Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Noncombatants

LOCAL BUSINESS OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES

5-28. Local commercial enterprises often have authorization to own personal firearms to protect their

workplace from theft or robbery. Authorization may be for either concealed or open carry. A business

owner or employee with a weapon is not necessarily a threat to the governing authority or coalition forces.

However, the mere presence of many weapons in public places adds to the uncertainty whether those forces

should consider such armed noncombatants as friend or foe. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of

uncertainty to slow the actions and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.

5-29. A local business may hire a PSC to protect its assets and interests. The irregular OPFOR or criminal

organizations may coerce a businessperson into running a front company on their behalf.

CRIMINALS AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-30. Criminals and the irregular OPFOR in an OE can be associated and/or affiliated with each other. For

example, some insurgents and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it serves their mutual

interests. Crime is a lucrative means to—

Fund operations.

Coerce and control key leaders and/or a relevant population.

Erode governmental authority.

5-31. Some criminals may oppose the irregular OPFOR when its actions jeopardize criminal operations

and profits. Criminal organizations may hire PSCs to provide additional security. Larger criminal

organizations can employ paramilitary elements and tactics. Some may expand from traditional criminal

activities into a pseudo-insurgency and establish de facto governance in areas, regions, and enclaves within

an otherwise sovereign territory of the governing authority. (See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of

criminal organizations and their possible roles in support of and/or cooperation with the irregular OPFOR.)

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS

5-32. Local citizens often have authorization to own personal firearms for the personal security. Some may

carry weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some are

members of legitimate private clubs for shooting competitions or hunting. In some societies, carrying a

weapon is simply part of the local culture. Many armed noncombatants openly carry weapons. This

generally includes the individuals mentioned above, as well as members of public law enforcement

agencies and various types of internal security forces. Other organizations and individuals may be

authorized to carry concealed personal weapons.

5-33. Ad hoc local militia or neighborhood watch programs may provide some of the same functions as a

PSC. However, they do so without some of the more sophisticated means and without the profit motive.

These ad hoc local citizen organizations perform such actions on a volunteer basis to protect their families,

homes, and businesses. (A local citizen organization that performs these functions on a contractual basis is

a PSC.)

5-34. Such a large number of armed noncombatants in public places makes it harder to distinguish them

from combatants. Members of the irregular OPFOR also try to blend in with the local populace when they

are not conducting operations. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of uncertainty to slow the actions

and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.

Note. In a broad sense, all individuals and groups not part of a formal, regulated military force

are civilians. That includes insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals.

UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS

5-35. Other actors in an OE include unarmed noncombatants. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or

potential side-changers in a conflict involving the irregular OPFOR. Their choice to take sides depends on

their perception of who is causing a grievance for them. It also depends on whether they think their

interests are best served by supporting the governing authority. Given the right conditions, they may decide

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to purposely support hostilities against a governing authority that is the enemy of the irregular OPFOR.

Even if they do not take up arms, such active support or participation moves them into the category of

unarmed combatants. (See the section on Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.)

5-36. Some of the more prominent types of unarmed noncombatants are—

Media personnel.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Transnational corporations and their employees.

Private citizens and groups.

However, unarmed noncombatants may also include internally displaced persons, refugees, and transients.

They can also include foreign government and diplomatic personnel present in the area of conflict.

MEDIA PERSONNEL

5-37. An area of conflict attracts a multitude of media personnel. This includes local, national, and

international journalists, reporters, and associated support personnel. They may be independent actors or

affiliated with a particular news organization.

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

5-38. The media can be a credible source of current information for multiple actors in an OE. News cycles

demand timely information and near-simultaneous reporting on current events. The irregular OPFOR

recognizes the value of media coverage of significant incidents. This coverage can draw attention to

irregular OPFOR successes or highlight failures or missteps by its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can

exploit media coverage to attack the will and resolve of—

Its enemies’ regular military and internal security forces.

The governing authority.

A relevant population.

Media coverage of operations can dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction.

5-39. The irregular OPFOR may closely observe media personnel. This surveillance can identify character

flaws or weaknesses of personnel the irregular OPFOR can co-opt to the advantage of its INFOWAR

activities. Although media personnel may seek to remain objective and report accurately, they can be

coerced or persuaded to promote an irregular OPFOR perspective. The irregular OPFOR uses threats,

extortion, and/or physical violence to minimize media coverage that is counter to its interests. Some media

representatives who support irregular OPFOR motives may purposely distort information to support

irregular OPFOR objectives.

5-40. The balancing effect of multiple reporting sources tends to reduce the impact of any one source with

overt bias. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that democracies with freedom of the press and widespread

access to media and other information systems can be less susceptible to INFOWAR. However, the

international public and foreign governments are still susceptible to how the irregular OPFOR presents its

agenda to a global audience.

Exploiting Media Access

5-41. The pervasive presence of the media provides access to information that might not otherwise be

available to the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR can use the physical access allowed to media

representatives to enhance its intelligence collection, information analysis, and consequent actions. Some

members of the irregular OPFOR or individuals who support them may be able to pass themselves off as

independent reporters or embed themselves in a media team under the guise of functional media expertise.

Media credentials can be easily counterfeited. The embedding may take place with or without the

knowledge of a sponsoring media organization. This may enable them to access plans and monitor

operations of the governing authority or regular military forces with which the irregular OPFOR is

in conflict.

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Media Organization Structure

5-42. A media entity can be as small as an independent reporter or videographer operating as a free-lance

entrepreneur or as large as a sophisticated media team with the credentials of a major news corporation or

international sponsor. Well resourced reporters or media teams may have—

Cellular telephones.

Cameras.

Video cameras.

Tape recorders.

Notebook or laptop computers.

General office equipment.

They may have an all-terrain vehicle equipped with the latest video manipulation technology and satellite

communication links.

5-43. Figure 5-4 shows an example of possible functions and individuals in a media team organization.

While most media teams carry out most of these functions, they do not necessarily have all these specific

coordinators and teams.

Media Team

Leader

Press Release

Documentation

Admin & Logistics

Coordinator

Videographer

Cameraman

Graphics

Liaison

Security

Team

Designer

Team

Figure 5-4. Media team organization (example)

Media Team Leader

5-44. The media team leader is responsible for the overall media coverage and news release program. This

individual supervises the development of products that the media team presents. He promotes the value of

its media resources and products and continually seeks to expand business investment in the team products.

Press Release Coordinator

5-45. The press release coordinator is the promotional “face” with the general relevant population and its

influential leaders. He develops the persona of a trusted member to relevant population.

Documentation Coordinator

5-46. The documentation coordinator transforms raw audio or video coverage and produces a final package

for release to the media-at-large via multiple means. Production coordination includes adding music, verbal

announcements, graphics, and other sound and visual elements to enhance a compelling message. This

coordinator is also responsible for crafting the long-term and recurring reinforcement of a particular

message in conjunction with the press release coordinator.

Administration and Logistics Coordinator

5-47. The operational administration and logistics of the media team is the responsibility of the

administration and logistics coordinator. Functions include—

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Personnel management.

Transportation.

Lodging.

Technical support.

Repair services.

Communications connectivity.

Transmission security.

The administration and logistics coordinator coordinates with the security team in planning, occupying, and

departing designated media coverage areas.

Videographer Team

5-48. The videographer team uses video camera equipment to record an assigned project. It then edits and

assembles an audio-visual production. The documentation coordinator and videographer team review the

product to ensure consistency and relevancy in support of an intended message. Each team member is

responsible for the operation and maintenance of the equipment used in shooting and editing. A

videographer may also be responsible for lighting and sound at a particular event. Depending on the

assigned task, videographers can use diskette, videotape, and/or live broadcast capabilities.

Cameraman Team

5-49. The cameraman team is responsible for physically operating a camera and maintaining composition

and camera angles throughout a given mission or task. Still-shot images are the norm for a cameraman.

Duties are similar to that of a videographer.

Graphics Designer

5-50. The graphics designer has expertise in emphasizing visual impact to using graphics or other special

effects such as animation. This individual also coordinates with media points of contact on how to best

promote the news message and image of materials including electronic and other media venues. Much of

the graphics design is focused on what effectively communicates with the targeted audience. This audience

is usually influential individuals of a relevant population in an irregular OPFOR area of responsibility

(AOR) as well as governing authority officials that are in conflict with the irregular OPFOR.

Liaison Team

5-51. The liaison team works closely with community members and leaders to ensure access to areas and

information that supports the media mission or task. However, other teams may conduct their own liaison.

Security Team

5-52. The security team is responsible for the physical security and protection of media team members in

the conduct of their duties. Security includes the actual mission sites, movement from and to the media

team’s operating base and/or logistics support areas.

Relationship to OPFOR Public Relations

5-53. Like media affairs, OPFOR public relations involve focused efforts to understand and engage key

audiences of a relevant population. Their purpose is to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable

for the advancement of OPFOR interests, policies, and objectives. They accomplish this through the use of

coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with all regular OPFOR and

irregular OPFOR actions.

5-54. Public relations are part of the perception management element of INFOWAR. In an expanding

INFOWAR campaign, the irregular OPFOR seeks partners within the specific OPFOR AOR and regional

and/or global supporters. When external states provide overt and/or covert support, the irregular OPFOR

provides appropriate public relations guidance on how to portray or hide such support.

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Noncombatants

5-55. A significant audience external to an irregular OPFOR AOR can be the diaspora of a relevant

population. INFOWAR and public opinion are critical to obtaining diaspora support and keeping the

struggle of guerrillas and/or insurgents in the spotlight of globalized media.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-56. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development,

environmental protection, human rights; supporting conflict resolution; and/or encouraging establishment of

democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). NGOs are likely to be present in any OE.

Variety of Types

5-57. The global community of NGOs includes a wide variety of organizations that are independent,

diverse, and flexible. They differ greatly in size, resources, capabilities, expertise, experience, and missions.

An NGO may be local, national, or transnational. It may employ thousands of individuals or just a handful.

It may have a large management structure or no formal structure at all. It may be a large organization with a

huge budget and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief or a newly created

small organization dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in such diverse

activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development

programs, human rights, and conflict resolution.

5-58. Some NGOs represent members of a particular religious faith. In most of these cases, humanitarian

aid originates in faith-based principles, but promoting a particular religion is not part of the aid provided.

However, some missionary aid groups use humanitarian aid as a means of access for religious awareness

and conversion of a relevant population.

5-59. Within a particular OE, there may be local NGOs as well as an international support presence of

larger NGOs. International NGOs may use localized staffs in building capabilities in and for a region.

Sometimes larger NGOs from outside a geographic region may not be openly visible while operating

through these local organizations. This cooperation can provide resources unavailable at the local and

regional levels during a crisis while incorporating localized capacity and knowledge of conditions,

interpersonal relationships, and informal operations.

NGO Organizational Structure

5-60. A board of directors (sometimes called executive committee) is normally part of the large-scale

decisionmaking process and working issues of the organization. The board serves as the trustee body of the

NGO. Board members are valuable in that they extend the organization’s resources into various

communities and include personalities that are not specifically significant in daily operations but provide

credibility to the organization as a whole. Many NGO boards have celebrities, former government officials,

experts, academics, and community leaders with the intention of attaining recognition or publicity. During

emergency appeals, NGOs will often send board members out to make public statements, write newspaper

or journal editorials, make speeches, or give interviews to spark focus on the organization’s work and needs

in responding to the emergency.

5-61. NGO boards vary widely in style. Some are very active, often establishing close relationships with

NGO officers and staff and involving themselves in planning processes and fundraising programs. Other

boards are largely fundraising entities, lending their names to give credibility to an organization’s

fundraising practices. Boards can be primarily symbolic and fulfill the legal requirements of meeting a

specific number of times each year and certifying financial obligations. The actual authority may reside in

leaders who purposely remain discrete or unpublicized donors of an NGO.

Note. The irregular OPFOR may seek to co-opt board representatives and/or influential

celebrities and donors to overtly or covertly support its goals and objectives.

5-62. Figure 5-5 shows an example of the possible functions of an NGO field office. A smaller, local NGO

may not have all these functions.

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Chapter 5

Board of Directors

Director

NGO Coordinating Group

Field Office

Functions

Administration

Operations

Plans

Logistics

Procurement

Transportation

Services

Distribution

Communications

Media Affairs

Special Projects

Finance

International Law

Liaison

Security

Figure 5-5. NGO field office functions (example)

5-63. Internal coordination, though not always formal, is the most common way civilian sectors organize in

humanitarian emergencies. NGOs coordinate extensively within the local NGO community to manage

information. They can act as advocacy bodies to international donors or local and regional governments.

There is also external coordination between NGOs, regular military forces, governments, and donor

agencies involved in a geographic region and/or international setting.

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

5-64. Some internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local implementing partners.

Extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable

sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes.

5-65. Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for communications and personal

security. They prefer instead to rely on the good will of the local populace for their safety. However, many

larger NGOs have very capable communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support

and assistance in the security area.

5-66. Communications provide some special challenges to NGOs. NGOs strive to provide assistance based

on need rather than race, religion, political affiliation, or ability to pay. To avoid the perception of

favoritism and operate in a neutral manner, NGOs normally do not use any encryption devices. They

operate with the understanding that the local governing authority will likely be monitoring all their

communications. They often have access to sensitive information that could assist political or military

objectives of either side. This requires that information be recorded and transmitted in a way that reduces

rather than incites conflict.

5-67. Modern communications equipment is essential for the NGO headquarters to remain in contact with

field offices or mobile teams. However, such equipment might make NGO personnel a target of crime in

areas where the technology is not commonly available. A satellite phone, which provides an NGO team

global coverage, might represent a significant capability if acquired by the irregular OPFOR or criminals.

The same might apply to a vehicle outfitted with a communication suite of sophisticated radios. In some

areas, simply carrying a cellular phone or radio could be viewed as a threat by actors who would like to

keep their activities concealed.

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5-68. Security planning by an NGO is an ongoing process that continually reassesses threats. In some

cases, NGOs operate in violent environments without developing a strong organizational culture of safety

and security. Aid personnel often rely on the apparent immunity provided by a perceived humanitarian

space and do not view themselves as party to the conflict. Various factors, including programs connecting

an NGO and a governing authority, can cause specific targeting of NGO staff for kidnapping or murder by

violent groups. NGOs often have formal safety and security systems to meet these threats. Some NGOs use

professional security officers and/or PSCs with former military, police, or intelligence experience.

5-69. Reliable transportation is essential for NGO operations. However, this also poses the risk of

accidents, assault, injury, and death for aid workers. The NGO must balance the need for a completely

reliable vehicle against the risk of becoming a target of carjacking in areas of conflict or crime. NGOs may

hire local drivers who have knowledge of which routes to use and how to negotiate check points. Such

drivers may eventually gain trust as representatives of the organization. A driver from a group

disenfranchised due to religious, ethnic, racial, or caste, may cause prejudice against the NGO. A driver

might also be part of a criminal gang or the irregular OPFOR with the intent on stealing the vehicle or

committing a crime against the NGO.

NGO Cooperation with a Governing Authority or Colaition Forces

5-70. The mission of an NGO is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting a military

force in accomplishing its objectives. International guidelines on NGOs emphasize the principle of

“humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality).

5-71. The preferred external coordination for NGOs is a United Nations (UN)-coordinated effort rather

than a military-administered effort unless the UN is unable to do so. In cases where civil government is

incapable or not present to coordinate NGO response, NGOs and militaries can interface with each other in

operations centers administered by regular military forces.

5-72. Large NGOs often employ specialists or retired military personnel to assist in managing relations and

activities that require interface with military entities. NGOs and military units have many incentives to

coordinate and collaborate. NGOs often need many things from the military: logistics assistance,

communications, intelligence, and protection. Military forces often find value in coordinating with NGOs

for understanding ground-level activity, and to manage population movements, assistance projects, and

general humanitarian activities. Both groups find that coordination is essential.

5-73. Military personnel often contact a NGO coordination group, which can—

Provide contact information for liaison with member NGOs.

Indicate what NGOs are doing in the region or area.

Identify which NGOs are active in specific areas.

5-74. The UN often sets up humanitarian information centers (HICs) as central coordination points. NGOs

are either required or voluntarily register with an HIC to keep updated on information and regional

developments. A civil-military operations center or humanitarian operations center can be established

for official coordinating between NGOs, the UN, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and

the military.

5-75. NGOs and military forces can operate together, but challenges exist. Sometimes, in a region

receiving NGO support and despite coordination efforts and extensive collaboration, NGOs can become

frustrated with the apparent idle capacity that military commanders have in reserve for emergency or

contingency actions. NGO managers may question why large numbers of military personnel, expertise, and

supply stores remain unused while NGOs are short-staffed and significant support requirements exist for

displaced persons and other elements of a relevant population. NGOs often want to ensure a distinct

separation between military operations and NGO relief activities.

5-76. Coordinating and cooperating among NGOs and regular military forces does not necessarily mean

sacrificing NGO impartiality or transparency. The benefits of working with military forces can enhance

more effective and efficient NGO operations. Some factors for and against cooperation are—

NGOs are generally capable organizations but may lack robust communication and logistics

capacities.

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Chapter 5

NGOs are civilian organizations that do not fall into a military-style command structure.

NGOs prefer to keep their programs, activities, and image as independent as possible.

NGOs can work effectively and efficiently during an emergency, often with a comparative

advantage, in specific areas or regions.

Routine and informal meetings between the NGO community, UN agencies, and the military can

reduce much of collective tension and misunderstanding.

Motivations

5-77. NGOs are generally motivated by charity. They are trying to help the local population deal with

manmade and natural disaster and disease, hunger, and poverty. NGOs are not affiliated with a government,

but may be influenced by governing authority policies of their home nation.

5-78. NGO leaders and operators may have both stated and hidden interests and objectives. Some

organizations and individual participants may have motivations that differ from the NGO’s public mission

statements. These motivations can be—

Political.

Economic.

Ideological.

Religious or theological.

Social or cultural.

Private and/or personal agenda.

The irregular OPFOR may play on these motivations to induce NGO personnel to act in ways that favor its

own objectives.

Relation to Irregular OPFOR

5-79. Individuals participating in or in conjunction with an NGO may willingly support or be coerced to

support the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to embed its supporters and/or covert operatives

in NGOs operating its AOR. This could allow it to access plans and monitor operations of the governing

authority or regular military forces with which it is in conflict.

5-80. Perceptions can easily be interpreted as reality by a relevant population when INFOWAR presents a

compelling irregular OPFOR message and story of unresolved grievances. The irregular OPFOR can

manipulate NGO actions to knowingly or unknowingly serve its goals and objectives.

5-81. The irregular OPFOR can use visible cooperation by an NGO with regular military or internal

security forces of a governing authority to its advantage in INFOWAR. Media exploitation by the irregular

OPFOR can depict NGO presence as biased in favor of a governing authority that is unjust and corrupt.

Reducing NGO presence or causing NGOs to depart particular geographic regions may increase the civil

turmoil the irregular OPFOR desires in its actions against the governing authority.

5-82. NGOs can be inundated with large numbers of civilians seeking medical care in refugee camps and

NGO facilities. It may be difficult for an NGO to distinguish sick or wounded members of the irregular

OPFOR from others requesting care.

5-83. NGOs provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need. Unfortunately, the irregular

OPFOR may exploit the charitable sector to support its organizations and activities. This abuse can take

many forms, including:

Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of irregular OPFOR

organizations.

Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across

geographical boundaries.

Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support irregular

OPFOR organizations.

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Noncombatants

Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for

irregular OPFOR organizations.

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

5-84. A transnational corporation is a business that conducts commerce beyond national boundaries.

Corporate activities may be regional or global. The term transnational, as opposed to international,

accentuates the fact that these organizations and activities are not created or governed national

governments. Instead, they arise under private enterprise for profit.

5-85. Transnational corporations may enter into partnerships with countries that are trying to increase their

world economic position. Emerging states may invite such corporations to establish research and

manufacturing facilities in their countries as a means of building infrastructure. The presence of these

corporations can also enhance a country’s security. However, the motivations of transnational corporation

leaders are business oriented and not usually charitable. The corporations may try to influence regional

affairs or assist their host country in actions that promote their own economic gain.

Note. In pursuit of its own financial gain, a transnational corporation may provide overt or

covert support to the irregular OPFOR. This may include support in obtaining weapons and

equipment, fiscal funding, transshipment of materiel to irregular OPFOR sanctuaries, and/or

placing economic pressure on governing authorities.

5-86. When external forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account

transnational corporations conducting business in the region. The presence of these outside business

interests can put additional pressure on the intervening external forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian

life and property.

Note. Some transnational corporations may have their own armed security forces, or hire PSCs,

to protect their business interests or perhaps also those of the host country and governing

authority. Such security forces become armed noncombatants. However, if they participate in

armed conflict on behalf of the host country, they become combatants.

5-87. A host country must also take into account transnational corporations conducting business within its

borders or region, and their international connections. If the host country’s actions adversely affect foreign

commercial enterprises or regional security, conditions may encourage local, regional, or international

support for irregular OPFOR goals and objectives.

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND GROUPS

5-88. The various types of civilians in an OE can include—

Government officials.

Business people.

Farmers.

Lawyers.

Doctors.

Clergy.

Tradesmen.

Shopkeepers.

Other groups of the local relevant population.

Transients.

Internally displaced civilians.

Refugees.

These individuals and activities include offices, bureaus, and agencies of a governing authority,

intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil organizations, and independent or transnational corporations.

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They provide a wide range of services, support, and other activities that can be susceptible to the influence

of the irregular OPFOR.

Note. The irregular OPFOR can attempt to embed operatives in low-level jobs in order to

infiltrate government, commercial, and military activities. Such an insider threat can reap

significant information and intelligence for the irregular OPFOR. It can also increase the

restrictions placed on a relevant population and/or incite additional dissatisfaction with policies

and practices of the governing authority.

5-89. Some government officials, such as police and emergency service personnel, have specialized

equipment and standard uniforms. Other officials, such as mayors and town council members, wear

clothing appropriate to the local customs. These officials are generally linked to a geographical area and/or

functional responsibility and authority. Each actor has varied concerns and agendas. In some instances, the

irregular OPFOR can masquerade as officials and act in a manner to discredit the governing authority.

5-90. Various political, religious, or social groups may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. Even if

unarmed, this can affect their status as noncombatant actors. Criminal organizations or elements of a

criminal organization can—

Be unarmed noncombatants who violate civil law.

Be armed noncombatants.

Be involved in armed combatant acts.

Note. The irregular OPFOR identifies weaknesses in the social structure and/or individuals of a

relevant population and seeks to co-opt or manipulate particular individuals and/or groups to

enhance its agenda. It may also acquire organizational capabilities, skill sets, and/or materiel in

the population within which it operates. When possible, it gains this support voluntarily.

However, it uses extortion and violence to attain its objectives if required.

5-91. Support from the civilian population is a key to irregular OPFOR operations. The irregular OPFOR

recruits its manpower, gains intelligence, and receives safe haven and materiel support from the relevant

population. Even if it also has external support, the irregular OPFOR cannot exist for an extended period

without significant support from the civilian population.

UNARMED COMBATANTS

5-92. The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right

conditions, may decide to purposely support hostilities against the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. Such

active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing weapons.

5-93. In an insurgent organization or guerrilla unit, unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, financing,

intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or INFOWAR functions

(including

videographers and camera operators). Technicians and workers who fabricate improvised explosive devices

might not be armed. The same is true for people who provide sanctuary for combatants.

5-94. Unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders might participate in or actively support the

irregular OPFOR. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military or

paramilitary organization. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile

actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants.

Note. From the viewpoint of some governing authorities, any armed or unarmed person who

engages in hostilities, and/or purposely and materially supports hostilities against the governing

authority or its partners is a combatant.

5-95. Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal

organizations might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a

paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons.

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Chapter 6

Terrorism

Terrorism is a tactic. This chapter presents an overview of conditions that are a composite of

real-world capabilities and limitations that may be present in a complex operational

environment that includes terrorism. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause

significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or

threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the

resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are

in conflict. International conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often

not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random,

and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish

the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social

and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority,

is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global

information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on

acts of terrorism by state and/or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its relevant

population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to

use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can

accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually

defeat an enemy.

TERRORISM IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

6-1. Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce

governments or societies. Often motivated by philosophical or other ideological beliefs, objectives are

typically political in nature. The pursuit of goals and conduct labeled as terrorism by some actors in

complex operational environments (OE) can be considered fully justifiable by other actors. The spectrum of

actors in an OE can range political, public, and/or commercial institutions, other institutions appearing

legitimate but disguising an illicit agenda, and/or organizations and individuals who openly declare intent

to use terror as a matter of policy and practice. Irregular forces typically use terrorism (see figure 6-1).

Insurgents

Guerrillas

Criminal Organizations

Irregular Force Adherents

Independent Actors

Figure 6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments

6-2. The geographical perspectives of local, national, regional, international, and/or transnational terrorist

acts can indicate why terrorism is used but a more effective measure of understanding terrorism must relate

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Chapter 6

directly to the actors involved in a particular OE. Ultimately, terrorism is about people and the

psychological effectiveness of convincing or compelling a relevant population to act in a desired manner.

6-3. Multiple actors in an OE can use terrorism to enhance the conditions that favor their agenda and

overarching purpose. Terrorism in irregular actions favors indirect and asymmetric approaches. However,

terrorism can be employed within a full range of military and other explicit or subtle capabilities in order to

erode an enemy’s power, influence, and will. Irregular forces are generally categorized as armed

individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security

forces of a governing authority. Similarly, a hybrid threat can be visualized as the diverse and dynamic

combination of regular armed forces, irregular forces such as insurgent organizations and/or guerrilla units,

and/or affiliated and associated criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Other

irregular forces can include mercenaries, corrupt officials of a governing authority, compromised

commercial enterprises, public entities, active or covert supporters, and/or coerced and passive citizens

of a populace.

6-4. Independent actors using terrorism can also exist in an OE distinct and separate from the agendas

from other irregular forces. Adherents may have no direct connection with an irregular force but apply

terror in support of an irregular force’s agenda. Threats can be as small as one individual or expand in size

from a small and discrete band, cell, or unit to the noticeable presence as a large group of rogue actors that

are affiliated or united in purpose.

6-5. Irregular forces adapt their capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to achieve organizational

objectives. Terrorism is a means of conducting violent conflict that typically provides significant

psychological impact on an intended target. Acts of terror may be actually intended for an audience other

than the victims of an attack. Conducting terrorism typically emerges from a deliberate decisionmaking

process. Terrorists usually compare and contrast advantages and disadvantages to evaluate probable cost-

benefits of a particular act or acts of terror. When an irregular force terrorist self-justifies the legitimacy of

using terrorism against an enemy, the terrorism often affects enemy combatants and noncombatants in a

relevant population. The analysis and decision to use terror is often a simple cost-efficient and effective

results-oriented means to pursue violent conflict in order to achieve a purpose.

Note. For the purpose of this TC, the term enemy refers to an enemy of the irregular force.

MOTIVATIONS

6-6. Motivations often include a wide range of reasons that an individual, cell, unit, or other type of

irregular force organization may feel compelled to use terrorism. Encouragement from outside an

organization to use terrorism can be part of the conditions and circumstances that influence an irregular

force to act. Support to use terrorism may be from regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces

(SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces and/or law enforcement organizations that have been

infiltrated by an irregular force can also support irregular force actions within a local or regional area of

responsibility. The collaboration among organizations, units, cells, and/or individuals may be based on

coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives.

6-7. Motivations for initiating and/or continuing acts of terrorism can include—

Spotlight attention on unresolved grievances with an enemy.

Disrupt an enemy’s ability to continue actions against an irregular force.

Champion causes of a suppressed and/or disenfranchised segment of a relevant population.

Demonstrate irregular force capabilities.

Obtain active and/or passive support from a relevant population.

Receive overt and/or covert support from a state or non-state actor.

Deter continued enemy military operations in a particular geographic area.

Dissuade enemy governmental influence over a relevant population.

Develop acceptance and legitimacy of an irregular force agenda and programs.

Cause an enemy to overreact to acts of terror and correspondingly alienate a relevant population.

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Defeat enemy military and/or internal security forces and/or its governing institutions.

Achieve irregular force objectives.

6-8. Irregular force objectives promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular relevant

population. An irregular force may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and

non-lethal action to achieve its objectives, but is committed to violent action when necessary to compel an

adversary, enemy, and/or other opposing form of governance to submit to the irregular force demands. In

most cases, irregular force operations include politically oriented plans of action. Some irregular force

organizations, such as affiliated criminal gangs, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are

not interested in improving aspects such as quality of life and civil security of a relevant population that

they affect.

6-9. Transforming a grievance into a concept and plan for action develops typically along a pattern that

evolves from generalized ideas to tactical options and a heightened sense of needing resolution to a

grievance. Continuous information and intelligence collection refines options for the likelihood of success

and a decision to act. Motivation provides a momentum of commitment to actually conduct the terrorism. A

way to visualize this human dimension sequence is a terrorism planning cycle.

TERRORISM PLANNING AND ACTION CYCLE

6-10. A generic sequence and timing of irregular force terrorism depends on organizational capabilities and

limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization.

To effectively understand this commitment, knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to

appreciating the resolve to plan and act. The irregular force sets conditions to optimize its awareness,

training, and mission readiness to achieve objectives that counter enemy forces. When advantageous to

irregular force operations, coordination and cooperation can combine the capabilities of conventional

military, paramilitary, criminal activities, and/or terrorism.

6-11. Tactics, techniques, and procedures include creating conditions of instability in a particular OE,

alienating the population from the governing authority of the region, and improving the irregular force

influence on a designated populace and key leaders in that relevant population. In complex conditions, an

irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells

to global networks in order to promote psychological effect and mission success. Such networks can be

local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs

programs; as well as acquire covert and/or overt financial, political, military, or social support.

6-12. A terrorism planning cycle is actually a continuum. Irregular forces plan, prepare, act, and apply

experience and skill in order to achieve objectives. The concept of a spiral effect may be an effective way

to visualize and understand a planning cycle of terrorism. Even with periodic setbacks in acts of terror

capabilities and execution, the resolve of terrorists to a compelling agenda is often progressive, adaptive,

and long-term in order to achieve objectives.

BROAD TARGET SELECTION

6-13. Irregular force terrorism operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest

probability of success by avoiding an enemy’s strengths and concentrating attack on an enemy’s

weaknesses. Emphasis is often placed on maximizing irregular force security and terrorism effects. Security

measures usually include planning and operating with small numbers of irregular force members to more

effectively compartment knowledge of a pending terrorism mission.

6-14. Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon.

Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises. While some

targets may be vulnerable enough with shorter periods of observation, the information gathering and

analysis for intelligence will be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or

cancelled due to changes at the target or in local conditions. Tactical missions conducted by and/or for

larger irregular forces complement operational objectives and strategic goals of the irregular force. The

psychological impact on a targeted population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.

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6-15. There is no universal model for planning, but irregular forces use their experience and expertise to

effectively apply traditional principles for plans and operations. Irregular forces often exchange expertise in

particular skill sets such as recruitment, media affairs, and training on various forms of direct action in

terrorism. Tactical methods and analysis of successful missions are often shared via the Internet and

websites hosted by an irregular force. Adaptability, innovation, improvisation, and risk assessment are key

components of plans and actions toward mission success (see figure 6-2).

Conduct broad target analysis and general intentions.

Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.

Select specific target and resources.

Refine target surveillance and intelligence.

Rehearse plan and contingencies.

Attack.

Exploit effects.

Target

Recon

Select

Refine

Ready

Act

Exploit

Continuum of planning -- execution -- reapplication -- lessons learned - evaluation

Figure 6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle

6-16. Tactical and operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and

operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular organizational requirements to conduct an act of

terror. The significant differences among irregular forces often center on factors of intent and capability

and the organizational, key leader, and individual commitment to a philosophical, ideological, or otherwise

practical motivation and compulsion.

6-17. Irregular forces often pride themselves on being a learning organization. Combined with motivation

and a compelling agenda, irregular forces gather information and intelligence, analyze their own and enemy

strengths and weaknesses, determine enemy patterns, trends, and emerging actions susceptible to attack,

and identify key vulnerabilities in an enemy’s systems, functions, and actions.

6-18. Consideration in selecting potential targets focuses directly to counter enemy governing authority or

supporting force programs that demonstrate security, safety, and assurance to the relevant population that

the irregular force needs to influence. Tactical operations that might counter an enemy through irregular

force subversive or direct actions can include—

Secure a critical segment of a relevant population.

Declare the control and/or sovereignty of geographic areas that support the irregular force.

Disrupt military and/or internal security forces of an enemy.

Diminish the credibility of civil police and law enforcement activities.

Degrade a public sense of safety and stability from the enemy governing authority.

Discredit the political agenda of the enemy governing authority.

Demonize key leader actions of the enemy governing authority and civil administration.

Provide basic social services not being adequately provided by the enemy governing authority.

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE

6-19. Targets displaying significant vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort

for intelligence gathering and surveillance. This potential for successfully attack establishes a requirement

to gather additional information on a target’s patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span

months and even years. The type of surveillance employed depends on the type of target and its location.

Elements of information typically gathered include—

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Assessing the practices, procedures, and/or routines of an organization and/or facility. Items of

interest include scheduled product deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures

and other observable security routines. Examples are as simple as recording when regularly

scheduled supply deliveries arrive or commodity pickup occurs, or where key leaders park

personal vehicles.

Observing the physical layout and individual activities at residences and business offices of key

leaders. Actions include knowing how the power grid services the location and critical points of

failure if electrical power is to be interrupted during an attack.

Monitoring transportation routes of travel for targeted individuals for common routes, choke

points, and limited visibility areas along routes that may be conducive for an attack. Personal

patterns can include routes among a personal residence, temporary lodging, commercial site, gym,

and/or school or university. Attention at facilities may include access and exit points, types of

vehicles allowed on the facility property, and/or physical security barriers that must be bypassed

or breached to enter a location.

Probing security measures to determine the complexity of security at a target and/or reaction time

of security response units. Other items of interest can include any hardening of structures, barriers,

or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of

emergency reaction drills at a facility.

SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION

6-20. Selection of a target for actual tactical planning typically considers some of the following issues:

Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?

Will the target attract immediate high profile media attention beyond the immediate region?

Does attack success emphasize the desired grievance to the appropriate audience that can resolve

the grievance?

Is the attack effect consistent with overarching objectives of the irregular force?

Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the irregular force by demonstrating

its organization’s capabilities?

What are the near-, mid- and long-term costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?

6-21. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the selected target. Targets

that do not receive immediate primary consideration may still be collected on for future opportunities.

PRE-ATTACK SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNING

6-22. Members of the unit or cell that will conduct the attack begin to appear during this phase. Trained

intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the irregular force may be organized to

prepare logistics and/or locations for the operation. Operatives gather detailed information on the target’s

current patterns in recent days to weeks. The irregular force assesses and confirms information gathered

from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

6-23. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target’s activities. Current information is used to—

Conduct security studies.

Conduct detailed preparatory plans and operations.

Recruit specialized operatives and/or active supporters.

Procure a base of operations in the target area such as safe houses and caches.

Design and test escape routes.

Decide on types of weapons and other means of attack.

REHEARSAL

6-24.

Rehearsals improve the probability of success, confirm planning assumptions, and assess

contingencies. Rehearsals test security reactions to particular attack profiles in primary and alternate plans of

attack. Irregular forces use their own operatives and/or unsuspecting people to test target reactions.

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6-25.

Typical rehearsals include—

Equipment and weapons operational checks.

Communications and signals to be used in the mission.

Skills performance of all and/or particular specialists.

Final preparatory checks.

Pre-operations inspection drills.

Deployment sequence of movements and maneuver into the target area.

Actions near and/or on the objective.

Primary and alternate escape routes.

Initial safe haven, hide sites, and/or rally point actions.

Transfer plans from initial to subsequent safe havens or hide sites.

6-26.

Confirmation checks in the target area can include—

Target information gathered to date.

Target patterns of activities.

Physical layout of target area for changes in routes and/or manmade features.

Time-distance factors from the assault position to the attack point.

Security force presence during varied states of alert.

Reaction response timing by security forces to a demonstration, feint, and/or threat.

Ability to preposition and/or retrieve equipment or vehicles near the objective.

Ease of blocking and/or restricting an escape route at critical choke points.

ATTACK AND ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

6-27.

The irregular force executes its tactical plan but remains flexible to changing conditions and adapts

accordingly. The plans and rehearsals have considered primary and contingency actions that possess the

advantages of initiative and deception. Actions provide for—

Use of Surprise.

Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack.

Employment of diversions and supplemental attacks.

Support of security and related positions and/or forces to neutralize target reaction forces and

security measures.

6-28.

Simultaneous actions may include an assault element, security element, and support element. Some

missions may require a breach element. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks:

Isolate the objective site.

Gain access to the individual, individuals, and/or asset.

Control the target site.

Seize and/or destroy the individual, individuals, and/or asset at the objective.

Achieve the mission task.

ESCAPE AND EXPLOITATION

6-29.

Escape plans are well rehearsed and executed. Rapid withdrawal and dispersal from the target site

can involve multiple withdrawal routes and temporary safe houses. Even in the case of a suicide attack, a

handler or observer-recorder requires a plan to evade identification and capture. Similar expectation to evade

capture occurs with an attack by fire element or support by fire element.

6-30.

Media exploitation to a global audience will usually include video coverage, sometimes with audio

commentary by observers with a videographer. Mass casualties or major disruption of economic and social

services typically gain prime international media coverage. Extending the duration of an act of terrorism may

promote awareness of an irregular force agenda and assist the irregular force in winning the “battle of the

narrative” with a relevant population.

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6-31.

The irregular force attack must be actively publicized to achieve an intended effect of exploiting a

successful attack. Media outlets influenced or coerced to support an irregular force agenda with prepared

public statements are examples of preparation to effectively exploit irregular force operations. Release of

warnings and/or announcements are timed to take advantage of media cycles for selected target audiences at

the local, regional, and global levels of information warfare.

6-32.

Unsuccessful operations are often disavowed by the irregular force when possible. The perception

that an irregular force has failed can damage its prestige and indicate vulnerability.

6-33.

In addition to the negative impact on the enemy, successful attacks can bring favorable attention,

notoriety, and encourage support such as funding and recruiting to the irregular force. The proof that an

attacker can attack and evade may sway potential recruits to join and/or convince recruits that have been

coerced to approach assigned tasks with an expectation of success and survival.

6-34.

The general concept of planning and action by irregular forces is adaptable. The seven concept

phases are generally descriptive of tactics and techniques but are not prescriptive. Operations retain a flexible

expectation based on evolving conditions. Knowing the underlying motivations for terrorism is fundamental to

appreciating the resolve of irregular forces to plan and act.

6-35.

When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can include combinations of regular

military forces, paramilitary units, insurgent organizations and guerrilla units, and criminal networks. Any

and/or all of these groups can use terrorism. Regardless of an irregular force network as local, regional,

international or transnational in capability, media exploitation using simple or sophisticated systems is critical

to create the desired influence within a targeted population.

TERRORISM ACTIONS

6-36.

Irregular forces apply terrorism for offensive and defensive purposes. Common tactical principles of

armed conflict and INFOWAR apply capabilities with the intent to cause psychological anxiety and fear in an

enemy in addition to physical effects. Adding aspects of surprise and deception to acts of terrorism often

weakens resolve of a targeted relevant population. Nonetheless, each situation in an OE can present tactical

variations and techniques to conduct a successful irregular force mission.

6-37.

In applying a definition of tactics as an ordered arrangement and maneuver of forces in relation to an

enemy to achieve a mission objective, an irregular force has a wide range of technique options in traditional or

irregular conflict. Techniques describe methods used to conduct a tactic in order to accomplish required

functions or tasks. Techniques evolve through the analysis of an intended mission and observations and/or

lessons learned from successes and failures of previous missions. Procedures are standardized steps,

performed deliberately and consistently, that prescribe how to perform specific tactical functions and tasks.

The “how-to” of understanding terrorism is a composite of knowing TTP and the motivations that provoke

and compel their use by irregular forces.

6-38.

Incidents of terrorism can range the rogue action of a lone individual or the sanctioned activities of

large organizations acting on the overt or covert policies of a state. Terrorism can also be sponsored or

conducted by non-state actors. The following descriptions focus primarily on individual and small unit, cell, or

group actions experienced as a sudden, violent engagement among friendly and enemy forces. These tactical

engagements usually orient on offensive actions and terrorism but may also require irregular forces to

transition temporarily to defensive forms of conflict.

6-39.

The irregular force uses a flexible array of terrorism means and materiel to accomplish assigned

missions. The irregular force makes decisions under conditions of uncertainty but continually seeks to

minimize its risk and identify vulnerabilities in an enemy that can be attacked. Deception and surprise

compound the effects of massing an attack against a point of weakness in order to achieve physical effects and

create anxiety or fear. Understanding and applying these debilitating effects of coercion, anxiety, and/or fear is

central to the intended physical and psychological effects of terrorism.

6-40.

The irregular force is adaptive and learns from tactical success and failure and will adjust techniques

to particular conditions in order to achieve an objective. TTP examples underscore the fact that the science of

tactics is only as effective as the leadership, training, and experience of an irregular force unit, cell, or related

organization. Elements such as demonstrated capabilities, weapon systems, location, restrictions and

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constraints, logistic support, and time-distance and weather and terrain factors are important to planning and

conducting an irregular force action. However, the essential aspect of executing an irregular force act is the

motivation and commitment of an irregular force in the individual and collective execution of tasks to achieve

a mission objective.

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

6-41.

Irregular force tactics can augment defensive actions with terrorism in order to—

Defeat an enemy attack.

Gain time.

Economize irregular force capabilities.

Develop conditions favorable for subsequent offensive operations.

6-42.

Other objectives for conducting defensive actions related to terrorism include denying access to an

area, causing extensive commitment of enemy forces and materiel, and/or fixing enemy forces for a specific

time. Since acts of terrorism are typically sudden, violent acts similar to an assault, ambush, or raid, defensive

actions often involve the delay or disruption of enemy response to the act of terrorism. An irregular force may

attempt to deny access to designated terrain or a resource for a specific time, limit the freedom of maneuver to

an enemy pursuit, or channel enemy forces into a killing zone for a subsequent assault or ambush. Defensive

actions remain closely linked to offensive actions and terrorism.

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

6-43.

An irregular force plans and acts decisively with deception and surprise as tactical enablers for

terrorism. Creating overwhelming combat power against a specified objective requires an irregular force to

have keen situational awareness and understanding of its AOR.

6-44.

The shock effect of terrorism depends heavily on effective reconnaissance and surveillance in

information gathering and intelligence analysis. The resulting awareness and understanding improves the

ability to combine irregular force effects at a time and place for the optimum application of surprise and

deception with available resources for an expectation of mission success.

Attack Threat on Land

6-45.

Attacks using terrorism are often considered most likely during the normal conduct of lifestyles in

familial, social, or commercial settings. Attacks often occur in the context of a local setting. Political

perspectives can affect each of these daily domains and the willingness of people to be an active or passive

supporter to an irregular force agenda.

6-46.

An irregular force evaluates the situational context of its operational environment in order to

determine the most effective ways to advance its objectives. The variables of a particular setting and the

capabilities that exist for improvised or innovative actions by an irregular force can include physical domains

beyond conflict on land or its sub-surface. Two other domains can be maritime and aerial environments in

which to conduct irregular conflict.

Maritime Attack Threat

6-47.

A maritime attack has the potential for significant disruption and/or damage on the economy of a

governing authority and other international actors with which the irregular force is in conflict. An attack at a

major port facility or a choke point on a main maritime route would cause significant regional disruption and

negative impacts on a global economy.

6-48.

If a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) was detonated at any of these locations, the immediate

damage would be great to shipping and port facilities. However, a potentially even greater damage would be

the economic repercussions on regional and global markets and commerce.

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Aerial Attack Threat

6-49.

An aerial terrorism threat can use multiple means to attack. Traditional forms include hijacking

aircraft and hostage-taking, sabotage of aircraft and facilities, and/or using a manned civil or military aircraft

as a suicide bomb against a designated target.

6-50.

Another variation is use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with an explosive payload to attack a

target. Techniques can range from small hobby craft model airplanes with small ad hoc explosive packages to

the acquisition and use of sophisticated cruise-type missiles with significantly larger warhead capabilities.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

6-51.

Irregular forces use a wide array of tactics and techniques to apply terrorism. The TTP are intended to

be flexible and adaptive approaches. Surprise, secrecy, and indirect methods of attack are fundamental to acts

of terror. The tactical options are as broad and diverse as the resolve of the irregular force leader to improvise

and/or innovate with available resources.

6-52.

The irregular force leader uses tactics, forces, and weapon systems tailored to a particular mission.

Operations are planned for a specific target and effect and use reconnaissance and surveillance to plan,

counter, and overmatch an enemy. If changes or unexpected conditions render success unlikely, the irregular

force leader may cancel or postpone an operation and return at a more opportune time. He may choose a

different target and continue his planning and attack process.

6-53.

Extensive use of the Internet encourages exchange of practical information, training, and

observations among terrorists. Training material, training videos, and on-line dialogues develop and sustain

initiatives and encouragement among irregular forces. Shared information and intelligence continue to

improve irregular force techniques as field experiences demonstrate degrees of effectiveness in employing acts

of terror.

6-54.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures typical of irregular force actions and terrorism include—

Threat-Hoax.

Arson.

Sabotage.

Bombing.

Hijack-Seizure.

Kidnapping.

Hostage-taking.

Raid or ambush.

Assassination.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

THREAT OR HOAX

6-55.

Irregular forces can use threats to coerce or preclude actions by a targeted individual or population.

Threats and hoaxes can degrade the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual

or population loses situational awareness of an actual terrorist threat or disperses finite assets against many

possible threats. At the less lethal end of the conflict spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and/or

degrade the alertness of security forces and keep the population constantly agitated. Bomb threats, leaving

suspicious items in public places, and other ploys consume time, resources, and effort from an enemy and its

security operations and contribute to general uncertainty and anxiety.

6-56.

Extortion is an example of a threat that can obtain money, materiel, information, or support by force.

For example, numerous reports from a region could indicate that warlords and militias are in contractual

agreements with a governing authority to protect government and coalition supply convoys. However, these

same warlords and/or militia in many cases are corrupt and extort large sums of money from the regional

trucking contractors. Corrupt government officials or an activity that require bribes to retain business

permits or easy route access further complicates actual or alleged threats and extortion. Another example

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of extortion can occur in the opium trade of a region with “taxes” levied on farmers, traffickers, and

competing trafficking networks.

6-57.

Intimidation is another form of extortion. An irregular force individual, intelligence cell or

specialized team can intimidate people to obtain information on a target location or to provide resources.

Death threats against an individual or his family may cause the individual to provide information or resources

to a cell, unit, or organization with which he has no interest or allegiance. Intimidation can also be used as a

means to convince individuals not to take an action. For example, security personnel may be intimidated to not

implement required security measures during a specified period of time at a critical infrastructure facility.

6-58.

The effects of coercing individuals can be significant while appearing irrational to some people.

Nonetheless, irregular forces have successfully used these simple techniques to coerce individuals to

participate in an attack that could include an individual suicide or vehicular borne suicide mission.

ARSON

6-59.

Arson is most often used for symbolic attacks and economic effects. Examples of attack by irregular

forces can include—

Assaulting and setting fire to a temporary staging area for fuel tanker trucks.

Burning transportation infrastructure in order to disrupt the flow of logistics along a main supply

route and a resulting requirement for reallocation of security forces to reinforce route protection.

Damaging communications nodes to disrupt cable or digital relay transmissions.

6-60.

A number of arson attacks by small groups of armed extremists can hamper other ongoing governing

authority operations and/or regional law enforcement responsibilities. Arson can be combined, directly or

indirectly, with other forms of terror. An arson attack on residential areas or public facilities could injure or

kill noncombatants and incite civil unrest.

SABOTAGE

6-61.

Sabotage is the planned destruction of the enemy’s equipment or infrastructure. The purpose of

sabotage is to inflict both psychological and physical damage. Sabotage can be an incident creating a large

number of casualties or cause a severe disruption of services for a relevant population.

6-62.

Destroying or disrupting key services or facilities displays irregular force capabilities on the public

consciousness and either increases a target population’s frustration with the ineffectiveness of its governing

authority or may inspire others in the population to resist along with the irregular force. Oil pipelines, water

purification plants, sewage treatment facilities, air traffic control hubs, and/or medical treatment or research

facilities are examples of potential sabotage targets. Sabotage and terrorism can also be demonstrated as a

combination of techniques such as bombing, arson, cyber, or use of industrial materials and contaminates.

BOMBING

6-63.

Bombs are commonly used by irregular forces to conduct acts of terrorism. Bombs can be highly

destructive and easily tailored to a mission, do not require the operator to be present, and have a significant

physical and psychological impact (see figure 6-3).

6-64.

The type of terrorism can employ varied explosive device —

Military-grade type-classified mines.

Military-grade or civilian engineer/construction explosives.

Commercial-industrial products adapted to create explosive components and/or devices as

improvised explosive devices (IED).

6-65.

Car bombs, commonly referred to as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), are used

regularly in terrorism. Suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) are a norm of some

terrorists. In a contemporary tally of attack methods used by irregular forces, only armed attacks surpass the

use of bombing.

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IED

Bombing: Insurgent Affiliate (Example)

An insurgent organization affiliate operating within a sovereign state selected an urban

compound that housed coalition forces as the target for a vehicle borne explosive device

(VBIED) attack. The governing authority had been successful in suppressing any public

demonstrations by the insurgent organization as coalition forces arrived in the state to

assist in stabilizing the expanding insurgency of the region. A small cell of six insurgents

conducted reconnaissance and detailed surveillance of the compound and identified that

breaching an entry into the compound was not likely to succeed. The plan evolved to

detonate a large VBIED close to a perimeter wall near high-rise apartments inside the

compound. The fabricated bomb was sure to cause significant death and injuries to the

multinational military members and civilian contractors operating from the compound.

Insurgents placed several thousand pounds of explosive inside the bulk fuel tank of a

commercial tractor-trailer truck. Training and other logistical support was provided by the

insurgent organization in a neighboring state of the region. An insider threat identified that

the governing authority would not allow any expansion of stand-off distance along a

particular section of compound wall. Insurgent observers confirmed that physical security

checks by local police were infrequent and the area next to the wall was easy to access.

At an early morning hour with visibility limited due to a heavy rain, three insurgents waited

near the compound wall in a sedan. Other insurgents drove the tractor-trailer fuel truck up

to the compound wall, set the timing device on the bomb, and quickly departed the area

with the other insurgents in the sedan. An insurgent observer remained to observe

security force and first responder reactions to the bombing.

Guards inside the compound noticed the suspicious activity but were unable to warn

many of the residents in the apartments before the VBIED detonated. Structure damage

was significant to several apartment buildings. The bombing caused 35 deaths and over

100 other people were injured in the attack.

The public outcry from several coalition states caused the compound to be evacuated

within days. The insurgent organization claimed a major victory in forcing the removal of

coalition forces from the area as the insurgency increased its active and passive support

of the relevant population.

Figure 6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example)

6-66.

A technique used often by terrorists is an initial bomb detonation followed by secondary bomb

detonations as first responders or other people arrive at the attack site. In recent years, bombs and in particular

IEDs increased in lethality and adaptation of techniques used by terrorists. Some IEDs are bulky devices often

made from artillery shells and detonated with simple electric triggers using garage door openers or doorbells.

However, irregular forces also produce and use smaller lethal devices that can be planted quickly and can be

detonated from longer distances with more sophisticated devices.

6-67.

Another IED innovation is to use a device called an explosively formed projectile (EFP). The

penetrating principle is common to shaped-charge munitions in order to outmatch armor protection. Although

some technical skill and machining is required to obtain an optimum effect, a simple EFP is a section of pipe

filled with explosives and capped by a shaped copper disk. When the explosive detonates, the EFP liner folds

into a slug-like shape to penetrate armor plating of a vehicle. Emplacement of the EFP is factored to hit a most

likely weak point for penetration. The angle of an EFP attack can be from below a target, along a side of a

target, and can even be from above or at an extended height from a road or trail surface to attack wheeled or

tracked vehicles.

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6-68.

A prevalent suicide tactic involves an individual wearing or carrying an explosive device to a target

and then detonating the bomb or driving an explosive-laden vehicle to or into a target and then detonating the

bomb. Suicide attacks differ in concept and execution from other high risk operations. In other high-risk

missions, mission success does not require that the participant die. The plan allows for possible escape or

survival of the terrorist or terrorists.

6-69.

Some terrorists have used people who are unknowingly part of a suicide attack. An example is an

individual associated with a terrorist cell who believes he is only a courier of information and materiel but is

unknowingly transporting an IED in a vehicle that is command- detonated by an observer-handler against a

selected target.

6-70.

Another way of describing a suicide bomber is a highly effective precision-guided munition.

Psychological impact increases when confronted by a person who plans to intentionally commit suicide in

order to kill other people. Although a suicide bomber can be a lone terrorist working independently, the use of

suicide terrorism as a tactic is normally the result of a conscious decision on the part of the leaders of an

irregular force to engage in this form of attack.

HIJACK-SEIZURE

6-71.

Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a means of transportation such as an airplane,

ship, train, or bus. Purposes for hijacking and terrorism can include—

Hostage-taking activities.

Obtaining a means of escape from a tactical area of responsibility.

Obtaining a means to conduct a suicide attack with a weapon of mass destruction.

6-72.

While hijacking of aircraft for hostage taking has declined in frequency in recent times, the use of

hijacked aircraft for escape or as a weapon continues to be a dangerous threat. The attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 are tragic examples of hijacking commercial jet planes that are

used for terrorism in a deliberate and multiple suicide attacks.

6-73.

The use of hijacked vehicles for destructive devices is not restricted to aircraft. Trucks carrying

explosive or flammable materials have been seized for use as weapon delivery devices. The possibility of such

a technique could also apply to commercial transport ships carrying petroleum products such as liquefied

natural gas (LNG). The damage or environmental contamination caused by an explosion of such carriers or

other explosive commodities would be devastating. Accidental explosions of this nature are evidence of the

catastrophic infrastructure damage that would be caused to ports and people.

6-74.

Seizure of a critical element of infrastructure, similar to hostage-taking, can be a physical site such as

a facility of critical importance to a relevant population or a cyber node that disrupts and/or prevents use of

selected cyber functions. The terrorism threat of disruption or destruction of seized infrastructure can be a

bargaining issue for an irregular force or could be the intentional seizure and use of infrastructure to

contaminate and/or damage a geographic area.

KIDNAPPING

6-75.

Kidnapping is usually an action taken against a prominent individual for a specific reason. However,

kidnapping can be an indiscriminate act to cause anxiety in a relevant population. The most common reasons

for kidnapping include—

Ransom.

Barter for release of a fellow irregular force member.

Desire to publicize a demand or issue with terrorism.

6-76.

Success of kidnapping often relies on correctly assessing the impact to the governing authority in

maintaining their prestige with a relevant population. A contrast is the possible reactions of the governing

authority to demonstrate their resolve. Detailed planning considers contingencies of how to release the kidnap

victim and/or how often to move the kidnap victim among safe houses. The irregular force typically states

specific demands with a timeline for a response. Kidnapping can also be used as a means of financing the

organization. Ransom from seized individuals or groups is often a significant income for irregular forces in

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several regions of the world. Irregular forces are often willing to hold a victim for significant time in order to

have its demands satisfied (see figure 6-4).

Kidnapping: Insurgent-Criminal Affiliation (Example)

A criminal organization was contracted by an insurgent leader to kidnap a prominent

member of the regional governing authority. This appointed government official was a

leading advocate to disrupt the cross-border smuggling operations of the criminal

organization and had recently sponsored the arrest and detention of several criminal

leaders. Members of the criminal organization observed the daily routine of the official

and determined that seizing him at his residence provided the best opportunity for

success. No personal security existed once the driver and guard delivered the official to

his apartment. The criminals posed as city water engineers inspecting a reported water

leak in the apartment complex.

When the official allowed the engineers to enter his apartment, they gagged and bound

him before placing him in a work chest on rollers. The official’s spouse and children were

gagged, blindfolded, and tied to a room radiator but were otherwise physically unharmed.

The kidnap victim was casually rolled out of the apartment complex to a waiting van and

brought to a safe house in a nearby town. The official was delivered to an insurgent cell

and brought to a separate safe house.

The insurgent organization sent photographs of the official and a manifesto to media

outlets and on the Internet that unless the criminal leaders were released from detention

by the governing authority, the official would be killed. Negotiations continued for two

weeks before the governing authority agreed to release the criminal leaders in exchange

for the official. Although the official was released unharmed, the kidnapping embarrassed

the governing authority in its apparent inability to curtail the criminal organization in its

illicit international smuggling operations. Concurrently, the insurgency gained more active

and passive support from the relevant population in the region’s urban areas and

sections along the inter-border smuggling routes.

Figure 6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example)

6-77.

Some kidnapping operations are actually assassinations with killing the victim as a planned outcome.

Actions include obtaining intermediate concessions and publicity during the negotiation process that the

irregular force would not receive from a simple assassination. Irregular forces may distribute videotapes

and/or photographs to the media and post similar exploitation means on Internet websites.

HOSTAGE-TAKING

6-78.

Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of people to—

Gain publicity for a grievance.

Seek political attention and/or concessions.

Obtain safe passage for irregular forces contained by enemy forces during a mission.

Demand release of irregular force prisoners held by an enemy governing authority.

Ransom.

6-79.

Unlike kidnapping where a prominent individual is normally taken and moved to an unknown

location, the hostages can be individuals not well known in the enemy’s society. Hostage situations are

frequently risky for irregular forces especially when conducted in enemy territory. This location exposes the

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irregular forces to hostile military or police operations and carries the possibility of mission failure and

capture. Therefore, hostages may be held in a neutral or friendly area rather than in enemy territory. Irregular

forces will sometimes take often hostages with the intent to kill them after they believe they have fully

exploited the immediate tactical advantage and/or media coverage from the situation. However, some hostage

situations are conducted to cause a direct confrontation with enemy forces and the resulting global media

attention while negotiations are in progress (see figure 6-5).

Hostage-taking: Guerrilla Unit (Example)

A guerrilla unit was directed by its higher insurgent organization to seize hostages and

demand several political concessions from the governing authority with whom the

insurgency was in conflict. The raid by approximately 15 guerrillas approached the

opening day ceremonies of a middle school in a medium size industrial city. Guerrillas

jumped from trucks firing weapons into the air as they entered the large school courtyard

and quickly forced students, parents, and other relatives into the main school building.

Local police had been deceived earlier by a hoax and were in a different part of the city.

Government response to the hostage-taking was slow and ineffective.

Guerrillas barricaded the school building and after separating young male adults from the

main group of hostages, murdered the 20 male adults and dumped their bodies out of a

second floor window into a main street. Internal security police had arrived at the scene

along with regular military forces but were unable to prevent the murder and mayhem.

International news media arrived on the scene based on insurgent announcements

posted to the Internet. The governing authority’s response to the terrorism received public

criticism by the local citizenry and mass media as confused and sluggish. The guerrillas

allowed selected negotiators and news representatives inside the school to record the

tension and suffering of the hostages. Guerrillas stated their willingness to fight to the

death if attacked or if their demands were not satisfied.

The stalemate ended abruptly when a guerrilla improvised explosive device detonated

under suspicious circumstances. Both guerrillas and government forces started firing at

each other and many hostages were killed or wounded in the firefight. Beyond the tragic

loss of life and injuries, the governing authority was embarrassed in front of a global

audience. All guerrillas died in final room-by-room assaults by government forces inside

the school but the insurgent leader achieved his objective of spotlighting the plight of the

relevant population in the region being suppressed by an unjust governing authority.

Figure 6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example)

RAID OR AMBUSH

6-80.

A raid or ambush is similar in concept and can be used to accent anxiety in an enemy with its sudden

and violent actions. A raid permits control of the target for the execution of some other action. The kidnapping

or assassination of a target may require a raid to gain access and control a particular person or area for a brief

period of time.

6-81.

Some raids may not expect irregular force members to survive. Other raids may use raiders that

volunteer to attack with the expectation of committing suicide as integral to the assault and/or to fight until

killed in order cause the maximum amount of destruction and mayhem (see figure 6-6).

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Raid: Multiple Insurgent Suicide Cell Assaults (Example)

An insurgent organization conducted nearly simultaneous assaults with a cell of two and

three-person teams at multiple locations in a major metropolitan city. The choice of target

areas ranged business centers, famous entertainment sites, mass transit hubs, and

cultural landmarks for the purpose of indiscriminate killing as well as focused hostage-

taking and murder of citizens and foreign visitors based on their nationality or religious

faith. Terrorism was to exploit psychological trauma on a major urban population and

undermine the confidence of citizens on the ability of their governing authority to protect

its people and foreigners, as well as spotlight the insurgent organization’s ideological

extremism and agenda to global attention.

A ten-person direct action cell was thoroughly trained and indoctrinated in the safe haven

of a neighboring state. None of the terrorists in the cell expected to survive the raid. The

insurgent organization prepared for more than one year with refined surveillance and

reconnaissance. The terrorist cell used a fishing trawler to infiltrate past coastal security

patrols and arrive at the city’s harbor area. The cell unloaded their weapons, explosives,

and equipment and split into five two-person teams. Dressed as normal citizens with

travel bags, they moved to their separate objectives by walking, taxi cab, or a small

inflatable boat for travel further into the city’s port.

Confirming via cellular telephone that all assault teams were in position, the terrorists

used semiautomatic rifle fire and hand grenades to assault people in a rail station,

hospital, urban streets, café, hotels, and religious cultural center. Improvised explosive

devices (IEDs) had been hidden in taxis and were timed to explode well after the

simultaneous attacks were underway. These taxi explosions caused additional confusion

and mayhem in the first hours of the incident. After attacking a café, one team quickly

joined a team assaulting an internationally famous hotel complex. Random killing

continued as they started fires in the hotel and seized hostages. Hostages at a cultural

center were tortured and murdered. Another team killed or wounded people randomly in

a train station and a hospital. As these terrorists attempted to link up with other insurgent

cell members they were intercepted and killed by internal security forces in a city street.

Several IEDs were emplaced with timers or tripwires at various sites in or near a hotel.

The terrorists barricaded in the hotel were in regular communication with senior insurgent

leaders in a neighboring state via satellite telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA)

devices, and cellular telephones. The insurgent leaders and cell handlers provided

ideological encouragement and tactical advice to the insurgents as the hostage crisis

continued for several days with live-feed media coverage to a global audience.

Regular military forces and special purpose forces eventually killed nine terrorists and

captured one terrorist but the insurgents had already achieved their information warfare

objectives. The murder or injury of hundreds of noncombatants and days of mayhem in a

metropolis embarrassed the governing authority in front of international partners and its

citizens and demonstrated the insurgent’s commitment to its extremist agenda.

Figure 6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example)

6-82.

An ambush is another form of surprise attack characterized by terror, violent execution, and speed of

action. The intended objective may be to cause mass casualties, assassinate an individual, or disrupt enemy

security and stability operations. Explosives, such as bombs and directional mines, are a common weapon

used in ambushes as well as antitank rockets, automatic weapons, and/or other small arms fires.

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ASSASSINATION

6-83.

An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific individuals. Targets for assassination are often

individuals that have notoriety in a relevant population such as political leaders, well-known citizens, and/or

public spokespersons. This form of terrorism can also target individuals with no public or governing authority

importance and appear indiscriminate. This type of targeting for assassination can intimidate and cause

anxiety and fear and coerce the passive support of a relevant population to an irregular force and preclude the

active support to a governing authority with whom the irregular force is in conflict. Extensive target

surveillance and reconnaissance of engagement areas is critical to planning and conducting an assassination.

Although many factors play into the decision, the target’s vulnerabilities often determine the method

of assassination.

6-84.

Many targets of assassination are symbolic and are intended to have significant negative

psychological impact on the enemy and the relevant population that it controls. For example, assassinating an

enemy senior government official, a successful corporate leader, or a prominent cleric can demonstrate the

inability of an enemy governing authority to protect its own people. Assassinating local representatives and/or

leaders of a society can contribute to civil disorder while demoralizing members of a local governing authority

and/or law enforcement organizations.

TECHNIQUE ENABLERS

6-85.

Techniques that take advantage of restrictions and constraints on an enemy operating within a

relevant noncombatant population are a norm of irregular force actions. Limitations on an enemy can include

social traditions, moral codes, and/or legal policies of a governing authority and its forces. Irregular forces can

remain discrete and secretive within a population or can choose to be open in their operations when operating

in or from a safe haven. In either case, irregular forces seek to create an environment of authority and relative

protection in and from which to operate. Examples of these enablers include dispersion of the irregular force

organization within a relevant population and/or the use of noncombatants of the population as human shields

when confronting an enemy.

6-86.

Actions by irregular forces demonstrate a tempo and/or pace based on the capabilities of the irregular

force as it attempts to gradually or dramatically impact on its enemy. Attacks preferably employ surprise and

deception with irregular force units, cells, or other organizations and also plan for the infiltration of insider

threats to enemy activities and infrastructure. Several offensive action techniques that can easily compound a

sense of anxiety, fear, and/or terror are use of suicide attacks, cyber attacks, and attacks with a weapon of

mass destruction.

Disperse

6-87.

Dispersion in complex rural and urban environments can degrade situational awareness and

complicate enemy intelligence and targeting efforts. Urban areas offer excellent cover and concealment from

enemy ground forces and airpower because building interiors and subterranean areas are hidden from airborne

observation, and vertical obstructions hinder the line of sight to ground targets. Irregular force individuals,

cells, units, or other organizations are often decentralized and purposely dispersed in locations. Similar cover

and concealment in rural areas may be available in villages or natural terrain such as caves, tunnels, and/or

every restrictive physical terrain.

6-88.

Safe houses or sites facilitate irregular force ability to discreetly transit from one location to another

by providing a place to rest, acquire resources, plan, prepare, and stage for acts. Active supporters in a relevant

population and/or criminal organizations can facilitate such networks and trafficking from location to location

in a local community and/or across regional and/or international borders.

Shield

6-89.

Irregular forces can deliberately use noncombatants as human shields that limit enemy forces in using

their weapons systems when noncombatants may be injured or killed. Noncombatants are sometimes

prevented from evacuating likely engagement areas to ensure that irregular forces have human shields present

in their immediate vicinity. These groupings can conceal movements and/or be a means of escape for an

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irregular force after executing an attack. Some irregular forces purposely use the elderly, women, and/or

children as human shields. Activities to create selective areas of human shields can include—

Orchestrating work strikes.

Fomenting mass rallies.

Coordinating peaceful-appearing demonstrations.

Coercing civilians to gather with and around an irregular force action, security, and/or support

element.

6-90.

Types of withdrawal actions or repositioning through human shields causes terror for the

noncombatants involved and may allow an irregular force to regain a tactical initiative and renew offensive

actions. Asymmetric techniques take advantage of typical restrictions on enemy rules of engagement and often

reduce enemy capabilities to apply their full suite of weapon systems against an irregular force. Some

defensive tactics are to—

Disperse within a relevant population of noncombatants.

Use noncombatants as a human shield during armed conflict with an enemy.

Exploit positioning in close proximity to infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, or places of

religious worship.

Conduct INFOWAR manipulation of actions when enemy forces cause noncombatant casualties in

combating the irregular force.

Women and Children Combatants

6-91.

Women and children cover a broad range of irregular force capabilities. Women and children can be

involved in the direct actions of an assault, raid, or ambush and/or be critical to the security and/or logistics

support to an irregular force.

6-92.

Media reporting often spotlights the contributions of women in irregular force operations. In some

instances irregular forces may encourage their front organizations to promote the visible presence of women

and children in their public awareness efforts. In other instances, irregular forces will co-opt women and

children to be suicide bombers in sensational incidents that receive much attention in media affairs.

6-93.

Less obvious but often just as dangerous are other forms of direct combative and support activities.

Women and children can serve a valuable role as couriers when cultural custom or civil restrictions in a region

allow them easier ability to transit public areas without the level of detailed personal searches that a man

would normally experience at checkpoints of a governing authority and/or its internal security forces and law

enforcement organizations.

6-94.

From other support perspectives, women can be key operators in the logistical systems of irregular

forces. Personnel operations can involve the recruitment of new members with a maternal image and be an

example of how a woman can obtain status within a social-cultural setting. Recruitment of women and

children can range from selective invitation of individuals perceived to be receptive to an irregular force

agenda to overt coercion and forceful levy for manning irregular forces in a local community. Alcoholic

beverages and/or drugs can be used at times to dull the ability of children to resist assisting irregular force

activities. Child fighters may be indoctrinated or coerced to conduct specific tasks and can be forced to act in

irregular force operations with little or no training.

6-95.

However, training of particular skills such a bomb making or other functional capabilities can support

the transition of recruits to be fully integrated members in an irregular force. Women and men may be

responsible for establishing and maintaining safe houses for irregular forces that may require a periodic

sanctuary on short notice. Women and men may also be the overt presence in a facility used for maintaining

kidnapped people, cached supplies, or medical treatment sites. Similarly, fund raising and the informal

connections within a community can use women and children as a significant symbol of family value and

need. When public expression of an irregular force agenda is allowable in a locale or region with recognition

as a legitimate political party, women can be a spotlight for media affairs coordination and publicity. In some

cases, women are elected political spokespersons for an irregular force agenda.

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6-96.

Women and children can be fighters with a weapon, couriers of money or munitions, shields to male

fighters who engage an enemy with small arms fire, and/or other forms of support operations for an irregular

force. Women and children in irregular conflict are a significant combat multiplier for an irregular force.

Safe Haven

6-97.

Safe havens are typically located in ungoverned or physical areas where irregular forces are able to

organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of

inadequate governance capacity by a governing authority with whom an irregular force is in conflict. In some

cases, safe havens are located in semi-autonomous areas within a sovereign state while in other cases an

enclave across international borders. Distant locations from an irregular force AOR may be more acceptable to

sustaining irregular force operations.

6-98.

A safe haven is often used to train regional and/or foreign recruits and integrate them into the tactical

and/or logistical support operations of an irregular force. An extension of some safe havens is use of cyber

connectivity and the ability to mask or distort Internet irregular force cyber points of origin. Recruitment,

training, and encouragement can be particularly effective with recurring communications and encouragement

to irregular force members, affiliates, and/or adherents.

Insider Threat

6-99.

An insider threat and intent to conduct acts of terror involve the infiltration by an irregular force

member or members into an area and/or facility. The insider threat is a practical and psychological perspective

that consumes significant enemy resources to counter such invasive actions.

6-100. The “insider” is an individual who is authorized access to open or secure systems of an enemy or

supporting organization that can include physical facilities and infrastructure as well as information systems.

In the context of irregular forces and terrorism, an insider can be a member of an irregular force and/or an

adherent of an irregular force agenda. In either instance in context of command and control and/or information

system operations and infrastructure, the insider threat can—

Disrupt general and/or specific operations of an enemy.

Deny enemy use of particular systems and data.

Corrupt or destroy selected information.

Cause malicious damage or destruction to a facility and/or other infrastructure.

6-101. An insider threat mission can be planned as a one-time breach of enemy security measures or be

planned as a recurring, long-term covert investment to gather information and intelligence. An insider threat

can be a willing participant with an irregular force or be coerced into supporting actions that support irregular

forces. In addition to tasks on gathering specific information and/or intelligence on enemy operations and

procedures, a complementary task may be to identify weaknesses in a particular enemy capability or function.

6-102. Irregular force accomplices may already exist within an objective area and be able to assist the entry

and acceptance of additional irregular force members as an insider threat. Uniforms, security badges and/or

identification cards, and/or purposeful lapses in physical security measures are examples of insider accomplice

support. Once an insider threat is established in an assigned objective area, it may be directed to perform a

number of tasks or be focused with a specific function. Tasks can include—

Remain discrete and report on current operations and personal observations in the objective area.

Plan for acts of sabotage on designated systems and/or equipment.

Attempt to subvert other actors in the objective area to support the irregular force.

Conduct sabotage as critical opportunities arise.

Support the actions of other insider threats of the irregular force.

Commit, on order, violent acts on a designated target.

Conduct a suicide attack on a designated target.

6-103. An insider threat or an irregular force observer in the objective area can sometimes capitalize on

witnessing an incident that identifies individuals with a personal and/or ideological grievance and who has

already been vetted for security clearance into an enemy’s organization and/or facility area. This type of

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individual may be gradually co-opted by an irregular force observer and recruited as an insider threat. On

other occasions, a personal grievance may incite an individual to act violently even though there is no direct

connection to an irregular force. The INFOWAR campaign of the irregular force will manipulate such

incidents to support its agenda and often claim responsibility for the violent and/or terrorism actions.

Information Warfare

6-104. Irregular force information warfare can disrupt popular support for a governing authority and its

allies and/or coalition partners. Irregular forces can spread rumors or misinformation as a means to offset the

official information from a governing authority and its military and/or internal security forces.

6-105. Irregular forces can use the Internet to disseminate their message as quickly as events occur. An

immediate press release from a Website offers irregular force control of initial message content and media

reporting. Irregular forces manipulate images and create special effects or deception that enhances the anxiety

and/or fear of terrorism. Audiovisual coverage of irregular force successes are incorporated in irregular force

recruitment efforts and sustain morale. Multimedia sites can display manufactured evidence of governing

authority atrocities and war crimes to turn domestic and international opinion against the governing authority.

Irregular forces use sympathetic media to reinforce their INFOWAR campaign (see Appendix A).

Suicide Attack

6-106. Suicide attack can be the act of an individual or a tactic planned and conducted by an irregular force

to spotlight a grievance with an intentional self-destruction and incidence of mass casualties, death, and

mayhem. Mass media attention is often focused on an organization’s grievance when such a sensational action

occurs. As a tactic, suicide attack seeks to degrade the resolve of a relevant population and obtain concessions

from an enemy to an irregular force agenda. Organizational aims and ideological support to commit suicide in

attacking an enemy is often complicated in motivations but is typically an action used when other more

conventional means of combating an enemy are overmatched and produce nil results. A tactic of suicide attack

can also be evaluated for an operational intent and/or strategy to obtain support for an irregular force agenda

from state and non-state actors who might be otherwise unwilling to get involved in a social or political

conflict of an irregular force.

6-107. In whatever means a suicide attacker uses, an irregular force member conducting such an act of

terrorism has the ability to adjust actions until the moment of attack. This adaptive behavior makes a suicide

attacker particularly dangerous. When the weapon is a suicide bomb, the moment to detonate a suicide vest or

a vehicle borne improvised explosive device can be adjusted given conditions as they exist at a time and

place of a planned attack. An attacker can estimate the degree of mayhem that will be caused by the

explosion and change who and where to assault. In other instances, a handler of the suicide attack can

command-detonate a bomb on a willing and/or unknowing individual carrying a bomb. The attack can

be a deliberate assault on a specified target or can be intentionally an indiscriminate act to kill and/or

main combatants and noncombatants. Suicide attack is primarily a psychological assault on an enemy

and its supporters.

Cyber Attack

6-108. A cyber attack can be obvious or purposely masked to prevent an enemy from knowing a system has

been or is about to be attacked. Cyberspace use can be a key enabler to commit espionage, subversion, and/or

sabotage. From a terrorism perspective, cyber attack can create anxiety and fear in a targeted population or

group of key leaders. An intrusion into a cyber system can be embedded with a time delay feature and/or be

programmed to execute an action on order of a specific signal. Whether a cyber intrusion is from an external

source or has been emplaced by an insider threat, the reasons for conducting terrorism with a cyber attack on

an enemy can include―

Sabotage cyber networks.

Extort concession from an enemy.

Damage enemy or supporting activities and infrastructure.

Endanger people within a relevant population as part of an irregular force objective.

Support other threat capabilities with a greater probability of success in mission conduct.

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Identify vulnerabilities in cyber systems and facilities.

Evaluate enemy TTP for the ability to limit or prevent particular cyber attacks.

6-109. Irregular forces can employ a broad range of technology to support cyber attacks. Cyber technology

is readily available from commercial or illicit markets in order to conduct terrorism. The ability to exploit

advanced or low-cost technology and integrate with basic TTP is limited only by the fiscal means and

application skills of a terrorist. TTP can use a range of capabilities simultaneously to gather critical

information for planning and conducting a future while a cyber attack is in progress. TTP of a very simple

nature include―

Exploiting social media to collect information through false representation

Gathering open source information from Internet or intranet electronic postings.

Exploiting people through techniques such as phishing, spearphishing, or whaling expeditions.

Infiltrating malware to disrupt, damage, or destroy cyber systems.

Exfiltrating critical information from cyber systems that enables sabotage and other types

of attack.

6-110. A model for planning and conducting cyber attack can be very sophisticated in attempt to breach

layers of detection and protection. Other models can be quite simple in concept. A cyber attack model

can include―

Reconnaissance to identify and select potential targets.

Weaponization of a computer operating system or software application.

Delivery of malware by remote or physical access to a targeted computer.

Exploitation by triggering a malware code in a targeted computer.

Installation that creates an access point on a victimized computer and allows unauthorized entry

and exit on a victimized computer and network.

Command and control to send instructions to targeted computers previously installed with payload

malware and provides the means to conduct a cyber attack.

Actions to accomplish the intended cyber attack objectives.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

6-111. Listing a category of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) acknowledges a broad range of

capabilities that specific terrorist organizations, units, cells, and/or groups would like to acquire. WMD for an

irregular force can be as simple in concept as several tons of improvised explosive from fertilizer and

chemicals to acquisition of a sophisticated nuclear device from a rogue state and/or contract technicians.

Fundamental information on using materials to construct types of WMD is available on the open-source

Internet. Once skills are acquired and precursor or selected material and equipment are obtained by terrorists,

the possibility exists to threaten use and/or actually employ WMD for catastrophic results.

6-112. The types of WMD are categorized generally as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

(CBRN) materials. Sometimes WMD is described as nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry. However,

this is a limiting viewpoint on what can be used as a WMD.

6-113. Materials that are weaponized as WMD can include toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) and toxic

industrial materials (TIM), biological agents, and/or radiological materiel. Low-yield and high-yield common

explosives can also be configured to cause results considered a WMD. Although difficult to acquire by

irregular forces, a nuclear demolition and/or bomb-like device is by its nature a weapon of mass destruction.

Any of these weaponized materials can be a significant irregular force and/or terrorism capability.

6-114. WMD can be employed through numerous types of delivery systems. Once a dangerous biological

agent is acquired, a simple means of employing the WMD can be letters contaminated with a biological agent

being sent through a postal service to cause death and/or severe injury to those individuals who are

contaminated. Additional impacts of such an attack are contamination and/or the potential contamination of

facilities that the letters transited during the delivery process. Extensive decontamination requirements would

disrupt or temporarily halt private and or commercial mail systems. The psychological impact on a relevant

6-20

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 26