Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Terrorism

larger population would accent anxiety, fear, and frustration of how to prevent other similar attacks with a

WMD (see figure 6-7).

Figure 6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example)

6-115. The expertise to acquire and use WMD remains a significant terrorist threat based on some irregular

forces intent to―

z Acquire materials to construct or develop WMD.

z Threaten to attack with WMD

z Attack combatants and noncombatants indiscriminately with WMD.

z Create mass injury, death, mayhem, and damage with WMD.

TERRORISM TRENDS AND EMERGENT VECTORS

6-116. Trends of terrorism can be considered emergent variations and adaptation to age-old truths of conflict

when at least two forces are unequally matched in military power. Terrorism is often indicative of a weaker

force seeking vulnerabilities in a more powerful force and attacking those weaknesses with an expectation of

persistent conflict. No accurate prediction exists on the character, location, or duration of any specific future

terrorism; however, irregular force will continue to improvise, innovate, and adapt TTP to achieve success

through acts of terror.

6-117. Situational accelerators can spotlight probable vectors of terrorism adaptation by irregular forces in

near-term years. Uncertainties include the pace and/or tempo an irregular force can demonstrate in its

tactical or operational reach, effects an irregular force can display throughout the strategic depth of an

enemy, and how successful the “battle of the narrative” will be in influencing a targeted population. The

resilience of motives and ideological commitment of an irregular force and its leaders remain primary

strengths in an irregular force campaign of terror. Terrorism trends and emergent vectors that irregular

forces consider include—

Improved situational awareness and understanding of the enemy.

Radicalized philosophy and/or ideology as a compelling motivation.

Adaptive organizational tactics and techniques.

Versatile organizational affiliations.

Expanded transnational affiliates.

Emergent independent adherents.

Devastating full spectrum weaponry.

Targeted economic disruption.

Globalized media affairs.

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IMPROVED AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING

6-118. Understanding situational context approaches the issue of irregular emergent vectors along an avenue

of action used by irregulars, paramilitary, guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, or criminals. Intent has a premise

of adapting constantly to optimize knowledge, training, logistical support, and readiness to conduct irregular

operations. Terrorism will be used when this type of action accomplishes the desired psychological and

physical effects. Irregular forces can be patient. Irregular forces plan while waiting for critical opportunities

to strike.

6-119. Irregular force vectors consider the nature of irregular forces and the capabilities and limitations of

specific irregular forces in an evolving contemporary operational environment. As the regions of the world

advance in technological areas, expand the mobility opportunities of people, and exploit the Internet and

other media, extremists concurrently fuel grievances and alienate segments of populations to foster support

for their agendas.

6-120. Irregular forces assess and plan for conducting operations in an area of responsibility and also

consider how to attack forces and/or states that may exist in regions that are distant from a primary area of

land, air, and/or maritime conflict. Cooperation and collaboration among extremist affiliates and/or

adherents will plan for and attempt to attacks the homelands of those states that may be supporting a

governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Irregular forces also assess and plan

for attacking intermediate staging locations that would disrupt the flow or prevent significant support

from these states.

RADICALIZED MOTIVATIONS

6-121. Core grievances are real or perceived issues of segments in a targeted population. The importance of

the core grievances or even their existence can change over time. Irregular forces can manipulate core

grievances to create conditions for developing the willing support within a population. The perception of

foreign exploitation or a governing authority that appears to be excessively influenced by foreigners can be a

core grievance. For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some of

the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A foreign military

presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment as well. The mere presence or specific actions of

foreigners may offend local religious or cultural sensibilities. A state or regional governance in an area can

be a core grievance.

6-122. Extremists that are very conservative can be as revolutionary in intent as other groups that are

considered very liberal. Intents may include replacing forms of legitimate government with varied types of

authoritarian rule. Socialism or variants of communism and/or other forms of totalitarianism can exist in

many forms. However, ideology can range the political variable from fascist or other totalitarian intentions

to an opposite political perspective of anarchism. As regimes fail to demonstrate its value to a subjected

population, a population may gradually and secretly plan and act for change. Religious fundamentalism or

extremist viewpoints can become a core grievance. Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels

widespread public dissatisfaction in a relevant population. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for

recruitment into an irregular force. Lack of essential services in a population complicates an OE and its

effective governance. Examples of these essential needs are availability of food and potable water, credible

law enforcement, emergency services, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and sanitation

programs for trash and sewage. Stabilizing a relevant population requires meeting these basic social and

civil needs. Frustration and a feeling of disenfranchised existence can sway a relevant population to support

an irregular force that promises change and improved living conditions.

ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

6-123. In an era of sophisticated weapon systems and rapid international deployment of military forces,

incidents demonstrate the effectiveness of simple tactics conducted efficiently by small irregular forces.

Devastating attacks can be conducted by a small unit or cell of irregular force terrorists. Operating in two- or

three-person teams, they could simultaneously attack separate locations. The terrorists would be armed

primarily with small arms, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices. The attacks and eventual

destruction of the terrorists could extend to hours or days of horrifying murder and mayhem. A methodical

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Terrorism

containment and room-by-room clearance of historic and multi-story buildings in a large metropolitan

complex would be covered by global media outlets throughout the incident. An irregular force conducts

operations with the expectation of such publicity to spotlight its irregular force agenda and embarrass the

governing authority that it defies.

VERSATILE ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

6-124. Irregular forces will normally start as small entities with modest operational capabilities. As

capabilities develop, plans may focus on acquiring improved capabilities across the functions of intelligence,

logistics, communications, media affairs, and direct action. Building capacity in order to demonstrate

commitment and capability is progressive. Temporary setbacks in plans and actions require flexibility to

adjust timelines and adapt support networks. These networks can be as local as a neighborhood information-

intelligence collection effort to a disciplined outreach for assistance from sources external to the immediate

community or region.

6-125. Organizational versatility can include units or cells focused on acts of terrorism or other actions and

organizations which are difficult to distinguish from civil crime. The increasing role of criminal activity in

financing an agenda, either in partnership or competition with traditional criminal activities, can be a

condition used by irregular forces. These enterprises include drug trafficking and human smuggling, fraud,

tax evasion, counterfeiting, money laundering, and theft. Some activities are associated with terrorist’s

evolving capabilities for false documents production and concealment of money transactions for their

operational purposes.

6-126. Irregular forces and criminal organizations can be closely related for mutual benefits. Mega-cities are

expanding in countries with poor services and weak governance. Bases and operations in rural and urban

environments will increase where law enforcement is often ineffective and/or corrupt. Rampant

unemployment and dissatisfaction creates a productive recruiting ground and operating environment for

irregular forces promoting grievances acknowledged by large segments of the population. Many of these city

areas have materiel, communication, and transport capacities for irregular forces to use, and a potentially

huge base of sympathizers and recruits.

6-127. A development related to this is the emergence of regions where governments exercise marginal

control of geographic areas within their sovereign territory. Control is imposed by sub-state actors that can

span criminal organizations, militias, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists. Government forces confront

violent and capable irregular forces that often resort to open coercion and terrorism of officials, police

officers, military forces, their families, and the general citizenry. In addition to overt intimidation of a

populace, irregular forces exploit the vulnerabilities of new technologies to attack and have a great deal of

flexibility in their use of new technology. They have the advantage of only needing to attack or neutralize

specific systems or capabilities, and can concentrate fiscal expenditures on specialized counter-technology to

protect their criminal systems. Nonetheless, irregular forces can often neutralize advanced systems or

capabilities through the use of simple and unconventional techniques such as a suicide bomber.

EXPANDED TRANSNATIONAL AFFILIATES

6-128. Transnational actions and terrorism presents a global challenge. Some irregular forces seek to

conduct major operations that cause large scale, maximum casualty impact. Globalization removes the

perceived security that national borders and geographic distance from adversaries and enemies once

indicated. Commerce and finance is international, travel is international, and society in general is a much

more international community. Operating beyond the organizational reach of an opponent can provide the

physical space or fiscal and media affairs support to enhance an irregular force purpose.

6-129. Irregular forces can operate in and among this international reach and develop transnational

capabilities through a loose affiliation of clandestine networks, inserted sleeper or active cells within

geographic regions, and adaptability to constantly shift and change in organizational form. When extremist

ideology is the primary motivation, the commitment is often absolutist with no allowance for compromise

and seeks no negotiation. Violence signals a committed path to conditions with no restrictions by social

norms, laws, or values. Actions such as terrorism are often becoming more networks based. Irregular forces

can encourage loosely organized, self-financed organizational structures. The motivation of terrorists

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Chapter 6

appears to be based increasingly on theological extremes and ideological absolutes. International or

transnational cooperation among some terrorists provides an improved ability to recruit members, develop

fiscal support and resources, gain skills training and expertise, transfer technology, and when desired,

political advice.

EMERGENT INDEPENDENT ADHERENTS

6-130. The presence of varied irregular forces and/or possible independent actors that separate from an

originating organization can easily blur in organizations claiming responsibility for terrorism incidents.

These actors can be at the individual level or small cells acting on a specified agenda that may be similar but

distinct from more well known irregular force organizations. Independent actors may purposely minimize or

preclude public announcement of their plans and action in order to improve their cell security.

6-131. Independent adherents are adjusting their financial operations to be self-sustaining in their activities.

This independence from any external control is a value to an irregular force as it gains the impact of diverse

and separate adherent actions at no real cost to his own organizational base. The facility with which groups

can obtain and move funds, procure secure bases, and obtain and transport weaponry determines their own

operational abilities and the level of threat that they pose to a common enemy. The international nature of

finance, the integration of global economies, and the presence of terrorist adherents in the illegal economies

of slaves, drugs, smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, identity theft, and fraud have aided an

independence from traditional sources of state-linked sponsorship and other interconnected support.

DEVASTATING FULL SPECTRUM WEAPONRY

6-132. Weapon lethality can be assessed in many ways but efficiency and effectiveness are two general

means to determine intent. Some weapons are quite simple and very deadly in effect. Lethality and overall

effects are key considerations when assessed with types of action to obtain attention and reaction. The

trauma of violent deaths as well as mass injuries and damage on a targeted population can be critical to the

psychological effect and consequent actions or inaction by the affected population. Terrorism will continue

to seek forms of indiscriminate violence. Acts of terror can also be targeted to specific people, groups, or

capabilities. Terrorism is merging and combining with various other state and sub-state actors, further

blurring the difference between criminals, rogue governments, and terrorists.

6-133. Ongoing conflicts display that terrorism attacks account for only a small fraction of civil violence but

the high-profile nature of many terrorist operations can have a disproportionate negative impact. Conditions

and changing dynamics in conflict can create a perception in a relevant population of unchecked violence

and fear. Such perception can harden differing opinions, empower militias and vigilante groups, increase a

middle-class exodus from a region, and disrupt confidence in a governing authority and its security forces.

Terrorism plays a key role in much of this physical and psychological violence.

6-134. The means to cause mass casualties can be a highly sophisticated weapon system such as a

weaponized military-grade nuclear device. However, mass destruction can also be caused by an improvised

low-yield explosive weapon such as the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the

Pentagon. While purposeful mass casualty incidents may have appeared to be extraordinary events several

decades ago, contemporary acts of terror surpass these former acts and demonstrate a profound impact on

populations at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Emergent actions indicate that terrorism

previously centralized and controlled by formal networks and organizations, is being conducted increasingly

by loosely affiliated terrorists or groups that may generally identify themselves with an ideology or special

purpose agenda. The threat can be foreign and domestic.

6-135. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a particularly alarming issue. The projected effects

amplify the danger and fear of a catastrophic attack. Some of these materials that could be used to construct

some form of WMD are easily accessible in the public domain. Other potential capabilities are quite

problematic to weaponizing materiel. The knowledge and technological means of specialists to produce

WMD is a shadowy area of science, crime, and intrigue available to some terrorists.

6-136. The trend to exploit available simple and sophisticated technologies and the desire to cause mass

casualties could be demonstrated in irregular force attacks that employ WMD such as—

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Terrorism

Chemical [sarin nerve agent] attacks in a metropolitan subway system.

Biological [anthrax] attacks using contaminated letters in postal system.

Low-yield explosive aerial bomb as in nearly simultaneous suicide attacks with large commercial

jet aircraft into critical infrastructure.

Low-yield explosive vehicular bomb as in a vehicle borne improvised explosive device attack on a

Federal governing authority building and commercial business locale.

Radioactive material placed in a public location for area contamination.

Nuclear weapon detonation in a controlled environment as a demonstration of capability.

TARGETED ECONOMIC DISRUPTION

6-137. Modern, high-technology societies are susceptible to a concept of complex terrorism. Dependence

on electronic networks in modern infrastructure, sometimes with questionable redundancy in systems, and

concentrating critical assets in small geographic locales can present lucrative targets for the irregular force.

Some emerging irregular forces wield effective power in failing states and view terrorism as an effective

mode of conflict.

6-138. Critical infrastructure and support systems provide terrorists with a wide array of potential targets in

land, maritime, cyber, and space environments that would directly affect economies on a regional and global

scale. Common vulnerabilities may focus on oil refinery operations and overland and/or maritime

shipment of oil products. Infrastructure for oil production has critical aspects in key areas of the world.

Single points of failure in the infrastructure or denying critical services for a period of time could severely

disrupt world economies.

GLOBALIZED MEDIA AFFAIRS

6-139. Exploiting mass media considers the value of effectively marketing an irregular force message

through a nearly simultaneous global information environment. An overarching principle is to create and

maintain international attention and impact. To gain international awareness and attention to grievances and

issues, incidents must often be spectacular to attract mass media coverage. Effectiveness of INFOWAR will

be measured by its ability to cause a dramatic impact of fear and uncertainty in a target population. Surprise

and sustained violence may be normal against specified people representing elements of civil or military

control and order of a governing authority with whom irregular forces are in conflict. Common citizens may

also be targets in a culture of violence. Damage or destruction of community, regional, or national

infrastructure and governance will be used to gain attention, provoke excessive reaction by host nation or

coalition military forces, and attempt to alienate general population support of a governing authority.

6-140. Irregular force operations consider a desired media effect and plan for verbal or visual reporting

coverage. Supporting events and interviews reinforce the desired message. These messages may present

disinformation and false perspectives. Frequently, military reluctance to comment on ongoing operations in

the media for operational security reasons can assist the irregular force. If no balanced information comes

from official sources in a timely manner, the media may use the information readily available from the

irregular force or a terrorist cell as a primary source for reporting an incident.

6-141. Future armed conflicts are more likely to be fought “among the people” rather than “around the

people.” Conflict in urban areas and populated locales is inevitable. Much of the world’s population is

already located in urban terrain. In the next two decades, estimates pose five billion of the world’s eight

billion people will live in cities. Many of the population hubs will be along coastlines throughout the world’s

regions. Irregular forces will attempt to blend into concentrated populations in order to marginalize

detection of their recruiting, training, and staging initiatives; obtain support within a coerced or passive

populace, and act at times and locations of their own selection. Media attention to a major incident will be

immediate in coverage.

6-142. Rural areas and their inhabitants, depending on conditions in particular regions, will complement

operations in urban centers. Irregular forces will evolve hybrid capacity of selective conventional military,

paramilitary, and criminal organization capabilities. Rural irregular forces will operate in regions providing

cover and concealment such as heavily forested or mountainous areas that hinder some forms of detection

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Chapter 6

and interdiction. Notwithstanding, a rural orientation must lead back to urban centers as a presence and

connection to the main population masses and the political infrastructure of governing authorities with

whom irregular forces are in conflict.

THE SPECTER OF TERRORISM

6-143. The specter of irregular forces using terrorism on a society illustrates the value that such acts can

provide to an irregular force that is often incapable of directly confronting an enemy with overwhelming

combat power. The key factors of a successful campaign of irregular force terrorism will continue to be the

long-term resolve and resilience of terrorists to continue the conflict until their aims are achieved.

6-144. The dedicated irregular force using terrorism must be adaptive and flexible to the periodic success of

an enemy. When terrorism is disrupted with key irregular force leaders killed or captured, and functional

capabilities are degraded or destroyed, other irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents are

prepared to continue the struggle against a declared enemy.

6-145. A relevant population is a critical qualifying environment of nearly all irregular conflict. Irregular

forces decentralize, network, and operate among a relevant population to overcome technological advantages

of an enemy. The resilience of an irregular force and the expected debilitating effects of terrorism on an

enemy require a determined long-term commitment from irregular force leaders to defeat an enemy. The

massing of effects over time often requires a patient and decentralized approach to irregular conflict. The

irregular force maintains a keen sense of cultural awareness and social understanding to establish a rationale

for terror that is tolerated to a relevant population. The irregular force must obtain and sustain the passive

and/or active support of the relevant population within which it operates.

6-146. An INFOWAR campaign must promote a resilient irregular force message of purpose and

commitment to a relevant population. The objective of terrorism in support of an irregular force agenda must

be recognized by a relevant population as a compelling outcome worth the amount of suffering and social

disruption that terrorism and other acts by an irregular force may cause. Whether the ultimate aims of an

irregular force are ideological, philosophical, and/or practical, terrorism will continue to be a vexing

factor in future conflicts among and between state and non-state actors throughout the world.

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Chapter 7

Functional Tactics

Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive

functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander

or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission.

Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes

the effort.

Note. Since criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional

tactics, the term irregular OPFOR in this chapter refers to insurgents and/or guerrillas.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-1. An irregular OPFOR commander or leader specifies the initial organization of forces or elements

within his level of command, according to the specific functions he intends his various subordinates to

perform. At brigade level (when that exists in guerrilla units), the subordinate units performing these

functions are referred to as forces. At lower levels they are called elements.

Note. This functional organization provides a common language and a clear understanding of

how the commander or leader intends his subordinates to fight functionally. Thus, subordinates

that perform common tactical tasks such as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security,

deception, or main defense are logically designated as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation,

security, deception, or main defense forces or elements. Irregular OPFOR commanders and

leaders prefer using the clearest and most descriptive term to avoid any confusion. When the

irregular OPFOR operates in conjunction with an affiliated regular military force, there is the

advantage that regular OPFOR commanders also use this common language.

7-2. The commander or leader organizes and designates various forces and elements according to their

function in the planned offensive or defensive action. A number of different functions must be executed

each time the irregular OPFOR attempts to accomplish a mission. The functions do not change, regardless

of where the force or element might happen to be located. However, the function (and hence the functional

designation) of a particular force or element may change during the course of a tactical action. The use of

precise functional designations for every force or element involved in a particular tactical action allows for

a clearer understanding by subordinates of the distinctive functions their commander or leader expects them

to perform. It also allows each force or element to know exactly what all of the others are doing at any

time. This knowledge facilitates the ability to make quick adjustments and to adapt very rapidly to shifting

tactical situations. This practice also assists in a more comprehensive planning process by eliminating the

likelihood of some confusion (especially on graphics) of who is responsible for what.

Note. A subordinate designated as a particular functional force or element may also be called

upon to perform other, more specific functions. Therefore, the function of that force or element,

or part(s) of it, may be more accurately described by a more specific functional designation. For

example, a disruption force generally “disrupts,” but also may need to “fix” a part of the enemy

forces. In that case, the entire disruption force could become the fixing force, or parts of that

force could become fixing elements.

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Chapter 7

7-3. The various functions required to accomplish any given mission can be quite diverse. However, they

can be broken down into two very broad categories: action and enabling.

ACTION FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-4. One part of the organization conducting a particular offensive or defensive action is normally

responsible for performing the primary function or task that accomplishes the overall mission goal or

objective of that action. In most general terms, therefore, that part can be called the action force or action

element. In most cases, however, the higher unit commander will give the action force or element a more

specific designation that identifies the specific function or task it is intended to perform, which equates to

achieving the objective of the higher command’s mission.

7-5. For example, if the objective of the action of a guerrilla company or a grouping of insurgent direct

action cells is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete that action may be called the raiding

element. In a brigade-level offensive, a force that completes the primary offensive mission by exploiting a

window of opportunity created by another force is called the exploitation force. In defensive actions,

the grouping that performs the main defensive mission is called the main defense force or main

defense element.

ENABLING FORCES AND ELEMENTS

7-6. In relation to the action force or element, all other parts of the organization conducting an offensive

or defensive action provide enabling functions of various kinds. In most general terms, therefore, each of

these parts can be called an enabling force or enabling element. However, each subordinate force or

element with an enabling function can be more clearly identified by the specific function or task it

performs. For example, an element that clears obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish a

battalion’s tactical task is a clearing element.

7-7. In most cases, irregular OPFOR tactical actions would involve one or more types of enabling forces

or elements designated by their specific function. The most common types include—

Disruption force or element. Disrupts enemy preparations or actions; destroys or deceives enemy

reconnaissance; begins reducing the effectiveness of key enemy elements.

Fixing force or element. Fixes the enemy by preventing a part of his force from moving from a

specific location for a specific period of time, so it cannot interfere with the primary

OPFOR action.

Security force or element. Provides security for other parts of a larger organization, protecting

them from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed.

Deception force or element. Conducts a deceptive action (such as a demonstration or feint) that

leads the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to enemy interests or favoring the success of an

OPFOR action force or element.

Support force or element. Provides support by fire; other combat or combat service support; or

command and control (C2) functions for other parts of a larger organization.

Reconnaissance force or element. Conducts specific reconnaissance task(s) tailored to

the mission.

Note. In a defensive situation, there may be a particular unit or grouping that the irregular

OPFOR commander or leader wants to be protected from enemy observation and fire, to

ensure that it will still be available for further actions. This may be designated as the protected

force or element.

FLEXIBILITY

7-8. The function of a particular force or element may change in the course of a tactical action. For

example, a grouping originally designated as a reconnaissance element may locate an enemy unit that it has

the combat power to engage. In that case, the element in question could become an assault element, ambush

element, or raiding element.

7-2

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Functional Tactics

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

7-9. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by smaller

tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include—

Ambush.

Assault.

Raid.

Reconnaissance attack (guerrillas only).

Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack. (See TC

7-100.2 for basic discussion of these offensive actions, as they are also conducted by the regular OPFOR.)

7-10. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the offensive action best suited to accomplishing

their mission. Insurgent cells and small guerrilla units typically execute one combat mission at a time.

Therefore, it would be rare for such a cell or unit to employ more than one type of offensive action

simultaneously. However, irregular OPFOR organizations are dynamic and adapt very quickly to the

situation. An offensive action may have to make use of whatever cell(s) or unit(s) can take advantage of a

window of opportunity.

AMBUSH

7-11. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position against a moving or temporarily halted

target. In an ambush, the actions of the enemy determine the time, and the irregular OPFOR leader decides

on the location. Similar to purposes used by regular military OPFOR, the irregular OPFOR can conduct

ambushes to—

Destroy or capture enemy elements, personnel, and/or designated very important persons.

Secure supplies.

Demoralize enemy military forces and officials of a governing authority.

Delay introduction of international and/or enemy coalition assistance to a governing authority.

Block enemy movements and/or logistics support.

Canalize or restrict enemy movement.

7-12. The irregular OPFOR can use an ambush as a primary psychological tool in its information warfare

(INFOWAR) activities. The psychological effects of ambushes can be enhanced by—

Conducting recurring ambushes at known areas and/or points where enemy forces must travel.

Changing the tempo or the number of ambushes to appear unpredictable.

Attacking targets that were previously considered safe or had not been attacked.

Using weapons with range capabilities previously not used in an area of conflict.

Increasing weapons and/or demolitions effects against particular targets.

7-13. A common tactic is to conduct an ambush as a means to set up ambush(es) of enemy forces that

respond to the original ambush. Multiple and nearly simultaneous ambushes can be conducted along likely

avenues of approach to the area of the initial ambush. Ambushes may also target enemy medical treatment

and evacuation assets, when irregular OPFOR commanders or leaders decide to not comply with

international conventions and law of war norms that regular military forces use. The destruction of means

to evacuate and treat wounded can instill a sense of tentativeness in enemy soldiers because they realize

that, should they become wounded or injured, medical help may not be forthcoming.

7-14. Attacking known points of enemy weakness is a fundamental planning consideration for the irregular

OPFOR. Correspondingly, the irregular OPFOR avoids enemy strength.

7-15. Surprise and overwhelming massed firepower at a specific place and time provides an expectation

of tactical success for the irregular OPFOR. Factors that complement tactical surprise and massed

firepower are—

Detailed plans and rehearsals.

Selection of ambush positions.

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Chapter 7

Rapid and violent conduct of the ambush.

Disciplined withdrawal of irregular OPFOR elements from the ambush site.

Functional Organization for an Ambush

7-16. An ambush force is typically organized into three types of elements: the ambush element, security

element, and support element. There may be more than one of each element (see figure 7-1).

IED

Ambush

Security

Support

Element

(w/ Video

Security

Camera)

Element

Exfiltrate

Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example)

Ambush Element(s)

7-17. The ambush element has the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in kill zone(s).

Other tasks may include capturing personnel and/or recovering supplies and equipment.

Security Element(s)

7-18. The security element has a mission to provide early warning to irregular OPFOR elements of any

enemy presence that might disrupt the ambush. Another task can be to protect the ambush element from

becoming decisively engaged by enemy forces before, during, or after the ambush.

Support Element(s)

7-19. The support element can include direct and/or indirect fires and provides general support to improve

success of the ambush. The insurgent leader or guerrilla commander typically commands and controls the

ambush from the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control.

Executing an Ambush

7-20. There are three types of ambushes based on the desired mission effects⎯annihilation, harassment, or

containment. The irregular OPFOR conduct ambushes with a particular purpose that often supports a larger

tactical action.

Annihilation Ambush

7-21. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy an enemy force within a designated kill zone. In

addition to massed direct fires, the irregular OPFOR often increases the lethality of a kill zone with indirect

fires, manmade obstacles, mines, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to halt, contain, and kill the

enemy force in the kill zone (see figure 7-2).

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Functional Tactics

Note. For guerrilla forces, annihilation ambushes in complex terrain, including urban

environments, often involve task-organized hunter-killer (HK) teams.

Ambush

IED

Support

Element

Security

Element

Support

Element

KILL

ZONE

IED

Ambush

Element

Ambush

Security

Element

IED

Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example)

7-22. Irregular OPFOR commanders and leaders may be willing to accept decisive engagement with the

enemy in this type of ambush. An annihilation ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks to—

Block.

Contain.

Destroy.

7-23. The ambush and support elements normally remain in their fighting positions until the enemy in the

kill zone is rendered combat ineffective. The intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the

kill zone with concentrated firepower.

7-24. Once the enemy is destroyed, the ambush element can secure the kill zone and eliminate any

remaining enemy in the kill zone. The support element provides overwatch protection to the ambush

element when the ambush element is directed to search the destroyed enemy force and equipment for

information and/or intelligence. Weapons and materiel can be seized by the ambush element for future

irregular OPFOR tactical actions.

7-25. The security element remains in fighting positions to ensure early warning, isolate a kill zone, and

prevent any enemy from escaping the kill zone. Once the ambush element clears the kill zone, the ambush

force withdraws from the ambush area. The ambush element withdraws first and is followed by the support

element. The security element is the last element to depart the kill zone area and delays or blocks any rapid

response of enemy forces that attempt to pursue irregular OPFOR elements as they depart the kill zone

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Chapter 7

area. Depending on the size of the ambush force, the elements typically reassemble at a predetermined

location and time at a safe house or safe haven.

Note. An irregular OPFOR ambush could employ security elements to provide early warning

and/or isolate a series of kill zones on a known convoy route of the enemy. Restrictive natural

terrain and manmade features are reinforced with IEDs to disrupt and contain an enemy force in

the kill zones. A simple ambush technique is to employ a decoy IED that is observable on an

enemy force route. Once enemy forces halt to investigate the potential of an IED detonation, the

ambush force initiates the actual ambush with the simultaneous detonation of IEDs directed into

the kill zone where enemy soldiers and vehicles are expected to halt. Lead and trail vehicles are

initially the primary targets for massed direct fires and destruction. When they are destroyed, the

ambush and support elements shift direct and indirect fires from both ends of the enemy column

toward the center of the contained enemy forces. The enemy convoy is destroyed with massed

overlapping direct and indirect fires. Ambush elements and designated support elements

exfiltrate from the area while security elements provide rear security and an all-arms air defense

capability against any enemy response forces. On order, security elements also exfiltrate from

the ambush site and rendezvous with other guerilla elements at a safe haven.

Harassment Ambush

7-26. The purpose of a harassment ambush is to disrupt routine enemy activities, impede the enemy’s

freedom of movement, and/or create a negative psychological impact on enemy personnel. The irregular

OPFOR may choose to conduct a harassment ambush when the enemy has superior combat power and

destruction of an enemy force is not feasible as in an annihilation ambush. This type of ambush does not

require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill zone but can include terrain reinforced into a kill

zone with manmade obstacles, mines, and/or IEDs to halt and/or contain the enemy force for a limited

period of time. Compared to an annihilation ambush, the irregular OPFOR typically conducts a harassment

ambush at a greater distance from the enemy in a kill zone. A harassment ambush often considers the

maximum effective range of its weapons when massing firepower.

7-27. The irregular OPFOR does not normally accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of

ambush. A harassment ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks that can include—

Disrupt.

Delay.

Defeat.

7-28. The ambush and support elements are often combined to provide more effective control of fires

throughout the kill zone. This combination is especially useful when the kill zone is quite wide and/or

extends for a long distance. The security element provides early warning of any enemy forces conducting

reconnaissance prior to the ambush and/or enemy forces attempting to respond to the ambush.

7-29. Once the irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines that the ambush has achieved the

desired effects, he directs the ambush and support elements to withdraw along designated routes. The

security element continues to report on enemy activity in the kill zone area and any attempt of enemy

forces to pursue. The irregular OPFOR will not become decisively engaged by enemy forces and often

emplace mines and/or IEDs to delay enemy pursuit.

7-30. Repeated harassment ambushes against the enemy can⎯

Cause the enemy to allocate a disproportionate amount of forces to security tasks which affect

other enemy force missions and potentially create enemy vulnerabilities.

Create a negative psychological effect upon enemy soldiers and leaders, and officials of a

governing authority with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict.

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Functional Tactics

Containment Ambush

7-31. A containment ambush is a security task that is usually part of a larger tactical action. This type of

ambush can prevent the enemy from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another tactical action

such as a raid or another ambush.

7-32. The ambush element can be directed to secure a kill zone, but this task is not necessarily required for

mission success. The support and security elements perform the same functions as those described in an

annihilation ambush. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush. The commander or

leader determines if his relative combat power compared to enemy forces is adequate to conduct a

containment ambush. The fact that containment may require the irregular OPFOR elements to remain in an

ambush site for an extended period places those elements in danger of being fixed and defeated by enemy

reinforcements.

7-33. The ambush force will normally not accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of

ambush. However, it can be directed to accept decisive engagement in support of a larger irregular OPFOR

action. A containment ambush typically emphasizes related tactical tasks that can include—

Contain.

Fix.

Delay.

Defeat.

Command and Control of an Ambush

7-34. The commander or leader of the ambush force normally positions himself with the support element

and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the ambush element. However, the ambush

force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the ambush.

7-35. Urban and rural complex terrain provides several tactical advantages to irregular OPFOR ambush,

security, and support elements. Operating among indigenous citizens in an urban area or other complex

terrain can be used to—

Observe enemy forces along known canalized routes or areas of reconnaissance and/or avenues

of approach or directions of attack.

Provide for easily camouflaged irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance activities.

Provide covered and/or concealed irregular OPFOR routes into and out of the ambush kill zone

area.

Improve irregular OPFOR ambush, security, and support positions with cover, concealment, and

camouflage of the natural and manmade tactical environment.

Encourage deception activities in a relevant civilian population against enemy forces and a

governing authority.

Encourage techniques that employ overlapping direct fires from multiple directions into a

designated kill zone.

Support of an Ambush

7-36. An ambush typically requires several types of support. These can include reconnaissance, fire

support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. Covert or overt assistance may

also be provided from external sources such as special-purpose forces (SPF) of another state.

Reconnaissance

7-37. Reconnaissance is critical to a successful ambush and is continuous in the objective area in order to

confirm and/or adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The

irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities

at the planned objective area in order to select the best terrain on which to locate irregular OPFOR

positions.

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Chapter 7

7-38. The irregular OPFOR often has sufficient time in a local community and in vicinity of the objective

to observe and interact with the relevant population. Posing as innocent civilians or coercing local civilians

and/or civic leaders, irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance reports combine with the reports

from active supporters. Assessing and analyzing these reports assist the commander or leader in finalizing

his ambush plan. Once infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintain these

routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the ambush. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations

and activities is essential to tactical survival.

7-39. The irregular OPFOR will closely monitor—

Routines of enemy forces selected as the target.

Enemy use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.

Lapses in local security measures among groupings of enemy soldiers and vehicles.

Routes and response time of enemy quick reaction forces during prior ambushes or irregular

OPFOR ruses.

Cooperation of governing authority law enforcement and paramilitary units with enemy forces.

Medical treatment and evacuation norms of enemy forces.

Fire Support

7-40. Fire support is typically in the support element. In most ambushes, support elements in proximity to

ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or antitank

grenade launchers (ATGLs). However, some support elements may also provide indirect fires from mortars

and rockets. Fires can also support security elements, if necessary. The irregular OPFOR emplaces fire

support systems with the intention of quickly withdrawing them at the conclusion of the ambush.

7-41. Artillery from an affiliated regular military force can augment fires organic to the irregular OPFOR

ambush force. Such artillery support can provide additional fires into the kill zone, illumination over it, or

smoke to permit withdrawal.

Air Defense

7-42. Capabilities for air defense during an ambush may be limited to an all-arms air defense concept,

using the small arms and direct fire weapons with the ambush force. However, guerrilla battalions typically

have a limited man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) capability in their weapons company. If

allocated to an ambush force, these MANPADS would likely be located in security element(s).

Note. Air defense in the irregular OPFOR can also be improved by state and non-state sponsors

providing sophisticated air defense weapons, technologies, training, and logistics support. Other

opportunities may arise when insurgents or guerrillas in armed conflict capture or acquire

sophisticated air defense weapons. In either case, clandestine state or non-state agents and/or

technicians can provide technical support to ensure the effective use of the weapon systems.

Examples of state-of-the-art air defense systems include shoulder-fired MANPADS and/or other

air defense missiles with detection and tracking systems mounted on wheeled or tracked

vehicles.

Engineer-Like Capabilities

7-43. Mobility and countermobility support often depends on insurgents or guerrillas with specialized

skills and expertise from their civilian occupations or previous military experience. Guerrilla units include

sappers, who are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. Covert or overt assistance

may also be provided from external sources such as SPF of another state.

Logistics

7-44. Logistics are prepared as caches or supported from safe houses and havens as part of detailed

planning and rehearsals. The ambush force typically moves from a secured location with everything it

needs to complete the mission. In those rare situations that require a multi-day hide prior to executing the

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Functional Tactics

ambush, the ambush force will have to move with its own extra life support. Resupply of the ambush force

would significantly increase the chances of its detection and defeat its purpose.

INFOWAR

7-45. INFOWAR activities can support ambushes by concealing the intended action through deception and

information protection. An INFOWAR campaign may use successful ambushes to demonstrate the

progressive failure of an enemy force and/or governing authority. INFOWAR support of an ambush can

temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. (See appendix A for additional information on

irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

ASSAULT

7-46. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation

and/or destruction of his position. An assault is a basic form of irregular OPFOR tactical offensive combat.

Therefore, other types of offensive action may include an element that conducts an assault to complete the

mission. However, that element will typically be given a designation that corresponds to the specific

mission accomplished. For example, an element that conducts an assault in the completion of an ambush

would be called the ambush element.

Functional Organization for an Assault

7-47. The insurgent cell(s) or guerrilla unit(s) conducting an assault constitute an assault force. The assault

force typically is organized into three types of elements:

Assault element.

Security element.

Support element.

There may be more than one of each of these types of element.

Assault Element

7-48. The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, destroying

any forces there.

Security Element

7-49. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from

reinforcing the assaulted enemy unit. Security elements often make use of terrain choke points, obstacles,

ambushes, and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the assault. The commander or

leader may (or may be forced to) accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early

warning that is not strong enough to block or delay enemy reinforcements. This decision is based on the

specific situation.

Support Element

7-50. The support element provides the assault element with one or more of the following:

C2.

Combat service support (CSS).

Supporting direct fire (such as small arms, grenade launchers, or ATGLs).

Supporting indirect fire (such as mortars or rockets).

Mobility support.

7-51. The assault force commander or leader typically commands and controls the assault from the support

element. However, he will position himself where he can best exercise C2.

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Chapter 7

Executing an Assault

7-52. An assault is a rapid and violent action that can have significant and even decisive effects. However,

a simple direct assault has a very low chance of success without some significant mitigating factors.

Decisive assaults are characterized by—

Isolation of the objective (enemy position) so that it cannot be reinforced during the assault.

Early warning of any approaching enemy reinforcements and/or other security measures by the

security element.

Effective suppression of the enemy by the support element prior to the assault element

maneuvering on the enemy position.

Violent fire and maneuver into and through the enemy position.

7-53. The assault element maneuvers from its assault position to the objective and destroys the enemy

located at the objective. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is often not an optimal method and should be

used only when necessary. Typical tactical tasks of the assault element are—

Clear.

Destroy.

Seize.

7-54. The irregular OPFOR normally does not assault to secure, since this task indicates an intention to

prevent the loss of an objective to subsequent enemy reaction. Any occupation of an objective is typically

temporary to minimize the ability of an enemy force to mass overwhelming combat power against the

irregular OPFOR. Speed of execution and surprise are critical to an assault. (See figures 7-3 and 7-4 for

examples of assaults.).

Security

Element

INFOWAR

Coalition

KILL

TCP

ZONE

Support

Element

Assault

Security

Element

Coalition

QRF

Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example)

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Functional Tactics

IED

Security

Element

Support Element

2ea 7.62-mm PKM

Assault

Support

Element

KILL

ZONE

Support

Element

60-mm

Security

Element

IED

Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example)

7-55. The security element is equipped and organized to detect enemy forces that may be able to react to an

assault on an objective. While the assault is in progress, security tasks may include the requirement to

isolate the objective from any reinforcement by enemy forces, with tasks such as block, contain, or delay.

The security element may be directed to conduct similar tasks that allow the assault and support elements to

exfiltrate.

Note. A simple, effective, and successful assault technique employed often by the irregular

OPFOR is to surprise the enemy by focusing enemy attention in one direction and then

assaulting from a different direction in a nearly simultaneous action with massed firepower and

maneuver on the objective. Support element(s) shift and/or lift initial small arms fire across the

objective as the assault element assaults through the objective. Security element(s) prepare to

ambush any enemy response forces and provide early warning to other elements. The assault

element is already exfiltrating from the objective when the assault force commander or leader

gives the order to support and security element(s) to exfiltrate from the area. A security element

with an INFOWAR team can record the successful assault and relay the video and audio

coverage to an intermediary for delivery to local media outlets. The INFOWAR team can

publish its videotape with added narrative from a higher headquarters spokesperson on an

Internet website often within hours of the assault.

7-56. The commander or leader of the assault force typically exercises C2 from within the support element.

He can also lead the assault element when he determines that his personal presence in the assault is critical

to mission success.

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Chapter 7

7-57. The support element controls all combat support (CS) and CSS functions as well as any supporting

fires. Tasks expected of support elements in the assault are normally attack by fire and/or support by fire.

These direct and/or indirect fires are often intended to divert the enemy’s attention during the maneuver by

the assault element.

Command and Control of an Assault

7-58. Command and control of the assault masses irregular OPFOR capabilities in time and space for rapid

and violent attack on a selected objective. The irregular OPFOR normally plans an assault in detail to

improve tactical execution with surprise and deception and in order to achieve temporary superior combat

power against an enemy force. However, the irregular OPFOR will often take advantage of an unexpected

opportunity as it occurs in order to assault an enemy force.

7-59. Fighting in complex terrain can be a significant tactical advantage for the irregular OPFOR. In urban

areas the irregular OPFOR can use the civilian community and its infrastructure for shielding and obstacles

against enemy forces. The irregular OPFOR may decide to not comply with international conventions and

law of war restrictions that apply to regular military forces and governing authorities.

Note. Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village

and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the

same space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions include but are not limited to slope,

high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.)

7-60. Channelized corridors of urban traffic networks and the vantage points of multi-story buildings

and/or surface or subsurface infrastructure can be demoralizing to an enemy force attempting to counter the

irregular OPFOR. People and facilities in urban areas provide cover and concealment to the irregular

OPFOR. Beyond that, enemy forces often operate within a relevant population that they do not want to

alienate due to excessive civilian casualties, restrictions, and/or damage to their facilities and livelihoods. In

comparison, rural complex terrain may have fewer people within designated areas but can provide similar

cover and concealment advantages to the irregular OPFOR. The civilians that reside in such rural areas can

be influenced to support the irregular OPFOR involuntarily or voluntarily through an effective INFOWAR

campaign.

Support of an Assault

7-61. Support of an assault normally includes reconnaissance, logistics, and INFOWAR. When required

for a particular mission, capabilities such as fire support and air defense can be added to the elements

conducting an assault.

Reconnaissance

7-62. Reconnaissance effort for an assault is continuous in the objective area in order to confirm and/or

adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The irregular OPFOR uses

active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the planned

objective area. Insurgents or guerrillas are often positioned in the local community and in vicinity of the

objective posing as innocent civilians conducting normal commercial or social actions. These

reconnaissance and surveillance reports, combined with the reports from active supporters, assist the

commander or leader of the assault force in finalizing his assault plan to shape, assault, and exfiltrate. Once

infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintains these routes under constant

surveillance prior to and during the assault. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations and activities is essential

to tactical survival. Locations of keen interest for reconnaissance and surveillance include—

Caches.

Infiltration routes.

Assault position.

Support position.

Objective.

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Functional Tactics

Exfiltration routes.

Safe houses.

Fire Support

7-63. The primary mission of fire support in an assault is to suppress the objective and protect the advance

of the assault element. Fire support assets are typically part of the support element(s). In most ambushes,

support elements in proximity to ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from machineguns and/or

ATGLs. However, the support element(s) can also include indirect fire weapons such as mortars and

rockets allocated to the assault force.

Air Defense

7-64. The typical purpose of air defense support to an assault is to prevent enemy air power from

influencing the action of the assault element. All three elements of an assault typically employ the concept

of all-arms air defense. If specialized air defense weapons (such as MANPADS) are available, they could

be used in any of the elements, but are least likely to be found in the assault element. The security element

provides early warning of enemy aerial response to the assault and may try to destroy the enemy aircraft.

The support element provides overwatch of the assault element and the objective. (See note under Air

Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Logistics

7-65. Logistics support for an ambush is similar to that for an ambush (see above). The support element is

responsible for CSS.

INFOWAR

7-66. INFOWAR support of an assault considers the rapid and violent nature of an assault and the intention

to temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. Isolation of the enemy may also use physical

means such as simultaneous assaults on multiple objectives to overload the enemy’s ability to respond

and/or effectively reinforce an enemy force at a particular irregular OPFOR objective. (See appendix A for

additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

RAID

7-67. A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that

culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids are usually small-scale attacks that

use surprise and combat power to successfully accomplish the purpose of the mission. Sudden violence

characterizes most raids and may be conducted to secure information, materiel, or individuals and can also

be used to confuse or deceive an enemy. A raid concludes with a planned withdrawal upon completion of

the assigned mission.

7-68. Raids can be used to⎯

Destroy or damaging key systems or facilities

(such as command posts, communication

facilities, supply depots, radar sites)

Seize hostages and/or prisoners.

Rescue insurgents, guerrillas, and /or active supporters being detained and/or imprisoned.

Destroy, damage, or capture supplies or lines of communication.

Obtain or denying critical information to the enemy.

Support INFOWAR actions that distract attention from other irregular OPFOR actions, keep the

enemy off balance, and/or to cause the enemy to deploy additional units to protect critical sites.

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Chapter 7

Functional Organization for a Raid

7-69. The size and configuration of a raiding force depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the

target, and the enemy situation in the objective area. Examples various raiding forces and their missions

could include—

A small insurgent cell or guerrilla HK team attacking an isolated voting station or a portion of

unprotected railroad track.

A larger raiding force attacking an enemy checkpoint, convoy route, or a large supply depot.

A larger insurgent cell, group of cells, or task-organized guerrilla unit attacking an enemy

combat outpost that is attempting to interdict irregular OPFOR movements and control in a

geographic area.

7-70. Regardless of size and specific capabilities, a raiding force typically consists of three elements:

raiding, security, and support. However, a raiding force may employ other functional elements such as a

fixing element or breaching element. It may also obtain advice and direct assistance from SPF teams and or

regular military forces that are in conflict with the same enemy force or governing authority.

Raiding Element(s)

7-71. The raiding element executes the primary task of the raid. That is to destroy or seize the objective of

the raid. In some situations, the raiding element moves physically into the objective, and in other cases it is

able to accomplish the raiding task from a distance. Other elements of a raid support and/or protect the

raiding element while it approaches, enters, and departs the objective.

Security Element(s)

7-72. The security element in a raid is primarily focused on enemy containing enemy security forces,

blocking enemy response forces, and/or fixing enemy escape from the objective area. Any of these tasks

are usually conducted for a limited time period in support of the raid objective. The security element is

often equipped and organized to detect enemy forces in the vicinity of the objective and prevent them from

alerting enemy forces at the objective. Insurgents or guerrillas may infiltrate into the objective area and

position themselves posing as civilians until the time of mission execution.

7-73. The task of a security element is to occupy enemy security and response forces and fix these enemy

forces so that they cannot react to the raiding element. Security elements deploy to locations where they

can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce

the objective or interfere with the raid mission. Insurgents and guerrillas employ an all-arms air defense

concept that uses all available weapons to disrupt and/or defeat enemy aircraft. Any additional air defense

assets are most likely found in the security element(s).

7-74. Covering the withdrawal of the raiding element with a designated level of rear security, the security

element typically does not allow itself to become decisively engaged. The size of the security element

depends upon the size of the enemy’s estimated capability to intervene and disrupt the raid.

Support Element(s)

7-75. The support element in a raid serves several enabling functions that assist in setting the conditions for

success of the raid. This support may take several forms. The support element provides fire support,

logistics, mobility and countermobility actions, and INFOWAR support to the raiding and security

elements.

7-76. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally commands and controls the raid from within

the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control the raid.

7-77. Critical support element tasks are often executed immediately prior to conduct of the raid and/or

facilitate its execution. Tasks that assist the raiding element(s) to achieve their objective can include—

Breaching and removing obstacles to the objective.

Conducting diversionary actions.

Providing fire support.

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Functional Tactics

Executing a Raid

7-78. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders plan for a rapid and violent execution of a raid. They do

not intend to be decisively engaged with the enemy. The security and support elements normally remain in

their fighting positions unless a task requires an element to accompany the raiding element into the

objective. A breaching element may be required to clear a lane or lanes in enemy defenses and pass the

raiding element(s) through to the objective.

7-79. When the intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the kill zone, concentrated

firepower may be able to accomplish the task without physically entering the objective. For example, a

guerrilla unit could use indirect fire weapons to raid an enemy site as an attack by fire with no intention of

entering the objective site (see the examples in figure 7-5 and 7-6 at pages 7-16 to 7-17).

7-80. If the raiding task includes seizing individuals and/or equipment, the raiding element temporarily

secures the objective and seizes designated equipment, individuals, and/or other materiel. The support

element provides protection to the raiding element when the raiding element searches the objective for

information and/or intelligence. The raiding element can seize weapons and other materiel for future

irregular OPFOR tactical actions.

Command and Control of a Raid

7-81. A raid is conducted by elements that are often autonomous from other irregular OPFOR or regular

OPFOR cells or units but can be coordinated in actions to support a common purpose. A raid is not

necessarily associated with actions being conducted concurrently by larger OPFOR organizations in the

same area. Irregular OPFOR raids are typically conducted by small insurgent cells or guerrilla units at the

tactical level of conflict.

7-82. The commander or leader of the raiding force normally positions himself with the support element

and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the raiding element. However, the raiding

force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the raid and may

maneuver with the raiding element into the objective when appropriate.

Support of a Raid

7-83. A raid typically requires several types of support. These types of support can typically include

reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.

Reconnaissance

7-84. The primary task of reconnaissance and surveillance in a raid is to collect information and

intelligence on the target of the raid and monitor all activities in and near the objective. Reconnaissance

also identifies the locations of response forces and their expected response routes to the objective

during a raid.

7-85. Reconnaissance elements confirm and/or adjust information collection collected previously in order

to determine current intelligence. Insurgents and guerillas are often members of a local community and

easily interact with the relevant population. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant

population to observe and report on enemy activities at the objective area in order to select the best terrain

in which to locate irregular OPFOR positions. Infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned and rehearsed,

and security elements maintain these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the assault.

7-86. In preparation for a raid, the irregular OPFOR will closely monitor—

Patterns of enemy force activities selected as the target.

Lack of discipline in enemy soldier use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.

Lapses in enemy local security measures in the objective area.

Availability of enemy quick reaction forces.

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Chapter 7

Raid Examples

Insurgent Raid

Insurgents could use a raid to rescue an insurgent leader who is being held in a

governing authority detention facility. A suicide vehicle-borne IED detonates at the

main gate to breach barriers and kill, wound, or daze internal security force (ISF)

guards in the immediate vicinity. Concurrently, support elements use small arms and

ATGL fire to kill and/or contain other guard forces at a separate gate and small

barracks. Security elements detect and ambush enemy reaction forces coming to the

aid of the detention facility.

Security

Element

IED

Support

IED

Element

Support

Element

Raiding Element

Security

4ea (Motorcycle)

4ea(Motorcycle)

Element

with Detainee

ISF

Leader

Detainee

Leader

(Linkup)

ISF

Security

Element

ISF

IED

ISF

IED

Vehicle Borne

IED IED

Security

Element

Support

Element

Raiding Element

4ea (Motorcycle)

Security

IED

Element

Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example)

A raiding element of four motorcycles moves through the breach at the main gate to a

designated linkup point inside the facility that had been coordinated within a covert

operative of the insurgency. The covert operative kills guards inside the holding cells

area and releases the insurgent leader. Once the raiding element secures the

insurgent leader, the element exits the facility through a side gate and quickly departs

the area on motorcycles to a safe house.

During the raid, security elements positioned along likely avenues for enemy

response forces ambush and delay law enforcement and quick reaction forces as

they approach the detention facility. The local insurgent leader in command of the

raid determines that the insurgent leader secured from the facility is now safe and

directs support and security elements to exfiltrate from the area.

An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It

releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media

outlets within hours of the raid.

(continued)

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Functional Tactics

An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It

releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media

outlets within hours of the raid.

Guerrilla Raid

A guerrilla battalion could employ a raid to demonstrate the inability of the enemy to

effectively defend critical infrastructure. However, the battalion in this example has

suffered significant losses, now having only one of its original three guerrilla

companies. Therefore, it is reluctant to attempt a raid against an enemy POL

installation by physically entering the objective, which has an enemy motorized infantry

company and two combat outposts in the vicinity. However, the guerrilla battalion still

has two of the original three 107-mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) of its weapons

company, although it has lost the crews trained to operate them. So the battalion

commander has one guerrilla platoon from his remaining company task-organized as

an MRL platoon and moved to a designated site for specialized training in MRL tactical

operations. SPF advisors from a neighboring state deploy into the area to train the

task-organized platoon and continue plans and rehearsals for the MRL raid. Insurgent

leaders and senior guerrilla commanders position themselves to observe the raid. An

INFOWAR cell of the local insurgent organization positions to record the raid.

MRL

107-mm

Support

CIV

Element

Support

SPF

Element

INFOWAR

Videographer

Security

Element

Security

Element

Raiding

G Element

MRL 107-mm

Security

Element &

Observer

COP

(-)

COP

Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example)

(continued)

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Chapter 7

In this example, the raiding element is one MRL section from the task-organized MRL

platoon, with one MRL (broken down into man-packable loads), the mortar crew, and

additional riflemen (from the original guerrilla platoon). It infiltrates to a firing point

near the maximum range of the rockets and establishes observations posts and

security teams. With their weapon reassembled and ammunition ready for firing, the

section leader orders the firing to commence. Significant damage is accomplished

with three volleys of rockets from the MRL. The guerrillas quickly disassemble the

weapon and move to hide positions along multiple exfiltration routes. The INFOWAR

cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points and releases an

account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media outlets with a

message from the local insurgent organization leader. On order, the guerrillas split

into small teams and continue to exfiltrate to safe havens in the neighboring

mountain range.

Fire Support

7-87. Most raids may use support elements in proximity to raiding elements with supporting direct fires

from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or ATGLs. In some cases, support element(s) can also

provide indirect fires from mortars or rockets allocated to the raiding force.

7-88. Fire support for a raid can assist in—

Isolating a point of penetration in the enemy defenses at the objective.

Fixing enemy forces in the objective and protecting the breach of enemy defenses.

Suppressing effective direct and indirect fires from enemy forces.

Disrupting enemy response forces.

Obscuring the vision and sensors of the enemy as the raiding force withdrawals.

Air Defense

7-89. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort that uses all weapon systems

and resources available to the raid. (See TC 7-100.2, chapter 11 for more information on the OPFOR all-

arms air defense concept.) The irregular OPFOR seeks new and adaptive ways to employ systems not

traditionally associated with air defense. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited MANPADS

capability in their weapons company. If allocated to a raiding force, these MANPADS would likely be

located in security element(s). Security elements provide early warning and fires against enemy aerial

response forces. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense

assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

7-90. Irregular OPFOR cells and units do not have organic mobility and/or countermobility capabilities.

Breaching and/or removing obstacles before and during a raid on an objective may require insurgents or

guerrillas with specialized skills and expertise from their civilian professions or previous military

experience. Guerrilla sappers are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. The irregular

OPFOR may also rely on assistance from affiliated SPF or regular military forces in support of a raid.

Tasks in either situation involve ensuring freedom of movement and maneuver to the objective, within the

objective and to the target, and timely withdrawal from the objective. Insurgents, guerillas, and/or SPF

soldiers with these skills may be located with the raiding, support, and/or security element depending on

the assigned tasks.

Logistics

7-91. Raids are typically brief in duration. The raiding force will move from a secured location such as a

safe house or safe haven to the objective area with all materiel required for the raid. Caches can be used in

the vicinity of the objective when this technique improves tactical security and/or when irregular OPFOR

materiel needs to be located close to the objective. Caches can also be mobile in transportation masked

7-18

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

within a relevant civilian population in urban or rural environments. Examples of mobile caches are as

simple as a wheel barrow covered with a tarpaulin to a modern truck with hidden compartments as part of a

commercial convoy.

INFOWAR

7-92. INFOWAR primarily supports a raid by concealing the action through deception and information

protection. Successful raids can be used in INFOWAR to demonstrate the inability of enemy forces to do

one or more of the following:

Defend civilian, government, and military facilities.

Safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.

Protect civilian and military infrastructure critical to a governing authority’s counterinsurgency

or counter-guerrilla campaign.

(See appendix A for more information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

7-93. Recurring irregular OPFOR raids can be conducted to—

Isolate psychologically the enemy force and governing authority from each other and the

relevant civilian population.

Degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing authority to continue counterinsurgency

or counter-guerrilla operations.

Obtain needed materiel to continue the irregular OPFOR.

RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK (GUERILLAS)

7-94. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed

enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. A guerrilla commander may also use it to gain

information about the enemy’s location, dispositions, military capabilities, and possibly his intentions.

(Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack.)

7-95. The guerrillas recognize that an enemy will conduct significant measures to prevent them from

gaining critical intelligence. Therefore, quite often they will have to fight for information, using an

offensive action to penetrate or circumvent the enemy’s security forces to determine who and/or what is

located where or doing what.

7-96. The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious method to collect information and is ordered by a

guerrilla commander only after prudent consideration of other tactical alternatives. Key factors in

reconnaissance attack considerations are—

Accurate situational assessment of an area of responsibility (AOR) within which the guerrillas

operate.

Contact conditions: having maintained contact with the enemy or the requirement to reestablish

contact.

Current capabilities to simultaneously support the movement and/or maneuver of multiple

reconnaissance, security, and action elements in the guerrilla AOR.

Level of active support from the local relevant population.

Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack

7-97. Depending on the situation, a guerrilla commander organizing a reconnaissance attack may designate

reconnaissance, security, and/or action elements. There may be more than one of each type. The

commander may also form various types of support elements.

Reconnaissance Element(s)

7-98. If the purpose of the reconnaissance attack is merely to gain information, a guerrilla commander may

organize several reconnaissance elements. Their role is to locate enemy elements operating in the unit’s

AOR. If the purpose is to also have the capability to fix and/or destroy located enemy elements, the

reconnaissance elements provide reconnaissance and surveillance support to the elements that carry out

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Chapter 7

those functions. A tactical option is for security elements to perform this role if reconnaissance

elements are not formed. Once a reconnaissance element locates an enemy element, it may become a

security element.

Security Element(s)

7-99. If the guerrilla commander believes he has sufficient combat power to engage enemy elements that

may be located, he may also organize one or more security elements. Size and task organization of security

elements are dependent on the assigned mission and the expectation of how long a security element will

conduct its functional tasks before arrival of action elements or other elements. (When performing some of

these functional tasks, the unit originally designated as a security element may receive a designation that

describes that specific function.)

7-100. Security elements can either work in conjunction with reconnaissance elements or perform the

reconnaissance role for the guerrilla unit. Upon locating an enemy element, a security element may be

directed to conduct one of several tactical tasks. It may—

Report on conditions in the AOR.

Observe and monitor the enemy in the AOR.

Locate enemy direct-fire weapons concentrations such as enemy antitank ambush sites.

Locate enemy countermobility obstacles along friendly axes.

Identify bypasses to enemy countermobility obstacles.

Prepare infiltration lanes through enemy countermobility obstacles that cannot be bypassed.

Fix enemy forces (as a fixing element).

Block probable enemy avenues of withdrawal or reinforcement (as a blocking element).

Attack a smaller enemy element (as an ambush element or raiding element).

Action Element(s)

7-101. A guerrilla commander task-organizes one or more action elements to conduct designated tasks

against enemy element(s). These action elements may receive a functional designation that more

specifically describes the action they are to accomplish, such as raiding element. Once an enemy element is

located and/or fixed, the action element(s) attack to defeat or destroy the enemy. The number of action

elements for a mission is based on the anticipated tasks to engage enemy elements located by

reconnaissance and/or security elements. Action elements may be directed to plan for operations in

conjunction with one or more security elements in an AOR. Each security element may not necessarily

have an action element dedicated to follow and assume an offensive task.

Support Element(s)

7-102. One or more support elements can perform various supporting tasks. Typical CS and/or CSS tasks

are discussed in subsequent paragraphs under Support of a Reconnaissance Attack.

Executing a Reconnaissance Attack

7-103. Multiple attack axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. Control measures may include start

times, check points, orientation objectives, and objective rally points designated for each axis. Multiple

axes of advance provide more tactical flexibility to guerrilla elements in accomplishing their respective

missions and tasks (see figure 7-7 on page 7-21).

7-104. Guerrilla elements normally infiltrate within or into an AOR. The norm is reconnaissance and/or

security elements maneuvering separately to find the enemy and/or report on activity and/or conditions

along designated routes or axes. When the enemy is located, the guerrilla commander decides on

subsequent tasks for his unit. A typical task is to fix the enemy with security forces and attack with action

elements to defeat or destroy the enemy. Success often relies on the ability of reconnaissance and/or

security elements to operate independently. Action elements are positioned within an AOR to quickly

respond to intelligence confirmed by reconnaissance and/or security elements. (See figure 5-7 for an

example of a reconnaissance attack.)

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TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

Reconnaissance Attack Example

Recent combat actions have severely reduced a guerrilla battalion two guerrilla

companies and limited organic fire support. The guerrilla brigade allocates mortar

and rocket launcher support as the guerrilla battalion prepares for a reconnaissance

attack. The battalion commander uses remnants of his third company to create two

dummy companies as deception elements. SPF INFOWAR teams support guerrilla

deception activities. Avoiding enemy screening elements, several reconnaissance

elements infiltrate to reestablish contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements

report on activities and conditions within the AOR, identify enemy force locations, and

guide security elements into positions to fix enemy forces. Other reconnaissance

elements reach their orientation objectives without enemy contact and transition to

security tasks. The guerrilla battalion conducts simultaneous attacks on enemy forces

using massed direct and indirect fires.

Recon

Element

KILL

Element

Security

ZONE

G Element

Security

Raid

G Element

Element

Raid

Element

Raid

Element

IED

MRL

107-mm

IED

Support

Element

Recon

Element

Recon

RL 122-mm

120-mm

Element

Support

Recon

Support

Action

Element

82-mm

IED

Element

INFO

Support

WAR

Element

IED

Action

Element

Cache

SPF

INFO

WAR

Cache

Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example)

Guerrilla forces quickly withdraw to safe havens while security elements and on-call

indirect fires prevent any enemy pursuit. The surprise attack by guerrillas disrupts

enemy logistics and stalls enemy offensive operations.

Command and Control of a Reconnaisance Attack

7-105. A reconnaissance attack requires planning and coordination typically more detailed than in other

offensive actions for a guerrilla unit. The commander or leader must plan for multiple reconnaissance

and/or security elements operating across a broad area is one consideration. He must also position one or

more action elements to respond quickly to tactical opportunities identified by reconnaissance and/or

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Chapter 7

security elements. The organization and positioning of functional elements is further complicated as

guerrillas plan to deceive the enemy as to their presence and tactical intentions.

Support of a Reconnaissance Attack

7-106. A reconnaissance attack typically requires several types of support. These can include

reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.

7-107. Special situations may exist when guerrilla units have levels of capability more expected of regular

forces. These capabilities can include armored fighting vehicles, aviation, and additional air defense or fire

support. Weapons and equipment can be—

Provided by state and/or non-state sponsors.

Acquired from indigenous resources.

Captured from the enemy.

Purchased from criminal organizations and/or other commercial enterprise intermediaries.

7-108. Sustained intelligence activities, logistics, and training support are critical aspects of long-term

guerrilla unit effectiveness. These types of functional capabilities of a guerrilla unit can be supported by—

SPF from a state overtly or covertly affiliated with the guerrilla unit.

Regular military force or intelligence activity liaison teams that operate with the guerrilla unit.

Criminal organizations with expertise and assets available on a contractual basis to the guerrilla

unit.

Adherents in the relevant population who actively support guerrilla actions but will not be

visibly involved in the direct actions and combat of the guerrilla unit.

Higher-level or SPF-supported INFOWAR activities.

Reconnaissance

7-109. Reconnaissance in a reconnaissance attack can be conducted in two primary ways. A

reconnaissance element can be formed with a mission to find the enemy forces and guide security elements

to locations that allow the security elements to fix the enemy forces. When no reconnaissance element is

formed, each security element performs its own reconnaissance tasks with the responsibility to both find

and fix an enemy force.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

7-110. Some guerrilla units may have armored vehicles present in their organization and can use them for

particular tasks. When a guerrilla commander believes he has a level of near parity with local enemy forces

and is confident in his air defense capabilities for limited periods of time, he can use armored vehicles in

his various functional element(s). With effective camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D), he

may decide to introduce wheeled and/or tracked armored vehicles from safe havens or local hide positions

to augment reconnaissance and/or security elements. The thermal imagers and other electro-optical aids on

armored vehicles can be of great value in detecting enemy forces. Armored vehicles can also increase

mobility, firepower, and protection for reconnaissance and/or security elements, significantly enhancing

their ability to fix and possibly destroy the enemy. The mobility and speed of these vehicles permit them to

serve in the action element(s), rapidly orienting on located and/or fixed enemy forces and moving to a

position of advantage to destroy them. Especially when the enemy was previously unaware of their

presence in the AOR, these armored vehicles can provide a significant advantage in firepower and

shock effect.

Fire Support

7-111. Fire support is positioned in an AOR to provide responsive fires throughout the reconnaissance

phase, security element movement and occupation of fixing and/or blocking positions, and the maneuver

and combat of action of elements. Various wheeled, towed, or tracked fire support systems may be

available to cover the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other support elements after

completing the reconnaissance attack mission.

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Functional Tactics

7-112. Guerrilla units may include medium and heavy mortars, artillery, and/or rocket systems as a varied

collection of antiquated and contemporary capabilities. Mobility of systems can vary also. Guerrilla units

may have to improvise transportation, using captured military trucks, local commercial vehicles that

conceal a weapon system, or other expedient means. In some cases, pack animals, bicycles with reinforced

frames, and/or porters can be used to transport disassembled fire support systems for reassembly at

locations unexpected by the enemy.

Aviation

7-113. Aviation is not typically anticipated in a guerrilla unit order of battle. However, a guerrilla

commander can acquire small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with relative ease through normal means

on the commercial market and/or illicit purchases from criminal organizations or other sources. State

sponsors can provide technical expertise with clandestine agents and/or technicians or provide training and

advice through SPF teams. A guerrilla commander could acquire systems and technical expertise on a

contractual basis from disenfranchised experts or rogue non-state enterprises. UAVs in a guerrilla unit can

be used to enhance real-time reconnaissance and surveillance in conjunction with reconnaissance elements

maneuvering on the ground in an AOR. A number of small UAVs could be armed with IEDs to create an

aerial attack capability. Used with a swarm technique on a point or area target, a mass of low-flying UAVs

could conduct a disruptive or devastating attack on critical enemy assets.

7-114. Aviation in guerrilla units can also include rotary- and/or fixed-wing capabilities. Although these

capabilities may be considered exceptional for most guerrilla forces, state and non-state sponsors can

covertly introduce limited aviation capabilities into an advanced insurgency and/or highly trained guerrilla

units. Operating from a guerrilla enclave or safe haven, even one or two helicopters or fixed-wing

commercial aircraft could be converted into an attack system with military-grade rockets or bombs.

Capability for aviation attack against a governing authority or its military forces could create a significant

psychological impact in a guerrilla INFOWAR campaign.

Air Defense

7-115. Guerrilla air defense can be developed to a level of protection that limits enemy aerial response

forces and reinforcements from influencing a particular guerrilla mission in the AOR. Any guerrilla unit

conducts all-arms air defense as a norm to damage and/or destroy tactical enemy aircraft within the range

of their available small arms weapons systems. (For more information on the all-arms air defense concept,

see chapter 11 of TC 7-100.2.) However, guerrilla battalions also typically have a limited MANPADS

capability in their weapons company. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding

additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

7-116. Mobility and countermobility support to a reconnaissance attack focuses on freedom of movement

and/or maneuver of reconnaissance, security, and action elements. Mobility and countermobility tasks are

performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. For example, guerrillas with expertise from civilian

engineering occupations and/or previous training by SPF teams may be assigned tasks that concentrate on

emplacing rudimentary obstacles and IEDs along planned withdrawal routes to disrupt any pursuit by the

enemy after a successful reconnaissance attack. Guerrillas from sapper units can be task-organized to assist

various elements in infiltrating through enemy security elements, breaching enemy obstacles, as well as

support attacks on located enemy forces or installations.

7-117. Additional mobility and countermobility support, training, and assistance can be obtained from

sappers in SPF teams that accompany and/or augment a guerrilla unit. SPF and/or guerrilla sappers can also

train active supporters in the relevant local population to assist the reconnaissance attack in specified

supporting roles. Guerrilla units can use to their advantage the blurred distinctions of what constitutes the

role of active support versus being considered a guerrilla. Regardless of who is providing mobility and

countermobility support, this guerrilla capability is essential to offensive action in fixing, blocking, and/or

attacking enemy forces.

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Chapter 7

Note. Guerrilla sappers are not combat engineers. However, sappers are trained to perform

several tasks that are typical of raider and combat engineer-like functions.

Logistics

7-118. A reconnaissance attack can be conducted by widely dispersed guerrilla elements operating over

extended time periods and distances. Elements typically carry sufficient logistics with them during their

movements. Guerrillas can create and stock caches and/or preposition designated logistics elements in an

AOR for multiple reconnaissance advances toward orientation objectives and during guerrilla unit

withdrawals to safe havens after a reconnaissance attack.

7-119. Guerrillas are self-sufficient as a goal but must often subsist on the local economy without

offending a local relevant population. Use of civilian facilities and support of the population to guerrilla

units may result in reaction by enemy forces and the governing authority on the civilian population and its

institutions. Guerrilla INFOWAR activities amplify enemy repression to increase and sustain tactical and

logistics support by a relevant population for guerrilla actions.

INFOWAR

7-120. With the support of INFOWAR deception, the guerrilla commander attempts to deceive the enemy

concerning the strength and composition of his forces, their current deployment and orientation, and the

intended manner of employment. False intelligence provided to enemy forces by active supporters of

the guerrillas disrupts enemy information collection. When successfully conducted, deception

activities support tactical surprise by the guerrilla force and improve the likelihood of achieving the

reconnaissance attack objective.

7-121. INFOWAR activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to—

Deceive the enemy force regarding guerrilla actions and intentions.

Protect elements of the guerrilla force from being detected.

Create a false sense of security in the enemy.

Encourage the active and passive support of the guerrilla operations by a relevant population.

Demoralize enemy forces and the governing authority they support.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

7-122. Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller

tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include—

Defense of a simple battle position.

Defense of a complex battle position.

(See TC 7-100.2 for basic discussion of these types of defensive actions, as they are also conducted by the

regular OPFOR.)

7-123. Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the defensive action best suited to accomplishing

their mission, given the conditions under which they assume a defensive posture. Some parts of an

insurgent or guerrilla organization may conduct defensive actions while other parts of the same

organization are on the offense.

BATTLE POSITIONS

7-124. A battle position (BP) normally is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of

approach. However, the irregular OPFOR may select defensive locations to avoid contact with an enemy

but provide for defense if discovered. When irregular OPFOR leaders determine that they will operate in a

defensive posture, defensive positions will be either a simple battle position (SBP) or complex battle

position (CBP). The mission and specific circumstances will influence the type of BP to establish and

occupy. Figure 5-8 shows examples of symbols for SBPs and CBPs (see figure 7-8 o page 7-25.

7-24

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

CBP perimeter and

guerrilla company occupation

SBP perimeter and

platoon-size defense

SBP perimeter and

DA Cell

squad-size defense

INFOWAR

Demolitions,

Sabotage & IED

Team

Cache

DA Cell

CBP perimeter and

Enemy

insurgent cells occupation

Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions

Note. Sometimes graphics show a relatively large unit, such as a guerrilla battalion or brigade,

inside a symbol for a CBP. This actually means that such a unit’s subordinates occupy a series of

CBPs within that area.

Simple Battle Position

7-125. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of

approach. SBPs are not necessarily tied to complex terrain. However, they often employ as much

fortification and C3D measures as time allows. Defenses are improved upon continuously until the

SBP is abandoned.

Complex Battle Position

7-126. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of

complex terrain, C3D, and engineer-like capabilities to protect the cells or units within them from detection

and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. CBPs typically have the following

characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs:

Not on or along an enemy avenue of approach.

Limited avenues of approach toward and/or in vicinity of a CBP.

Observation of any existing avenues of approach.

Defensive posture with an integrated 360-degree perimeter.

Countermobility and mobility efforts prioritizing C3D measures of the CBP location.

Substantial logistics caches.

Sanctuary.

DEFENSE OF A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

7-127. Construction of an SBP places special attention on the camouflage, concealment, and cover of

fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR normally expects significant enemy

17 January 2014

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Chapter 7

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities and recognizes that

sophisticated RISTA capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of

sophisticated technology and systems may be to embed the SBP within a relevant population in an urban

and/or rural environment, or physically use rural and/or urban terrain to mask the presence of SBPs.

Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves,

and/or village or city dwellings. An SBP or group of SBPs establishes kill zone(s) on likely enemy

avenues of approach.

7-128. Deceptive techniques can include the façade of being commercial or private equipment, vehicles,

work places, and/or public institutions and public gathering places such as houses of worship, hospitals,

and civic centers with regular intermingling of the relevant population. Insurgents usually wear the clothing

of the local population and often keep weapons, munitions, and materiel in caches that are easily retrievable

in the vicinity of the SBP. The same may be true of guerrillas. However, guerrillas may transition to

recognizable paramilitary uniforms.

7-129. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader makes prudent risk assessments when establishing

SBPs. He evaluates the desirability and/or requirement to invest substantial time, effort, and materiel on an

SBP. He weighs this against the expectation that he must defeat an enemy that can typically mass combat

power quickly against an SBP.

7-130. Once the commander or leader decides to defend an SBP, he focuses his available combat power

on one or more kill zones. The irregular OPFOR plans and rehearses all actions necessary to prevent enemy

penetration of an SBP and/or what an SBP or group of SBPs is protecting, and also considers measures to

defeat an enemy penetration of an SBP if it occurs.

7-131. The commander or leader considers what criteria he will use to direct a withdrawal and/or

withdrawal under pressure from an SBP or group of SBPs. Unless directed to retain a specific SBP by a

higher level, the commander or leader responsible for an SBP recognizes that he is committed to a long-

term struggle and that preserving combat power for a future engagement may be the appropriate decision.

However, some insurgents or guerrillas may have a self-determined commitment or directed mission to

fight until killed or captured in a particular SBP.

Functional Organization for Defending an SBP

7-132. The commander or leader defends an SBP with cells or units that are organized as functional

elements. Typical functional designations are—

Disruption element.

Main defense element.

Reserve element.

Support element.

Deception element.

7-133. There may be more than one of each type. The name of an element describes its function within

the defensive action.

Disruption Element(s)

7-134. Insurgents or guerrillas assigned to a disruption element have a mission of identifying enemy

reconnaissance efforts and reporting the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy

forces. When disruption elements have the capability to target and attack designated subsystems of an

enemy force, they conduct disruption actions as part of a comprehensive defense plan of the higher

commander or leader.

7-135. Disruption activities may include direct and indirect fires, remote-controlled or command-

detonated IEDs and/or other execution of obstacles to slow, channel, contain, or block an enemy force. The

normal intention of a disruption element is to not become decisively engaged by the enemy. However, a

commander or leader can direct decisive engagement if the action is necessary to preserve the combat

power of other critical capabilities in the irregular OPFOR organization.

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Functional Tactics

7-136. Tactical tasks typical of a disruption element include—

Ambush.

Attack by fire.

Delay.

Disrupt.

7-137. The irregular OPFOR will typically not assign a small cell or unit a fixing task when an

expectation of “fix” is to deny movement of any part of an enemy force. A more probable task for the

irregular OPFOR in an SBP is “delay” with an expectation to slow the momentum of an enemy advance

and cause significant damage to the enemy force without becoming decisively engaged.

7-138. A disruption element for an SBP can be as small as one or two insurgents or guerrillas with assault

rifles, light and/or medium machineguns, grenade launchers, IEDs, and/or ATGLs. Typically, it is no larger

than 8 to12 such personnel.

Main Defense Element(s)

7-139. The main defense element of an SBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. Insurgents or

guerrillas in a main defense element are prepared to use fires and maneuver to defeat the penetration or

seizure of their SBP or other SBPs. Main defense elements focus the combat power of available weapon

systems into designated kill zones to defeat or destroy an enemy force.

Reserve Element(s)

7-140. The reserve element of an SBP exists to provide the irregular OPFOR commander or leader with

tactical flexibility. The commander or leader will normally assign priorities of effort to the reserve element

for contingency planning and rehearsals. Although a reserve element may not have specified tasks to

perform initially, tactical tasks it can later receive include—

Counterattack.

Block.

Contain.

Delay.

Defend.

Support Element(s)

7-141. The support element of an SBP can include—

CSS.

C2.

Direct fires such as heavy machineguns, ATGLs, antitank guided missiles, recoilless rifles, or

automatic grenade launchers.

Indirect fires such as mortars or rockets.

Nonlethal actions such as smoke obscurants.

INFOWAR activities.

Engineer-like capabilities with specialized talents of individual insurgents or guerrillas.

Deception Element(s)

7-142. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual

elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to

enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force

measure to portray strength where none exists.

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Chapter 7

Organizing the Battlefield for an SBP

7-143. When establishing an SBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the

organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. This normally includes a battle

zone and often a support zone. It may also include a disruption zone. (See figures 7-9 and 7-10 for

examples of SBP defense.)

Battle Zone

7-144. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander or leader commits the preponderance

of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces. Generally, an SBP will have its battle zone fires

integrated with those of any adjacent SBPs. Fires will orient to form kill zones where the defenders plan to

destroy key enemy targets.

IED

Main Defense

Element

Security

Element

RPK

AKMS

RPG-7V

7.62-mm

7.62-mm 7.62-mm

7.62-mm

KILL

ZONE

IED

Main Defense

Element

Support

Element

60-mm

AKM with BG-15

Mosin/

AKMS

PKM

7.62-mm

40-mm

Nagant

7.62-mm

IED

Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example)

Disruption Zone

7-145. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to—

Report on the enemy situation.

Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.

Detect attacking forces.

Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach.

Engage and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.

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17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

7-146. Engagement (such as ambush or attack by fire) in the disruption zone may be beyond the

capabilities of a small disruption element. However, it may be able to delay or disrupt the enemy advance

or channel it away from the SBP(s). In any case, some level of reconnaissance and/or security will be

placed outside of an SBP for early warning of enemy approach.

Support Zone

7-147. Depending on the mission and size of the defensive positions, support capabilities may be

incorporated into the battle zone of an SBP, or there may be a support zone inside or outside the battle

zone. Aside from the support element(s), the support zone may contain a reserve element.

Executing Defense of an SBP

7-148. Aggressive security measures throughout the development and occupation of an SBP provide early

warning of enemy activities. Once enemy forces are detected, the irregular OPFOR commander or leader

decides when to engage the enemy. He may direct that disruption elements engage with direct and

indirect fires, or he can continue to observe movements and maneuver of the enemy as it approaches

SBP kill zones.

Disruption

Security

Element

Main

Defense

Element

Reserve

Support

Element

Support

Element

60-mm

PKM 7.62mm

Main

Defense

Element

Support Element

PKM 7.62mm

Main

Defense

Disruption

Element

Security

Element

Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example)

7-149. On order of the commander or leader, the irregular OPFOR engages the enemy to defeat and/or

destroy the enemy in designated kill zones. Given the norm of an enemy quickly responding to contact

with additional forces, the commander or leader may decide to withdraw or reposition from initial

defensive positions.

7-150. The irregular OPFOR can initiate deception activities to confuse an enemy when it is displacing

from its initial SBP or SBPs. Deception can include small stay-behind direct action cells or guerrilla teams

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

7-29

Chapter 7

to indicate a continued defense of an SBP or SBPs. Other actions that can slow the reaction of enemy

forces to irregular OPFOR maneuver are keeping insurgents or guerrillas close to or within a relevant

civilian population as a shield. Multiple IEDs along withdrawal routes can be both active and inert

munitions. Both types of IED-appearing obstacles cause enemy responses to assess and disarm or bypass

the munitions.

Note. The commander or leader of an SBP can position main defense elements to mass

overlapping small arms fire (SAF) and ATGL fires in to a kill zone or kill zones. He selects the

kill zone(s) to best use restrictions in terrain, such as difficult fords across a river. He reinforces

the terrain with antipersonnel mines to further channel, separate, or contain the enemy force as it

enters the kill zone(s). Security elements are located where they can observe any approaching

enemy along ground and aerial avenues of approach to the SBP. The security elements may be

directed to continue reporting on enemy activity and to not engage the enemy. Support elements

such as mortars are ordered to commence indirect fires in support of machinegun and automatic

rifle SAF that coincide with detonation of antipersonnel mines and/or IEDs in and near the kill

zone. All SAF orient on identified enemy in their kill zone(s).

When the commander or leader determines that he has achieved the intended effects on the

enemy, he directs exfiltration of his elements and rendezvous at a designated location. Main

defense elements disengage while support elements continue to suppress enemy forces. Security

elements may add their SAF to the suppression. Security and support elements disengage but

may leave observers in the area to continue reporting on actions of the enemy.

Command and Control of an SBP Defense

7-151. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader will position himself where he can best command and

control the defensive fight. Security during defensive preparations includes communications such as

couriers, landline or wire intercommunication systems, visual signals, and limited use of cellular

telephones. Once the irregular OPFOR initiates the defense with direct and indirect fires, communications

make full use of handheld radios and cellular telephone technology.

Support of an SBP Defense

7-152. Support of an SBP defense is typically provided from local resources in the geographic area and

may include CS and/or CSS. While some of this support resides in irregular OPFOR cells or units, a

higher-level organization may temporarily allocated some support or assign it to a particular subordinate

cell or unit.

Reconnaissance

7-153. SBP defenders will perform aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy from

remaining in reconnaissance contact with the SBP. The irregular OPFOR will observe avenues of approach

to provide early warning; determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct fires

against key enemy capabilities.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

7-154. The irregular OPFOR may occasionally capture armored fighting vehicles or acquire them from

other sources operating in the region. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored fighting vehicles

are normally concealed and covered in hide positions until the commander or leader directs them into the

engagement. Their visible and other signatures are masked to preclude identification by enemy RISTA

systems. Once armored fighting vehicles are employed in defensive actions, they move frequently to

alternate and supplemental fighting positions to improve their survivability.

Fire Support

7-155. Fire support to an SBP or SBPs is usually under the command and control of the commander or

leader responsible for the defensive actions. When additional fire support assets are required in a defensive

7-30

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

mission, a higher-level organization may allocate assets to a subordinate for a particular mission or on a

temporary basis.

Air Defense

7-156. The irregular OPFOR in an SBP can employ active and passive air defense measures to protect the

defender from air threats within an all-arms air defense concept. Medium or heavy machineguns and

shoulder-fired MANPADS may be found in or near an SBP. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an

Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

7-157. The irregular OPFOR commander or leader is responsible to countermobility and mobility tasks.

He uses the specialized talents that exist among insurgents or guerrillas in a cell or unit but does not have

cells or units structured for only engineer-like tasks.

Logistics

7-158. When present, logistics capabilities will normally be found with the support element, within the

SBP. However, they can also be located in caches and safe houses in or near an SBP. Weapons, munitions,

and materiel will normally be hidden from open surveillance until just prior to a defensive action. Items are

brought from concealment and emplaced in fighting positions on order of the irregular OPFOR commander

or leader.

INFOWAR

7-159. The SBP obtains support from INFOWAR activities that deceive the enemy as to the defenders’

presence, actual locations, and/or intentions. A successful INFOWAR campaign can promote the

impression that the enemy to failing to effectively protect its population. Other INFOWAR messages

portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime and further isolate them from a

relevant population the irregular OPFOR claims to protect. (See appendix A for additional information on

irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

DEFENSE OF A COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION

7-160. C3D measures are critical to the success of a CBP, since the defenders generally want to avoid

enemy contact. Additionally, cells or units in a CBP will remain dispersed to negate the effects of precision

ordnance strikes. Generally, once the defense is established, non-combat vehicles will be moved away from

concentrations of personnel to reduce their signature on the battlefield.

7-161. Units defending in CBPs will use restrictive terrain and countermobility efforts to deny the enemy

the ability to easily approach the position. Construction of a CBP places special attention on the

camouflage, concealment, and cover of fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR

normally expects enemy RISTA capabilities to be significant and recognizes that sophisticated RISTA

capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of sophisticated technology

and systems may be to embed a CBP within a relevant population in an urban and/or rural environment.

Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, and/or

village or city dwellings.

7-162. Cultural shielding is a tactical consideration to deny the enemy the ability to detect and attack a

CBP. Examples of cultural shielding in order to create tactical standoff are using a religious location,

school, community center, or medical facility as a base of fire or firing from within a crowd of

noncombatants.

7-163. If a CBP is identified and attacked, the commander or leader will engage only as long as he

perceives an ability to defeat the enemy. Prior to becoming decisively overmatched, he will withdraw in

order to preserve his combat power. A guerrilla commander or leader can be directed by a higher guerrilla

headquarters to accept decisive engagement in order to support a larger mission.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

7-31

Chapter 7

Functional Organization of a CBP Defense

7-164. The commander or leader of the defending force organizes his subordinates as functional elements.

Typical functional designations are─

Disruption element.

Main defense element.

Reserve element.

Support element.

Deception element.

7-165. These functional elements conduct tactical actions very similar to those used in defending an SBP.

That is because the names of these elements identify their basic functions. However, the following

paragraphs highlight some differences. There may be more than one of each type of element.

Disruption Element(s)

7-166. The disruption element of a CBP is primarily concerned detecting attackers and providing

early warning to the defending force. The disruption elements may be directed to only observe and

report enemy movements and maneuver but can also be directed to attack enemy forces once they pass

the disruption elements.

Main Defense Element(s)

7-167. The main defense element of a CBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. This element

can be directed to delay an enemy while other cells or units withdraw from direct contact with the enemy.

Reserve Element(s)

7-168. The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide the commander or leader with tactical flexibility.

Tasks for a reserve element can include—

Counterattack.

Block.

Delay.

Defend.

Support Element(s)

7-169. The support element of a CBP has tasks that include C2, CS, and CSS for the defending force.

Other support functions can include direct and direct fires; countermobility or mobility capabilities; and/or

INFOWAR activities. Support elements typically are located within the CBP but can be outside and in the

vicinity of a CBP.

Deception Element(s)

7-170. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual

elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to

enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force

measure to portray strength where none exists.

Organizing the Battlefield for a CBP

7-171. When establishing a CBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the

organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. He will determine if he

designates a battle zone supported by a disruption zone and support zone. (See figures 7-11 on page 7-33

and 7-12 on page 7-34 for examples of a CBP defense.)

7-32

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

Battle Zone

7-172. The battle zone is the area where the defending commander commits the preponderance of his

force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces or delaying them while the defenders withdraw. In the

defense of a CBP, the battle zone is typically the area in and surrounding the CBP that the defending force

can influence with its direct fires. It may be larger depending on the availability of indirect fires.

Disruption Zone

7-173. The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to—

Report on the enemy situation.

Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.

Detect attacking forces.

Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach.

Destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.

Support Zone

7-174. The support zone contains C2, CSS, fire support, and other supporting assets. A reserve element

may also be located there. The support zone is normally located within the CBP.

DA Cell

Suicide

Support

Disruption

IED TM

Element

Observer

Mortar

SAFE

60-mm

DA Cell

Comms &

DA Cell

Tradecraft

Observer

Extortion

DA Cell

Technical

I Finance

Support

IED

DA Cell

Intell

Transport

DA Cell

Disruption

Element

DA Cell

I Planning

CACHE

Demolitions,

abotage& IED

DA Cell

I INFOWAR

DA Cell

Main Defense

Element

IED

Element

SAFE

DA Cell

Multi-Function

IED

Reserve

Observer

ENY

LZ ?

DA Cell

KILL

IED

Disruption I

ZONE

Element

Observer

IED

DA Cell

Disruption

IED

Element

Observer

IED

SAFE

CACHE

Observer

DA Cell

Logistics

Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example)

Executing Defense of a CBP

7-175. The commander or leader will determine whether or not to organize a disruption force in a

disruption zone. He may determine that the manning and capabilities of his organization are more

effectively used with security elements close to the defensive perimeter of the CBP. Whether near or distant

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

7-33

Chapter 7

from the CBP main defenses, security actions are disruption, active reconnaissance, and

counterreconnaissance. However, contact with the enemy is on order of the commander or leader. The

normal intention is to keep a CBP undiscovered by enemy forces. Working in close coordination with main

defense elements, support capabilities are often incorporated into the CBP.

7-176. A disruption element in the disruption zone can engage enemy forces in tactical depth as they

approach the CBP or CBPs. Direct and indirect fires coordinated by a disruption element can delay and

attrit enemy forces and cause them to enter the attack on a CBP in a piecemeal manner.

7-177. Main defense elements mass direct and indirect fires to defeat an enemy attack. The commander or

leader of the defending force may retain a reserve element and commit it only when necessary to prevent

defeat by enemy forces. Support elements in the support zone provide support to defenders in the disruption

zone and battle zone as required. In the event the commander or leader orders of a withdrawal from the

CBP, some support elements will exfiltrate quickly while other elements such as indirect fires

continue support to the main defense elements until directed to disengage by the commander or leader

and also exfiltrate.

KILL

ZONE

82-mm

IED

PKM

7.62-mm

60-mm

KILL

IED

ZONE

IED

CSOP

Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example)

Command and Control of a CBP Defense

7-178. The irregular OPFOR leader will position himself where he can best command and control the

defensive fight. C2 of a CBP is generally more difficult than that of an SBP because the defenders may be

more dispersed. Insurgents or guerrillas operating in and from the CBP use secure communications such as

couriers and wire.

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TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Functional Tactics

Support of a CBP Defense

7-179. Support of a CBP can be provided from within the local insurgent or guerrilla organization and/or

local resources in the relevant population. Some support may be allocated higher-level irregular OPFOR

organizations or from a state or non-state sponsor. Specialized support such as SPF can be temporarily

associated with insurgents or guerrillas in a CBP in order to provide training, materiel, and/or tactical and

technical advice.

Reconnaissance

7-180. Reconnaissance assets observe avenues of approach key to providing early warning and allow the

commander or leader time to defend or to exfiltrate personnel and resources from the CBP. Insurgents,

guerrillas, and/or their active supporters embed themselves within local populations. The irregular OPFOR

is less likely to engage in counterreconnaissance activities if these actions would reveal CBP location.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

7-181. Armored vehicles are not the norm in a CBP. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored

fighting vehicles and ad hoc fighting vehicles mounting heavy weapons are normally concealed and

covered in hide positions. The commander or leader may retain armored vehicles as part of his reserve for

quick response to contingencies in defense of his CBP.

Fire Support

7-182. CBPs are typically self-supporting in their defense. Fire support assets normally locate within the

CBP but may also locate outside of the CBP perimeter to best employ specific fires. Defenders employ

these fires to—

Defeat enemy forces in the battle zone.

Attrit enemy forces along avenues of approach near a CBP.

Disrupt enemy use of landing zones in the vicinity of a CBP.

Delay enemy forces to support withdrawal of the irregular OPFOR from the CBP.

Air Defense

7-183. Passive air defense is the norm for a CBP. Active air defense generally involves systems that do

not emit an electromagnetic signature. Insurgents or guerrillas engage aerial targets on order of the

commander or leader. An all-arms air defense concept involves using weapons of all personnel of a CBP to

protect against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft threats. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited

MANPADS capability in their weapons company. When available, shoulder-fired MANPADS would likely

be located in disruption or security element(s) that occupy fighting positions near a CBP oriented on

probable enemy air avenues of approach. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding

additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

7-184. The irregular OPFOR conceals fighting and survivability positions using C3D techniques with

locally available resources. Military-manufactured antipersonnel and/or antitank mines and/or IEDs are

emplaced on or near likely enemy avenues of approach. Particular mines and/or IEDs are emplaced

and secured with a cell or unit designated to arm and/or detonate the munition on order of the

commander or leader.

7-185. The irregular OPFOR reinforces urban and/or rural terrain to channel enemy forces into kill zones

on approaches to a CBP. Obstacles are generally more protective in nature than obstacles used near an SBP.

Insurgents or guerrillas may have specialized talents for engineer-like countermobility and mobility tasks.

When supported overtly or covertly by a state sponsor, SPF or regular forces may be associated with an

insurgent or guerrilla organization in order to provide training, materiel, and advice.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

7-35

Chapter 7

Logistics

7-186. Logistics operations of a CBP are generally self-sustaining and blend into the local commerce and

daily operations of a relevant population in the vicinity of the CBP. Provisioning a CBP with regular

resupply is facilitated by active supporters of the insurgent or guerrilla organization. The commander or

leader typically does not coerce local citizens to provide logistics support but can use such extortion when

critical commodities are required to sustain the CBP defense.

7-187. Supply caches and safe houses are distributed throughout the urban or rural area near the CBP.

Other supply caches and safe houses are located within the CBP perimeter.

INFOWAR

7-188. Elements from the CBP may attempt to integrate within any local communities for the purpose of

gathering information, collecting intelligence, and disseminating INFOWAR themes to the local relevant

population. Active supporters of the irregular OPFOR assist the commander or leader in keeping a low

profile. INFOWAR activities may focus on downplaying the existence or significance of the CBP.

Generally, the CBP will not conduct easily detectable INFOWAR activities that would call the enemy’s attention

to it. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

7-189. If the presence of a CBP cannot be hidden, INFOWAR may attempt to convince enemy forces that

the defenders are friendly to them. It may attempt to convince leaders of the governing authority that the

insurgents or guerillas are willing to affiliate and/or associate with them in levels of reconciliation. Other

INFOWAR techniques can portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime to further

isolate them from the relevant population. The insurgents or guerrillas can claim and demonstrate

themselves to be the population’s protector. In some cases, senior irregular OPFOR leaders may conduct

INFOWAR from a CBP to convince followers in other locations that they are still alive and leading their

organizations in the struggle against the enemy. INFOWAR can include support to provide basic social and

civic services to the relevant population that is not being provided by the governing authority.

7-190. Other INFOWAR techniques can result in the gradual acceptance by the relevant population to the

point that members of the insurgent or guerrilla organization become informal or legitimate representatives

in civil governance. This recognition can lead to election in a state’s formal voting processes and/or

establishing self-proclaimed semi-autonomous enclaves within a state with which the irregular OPFOR is

in conflict. In either case, the irregular OPFOR ensures a significant INFOWAR campaign to weaken

enemy support and strengthen its own support from a relevant population.

IRREGULAR OPFOR IN HYBRID THREAT TACTICS

7-191. The above section of this chapter shows examples of functional tactics in which insurgents and/or

guerrillas employ some of the same types of offensive and defensive actions used by smaller tactical units

of the irregular OPFOR (see TC 7-100.2). However, insurgents and/or guerrillas may also participate in

larger-scale functional tactics when acting as part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (See TC 7-100 for examples

of such involvement.) They often work closely with SPF units in such roles.

7-192. One would expect the irregular OPFOR to play a relatively minor role in HT tactics, perhaps used

as an economy-of-force measure when regular OPFOR units are not available. However, as examples in TC

7-100 show, insurgents and guerrillas can sometimes do things that regular military units cannot. For

example, they are well suited to dispersed actions as part of a disruption force in a disruption zone (in

offense or defense). However, their small size and ability to blend in with the local population also make it

easier for irregular OPFOR units or cells to infiltrate into enemy-held positions. There, they may serve as

enabling forces or elements, paving the way for exploitation by larger, regular military units, or they may

play key roles as part of an exploitation force or other action force or element that accomplishes the overall

mission of the HT action.

Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals can perform acts of terrorism that complement

functional tactics actions separate from or in conjunction with a larger HT force. (See chapter 6

for more details on terrorism.)

7-36

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Appendix A

Information Warfare

The irregular OPFOR (including insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements) is trained to

use adaptive techniques to defeat a superior opponent. Naturally it uses information warfare

(INFOWAR) to obtain asymmetrical effects. These tactics are constantly evolving thanks to

the exponential growth of networking and information technology. Increased accessibility to

the Internet, commoditization of information, and unprecedented global awareness provide

the irregular OPFOR with the ability to focus its INFOWAR activities on one of the

enemies greatest weaknesses—his dependence on information communication

technology in every aspect of his operations.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A-1. The irregular OPFOR, along with the regular OPFOR, defines information warfare as specifically

planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times.

Conducted in conjunction with offensive or defensive actions, INFOWAR is designed to exploit the

weaknesses of the opponent’s information systems.

GOALS

A-2. The primary goals of INFOWAR are to—

Influence the enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information,

information systems, and information-based processes.

Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.

TACTICAL TASKS

A-3. The effects of INFOWAR can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. However, the

irregular OPFOR highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of

INFOWAR at the tactical level:

Destroy. Destruction tasks physically render the enemy’s information systems ineffective.

Destruction is most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and

control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute.

Neutralizing or destroying the opponent’s information capability can be brought about by

physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.

Degrade. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information

infrastructure, information systems, and information collection means.

Disrupt. Disruption activities focus on disrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at

critical times and locations. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect

information and obtain or maintain information dominance.

Deny. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information

on the irregular OPFOR or deny his collection efforts.

Deceive. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decisionmakers and manipulate his

overall understanding of OPFOR activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes

disorientation among decisionmakers within their decision cycle.

Exploit. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemy’s C2 or reconnaissance intelligence,

surveillance, and target acquisition

(RISTA) capabilities to the advantage of the irregular

OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR also uses its various INFOWAR capabilities to exploit any

enemy vulnerability.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

A-1

Appendix A

Influence. Influencing information affects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, perspectives, and

reasoning capabilities, in order to support irregular OPFOR objectives. This may be done

through misinformation or by manipulating or “spinning” information.

INFOWAR ELEMENTS

A-4. Across the spectrum of competition, conflict, and war, the following elements are integrated when

developing and implementing INFOWAR:

Electronic warfare (EW). Activity conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use of the

electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the irregular OPFOR.

Deception. Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification

of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

Physical destruction. Use of all types of weapons and explosives to destroy critical components

of the enemy force, focusing on C2 nodes and RISTA sensors.

Protection and security measures. A wide range of activities (including the elements of

deception and EW) to enhance survivability and preserve combat power.

Perception management. Measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits

irregular OPFOR objectives.

Information attack (IA). Intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that

supports accomplishment of the irregular OPFOR mission.

Computer warfare. Attacks focused specifically on computer systems, networks, and nodes.

A-5. The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually

exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires that they all be integrated into a single,

integrated INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of INFOWAR does not necessarily involve the

use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully

execute a tactical INFOWAR action. Nevertheless, using one element or subelement, such as camouflage,

does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of INFOWAR.

A-6. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situation and

support to the overall objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to

which the irregular OPFOR employs the various elements of INFOWAR. The commander or leader has the

freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from

higher authority. The resources and capabilities of the irregular OPFOR, and the appropriateness of the

INFOWAR medium to the target, determine the choices and the extent to which the various INFOWAR

elements are employed and integrated.

TOOLS

A-7. Tools for waging INFOWAR can include, but are not limited to—

Conventional physical and electronic destruction means.

Malicious software.

Denial-of-service attacks.

The Internet.

The media.

International public opinion.

Communication networks.

Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.

The irregular OPFOR can employ INFOWAR tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets

of third-party actors.

A-8. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR will conduct INFOWAR activities that are criminal in nature.

For example, it may—

Use known computer exploitation tactics such as identity theft and industrial espionage.

Sell its computer warfare capabilities to create additional funding for its operations.

A-2

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Information Warfare

TARGETS

A-9. The OPFOR sees the targets of INFOWAR as an opponent’s—

Decisionmakers.

Weapons and hardware.

Critical information infrastructure.

C2 system.

Information and telecommunications systems.

C2 centers and nodes.

Information links, such as transmitters, communication devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The

irregular OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate,

influence, use, or destroy an information link. See table A-1 for typical examples of INFOWAR objectives

and targets.

Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets

Elements

Objectives

Targets

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the

C2 and RISTA assets and

enemy’s use of the electromagnetic

networks.

spectrum.

Deception

Mislead enemy decisionmakers.

Key military decisionmakers.

Cause confusion and delays in the

decisionmaking process.

General population and

international media sources and

Persuade the local population and/or

Internet sites.

international community to support

irregular OPFOR objectives.

Physical Destruction

Destroy the enemy’s information

C2 nodes and links, RISTA

infrastructures.

assets, telecommunications, and

power sources.

Protection and Security

Protect critical assets.

Enemy RISTA assets.

Measures

Perception Management

Distort reality or manipulate information to

Enemy RISTA assets.

support irregular OPFOR goals.

Local populace and leaders.

Media sources (international and

domestic).

Information Attack (IA)

Alter or deny key information.

Decisionmakers and other users

of information.

Systems reliant on accurate

information.

Computer Warfare

Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s

C2 and RISTA assets and

computer networks and information flow.

networks.

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

A-10. To conduct successful action against a more powerful enemy force likely enjoying a technological

overmatch, the irregular OPFOR must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur

naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment (OE). Most often, however, the

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A-3

Appendix A

irregular OPFOR will have to create its own opportunities. INFOWAR can help create the necessary

windows of opportunity for any type of offensive or defensive action, by executing deception techniques,

EW, perception management, and/or physical destruction.

A-11. Specific INFOWAR activities that can limit enemy force effectiveness can include—

Deceiving enemy forces with recurring social and political activities by active supporters of the

irregular OPFOR that appear non-threatening in the vicinity of the targeted objective.

Exploiting enemy information collection with false intelligence provided by active supporters of

the irregular OPFOR and/or insider threats.

Disrupting enemy information collection through coercion and extortion of the relevant

population to not cooperate with enemy forces.

Influencing enemy forces with misinformation and/or manipulated claims against the governing

authority to which the enemy forces belong.

Demonstrating the inability of enemy forces to protect civilians, effectively defend civil and/or

military facilities, and/or safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.

Psychologically isolating the enemy force and governing authority from each other as well as

from a relevant civilian population.

Creating a positive impression of irregular OPFOR actions and objectives among local, regional,

and/or global audiences.

Influencing a local, regional, and/or global audience with near real-time media coverage of

successful irregular OPFOR actions against enemy forces and the governing authority.

Using media releases to indicate the increasing discontent in a relevant population due to the

governing authority’s actions and reactions affecting daily civil commerce and lifestyles.

Using progressive INFOWAR activities to degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing

authority to continue counterinsurgent, counter-guerrilla, or anti-crime operations.

INFOWAR ORGANIZATIONS

A-12. Various types on non-state actors might be part of the irregular OPFOR, affiliated with it, or support

it in some manner. Even those organizations that do not belong to the irregular OPFOR or support it

directly or willingly could be exploited or manipulated to support its objectives. Irregular INFOWAR

organizations can be semiformal in the case of insurgent organization or ad hoc in informal organizations

such as guerrillas or criminal gangs. In most case, the irregular forces are organized to perform a specific

mission. Their number and size will increase or decrease based on the tactical situation.

A-13. INFOWAR organizations conduct actions either in support of or independent of established irregular

OPFOR units. The determining factors are base on those means that achieve their goals expeditiously.

Note. Special-purpose forces (SPF) can organize, train, and support parts of the irregular

OPFOR (insurgents or guerrillas and possibly even criminal organizations) and conduct

operations in conjunction with them. SPF missions can also include the use of INFOWAR.

A-14. Criminal elements will engage in INFOWAR activities to protect their operations. However, some

criminal organization specialize in INFOWAR and use technology to illegally produce profits either by

acquiring sensitive financial information or by selling hacking services and malware toolkits. (See chapter

4 for more information.) INFOWAR organizations will provide a variety of products and technical

assistance to aligned irregular forces through direct action cells or through specialized INFOWAR cells.

INFOWAR CELLS

A-15. In a local or higher insurgent organization, an INFOWAR cell plans, coordinates, and implements

the organization’s INFOWAR plan and provides guidance and assistance to the INFOWAR direct action

cells whenever required. The INFOWAR cell may use a variety of lethal and nonlethal methods to

influence the enemy and the population. Examples of such activities include but are not limited to—

Propaganda such as night letters and disinformation campaigns.

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Information Warfare

Incentivizing of destabilization activities such as criminal activities.

Assassinations and sabotage.

IED and other terrorist attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may

also be used in a manner to deceive the enemy and confuse the source of the attacks. The ultimate goal of

the INFOWAR cell is to create and maintain the perception that the enemy cannot provide security and

stability to the population.

A-16. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be

capable of several functions. Multiple functions and activities are necessary if the enemy has mounted his

own INFOWAR campaign. Some example functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are—

Information management (internal methods, links, and security).

Media manipulation, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and public affairs designed to influence

the population.

Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of

direct action teams, or printing).

Rumor control (misinformation and disinformation).

Sabotage actions.

Civic actions.

Indoctrination training.

Fund-raising (including international).

Recruiting.

Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence.

All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.

INFOWAR DIRECT ACTION CELLS

A-17. An INFOWAR direct action cell supports the insurgent organization’s INFOWAR plan and may or

may not receive guidance from the INFOWAR cell. Direct action as the title indicates is the nature of its

objective, purpose, and role. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other terror attacks are often used to

support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the

attack to their enemy.

A-18. Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, an INFOWAR direct action

cell may be capable of several functions. Some example functions performed by this cell are—

Selective sabotage actions.

Information management

Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation—PSYWAR).

Communications

(cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos,

broadcast successes of other direct action teams).

Civic actions.

Assistance in the cyber-mining for intelligence.

All of these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.

A-19. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation

function (PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or

cultural leader; or other experts. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell may be dispersed and are

assigned as the mission dictates. When countering the enemy’s INFOWAR campaign, specific knowledge

of stabilizing factors and systems is required. For example, if the enemy engages in reconstruction efforts

the direct action cell may require specific knowledge to sabotage the operation.

A-20. The mission, combat conditions, and many other variables determine the configuration and

composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is

not fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and OE to OE. The structure, personnel,

equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons

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A-5

Appendix A

appropriate to the mission. Other equipment is added as required, such as computers, computer rigged

vehicles, specialized antennas, and communications. Several members of the direct action cell may be hired

INFOWAR specialists. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the cell. There may

be as few as one INFOWAR direct action cell to over 20 INFOWAR direct action cells, depending on the

mission and other factors. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell are probably dispersed.

SUPPORT TO INFOWAR Cells

A-21. Irregular OPFOR organizations at times will compete for limited resources either from their higher

headquarters or from an external supporting state or non-state actors. This competition appears to the

outside observer as disjointed or lacking the discipline needed for unity of effort. However, individual

leaders of the irregular OPFOR are allowed to develop lines of operation as it sees fit given the unique set

of circumstances of its area of responsibility and the means at its disposal. When a particular tactic is

proven to be effective, it will be replicated as necessary in order to exploit success, increase the perception

of legitimacy for the irregular OPFOR cause, and to give the impression of progress. This sort of “groping

in the dark” for a successful strategy means that the irregular OPFOR is able to experiment to find what

works and to capitalize on effective tactics. The key is to open as many inroads as possible and to increase

the likelihood for windows of opportunity for the irregular OPFOR to exploit the political, economic or

social situation.

A-22. The operational variables will determine whether or not a local area will require all of the elements of

tradecraft for a complete perception management campaign. Important issues such as regional conflicts,

underprivileged and underrepresented populations, and the location of political, commercial or economic

power centers, all have the potential to be targets of an INFOWAR campaign plan. Support may come in

many forms from the general population. Online chat rooms, radio and television opinion shows and

politically motivated groups may all provide support to the INFOWAR mission. As the irregular OPFOR

assess the local environment and the enemy’s center of gravity is determined, INFOWAR planners will

target select groups, organizations, and individuals for a variety of activities.

A-23. Some INFOWAR missions may require cultural insights, organizational intelligence, and specialized

expertise for use in an INFOWAR campaign. For example, the media manipulation function (PSYWAR)

may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethnic, or cultural leader; or other

experts. Other functions could be used to obtain specific technical expertise such as the configuration of

important infrastructure, industrial, economic, and financial systems to develop targets for cyber attack.

INFOWAR activities will leverage the knowledge of individuals employed by these sectors of the

operational environment.

INFOWAR SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR OPFOR

A-24. INFOWAR activities support all of the categories of irregular OPFOR—insurgents, guerrillas, and

criminal elements. INFOWAR Cells provide the ways and means to conduct all elements of INFOWAR

activities. INFOWAR actions in the form of perception management or propaganda are designed to garner

support of the population for the irregular OPFOR. By establishing seemingly innocuous activities such as

web logs (blogs) and news outlets, INFOWAR cells can establish inroads for C2 functions, targeting and

other support functions. By targeting an information system’s weakest link, (the user), INFOWAR cells can

obtain information that provides inroads for further attacks by the irregular OPFOR or to by components of

the Hybrid Threat. If the current governing authority has control over information technology, INFOWAR

cells can conduct their operations from the sanctuary of a sympathetic nation.

A-25. INFOWAR activities provide support to the irregular OPFOR covertly in both times of peace and

times of war. OPFOR INFOWAR organizations can provide a variety of products and technical assistance

to aligned irregular organizations. INFOWAR cells also provide information technology resources such as

servers and networks to the irregular OPFOR in order to protect INFOWAR activities and disassociate it

from INFOWAR operations.

A-26. Some examples of INFOWAR support—

Locations of media outlets and personalities both friendly and enemy.

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Information Warfare

Accepted customs and norms and practices used to foster support for the irregular OPFOR.

Inside access to government, commercial, and financial leaders and institutions that support the

enemy.

Locations of civilian and government communications infrastructure.

Distracting of enemy forces through instantaneous civil disobedience such as flash mobs.

Economic data vital to projecting required resources necessary to establish local rapport.

Established networks for recruiting and mobilization of combatants and noncombatants.

Enemy forces mission command tactics techniques and procedures, and command and control

structure.

A-27. INFOWAR cells provide advisors and technological resources to the irregular OPFOR in either a

covert or clandestine manner depending on the objective. Examples of such support could include either

all or some of the elements of INFOWAR and range from hosting servers and managing networks for

an insurgency or criminal element to supplying software and/or EW equipment to guerrillas for

INFOWAR operations.

A-28. INFOWAR cells may or may not have the necessary resources to conduct research and development

of INFOWAR technologies and to develop mature INFOWAR training and doctrine. In some cases,

commercial-off-the-shelf technology satisfies the requirement for the irregular OPFOR. The INFOWAR

cell may provide funds or equipment such as computers and network equipment, low-power GPS jammers,

or software for use by other insurgents or by affiliated guerrillas or criminals. The benefit of using

commercial information technology is that it is dual purpose and has less chance of raising suspicion when

transporting it.

Perception Management Activities

A-29. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth or stability that

best suits the irregular OPFOR objectives. Perception management integrates a number of widely differing

activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences

range from enemy forces, to the local populace, to world popular opinion. At the tactical level, the irregular

OPFOR seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through PSYWAR and other

perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and

influencing civilian populations.

A-30. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of—

PSYWAR.

Direct action.

Public affairs.

Media manipulation and censorship.

Regional or international recruitment and/or fundraising for affiliated irregular forces.

A-31. Information communications technology and global dissemination of the 24-hour news cycle has

empowered the irregular OPFOR to implement complex perception management activities public affairs to

affect change, garner global support, and generally shape the OE to its purposes. INFOWAR activities

engage in public affairs to involve interest groups and media outlets to gain influence and to obtain their

objectives. The irregular OPFOR can enable political and civic leaders at all levels to engage the population

to accept its ideology and support the irregular OPFOR.

A-32. Although the irregular OPFOR maintains that perception management activities conducted at the

tactical level must be consistent with, and contribute to, the goals of the highest levels of organization,

subordinates are allowed much discretion on the ways and means of achieving their perception

management objectives. For example, forming a partnership with a charitable organization or a local

business leader in order to obtain secure lines of communications, and a recruiting pool would be a natural

extension of the strategy necessary to influence the local populace. If there is a religious or other

ideological approach available, the irregular OPFOR will leverage this to establish drivers of social

mobility such as educational organizations or business alliances. These organizations also provide the

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A-7

Appendix A

irregular OPFOR a conduit for recruiting, indoctrination, and long-term influence within the target group.

Additionally, the irregular OPFOR has the freedom to provide immediate assistance and disperse funds

without delay during times of crisis or whenever there is an opportunity to meet a particular objective. This

gives the irregular OPFOR the opportunity to be the so called “first with the most” in the struggle for hearts

and minds.

Psychological Warfare

A-33. PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management. Targeting the forces of the enemy,

PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and

reasoning of enemy personnel. In addition to the enemy’s military forces, PSYWAR specialists also

concentrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the irregular OPFOR,

turning opinion against the enemy’s objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy

casualties and lack of success. They also highlight enemy mistakes, especially those that cause civilian

casualties or damage civil infrastructure.

A-34. The irregular OPFOR skillfully employs media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental

organizations

(NGOs), to further influence public and private perceptions. However, if the irregular

OPFOR perceives the presence of NGOs to be detrimental to its objectives, it can be extremely effective in

hindering their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, thus discrediting them.

Public Affairs

A-35. Local partnerships and projects are regarded as enhancing the strategic and operational goals of the

irregular OPFOR but are not necessarily prescribed by the higher command. The objective is to provide a

working solution that is culturally acceptable to the target population and does not compromise the core the

irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to integrate its activities into the target society and does this

by providing the essential services for everyday life. Through cultural acceptance and shared goals,

INFOWAR operators are able to develop trust and loyalty among the society and create opportunity for

future projects and the perception of social mobility. Other examples of grassroots assistance given to a

disenfranchised segment of the population by the irregular OPFOR could include—

Establishment or purchase of a local business or industry in order to buy influence, generate

funds for irregular OPFOR activities, and provide access to lines of communications.

Cash payments to victims of both natural and manmade disasters.

Support to religious, educational, or charitable institutions for public relations purposes, and

recruitment.

Provision of public services such as welfare, disaster response, or law and order services in order

to delegitimize the existing government.

Monetary support to religious, political, academic, or business leaders who are willing to support

the irregular OPFOR cause.

Establishing a parallel legal process where the population can obtain a just resolution for

disputes without unwanted corruption by external values.

A-36. If properly employed, the results of perception management activities become ingrained into

everyday life and can be viewed as a positive force to the targeted population. The targeted population gets

the services denied to them by the current governmental structure, while the irregular OPFOR is able to

move freely among the population and establish a support structure for future operations. Perception

management activities are regarded by the enemy as propaganda, despite the fact that the irregular OPFOR

enjoys more influence over the population than the existing government does. The irregular OPFOR is able

to maintain contact with the target population in an overt way that further legitimizes its presence. By

providing opportunities for education, work and charity, the irregular OPFOR receives in return loyalty and

support for its cause. The irregular OPFOR may adopt a long-term strategy that allows it to fully integrate

into all aspects of society. The fact that it administers resources and services that are unavailable to the

targeted population increases its influence and makes affiliation with its cause a desirable goal for the

target population.

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Information Warfare

A-37. Providing footage of perceived abuses of power by the enemy to the public helps INFOWAR

activities make a case for allowing the irregular OPFOR to establish an ideological foothold within the state

and provides the moral support needed to increase the resistance to the government.

Disaster Response

A-38. Response to disaster, whether natural or manmade, is viewed by the irregular OPFOR as another

opportunity to gain influence and support in a region. Human suffering on a large scale sets the conditions

for chaos and an overextension of the state’s resources. In many regions, disaster-relief services may be

inadequate, and there is usually an inordinate amount of suffering before any assistance becomes available.

Because of its access to resources and support systems that are outside the government’s bureaucratic

structure, the irregular OPFOR can enable a more comprehensive response to natural disasters in certain

targeted areas. In some cases, it will augment the current regime’s disaster-relief efforts and attempt to

integrate and legitimize its role in assisting the population. In other situations, it will supplant the existing

structure and outperform the competition. The goal is to be the first with the most in terms of aid and

assistance. Disaster response efforts may include—

Evacuation of personnel from threatened areas.

Provision of humanitarian relief such as food and temporary shelter.

Long-term plans to rebuild structures destroyed by the disaster.

Cash payments to victims to pay for immediate needs or to compensate a loss.

A-39. The irregular OPFOR can couple these services—including grassroots activism, social services and

disaster response—with a political message and an intimidating presence. These combined methods allow

the irregular OPFOR to establish its legitimacy, separate its enemies from its friends, and build support

among the population while establishing inroads for future operations.

Media Activities

A-40. Irregular OPFOR will use all available means to exploit the media. These include both traditional

forms such as television and newspaper outlets and as “new” media such as social networks and other

computerized outlets. Benefits to the irregular OPFOR include the ability to connect with sympathizers for

recruiting and resourcing, channeling responses through emotive themes, and promulgating a narrative of

events that is more conducive to its objective.

A-41. The barriers to obtaining and using the media have diminished significantly with the ubiquitous

expansion of the Internet. Media resources are no longer restricted to a limited number of corporations or

individuals. Individuals with the technical knowledge can leverage a variety of commercially available

technologies and reach a large audience. In some cases video releases or newscasts produced exclusively

within the new media are used by traditional media outlets and are given more attention than the official

account of events. Unburdened by a multi-step approval process, irregular OPFOR can manipulate the

media to their political and military advantage. Oftentimes it is not the most accurate or properly vetted

message that attracts attention, but rather the first to hit the media.

A-42. Having the ability to appeal or relate to the broadest possible audience within the cultural context of

the OE, means that the irregular OPFOR has an intimate understanding of the target audience including

social and cultural factors such as race issues, economic status and education levels.

A-43. The irregular OPFOR uses its knowledge of technology and culture to craft a message that is both

targeted and suggestive. It also uses media operations as a front for reconnaissance and intelligence

operations. Some of the techniques available to the irregular OPFOR are —

Producing pamphlets, signs, and banners to spread their message usually through the use of

images for illustration.

Using radio television and other media in a fashion that exploits freedom of speech laws in order

to operate on the fringe of social norms without being illegal.

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Appendix A

Computer Warfare Information Attack

A-44. OPFOR information warfare (INFOWAR) units engage in a combination of computer warfare,

information attack and perception management to establish and maintain information dominance in

cyberspace by using both direct and indirect attacks on their adversary’s computer networks, information

systems and online media. Computer warfare and information attack targets both the networks and the

information enemy elements of national power need to function daily basis and conduct warfare.

INFOWAR brings to bear the information oriented elements of national power to decisively defeat

the enemy.

A-45. The complex nature of the information environment provides the conditions for both direct and

indirect INFOWAR attacks and presents an opportunity for INFOWAR tactics and techniques to augment

traditional military operations at all levels of command from tactical to the strategic. Modern militaries

rely on information systems and automation as well as worldwide connectivity to project power on a global

scale. These information systems are used in command and control; logistics support; surveillance and

reconnaissance; and for global positioning and navigation satellites which provide both navigation and

precision targeting data.

A-46. The direct approach to INFOWAR is a concerted operation designed to attack a specific target

whether it is key infrastructure, a civil institution’s databases or critical command and control nodes. While

the indirect approach could involve the constant probing of the adversary’s weaknesses and multiple

limited engagements designed to wear down electronic defenses, win decisively in the propaganda

campaign, or to identify vulnerabilities for future operations.

Providing Computer Warfare Tools and Services

A-47. Hosting services are the key to supporting INFOWAR activities in cyberspace. The INFOWAR unit

provides access for a variety of services and is a clearing house for exchanging successful techniques and

data on potential targets in chat rooms and on blogs. The irregular OPFOR can use these services to email

or embed links to servers outside the area of operations that can be used for recruiting, exchanging

intelligence and propaganda, and launching attacks.

A-48. Propaganda is still a key component of the INFOWAR campaign. Redirecting Internet users to

OPFOR themed websites will have the effect of not only spreading the irregular OPFOR’s message but

giving the enemy and his supporters the impression that the irregular OPFOR has compromised every

aspect of his society.

Developing Paralell Networks

A-49. Providing to the irregular OPFOR a C2 network is an effective way for the INFOWAR activity to

maintain situational awareness and gather intelligence on the state’s infrastructure and elements of power.

A dedicated communications network can also be used to recruit and mobilize large groups for specific

actions such as rallies, protests, riots, or attacks.

A-50. The irregular OPFOR posing as commercial or humanitarian venture, such as an NGO, a legitimate

business, or another noncombatant entity, can establish network connectivity in a contested area of interest.

This can be accomplished at another level by providing telecommunications infrastructure and switching

equipment to the state’s telecommunications company with embedded backdoor access to the input-output

systems of the equipment.

A-51. This will give the INFOWAR activity free access to important elements of the nation’s

telecommunications network. In other cases, after hostilities have begun, telecommunications equipment

can be replaced or reconfigured after a key node is physically seized and repurposed for manipulation and

use by the irregular OPFOR.

A-52. The irregular OPFOR has the ability to seize enemy civil telecommunications infrastructure and use

it for their purposes. Existing switching equipment can be integrated with that of their own and used with

existing lines and wireless towers to extend the range and services for the irregular OPFOR C2 network.

Once implemented the irregular OPFOR can commercialize its services. As more subscribers are added, the

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Information Warfare

network becomes a source of intelligence by logging calls made and received by persons of interest. It can

also be a source of revenue to fund future actions.

SPF and INFOWAR

A-53. INFOWAR capabilities provide clear advantages for SPF missions, due to the fact that SPF will

always conduct missions in small teams or detachments and will use INFOWAR capabilities and

techniques to maximize the effectiveness of their small numbers. INFOWAR capabilities have the potential

to increase situational awareness, facilitate deception, and disrupt the enemy’s decision making process.

A-54. SPF conducts an array of operations in support of the INFOWAR plan. Examples include—

Perception Management.

Diversionary Measures.

Sniper.

Indirect Fire.

Air Defense (denial of airspace and enemy claims of air supremacy and/or superiority).

Electronic Warfare.

Note. SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support local insurgents or guerrillas and

possibly even criminal organizations and conduct (or lead) operations in conjunction with them.

SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for offensive actions,

diversionary measures, INFOWAR activities or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not

only advise and assist but actually control (command) the irregular forces as a surrogate force.

SPF missions (and those of their affiliates or surrogates) can include the use of terror tactics. See

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7 INFOWAR, and Chapter 15Special Purpose

Forces for more information.

A-55. The nature of the shared goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree

of affiliation. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with criminal (or guerrilla) organizations is

dependent only on the needs of the criminal (or guerrilla) organization or on the needs of the SPF at a

particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to

the next. Shifts in affiliations may in turn cause adjustments in the SPF task organization to

accommodate these changes.

Direct Action Team

A-56. A Direct Action Team is embedded in most INFOWAR units to provide support to the PSYWAR

company. The teams specialize in infantry antiarmor style attacks; antiarmor ambushes; hit-and-run attacks

against armored and/or hardened or rear area targets. Usually one Direct Action Teams, each broken into

three attack elements of 4 persons each. The teams will probably be supported or augmented by different

types of SPF specialty teams such as Sniper Teams or Sapper Teams. The SPF Teams (UAV) may be used

to acquire reconnaissance information on targets or facilities.

A-57. SPF team members are cross-trained in the use of all equipment, weapons, and vehicles assigned to

the company. The equipment and weapons mix is determined by the mission. SPF Soldiers speak several

languages and are able to interact with the local populace for perception management and or PSYWAR missions.

All SPF teams may be augmented by other SPF personnel, weapons, and/or equipment. The team serves as a

standard SPF Team when not required for INFOWAR.

A-58. The SPF team leader coordinates all combat activities as well as reconnaissance and jamming

activities, operations, employment, monitoring, direction finding, collection, and reporting. This includes

GSR, sensor sets, remote sensor monitoring, and observation.

Signal Team

A-59. A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla units up

to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. Teams can also support

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A-11

Glossary

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKO

Army Knowledge Online

AOR

area of responsibility

antipersonal

Army regulation

antitank

ATGL

antitank grenade launcher

ATGM

anitiank guided missile

AUTL

Army Universal Task List

battle position

command and control

C3D

camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception

CBP

complex battle position

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

counterintelligence

comand post

counterreconnaissance

combat support

CSS

combat service support

direct action

DODD

Department of Defense Directive

EFP

explosive formed projectile

electronic warfare

field manual

guerrilla [in guerrilla unit symbol]

GANG

criminal (generic) [in crimainal organization symbol]

GPS

global positioning system

HEAT

high explosive antitank

hunter-killer

HRO

humantarian relif organization

Hybrid Threat

HUMINT

human intelligence

HVT

high-value target

insurgent [in insurgent organization symbol]

information attack

IED

improvised explosive device

INFOWAR

information warfare

INS

internal security

ISF

internal security forces

joint publication

kilometer(s)

LNG

liquefied natural gas

17 January 2014

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Glossary-1

Glossary

LOC

line of communications

LVCG

live, virtual, constructive, and gaming

landing zone

MANPADS

man-portable air defense system

meter(s)

millimeter(s)

MRL

multiple rocket launcher

NGO

nongovernmental organization

operational environment

observation post

OPFOR

opposing force (AR 350-2)

OPSEC

operational security

PSC

private security contractor

PMESII-PT

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical

environment, and time

PSYWAR

psychologcial warfare

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

RISTA

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition

SAF

small arms fire

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SATCOM

satellitte communications

SBP

simple battle position

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SPF

special-purpose forces

SSM

surface-to-surface missile

SVIED

suicide vest improvised explosive device

SVBIED

suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device

training circular

TCP

traffic control post

TIC

toxic industrial chemical

TIM

toxic idustrial material

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command [US Army]

TRISA

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity [US Army]

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

United States

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UJTL

Universal Joint Task List

United Nations

VBIED

vehicle borne improvised explosive device

WMD

weapon of mass destruction

Glossary-2

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Glossary

SECTION II - TERMS

adherent

An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that forms collaborative relationships with, acts

on behalf of, or is otherwise inspired, without any requirement of allegiance to another organization, to

take action in support of the goals and objectives of another irregular force [such as al-Qa‘ida—the

organization and the ideology—including support and/or acts of violence]. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3

from U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism)

affilitate

An individual or one or more unit, organization, or cell that aligns with another individual, unit,

organization, or cell to influence, support, and/or act in concert with for mutual benefit. No command

relationship exists necessarily between an affiliate and the unit, organization, or cell in whose area of

responsibility it operates; however, localized operations of the affiliate may support the area, regional,

or global agenda of an organization [such as al-Qa’ida]. Affiliates are typically nonmilitary or

paramilitary individuals or groups. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive support from regular

military forces as part of an agreement under which they cooperate. (As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from

U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism)

antiterrorism

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to

include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 3-07.2)

ambush

A surprise attack from a concealed position used against moving or temporarily halted targets in order to

destroy or capture personnel and/or supplies; harrass and demoralize the enemy; delay or block movement

of personnel and supplies; and/or canalize enemy movements. (TC 7-100.2)

area defense

A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by forcing the enemy’s offensive

operations to culminate before the enemy can achieve his objective, and/or by denying the enemy his

objectives while preserving combat power until decision can be achieved through strategic operations

and operational mission accomplishment. (TC 7-100.2)

area of reposnibility

The geographical area and associated airspace, as defined by the Opposing Force (OPFOR), within

which a commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations. An AOR is bounded by a

limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the organization may not operate or fire without

coordination through the next-higher headquarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature. Linear

AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa. (TC 7-100.2)

assault

An attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation and/or

destruction of the enemy position. (TC 7-100.2)

attack

An offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both

destroys or defeats enemy forces and seizes and secures terrain. (TC 7-100.2)

battle

A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an

engagement. (ADRP 3-90)

battle positon

A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2)

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Glossary-3

Glossary

combating terrorism

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and

counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See antiterrorism and

counterterrorism. (See also JP 3-26)

complex battle position

A defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer effort

to protect the unit(s) within it from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by

the enemy. (TC 7-100.2)

condition

Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is

expected to operate and may affect performance. See also joint mission-essential tasks. (JP 1-02)

counterterrroism

Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to

terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 3-26)

deception

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence

to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13.4)

enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0) [The enemy in

the context of TC 7-100.3 is any hostile party to the irregular opposing force (TC 7-100.3)]

enemy combatant

In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an

armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful

enemy combatants.” (U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of

Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006)

engagement

A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. (ADP 3-0)

guerrilla

A typically indigenous individual within a irregular unit structure organized along military lines in

order to conduct military and paramilitray operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. TC 7-

100.3 typically identifies guerrillas within the context of guerrilla units. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3

from JP 1-02/No approved JP 1-02 definition]

guerrilla force

A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct

military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

hybrid threat

The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all

unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. (ADRP 3-0; see also TC 7-100)

improvised explosive device

A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal,

noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny

mobility, or distract. Also called IED. (JP 1-02)

information operations

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network

operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with

specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human

and automated decision making while protecting the irregular opposing force human and automated

decision making. Also called IO. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 3-13]

Glossary-4

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Glossary

intergovernmental organization

An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or

functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (ADRP 3-0)

irregular forces

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal

security forces. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24)

irregular warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant

population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full

range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02)

insurgent

An individual organized within an irregular insurgent organization structure that uses subversion

and/or violence in order to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. TC 7-100.3 typically

identifies insurgents within the context of cells. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02 and

JP 3-24/no approved JP 1-02 defintion.]

kill zone

A designated area on the battlefield where the opposing force (OPFOR) plans to destroy an enemy

using obstacles and massed fires of direct and indirect weapon systems. (TC 7-100.2) [As adapted for

TC 7-100.3 from FM 3-21.8, ATTP 3-06.11, ATTP 3-21.9.]

lawful enemy combatant

Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include

members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and

organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible

command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide

by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an

authority not recognized by the detaining power. (Department of Defense Directive (DODD)

2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, 5 September, 2006)

maneuver defense

A defensive operation designed to achieve tactcial decision by skillfully using fires and manuever to

destroy key enemy elements of the enemy’s combat system and deny enemy forces their objective,

while preserving the friendly force. (TC 7-100.2)

militia

An organization which generally refers to citizens trained as soldiers (as opposed to professional

soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored militia that is part of the state’s armed

forces but subject to activation only in an emergency. To avoid confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses

militia typically in the latter sense. Irregular forces might be referred to or declare itself as a “militia;”

however, the term militia is not typically used to describe gurrilas, insurgents, or criminals associated

with opposing forces. (TC 7-100.2; TC 7-100; TC 7-100.3)

mercenary

An individual who acts individually or acts a member of a formed group and volunteers from

recruitment locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; is operating directly in the

hostilities; is motivated by the desire for private gain, are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the

conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of

similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; is neither a national of a party to the

conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed

forces of a party of the conflict; and, is not on official military duty representing a country that is not

involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment between. (Geneva

Conventions IV)

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or

promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Glossary-5

Glossary

conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

NGO. (JP 3-08)

objective

The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. A location

on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide

for unity of effort. (ADRP 1-02)

operational area security

A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces. Forces engaged in area security

operations focus on the force, installation, route, area, or asset to be protected. (ADRP 3-37)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational variables

Those interrelated aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that differ

from one operational environment to another and define the nature of a particular operational

environment. The eight operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information,

infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) (ADRP 3-0)

opposing force

A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities

of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces

(AR 350-2).

paramilitary

An irregular individual belonging to forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any

country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. [As adapted for TC 7-

100.3 from JP 1-02 and JP 3-24]

paramilitary forces

Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in

organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02; JP 3-24)

procedure

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. See also tactics; techniques.

(JP 1-02)

propaganda

Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to

influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor,

either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

protection

The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel,

equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the

boundaries of a given operational area. (ADRP 3-37)

raid

An attack against a stationary target for the purpose of its capture or destruction that culminates in the

wihdrawal of the raiding dorce to safe territory. (TC 7-100.2)

reconnaissance attack

A tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either

fixes or destroys them; and/or gain information about the enemy’s location, dispositons, military

capabilities, and/or intentions. (TC 7-100.2)

Glossary-6

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Glossary

red team

An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent

capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational

environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 1-02)

resistance movement

An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established

government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

risk management

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making

decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations

under which [United States] forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces

encountered. Also called ROE (JP 1-04; ADRP 3-0)

simple battle position

A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. (TC 7-100.2)

standard

A satisfactory level of performance for a task and condition for each individual and collective task to

ensure that the individual or organization meets mission requirements. When no standard exists, the

commander or organizational leader establishes a standard and the next higher commander or leader

approves it. All training conducted by the unit, organization, or cell is assessed against the

commander’s or leader’s intent for the training event, mission, and/or published doctrinal standards.

See also TC 7-101, Appendix A. [As adapted for TC 7-100.3 from ADP 7-0]

tactics

The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. See also procedures;

techniques. (JP 1-02)

task-organizing

The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and

composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADRP 3-0)

techniques

Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures;

tactics. (JP 1-02 )

terrorist

An individual who commits unlawful acts of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce

governments and societies in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. TC 7-100.3

typically identifies terrorists in the context of cells. [As adapted to TC 7-100.3 from JP 1-02/no

approved JP 1-02 defintion.]

terrorism

The use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to

intimidate governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other

ideological beliefs and committed to the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2)

threat

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm the United

States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0) Note. Irregular opposing

forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm

irregular opposing force goals and objectives.

threat analysis

In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning

potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Glossary-7

Glossary

review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well

as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in

identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism.

(JP 1-02) Note. Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that

have the capability and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives.

traditional warfare

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the

objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or

seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. (DOD

Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), December 1, 2008)

transnational threat

Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across

international boundaries and threatens [United States] national security interests. (JP 3-26) Note.

Irregular opposing forces can apply this definition to actors, entities, or forces that have the capability

and intent to harm irregular opposing force goals and objectives.

unconventional warfare

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly

conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped,

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, and includes but is not limited

to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted

recovery. (JP 1-02)

unlawful enemy combatant

Persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its

coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of

the war on terrorism, the term unlawful enemy combatant is defined to include, but is not limited to, an

individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are

engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. (Department of Defense

Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, September 5, 2006)

weapon of mass destruction

Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or

causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such

means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 3-40) Note. WMD

effects can be caused by other means such as high-yield or low-yield explosives.

Glossary-8

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

References

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

ADP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.

ADP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2013.

ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.

AR 350-2. Opposing Force Program. 9 April 2004.

DOD MIL-STD-2525-C. Common Warfighting Symbology. 17 November 2008.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Available online at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010.

TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011.

TC 7-101. Exercise Design. 26 November 2010.

READINGS RECOMMENDED

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012.

AR 11-33. Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP). 17 October 2006.

AR 381-11. Intelligence Support to Capability Development. 26 January 2007.

ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.

ATTP 3-21.9. SBCT Infantry Platoon and Squad. 8 December 2010.

DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006.

DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare. 1 December 2008.

FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007.

FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.

FM 3-24.2. Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009

FM 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 18 February 2011.

FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.

FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004.

FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide. 3 May 2007.

Geneva Conventions. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva_conventions-1949.html

JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011

JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.

JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 26 January 2012.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

References-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a

page reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the

paragraph symbol (¶).

cadre, 2-36

immediate leaders, 4-44

camera operator, 2-119, 5-93

passive supporter, 4-47

action element, 7-4

CBRN, 6-112

senior leaders, 4-41

action force, 7-4

cellular structure, 2-72, 2-73

cult, 1-53

action function, 7-1 ¶ 1

child combatant, 6-91

cyber attack, 6-108

actions on objective, 6-27

civil affairs cell, 2-155

cyber crime, 4-81

active supporter, 1-57, 2-41

clan, 1-21, 2-43

adaptive, 2-19

clandestine, 2-34, 3-28, 6-129

adherent, 6-4, 6-130

deception elment, 7-170

clearing element, 7-6

adversary, 1-6, 1-64, 6-8

deception force, 7-7

coalition, 1-67

advisor, 2-29

deception, 1-40, 6-39,

combat service support, 7-50

affiliation, 1-10, 1-57, 2-48, 3-2.

defensive action, 3-181, 6-41,

combat support, 7-57

3-13, 4-8, 5-66, 6-124

7-122

command and control, 2-10,

air defense, 7-42

demolition, sabotage, and IED

3-1, 4-40

all-arms air defense, 7-89

team, 2-124

compare and contrast table:

allegiance, 1-56, 2-43, 5-10

diaspora, 1-25, 1-60-1-63

communications, p.1-17

ambush, 6-80, 7-11

direct action cell, 2-11, 2-64,

composition, p.1-16

annihilation ambush, 7-11,

2-70, 2-71, 2-75 2-81,

disposition, p. 1-16

7-21

assassination cell, 2-84

equipment, p.1-16

containment ambush, 7-11,

extortion cell, 2-90

finances, p.1-17

7-31

INFOWAR cell, 2-117, A-15

interal security, p. 1-17

harrassment ambush, 7-11,

kidnapping cell, 2-90

organization-structure,

7-26

mortar cell, 2-99

p. 1-16

antitank battery, 3-80

multifunction cell, 2-81

personnel, p. 1-16

antitank platoon, 3-123

rocket cell, 2-99

recruitment, p. 1-16

anxiety, 6-39, 6-55, 6-75

sniper cell, 2-84

terrorism, p. 1-17

area of operations (AOR), 3-2

dispersion, 6-87

training, p. 1-17

armed combatant, 5-1, 5-10,

disruption element, 7-134

uniforms, p. 1-16

5-90

disruption force, 7-2, 7-7

weapons, p. 1-16

armor, 2-62, 7-110, 7-181

disruption zone, 7-145

complex battle position,

arms trafficking, 4-73

drug trade, 4-76

7-122, 7-124, 7-126

arson, 4-63, 6-59

complex terrain, 7-59

assassination, 4-69, 6-83

computer crime, 4-85

economic disruption, 6-137

assault, 7-46

computer fraud, 4-90

element, 7-1

assault element, 7-48

computer warfare, A-44

enabling element, 7-6

association, 1-57, 2-43, 2-49,

corporate organization, 5-25

enabling force, 7-6

2-61, 3-11, 3-174, 4-30

counterintelligence, 2-41, 2-53,

enabling function, 7-6, 7-75

attack, aerial, 6-49

2-112,

enemy, 6-5

attack maritime, 6-47

counterreconnaissance, 7-153,

engineer, 3-97, 7-43

attack on land, 6-45

7-175, 7-180

escape and exploitation, 6-29

courier, 3-88, 3-145, 4-14, 5-93

exploitation force, 7-192

criminal activity, 1-73, 4-2

base camp, 3-31-3-37

exploitation, 6-29

criminal network, 4-30

battle position, 7-124

explosively formed projectile,

criminal organization, 4-4,

battle zone, 7-144

6-67

4-30

bombing, 6-63

external state, 1-8, 1-64, 5-54

transnational organization,

external support, 1-71

breach, 7-77, 7-90

4-36

extortion, 2-90

bribery, 4-62

criminal, 1-56, 2-73,

4-1

field operatives, 4-46

faith system, 1-52, 2-43

cache, 7-91

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Index-1

Index

finance, 2-39, 2-90

6-104, 7-45, 7-66, 7-92,

non-state, 1-68-1-71

finance cell, 2-138

7-120, 7-159, 7-188,

fire support, 7-40

A-1

fixing element, 7-7

insider threat, 5-88, 6-99, A-11

objectives, irregular OPFOR

fixing force, 7-7

insurgents, 1-48, 2-1

1-12, 1-39

flexibility 7-8

insurgent irregular OPFOR,

offensive action, 2-180,

forces, 7-1

2-1

3-178, 6-43, 7-9

fraud, 4-52

insurgent organization, 2-1

OPFOR, p. vii ¶ 1, p. vi ¶ 1

functional tactics, 1-18, 1-72,

higher insurgent

opposing forces, p. vii ¶ 1

p.7-1 ¶ 1

organization, 2-48

fundamentalist, 1-52

local insurgent organization,

2-13, 2-64

paramilitary, p. vii ¶ 4 , 1-2,

insurgents-criminals,1-77, 6-76

gambling, 4-57

1-23, 2-43, 3-1, 4-1, 5-2

intelligence cell, 2-105

gang, 4-4, 4-27

passive supporter, 2-27, 2-44

internal security forces, 1-11,

Geneva Conventions, 5-4

perception management,

2-12, 5-32, 6-3

governing authority, 1-21

1-30, 2-37, 4-110, A-29

irregular forces, p. viii-ix

government-in-exile, 2-6, 2-32,

planning cell, 2-115

irregular OPFOR, 1-1,1-9,

2-37

PMESII-PT, 1-20

p.7-1 ¶ 2

guerrilla, 1-47-1-48, 3-1

political, 1-21

irregular warfare, p. vii ¶ 4,

guerrilla battalion, 3-107

military, 1-23

guerrilla brigade, 3-23, 3-46

economic, 1-26

guerilla company, 3-150

social, 1-28

guerrilla company, hunter- killer,

information, 1-30

3-163

infrastructure, 1-32

kidnapping, 4-65, 6-75

guerrilla force, 2-2-2-3, 3-1

physical environment, 1-33-

guerrilla hunter-killer group,

1-34

3-170

time, 1-36

law enforcement agencies, 1-5

guerrilla platoon, 3-159

political advisor, 2-33, 2-37,

guerrilla scouts, 3-169

legitimacy, 1-7, 5-6, 6-5

2-56, 3-57, 3-114,

guerrilla squad, 3-160

local insurgent organization

principles [OPFOR], 1-38

guerrilla unit, 2-65, 2-72, 3-1

2-64

adaptability, 1-44

logistics, 1-71, 3-21

concentration, 1-45

logistics cell, 2-134

deception, 1-40

initiative, 1-39

hierarchical organization, 1-68

mobility, 1-43

hijacking, 2-90, 4-64, 6-71

main defense element,,

perseverance, 1-46

hoax, 6-55

7-132, 7-167

protection, 1-42

hostage taking, 4-67, 6-78

main defense force, 7-5

surprise, 1-41

higher insurgent organization,

MANPADS squad, 3-126

private security company, 4-15

2-48

media activities, 6-136, A-40

private security contractor,

human shield, 6-89

media manipulation, 2-96,

5-13

human trafficking, 4-74

2-117, 5-41,6-30

protected element, 7-7

humanitarian, 2-16, 5-9

media organization, 5-42

protected force, 7-7

hunter-killer, 3-42

media personnel, 5-37

psychologcial techniques, 1-16

Hybrid Threat tactics, 5-188

medical cell, 2-157

psychologcial warfare, 1-6,

Hybrid Threat, 1-1, 2-5,

medical section, 3-103

5-21, A-16, A-33

3-10, 6-3, 7-191

mercenaries, 1-71, 6-3

public affairs, A-35

militia, 3-44, 4-13, 5-31

mortar battery, 3-69

independent, 1-51, 2-4, 3-2

mortar platoon, 3-119

independent actor, 1-51, 6-4,

motivations, 1-47,

4-19,

5-5,

6-130

raid, 1-83, 6-80, 7-67

5-77-5-78, 6-6, 6-121, A-33

infiltrate, 3-185, 6-6, 7-192

raiding element, 7-5,

multile rocket launcher

information warfare cell, 2-96,

7-70

platoon, 3-75, 3-121

2-117

reconnaissance, 2-205, 3-58,

information, 1-30

3-90, 7-37, 7-62, 7-84,

elements, A-4

7-108

objectives, A-9

reconnaissance attack, 7-94

nationalistic, 1-50, 1-61, 2-149

tactical tasks, A-3

network organization,2-49,4-12

reconnaissance company, 3-90

targets, A-9

reconaissance element, 7-7

noncombatant, 5-1

tools, A-7

nongovernmental organization,

reconnaissance force, 7-7

INFOWAR, 1-30, 2-117,

reconnaissance platoon, 3-128

5-56

Index-2

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Index

recruiting cell, 2-147

subversion, 1-21, 2-1, 4-3

transnational affiliate, 6-128

recruitment, 2-14, 6-94

suicide attack, 6-106

transnational corporation, 5-84

regular forces, 1-22

support element, 7-19, 7-50

transnational network, 1-68

regular OPFOR, 1-10

support force, 7-7

transportation cell, 2-152

regulated military forces, 1-5,

support zone, 7-143, 7-147

tribe, 1-50

5-4

supporting cell, 2-18, 2-73

rehearsal, 6-24

surprise, 1-41, 6-39

surveillance, 2-41, 3-129,

relevant population, 1-6, 1-21

4-50, 5-3, 6-22

6-145

surveillance, pre-attack, 6-22

unarmed combatant, 5-1, 5-92

reserve element, 7-140

swarming, 1-45, 3-188

rocket launcher battery, 3-73

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

3-19, 6-50, 7-113, A-56

tactics and techniques, 7-1

tailor, vii

sabotage, 6-61

videographer, 2-79, 5-42, 5-93,

target selection, 6-13, 6-20

safe haven, 1-25, 1-34, 1-54,

6-30

technical support cell, 2-120

1-66, 3-21, 6-25, 6-97

terror tactics, 6-36

safe house, 2-41, 2-141, 3-41,

terrorism, 1-72, 6-1

6-23, 6-29, 7-44

weapons battalion, 3-66

terrorism techniques, 6-37

sapper, 3-16, A-12

weapons company, 3-116

terrorist, p. viii ¶ 3, 6-1

sapper company, 3-97

weapons of mass destruction,

threat, p. viii ¶ 2

security element, 7-7, 7-18,

6-54, 6-111, 6-135

totalitarian, 1-54

7-25

WMD support team, 2-129

toxic industrial chemicals,

security force, 7-7

woman combatant, 6-91

2-131, 6-113

separtist, 1-50

toxic industrial material, 2-131,

shelter cell, 2-141

6-113

simple battle position, 2-272,

trafficking, 4-73

3-183, 7-125

training, 1-60, 2-45, 6-10, A-16

sniper section, 3-157

training camp, 3-31-3-37, 3-41

special purpose forces, 1-11,

training cell, 2-143

2-3, 3-13, 4-13, 6-6, A-53

training facilities, 1-66

stay-behind forces, 3-191

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Index-3

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 27