 15-2.

Communications Control Panel (BuNo 162991 and Subsequent) (Sheet 5)

15-13

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

NUMBER

CONTROL LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

Status Annunciators

Eight yellow-illuminated annunciators that display non-availability of CSCG

and other units. Illuminates when equipment is not available because of

failure or power off. Lack of coding of security equipment controlled by

CSCG (KY-58 and KYV-5) will cause the ACP annunciator to illuminate. The

annunciator legends in left to right sequence are defined as follows:

SR1

Sonobuoy receiver, NO. 1.

SR2

Sonobuoy receiver, NO. 2.

INT

IFF interrogator.

UHF 1

UHF, NO. 1 radio.

UHF 2

UHF, NO. 2 radio.

RS1 2

Pilot and ATO RADIO panels.

RS3 4

SO and observer RADIO panels.

ACP

Audio converter-processor (light is not tested when Lamp Test is selected but

tested when CSCG TEST is initiated).

Notes:

1. Avoid relay frequency separations of less than 10 MHz, frequency separations of multiples of 29 MHz,

UHF relays below 265 MHz, and VHF to VHF relays.

2. A delay will occur regardless of the UHF TD switch position on the COMM CONTR panel if the KY-58

delay is selected on (switch external on KY-58).

Figure 15-2. Communications Control Panel (BuNo 162991 and Subsequent) (Sheet 6)

15.1.3 Radio Control Panels

The four radio control panels (Figure 15-3) allow crewmembers to control the audio received at and transmitted from

theirstation.PowerissuppliedbytheNO. 1ACprimary andAC essentialbuses forthepilotand ATOfrom thecenter

circuit breaker panel, through two circuit breakers marked AUDIO and CONV PROCR AUDIO respectively, and

by115Vac,1phasefortheSOandobserverthroughacircuitbreakermarkedCOMMSWGlocated ontheSOconsole

avionics rack circuit breaker panel. These panels are also referred to as RSCs.

Note

The audio channels to be recorded on the FLIR VCR are controlled by the

switches on the radio control panels (SO or instructor) to which the VCR audio

input is connected.

15.1.4 Hoist Operator and Maintenance IBs

The IBs allow maintenance personnel and hoist operators to patch into the aircraft ICS. The ICS is powered by the CSCG

(see paragraph 15.1.1). The boxes contain volume controls and a push--to--talk switch. The ACP directs audio to and from

the IBs. The maintenance IB is located in the external ICS/ARM access cavity above the left mainmount.

15.1.5 Radios

15.1.5.1 UHF Radios, AN/ARC-159

Note

ARC--159 UHF radio sets are installed in aircraft BuNos through 162990.

ARC--182 UHF/VHF radio sets (refer to paragraph 15.1.5.2) are installed

in aircraft BuNo 162991 and subsequent.

ORIGINAL

15-14

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

INDEX

CONTROL

NUMBER

LABELS

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

RADIO

Allows independent selection of receivers while restricting transmission

selection to one. The OFF position disables audio of selected radio.

BIT

Magnetically actuated flag BIT indicator.

BLACK

Go.

WHITE

No go, indicates failure in control box.

UHF-1/REC

UHF-1 radio two-position toggle. Receiver, permits monitoring UHF-1

audio.

UHF-2/REC

UHF-2 radio two-position toggle. Receive, permits monitoring UHF-2

audio.

D/L/REC

Data link (D/L) two-position toggle. Receive, permits monitoring of D/L

secure audio.

XMTR SEL

Transmitter select six-position rotary switch selects radio transmission

mode.

UHF-1

UHF-1 radio transmission and reception.

UHF-2

UHF-2 radio transmission and reception.

D/L

D/L voice transmission and reception.

H/F

High frequency radio transmission and reception.

UHF BKUP

UHF or UHF/VHF radio backup (not available to SO or OBS stations).

HF/REC

High frequency radio two-position toggle. Receive, permits monitoring

HF.

SONO/REC

Sonobuoy two-position toggle. Receive, permits monitoring of

sonobuoy receiver audio.

TACAN/REC

TACAN two-position toggle. Receive, permits monitoring of TACAN

identifier tone.

ICS

Intercommunications System.

NET

Intercommunications system net, three-position toggle switch.

Establishes intercom net.

CONF

Conference, connects pilot and ATO positions for cockpit RADIO

panels and connects SO and observer positions for cabin RADIO

panels.

NORM

Normal, connects originator station to all other stations set to NORM

and to the hoist operator and groundcrew ICS boxes.

CALL

Connects originator station to all other crew positions, overrides CONF

selection at any RADIO panel. In an emergency (COMM CONTR or

ACP power failure), provides backup communications to all stations.

VOL

Volume, 12-position rotary switch. Volume control for radio audio at

headset.

MIC MODE

Microphone mode control.

VOX

Voice-operated transmission 12-position rotary switch.

INC

Establishes audio threshold which must be exceeded by the

crewmember microphone signal before microphone signal is

transmitted to other crewmembers. Clockwise rotation increases

threshold.

PTT

Push-to-talk when control is in this position. Switch must be actuated

for ICS voice transmission.

VOL

Volume, twelve-position rotary switch. Volume control for intercom

audio at headset.

Figure 15-3. Radio Control Panel (Sheet 2)

ORIGINAL

15-16

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

The two sets, designated as UHF--1 and UHF--2, can be tuned to any of 7,000 communication frequencies. Each

transceiver is provided with a separate guard receiver that will receive voice transmissions on the standard emergency

frequency of 243.0 MHz. The UHF transceivers have a line--of--sight range. Line--of--sight range in nautical miles

to a spot on thesurface ofthe Earth may beestimated by multiplying 1.23 times thesquare root of thealtitude in feet.

Derivation of this formula is left to the reader. Ranges will be greater for any elevation of the other station.

Power for UHF--1 receiver/transmitter is supplied from the DC essential bus through a circuit breaker on the cockpit

overhead circuit breaker panel, marked RADIO NO. 1 R/T UHF. Power for UHF--2 receiver/transmitter is supplied

from the NO. 2 DC primary bus through a circuit breaker marked RADIO NO. 2 R/T UHF on the SO circuit breaker

panel.

In the event of COMM CONTR failure, UHF--1 may be used by the pilot by selecting backup on the RSC and can

be controlled from the backup UHF radio control panel. UHF--2 may be used by the ATO for guard communications

only by selecting UHF backup on the RSC. If the ACP fails, the pilot will automatically be connected to UHF--1.

The ATO will automatically be connected to UHF--2, preset to Guard T/R. Internal communications between all

aircrew may be made by selecting CALL on the RSC (foot or cyclic switch) or by using the CALL pushbutton switch

on the cyclic for the pilots and the floor switch for the SO. Pilots only can also talk to each other externally over

GUARD. If the AC power fails, the pilot will automatically be connected to UHF--1 via the backup UHF radio control

panel. In this case, the ATO will have no internal or external communication capability. CSCG/ACP failure modes

are covered in Figure 15-4.

Up to 20 channels (1 to 20)can bepreset fordirect tuning by channel selection on either radio. An additional channel

(00) is available for independent frequency selection on either radio. Once channels are preset, the preset frequencies

remain stored after power is removed from the unit.

The two UHF radios can be used to relay secure or clear voice UHF communication between two stations. Secure

data link cannot be relayed. If secure--voice relay transmissions or monitoring by the flightcrew are required, the

SECURE switch on the COMM CONTR panel must be in either ON position. A correctly keyed appropriate

wideband speech security set must be installed. Secure voice relay without monitoring or transmitting capability may

be conducted without a wideband security set installed. The system will allow simultaneous clear and secure transmissions

by the flightcrew. The selected UHF radio may be used by the flightcrew in secure voice while the other radio will be

available in clear voice mode.

Note

The KY--58 will not pass guard relay or transmission.

There are two UHF antennas on the helicopter. Using a switch on the panel, the operator may select either UHF--1

or UHF--2 to operate with the top antenna. The otheris selected automatically to use thebottom antenna. In theevent

of communication difficulty using the top antenna, the operator may attempt to correct the problem by switching the

communicating unit to the bottom antenna.

The data handling system automatically selects whichever UHF radio is connected to the bottom antenna for

command activated sonobuoy command transmission. To provide this capability, the CSCG must be in AUTO and

the UHF connected to the bottom antenna must not be in SECURE, G T/R, or UHF BKUP. The data handling system

will momentarily cancel the ADF mode, relay mode, or T/R UHF transmissions in order to send its sonobuoy

commands.

15.1.5.1.1 UHF Backup

In the event of COMM CONTR panel failure, the UHF--1 radio can be operated directly from the backup UHF radio

control panel (Figure 15-5). Place the XMTR SEL switch on the pilot radio control panel (Figure 15-3) to the UHF

BKUP position.

15-17

ORIGINAL

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

MODE

UHF-1

UHF-2

ADF

OTPI

IFF

ICS

Pilot RSC BKUP

Pilot control via

ATO — Full

UHF-2 only

Yes

selected

backup control

control SO &

(Note 9)

(Notes 1, 3)

panel, bottom

OBS-T/R control

ANT

ATO RSC BKUP

Pilot — Full

ATO — Guard

UHF-1 only

Yes

selected

control SO and

T/R fixed volume

(Notes 1, 4)

OBS-T/R control

TOP ANT

Loss of ACP PRI

Pilot control via

ATO — Guard

Call only

PWR (NO. 1 AC

backup control

T/R fixed volume

PRI BUS) (Notes

panel, bottom

TOP ANT

2, 5)

ANT

Loss of ACP/CI

Bottom ANT only

TOP ANT only

Yes

DC PWR (NO. 2

DC PRI BUS)

(Note 6)

Loss of UHF R/T

Yes

UHF-2 only

Yes

PWR (DC ESS

BUS) (Note 7)

(NO. 2 DC PRI

Yes

UHF-1 only

Yes

BUS) (Note 8)

Notes:

1. Selection of UHF BKUP mode on RSC precludes all other transmit control functions.

2. BKUP mode must be selected on RSC.

3. UHF-1 FREQ and CHAN display blanks, UHF or UHF/VHF backup control energizes.

4. UHF-2 FREQ and CHAN display blanks.

5. CI panel blanks, call function powered via AC ESS BUS.

6. No CI ‘Zero Code’ function.

7. Zeros on UHF-1 FREQ display for DC ESS BUS.

8. Zeros on UHF-2 FREQ display for DC PRI BUS.

9. If the CSCG ICS function is completely lost, crew intercom can be achieved by using UHF or UHF/VHF

radio side tones. All stations must select the same UHF transmit function on RSC and then use radio

PTT switch for intercom.

Figure 15-4. CSCG Failure Matrix

15.1.5.2 UHF/VHF Radios, AN/ARC-182

The AN/ARC--182 UHF/VHF transceivers operate in the following frequency ranges: from 30.000 through

87.975 MHz FM, 108.000 through 117.975 MHz AM (receive only, VOR), 118.000 through 155.975 MHz AM,

156.000 through 173.975 MHz FM, and 225.000 to 399.975 MHz AM/FM (FM for data transmissions or limited

voice). Figure 15-6 illustrates these operating ranges and guard frequencies.

Note

UHF/VHF transmitter power reduction, down to 2 watts, may occur with high

radio temperatures or if the transmitter is keyed continuously for longer than

1 m inute.

ORIGINAL

15-18

A1-H60BB-NFM-000

Note

ARC--182 UHF/VHF radio sets are installed on BuNo 162991 and

subsequent aircraft. For aircraft equipped with ARC--159 radio sets, refer

to paragraph 15.1.5.1.

In addition, each unit is provided with a separate guard receiver that will receive voice transmissions on the standard

emergency frequency corresponding to each frequency band; that is, 40.5 MHz, 121.5 MHz, 156.8 MHz, and

243.0 MHz. If G T/R is on, the ARC--182 radio set will tune the guard frequency of the frequency band in operation.

The UHF/VHF transceivers have a line--of--sight range.

A minimum of propagation problems will be experienced if the receiver/transmitter is used as follows: 30 to 87.975 MHz

band for close in, air--to--ground communications up to 60 miles distance; 108 to 155.975 MHz band for air traffic control

up to 120 miles from the ground station; 155.975 to 173.975 MHz maritime band for communications up to 120 miles

from the ground station; and 225 to 399.975 MHz band for communications up to 120 miles from the ground station.

Distances up to 300 miles may be achieved in air--to--air communications with frequencies above 117.975 MHz.

External sources of RF may interfere with ARC--182 operations. In addition, the receiver/transmitter may cause

interference with the installed mission equipment.

Operations within 5 nm of commercial radio and TV broadcast stations can

cause white noise or music interference, which degrades radio reception in the

30.0

173.975 MHz frequency bands. Interference from commercial

broadcast stations can suddenly render two--way radio communications in the

VHF--AM aviation band (108.0 to 155.975 MHz) completely unusable,

causing loss of two--way radio communications. During actual IMC

approaches, pilots shall use UHF--AM frequencies to the maximum extent

practical for primary or backup communications with ground controlling

agencies.

Note

Low VHF band reception can be improved by deselecting guard (G REC —

OFF). This helps eliminate undesired signals from the guard receiver being

mixed with desired signals from the main receiver.

ADF and OTPI interference will be characterized by false or erroneous bearing indications or needle fluctuations.

Active sonobuoy interference will be characterized by display zone noise up to and including complete obliteration

of target return. Observe the following frequency separations for optimum performance:

1. ADF — 10 MHz separation.

2. OTPI and active sonobuoy radio frequencies — 5 MHz separation.

a. Sonobuoy radio frequencies can be found in the ASW Tactical Pocket Guide (NTTP 3--22.5--ASW).

Note

Upper antenna utilization, for communications, is recommended while using

the OTPI.

15-19

ORIGINAL

SH-60B HELICOPTER. FLIGHT MANUAL (2008) - page 10