Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is responsible for

the training, personnel, doctrine and policy to support Army Special Operations Forces, or ARSOF.

SWCS serves as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, proponent for all matters

pertaining to individual training, develops doctrine and all related individual and collective training

material, provides leader development, develops and maintains the proponent training programs

and systems, and provides entry-level and advanced individual training and education for Civil

Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces. SWCS, a component subordinate command of

USASOC, constitutes the training center and institution of ARSOF.

The Directorate of Special Operations Proponency has the responsibility for managing the

careers of all Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers from the time

they enter one of the career fields until they leave.

The SWCS’ Directorate of Training and Doctrine develops all Army special-operations doctrine

and works with the field and trainers at SWCS to develop all courses and training programs. The SWCS

has some of the most up-to-date doctrine in the Army, with 30 field manuals and other doctrinal

publications being revised or written at any given time.

The Directorate of Special Operations Education serves as the USAJFKSWCS adviser for education issues.

It provides training and education opportunities that enable the USAJFKSWCS staff and faculty to perform as

flexible, adaptive ARSOF leaders and trainers. Key in the training of special-operations forces is language and

culture training, which falls under the auspices of the Directorate of Special Operations Education.

The Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center is responsible for all U.S. military special-opera-

tions forces combat medical training including Army Rangers, Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Navy SEALs.

Advanced education for Army special-operations Soldiers is provided through the Noncom-

missioned Officer Academy and the Warrant Officer Institute. The NCO Academy prepares enlisted

Soldiers for leadership positions in all ARSOF including Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and

Special Forces. Soldiers receive training in leadership skills, military studies, resource management,

effective communication, operations and intelligence, unconventional warfare, operational plan-

ning, psychological operations, civil-military operations and advanced military occupational skills.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute educates and trains warrant officer candidates,

newly appointed warrant officers, and senior warrant officers at key points in their career in order

to provide the force with competent combat leaders and planners.

The Center and School’s Training Group, consisting of five battalions, conducts the complete

spectrum of special-operations training from the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

advanced individual training to CA, PO, and the SF Qualification Course.

The Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center anticipates the future environ-

ment, threats, and requirements for the ARSOF, and to look at what can be done today to prepare

for tomorrow’s issues. The center validates concepts through experimentation, war-gaming and

formulates the impact on proposed ARSOF futures capabilities and operational architectures.

The International Military Student Office is responsible for the oversight of international

students who attend any one of many courses offered by the SWCS.

The Center and School conducts more than 44 different courses and trains more than

14,000 students annually. Since 1963, SWCS has led the way in creating the world’s finest

special operations forces.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Direc-

tor, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare

Center and School, 3206 Ardennes St., Fort Bragg, N.C. 28310. Copies of this publica-

tion may be obtained by calling SWCS at 910-432-5703. Electronic versions of this

publication can be found at www.arsofu.army.mil.

The Special Warfare Professional Development Publication Office is currently

accepting works relevant to Army special operations for potential publication. For

more information, please contact Mr. Jerry Steelman or Mrs. Janice Burton, Special

Warfare at 910-432-5703 or Steelman@soc.mil or Burtonj@soc.mil.

This work has been cleared for public release, distribution is unlimited.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Foreword

At the end of World War II, the Army developed the concept of unconventional

warfare, or UW, based largely on the experiences of

Soldiers who had worked with resistance move-

ments during the war. The concept was formally

introduced into doctrine in 1955, specifically to

convey a wider responsibility than simply working

alongside guerrilla forces. UW is currently defined

as activities conducted to enable a resistance move-

ment or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow

a government or occupying power by operating

through or with an underground, auxiliary or guer-

rilla force in a denied area. From the beginning, UW

has been a mission of Special Forces, and the JFK

Special Warfare Center and School has been the

proponent for UW training and doctrine.

Our operating environment has been less constant since the 1950s, however. We

no longer face the threat of major combat operations, as during World War II. The

dominant form of warfare that now confronts the United States and will likely do

so for the remainder of the 21st century is irregular warfare. The five components

of irregular warfare — counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability opera-

tions, counterinsurgency and UW — will increasingly involve all elements of the

U.S. military and other elements of national power. UW thus presents a challenge to

conventional forces and special-operations forces alike.

This paper, although it is not doctrine, is intended to introduce a new generation

of Soldiers to the concept, the history and the techniques of UW. It is intended to be

the first in a series of papers published to inform readers and provoke thought on a

number of topics that are of interest to members of the special-operations commu-

nity and, in some cases, general-purpose forces as well.

Major General Thomas Csrnko

Commander

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic is assigned to the U.S. Special Operations

Command Central. His previous assignment was as the director of the USASOC G3X

Special Program Division. Other assignments include Director of the President’s

Emergency Operations Center, White House Military Office. He was formerly chief

of the Special Forces Doctrine Branch, SF Doctrine Division, in the U.S. Army John F.

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

His other SF assignments include service with the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group,

as commander of SF detachments 016 and 032; small-group instructor for the offi-

cer portion of the Special Forces Qualification Course; company commander and S3,

3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; and commander, Company A, 4th Battalion, 1st Special

Warfare Training Group. Lieutenant Colonel Grdovic holds a bachelor’s degree from

SUNY Cortland University and a master’s degree from King’s College London.

In 2002, Grdovic was one of the main architects of the UW campaign plan for

Northern Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2003, he infiltrated northern

Iraq prior to the start of the invasion in order to link-up with the leadership of the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and synchronize the Kurdish efforts. In 2007-

2008, he served as the CJSOTF-AP LNO to Multi- National Force Iraq (MNF-I).

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, far right, was one of the main architects of the UW campaign

plan for Northern Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Understanding Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare, or UW, is defined as activities conducted to enable a

resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying

power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and

guerrilla force in a denied area. Inherent in this type of operation are the inter-relat-

ed lines of operation of armed conflict and subversion. The concept is perhaps best

understood when thought of as a means to significantly degrade an adversary’s ca-

pabilities, by promoting insurrection or resistance within his area of control, thereby

making him more vulnerable to a conventional military attack or more susceptible

to political coercion. “UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance

movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to

organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying

power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these sup-

ported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S.

national security objectives.” ¹

In many regards UW is a unique and appropriately unpublicized category of

[instability] operations that complements the Army’s full-spectrum operations

consisting of offense, defense and stability operations. The successful conduct of UW

can significantly contribute to a conventional military campaign or even provide an

alternative option when the application of conventional military power is not appro-

priate. However, conducting UW is not applicable to all situations, environments or

adversaries. The promotion of instability into an environment is not always beneficial

to the long-term strategy for a region. There are certain prerequisite conditions that

must be present in order for a UW effort to be successful. These conditions (some-

times referred to as the UW potential) cannot be artificially manufactured if they do

not exist within the environment. When viewed in this context, the potential strategic

and operational value, as well as the potential risks, becomes more apparent.

While many of the tactics and techniques utilized within the conduct of UW have

significant application and value in other types of special operations, many of these

techniques, such as sabotage or intelligence collection, are not exclusive to UW, and

subsequently should not be categorized as such when conducted as part of other

special operations. Similarly, the technique of utilizing indigenous forces or sur-

rogates is a methodology applicable to any type of special operation. In 1943, the

Allied Forces enlisted the assistance of the Norwegian Resistance to aid the Special

Operations Executive (SOE) in their sabotage mission to destroy the Nazi’s heavy-

water facility in Norway. In 1998, selected elements from Afghanistan’s Northern Al-

liance were employed to assist U.S. special operatives in capturing Osama bin Laden.

While both of these examples represent the employment of indigenous irregular

forces in special operations, they are more accurately direct action and counterter-

rorism rather than UW. Operations are more clearly categorized by what they intend

to achieve rather than by individual techniques or who is conducting them.

Like all strategic capabilities, the value of UW is not measured by its frequency of

employment, but by its potential effects. It should also be noted that UW represents

only one of several types of special operations listed as U.S. Special Operations Com-

mand’s responsibilities within Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

The Conduct of UW

Enabling a resistance movement or insurgency entails the development of guer-

rilla forces and an underground, both with their own supporting auxiliaries. The

end result comes from the combined effects of “armed conflict,” conducted predomi-

nantly by the guerrillas, and “subversion,” conducted predominantly by the under-

ground. The armed conflict, normally in the form of guerrilla warfare, reduces the

host-nation’s security apparatus and subsequent control over the population. The

subversion undermines the government’s or occupier’s power by portraying them as

illegitimate and incapable of effective governance in the eyes of the population.

In order for an adversary to be susceptible to the effects of insurgency or resis-

tance, he must have some overt infrastructure and legitimacy that are vulnerable

to attacks (physical or psychological). In this respect the “target recipient” does not

have to be a state government, but it does have to possess state-like characteristics

(e.g. the elements of national power), such as those similar to an occupying mili-

tary force exercising authority through martial law. It is not uncommon for military

planners to overfocus on the quantifiable aspects related to the more familiar armed

conflict and underfocus on the somewhat less quantifiable and less familiar aspects

of subversion.

While different insurgencies are unique to their own strategy and environment,

U.S. Army Special Forces has long utilized a doctrinal construct that serves as an

extremely useful frame of reference for describing the actual configuration of a resis-

tance movement or insurgency. This construct depicts three components common to

insurgencies: the guerrillas, the underground and the auxiliary. Without an under-

standing and appreciation for the various components (guerrillas, underground and

auxiliary) and their relation to each other, it would be difficult to comprehend the

whole of the organization based solely on what is seen. In this regard, insurgencies

are sometimes compared to icebergs, with a distinct portion above the surface (the

guerrillas) and a much larger portion concealed below the surface (the underground

and auxiliary).

The Guerrillas

Guerrillas are the overt military component of a resistance movement or insur-

gency. As the element that will engage the enemy in combat operations, the guerrilla

is at a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment and fire power. For all

his disadvantages, he has one advantage that can offset this unfavorable balance…the

initiative. In all his endeavors, the guerrilla commander must strive to maintain and

protect this advantage. The guerrilla only attacks the enemy when he can generate a

relative (albeit temporary) state of superiority. The guerrilla commander must avoid

decisive engagements, thereby denying the enemy the opportunity to recover and

regain their actual superiority and bring it to bear against his guerrilla force. The

guerrilla force is only able to generate and maintain this advantage in areas where

they have significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection with the local

population that allows them to harness clandestine support.

A guerrilla force needs a base in order to rest, train, prepare and refit. The

degree of sophistication of the guerrilla bases is proportional to the guerrillas’

ability to establish an early-warning system (which includes support from the local

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

population), the capability of the enemy counterguerrilla forces and the difficulty of

the terrain. Bases need to be mobile enough to move if the supporting early-warning

networks indicate the approach of a superior enemy force. The guerrilla also needs

the ability to acquire, store and distribute large quantities of supplies without the

benefit of standard lines of supply and communication. This is achieved through

a decentralized network of caches across a wide area instead of maintaining large

centralized stockpiles. This minimizes the loss of material if a base has to displace

or is destroyed. It also allows the guerrillas to conduct operations across a wide area

without a long logistics trail.

The guerrilla leader needs to communicate with other guerrilla bands, his

auxiliary and possibly the “shadow government” residing inside the country or the

resistance movement leadership or displaced government “in exile” residing outside

the country, all within an area where the enemy forces are always actively looking

and listening for any indicators that would compromise the location of his forces

or supporting mechanism. The smaller the force, the less power the guerrillas can

project. The larger the force, the more challenging it is to sustain the force without it

becoming compromised. One of the greatest dangers to a guerrilla force is growing

too quickly or beyond its means.

Depending on the degree of control over the local environment, the size of guer-

rilla elements can range anywhere from squad- to brigade-size groups. In the early

stages of an insurgency, the guerrilla force’s offensive capability might be limited

only to small stand-off attacks. As the guerrilla force’s base of support from the

population grows, so does its ability to openly challenge government security forces

with large-scale attacks. At some point in an insurgency or resistance movement,

the guerrillas may achieve a degree of parity with the host-nation forces in certain

areas. In these cases, units may start fighting more openly, sometimes referred to as

partisans, rather than as guerrilla bands. In well-developed insurgencies, formerly

isolated pockets of resistance activity may eventually connect and create liberated

territories, possibly even linking with a friendly or sympathetic border state.

It is important to use the term “guerrilla” accurately in order to distinguish

between other types of irregular forces that might appear similar, but are in fact

something entirely different, such as militias, mercenaries or criminal gangs. The

Department of Defense definition defines a guerrilla as someone who engages

in guerrilla warfare. This is somewhat oversimplified, in that guerrilla warfare is

generally considered a tactic that can be utilized by any force (regular or irregular).

True guerrilla forces normally only exist, for an extended period of time, as part of a

broader resistance movement or insurgency.

Counterinsurgency forces may utilize indigenous militias or intelligence net-

works that in many ways resemble parts of a resistance force. While these forces

are “guerrilla-like,” they operate in a much less restrictive environment than actual

guerrillas and undergrounds. They are still part of the host-nation forces, and are

employed in support of the goals of the governing authority or state.

The Underground

The underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement or

insurgency that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the control of the local security forces. The

underground can function in these areas because it operates in a clandestine man-

ner, resulting in its members not being afforded legal belligerent status under any

international conventions.

Examples of these functions include:

• Intelligence and counterintelligence networks

• Subversive radio stations

• Propaganda networks that control newspaper/leaflet print shops and or Web pages

• Special material fabrication (false identification, explosives, weapons, munitions)

• Control of networks for moving personnel and logistics

• Acts of sabotage (in urban centers)

• Clandestine medical facilities

Underground members are normally not active members of the community

and their service is not a product of their normal life or position within the com-

munity. They operate by maintaining compartmentalization and having their aux-

iliary workers assume most of the risk. The functions of the underground largely

enable the resistance movement to impact the urban areas.

The Auxiliary

The auxiliary refers to that portion of the population that is providing active

support to the guerrilla force or the underground. Members of the auxiliary are

part-time volunteers who have value due to their normal position in the community.

The auxiliary should not be thought of as a separate organization, but rather as a

different type of individual providing specific functions as a component within an

urban underground network or guerrilla force’s network. These functions can take

the form of logistics, labor or intelligence collection.

Auxiliary members may or may not know any more than how to perform

their specific function or service in support of the network or component of

the organization. In many ways, auxiliary personnel assume the greatest risk

and are the most expendable element within the insurgency. These functions

are sometimes used to test a recruit’s loyalty prior to his exposure to other

parts of the organization. The functions of the auxiliary can be likened to

embryonic fluid that forms a protective layer, keeping the underground and

guerrilla force alive.

Specific functions include:

• Logistics procurement (all classes of supply)

• Logistics distribution (all classes of supply)

• Labor for special material fabrication (false identification, improvised explo-

sives, weapons, munitions)

• Security and early warning for the underground facilities and guerrilla bases

• Intelligence collection

• Recruitment of new members

• Couriers and messengers as part of a communications network

• Distribution of propaganda material

• Managing safe houses

• Transportation for logistics and personnel

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Resistance Force Commands

Resistance force headquarters are traditionally referred to in U.S. Special Forces

doctrine as area commands. If an area command is divided into subordinate units,

these are referred to as sector commands. These terms are important in that they

refer to a region more than a unit’s size. These commands control all forces of the

resistance within their areas of responsibility, to include the guerrillas and the

underground, and are subsequently responsible for all functions of the organization.

This enables these groups to operate in a self-sufficient and decentralized manner.

In addition to the regional commands, the whole of the insurgency may receive guid-

ance from a single body of leadership. If this body exists within the resistance area,

it is referred to as the shadow government. It can reside within the guerrilla force or

the underground. If a body of leadership resides outside the country, it is referred to

as the government-in-exile.

How the Environment Shapes the Structure of an Insurgency

The environment significantly affects the structure or operational design of an

insurgency. In some cases, the structure can be mistaken or mislabeled as a strategy.

Planners and advisers need to have an appreciation for this difference, otherwise the

plan for support and advice rendered may prove inadequate or insufficient.

The following excerpt from the unclassified 1989 RAND study, The Nicaraguan

Resistance and U.S. Policy, highlights this exact problem with that particular cam-

paign effort. “The resistance’s lack of authenticity as an indigenous insurgency and

the Contras’ extreme dependence on U.S. support were deprecated even by partici-

pants who otherwise generally favored active U.S. support to anti-communist insur-

gencies. The resistance has always been structured (inappropriately) as a force with

short-term, purely military objectives. The U.S. effort to assist the Contras in Nicara-

gua was obviously handicapped by a lack of expertise on how to effectively organize

and prosecute an insurgency. The United States erred particularly in structuring the

Contras as a conventional raiding force that depended heavily on outside resupply.”

Understanding why one pattern works well in a given environment, but may not

work in a different one, is the key to avoiding template-like solutions to complex and

unique problems. Fundamental to the successful development of a UW strategy is

a comprehensive understanding of how insurgencies function. According to a 1995

RAND study, The Urbanization of Insurgency, most successful insurgencies have been

able to generate and maintain a rural and urban capability. In the 1966 DA PAM 550-

104 Human Factors Considerations in Undergrounds and Insurgencies, a comparison

of 24 case studies placed the average ratio between rural guerrillas and urban cell

members at 1 guerrilla to 9 underground/auxiliary members. In agrarian based cul-

tures, this gave the insurgency control over the rural areas, including the numerous

small villages contained within and influence in the major cities. While this degree

of balance is a desirable structure for a developing insurgency, the fact remains that

certain environments do not support this design.

The significant rise in urbanization in the last 60 years has promulgated a

change in modern insurgent strategies, increasing the importance of the urban

aspects. This places as much if not more emphasis on the development of the un-

derground as compared to the traditional guerrilla bands. In these cases, the ratio of

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

rural guerrilla to urban cell member may become as high as 1 to 30 underground/

auxiliary members. This should not be interpreted as an advantage as much as a

challenge. Without a rural capability, the ability of an insurgency to execute large-

scale attacks is greatly limited, thereby limiting the overall ability to challenge the

host-nation security apparatus. While urban insurgencies can certainly coordinate

and conduct dramatic small-scale attacks, such as bombings and stand-off rocket

The Auxiliary

The Guerrilla

Force

The Underground

The Auxillary

Figure 1. The traditional ratio of guerrillas to underground/auxiliary members

attacks, the psychological impact of guerrillas overrunning a host-nation police or

military outpost is a significant demonstration of power to a population.

In rare cases, where the operational environment is particularly remote and

devoid of a significant population, it may be possible for guerrillas to function almost

independently of an over arching resistance movement or insurgency. However, this

is more the exception than the rule, and this seemingly more familiar military-like

structure should not automatically be used as a template for other cases.

The Guerrilla Force

The Underground

Figure 2. An example of an insurgency almost completely comprised of a guerrilla force

Phases of an Insurgency

There are various steps or phases that insurgencies traditionally progress

through during their development. Without an appreciation for these steps, military

planners can have unrealistic expectations for the time required to develop and em-

ploy a guerrilla offensive capability. The following six steps are intended to serve as

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

an example of how an insurgency may develop, with a specific focus on the prepara-

tions prior to the establishment of a guerrilla capability. These steps should not be

confused with the phases of U.S. support to a resistance movement or insurgency,

which will be addressed later in this document. The material below is largely de-

rived from a 1961 document, A Basic Doctrine for the Conduct of UW, written by OSS

and CIA veteran Frank Lindsay.²

The development of organized resistance in a territory must follow a carefully

planned sequence of steps, each of which must be completed successfully before the

following step can be safely taken.

1. Organization of clandestine networks. The first essential is to be able to move resis-

tance organizers and propaganda material into the territory; support them clandes-

tinely, and provide for continuing communications with adjoining resistance bases.

These networks also pave the way for later active resistance by developing active

support from a significant part of the total population.

2. Organization of intelligence and counterintelligence networks. No resistance

organization can operate successfully unless it is fully protected by a deep intelligence

screen. Equally, it is necessary to establish effective counterintelligence nets to verify

every participant’s loyalty to the movement and, through penetrations into the enemy

security services, to identify those who are acting as double agents.

3. Organization of local area commands in areas of favorable terrain. Such area com-

mands will be the forerunners of later fully-armed guerrilla units, and will provide the

transition between the entirely clandestine civilian organization and the mobile armed

guerrilla force living in forests and other inaccessible areas. These commands will be

given full responsibility for the organization of their geographical areas, including the

organization of supplies, intelligence, propaganda and communications. As the area

commands continue to develop, they may further subdivide the area into subordinate

sector commands. These sector commands will carry the brunt of attacks against en-

emy installations and forces, while drawing support from the area commands.

4. The development of direct communications with the outside. At approximately this

point in the development of resistance in the area, direct communication with the

outside world can be established, although it may be established in some cases at an

earlier stage.

5. Gradual development of free territory in the hinterlands. As the fighting units further

develop in strength, it will be possible to establish relatively large areas that are nor-

mally free of any enemy troops and all enemy controls over the civil population. At this

point, these “liberated” territories can begin to prepare and organize to replace the

enemy structure on the completion of the conflict.

The principal danger at this stage is that the resistance leadership will become

overconfident and will become too quickly adjusted to the relative tranquility of life

in territories from which the enemy has been expelled. If this occurs, the resistance

movement will likely suffer serious setbacks as a result of violent enemy counterat-

tacks for which it will find itself unprepared.

A second major danger at this stage is the over-recruitment of guerrilla forces. It

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

will be a natural tendency on the part of a previously uncommitted civilian popula-

tion, seeing the apparent success of the resistance forces, to attempt to join the resis-

tance as its final success appears assured. There will also be a tendency on the part

of guerrilla leadership to accept all recruits in order to deny them to the enemy, and

to incorporate them into the organized structure of the resistance. This can cause

serious losses as there is a maximum strength of resistance forces that any particu-

lar territory can absorb and provide with room for dispersal. Guerrilla forces in

excess of this upper ceiling will contribute little to the fighting strength, and become

a heavy burden on the command for supply and for protection in the event of strong

enemy attack.

6. Final consolidation of formerly separated liberated areas. It is at this point that the

former clandestine area commands transform into the overt governing authority.

U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine addresses phases of an insurgency as a con-

struct for describing the current state of an insurgency in a very precise manner.

These doctrinal phases are the latent incipient phase, the guerrilla warfare phase

and the war of movement phase. While the previously mentioned six steps are

somewhat more detailed than this doctrinal three-phase model, Steps 1-4 essentially

represent the latent incipient phase, Step 5 represents the guerrilla warfare phase

and Step 6 represents the war of movement phase.

The Development of a Resistance Movement Following an Invasion

During the aftermath of an invasion, pockets of potential resistance normally

form out of groups that either deliberately went into hiding or have inadvertently

become isolated from the main society by the invading forces. The structure and or-

ganization of these groups will likely be very ad-hoc and disconnected, as compared

to an insurgency that has developed over a decade due to dissatisfaction with the

status quo of the state. These forces have not had the benefit of time to develop their

plan or seek the skills required to resist. In this situation the value of understanding

the normal progression of an insurgency becomes more evident. When assessing a

situation or developing a plan to support a given group, planners and advisers must

be able to recognize when steps have not taken place or have taken place in a less

than effective manner.

Personnel who migrate toward the resistance are often individuals who feel they

have the requisite skills to resist. Many occupations have significant experiences that

translate well into resistance. Active and retired military, police and hunters have

the skills needed to function as guerrillas. Business connections, religious institu-

tions and community organizations can form the basis for a network. Although

not formally trained, criminal elements are very familiar with techniques such as

operating through compartmentalized networks and countersurveillance. The chal-

lenge these groups will face is in adapting their existing skills to the new unfamiliar

environment and against an organization not bound by the rules of the former state.

They will have to adapt while applying these skills during an unforgiving period of

trial and error.

These forces are likely to experience a sense of isolation that will impact their

psyche and decision making. The enemy will attempt to portray their situation as

hopeless and futile and possibly offer a viable alternative to rejoin the new society.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Personnel not prepared for the stress associated with life as a resistance member

are very susceptible to “giving up.” It is exactly at this point, while allied forces, in

conjunction with the government in exile slowly develop a plan to reclaim the lost

territory, that a message must be sent to the population now living in occupied ter-

ritory; “Do not lose faith. You have not been forgotten. Your government still exists.

Help is on the way!”

If these pockets can survive long enough to establish supporting clandestine

infrastructure and coordinate their efforts with other dislocated pockets, they

might be able to transform into an actual resistance movement. It is the enemy’s

challenge to consolidate control and eliminate these pockets before they mature.

External sponsorship, particularly in the form of professional assistance (in the form

of trainers and advisers) and critical logistics can serve as the catalyst that ignites a

smoldering resistance potential into an actual capability.

How the U.S. Military Conducts UW

U.S. support to an insurgency can be categorized as one of two types of campaign ef-

forts: as part of general war scenarios and limited war scenarios. When a UW campaign

is conducted in support of an eventual conventional invasion as part of a general war

scenario, the objectives and goals focus primarily on operational and tactical military ob-

jectives. When a campaign is conducted in support of a limited war scenario (not overtly

involving U.S. forces), the objectives take on a more strategic political and psychological

nature that normally outweighs the operational and tactical military objectives.

UW In Support of General War

The purpose of this type of operation is normally:

• To facilitate the eventual introduction of conventional allied forces.

• To divert enemy resources away from other areas of the battlefield.

The normal phases for U.S. support for this type of operation are below in Figure

3. The progression of these phases with the operational signature is depicted in the

graph below (Figure 4).

Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include:

• The OSS in the European theaters

• U.S./Filipino resistance (1942-45)

• North Korea (1951-53)

• Cold-War contingency plans for Europe (1952-1989)

• Kuwait (1990-91) (aborted)

• Afghanistan (2001-2002)

• Northern Iraq (2003)

During these types of operations, the resistance forces can assume a greater

degree of risk by exposing nearly all its infrastructure based on the expectation of

success and link-up with coalition invasion forces (Fig. 4). If the intent of the UW

operations is to develop an area in order to facilitate the entry of an invasion force,

the challenge is to ensure that the resistance operations complement rather than

inadvertently interfere with or even compromise those of the invasion forces. If the

timing is wrong or the conventional invasion forces fail to liberate the territory and

link up with resistance forces, it is likely that the resistance organization (guerrillas,

underground and auxiliary personnel) will suffer significant losses.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Figure 3. The seven phases of U.S. sponsorship for UW

In this scenario, UW planners should not know the specific date of D-Day (if it is

even known at the time of planning for support to resistance forces). At some point

these personnel may be infiltrating into enemy territory. This type of information is

far too sensitive to be known by personnel in these positions due to their potential

to become captured and subsequently jeopardize the entire invasion. UW plan-

ners need to know parameters that would allow them to plan accordingly without

compromising the pending invasion details. An example of this could be “no earlier

than 120 days after C-day (C+120) a capability to disrupt the enemy in sector XXXXX

must be in place and ready for activation. BPT to sustain combat operations for 30

days after the commencement of open hostilities by the U.S. ground forces.” This does

not imply that D-Day is C-Day +120 but rather that a window for when D-Day could

occur begins at C+120.

Additionally, an agreement must be reached between the UW headquarters,

or HQ, and the conventional HQ regarding how the UW force will be notified of the

commencement of D-day. This is critical in order for the U.S. advisers and/or the

resistance force to be able to alert and mobilize their operational forces. These

forces have planned numerous compartmentalized operations, ranging from guer-

rilla attacks, sabotage, reception of conventional forces and deception. Many of these

elements have been standing by waiting for an initiation signal. They may require

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

The Risk Threshold

for Exposure of Resistance

Infrastructure

Combat

Operatons

Build-Up

 D-day

Time

Figure 4. The phases of U.S. sponsorship in support of a conventional allied invasion

a period of darkness to alert, assemble force and materials and move into position

prior to execution. An example of how this might be written in an order could be

“execute operations (the specific type TBD by you once on the ground) to disrupt the

enemy at H-hour, D day to D+2. You will be notified 24 hrs in advance of the required

effects.” Needless to say, the need to balance operational security and still achieve

synchronization is particularly challenging, especially if both sides are unaware of

these challenges and have never practiced this previously.

Wide-scale resistance operations are not well suited for main battle areas. They

are more effective along the flanks and rear of the enemy area. With this in mind,

resistance forces can perform considerable supporting operations that range from

intelligence collection, reception for conventional advance airborne and amphibious

forces such as pathfinders and scout swimmers, deception operations, sabotage and

limited interdiction.

If the intent of this type of UW effort is to compel an adversary to commit his

forces to another part of the battlefield away from the proposed invasion area this

is reasonably simple with a few exceptions. The challenge in this scenario is “Which

resistance actions will trigger the desired responses? “How much is enough?” and

“When to begin combat operations to appropriately affect the adversary’s decision

cycle?” If these operations are not coordinated with the invasion force or if they are

timed incorrectly they can have significant unintended negative consequences. It is not

difficult to imagine unintentionally causing a negative effect by damaging a bridge in-

tended for later use by the allied invasion force, or alerting an enemy with a premature

spike of resistance activity too far in advance of an invasion.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

If guerrillas start to achieve a degree of parity with the host-nation forces, par-

ticularly if overt U.S. support in the form of Special Forces advisers becomes permis-

sible, their tactics may change to allow them to fight as partisan units, rather than

as guerrilla bands waging guerrilla warfare. U.S. advisers need to be careful that this

transformation does not occur prematurely and inadvertently draw their respective

guerrilla units into a decisive engagement that they are not prepared for largely due

to the belief that close air support will make up for other deficiencies. Planners should

not become fixated on only using the resistance force as security for the U.S. advisers

in order to provide terminal guidance for air interdiction missions. While this is a vi-

able application, when fully developed and employed, the capabilities of the resistance

forces can have a much broader physical and psychological impact on the enemy.

It is the responsibility of U.S. Special Forces personnel to ensure a successful

link-up between conventional forces and the resistance forces in order to prevent

fratricide and facilitate a rapid advance of the invasion forces. Once this occurs,

Special Forces personnel will be in a position to focus and coordinate the return to

normalcy in the urban centers through the resistance force’s temporary facilitation

of basic civil infrastructure and governance roles.

Following successful link-up with the conventional forces, they can perform a

host of manpower-intensive security tasks, particularly in the rear and flank areas

away from the front lines. During the Normandy invasions, resistance forces sabo-

taged rail cars intended to deliver German armor units to the beachhead, and at-

tacked hundreds of small targets ranging from attacks on logistics facilities, check

points, lines of communication and leadership. Their networks actively recovered

downed air crews and transported them to safety until they could be returned to

advancing allied units. Following the invasion, they were immediately integrated

into local security functions.

UW in Support of Limited War

The purpose for this type of operation is usually to apply pressure against an

adversary of the United States. If U.S. adviser participation is permissible this type

of campaign could also be conducted with the seven-phase model. However, if direct

U.S. advisers’ involvement is limited to a training and advisory role from across a

friendly border, the traditional phases are adjusted. In place of Phase 3 (Infiltration),

indigenous personnel are removed from the occupied territory, receive training

and are reinserted back into the operational area (possibly to serve as cadre). (The

reader should be aware that this nine-phase model is not doctrine as opposed to the

seven-phase model.) The nine-phase model is:

• Preparation

• Initial contact with resistance force representatives

• Removal of selected indigenous personnel from the operational area

• Training for selected indigenous personnel

• Reintroduction of indigenous personnel into the operational area

• Organization of the resistance forces

• Build-up of resistance force capability

• Sustained combat operations

• Transition to normalcy

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

Without the introduction of conventional invasion forces, the nature of pro-

tracted combat operations is very different from the seven-phase model mentioned

previously. The insurgency must consider the acceptable level of exposure of their

organization in relation to the enemy’s willingness and ability to retaliate. The insur-

gents must ensure they retain the initiative at all times and never expose too much

of the organization. These types of operations are highly sensitive and normally

conducted with a relatively small U.S. footprint, often in theaters that do not have a

higher joint task force.

With this type of effort, it is likely that the level of involvement by U.S. advisers in

denied territory will be limited due to the political risk involved. In these instances

the U.S. advisers’ level of influence over the insurgent group’s action will be less than

if they were participating alongside the resistance forces in combat operations (like

in the seven-phase model). For this reason, it is particularly critical that the ideologi-

cal goals of the U.S. and the group receiving support must be aligned. If this is not

the case, the relationship will prove unproductive in the long term. It is critical not

to overfocus on short-term tactical objectives at the expense of long-term impact on

the region.

The normal progression of the phases with the operational signature is depicted

in the graph below (Figure 5).

Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include:

• OSS in the Asian/Pacific theaters (1943-1945)

• The Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) (1950s)

• Guatemala (1954)

• Albania (1949-54)

• Tibet (1955-61)

Combat

Operatons

Build-Up

No D-day

Time

Figure 5. The phases of U.S. sponsorship when large-scale involvement is not anticipated

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

• Indonesia (1958)

• Cuba (1960s)

• N. Vietnam (1961-64) (aborted)

• Afghanistan (1980s)

• Nicaragua (1980s)

The Roles of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Interagency

UW is not restricted to any single military service; however, specific aspects have

historically been the responsibility of each service.

The Army has traditionally provided the trainers and advisers to resistance

forces. This specifically equates to training or advising guerrilla units in guerrilla

warfare and underground organizations, including their respective auxiliary person-

nel, in the full spectrum of required functions, such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage,

subversion, intelligence collection and logistics.

Psychological operations units assist and facilitate the tactical and operational

HQ in the production and distribution of media intended to bolster the morale of

the resistance and population or undermine the governing authority’s legitimacy,

whether a host-nation government or occupying military force. This support can

take the form of audio broadcasts, Internet and printed material. Subversion is

a critical line of operation in this type of campaign and should not be viewed as

merely a supporting task assigned to the psychological units. The psychological

operations personnel and units provide expertise for the HQ in how to achieve the

desired results. This is largely done from outside the denied territory and coordi-

nated through the advisers on the ground with the resistance forces.

As a collateral activity, U.S. personnel can establish capabilities with the resistance

forces to assist in the recovery of friendly personnel, particularly downed aircrews

in the course of evading, or post escape, in enemy-controlled territory. This activity

is referred to as unconventional assisted recovery. During World War II, this capabil-

ity rescued thousands of downed airmen. Although still a viable task with resistance

forces, improvements in fighter and bomber aircraft technology, coupled with the

introduction of the helicopter in the last 60 years have reduced the criticality of this

capability to a fraction of its former historic requirement.

The Air Force and the Navy have traditionally provided infiltration, exfiltration and resup-

ply support. In the absence of normal lines of communications and supply, the impor-

tance of this logistical support cannot be overstated.

Numerous other government agencies, such as the Department of State and the

CIA, also play important roles in supporting UW efforts.

Prerequisite Conditions for Successful UW

The successful execution of UW is contingent on certain prerequisite condi-

tions in the environment, some of which are beyond control and some that can be

influenced. If these factors are not clearly understood by planners or overlooked by

decision makers, the likelihood for missed opportunities, inappropriate application

or unintended consequences will be high. It is essential that leaders and planners

maintain objectivity in their analysis of these prerequisites. They must remain cau-

tious of becoming overly focused on seeking opportunities to conduct a desired type

of operation rather than determining the type of operation needed to achieve the de-

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

sired end state. U.S. military doctrine has traditionally stated, “Special Forces do not

create resistance movements, they support them.” This is not a reflection of a lack of

authority, but rather the reality that existing resistance potential can be developed

further, but it cannot be manufactured.

In April of 1961, two weeks before the Bay of Pigs incident, Lindsay wrote a

document entitled A Basic Doctrine for the Conduct of UW.³ This document was based

on his significant experience supporting the Yugoslav Partisans while with the OSS

in World War II and various unsuccessful covert efforts with the CIA to promote

resistance in Soviet satellites during the early days of the Cold War. One of the most

critical aspects of his document was the realization that conducting UW in peace-

time against an adversarial regime requires different operational techniques than

those utilized during general war against occupying armies. From his experience,

he identified the following prerequisites for the successful prosecution of UW (the

following section on prerequisites comprises the original work of Lindsay with the

exception of my bold comments).

A Weakened or Unconsolidated Regime

The organizational mechanisms by which the regime in power maintains control

over the civilian population must be sufficiently unconsolidated or weakened to permit

the successful organization of a minimum core of clandestine activities. It will be

almost impossible to organize successful resistance under a fully consolidated govern-

ment. Unless the regime has some chinks in its control system, any clandestine activity

will become penetrated and controlled by the enemy before it attains the minimum size

and dispersal necessary for survival and effective action.

A Population of Strong Character

The character of the population must be sufficiently strong to sustain resistance

over long periods through serious reprisals, and against the repressions of the

regime in power. Populations that have recently been overtaken by an occupying

military force have a very different character than those that have had to survive for

decades under an oppressive regime. Over time, populations can lose their ethnic,

cultural and religious identities to those imposed by an oppressive regime. This was

the case in some former Soviet satellites and potentially the case in regions under a

religious extremist ideology.

Favorable Terrain

The terrain must provide a minimum of cover as protection against surprise attack

from the enemy. Normally this will mean forest cover or mountains and relatively large

areas free from intersecting roads and rail lines. Resistance can take place in cities,

but it has a special character and will usually require support from major resistance

centers located in the hinterlands where terrain is more favorable. Resistance activi-

ties in cities will normally be limited to clandestine activities and to unarmed, overt

civil actions such as mass demonstrations and strikes. Resistance in cities can, in turn,

provide important support to armed guerrilla activities in the hinterland.

Since the original writing of this document certain changes have occurred

that impact this prerequisite and warrant mentioning. Advancement in tech-

nology, such as UASs and the helicopter, have reduced the potential safe havens

in restrictive terrain traditionally utilized by guerrilla elements. Since the end

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

of World War II, guerrilla elements have increasingly had to seek safe havens

across sympathetic international borders or in artificial favorable terrain in

the form of ghettos and refugee camps. Unlike actual favorable terrain, such as

jungle-covered mountains, these artificial safe havens only continue to provide

utility as long as the host-nation security forces are willing to tolerate them.

Compatible Goals and Ideology with Those of the United States

The goals of a resistance movement must essentially be indigenous goals. It is un-

likely that these goals will be identical with those of the United States. Nevertheless,

through the skillful influence of the U.S. representatives with the resistance leader-

ship, a greater community of interest can be established, which will make it possible

for the United States to provide assistance and to establish substantial influence over

the course of the resistance itself. It is essential to recognize that the only goals and

objectives that will provide sufficient motivation for a successful resistance are those

that develop indigenously, or are soundly based on indigenous political and social

conditions, and that goals and objectives artificially imposed from the outside will

not find sufficient acceptance to make for a strong and successful resistance.

Through timely preparation the United States can influence the selection and

emergence of the indigenous leadership and can, within limits, influence the objec-

tives, organization and conduct of the resistance movement. The time to exercise this

influence will be before the resistance begins and during its early stages. By the time a

resistance movement gains sufficient strength to be “visible” to the world, it will be too

late to exercise very much influence over the character and goals of the movement and

over the selection of leadership.

It is essential to recognize that leadership rarely can be imposed from the

outside, either in the form of U.S. representatives or in the form of expatriates who

are sent back by the United States. The leadership must arise internally, and must

prove itself at every stage in order to justify internal confidence and support it will

need to be successful.

Capable and Skilled Indigenous Leadership

The resistance leader must first define his political goals in terms that can win the

support of most of the population. He must communicate these effectively to the major-

ity of the population in an environment in which all of the overt forms of communica-

tion are controlled by his enemy. He must therefore be able to establish a pervasive

clandestine underground organization so that he can reach, with his propaganda, a

majority of the population; so that he is able to be informed at all times of the move-

ments of enemy forces and of the plans being made against him; so that he can supply

his forces clandestinely by civilian contributions of food, clothing and money; and so

that he can recruit into the active fighting arm of his movement the necessary man-

power to ultimately prevail. In doing this, he will have no organized system of taxation

and supply. He will have no established courts, police forces and prisons with which to

enforce his orders. He will have no organized system of propaganda and no organized

recruiting service to supply him with manpower.

The resistance leader must be able to combine divergent political groups and

objectives into a single common program to defeat the enemy. From the standpoint of

U.S. interests, he must not only be able to do all of these things, but he must have the

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

political astuteness to lay solid foundations during the resistance period for the type

of postwar government that will be consistent with long-range United States interests.

Resistance leadership must, from the outset, plan and prepare for the ultimate assump-

tion of power. Many of the decisions that will determine the success or failure of the

resistance leadership in establishing an effective postwar government will be made

irrevocably during the resistance period. Failure to plan and prepare for the postwar

period may thus jeopardize the realization of postwar aims. Decisions postponed until

the war is won may be too late.

Because internal resistance breeds such violent emotions and antagonisms, and

because it encourages and depends on defiance of established order, a long period

of resistance and guerrilla warfare will make the postwar re-establishment of an

organized society infinitely more difficult. It must, therefore, be a duty of resistance

leadership to build during wartime toward the establishment of a postwar society in

which various elements and groups have not become so violently antagonistic to each

other that they cannot work together in the postwar period. Similarly the wartime

leadership must, with the help of its external allies, train during the war a full cadre of

technical and administrative personnel so that they will be able to step into positions

of civil administration and labor in order to rapidly restore essential social services

and infrastructure.

In most cases, successful wartime resistance leadership will become the postwar

government. The time to influence the character of the postwar government is, there-

fore, at the earliest stage in the organization of resistance.

The Criticality of the Feasibility Assessment

Planning must remain limited until certain assumptions have been confirmed as

valid. If operations proceed without a proper assessment of feasibility, the likelihood

of unintended consequences is high. To gain an accurate picture, operational per-

sonnel will need to meet with indigenous personnel who represent the resistance

forces. This can take place inside the denied territory (extremely high risk), in the

U.S. or in a third-party nation. While meeting representatives in the U.S. or a third

nation provides a safer option for an assessment team, it conversely provides a less

reliable assessment for potential capabilities.

The normal questions that comprise a feasibility assessment are as follows:

• Are there groups who could be developed into a viable force?

• Are we in contact with or can we make contact with individuals representing

the resistance potential in an area?

• Are there capable leaders, with goals compatible with U.S. goals, which are will-

ing to cooperate with the U.S.?

• Can the leaders be influenced to remain compliant with U.S. goals?

• Are their tactics and battlefield conduct acceptable by the Law of Land Warfare

and acceptable to the U.S. population?

• Will the environment (geography and demographics) support resistance operations?

• Does the enemy have effective control over the population?

• Is the potential gain worth the potential risk? Is this group’s participation

politically acceptable to other regional allies?

Expatriates can prove to be a valuable resource, particularly in regions where

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

the culture is largely unfamiliar or alien to a planner’s frame of reference. However,

great care should be taken to ensure the individual’s claims are valid. An expatriate’s

influence in a given country is inversely proportional to the length of time he has

been away from his former homeland and the level of control measures, propaganda

and intimidation employed against the population. While there are many reasons

an expatriate might exaggerate his influence in a region and attempt to exploit the

situation in his favor, he may legitimately be surprised to find his own assessment

of his influence to be grossly inaccurate. During normal peacetime conditions, a

person can spend years away from a country and expect to maintain his contacts

and influence. Under the pressures of a harsh regime or occupation, this time period

is reduced significantly.

Operational personnel involved in determining the feasibility of a potential

campaign must have (1) clear campaign objectives, (2) a desired end state and (3)

knowledge of exactly what level of support is available and acceptable. Without

these specifics, negotiations with potential resistance forces would be futile. During

assessment, if conditions prove to be unfavorable, planners need to also consider

if there are measures that could change the current situation to one that would be

favorable. For example:

• Can a potential resistance group be persuaded to cease unacceptable tactics or behavior?

• Can a coalition ally be persuaded to accept a specific resistance group’s partici-

pation under certain conditions?

• Can the enemy’s control over the population be degraded?

• Can the population’s will to resist be bolstered?

• What can actually be achieved given the constraint of time?

Operational detachments need time to organize with their indigenous counter-

parts, to develop a working relationship in terms of trust and credibility, and to build

up the guerrilla capability and supporting infrastructure, while remaining relatively

undetected by the enemy. These objectives would take considerable time to achieve

in friendly territory, operating with U.S. units. For forces working within enemy

territory, dealing with unfamiliar units and coordinating operations across a wide,

decentralized and compartmentalized front, the time requirement is much greater.

Risk Analysis and Risk Acceptance

Planners and commanders need to appreciate the relationship between risk and

capability. The resistance capability that can be developed is directly proportional to

the amount of time available to operational detachments on the ground. If the risk

associated with inserting U.S. operational detachments is considered to be unac-

ceptable until the night prior to an invasion, the desired operational capabilities will

likely not be in place for several months.

During operational phases, forces (to include U.S. advisers) are normally out of

range of many capabilities that are generally accepted as the norm in conventional

military operations. These absent capabilities may include medical evacuation,

close air support and continuous lines of communication. The associated risks from

not having these inherent standing capabilities can be mitigated to some degree by

many SF operating techniques. Commanders will likely need to accept a greater de-

gree of decentralization than they may be used to from operational elements during

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

these types of operations.

Logistics Challenges

Logistics support for UW has some unique challenges as compared to conven-

tional operations. Guerrilla forces do not operate on a contiguous battlefield or with

standard lines of communication. They must sustain themselves largely with mate-

rial obtained from their environment, whether gained from the population or by

battlefield recovery. External logistical support from a sponsor should only serve as

a supplement to existing resistance logistics. Over dependence on external logistics

could hamper the insurgent leadership’s desire to develop and employ traditional

underground and auxiliary supporting mechanisms. While this may seem simpler in

the short-term, remaining disconnected from the population also causes the popula-

tion to become disconnected from the insurgency. If conducted in a manner that

doesn’t overburden the supporting population, allowing local populations to provide

support for the insurgency, although operationally challenging, serves to maintain a

vital connection between the two entities.

While external support can provide a significant increase in capability, it comes

with the risk of exposing the resistance force during its delivery and dispersion,

not to mention the risk to the U.S. platform. Advisers need to carefully consider

factors such as which items of supply warrant utilization of limited U.S. resup-

ply platforms and the optimum time for their delivery. The delivery of logistics

is one of the most powerful tools available to the adviser in his quest to develop

influence. Early in a relationship, the adviser’s future status can rest on the suc-

cessful or unsuccessful delivery of supplies. It is entirely possible that a planned

resupply may not take place due to the tactical situation, the weather or recent

losses of platforms. Sometimes resupply efforts are unsuccessful because bundle

parachutes fail to open, materials are dropped in the wrong location or bundles

can contain the wrong materials. While none of these factors are the fault of the

adviser, he alone has to deal with the consequences.

If an external sponsor provides logistical support, it must be compatible with

the existing indigenous equipment. Requirements may dictate that the support is

delivered in a manner that does not expose the operation. This can be a significant

challenge for U.S. planners in that the requirements may be for non-standard materi-

als and equipment that do not exist within the U.S. military supply system. Organiza-

tions with a UW mission requirement should be familiar with the unique procedures

for the procurement, requisition, delivery and accountability of standard and non-

standard types of material.

Command and Control Challenges

Communications

Conventional commanders need to be aware that tactics and techniques for

command and control used in other operations will not apply during UW mis-

sions. During the conduct of UW, units will not be able to communicate with their

headquarters in the same manner as during other types of operations. Even if the

communication architecture is available, great care should be exercised before

emplacing requirements on units operating from within enemy territory. Unlike

conventional units, UW organizations risk some degree of exposure with every com-

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

munication. Communications encryption should not be confused with not emitting

a communications’ signature. The U.S. military’s insatiable appetite for computer-

based briefings and real-time communications needs to be managed in relation to

the operational environment. Units engaged in UW should always operate under

the assumption that the enemy is listening to all open communications as well as

conducting direction finding for unusual signals in urban and rural areas.

Managing the Size and Location of the U.S. Headquarters

Unlike conventional operations, the acceptable size and optimum location for

headquarters of units engaged in UW change as the mission progresses. Whether a

headquarters provides C2 from an adjacent country or chooses to infiltrate the resis-

tance area, should be based on where it can provide the most value to the opera-

tion. SF company and battalion headquarters are tactical elements intended to not

only coordinate the actions of their subordinate units, but also integrate with their

resistance force counterparts (sector or area command) if needed. Unit headquarters

need to consider (prior to entering into the guerrilla-controlled territory) if their

signature will jeopardize the mission and if there is an appropriate level of the resis-

tance’s headquarters that could benefit from their direct interaction. In either case,

large unwieldy headquarters would prove inappropriate for these types of opera-

tions, particularly in forward areas.

If an SF company, battalion or group chooses to infiltrate a small forward

headquarters into the resistance area, they essentially relinquish or greatly degrade

their ability to provide C2 for other special operations being conducted outside the

area of operations. If an SF company headquarters is waiting to infiltrate into the

occupied territory (or guerrilla-controlled territory), they normally do not simulta-

neously provide C2 for their detachments already operating in the resistance area.

Operational control is retained by the SF higher headquarters and transferred to the

company pending successful infiltration and link-up with resistance forces. At some

point, the full battalion or group HQ might be able to operate in the resistance area,

but this would likely be in the final phases of a UW campaign, when overt participa-

tion has become permissible.

In instances where large-scale U.S. involvement is not envisioned as part of the

campaign, UW efforts are, more frequently than not, compartmentalized efforts

executed by relatively small organizations, consisting primarily of senior person-

nel. Because of the political implications of such operations, the headquarters of the

ground advisory forces needs routine direct access to the top U.S. decision makers

for the campaign. This is particularly important if the U.S. advisers are directly inter-

acting (and often negotiating) with senior resistance force leaders that regard the

government-in-exile as their higher chain of command. It would be highly ineffective

to institute an ad-hoc intermediate military chain of command of senior ranking of-

ficers in order to replicate a more familiar C2 structure.

Complex Relationships with Foreign Allies

UW efforts are generally launched from across the borders of a neighboring

country to the targeted area. These countries may act as overt allies (as was the case

of Great Britain in World War II) or act as neutral nations and conceal their coopera-

tion (as was the case with India and Tibet in the 1950s, Honduras and Nicaragua

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

or Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s). These complex allied relationships are

a reality in this type of operation and must be accepted and dealt with rather than

avoided. In this regard, the State Department and Embassy Country Teams play a

vital role in synchronizing efforts in these adjoining countries and must be well

integrated with the executing UW HQ.

The resistance forces should be thought of as a partner ally. To view the re-

sistance forces during a UW effort as anything less than an allied partner is both

unrealistic in terms of the amount of control that can be exerted over them or an

indication that the force is more a manufactured group of mercenaries rather than

a true resistance force. In most cases it is unlikely that an insurgency or resistance

is one homogenous organization. It is more likely a loosely aligned confederation of

organizations that have probably never met before and have never seen the whole of

their own organizations.

The U.S. Army Special Forces Group is specifically designed to synchronize

the efforts between displaced sector and area commands with their Operational

Detachment-Alphas (ODAs), Operational Detachment-Bravos (ODBs or company

HQ) and Operational Detachment-Charlies (ODCs or battalion HQ). Each one of these

Army unit HQ maintains the ability to operate with its equivalent resistance force

counterpart.

Preparatory Measures Taken Within an Allied Nation at Risk

In areas that have a high potential of invasion, the U.S., alongside the allied part-

ner, could take preemptive measures to prepare an area for future resistance efforts.

In these cases, the U.S. could train host-nation military forces in resistance tactics

and techniques with the intent that they would become the “pockets of resistance”

that the U.S. would contact and support in the event of an invasion.

In these scenarios, planners need to avoid considering pre-existing pockets of

dissident activity or resistance potential unless it is believed they could be per-

suaded to join into a coalition with the government in exile. Although these ele-

ments might provide some degree of resistance potential, their existing adversarial

relationship with the allied government would negate this tactical value. Only

resistance forces believed to be loyal to the existing government (potential govern-

ment in exile) should be considered in scenarios with allied nations at risk of inva-

sion. Consideration and contact with potential resistance forces without the allied

partner-nation’s knowledge risk inadvertently undermining the ally’s legitimacy

and damaging, if not ending, the partnership with the U.S. government. In the event

of any U.S.-sponsored resistance training with host-nation military counterparts, it

is critical that U.S. trainers and planners maintain the highest degree of confidence

in the training recipients that they would not employ these skills against their own

government at some later time.

In extreme cases, the U.S. could develop the basic supporting human and logisti-

cal infrastructure in a region with the potential to become a future pocket of resis-

tance. Plans could be developed for stay-behind elements (U.S. and/or host nation)

to be pre-positioned in a region anticipated to be overtaken by enemy forces. These

groups would later serve as the cadre or nucleus from which resistance forces would

be organized. These activities would be conducted in secret from the population, but

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

with assistance of selected host-nation forces.

If these activities were conducted with the host nation, they would likely be per-

ceived as a sign of U.S. commitment to that ally’s survival and the development of a po-

tential means to provide assistance, even if they lost control of their state to an invader.

Conversely, if preparations for potential future resistance were conducted without

the knowledge of the host nation and discovered, it would likely be perceived as a

lack of confidence in that state’s government and their continued relationship with

the U.S. The value of unilaterally developing supporting infrastructure (for resistance

operations) for potential future contingencies would need to be seriously considered

in comparison to the actual incurred risk to the existing diplomatic relationship and

legitimacy of the host-nation government.

Preparatory Measures Focused Toward a Potential Adversary

Preparatory actions focused toward a potential adversary are somewhat differ-

ent than those activities conducted with an allied nation at risk of invasion. While

many of the same activities are still applicable, in these cases it could be permissible

to identify possible elements within a region with the potential to effectively develop

into a resistance organization. This is significantly different than any UW prepara-

tions that might be taken within an allied country at risk of invasion (i.e. alongside

the allied government forces). In this scenario, whether or not these groups would

be willing to engage in a potential relationship with the U.S. government is less rel-

evant than developing a basic understanding of these organizations to include their

leadership, ideology, objectives and capabilities. It may also be permissible to deter-

mine host-nation military and security capabilities and weaknesses with regards to

their control over the population.

These types of activities should only be considered in regions where the govern-

ments are categorized as “potential adversaries” rather than allies or neutral states.

These actions would be counterproductive or even divisive to other U.S. government

efforts at maintaining or strengthening an existing tenuous relationship. This course

should only be considered if the relationship is deemed to be unrecoverable.

The Impact of Technology on UW

The significant increases in military technology impact how U.S. forces could

support an insurgency or resistance movement. Certain capabilities, such as air

support, if made available to guerrilla forces, can in some cases allow them to cease

fighting as guerrillas and openly challenge the opposing military forces. While it

might seem like an attractive option to rapidly raise the ability of the guerrilla force

to openly challenge the opposing forces, if not managed correctly, it can have several

unintended effects.

The first concern is the premature or inadvertent exposure of U.S. sponsorship.

There are several examples where advanced military capabilities were injected into

a supposedly indigenous insurgency, in lieu of developing the insurgency’s internal

capability, only to prematurely expose U.S. sponsorship. Any technology introduced

into this type of campaign needs to be compatible with the rest of the existing

strategy. It should augment and support the strategy and not make the strategy in

support of the capability.

The second concern is the unintended transformation of the guerrilla force into

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

make-shift infantry battalions. Advisers need to guard against overconfidence among

guerrilla commanders who feel that, based on their previous success fighting as guer-

rillas, their units are capable of fighting as regular infantry…and that the U.S.-provided

air support will make up for any deficiencies. Some planners may see this as an attrac-

tive option to increase the number of “battalions” in the fight. It’s important to main-

tain realistic expectations for guerrilla forces. If guerrilla units place too much faith in

U.S. air support to “carry the day” or are asked to operate in regions that they have no

familiarity with or connection to the local population, the results will be poor.

It is not the goal of U.S. advisers to transform their counterparts into infantry

battalions, but rather to assist their commanders in employing them in the most

effective manner possible. The lure of technology can cause planners to mistakenly

believe that transforming all these forces into infantry-like units is a feasible option.

While it is difficult to quantify the psychological impact of wide-scale resistance, of

which guerrilla attacks are only a part, the overall value cannot be overstated, but

it can certainly be undervalued. Planners should possess a familiarity with the con-

cepts and techniques of insurgency in order to synchronize this disruptive potential

alongside conventional operations rather than default to transforming it into some-

thing that appears more familiar, but is in fact much less useful than its full potential.

Law of Land Warfare Challenges

The Law of Land Warfare outlines criteria for resistance forces and foreign advisers.

In order for resistance forces to receive legal belligerent status as prisoners of war

they must comply with the following four criteria:

• Carry their arms openly

• Wear a distinctive insignia

• Follow a chain of command

• Conform with standards of conduct outlined by the Law of Land Warfare

When irregular forces do not comply with these criteria, they do not qualify for

legal belligerent status and are subject to the normal criminal laws of the govern-

ment they are operating against. With regards to resistance movements, the Law of

Land Warfare only addresses guerrillas as possible legal belligerents. This presents a

problem for other members of the resistance, specifically underground or auxiliary

members. These individuals are traditionally charged with espionage and often sen-

tenced to long prison sentences or even death for their crimes against the state.

In order for foreign advisers to qualify for legal belligerent status, they must com-

ply with the previously mentioned four criteria with the exception that they must wear

the uniform of their own country. Depending on the mission and adversary, there are

situations where qualifying for such status may not be a high priority. Under certain

conditions, units conducting UW may deliberately choose to assume risk and forfeit

their right to these qualifications for operational reasons. If and when this decision is

made, it is a command decision and not an individual preference.

Some of these criteria are open to a degree of interpretation, particularly in

terms of what exactly constitutes a distinctive unit insignia and what constitutes car-

rying arms openly. Regardless of “interpretations,” if U.S. advisers learn of resistance

behavior that would constitute a violation, such as human-rights abuses, they have

a responsibility to attempt to correct these actions and report the behavior to their

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

higher headquarters. The level of influence exercised by U.S. advisers will be propor-

tional to the amount of direct U.S. support and their involvement in resistance-force

operations. If U.S. advisers are accompanying guerrillas on operations, they are in a

much stronger position to influence the guerrillas’ behavior as compared to if they

are restricted to bases in safe havens.

Advisers need to always remain cognizant of their own safety. If the resis-

tance force perceives that the advisers are reporting negatively against them

and possibly jeopardizing the continuation of support, a small group of advis-

ers could suddenly find themselves in significant danger. Advisers must always

consider the benefits versus the risks of maintaining and continuing a relation-

ship with groups whose behavior is questionable. While disengagement might

seem ethically and morally appropriate, remaining engaged affords advisers the

potential to favorably alter a group’s behavior for an operational and strategic

long-term outcome.

U.S. UW Efforts from 1951- 2003

U.S. Military and CIA in Korea (1951-1953)

The U.S. military was largely caught off guard by the conflict in Korea. Despite

tremendous success during World War II, the capability to support resistance move-

ments was almost completely removed from within the Department of Defense by

1950. A fraction of the capability was retained in the newly established CIA, but

proved to be inadequate to meet the needs of a full-scale campaign.

Overall this campaign effort was effective, but not nearly as effective as it could

have been. The inability to establish sustainable guerrilla areas on the mainland

hampered long-term operations. The U.S. provided personnel who were not famil-

iar with the concepts and techniques associated with resistance operations. The

military’s best attempt to find a matching experience set was to send basic-training

instructors. Operations made wide use of displaced refugees as recruits and were

generally launched from outside enemy-controlled areas and resembled temporary

raiding parties.

The resulting operations caused the military to re-think its position on a military

force trained for this type of operation. In 1952, the first official U.S. Special Forces

organization was established. In 1953, some of the newly developed Special Forces

deployed to Korea. However, they were not employed as intended and generally used

as replacements.

CIA in Albania and Latvia (1951-1955)

The CIA used these opportunities to test theories for rolling back communist

domination of Eastern Europe. These locations were chosen due to their relatively

small size. Both efforts were failures. From these efforts the CIA theoretically

learned three lessons. First, techniques used during wartime do not apply in peace-

time (emphasizing the need for covert methods of operating). Secondly, tyrannical

regimes that have had the benefit of years to consolidate power have a much greater

hold over the population than a newly occupying power. Subsequently, there must be

a weakness that can be exploited. This specifically equates to the ability of the state

to exert control over the population and the population’s willingness to resist. Lastly,

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

prior to any guerrilla operations, a sufficient base of support must be present in the

form of auxiliary and underground networks, although the least visible and under-

stood, it is the most time-consuming and difficult to establish. Developing guerrilla

elements is relatively easy; keeping them alive is much harder. Trying to jump ahead

to developing guerrillas is like trying to build the upper floors of a house before lay-

ing the foundation.

CIA in Guatemala (1954)

In 1954, various influential businesses persuaded members of the media as well

as members of the U.S. government that the Arbenz government, which was the

elected government of Guatemala, was leaning toward communism. The U.S. govern-

ment, through the State Department and the CIA, convinced several senior Guatema-

lan military officials to overthrow Arbenz’s government. This effort was supported

by a highly successful psychological campaign that portrayed the overthrow as part

of a much larger movement. Although widely suspected, the U.S. government’s hand

in this effort remained ambiguous for a couple of years until it was finally exposed

as the follow-on governments were accused of being inept dictators by the Guatema-

lan population. Although often portrayed as a success, the hindsight of history now

reveals the Guatemalan operations were in fact “shameful, particularly so because

the five decades of governments that followed the 1954 coup were far more oppressive

than Arbenz’s elected government. Aside from the morality, there were other unfortu-

nate legacies of the Guatemalan “success”. Allen Dulles used it as a model in advising

President Kennedy seven years later to pursue the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of

Cuba.”⁴The Guatemalan effort serves as an example of tactical success in isola-

tion of any wider sound strategy, particularly in the form of long-term effects on a

region. This effort coupled with the coup of the elected Mossedegh government in

Iran (1953) provided a strong argument to de-legitimize any U.S. claim to support

democracy for the remainder of the Cold War.

CIA in Tibet (1955-1969)

While this campaign was very well executed, no level of tactical success in Tibet

could defeat the Chinese. The National Volunteer Defense Army (NVDA) did suc-

cessfully delay the Chinese victory by several years. In 1960, the first U2 aircraft

was shot down. Although not related to the covert support efforts, the subsequent

compromise of U.S. clandestine overflights of communist territory caused the U.S.

President to suspend all further clandestine overflights, which essentially crippled

the air resupply to the Tibetan guerrillas. A year later, the catastrophic failure of

UW efforts in Cuba nearly ended the Tibetan program. The last resupply airdrop to

Tibetan resistance forces took place in 1965. Although the U.S. ceased all support to

the Tibetan resistance in 1969 as a condition for eventually establishing diplomatic

relations with China, the Tibetan resistance continued to resist into the 1970s.

Two lessons can be drawn from the Tibetan efforts. As an alternative to prior U.S.

efforts where advisers infiltrated into the combat area, in this effort selected person-

nel were extracted, trained and reinserted with reasonable success. The nature of

the offensive operations in this type of campaign is different compared to opera-

tions that culminate in support of a TBD D-day. Without the eventual introduction

of conventional forces (i.e., a D-Day) the combat operations need to be sustained for

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

an undetermined period of time and therefore conducted in a manner that does not

compromise the supporting resistance infrastructure.

CIA in Indonesia (1957-1958)

Fearing that the Indonesian government was leaning toward communism, after a

declaration of neutrality, the CIA supported several Indonesian military officers who

claimed to control a rebel army made up of former military units. During this opera-

tion, the CIA chose to employ refitted B-26 bombers and P-51 fighter aircraft flown

by mercenaries from various countries. The rebel army had little popular support

among the population while the Indonesian government still held control of the ma-

jority of its military. During the course of the support effort, direct American support

was exposed several times causing embarrassment to the United States.

This situation finally came to a head when a B-26 flown by an American CIA

contract employee was shot down and the pilot was captured by Indonesian forces.

Although the CIA was confident that no link could be made between the U.S. govern-

ment and the pilot, he in fact had documents on him that indeed did link him to

Clark Air Force Base. The incident had been a major scandal for the Eisenhower

administration. Soon after the scandal broke, the CIA ceased all support and the

Indonesian government crushed the rebellion with conventional military forces.

A particularly interesting point in this case is that Indonesia was not considered a

belligerent state when the decision was made to support the rebels. The U.S. State

Department maintained relations with the government and had an embassy in

Jakarta during the operation.

CIA in Cuba and the Bay of Pigs (1961)

The CIA applied a variety of the nine-phase model, consummate with covert

operations, but attempted a culminating D-day style uprising rather than sustained

guerrilla warfare. There were some reasonably successful efforts to develop under-

ground elements, but these efforts were not coordinated with the larger campaign.

They did not employ appropriate techniques to conceal the operation or the U.S.

participation. The “resistance movement” was generally manufactured, rather than

fostered from an already existing one in country. Lastly operational security in the

United States was a complete failure.

The lessons of the Bay of Pigs are as follows:

• Resistance forces require clandestine infrastructure and support mechanisms.

• These operations require planners and advisers who understand the dynamics

of insurgency/ resistance operations (including guerrilla warfare and underground

operations and how they integrate with each other).

• When there is a population involved, the psychological piece (i.e. propaganda

and subversion) may be more important than the physical piece (guerrilla warfare).

• This type of effort requires the ability to conduct the full spectrum of non-

attributable psychological operations in conjunction with the physical piece.

• Any organization involved in UW (particularly peacetime) needs a com-

prehensive understanding and process for oversight, C2 and OPSEC for covert

and clandestine ops.

CIA and Special Forces in Laos (1959-1962)

In 1959 the United States began a secret program called White Star. This opera-

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

tion was coordinated in conjunction with the French government to train Laotian

Army Battalions. Personnel came from the 1st and 7th Special Forces groups. In

December of 1960, a group of Laotian paratroopers attempted a coup d’etat that

caused the withdrawal of the French advisers, whom had previously restricted

American military involvement to the role of trainers. During the counter coup,

Special Forces personnel advised the remaining parachute forces to rout the rebel

paratroopers, winning great favor with the Laotian government. By 1961 the

original contingent of nine ODAs had grown to 21 ODAs and the effort expanded to

include an advisory role. The counterinsurgency efforts also included training for

selected tribal elements in civil defense. A concept was developed to expand the

tribal operations [covertly] to the rural areas in northern Laos parallel to the North

Vietnamese border. Special Forces also undertook two major unconventional pro-

grams in northern Laos (as compared to the other counterinsurgency programs). Both

programs concentrated on training minority tribal groups as irregular forces capable

of conducting guerrilla warfare across rugged terrain or behind the enemy lines. The

Kha program, the second unconventional training activity, was designed by Special

Forces to use the various Kha tribes in harassing and raiding enemy rear bases and

installations especially along the Ho Chi Minh trail, the primary overland North Viet-

namese resupply route across Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia. Unfortunately

higher authorities refused to adopt the Special Forces suggestions regarding the newly

created guerrilla movements and due to political decisions the Meo and Kha programs

never realized their full potential.⁵ After 1962, the effort was dramatically reduced

when Laos declared its neutrality. While the Special Forces involvement ended, U.S.

support continued covertly by the CIA to General Vang Pao’s “Army Clandestine” for

another decade.

The counterinsurgency programs in Laos are sometimes misrepresented as UW.

The counterinsurgency efforts conducted against the Pathet Lao in southern Laos were

significantly different from the proposed UW efforts envisioned for northern Laos and

North Vietnam. The proposed UW efforts were intended to interdict and harass regular

North Vietnamese forces who were occupying Laotian territory in order to establish

supply networks into South Vietnam which later became the Ho Chi Minh trail.

CIA and Special Forces in North Vietnam (1961-1964)

In 1960, the CIA began attempts to establish agent networks within North

Vietnam. The program, called Leaping Lena, was highly penetrated by double agents

and never produced any viable results beyond a handful of questionable agents. The

hopes of conducting UW against North Vietnam had diminished by 1964 when the

military assumed control of the operation. The Special Observations Group’s or SOG’s

actual name had been UW Task Force. The Special Forces concluded Leaping Lena by

parachuting the questionable trainees over North Vietnam and terminating further

support. From this point on operational efforts focused on portraying a false resistance

movement intended to confuse the North Vietnamese.

The program shifted to covert coastal raids (similar to North Korea) and covert

reconnaissance and interdiction missions into Laos and Cambodia. Special Forces in

South Vietnam (1957-1975)

As a result of the increased concern over communist subversion in Vietnam and

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

at President John F. Kennedy’s insistence, SF added COIN to its list of missions in

1961, making a significant point that it is different from UW and not a subcompo-

nent of it. The majority of Special Forces efforts in South Vietnam were not UW but

rather COIN, specifically the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, the Provi-

sional Reconnaissance Units, or PRU, and Mike Forces.

The CIDG were indigenous irregulars who provided a vital counterinsurgency

role of area denial by securing hamlets.

The PRU were indigenous platoons developed as part of the CIA Phoenix program.

These elements identified insurgent support infrastructure (or underground and aux-

iliary members). This effort could be called counterterrorism, or counterinsurgency.

SOG also developed platoon- and company-size strike forces called Mobile Guer-

rilla Forces and Bright Light teams. The Mobile Guerrilla Forces acted as quick-reac-

tion forces for recon teams in contact with Viet Cong elements and the Bright Light

teams conducted raids to rescue allied prisoners and downed air crews. The Mobile

Guerrilla Forces conducted four static line jumps during their operations and the

Bright Light teams conducted nearly 100 raids (in S. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).

While these efforts utilized recruited indigenous personnel, they were not consid-

ered UW. In 1970, this program disbanded and transformed to an adviser program

for Vietnamese and Cambodian counterguerrilla forces.

See Colonel (R) Al Paddock’s (the author of U.S. Army Special Warfare and Its Ori-

gins) comments regarding a review of Imperial Grunts (and the misuse of the term

UW) in the March-April 2006 Special Warfare. Paddock, a Special Forces veteran of

SOG and the CIDG mission stated, “In truth, the mobile guerrilla forces can be more

likened to World War II long range penetration units such as Merrill’s Marauders or

Wingate’s Chindits. This is not to say that the Mobile Guerrilla forces did not perform

useful or heroic missions. They did, but not as guerrillas.”

CIA and Special Forces in Nicaragua and Honduras (1980-1988)

The United States supported various resistance groups that opposed the socialist

Nicaraguan Sandinista government. These groups, which operated from Honduras and

Costa Rica, collectively became known at the Contras. RAND after action reviews from

this covert operation criticize it for being artificially manufactured and not having

legitimate support inside Nicaragua. “This effort was developed almost entirely along

military lines and advisors lacked practical understanding of the requirements to de-

velop and run an insurgency.” (U.S. Support to the Nicaraguan Resistance, 1989 and The

U.S. Army’s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency, 1990). The Contras have been

compared to paid mercenaries with no real political component and connection to the

population. This may partially explain the lack of guerrilla bases inside Nicaragua. The

other part of the explanation comes from the strength of the government counter-

guerrilla forces. The Contras would not have survived without the safe havens across

neutral borders. Ultimately the covert operation, which became widely exposed due

to the Iran-Contra scandal, ended badly for the U.S. government and caused feelings

reminiscent to the post Bay of Pigs-era regarding covert support to insurgents.

CIA and Special Forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan (1980-1991)

While this covert effort remained primarily training and material support, it grew

to the point that the potential risk of providing indigenous guerrillas with U.S.-man-

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

ufactured lethal aid (such as Stinger anti-aircraft missiles) became acceptable. U.S.

personnel established supporting bases in Pakistan (following the nine-phase model

mentioned previously). There are several lessons of the operations in Afghanistan.

Covert operations of this nature require neighboring partner countries to develop

support bases. This necessity causes a level of compromise in U.S. objectives. Pakistan

controlled the distribution of U.S. support to rebel groups and subsequently was able

to alter the balance of power among resistance group in Pakistan’s favor.

Afghanistan highlights the importance of maintaining perspective of long-term

goals and not allowing enthusiasm to overtake decision making. The importance

of a feasibility assessment before the decision to throw support at a group can’t be

overemphasized. Any support will change the balance of power and dynamics of the

region. When a group is supported, engagement should continue until post-conflict

stability is achieved. The Taliban came to power because the U.S. ceased support to

Northern Alliance troops and other Islamic nations did not cease their support to

these radical groups.

The sensitivity of these types of covert operations demands that operational

commands interact directly with the national command authority and not through

various “go betweens” in a long military chain of command.

Cold War Contingency Plans for Scandinavia and Europe. (1952-1989)

Although not executed, it is worth including the contingency plans that Special

Forces would have implemented in the event of escalated hostilities in Europe

during the Cold War. There is little debate as to the nature of what SF was pre-

pared to do in this event; unfortunately, these plans count for little as they fade

farther away with each passing day. There would be much value to declassifying

some of this information for the betterment of the military’s knowledge. At the

height of the Cold War, 10^th Special Forces Group remained prepared to employ 50

plus detachments across the whole of Europe. In addition to 10^th SF Group, Det-A,

although manned with SF Soldiers not officially part of 10^th SF Group, remained

prepared to conduct UW with its six detachments specifically in the urban areas of

Berlin and northeast Germany.

Kuwait (1990-1991)

Following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, several isolated pockets

of Kuwaiti resistance formed. Although the U.S. was in contact with elements of the

Kuwaiti government in-exile in Saudi Arabia, efforts to support and coordinate the

resistance forces was poorly integrated with the main military campaign planning.

Planning efforts were too little and way too late. Although Kuwait offered little

favorable terrain to support resistance operations, ad hoc resistance forces did

operate without U.S. support until their eventual destruction. The operation may

have proven unfeasible, but other circumstances rendered that debate irrelevant.

Post-war after-action reviews indicated a general lack of organic capability, a lack

of understanding of the requirements for supporting a resistance throughout the

Department of Defense (to include special-operations forces) and a lack of synchro-

nization between DoD and the interagency.

Afghanistan (2001-2002)

Between October 19 and November 20, TF Dagger (5^th Special Forces Group)

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

inserted 11 ODAs that linked-up with and coordinated the actions of Tajik, Uzbek,

Hazar and Pashtun bands, loosely referred to as the Northern Alliance, in their ef-

forts to defeat the Taliban government, which was providing safe haven to Osama

bin Laden. These efforts were overwhelmingly successful. It is worth noting that

the general weakness of the Taliban as a military force and the dramatic increase in

lethal capability by the integration of U.S. air power created a state of parity between

the Northern Alliance and Taliban not typical of UW efforts. Success was largely

due to the operational capabilities of the inserted personnel. In many cases, these

personnel were familiar with the culture, the region and, in some cases, possessed

regional language skills.

Iraq (2002-2003)

As part of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, two UW campaigns were considered:

A northern effort with the Kurdish Resistance predominately made up from the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and a

southern effort comprised of various Shia resistance groups. For a variety of reasons,

the southern effort was not executed. The example of Iraq is significant because

it demonstrates a scenario where two UW efforts could have been conducted in

support of the conventional campaign, but each for entirely different purposes. The

northern effort was intended to keep the Iraqi forces focused on the northern part

of the country, making them unavailable to counterattack the coalition’s southern

invasion. The southern effort would have been executed to facilitate the introduction

of invasion forces. While many of the environmental conditions were not optimal

for coordinated resistance efforts in the south, there was also a perception among

military planners that the potential value that might be gained by enabling Shia

resistance forces would be unnecessary for the success of the coalition invasion and

therefore did not warrant the possible associated risk.

The northern effort was considered the third priority for special operations, until Tur-

key refused U.S. forces access to bases, eliminating a second conventional maneuver force

from the north. Without additional U.S. conventional forces invading from Turkey, only

six U.S. divisions would participate in the initial invasion from the south. Roughly 30,000

Kurdish forces, supported by two battalions of Special Forces, successfully tied down 12 of

Iraq’s 20 divisions during the invasion and liberated the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.

Notes:

1 JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 Dec 2003.

2 Lindsay, Franklin, A Basic Doctrine for the Conduct of UW, April 1961, accessed

through the John F. Kennedy Library archives.

3 Ibid.

4 Accessed via https://www.cia.gov/library.

5 Special Forces at War in SE Asia, 1957-1975, Shelby Stanton, p. 22.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare

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MRAP VEHICLES HANDBOOK

Foreword

This book describes the general capabilities and limitations of the mine-resistant

ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) employed by MRAP-equipped units. The essential information presented in this

book is a guide to assist commanders, leaders, and Warfighters in preparing for and

conducting operations with MRAP vehicles against an asymmetric, dedicated, and

innovative threat in current and future areas of operations.

MRAP vehicles are providing a significant increase in force protection and enhancing the

confidence of Warfighters engaging the enemy. In many cases, Warfighters have survived

attacks that would have completely destroyed other armored vehicles. This level of

protection did not come without trade-offs in performance. The MRAP vehicle's size,

weight, and height above ground contribute to its armor to make it a very survivable

vehicle; however, they also affect its overall maneuverability and mobility. Developers

intend to address the mobility issue with a restricted terrain MRAP variant that can provide

the protection similar to the current MRAP vehicle and the mobility similar to the

high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. This capability will increase the Warfighters’

effectiveness by giving them the ability to operate in areas previously denied to the MRAP

vehicle due to its size and weight.

TTP for employing MRAP vehicles are similar to those used with existing vehicles;

therefore, the aim of this book is to acquaint users with the capabilities and

limitations of the MRAP vehicle and identify how it may influence planning and

executing tactical missions. While this book serves as a starting point, units must

continually analyze how the MRAP vehicle affects operations in their current

mission and share that information with their unit and across the services.

Warfighters and leaders must understand and not exceed the operating limitations of their

specific MRAP vehicle. The safety guidelines outlined in this book will ensure you

operate the vehicle to its fullest capability, safely allowing you to fight and win in combat.

We continue to examine and anticipate the war-fighting needs of our deployed forces.

Based on lessons learned and with help from industry, future MRAP vehicles will have

improved capability. Units who successfully employ these vehicles against the enemy do

so by integrating protection with training, planning, smart tactics, and well-rehearsed drills.

This knowledge and preparation will help accomplish your missions and possibly save

your life.

WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Major General, USA

Commanding

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MRAP Vehicles Handbook

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1. Program Overview

Chapter 2. Vehicle Descriptions

Chapter 3. Mission Equipment Packages

Chapter 4. Configuration/Mission Crosswalk

Chapter 5. Operating Speeds

Chapter 6. Capabilities and Limitations

Chapter 7. Employment Considerations

Chapter 8. Tactical Manning

Chapter 9. Load Plans

Chapter 10. Individual Protective Measures

Chapter 11. Casualty Evacuation Procedures

Chapter 12. Recovery and Towing Operations and Damage Reporting

Appendix A. Recovery and Towing Operations

Appendix B-1. Rollover/Egress Procedures

125

B-2. Surviving Contact with High-Voltage Power Lines

133

B-3. Necessary Precautions During Battlefield Vehicle Crew

139

Rescue, Recovery, and Forensic Collection Efforts

Appendix C. Warnings and Cautions Common to the Mine-Resistant

143

Ambush-Protected Vehicle

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director

Colonel Robert W. Forrester

Managing Editor

George J. Mordica II

CALL Analyst

Scott Blaney

Contributors

Colonel Robert W. Radcliffe

Thomas J. Stafford

Production Coordinator

Valerie Tystad

Editor

Jenny Solon

Graphic Artist

Eric Eck

Distribution

Cole Davis

Bryon Gaudreau

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is

necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the

Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both

are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product,

such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution

system.

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Introduction

“The companies that have been awarded the MRAP [mine-resistant

ambush-protected] contracts are ramping up their production capabilities

… I am pressing them very hard to see where they can cut the time scale as

well as increase their production …. You have to look outside the normal

bureaucratic way of doing things and so does industry—because lives are at

stake.”

-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, March 27, 2007

This book will familiarize Warfighters and leaders with the MRAP vehicle, its

capabilities and limitations, and planning considerations for its employment. The

information found in this book does not replace or override any safety precautions,

warnings, notes in existing technical and/or operator manuals, or unit standing

orders or operating procedures.

The acronym “MRAP” does not mean any one specific vehicle. It is a generic term

intended to apply to vehicles from different manufacturers that meet a common set

of capabilities. There are several manufacturers, each providing a unique variant of

the MRAP vehicle. The photos and drawings used in this book are not intended to

imply a preference for any specific design or manufacturer. They are simply

representative of the family of MRAP vehicles. The joint services are fielding these

vehicles to improve the force protection of units operating in the high-threat areas

of Iraq and Afghanistan. The fielding plan is based on threat levels; units with the

highest threat level have the priority for MRAP vehicles.

There are three categories of MRAP vehicles. Category (CAT) I and CAT II

vehicles carry six and ten Warfighters respectively and supplement missions

performed with the up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle and

other combat vehicles. CAT III vehicles are used to support route clearance

missions.

Since the tactics, techniques, and procedures involved in employing MRAP

vehicles are similar to those employed with existing vehicles, the aim of this

document is to identify the basic capabilities and limitations of MRAP vehicles and

how equipping a unit with these vehicles may influence the planning and execution

of tactical tasks. While this document serves as a starting point, units equipped with

MRAP vehicles must continually analyze how the vehicle affects operations in their

current situation and share that information across their unit(s) and the Army. Units

are encouraged to send recommended changes to scott.blaney@us.army.mil and/or

the USAIC POC Thomas.j.stafford@us.army.mil.

Seen on the side of an MRAP vehicle:

"This truck saved my life as well as 5 others 02 Apr 08 at 2300 L in Basral,

IZ."

-CW2, SF

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MRAP VEHICLES HANDBOOK

Chapter 1

Program Overview

The mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle is not a new light tactical

wheeled vehicle; an interim replacement for the high-mobility multipurpose

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet; or a bridge to the joint light tactical vehicle,

which is intended to eventually replace the HMMWV. Its mission role is similar to

the Stryker in many respects. It will provide small units conducting typical

counterinsurgency missions with protected mobility and mounted firepower.

Squads and platoons use MRAP vehicles to conduct both mounted and dismounted

missions. Typical mission sets supported by MRAP vehicles include the following:

• Cordon and search

• Raids

• Mounted combat patrol

• Traffic control points

• Convoy security

• Escort

• Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)

• Protected personnel transport

MRAP vehicles replace many up-armored HMMWVs (UAHs) currently used to

conduct these missions. However, units will want to retain some UAHs for

operations in terrain where MRAP vehicles are unsuitable.

MRAP vehicles are divided into three categories based on the number of occupants

the vehicle must hold and mission-specific mine/improvised explosive device

clearance operations.

• Category (CAT) I MRAP vehicles are fire team-size vehicles designed to

hold six occupants, including the driver, vehicle commander, and gunner.

CAT I MRAP vehicles provide units with a protected maneuver

capability in urban areas and other restricted terrain. They primarily serve

as armored personnel carriers for fire teams and weapons carriers for

medium and heavy machine guns. Reconnaissance units use CAT I

MRAP vehicles to conduct mounted reconnaissance while employing the

Long Range Scout Surveillance System from the vehicle.

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CAT I MRAP

• CAT II MRAP vehicles are a squad-size vehicle designed to hold ten

occupants, including the driver, vehicle commander, and gunner. The

CAT II MRAP vehicle is considered a multi-mission vehicle and provides

units with protected transport between secure areas. Sapper and rifle

squads use the CAT II MRAP vehicle for protected maneuver and

movement when it is necessary to mass Soldiers rapidly for a mission

such as a quick reaction force. The purpose-built armored ambulance

used by MEDEVAC squads conducting ground MEDEVAC is a CAT II

vehicle.

CAT II MRAP

• CAT III vehicles are equipped for mine/improvised explosive device

clearance operations and explosive ordnance disposal. The vehicles

transport no less than six personnel, five with additional equipment

installed.

This book addresses CAT I and CAT II MRAP vehicles.

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Chapter 2

Vehicle Descriptions

Several manufacturers are producing the mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP)

vehicle. Each variant is distinctly different from another, but they all provide the

following similar capabilities and general levels of protection:

•

Designed from the ground up to reduce casualties and increase crew and

passenger survivability as a result of mine explosions, improvised

explosive device (IED) detonations, and small-arms fire.

•

Armored vehicles with blast-resistant body design (characterized by a

V-shaped hull, integrated armor, raised chassis, and blow-off wheels).

Blast forces are deflected away from the crew by the vehicle’s V-shaped

hull.

•

Can operate on all terrain and in all weather.

•

Troop capacity includes a driver and up to nine combat-equipped

Soldiers.

•

Armament may include an M2 50-caliber heavy machine gun, MK-19

automatic grenade launcher, or M240 medium machine gun.

•

Accessories may include objective gunner protection kit, driver vision

enhancer, jammer and AN/VRC 92 dual long-range radio system, Blue

Force Tracker, and a warrior aid and litter kit.

•

Can operate in extreme temperatures (-25 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit).

•

Can operate in excess of 300 miles without refueling.

•

Air transportable by C-17.

•

Can cross water obstacles up to 36 inches deep.

•

Can negotiate up to a 60 percent grade and 30 percent side slope.

•

Equipped with run-flat tires, anti-lock brakes, and a fire-suppression

system.

Individual characteristics of the common variants are displayed below.

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MaxxPro Category (CAT) I/CAT II, Navistar Defense, LCC

System Description: The MaxxPro vehicle is capable of supporting multiple

combat missions in urban or confined areas including mounted patrols, convoy

security, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, communications, command and

control, troop and cargo transport, and direct interaction. The CAT II is a 4X4 with

a gross vehicle weight (GVW) of 31,300 to 52,000 lb. Missions include convoy

lead/escort, ambulance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and combat engineer

operations. Operator manual is Technical Manual (TM) 9-2355-106-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 4X4

Operational length: 250 in.

Operational width: 120 in.

Operational height: 159 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 10.9 in.

Maximum speed: 69.2 mph

Time to 50 meters (m): 8.3 sec.

GVW: 43,500 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 62 ft. (R), 62 ft. (L)

Payload (gross vehicle weight rating [GVWR] - GVW): 4,368 lb.

Maximum slope: Up to 60%

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 57.8 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): 5.8

Figure 2-1

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MRAP VEHICLES HANDBOOK

MaxxPro MRAP Expedient Armor Program (MEAP), Navistar Defense,

LCC

System Description: The MaxxPro accommodates the MRAP MEAP

add-on-armor kit. The kit makes the vehicle 5 in. wider, adds 4,500 lb. of weight,

and raises the center of gravity by 2.2 in. This kit changes handling, stopping

distance (longer), and acceleration (slower) rates; increases fuel consumption rates;

and raises the center of gravity. The operator manual is TM 9-2355-106-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 4X4

Operational length: 250 in.

Operational width: 125 in.

Operational height: 159 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 10.9 in.

Maximum speed: NA

Time to 50 m: NA

GVWR: 43,500 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 68.3 ft.

Payload (GVWR - GVW): 132 lb.

Kit weight: 4,500 lb.

Maximum slope: 30% side/50% long grade

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 59.9 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): NA

Operating limitations (from the Certificate of Materiel Release, U.S. Army

Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center [TARDEC]):

• Maximum speeds:

º Paved road: 55 mph (handling issues)

º Smooth secondary road surfaces: 35 mph (suspension damage)

º Rough secondary road surfaces/cross-country: 10 mph

(suspension damage)

• Do not park vehicle on grade greater than 20 percent—the parking brake

will not hold. Always chalk the wheels when the vehicle is stopped.

• Do not ascend a grade greater than 50 percent.

• Do not climb over a vertical obstacle greater than 14 inches.

• Personnel should be trained on the proper installation and removal of the

spall liners to minimize the hazards associated with accessing and using

components and equipment within the vehicle.

• The base vehicle pneumatic door opening device was upgraded with the

MEAP kit to a linear electric actuator. The upgraded system allows the

operator to open and close the door with the additional weight of the

installed MEAP kit. The electric actuator is a 24-volt ball screw type

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MaxxPro Plus, Navistar Defense, LCC

System Description: The MaxxPro Plus is purpose-built to accommodate armor to

defeat the explosively formed projectile (EFP) IED. The operator manual is TM

9-2355-106-10.

System

MRAP CAT I

MaxxPro

MaxxPro Plus

GVW

43,500 lb.

53,000 lb.

Engine horsepower (HP)

300 HP

355 HP

Engine torque

950 ft-lb.

1,190 ft-lb.

Transmission

Allison 3000SP

Allison 3200SP

Alternator

400 amp

570 amp

Front axle gross axle weight rating (GAWR)

18,000 lb.

23,000 lb.

Steering system

Single steering

Dual steering

gear box

Brakes

Drum

Disc

Rear axle GAWR

25,500 lb.

30,000 lb.

Wheel configuration

Single wheel

Rear dual wheels

GVWR

43,500 lb.

53,000 lb.

Curb weight (CAT I)

36,800 lb.

38,900 lb.

Combat weight (CAT I)

39,100 lb.

43,178 lb.

Payload available (CAT I)

4,368 lb.

11,922 lb.

Max sustained speed (65 mph)

71.4 mph (rated)

65.8 mph (est)

0 to 50 m

8.9 sec.

9 sec. (est)

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RG-33L, BAE Systems-Ground Systems (BAE-GS), CAT II

System Description: CAT II vehicles provide a larger, reconfigurable vehicle that

is capable of supporting multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop

transport, EOD, ambulance, and combat engineering. The operator manual is TM

9-2355-108-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Operational length: 337 in.

Operational width: 108 in.

Operational height: 134 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 14.4 in.

Maximum speed: 67.9 mph

Time to 50 m: 8.7 sec.

GVWR: 52,000 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 81.6 ft. (R), 76.4 ft. (L)

Payload (GVWR - GVW): 778 lb.

Maximum slope: 60%

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 57.6 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): 6.9

Figure 2-5

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RG-33L, BAE Systems-Ground Systems (BAE-GS), CAT II

System Description: Same RG-33L vehicle as above except with

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)-approved add-on armor to

defeat the EFP threat. The add-on-armor kit adds 12,736 lb. and makes the RG-33L

4 ft. 9 in. wider. Expect slower acceleration rates, longer stopping distances, higher

roll rates (higher center of gravity), increased fuel consumption rates, and decreased

side-slope limitations. All of these characteristics have not been formally quantified

yet and are to be determined (TBD). The operator manual is TM 9-2355-108-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Operational length: 337 in.

Operational width: 167 in.

Operational height: 134 in.

Minimum ground clearance: TBD

Maximum speed: TBD

Time to 50 m: TBD

GVWR: 73,500 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): TBD

Payload (GVWR - GVW): TBD

Kit weight: 12,736 lb.

Maximum slope: TBD

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): TBD

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): TBD

Figure 2-6

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Heavy Armored Ground Ambulance (HAGA), BAE Systems-GS, CAT

System Description: HAGA is built from the base RG33L vehicle. Modifications

to the vehicle allow for en route care for six ambulatory to three litter-bound

patients, while still providing increased survivability and reducing additional injury

to patients or crew members from mine explosions, IEDs, and small-arms fire. The

operator manual is TM 9-2355-108-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Operational length: 337 in.

Operational width: 108 in.

Operational height: 134 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 14 in.

Maximum speed: 67.9 mph

Time to 50 m: 8.7 sec.

GVWR: 52,000 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 81.6 ft. (R), 76.4 ft. (L)

Payload (GVWR - GVW): 1,000 lb.

Maximum slope: 60%

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 57.6 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): 6.9

Figure 2-7

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Caiman, BAE Systems-Mobility and Protection Systems (M&PS), CAT I

System Description: The Caiman is based on the family of medium tactical

vehicles platform. CAT I and CAT II support the same mission profiles described

for the MaxxPro and RG-33L. The operator manual is TM 9-2355-107-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Occupants: 6

Operational length: 309 in.

Operational width: 121 in.

Operational height: 143 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 14 in.

Maximum speed: 64.4 mph

Time to 50 m: 9 sec.

GVWR: 50,620 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 61.8 ft.

Payload (GVWR - GVW): 8,368 lb.

Maximum slope: 60%

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 55.8 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): 5.5

Figure 2-8

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Caiman, BAE Systems-M&PS, CAT I

System Description: Same Caiman vehicle as described previously with

TACOM-approved add-on armor to defeat the EFP threat. The add-on-armor kit

adds 13,456 lb. and makes the Caiman 1ft. 1 in. wider. Expect slower acceleration,

longer stopping distances, higher roll rates (higher center of gravity), increased fuel

consumption, and decreased side-slope limitations. All of these characteristics have

not been formally quantified yet and are TBD. The operator manual is TM

9-2355-107-10.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Operational length: 309 in.

Operational width: 134 in.

Operational height: 143 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 14 in.

Maximum speed: TBD

Time to 50 m: TBD

GVWR: 62,000 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): TBD

Payload (GVWR - GVW): TBD

Kit weight: 13,456 lb.

Maximum slope: TBD

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): TBD

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): TBD

Figure 2-9: AKA "Mama Bear"

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Cougar, Force Protection, Inc. (FPI), CAT II

System Description: The Cougar can be configured for a wide range of tasks

including carrying up to 12 troops, EOD, command and control, artillery prime

mover, recovery, and ambulance duty. The operator manual is currently under

development. Use the manufacturer’s operator manual: FPI 100001624 REV B.

System Characteristics:

Configuration type: 6X6

Occupants: 8

Operational length: 277 in.

Operational width: 96 in.

Operational height: 137 in.

Minimum ground clearance: 13.6 in.

Maximum speed: 55 mph

Time to 50 m: 8 sec.

GVWR: 37,485 lb.

Minimum turning distance (curb to curb): 51.9 ft. (R), 50.9 ft. (L)

Payload (GVWR - GVW): 3,655 lb.

Maximum slope: 60%

Center of gravity (GVW vertical): 54.1 in.

Consumption rate (miles/gallon): 8.6

Figure 2-11

Additional Information

The Program Manager for MRAP vehicles has an AKO-shared folder that contains

the operator manuals listed in the above figures. To download the manuals, go to

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/kc_V.do?kcid=8895283&load=true>.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has an MRAP vehicles focus area within the

FORSCOM Training Guidance for SWA, Change 1. To access the site, go to

<https://call2.army.mil/toc.asp?document=2398#mrap>.

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Chapter 3

Mission Equipment Packages

The following depicts the planned mission equipment packages employed on

mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. Except for special purpose

variants, there is no difference between the mission equipment for Category (CAT)

I and CAT II MRAP vehicles.

MRAP vehicles are delivered for fielding with the following installed:

•

Objective gunner protection kit (OGPK)

•

Driver’s vision enhancer

•

Duke, Chameleon, or counter radio-controlled improvised explosive

device (RCIED) electronic warfare (CREW) vehicle receiver/jammer

(CVRJ) counter IED jammer

•

Radio system

º AN/VRC-92 Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

Dual very high frequency (VHF)

º AN/VRC-103 VHF/ultrahigh frequency (select vehicles)

º AN/VRC-104 high frequency/VHF (select vehicles)

º AN/VRC-110 (United States Marine Corps [USMC] and Army

Afghanistan)

•

Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Blue Force Tracker

•

Intercom system (Army: VIC [Vehicle Intercom System]-3; USMC:

Tactical Operations Center Intercommunications System [TOCNET])

•

Warrior aid and litter kit

•

Spotlights

•

Rhino II

•

Medical mission package (ambulance)

MRAP vehicles are delivered for fielding with installation kits for:

• Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) (CAT I

Recon)

• Remote Weapon Station (selected vehicles)

• Fire support mission packages (selected vehicles)

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Chapter 5

Operating Speeds

Mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles have relatively quick

acceleration and a high top speed for vehicles of their weight and size. Most

operations will not require use of all the speed the MRAP vehicle can deliver. Its

dash speed will permit rapid movement between covered and concealed positions or

breaking contact. Review your unit’s tactical standing operating procedures for

further guidance.

Ultimately, the commander will determine and set the rate of movement based on a

thorough understanding of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Operating MRAP

vehicles at high speed in a tactical environment will get you into a dangerous

situation faster than you can counter or react to it. Here are some things to keep in

mind when operating MRAP vehicles:

• Driving at high speed does not increase safety or security during combat

logistic patrols or other mounted combat operations. Higher speeds

reduce driver reaction time, extend stopping distances, and increase roll

rates that can lead to tip over/rollover.

• Traveling at high speeds (anything greater than 25 miles per hour [mph])

significantly decreases the ability to accurately visually scan the road

surface.

• Slow speeds and careful observation greatly increase the chance of

spotting improvised explosive device (IED) indicators or the IED itself.

• Slow speeds allow the MRAP vehicle crew and local national drivers to

react to one another on the road before escalation of force procedures or

evasive maneuvers are required.

• MRAP vehicles are generally very tall with a high center of gravity which

greatly increases the chance of a roll or tip over. Slow speeds will reduce

the possibility of an accident, tip over, or rollover.

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Chapter 6

Capabilities and Limitations

The mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle provides a shift in combat

power. Crew and passenger protection is increased; however, units are faced with

new challenges conducting movement and maneuver. The following are general

capabilities and limitations for leaders to consider when employing MRAP

vehicles.

Protection:

The MRAP is designed for the distinct purpose of increasing the protection of

Soldiers against small-arms fire and the detonation of mines or improvised

explosive devices (IEDs) employed singularly or in combination. While the exact

level of protection each vehicle offers is classified, the vehicles do allow Soldiers

and leaders to take measured risks. With increased protection, an MRAP vehicle

can reduce its standoff to potential threats or move through potential danger areas

when mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions dictate the increased risk

is required.

Given the evolving nature of the threat, the enemy will seek ways to defeat MRAP

vehicles’ anti-mine shape and armor. For this reason, commanders and leaders must

not rely on the sheer survivability of the MRAP vehicles, but must leverage all the

tools and technology available to defeat threats on the battlefield. Accordingly,

leaders and Soldiers alike must make sure that this boost in confidence does not

become overconfidence and lead to needless risk-taking. Units that successfully

employ MRAP vehicles against the enemy will do so by integrating MRAP

protection with training, planning, smart tactics, well-rehearsed drills, and lethal

execution.

Movement and Maneuver:

In order to effectively protect the MRAP vehicles, the weight and size have

increased significantly when compared to the up-armored high mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) (UAH). This has the following

second-order effects on a unit’s movement and maneuver:

• Acceleration and deceleration: MRAP vehicles will not accelerate or

stop at the rate Soldiers may be accustomed to with the UAH.

• Bridges and soft soil: MRAP vehicles will require a higher bridge

classification—20 tons or greater depending on the category of vehicle

and final load of troops and equipment. MRAP vehicles operators must

ensure bridge classifications are for wheeled vehicles. Soft soil poses a

risk to MRAP vehicles. It is likely that the four-wheeled MRAP vehicle

poses a greater risk of sinking or bogging down in soft soil. Avoid

moving too close to the edges of roads that may collapse and cause the

vehicle to tip over.

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WARNING

Operating on single-lane and/or steeply crowned rural roads, roads with no

shoulders, roads with soft shoulders and/or washouts around culverts and

especially any road bordering water (canal/irrigation ditch/pond) requires

extreme caution. The majority of MRAP vehicles rollovers are due to the

road/shoulder/bridge approach giving way under the MRAP vehicle’s

weight and high center of gravity.

Operation on slopes:

The MRAP will ascend longitudinal slopes of up to 60 percent; however, extreme

caution must be exercised on slopes greater than 50 percent. The MRAP vehicle is

capable of operating on side slopes of up to 30 percent (use extreme caution on side

slopes greater than 25 percent).

Restricted terrain:

The overall size of MRAP will limit its mobility in urban terrain:

• Narrow streets and gates may make turns and turning around difficult.

• There is the potential for increased difficulty in navigating through

traffic.

• Cross-country speeds are significantly reduced due to the high center of

gravity. Tall vehicles pose a greater risk of tip or rollover when

negotiating slopes, trenches, ditches, and other obstacles.

• Special consideration should be taken for low-hanging wires (crews need

to have a wire-strike plan). Leaders must account for antenna heights for

both counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) and radio

antennas when operating in urban terrain.

Vehicle height:

The height of the MRAP vehicle provides operational capabilities and limitations:

• During movement, the height allows the gunner to see over other vehicles

and perform overwatch for the convoy. It also can help Soldiers gain

access to second floors of buildings and observe over or gain access into

walled compounds.

• The height of the MRAP vehicles limits access to confined areas and

poses a safety risk where there are low-hanging power lines that pose an

electrical hazard to the gunner.

Area of operations (AO):

Vehicle commanders and drivers must know their specific MRAP vehicle’s

physical dimensions (length, width, height, and weight) and mobility limitations.

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MRAP VEHICLES HANDBOOK

Brigade combat teams and separate battalions must complete a MRAP-specific

trafficability study of the AO to identify the following:

• Dimensions and weight limitations of bridges and overpasses

• Narrow roads with no or narrow shoulders

• Roads that border bodies of water

• Culvert locations (also hiding places for IEDs)

• Power lines (height and voltages)

• No-go terrain (urban and rural)

Trafficability studies/products must be available to the leaders and Soldiers

operating MRAP vehicles so they can factor these AO-specific trafficability and

terrain limitations into their composite risk management and combat planning

processes.

Recovery:

The MRAP vehicle is all-wheel-drive capable. MRAP vehicles may be equipped

with a winch for self recovery. Most MRAP vehicles can tow a like-sized vehicle.

When a tow bar is connected to the bumper of an RG-33 (CAT I and CAT II), it

cannot be lifted high enough to connect it to the tow pintle of the towing RG-33.

The weight of the MRAP vehicle will require a wrecker that can pull approximately

20 tons. The vast majority of MRAP vehicle recovery scenarios can be adequately

accomplished with currently fielded recovery systems—MK-36 medium tactical

vehicle replacement (MTVR), logistic vehicle system (LVS) wrecker, M984 heavy

expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wrecker, and M88.

WARNING

The current self-recovery winch is inadequate and unsafe for recovery

operations and should not be used. Ensure personnel are clear of cables and

chains during recovery in case the cables and chains break.

Note: See Appendix A for recovery techniques and instructions for specific MRAP

vehicle variants.

Fields of fire:

While the MRAP vehicle provides a more stable firing platform than the UAH, it

also significantly limits the gunner’s field of fire (limited turret traversing due to

antennas and limited capability to fully depress). Additionally, the firing ports for

passengers in the vehicle are of very little use. There is significant dead space to the

front, rear, and sides. (See dead space diagram in Chapter 7, Employment

Considerations.)

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Load capacity:

While the MRAP appears large, the armor protection and V-shaped hull

significantly reduces the interior space. When fully loaded with Soldiers, there is

little space for additional mission equipment not directly designed into the vehicle.

Leaders and Soldiers are required to prioritize loads and use exterior points of

attachment or compartments to secure additional equipment. When the CAT II

vehicle gunner’s platform is raised, there is only space for 8 passengers (instead of

10) in some variants such as the Cougar.

Situational awareness:

Inherent with enclosed armored vehicles is the loss of some degree of crew

visibility immediately around the vehicle. While the MRAP vehicle is equipped

with windows, the passengers’ ability to view and hear outside the vehicle is

severely limited. Gunners are critical in compensating for these limitations;

however, the gunner protection kit reduces his ability to see in all directions.

Assigning occupants sectors of observation will be important. Commanders and

leaders must be aware of the psychological effect large armored vehicles have on

interacting with the population. Force protection must be balanced with the need to

interact with the population during stability operations.

Exiting and entering the vehicle:

Exiting the vehicle in response to an ambush and loading or unloading equipment

and casualties are difficult due to the steps and back hatch on some MRAP variants;

units must train and rehearse individuals and teams to streamline the process for

mounting and dismounting operations under various conditions.

The International Military and Government (IMG) MaxxPro is currently the only

MRAP vehicle with a rear ramp instead of a door. Make sure you know how long it

will take to lower and raise the ramp. Consider how this and the chance of enemy

encounter will affect where you dismount or remount the MRAP vehicle. Raising

the ramp can take between 13 and 16 seconds. Lowering the ramp can take between

17 and 19 seconds. For planning, use 14 seconds to raise the ramp and 19 seconds

to lower the ramp.

Recommendations

Vehicle commander:

• Enforce the use of crew restraints and protective headgear, and ensure all

loads are secure.

• Incorporate the potential for rollover due to terrain/roads/trails along

routes and in the area of operations to include bridge ratings, culverts, and

bridge approaches.

• Incorporate the potential for wire (power line) strike and have a workable

action plan.

• Ensure anticipated hazards to include alternate/bypass routes are briefed.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 28