Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

Chapter 2

2-33. The JFC approves the theater ROE. These established ROE enable the AADC to retain control of the

air battle by prescribing the exact conditions under which engagements may take place. ROE apply to all

warfare participants in the theater and are disseminated to all echelons of air, land, and sea forces. There are

seven ROE categories. The first three ROE are applicable to all air defense contributors. The others are

primarily for ADA forces. The seven categories of ROE are as follows:

Right of self-defense.

ID criteria.

Weapons control status.

Level of control.

Modes of control.

Autonomous operations.

Fire control orders.

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

2-34. Obligation and Responsibility for Defense. Every commander has the inherent right and obligation

to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander’s

unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

2-35. Commanders at all echelons must take whatever action is necessary to protect their forces and

equipment against air or missile attack. When under attack, the right of self-defense takes precedence over

any other established rules and procedures that normally govern engagements unless self-defense has been

denied.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA

2-36. The employment of defensive weapon systems requires early identification of friendly, neutral, or

hostile aircraft and missiles to maximize beyond-visual-range engagement and avoid fratricide. This

requires a clear understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE). The problem of distinguishing friendly,

neutral, and enemy assets while employing various weapon systems against the enemy is a highly complex

task for some threats. However since ballistic missiles have a distinct flight profile, ROE for this threat

should allow immediate engagement. The AADC and ACA establish procedures within the airspace control

system to positively identify all airborne assets, and permit active air defense. Active air defense measures

reduce delays in operations, and prevent fratricide. Positive identification (ID) of tracks is normally the

preferred method of operation. In the absence of positive ID, procedural ID is used, which employs

previously established and promulgated airspace coordinating measures. Procedural ID separates airspace

users by geography, altitude, heading, time, and/or maneuver. Generally, some combination of positive and

procedural ID will be used.

2-37. Hostile criteria are basic rules that assist in the identification of friendly or hostile air platforms fixed

wing/rotary wing (FW/RW) aircraft, CMs, and UAS. These rules are promulgated by the commanders of

unified commands and by other appropriate commanders when so authorized. The commander who

establishes hostile criteria parameters may consider the factors of speed, altitude, and heading or other

requirements within specified volumes of airspace. The local commander may also consider specific enemy

threat characteristics or hostile acts.

2-38. Echelons having identification authority use hostile criteria to determine the identification of detected

air targets. The highest echelon capable of managing engagement operations normally retains identification

authority. Upon target detection, fire units with near-real-time data transmission capability assist the

controlling authority by forwarding target information. The controlling authority makes final target

identification and delegates engagement authority. Delegation of controlling and identification authority to

lower echelons is normal for ADA units. Such units have both identification and engagement authority.

ADA units engage inbound ballistic missiles based on classification, not identification.

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Fundamentals of Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS

2-39. Weapons control statuses (WCSs) include free, tight, hold/safe. They describe the relative degree of

control of air defense fires. The AADC establishes the WCS for the joint force, which may be different for

an air breathing threat and a missile threat. This authority originates with the AADC and can be delegated

to any subordinate commander. Different weapons control statuses may be applied simultaneously to

different weapons systems, and/or volumes of airspace.

Weapons Free: Weapons can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is

the least restrictive weapon control status.

Weapons Tight: Fire only at air targets that are identified as hostile according to the prevailing

hostile criteria. Identification can be effected by a number of means to include visual

identification (aided or unaided), electronic, or procedural means. Capabilities dictate that ADA

units engage threatening ballistic missiles and air-to-surface missiles

(ASM) based on

classification, not identification.

Weapons Hold: Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. This is the

most restrictive weapon control status.

LEVEL OF CONTROL

2-40. Level of control describes the ADA echelon at which positive management of the air battle is

conducted. This can be an AADC, RADC, SADC, ADA brigade, battalion, or individual fire unit. This is

the level that has engagement authority. Different levels of control may be established for fixed-wing

aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, UAS, and theater missiles. The AADC will specify the level of control in the

AADP and this may change over the course of an operation.

MODES OF CONTROL

2-41. There are two modes of control, centralized and decentralized. The mode of control selected will

depend upon the capabilities of the communications system, the weapons systems employed, and both the

friendly and enemy air situations. The AADC's AADP specifies the modes of control, trigger events and

when they should be changed, and who has the authority to change them.

2-42. Centralized Control Mode. In this mode, a higher echelon authority assigns target engagements to

fire units. In some circumstances, fire units seek permission to engage targets by requesting authorization

from that higher air defense echelon. Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of engaging

friendly aircraft while permitting engagements of hostile aircraft and missiles only when specific orders are

issued to initiate the engagement.

2-43. Decentralized Control Mode. In this mode, higher echelon monitors unit actions to make direct

target assignments on a management by exception basis, to prevent engagement of friendly air platforms,

and to prevent simultaneous engagements of hostile air targets. Decentralized control is used to increase the

likelihood that a hostile aircraft or missile will be engaged as soon as it comes within range of an ADA

weapon system.

AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS

2-44. A unit assumes autonomous operations after it has lost all communications with higher echelons. The

unit commander assumes full responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets.

Normally, the rules of engagement and supplemental fire control measures in effect at the time of

communications loss remain in effect until communications are regained. Changes to rules of engagement

and supplemental fire control measures scheduled to go into effect after communications are lost, will be

implemented as scheduled.

FIRE CONTROL ORDERS

2-45. Fire control orders are commands that are used to control engagements on a case-by-case basis,

regardless of the prevailing weapons control status. Higher ADA echelons, when monitoring the

decentralized operations of subordinate units, most often use these commands. Fire control orders can be

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transmitted electronically or verbally; however, not all of the fire control orders explained below can or will

be used by every type of ADA unit.

ENGAGE is an order issued by the engagement authority to engage a specified target with the

intent to destroy it. An engage order will be acted upon under any weapons control status. This

order cancels any previous fire control order that may have been given on that target.

HOLD FIRE is an emergency fire control order to stop firing or not to open fire on the target

specified. Missiles already in flight must be prevented from intercepting by diversion or

destruction, if technically possible.

CEASE FIRE is a fire control order instructing ADA units to refrain from firing on, but to

continue to track, an airborne object. Missiles in flight are allowed to continue to intercept. This

fire control order is normally issued to preclude engagement of the same aircraft by two or more

weapons systems.

CEASE ENGAGEMENT In air defense, a fire control order used to direct units to stop the

firing sequence against a designated target. Guided missiles already in flight will continue to

intercept

ENGAGE HOLD is an order applicable to Patriot only. When operating in the automatic mode,

ENGAGE HOLD prevents engagement of the specified target by the system. This command is

effective only when used prior to the expiration of the operator override time. It is used to

increase the operator review time prior to an automatic engagement. Missiles in flight are

allowed to continue to intercept.

STOP FIRE is an emergency order to temporarily halt the engagement sequence due to

internally unsafe fire unit conditions. It is seldom transmitted outside the fire unit. This

command can be given by anyone in the fire unit who detects an unsafe condition. The

engagement may continue after the unsafe condition has been corrected.

COVER is an order maintaining a continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and

available, but not necessarily available for immediate use. Cover can also be defined as a fire

control order that allows an adjacent fire to automatically engage a target if the primary fire unit

misses or does not destroy the target.

SECTORS OF FIRE AND PRIMARY/SECONDARY TARGET LINES

2-46. Sectors of fire for ADA fire units are normally designated at battalion after review of radar coverage

diagrams. Primary target lines (PTLs) are established along the centerline of the assigned sector of fire to

assist in the distribution of ADA fires.

2-47. Secondary Target Lines (STLs) are established to supplement the effects of the fire unit to defend

adjoining areas on both sides of the PTL.

2-48. These limits must be clearly defined by right and left boundaries. Those ADA units with automated

tactical data systems must know whether they are to assign and engage air targets within or beyond the

stated sector boundaries.

METHODS OF FIRE

2-49. The available operational environment and level of protection will determine the method of fire used

by engaging fire units. Methods of fire, depending on the ADA system, include shoot-look-shoot (SLS),

ripple, and salvo.

Shoot-look-shoot — After the first shot has been fired the operator/gunner/system evaluates the

engagement. If the target is not destroyed and the operational environment permits, another shot

may be fired.

Ripple—Ripple is a method of fire used for BMs and is slightly different than that used for

aircraft. The time delay between firings for TBM is very small, while the firing delay for aircraft

is seconds.

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Fundamentals of Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

Salvo—Salvo is a method of engagement in which the two missiles are fired simultaneously

from different launchers. This method is used if there is insufficient time for SLS engagement.

Salvo method of fire is used for BMs or against self-defense threats.

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES

2-50. Airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of

airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Army

commanders request the establishment of ACMs through airspace command and control (AC2). The

approval authority for ACMs is normally the ACA. The ACA is the commander designated to assume

overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system. The ACA promulgates the measures

using airspace control orders (ACO) and special instructions (SPINS). ACMs are discussed in the following

paragraphs.

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS AREAS

2-51. Air defense operations areas (ADOAs) are the areas and the airspace above them within which

procedures are established to minimize mutual interference between air defense and other operations. The

following areas or zones are air defense operations areas.

Air Defense Action Area

2-52. Air defense action areas are volumes of airspace within which defensive counterair aircraft and ADA

weapons are given precedence in operations. This type of ADOA is used to minimize mutual interference

between friendly aircraft and ADA weapon systems. ADOA, which have been prioritized for ADA

weapons, are similar to restricted operations areas for aircraft, except that ADOA are normally in effect for

longer periods of time.

Air Defense Battle Zone

2-53. Air Defense Battle zone is areas of airspace around a firing unit or defended area, with identified

altitude, and range in which fires are conducted.

Air Defense Identification Zone

2-54. The air defense identification zone (ADIZ) is airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready

identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. The ADIZ encompasses that volume

of airspace in which friendly aircraft must have their identification friend-or-foe (IFF) equipment on and

operating.

High-Density Airspace Control Zone

2-55. The high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) comprises airspace designated in an airspace

control plan or airspace control order in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied

weapons and airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical

features or navigational aids. The maneuver commander normally controls access to the HIDACZ. The

maneuver commander can also direct the weapons control status within the HIDACZ.

Weapon Engagement Zones

2-56. In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air

threats normally rests with a particular weapon system.

2-57. Weapon engagement zones (WEZs) identify volumes of airspace of defined dimensions within which

a specific type of ADA weapon is preferred For example, a WEZ can be established for manned aircraft to

engage attacking fighters, and missiles and UAS could still be engaged within the WEZ by ADA weapons

for use in an engagement. Use of a WEZ does not preclude engagement of high-priority targets by more

than one type of weapon system if centralized control of each weapon system involved is available. The

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activation of a WEZ can be used to delegate identification and engagement authority. The WEZ can be

used for specific threats.

2-58. An activated WEZ supplements ADA hostile criteria and is used to make target assignments and

engagement decisions. ADA engagements within an activated WEZ may be conducted regardless of the

level of control; weapons control status, or hostile criteria in effect outside the activated WEZ. The echelon

controlling engagements may engage targets without further permission from the establishing authority of

the WEZ if the targets meet specified hostile criteria. Commonly used WEZ are listed below:

Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within

which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.

Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ). Missile Engagement Zones are volumes of airspace

reserved for engagements by Patriot. Within a MEZ Patriot may conduct engagements without

specific direction from the authority establishing the WEZ.

High-altitude Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ). In air defense, that airspace of defined

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with

high-altitude surface-to-air missiles.

Low-altitude Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ). In air defense, that airspace of defined

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with

low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles.

Short-range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). In air defense, that airspace of

defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests

with SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile

engagement zone.

Note: SHORADEZ are established to cover areas where maneuver ADA systems are deployed.

A SHORADEZ may fall within a MEZ, but it is also possible that maneuver ADA assets may

provide the sole defensive ADA capability for some areas. A SHORADEZ can be established to

define the airspace within which maneuver ADA forces conduct engagements. Centralized

control over SHORAD air defense weapons may not be possible; therefore, these areas must be

clearly defined so that friendly aircraft can avoid them.

Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ). In air and missile defense, a JEZ is airspace of defined

dimensions within which multiple air defense weapon systems (surface-to-air missiles and

fighters) of one or more service components are simultaneously employed and operated to

engage air threats.

TEMPORARY AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS

2-59. Temporary airspace restrictions can be imposed on segments of airspace of defined dimensions in

response to specific situations and requirements. These can include close air support (CAS) operations, air-

refueling areas, and concentrated interdiction areas. Implementation of temporary restrictions includes the

following:

Identification of the airspace user being restricted.

Time period, area, and altitude of restriction.

Procedures for cancellation or modification of the restriction in event of communications loss.

2-60. Five common temporary airspace restrictions are: restricted operations areas, minimum risk routes,

coordinating altitudes, standard-use Army aircraft flight routes, and weapons free zone. They are discussed

in the following paragraphs.

Restricted Operations Areas

2-61. Restricted Operations Areas identify airspace of defined dimensions within which the operation of

one or more airspace users is restricted for a fixed time period. The ACA establishes these areas in response

to the requests of ground force commanders. The maneuver unit commander has complete weapons control

status authority within an activated restricted operations area.

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Fundamentals of Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

2-62. Restricted operations areas for aircraft and missiles are established to maximize ADA effectiveness.

In such cases, the normal ADA weapons control status is WEAPONS FREE. Conversely, restricted

operations areas for ADA can be established to support friendly air and Army aviation operations. In such

cases, the normal ADA weapons control status is WEAPONS HOLD.

Minimum Risk Routes

2-63. Minimum risk routes (MRR) are temporary corridors of defined dimensions passing in either

direction through ADA defenses, HIDACZ, or through restricted operations areas. MRR are designated to

reduce risk to high-speed aircraft transiting the tactical operations area at low altitudes.

Coordinating Altitudes

2-64. Coordinating altitudes are procedural airspace control methods that separate fixed-and rotary-wing

aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which

rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. Coordinating altitudes are specified in the airspace control plan

and may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations.

Standard-use Army Aircraft Flight Routes

2-65. Standard-use Army Aircraft Flight Routes are temporary air corridors of defined dimensions

established below the coordinating altitude to allow the Army commander to safely route movement of

aviation assets performing combat support and combat service support missions. They normally are located

in the corps through brigade rear areas but may be extended to support logistics operations. Air corridors

are restricted routes of travel specified for use by Army aviation and established to prevent friendly forces

from firing on friendly aircraft.

2-66. The weapons control status for ADA fire units whose engagement ranges intercept an activated

standard-use Army aircraft route or air corridor remains at WEAPONS TIGHT for that part of the route or

corridor. Should it become necessary to change to WEAPONS FREE, the commander who established it,

would close that particular route.

Weapons Free Zones

2-67. Weapons Free Zones. A weapons free zone is established for the protection of key assets or facilities

other than air bases. Within these zones weapon systems may be fired at any air target not positively

identified as friendly.

AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL (AC2)

2-68. The JFC normally designates an ACA, which has overall responsibility for establishing and operating

the airspace control system. The air defense coordinator receives and distributes the relevant data from the

airspace control order (ACO) and air tasking order (ATO) to the AC2 elements. Airspace coordinating

measures (ACM) are procedural and positive controls used to synchronize military air operations above the

AO. Synchronizing airspace enhances command and control for Army forces using airspace. See Table 2-3

for definitions of airspace terms. For more information, see FM 3-52.

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Table 2-3. Airspace definitions

Airspace command and control (AC2)—The application of airspace control to coordinate

airspace users for concurrent employment in the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Airspace control authority

(ACA)—The commander designated to assume overall

responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area.

Airspace control order (ACO)—An order implementing the airspace control plan that

provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published

either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document.

Airspace control plan (ACP)—The document approved by the joint force commander that

provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the

joint force area of responsibility/joint operations area.

2-69. The ground commander manages the airspace below the coordinating altitude, using procedural and

positive control measures to air traffic above the AO. Corps and divisions routinely have AC2

responsibilities although a commander may provide the resources to accomplish this function to a brigade

operating independently. The AC2 element at each echelon provides airspace requirements through proper

channels to the BCD at the joint air operations center (JAOC) for incorporation into the ACP.

2-70. The ADAM Cells conduct coordination within the AC2 element and participate in the planning

process. The ADAM Cell supports planning coordination by checking the following AC2 tasks-

Ensure that the AMD portion of the AC2 plan is developed.

Involve the air and missile defense coordinator (AMDCOORD) /LNO in the AC2 planning

process.

Provide locations of ADA forces on the battlefield.

Provide maneuver ADA information that supports the maneuver unit's AC2.

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Chapter 3

Command and Control

This chapter addresses Command and Control in AMD operations and conforms to

Joint Air and Missile Defense doctrine as updated with the lessons learned in

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

BATTLE COMMAND

3-1. Battle Command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading,

and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle

command applies leadership to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting

functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions. Battle command is guided by professional

judgment gained from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition. It is driven by

commanders.

3-2. Battle Command for ADA is the conduct of tactical and operational decision-making as part of the

real time engagement control and timing of sensor and weapons tasking. It is based upon the automated

combination or fusion of data from various sensors, and the application of the existing ROE and supporting

Battle Command directives and restrictions.

3-3. Commanders must conduct risk assessments and implement risk management to define and support

the needs of subordinates and seniors. Commanders go where they can best influence the battle, where their

moral and physical presence can be felt, and where their will to achieve victory can best be expressed,

understood, and acted upon.

ENGAGEMENT AND FORCE OPERATIONS

3-4. Battle Command for Army ADA is grouped into two main categories: engagement operations (EO)

and force operations (FO). EO and FO are interrelated and interdependent. A real-time interaction takes

place between EO and FO during battle. This interaction results in continued force optimization as the

battle progresses. EO and FO are assisted through automation. EO is conducted in seconds and minutes. FO

may take hours and days to accomplish.

COMMUNICATIONS

3-5. Reliable communications are imperative for ADA systems conducting Battle Command during the

air battle. Effective Battle Command requires reliable signal/communications support to enable the ADA

commander to conduct AMD operations during stressing tempo situations for extended time durations over

extended distances. The commander must retain the flexibility to deploy ADA fire units across the

battlefield and to maintain communication links with the C2 elements and to maintain access to time-

sensitive data to influence the commanders’ battle.

3-6. Seamless, integrated secure communications networks provide for the horizontal and vertical

integration of voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video information. Integrated networks support combat

operations with the purpose of keeping the ADA commander informed. This means connectivity to joint

streamlined communications links, global connectivity of extended-range assets, and integrated

communications. These networks must connect to existing joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and

multinational (JIIM), operations, forces, intelligence sources, logistics centers, and support administrative

functions. Communications networks provide entry at key points within the force structure to facilitate the

single integrated air picture

(SIAP) and common operational picture (COP) data exchange through

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Chapter 3

automated routing capabilities and

supports filtering of information that can be used by ADA commanders

during

the conduct of AMD operations.

3-7.

Space-based systems provide ADA commanders with

intelligence,

surveillance,

reconnaissance

(ISR)

navigation and positioning

information,

early warning, and weather, terrain, and

environmental

monitoring. Satellite

communications support all

battlefield systems to significantly enhance the speed and

accuracy of useful information that

commander’s

exchange with

subordinates

3-8.

Tactical information is communicated among commanders, staffs, crews, and weapon

systems. ADA

commanders have the capability to communicate their intent

while moving

freely about

the battlefield.

Electronically linked

with command posts, commanders are able to access time-sensitive

operational and

intelligence information to assess

and influence the battle at the critical time and place in support of

decisive operations.

The AAMDC

supports top-level connectivity to the battlefield (see Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1. AAMDC connectivity

COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS

3-9.

Effective control of diverse systems requires the capability to collect, process, display, and

communicate large

amounts of

information

while denying

the enemy

access to the information

Communications systems, including space-based

resources, are

capable of providing secure near real time

exchange of essential information

between the

joint force commander and

subordinate commanders and

forces. The systems are sufficiently flexible

and responsive to allow timely redirection of forces.

Communications systems must

have sufficient capacity,

electronic protection, and

flexibility to

accommodate information exchange among all

levels of command, even when an intermediate level has

been disabled (degraded operations).

3-10.

Computers speed the exchange of essential information;

it may be necessary to filter/parse the extent

and type of information given to specific command and control levels. Data transferred between command

and control levels to

exercise JTAMD tasks calls

for automated data processing. These systems must have

alternative backup capabilities to maintain continuity of operations should the

primary system fail.

Intelligence

3-11.

Intelligence systems provide current, accurate, and

timely all-source information of enemy

capabilities and activities. These

systems are integrated and

synchronized

to ensure responsiveness to

operational needs. Intelligence systems accommodate a variety

of different armed forces (national, allied,

or coalition) communications systems. Intelligence systems are vital to the decision-making cycle and

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Command and Control

support the status, assessment, planning, warning, and IPB (both land and air) functions as well as target

prioritization recommendations.

Capabilities

3-12. Communications and ISR systems must rapidly disseminate intelligence to the JIIM forces and

support air, sea, and ground attack operations requirements with a rapid targeting capability.

Communications and ISR for AMD operations is integrated into the overall theater communications

network, but supports decentralized control or autonomous operations. Service organizations conducting

AMD operations maintain an interface with and are interoperable with the other JIIM organizations.

3-13. Offensive operations within theaters may have constraints or limitations requiring a reactive

Communications and ISR process. Extensive Communications and ISR preparation and preplanning using

continuous air and ground IPB provide critical targeting data.

Theater Missile Intelligence

3-14. Theater missile intelligence provides near real time data on enemy TM forward operating bases,

missile launch, load, and hide sites, EW systems, Communications and ISR facilities, surveillance and

control systems, and logistical support and infrastructure. The intelligence process detects and disseminates

signatures that indicate possible enemy missile launch preparations and pass the launch warning to friendly

units for decisive operations.

3-15. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may search areas that will then require more

refined ISR. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, and other intelligence assets are

rapidly cued to achieve the necessary accuracy for IPB targeting objectives.

3-16. Once a launch is observed, the preparation and planning measures provide a capability for concurrent

and simultaneous defensive and offensive response. An enemy missile launched through a sensor and

surveillance system’s field of view keys the Communications and Intelligence process. This process

enables communication interfaces to provide near real time defensive and offensive attack responses. .

Concurrently, launch warnings are provided to all units and commands within the theater as part of passive

defense.

3-17. Simultaneously while enemy missiles are in flight, updated enemy launch locations, predicted impact

areas, and target data, information is passed to the appropriate command and control centers and offensive

systems.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

3-18. Tactical operations include those functions required to execute the air, missile, and counter-

surveillance battles. The air surveillance function establishes a correlated air picture with target types and

identification. The mission control function processes commands from higher echelon units, evaluates the

threat, optimizes engagement performance, monitors the outcome of engagements, and manages the

employment of sensors and decoys. Passive defense support functions include early warning and missile

defense warnings. The attack operations support function determines the location of enemy air and missile

launch sites and provides it to attack systems. The data distribution function distributes track data and

engagement commands.

3-19. All airborne objects within the area of operation are quickly and accurately identified to effectively

protect the force and control airspace. Air tracks will be identified as friendly, unknown or hostile

according to the established criteria and procedures for identifying aircraft operating in an established area

of operations. Friendly or hostile identification may be assigned to an established air track from the

controlling authority or through the use of the following:

Electronic interrogation.

Air Tasking Order (ATO) information.

Airspace coordinating measures.

Point of origin, prior coordination.

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Voice authentication.

Direction of threat.

Positive visual identification.

3-20. Unknown identification is given to air tracks that do not meet criteria for a friendly or hostile. These

tracks are continuously monitored through electronic or visual means. Classification of enemy missile

threats may be sufficient in most cases to declare them hostile.

3-21. The AADC will specify the level of engagement authority in the AADP and this may change over

the course of an operation. The engagement authority is the lowest echelon at which the available

information on a track or surface target is evaluated against the rules of engagement (ROE) and the

engagement decision is made. Within the same AO the AADC may delegate engagement authority to

different echelons for fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, UAS, and theater missiles.

FORCE OPERATIONS PROCESSES

3-22. ADA FO processes include planning, coordinating, preparing, and sustaining the total AMD mission.

The situation analysis process continuously collects and evaluates all available information on friendly and

hostile forces, including the intelligence tasks of continuous IPB and situation development. The defense

planning process develops and assesses various options and produces a preferred course of action. The

coordination process implements the cooperative actions required for developing, distributing, and

executing AMD plans. The directives and orders process promulgates plans in a timely manner. The

monitoring and controlling process involves observing and recording activities taken in response to orders

issued and performing alerting based on the situation. Predictive EO algorithms will use FO information

from the situation analysis process as the basis for recommending or directing EO activities.

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES

3-23. Effective Battle Command enables air defense forces to successfully perform combat missions and

support overall force objectives. The following fundamental principles form the basis for air defense

engagement operations-

Centralized control with decentralized execution.

Air battle management.

Management by exception.

CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

3-24. Centralized control with decentralized execution permits the full exploitation of the combat

effectiveness of air defense operations at each level of command. Centralized control is the mode whereby

a higher echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units. Centralized control ensures unity of effort.

Decentralized execution gives subordinate commanders the flexibility that is essential to achieve the

Operational Concept elements of initiative and speed.

3-25. Centralized control is essential to ensure integration and control of all air defense assets from the

ADA brigade down to the ADA fire unit to maximize their collective effect on the AO. Centralized control

also facilitates the synchronization of offensive and defensive operations within the Army and among all

the participants in joint or multinational operations. In the case of Army AD, centralized control is executed

through compliance with theater ROEs and ADA weapon control procedures and measures. Data link

connectivity and operational control complete the synchronization.

3-26. Decentralized execution is necessary because the number of activities associated with air defense

operations prevents any one commander from effectively controlling all air defense forces and actions.

Decentralized execution also enables air defense assets to maximize their individual capabilities and meet

the extreme engagement timelines associated with countering air and missile threats. Thorough planning

and extensive coordination link centralized control and decentralized execution.

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AIR BATTLE MANAGEMENT

3-27. Air battle management controls engagements of air targets, ensures the early ID of friendly, neutral,

or hostile aircraft and missiles, destroys enemy aircraft and missiles, and maximizes Beyond- Visual-

Range (BVR) engagements to prevent fratricide and unnecessary multiple engagements. The preferred

method of operation is positive identification, in the absence of positive ID procedural ID is used.

Procedural ID employs both promulgated and established airspace control measures. Procedural ID

separates airspace users by geography, altitude, heading, time, and/or maneuver. Management of the air

battle normally employs a mix of positive and procedural control measures and information management.

MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION

3-28. The principle of management by exception reinforces the theme that no one commander can direct

the overall air defense battle on a real-time basis. If a unit is operating in the decentralized mode of control

for engagement operations, a higher echelon Battle Command node monitoring the air battle may make

direct target assignments to that unit on a management by exception basis. This would be done only when

necessary to ensure proper fire distribution, prevent engagement of friendly air platforms, and prevent

multiple engagements of hostile air targets.

JOINT COMMAND STRUCTURE

3-29. The joint command structure consists of multiple levels with varying degrees of involvement. Within

this structure, there are multiple organizations and singularly designated responsibilities peculiar to ADA

command structure.

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

3-30. Combatant commanders command one of the 10 unified combatant commands authorized by the

President in the Unified Command Plan. They are further divided into six Geographic Combatant

Commands and four Functional Combatant Commands. The Geographic Combatant Commanders are

responsible for ensuring that AMD plans and operations of subordinate forces are integrated at theater level

and documented in the appropriate operations plans and annexes. USSTRATCOM is responsible for

synchronizing those plans into a global plan. Combatant commanders establish theater guidance and

objectives for AMD, then assign, and apportion forces and resources to accomplish the mission. The

combatant commander’s staff and component commander’s staffs plan, monitor, advise, coordinate, and

execute overall operations. Combatant commanders may delegate command authority to assigned or

attached subordinate commanders.

JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS

3-31. A joint force commander (JFC) is a combatant commander, sub unified commander, or joint task

force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational

control over a joint force Figure 3-2. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, General Tommy Franks,

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander, was also the JFC.

3-32. The JFC establishes campaign objectives, approves plans, and establishes AMD priorities, allocates

forces, and apportions air power. Normally the JFC assigns overall responsibility for theater-wide and/or

joint operations area-wide counterair operations to a JFACC, overall joint force defensive counterair

(DCA) operations to an AADC, and airspace control to an ACA. The JFC commands forces through

component and functional commanders.

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JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

DESIGNATES

AFFOR

JFACC

ACA

AADC

JFLCC

NAVFOR

APPORTIONS

MARFOR

AIR POWER

ARFOR

ESTABLISHES

CAMPAIGN

OBJECTIVES

APPROVES PLANS

Figure 3-2. Joint force commander

COMPONENT COMMANDERS

3-33. Component commanders command one of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force.

These commanders plan and execute all TAMD operations within their assigned AOs as directed by the

AADC. Component commanders are responsible for planning and executing combat operations and for

jointly coordinating and prioritizing their operations and needs with the JFC and with other component

commanders. Component commanders are responsible for providing AMD warning to assigned forces.

Component commanders will normally retain operational control of their active defense assets. The JFC

may designate certain key forces or assets that the component commanders protect with their assigned

active defense forces.

3-34. Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC is necessary to employ

the most appropriate ADA resources. Appropriate ADA measures are required to execute effective JTAMD

operations and to ensure a synergistic effort. Component-to-component coordination may be required in

some situations as a result of the compressed timeline and short reaction times inherent in countering air

and missile threats.

Joint Force Land Component Commanders

3-35. Joint force land component commanders (JFLCC) command all land forces within the theater of

operations. The JFLCC is responsible to the JFC for making recommendations on the proper employment

of land forces, planning and conducting land operations or accomplishing such operational missions as may

be assigned. The JFLCC commands land forces, including Army and Marine ADA forces, and assigns

missions.

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Joint Force Air Component Commanders

3-36. Joint force air component commanders (JFACC) are designated by the JFC. The JFACC is a

component commander, either United States Air Force (USAF) or United States Navy (USN). Their

responsibilities include planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of air assets based on the JFC's

apportionment decision. The JFACC allocates air sorties to both offensive and defensive counterair, and

JTAMD attack operations. The JFC usually assigns the JFACC responsibilities as both ACA and AADC.

Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders

3-37. Joint force maritime component commanders

(JFMCC) are given the authority necessary to

accomplish maritime missions and tasks assigned by the JFC. During the early part of force-projection

operations, when the naval forces provide the preponderance of air assets, the JFMCC (or one of the

subordinates) may be designated as the JFACC. If assigned as the JFACC, the JFMCC would also be

assigned the responsibilities of the AADC and the ACA.

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commanders

3-38. Joint force special operations component commanders are responsible for planning and coordinating

special operations or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the JFC. Special

operations forces support OCA and JTAMD attack operations through reconnaissance and direct action

operations.

Area Air Defense Commander

3-39. The JFC assigns responsibility for overall joint force defensive counterair operations to an AADC.

The AADC is normally the component commander with the preponderance of ADA capabilities in theater

and the command, control, and communications capabilities necessary to plan and execute integrated

JTAMD operations. The AADC is usually a USAF/USN position. Normally, the AADC performs the

following functions:

Integrates defensive counterair forces and operations.

Develops a database of friendly JTAMD active defense capabilities to facilitate JTAMD

planning.

Develops and executes plans for JTAMD active missile defense operations.

Develops and promulgates JTAMD weapon control procedures and measures.

Develops and executes plans for dissemination of missile warning information to components,

allies, and host nation civil authorities.

Deputy Area Air Defense Commander

3-40. The JFC and AADC will determine whether a deputy area air defense commander for AMD

(DAADC[AMD]) is designated. If so designated, the commander of the Army air and missile defense

command assumes the role of the DAADC (AMD). This designation formalizes the relationship between

the land-based ADA assets dedicated to theater level missions and the AADC and also ensures fully

integrated and synchronized counterair and Army AMD operations.

3-41. The DAADC (AMD) serves as the AADC's principal advisor and coordinator for theater land-based

air defense and TMD operations. The DAADC (AMD) provides the following support to the AADC:

Integrates land-based active defense and ADA forces with the defensive counterair (DCA) plan.

Advises the AADC regarding weapons control procedures and recommended or implemented

airspace control measures, air defense warnings, weapon control status, and emissions control

measures.

Assists the AADC with AADP development.

Advises the AADC on matters regarding land-based active defense operations and ensures

effective integration of ARFOR assets into the AADP.

Advises the AADC about ARFOR air defense weapons capabilities.

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3-42. Although the AAMDC commander may serve as a "deputy" AADC, it is not envisioned that the

DAADC (AMD) would assume the role of the AADC if the AADC were incapacitated. The DAADC

(AMD) is not a true deputy commander in that sense. The DAADC (AMD) primary responsibilities are to

assist the AADC in planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing land-based ADA systems.

Neither the AAMDC commander nor the staff has the tactical, technical, or procedural expertise and

capability to perform all of the DCA functions of an AADC in a joint environment.

ARMY COMMANDERS

3-43. The levels of Army ADA command extend from AAMDC to brigade to battalion to battery to Fire

Unit. These commanders work within the ADA structure as well as within Army corps and divisions. The

commander has total responsibility for active air and missile defense planning within the Army component.

3-44. The ADA commander ensures that organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish

offensive and defensive counter air objectives in support of the ground commander's concept of operations.

The AAMDC commanders, ADA brigade commanders, and ADA battalion commanders develop air and

missile defense plans for protection of their supported commander's AMD priorities. They also prepare the

air defense annexes to division and corps operation plan (OPLAN) and the ARFOR commander or the

JFLCC's operations plan.

AAMDC Commander

3-45. The commanding general (CG) of the AAMDC performs three critical roles. The CG commands the

AAMDC and its subordinate echelons above corps (EAC) ADA brigades, performs the functions of the

theater Army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) for the ARFOR commander (or

JFLCC if designated), and performs the functions of the DAADC (AMD) for the AADC. The AAMDC is

the Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense.

ADA Brigade Commanders

3-46. ADA brigade commanders are responsible for the planning and execution of AMD plans and

missions. Commanders ensure that the ADA brigade is integrated and synchronized with adjacent, higher

and lower AMD operations within assigned AO. Brigade commanders task organize active defense forces

to protect priority assets on the defended asset list (DAL). ADA brigade commanders may also function as

the DAADC (AMD)/TAAMDCOORD if the AAMDC is not deployed.

ADA Battalion Commanders

3-47. ADA Battalion commanders can command an ADA Battalion Patriot [ADA BN(P)] consisting of

four Patriot firing batteries, one headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) and one organic maintenance

company or an ADA Battalion Patriot/Avenger [ADA BN(P/A)] consisting of four Patriot firing batteries,

one Avenger firing battery, one headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) and one organic maintenance

company. One Patriot firing battery consists of six launching stations, one radar set, and one engagement

control station (ECS). The ADA battalion (P/A) has six Sentinel radars, two Sentinels in HHB and four

Sentinels in the Avenger battery and 24 Avenger fire units in the Avenger firing battery comprised of three

platoons. Organic to the battalion is a maintenance company capable of field level maintenance. The ADA

battalions provide air and missile protection for the force and selected geopolitical assets.

Theater Army Air And Missile Defense Coordinator

3-48. The theater army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) is the commander of the

highest echelon Army ADA command in the theater. When the AAMDC is in theater, the commander will

be designated the TAAMDCOORD. The TAAMCOORD is the Army AMD coordinator for the ARFOR

commander, and the combined/joint forces land component commander (C/JFLCC) (if designated). The

TAAMDCOORD ensures that the Army is an integral part of joint counterair and active missile defense

operations and planning at the theater level. The TAAMDCOORD, as a special staff officer to the ARFOR

commander and JFLCC, participates in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J3)/plans directorate of a

joint staff (J5) cells and assists in developing Army OCA and DCA input to the air operations plan. The

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TAAMDCOORD ensures that corps AMD requirements are integrated into joint counterair and Army

AMD planning.

ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMANDS

3-49. There are three Army air and missile defense commands: two active component and one reserve

component. The AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense. The

AAMDCs command Theater AMD brigades. AAMDCs provide a bridge between Army air defense and the

joint world.

3-50. The AAMDC performs critical theater level air and missile defense planning, integration,

coordination, and execution functions for the ARFOR commander and the JFLCC if designated; the

AAMDC does not conduct engagement operations. The AAMDC integrates the following four operational

elements of JTAMD to protect contingency, forward deployed, and reinforcing forces:

Active missile defense.

Attack operations.

Passive missile defense.

C2, communications system, and Intelligence.

3-51. The AAMDC headquarters consists of intelligence, fire support, aviation, chemical, air defense

sections, and signal personnel. The AAMDC normally locates with the ARFOR/JFLCC headquarters or

with the JAOC/combined air operations center (CAOC); however, the location of the commander and the

role is dependent on METT-TC.

THEATER ADA BRIGADES

3-52. Theater ADA brigade missions include protection of theater level sustaining bases, military or

political headquarters, and ports of debarkation. Theater brigades will deploy early into the theater to

protect aerial ports of debarkation (APOD), seaports of debarkation (SPOD), early arriving forces and

critical supplies. Entry forces move into tactical assembly areas for expansion operations. As the lodgment

expands, ADA forces may move to protect critical assets, communications, transportation, and maneuver

forces. After deployment operations, Theater ADA brigades and multinational forces will form a joint

integrated defense.

ADA BATTALIONS

3-53. ADA battalions are located at Theater and corps. ADA battalions protect forces and selected

geopolitical assets in the Theater and corps from air and missile attack. These battalions can be positioned

to protect fixed assets or assigned to support maneuver forces. These battalions are versatile, mobile, and

relatively easy to deploy. The ADA battalion provides critical air and missile defense coverage and timely

early warning to maneuver units and multiple defended assets across the operational environment, allowing

freedom of maneuver and operations in a joint tactical environment. The ADA battalion consists of four

Patriot firing batteries with six launching stations each and an organic maintenance company; or in a

composite battalion include an Avenger battery with

6 Sentinel radar’s, and

24 Avenger fire units

controlled by the ADA battalion fire control center (FCC).

ADA BATTERIES

3-54. ADA batteries are tactical and administrative units corresponding to a company or similar unit in

other branches of the Army. ADA fire units are deployed as a unit. Battery’s with maneuver-based

weapons have firing platoons. This could consist of one or multiple maneuver types of systems.

3-55. Fire units are the smallest size of a team, squad, or platoon that makes up a battery, or fire team.

ADA COMMAND CONTROL NODES

3-56. There are four variants of C2 nodes used in ADA units: command posts (CP), tactical operations

centers (TOC), fire direction centers (FDC), and fire control centers (FCC). These nodes constitute the

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Chapter 3

physical and functional grouping of command personnel and of communications and computer systems that

provide terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. These C2

nodes are interdependent and do not necessarily exist as standalone entities.

COMMAND POST

3-57. The command post is the principal facility employed by ADA commanders to control operations.

AAMDC, ADA brigade, battalion, battery, and platoon command posts (CP) consists of facilities for the

commander, coordinating staff, and special staff. The organization of the CP reflects the commander's

needs. CPs can be organized by echelon, for example, a tactical CP, main CP, and rear CP.

3-58. Command posts provide assured access to timely, accurate, and relevant information through

interoperable digitized data links. Voice communications are also readily available. Command posts enable

the commander to respond to changing circumstances regardless of the commander’s location.

3-59. Command posts are organized to perform the following functions:

Monitor the execution of operations.

Synchronize combat activities to sustain tempo and adjust the plan to fit the situation.

Maintain the current operations situation.

Manage logistics.

Provide a focal point for the receipt and development of intelligence.

Plan future operations.

Monitor operations of supported, adjacent, and higher echelon units.

Provide situation information to higher headquarters.

Monitor AMD engagement operations.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTERS

3-60. A tactical operations center (TOC) consists of a physical grouping of elements concerned with

current and future operations and tactical support. ADA TOCs are found at AAMDC, ADA brigades, and

ADA battalions. The AMD planning and control system (AMDPCS) is the primary automated support

system at ADA TOCs. The key component of the AMDPCS is the AMD workstation (AMDWS). There are

multiple facilities (shelters and vans) at all echelons constituting a TOC.

FIRE DIRECTION CENTERS

3-61. A fire direction center (FDC) is that sub-element of brigade and battalion, batteries CPs, where

engagement operations are conducted. The FDC receives digitized target information and fire control

orders from the controlling authority. This information and orders are then propagated to appropriate fire

units.

FIRE CONTROL CENTERS

3-62. The fire control center (FCC) is where integrated, net-centric engagement operations are conducted

and engagement commands are directed to specific weapon platforms for rapid target prosecution and

effective fratricide risk mitigation and prevention.

3-63. The FCC provides an effective and versatile combination of system capabilities with 360-degree

coverage for a seamless air and missile defense while enhancing force protection capabilities. Voice and

data communications (internal and external /Joint) are accomplished with tactical digital information link

(TADIL)-J, TADIL-B, Patriot data information link (PADIL), enhanced position location reporting system

(EPLRS), and single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS). As a result of the increased

number of radars and weapon systems, the need for an additional C2 center, the FCC is necessary to

effectively manage the air battle and conduct friendly protect operations. The ADA battalion FCC is where

integrated, net-centric engagement operations is conducted and engagement commands are directed to

specific weapon platforms for rapid target prosecution and effective fratricide risk mitigation and

prevention. Organic to the ADA battalion is a maintenance company that provides both direct and

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FM 3-01

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Command and Control

organizational support. The organization will provide leaders that are oriented towards fighting air and

missile battles in the joint operational environment.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-64. The joint force commander (JFC) assigns responsibility for overall air defense operations to a single

area air defense commander. With respect to the conduct of TAMD operations, the following principles

normally apply-

A JFC exercises operational control of all assigned forces to ensure unity of effort. Normally,

this authority is exercised through component commanders. To achieve the objectives of the

JFC, operations are conducted under the TAMD guidance.

Command of ADA forces that may be committed to TAMD operations remain under the

command of their respective component commander. ADA Forces are integrated into the air

defense system according to the established joint operational procedures and the overall ADA

priorities of the JFC.

3-65. All air defense forces operate under the rules of engagement and weapon control procedures

approved by the JFC and promulgated by the AADC when conducting JTAMD operations. The JFC,

JFLCC, ARFOR commander, and corps/division/brigade/battalion/ battery commanders establish

command and support relationships for ADA units in accordance with joint and Army doctrine. ADA

forces assigned to corps and lower maneuver elements are under the operational control of the echelon

commander. At EAC, Army ADA forces are under the operational control of the ARFOR commander. The

JFC determines the most appropriate command authority over forces made available, but normally surface-

based active defense forces are provided in direct support to the AADC.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

3-66. Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the

operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command. Command responsibilities,

responsibilities for service support, and authority to organize or reassign component elements of a

supporting force remain with the higher headquarters or parent unit unless the authorizing commander

specifies otherwise (Figure 3-3).

3-67. Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander (at any level) to a

subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the

granting command.

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Figure 3-3. Command relationships

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

3-68. Combatant command (COCOM) (command authority) is a nontransferable command authority

exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant command cannot

be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over

assigned forces involving organizing and employing command and forces, assigning tasks, designating

objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and

logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command always

includes operational control.

Attachment

3-69. Attachment is the temporary placement of a unit within another organization. Subject to the

limitations imposed by the attachment order, the commander of the organization receiving the ADA

element will exercise the same degree of Battle Command over attached units as over organic units. This

includes administrative and logistical support. The parent ADA unit commander retains the responsibility

for administrative functions.

Operational Control

3-70. Operational control (OPCON) is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON may be delegated and is the authority to

perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing

commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary

to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations.

OPCON does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline,

internal organization, or unit training.

Tactical Control

3-71. Tactical control (TACON) is the command authority over assigned or attached forces, commands,

military capability, or forces made available for tasking. TACON is limited to the detailed and local

direction and control of movements or maneuvers. TACON is inherent in operational control. TACON may

be delegated to, and exercised, at any level at or below the level of combatant command. TACON allows

commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistics assets.

TACON does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and

logistical support.

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SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-72. Support relationships define specific arrangements and responsibilities between supporting and

supported units (Table 3-1).

General support

3-73. ADA units in general support (GS) roles provide support to the supported force as a whole and not to

any particular subdivision thereof. ADA units in GS remain under the operational control of and are

positioned by the ADA commander. GS is a support relationship commonly established to protect EAC,

corps, or division level assets.

General Support-Reinforcing

3-74. ADA units with general support-reinforcing (GS-R) missions provide support for the force as a

whole and secondarily augment the support provided by other ADA units. ADA units must coordinate with

the augmented ADA units to reinforce the coverage of assets in the AO.

Reinforcing

3-75. ADA units in reinforcing roles augment the coverage of other ADA units and strengthen the air and

missile defense capabilities of the force. Reinforcing ADA units are positioned to protect one or more of

the reinforced units’ priorities as specified by supported ADA unit commanders. For example, an echelon

above corps ADA battalion could reinforce the maneuver ADA battalion.

Direct Support

3-76. ADA units in a direct support (DS) role provide dedicated support to a specific unit. DS ADA units

provide dedicated air and missile defense for a specific element of the force, which has no organic air and

missile defense. Supporting ADA units coordinate their movement and positioning with the supported unit.

A maneuver ADA platoon, for example, may provide DS to a mechanized task force. The platoon will

provide dedicated support to the task force and the platoon leader will position the platoon in conjunction

with the task force commander’s concept of the operation.

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Table 3-1. ADA support relationships

*The term “positions” specifies the selection of the exact placement of individual fire units

within the AO. The parent ADA commander retains responsibility for administration and

logistics.

GENERAL

DIRECT

GENERAL

SUPPORT

ISSUE

SUPPORT

REINFORCING

The supported

The ADA

commander who

Who establishes

The supported

established the

priorities?

commander

support

relationship.

relationship

The ADA

commander with

commander in

commander with

commander in

Who positions*

the approval of

coordination with

approval of

coordination with

ADA fire units

the supported

local ground

reinforced ADA

commander

commander.

The ADA

Who coordinates

commander who

The supported

The reinforced

for terrain used by

established the

commander

ADA commander

ADA fire units?

support

relationship.

With whom should

As required and

The supported

liaison be

As required

the reinforced

the reinforced ADA

unit

established?

ADA unit

unit

With whom should

As required and

The supported

communications

As required

the reinforced

the reinforced ADA

unit

be established?

ADA unit

unit

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

3-77. AMDCOORDS and liaison personnel accomplish coordination and liaison on matters pertaining to

AMD. Liaison officers are drawn from air defense units at all echelons of command. They keep ADA

commanders and staffs apprised of the status of AMD operations and recommend appropriate courses of

action relative to air and missile defense. They also provide two-way information exchange with supported

and supporting units. At EAC, they serve as subject matter experts on the capabilities of the AAMDC and

its subordinate ADA forces. At a BCD, LNOs coordinate movement and support of ADA forces with

maneuver forces. Automation and digitization utilized by LNOs are factors in Battle Command, but the

coordination functions still require personal contact.

COORDINATION

3-78. Staff coordination is a function of the organization of the staff, command post configuration,

doctrine, and local SOP. The AMDCOORD has a representative in the staff cells to plan and execute

decisive, shaping ,and sustaining operations.

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3-79. At the AAMDC/ADA brigade, coordination provides horizontal and vertical linkages to the various

elements of the joint force. These staff elements include intelligence, fire support, electronic attack (EA),

Air Force staff, Army aviation, Navy and or United States Marine Corps (USMC) air control systems,

maneuver, and the Army airspace command and control (AC2) cell.

LIAISON

3-80. The AAMDC provides the staff and equipment to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and monitor the

execution of theater air and missile defense during joint and multinational operations. The AAMDC has

dedicated liaison teams that can deploy to major theater and ARFOR elements to integrate ARFOR air and

missile defense operations. Elements to which the AAMDC deploys liaison teams include the following—

Joint force commander (JFC).

Joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Area air defense commander.

Joint force land component commander (JFLCC).

Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).

Joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

Battlefield coordination detachment (BCD).

Deep operations coordination cell (DOCC).

Analysis and control element (ACE).

Multinational headquarters.

3-81. The AAMDC normally deploys a liaison team to the AADC location to support the DAADC (AMD)

and the AADC. The liaison team is normally led by an ADA colonel (O6) and will consist of sufficient

personnel experienced in active defense, attack operations, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB) to support 24-hour AMD operations.

3-82. If the AAMDC is not in theater, the highest echelon ADA organization in the theater is responsible to

provide liaison to the JFLCC, BCD, and AADC. It may also be necessary to send liaison teams to the air

operations centers of other services or multinational forces. Liaison teams may also be required at other

combat function locations for logistics or intelligence.

3-83. ADA brigade commanders at the corps level may provide liaison to the control and reporting center

(CRC) and selected CPs of the corps and selected major subordinate commands. In some cases, it may be

necessary to send liaison teams to divisions to augment the divisional AMDCOORD.

3-84. Maneuver ADA liaison officers are normally battery executive officers and platoon leaders. The

LNO will usually work in a supported unit command post. The primary function of the LNO is to provide

early warning and status of ADA systems. This contribution may be complementary to existing EW

disseminating procedures, or it may be the only means that supported units receive an alert. The LNO will

also become the maneuver unit’s operations and staff and ensures that the ADA battalion commander and

staff are informed of the maneuver unit’s situation.

3-85. The AMDCOORD/LNO supports AC2 planning and identifies and coordinates air management

issues (if any) not resolved between the aviation LNO, air liaison officer, and ADA officer. Maneuver

ADA LNOs conduct coordination with the AC2 elements and participate in the airspace management

process. The LNO verifies that ADA coordination is included in the AC2 plan. The LNO reviews the AC2

information that affects the maneuver ADA units.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL OFFICER

3-86. The ADAFCO is responsible to the senior director for coordinating air defense of designated

facilities and areas, as well as coordinating and monitoring the command, air picture, and fire unit exchange

between the CRC/AWACS/AEGIS/tactical air operations center (TAOC) and the Patriot Information

Coordination Central or the ADA Battalion Fire Control Center (FCC).

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3-87. An ADAFCO is required in any regional/sector air defense command in which an Army air/missile

defense capability is employed. The ADAFCO has the expertise to advise the RADC/SADC on what

course of action Army AD units would likely follow during non-standard situations, especially with

degraded communications, what limitations ROE can have on autonomous Army ADA units, what tactics

may be more effective, etc. ADAFCO elements should be part of/liaison to any of the Service air/missile

defense operations centers that may have control of or support from Army ADA assets. Typically, an

ADAFCO element deploys to the appropriate air defense region/sector location and is responsible to the

RADC/SADC for integrating Army ADA capabilities into that part of the integrated air defense system.

The ADAFCO must have access to dedicated AD communications links (for example, dedicated AD voice

circuit) and with Army AD C2 nodes when conducting active air defense operations. Unless very unusual

circumstances dictate, an ADAFCO should not be placed on an airborne warning and control/airborne

command and control aircraft that is not a full-time SADC directing ground-based AD in conjunction with

active air intercepts. Those aircraft normally lack a dedicated seat position and communications for the

ADAFCO, and they do not have as reliable situational awareness available as does a RADC/SADC with a

tactical data link and a common tactical picture or a COP.

AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-88. Airspace control provides increased operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and

flexible use of airspace. Airspace control consists of the coordination, integration, and regulation of the use

of airspace within a defined AO. Airspace command and control can be positive, procedural, or a mix. The

JFC assigns overall responsibility and authority for airspace control to the joint force air component

commander (JFACC). The JFACC, AADC, and ACA are usually the same individual. The mission of the

ACA is to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace. The ACA establishes broad policies and procedures

for airspace control operations and coordination among units in the joint operations area.

POSITIVE CONTROL

3-89. Army positive control is a technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders

actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. It may be restrictive in that commanders directly monitor

operations and intervene to direct specific actions to better synchronize subordinates’ operations. Excessive

use of Army positive control can rapidly become detailed command (FM 3-0) Positive control for ADA

relies upon near-real-time data from visual, radar, point of origin, sensors, computers, digital data links,

electronic ID systems like IFF, and communications equipment to provide airspace and air defense control.

Positive control is desirable but not always possible due to battlefield conditions and inherent system

vulnerabilities. Facilities for positive control are subject to direct link attack, sabotage, or jamming. Line-

of-sight requirements and limited communications can also restrict the availability of data from facilities

that are operational.

3-90. Aerial combat identification (CID), the process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an

unknown detected aerial object, ensures timely engagement of targets and prevents fratricide. Aerial CID is

normally provided to Army ADA via the CRC or TAOC or ADA sensors with organic identification friend

or foe (IFF). The tactical situation, electronic interference, or equipment malfunction may preclude positive

friendly identification, but airspace control measures provide a procedural backup.

PROCEDURAL CONTROL

3-91. Army procedural control is a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders,

regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures). Army procedural control

requires no intervention by the higher headquarters once it is established (FM 3-0). Procedural control for

ADA relies upon techniques such as segmenting airspace by geography, altitude, time, and weapon control

statuses. Procedural techniques are usually more restrictive than positive techniques but are less vulnerable

to degradation from electronic or physical attack. Procedural control enhances the continuity of operations

under the adverse conditions expected on the battlefield. Procedural control provides an immediate backup

method should degradation of positive control occur. Procedural techniques provide a management means

for air defense systems that do not have near-real-time data transmission capabilities. In conjunction with

the ACA, the AADC implements procedural airspace controls that facilitate the integration and

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synchronization of air defense assets into air operations to optimize airspace use, protect friendly units, and

prevent fratricide. These airspace control measures are disseminated and updated via the airspace control

order

(ACO), which may be published in conjunction with the Air Tasking Order (ATO)/ Special

Instructions (SPINS).

3-92. An ACM is employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and provide

safeguards for friendly forces. The theater airspace control plan and specific directives are used to

implement airspace control measures. The AMDCOORD and AC2 elements at each echelon provide

friendly ADA fire unit and radar locations to the BCD at the joint air operations center (JAOC). The

tactical operational data message contains radar locations to prevent friendly fratricide of ADA radars. The

intent is to eventually incorporate radar locations in the theater airspace control plan.

MIX OF POSITIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONTROL

3-93. Mixing positive and procedural techniques optimizes control of the airspace and air defense

operations. For positive management, commanders consider the numbers and types of electronic means

available. This will vary according to the depth of the battlefield. As operations move farther forward,

available means for positive control decrease, necessitating additional procedural management.

3-94. Outside the forward area, air traffic generally moves in ways that are better suited for positive

control. Positive control is easier to effect in this area and is usually the preferred method.

3-95. Forward of the corps, the generally high volume of aircraft and friendly missiles can make positive

control extremely difficult. Flexible and varying missions can also necessitate more reliance on procedural

control.

INTEGRATED AMD OPERATIONS

3-96. AMD operations are integrated through weapons control procedures, coordination with adjacent

ADA units, coordination between service components, and through shared knowledge of the enemy and

friendly situation. Integrated AMD operations require battle management, C2, computers, and intelligence

provision and exchange of essential near real time information. This information includes air defense

warnings that allow commanders to implement the appropriate active and passive air defense measures.

3-97. Air defense sensors are normally optimized to perform specific surveillance or control functions. To

provide the spectrum of coverage required for air and missile defense operations, a number of

complementary systems are necessary. These systems range from a mix of static and mobile equipment to

strategic warning systems. Systems are netted to enable the gathering and dissemination of information to

all ADA forces under all operational conditions.

BATTLE MANAGEMENT

3-98. Battle management is essential in an air environment that has large quantities of both threat and

friendly airborne platforms. The related functions of airspace control and ADA Battle Command are

coordinated through the principle of air battle management, which maximizes both offensive and defensive

counterair (DCA) effectiveness.

3-99. Precise coordination is necessary to synchronize ADA forces. As a participant in air battle

management, the operations staff officer (S-3)/assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) at each level of

command ensures close coordination among all airspace users. Management of the air battle employs a mix

of positive and procedural control.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-100. AD Battle Command systems provide automated support to passive and active missile defense and

attack operations to provide timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of tactical warning,

targeting data, mission assignment, and post-strike assessments to the appropriate ADA element. AD Battle

Command systems facilitate rapid data dissemination of information among intelligence assets, fusion and

decision-making nodes, warning systems, and weapon systems. AD Battle Command capabilities support

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the principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, and coordinated efforts by units assigned

AMD tasks.

3-101. AMD Battle Command functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

facilities, databases, and procedures. AD Battle Command provides command authorities timely and

accurate data and systems to plan, monitor, direct, control, and report AMD operations. For defense against

BMs, short missile flight times require that all applicable air, land, sea, and space-based sensor and

surveillance assets be linked to provide a complete and current air picture.

3-102. AD Battle Command planning begins with the JFC estimate of the situation, objectives, and

overall concept of operations. Subordinate commanders plan the tasking of their forces and resources based

on the commander's guidance and priorities. To ensure complementary efforts and synergism all

components of the force continually update their plans for passive missile defense, active missile defense,

and attack operations.

3-103. Planning operations consider both joint and multinational relationships when addressing the need

for near real time response to the threat. The wide range of operations that may be appropriate, the diverse

nature of the ADA elements that complement each other, and the possible impact of AMD on other

missions and tasks are all considerations.

Active Defense

3-104. Active air defense is a direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness

of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense

weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons (JP 3-01).

3-105. Active missile defense requires early detection of missiles in flight to permit cueing, acquisition,

tracking, classification, identification, and destruction as soon as possible after launch. The AADC

exercises control of active air defense operations by integration of ADA systems and forces into the

Communications systems. Component commanders retain command of their active defense forces. They

conduct operations within their areas of operations per AADC-developed, JFC-approved ROE, DAL, and

airspace control measures to protect their forces and the JFC air and missile defense priorities.

Passive Defense

3-106. Passive Air Defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the

effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include

camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning

systems, and the use of protective construction (JP 3-01).

3-107. Passive defense improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of being detected and targeted

from the air and by mitigating the potential effects of air surveillance and attack. Passive missile defense

measures include detecting air and missile launches, predicting impact points, and providing threat

identification

(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive

(CBRNE) or

conventional) and disseminating early warning. It includes measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to

minimize the effect of damage caused by missile attack. Passive defense measures by all elements of the

joint force are essential to force protection.

Attack Operations

3-108. Attack operations require timely transmission of targeting data and accurate identification of threat

operating location and support systems. Designation of engagement areas, assignment of areas of

operations (AO) and coordination of AMD attack operations are prescribed by the JFC. The JFC will

normally task component commanders for conduct of attack operations against threats within their assigned

AOs. Subordinate commanders control attack resources and coordinate and conduct their operations

according to joint doctrine and procedures. The JFACC normally supports planning and conducting attack

operations against theater missiles that are outside the other component commanders' AOs. Coordination of

attack operations involves the detection, acquisition, classification, and identification of enemy TMs and

the dissemination of the targeting information to the designated attack system for execution.

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TACTICAL-LEVEL AMD CONSIDERATIONS

3-109. Tactical-level air and missile defense requires the integration of ADA units with other combined

arms elements. Tactical-level air and missile defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA, but maneuver,

fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements participate directly. Each participant has a specific role in

tactical air and missile defense plans and operations. These integrated roles are mutually supporting.

MANEUVER

3-110. Maneuver forces with an air defense capability increase the density and effectiveness of AD across

the battlefield. However, the optimum role for these forces is ground combat. The maneuver commander

carefully considers the benefits of combined arms air defense contributions versus the decrease in ground

combat effectiveness. Combined arms elements can provide vital self-protection from air threats and

contribute to their freedom to maneuver.

3-111. Maneuver elements’ capabilities to engage fixed-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAS are

limited or nonexistent, but combined arms members can effectively engage hovering or slow-moving

helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. The AMDCOORD recommends to the maneuver

commanders those areas where the use of other combat arms weapons in an air defense role can supplement

the ADA units’ capabilities.

FIRE SUPPORT

3-112. Fire support capabilities can also augment tactical-level AMD. Indirect fire weapons can deny

enemy helicopters the use of masked, standoff positions. Fire support systems can concentrate their fires on

enemy launch systems and sites, landed fixed and rotary wing aircraft, command and control (C2) nodes,

landing zones, pickup zones, assembly areas, and forward arming and refueling points (FARP).

AVIATION

3-113. Army aviation contributes to AMD activities through air to ground combat operations. Aviation

can conduct air to ground attacks against targets that cannot be effectively engaged by indirect fire systems.

Army aviation also participates in air assault operations against aerial and missile launch platforms.

3-114. Other attack operations conducted by Army aviation occur in response to specific air threats and

their launch platforms. Attack reconnaissance battalions and attack helicopter battalions can fill gaps in the

force's air defense when ADA units are redistributing assets and adjusting forces. Early warning provided

by screening or attack aviation assets is integrated into AMD early warning and vice versa.

3-115. Coordination between the aviation and ADA commanders is particularly important, as aviation

forces operate within the same airspace as ADA systems. Prevention of fratricide is a major element of

force protection. Identification of on-order air defense missions for aviation occurs during the formulation

of the commander's plan. The plan includes command relationships and detailed control measures for the

employment of aviation in an air defense role.

INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE

3-116. Intelligence and electronic warfare

(IEW) assets contribute to AMD operations. As part of

information superiority commanders may coordinate the use of IEW systems, including joint assets, against

OCA. AMD targets are similar to coordination for fire support and involve the G-3, assistant chief of staff,

intelligence (G-2), fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), and AMDCOORD. Intelligence and electronic

warfare (IEW) information superiority supports air defense operations through electronic attack and

electronic warfare support on air targets. Careful planning and execution of electronic warfare

complements surface-to-air fires. IEW can also provide for surveillance, identification, and classification of

hostile air targets aiding AMD greatly through early warning.

3-117. The AMDCOORD coordinates with the G-2 or intelligence staff officer (S-2) to ensure air and

missile defense intelligence information requirements are met during the planning phase. The focus of

tactical intelligence could include forward operating bases, FARP, missile and UAS capabilities, electronic

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warfare systems, logistics facilities, and command and control nodes. The interface between the

AMDCOORD and G-2 or S-2 is essential to gain a coordinated and accurate evaluation of enemy air and

missile capabilities.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PLANNING

PLANNING

3-118. Planning for attack operations begins with the IPB process. The IPB process includes surveillance

of likely TM launch areas and prediction of likely enemy TM activities. AMD planners must coordinate

with the S-2 for IPB development. Upon completing the initial analysis, the JFC issues guidance on the

concept and priorities for TM attack operations. Based upon the JFC staff and component commander

recommendations, the JFC assigns missions to the component commanders and provides guidance for

AMD attack operations. Component commanders then plan attack operations based on the assignment of

attack responsibilities, the JFC's concept, priorities, and allocation of attack operations resources.

3-119. TAMD attack operations require the integration and coordination of all joint force plans. The JFC

may task an organization within the joint staff to integrate component commanders' plans or may delegate

this responsibility to a subordinate commander. If established, the joint targeting coordination board may

be an integration center for this effort or serve as a JFC-level review mechanism. Because of the mobility

of TM systems, the time to acquire, target, and attack TM elements may be very short. Thus, an accelerated

execution cycle using the decide-detect-deliver-assess process is required. Based upon pre-established JFC

approved priorities and ROE, enemy TM targets are attacked by the most appropriate attack system as soon

as detected.

3-120. Operational-level counterair and AMD planning requires careful selection and prioritization of

AMD attack operations targets. Effective planning enables each level to "decide-detect-deliver-assess" and

accelerates the engagement of targets during combat. AMD attack operations plans consider the use of all

available assets including aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, UAS, SOF, and EA.

3-121. The Fires Cell (FC) is an Army organization frequently used at division, corps, and theater levels

that serves as the center for focusing and integrating the planning, coordination, synchronization, and

execution functions for deep operations. The FC works with the BCD and other coordination elements. The

FC plans and coordinates, as appropriate, the use of fires, combined arms maneuver, SOF, and AC2 in

support of Army deep strike operations.

3-122. The AAMDC has the necessary intelligence tools to provide focus to AMD attack operations for

the commander ARFOR (COMARFOR), JFLCC, and the JFACC. The AAMDC recommends attack

operations targets to the FC for prosecution. The AAMDC provides liaison teams to the FC, analysis and

control element

(ACE), joint and special operations task force

(JSOTF), BCD, and JAOC/AOC to

coordinate and assist AMD attack operations within the ARFOR and the joint force attack operations

structure. The AAMDC does not usurp the traditional mission of the FC, BCD, or AOC in coordinating

attack operations.

3-123. TAMD attack operations targets are generally located deep within enemy territory and well behind

lines of contact. These targets include the following:

Air and Missile Systems. These systems include rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft, BMs,

CMs, UAS controllers, and launcher vehicles that are on the ground. Acquisition radars, tracking

radars, and other air operation support systems are also targets.

Enemy Support Facilities. Facilities include airfields, launch sites; logistics support facilities,

technical support facilities, and weather/navigational aids.

Command and Control Facilities. These facilities are used to maintain centralized control of

air and missile assets. Targeting these facilities supports information warfare by interfering with

the enemy's decision-making cycle and disrupting their ability to synchronize operations.

Electronic Attack (EA) Systems. EA targets include land-based jamming systems and their

control elements. Attacking these systems supports information warfare operations.

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Air Defense Systems. These systems include surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and radars.

Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) is an integral part of all friendly air operations.

3-124. Joint operations planning is performed according to policies and procedures established in the joint

operations plan. Joint AMD operations planning activities are conducted at the national, theater, and

supporting command levels. (Additional information on AMD planning is found in this manual, Appendix

C.)

OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR

3-125. Offensive counterair operations are conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. OCA seeks to

dominate the adversary’s airspace and prevent the launch of air and missile threats. OCA consists of

offensive measures to destroy, disrupt or neutralize adversary aircraft, missiles, launch platforms and their

supporting structures and systems. Ideally, joint OCA missions will prevent the launch of aircraft and

missiles by destroying or neutralizing them prior to launch. Those weapons that are launched will be

destroyed or neutralized as close to their source as possible. OCA and defensive counterair operations need

to be synchronized and integrated to achieve unity of effort for theater- and/or joint operations area-wide

counterair.

DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR

3-126. The goal of DCA operations is to provide a secure area from which joint forces can operate.

Defensive counterair is inherently joint. Joint theater missile defense operations are an integral part of CA

and operations against tactical aircraft and missile threats are thoroughly integrated with AMD operations.

Joint forces are integrated toward the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the adversary’s

offensive air and missile capability. A distributed, collaborative Battle Command environment will ensure

that the integrated air and missile defense system is integrated into the joint force commander's (JFC’s)

overall concept of operations and campaign objectives. Efficient battle management, communications and

ISR processes and systems ensure unity of effort and a synchronized joint force capability.

3-127. In addition to passive and active defense, the joint theater missile defense incorporates planning

and Battle Command actions to facilitate OCA attack operations. Preemptive destruction of aircraft and

missiles is more efficient and effective than engaging them in flight.

PLANNING PROCESSES FOR AAMDC, ADA BRIGADE, AND

BATTALION

3-128. AMD planning involves joint, multinational, and Army units including joint forces, service or

functional component commands, AAMDC, ADA brigades and battalions. At each level of command,

planning begins with the receipt of a mission from higher headquarters and culminates in the issuance of an

operations plan, which provides planning direction to subordinate commands. The designation “plan” is

usually used instead of “order” in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put

into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, it then becomes the operation order.

3-129. AMD planning is performed concurrently at all echelons, a process known as “parallel planning.”

The planning process is performed at each echelon as well as the planning products exchanged between

echelons. This planning is summarized in the paragraphs below.

AAMDC PLANNING

3-130. The AAMDC has overall responsibility for planning Army AMD operations in support of the Joint

Force Commander. As the AAMDC planners review the assigned mission, critical assets to be protected,

the enemy situation, and the composition and disposition of ADA resources available to protect critical

assets against the known threat. This is based on the IPB process. Then a top-level defense lay down is

conducted to estimate if available ADA resources can adequately protect critical assets. If levels of

protection cannot be achieved, additional resources are requested from the service or functional component

commander (or the commander is advised of the risk to forces or assets).

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3-131. The AAMDC task organizes the subordinate ADA brigade(s) and assigns missions to the

brigade(s). If the AAMDC is not present in theater, the responsibility for this planning falls to an EAC

ADA brigade. To ensure the overall Army ADA effort within the theater is coordinated and synchronized,

the AAMDC coordinates planning with the corps and corps ADA brigades.

ADA BRIGADE PLANNING

3-132. The ADA brigade commander and staff review the operation order (OPORD) received from higher

headquarters, including the mission, situation, concept of operation, tasks, air defense priorities and other

information. The ADA brigade commander and staff then produce an operations plan that describes how

tactical operations in the brigade AO will be carried out. This plan includes the restated mission, tasks to be

performed, resources to be allocated, assets to be protected, number of fire units needed to protect assets,

and coordination and control measures to be followed.

3-133. The number of fire units needed to defend an asset can be determined by referencing the DAL and

the levels of engagement effectiveness prescribed by the JFC. Critical assets are posted to a

database/overlay and provided to subordinate battalions along with the OPORD.

ADA BATTALION PLANNING

3-134. The focus of ADA battalion planning is to produce a detailed defense design that protects forces

and critical assets with required levels of protection. The battalion planning process conducted on the

tactical control station (TCS) is part of military decision-making process (MDMP). The defense design is

accomplished using automated planning capabilities resident in the TCS. The TCS provides the battalion

commander and staff with organized workspace to support defense planning with automated decision aids,

real-time situation awareness, and initialization of the battalions’ weapon systems.

3-135. EAC and maneuver ADA battalion planners require specific information inputs to accomplish the

planning function(s). These inputs are listed on the left side of Figure 3-4. As each step is completed,

specific planning products are produced. These products, or outputs, are listed on the right side of Figure 3-

4. The steps are performed in sequence to produce an accomplished mission with a defense design plan that

adequately protects forces and assets.

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Figure 3-4. MDMP process

3-136. Planning begins with the receipt of a new mission from the ADA brigade S3 or the division

depending on the type of battalion. The corps ADA elements and the assistant division air defense officer

both notify their battalions of new missions. Parallel planning begins at this time. They begin their

estimates and annexes to the corps and division OPORDs.

3-137. The ADA battalion commander depends heavily on the corps or division representative for

accurate and timely information during the initial stages of planning. If the situation permits, the maneuver

ADA battalion commander may need to move to the supported unit’s planning cell to best influence the

planning cycle during the deliberate decision making process.

MULTINATIONAL AMD OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

3-138. Army AMD operations are also conducted within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other

international arrangement. Within this context, the JFC is subordinate to the multi-national force

commander. In either event, the JFC considers those areas peculiar to multinational operations that may

influence the ability to achieve multinational unity of effort.

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3-139. Leaders of the alliance or coalition approve command relationships among the elements of the

alliance or coalition. Special AMD considerations and areas of emphasis are needed to ensure unity of

effort with non-U.S. forces. There are varying national interests that require AMD protection. Differences

in doctrine, training, equipment, and organization are identified and considered when determining alliance

interoperability requirements. The multinational combatant commander is responsible to both national and

allied or coalition leaders.

SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

3-140. When national forces of the multinational force are not capable of defending against enemy air or

missile capabilities, provisions are made to ensure that ADA assets are provided within JFC-established

priorities. This may entail introducing ADA assets from another theater. For this reason, ADA units and

support organizations train, orient, and exercise to operate in the total spectrum of potential operational

environments. As in joint operations, multinational combatant commanders may choose to organize on an

area or functional basis, or a combination of the two.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

3-141. Multinational consensus on the threat, a clearly defined chain of command, and a responsive,

interoperable Battle Command structure are crucial to successful multinational AMD operations. National

forces, civilian populations, and selected geopolitical assets are protected from the effects of the threat. A

multinational commander may also consider assisting host nation or civil authorities in establishing passive

defense measures for the civilian population and host nation assets consistent with the overall mission.

3-142. Threats to the total multinational force, to include rear areas, are considered. Consensus on the

threat facilitates the integration of national and alliance or coalition intelligence collection efforts,

allocation of collection resources, and threat evaluation.

3-143. National forces are assigned AMD missions that produce, in concert with other forces, more

significant effects than if employed alone. Tasks to national forces are assigned commensurate with their

capabilities.

3-144. Multinational commanders plan and disseminate warning and attack predictions to civil

authorities. They establish simple, effective warning dissemination systems.

3-145. Multinational exercises with full participation of communications systems and intelligence assets

are vital to establishing and refining sound procedures. Exercises provide an environment for the

simultaneous practice of multi-echelon procedures. Exercises are helpful in adapting a unit to a new

environment subsequent to deployment from one geographic area to another. Exercises may also provide a

deterrent effect.

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Offensive and Defensive Operations

This chapter describes Army air defense participation in offensive and defensive

operations. Offensive operations aim is to defeat the enemy decisively by using

overwhelming, aggressive force. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy

back time, economize forces, and/or develop conditions favorable for offensive

operations. Air defense elements protect friendly forces and geopolitical assets and

accomplish other missions assigned by the JFC. At the Strategic level of war ADA

forces protect high visibility JIIM and national assets, as a layer within the ballistic

missile defense system (BMDS) and supports homeland defense operations. At the

Operational level of war, ADA forces protect the theater assets based on the JFCs

critical asset list (CAL) like, seaports of embarkation, air ports of embarkation, cities,

logistic centers, religious centers, and lines of communications (LOC). At the tactical

level of war, Army ADA forces support the Land Component Commanders

(LCC)/ARFOR scheme of maneuver while protecting theater, Corps, division, and

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) forces according to the JFCs defended asset list

(DAL) priorities.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE OFFENSE

4-1. AMD is a key enabler to the force during offensive combat operations. AMD tasks in support of

offensive operations includes the following:

Providing air and missile defense to maneuver forces.

Protecting Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP), bridgeheads, supply trains, lines of

communications (LOC), and C2 nodes from aerial attack.

Developing targeting information in support of attack and passive defense operations.

Determining and reporting BM launch points and impact point predictions.

Gaining and maintaining information superiority.

Supporting the JFACCs theater counterair effort.

Provides force protection during attack operations.

ADA BATTALION IN THE OFFENSE

4-2. The ADA Battalion plan includes contingencies for continuing the attack, suppressing possible

enemy counterattacks, and protection of forces and critical assets from air attack. Commanders plan

defenses using ADA guidelines that include defense-in-depth as an essential element. Defense-in-depth is

the placement of mutually supporting defense positions designed to absorb and progressively weaken

enemy attack, prevent enemy observations of the friendly positions and permits the ARFOR commander to

maneuver reserve forces. From an AMD perspective, defense-in-depth involves employing ADA forces in

a manner that provides multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path or trajectory of a

hostile aircraft or missile.

4-3. ADA(A) battalions and batteries are the LCC primary tools in the counter-ISR fight. The LCC will

frequently use them to support the covering force. The tactical situation, LCC concept of operations,

defense priorities, and the units’ capabilities will determine SHORAD employment.

4-4. ADA units, with SHORAD capabilities, assigned for protection of friendly forces during offensive

operations will move so they are in positions to best protect the force. Consideration is given to weighting

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the main effort with additional SHORAD assets oriented on likely avenues of approach. The ADA

commander's plan supports the maneuver commander's scheme. If necessary, ADA(A) battalion

commanders can request assistance from ADA(P) battalion commanders to reinforce the air defense

coverage. This allows for massing of forces at the critical time and place to promote effective engagements.

COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE

4-5. During offensive operations, enemy forces may attempt to use maneuver and fire support assets to

regain the initiative. Enemy air activity includes ISR operations in support of artillery and maneuver. UAS

are best suited for these types of operations, especially if enemy forces have developed effective C2 and

ISR. The enemy may use helicopters as a secondary weapon system, or dedicated attack assets, or armed

utility helicopters. Helicopter assets can be used in attack, air insertion, or reconnaissance. Helicopters in

the reconnaissance role will operate in the same manner as UAS to support friendly artillery targeting and

maneuver. In the attack, friendly forces can expect spoiling attacks that usually consist of at least two

helicopters or more (taking full advantage of cover and concealment) with the mission of disrupting

friendly operations.

4-6. The enemy can use helicopters in conjunction with armored forces to attempt to deter friendly

penetrations by the U.S. forces. The enemy will use ground forces first to neutralize friendly air defense

assets whenever possible. Helicopters can be used as a primary aerial platform against U.S. maneuver

forces.

4−7. Enemy aircraft may be limited in the face of friendly air superiority. However, the use of enemy

aircraft cannot be entirely ruled out. If used by the enemy, the ground commander can expect to see aircraft

in support of a coordinated enemy ground operation.

4−8. Non-ADA combatants are capable of firing in self-defense at enemy attack or surveillance aircraft.

Small arms and crew-served weapons should fire against rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, UAS, and CMs

thus providing a significant terminal defense. Individual and crew-served weapons can mass fires against

enemy air threats. The massed use of guns in local air defense causes enemy aircraft to increase standoff

ranges for surveillance and weapons delivery and increase altitude in transiting to and from friendly targets.

These actions make enemy aircraft more vulnerable to air defense systems. Combined arms for air defense

training and tactical SOPs enable friendly forces to effectively prepare for self-defense against air attack.

THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ATTACK OPERATIONS

4-9. Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) attack operations are operations taken to destroy, disrupt,

or neutralize TM launch, aerial platforms, air threats, and supporting structures and systems. The objective

of attack operations is to prevent the launch of TMs by attacking each element of the overall system,

including such actions as destroying launch platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks and infrastructure. The

preferred method of countering enemy TM and air operations is to attack and destroy or disrupt BMs prior

to launch or flight.

4-10. Attack operations can be preemptive or reactive. Sustained effort is required to reduce the enemy's

TM and air capability and involves the execution of mutually supporting tasks. The detection, acquisition,

classification, identification, tracking, and attack tasks are highly dependent on a near real time

communications system, C2, and ISR process and rapid targeting capability. Attack operations use all-

source intelligence, missile-warning systems, and air defense radars to locate and target enemy TM, and air

systems, components, and supporting systems.

4-11. Attack operations are also dependent upon predictive and developed useful intelligence. Because it is

difficult to detect mobile launch systems, a communications system, C2, and ISR capability must exist to

support near real time targeting and attack operations. National sensor systems will normally augment

theater air- and ground-based systems to provide warning, impact prediction, and launch point

determination. Additionally, intelligence products collected by national sensor systems can assist theater

forces to anticipate TM operations and to determine enemy TM unit locations. SOF involvement may be

through attack of TM targets by direct action operations or through conduct of special reconnaissance.

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Offensive and Defensive Operations

ARMY ADA IN ATTACK OPERATIONS

4-12. The primary role of Army ADA in attack operations is identifying, planning, and coordinating enemy

targets. Army ADA systems provide estimated TBM launch points, which are used to locate potential

targets.

4-13. Execution, however, is outside the domain of Army air defense. Execution of air and ground AMD

attack operations is centrally planned, executed in a decentralized manner, and governed by applicable

policies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Execution of TAMD attack operations relies on

sensor systems, responsive near real time sensor management and communications networks, and long-

range attack weapon systems. Weapon systems used for attack operations include JIIM, Naval, Air, and

Land forces including fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft, CMs, and fire support systems. Special

operations forces (SOF) are also used to carry out attack operations. At execution levels, well-defined

intelligence and operations interfaces provide rapid targeting and engagement of mobile TM launchers and

support assets.

SYSTEMS AND FORCES AVAILABLE

4-14. The manner in which the offensive battle is prosecuted depends on the forces and systems available

and their general capabilities. Various forces and systems are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Aircraft

4-15. Aircraft conduct close and deep attack-strike operations against targets on the ground, in the air or

on/in the sea. They also conduct fighter sweeps and air escort missions to destroy enemy aircraft in flight.

Aircraft equipped for antisubmarine operations, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, and surveillance,

warning, and control activities also support offensive operations.

Surface Firepower

4-16. Cannon, Rockets, Artillery, Mortars, land, air, and naval gunfire may be employed against enemy

targets. Land-attack cruise missiles

(LACM) may be effective against stationary soft targets such as

unsheltered aircraft or command and control facilities. Surface-to-surface guided missiles, such as the

Army tactical missile system, CMs, and unguided rockets such as multiple launch rocket systems, may also

be used.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

4-17. Unmanned aircraft systems may be used for attack, surveillance, deception, jamming, decoy, or

harassment operations. They can be used against targets or in support of other forces conducting offensive

operations.

Special Operations Forces

4-18. Special operations forces (SOF) normally conduct direct action strikes and collect intelligence. They

can also provide terminal guidance (laser designation) for air attacks against transporter-erector-launchers

(TEL), airfields, operating bases, and other facilities that support enemy air operations.

Maneuver Forces

4-19. Though the majority of offensive operations require the use of air and fire support assets, maneuver

forces can also contribute. Mechanized or armored units, airborne and air-assault infantry, U.S. Marine

amphibious forces, and attack aviation assets can all be used to attack airfields, forward operating bases,

and other targets.

4-20. Defense applies to offensive operations and is initiated to protect maneuver forces against air and

missile attack by destroying airborne launch platforms, and missile threats in flight. Defense during

offensive operations includes a multilayered defense-in-depth via multiple engagements using air, land, and

sea assets. It also includes electronic warfare to disrupt remote or onboard guidance systems.

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Chapter 4

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4-21. Air and missile defense operations provide a secure area from which all elements of the joint force

can operate. To accomplish this, defensive counterair operations protect friendly land and naval forces,

bases, lines of communications, and other assets while denying the enemy the freedom to carry out

offensive air operations.

4-22. Route and point security missions require SHORAD capable units to locate along the main supply

route (MSR) and in positions to protect fixed locations. The AD commander allocates defense assets to

protect these locations in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.

4-23. ADA units in forward areas engage enemy aircraft providing CAS or attempting low-level

penetration of friendly air defenses en-route to a target in the rear area. Air Defense assets protecting

combat forces in forward battle positions and strong points are more exposed to destruction by enemy

direct and indirect systems than air defense systems located at rear areas.

4-24. In defensive operations, commanders position air defense forces to protect critical assets that include

reserve or striking forces, whether stationary or moving. Stinger-based systems protecting the reserve and

the striking force are as mobile and survivable as the forces they are protecting. The commander

continually coordinates defense activities with air and artillery operations to avoid fratricide. Air defense

units and support assets may move in support of the defensive effort. If the enemy can disrupt this support

from the air, it will affect the defense. Correct assessment of enemy air corridors and tactics is essential to

guarantee protection and management of these resources.

4-25. The destruction of key bridges, or the closing of choke points, interrupts the LCCs freedom of

movement. The force must protect these positions to sustain the defense and allow the conduct of

counterattacks. The commander coordinates air defense artillery forces to protect vital locations.

ACTIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

4-26. Active air defense operations are supported by dedicated, secure, and highly responsive

communications in order to detect, classify, identify, track, engage, intercept, and destroy hostile or

potentially hostile airborne targets. Integrated employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air systems through

coordinated detection, classification, identification, assessment, and engagement is necessary. Airspace

control in an active air defense environment is crucial to successful friendly air operations and effective air

and missile defense.

4-27. The commander’s priorities for air defense protection in the defense begin with command and

control facilities. Command and control facilities include command posts and tactical operations centers.

They are susceptible to targeting and attack because of their visual and electronic signatures. Air defense

coordinators examine air avenues of approach toward command and control facilities and position AD

weapons to prevent enemy aircraft from reaching their targets.

4-28. Positive control and procedural measures will be implemented to ensure that friendly aircraft can

safely transit the airspace without inhibiting air and missile defense or other friendly operations. Regardless

of other controls and measures imposed within defended airspace, all air defense artillery forces must

readily identify all aircraft in the area by electronic, visual, or procedural means.

EXECUTION OF ACTIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

4-29. Execution of active air defense operations requires surveillance and reporting systems capable of

near real time production and dissemination of tracking data. Detected tracks are classified and/or

identified. Classification is an automated process that puts targets in specific categories (for example, cruise

missile versus manned aircraft). Identification is a process that assigns the target a friend or foe status.

Classification and identification information along with target location is transmitted via broadcast

networks. Detailed and timely track data allows C2 nodes to evaluate the track, determine the significance

of the threat, and either designate air defense artillery systems for engagement or advise units of the

passage of friendly aircraft.

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Offensive and Defensive Operations

Employment of Active Defense Systems

4-30. Effective active air defense requires a mix of weapon types and systems. This balance is required

between aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and guns.

4-31. Surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile

(SLAMRAAM)/Avenger units are

employed to protect forces and critical assets as required. Terminal high altitude area defense

(THAAD)/Patriot units are deployed individually or as part of an ADA task force to protect early entry

forces (opposed/unopposed), airfields, seaports, transportation centers, population centers, theater-level C2

nodes/facilities and geopolitical assets.

4-32. ADA units help to secure the lodgment in entry operations. As the theater develops and entering

forces expand into forward positions, ADA units like Patriot support shaping and decisive operations.

Some Patriot units move with maneuver forces to provide protection for these forces. Other Patriot units

remain at theater and provide air and missile defense of critical assets in the theater rear.

4-33. ADA units protect the maneuver forces and critical assets from fixed and rotary-wing aircraft attacks,

CM attacks, and observation by ISR platforms. This protection provides maneuver force commanders the

ability to conduct aggressive, as well as sustained defensive operations. The emphasis at the

division/brigade level is to destroy enemy aerial threats and ISR platforms.

4-34. Based on the tactical situation, the ADA brigade/battalion commander may task organize to satisfy

air defense priorities. The division commander requires corps support for low-to-high-altitude air defense

and any reinforcing ADA weapons needed for mission accomplishment. The BCT commanders should use

the BCT ADAM cells to ensure AMD capabilities are available based on METT-TC.

PASSIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

4-35. Passive defense consists of all measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the

effectiveness of enemy air and missile threats attacking friendly forces and assets. Passive defense

measures include camouflage and concealment, dispersion, emission control (EMCON), and operations

security (OPSEC).

4-36. To increase survivability, the Battle Command authority directs the ADA fire units to activate or

deactivate radar search modes and IFF based on the battalion emission control

(EMCON) plan.

Communications systems receive an integrated network air picture and transmit it to all ADA fire units,

permitting them to remain in EMCON silent, and passive search mode until a potential target is detected.

Passive defense measures are employed by ADA units to assist in the survivability of the unit and

accomplishment of the tactical mission.

THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

4-37. Due to the political and military aspects of the enemy, TAMD objectives are often strategic in nature.

These include deployment for stability/support operations and defense of geopolitical assets. Defense of

early entry forces and lodgments can also be strategic objectives since U.S. forces are extremely vulnerable

during these stages and U.S. political support for operations must be kept at the highest levels possible.

4-38. The types of passive measures implemented are determined based on the enemy’s capabilities and

probable means of delivery. Exposure, vulnerability to discovery, location, mobility, surrounding terrain

and ability to avoid detection are considered when implementing passive defense measures.

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Chapter 4

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY FORCE PROTECTION IN THE DEFENSE

4-39. Air defense artillery provides vertical dimension protection to the joint force. Army AD protects

friendly land forces, bases, lines of communications, and other assets while denying the enemy the freedom

to carry out offensive air operations.

DECISIVE OPERATIONS IN AMD

4-40. A decisive operation, in an AMD context, defeats the enemy air and missile attack. In a mobile

AMD, the counterattack defended by the fast moving AD systems is decisive in the protection of the force.

4-41. In an area defense, ground commanders closely integrate patrols, intelligence units, and reserve

forces to cover the gaps among defensive positions. ADA units can best support by providing protection for

logistics support areas and routes. In retrograde operations, some ADA units conduct mobile area defenses

or provide static AMD protection as other units execute carefully controlled maneuvers or movement

rearward.

4-42. Defeating the enemy air attack within engagement areas is a decisive operation. Throughout the

execution of mobile and area defenses, commanders designate a main effort and synchronize fires to

support it. If necessary, they shift their coverage to concentrate ADA fires against the air threat.

SHAPING OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

4-43. Shaping operations are executed simultaneously throughout the AO to support the conduct of the

defender’s decisive operation by upsetting the attacker’s design. Friendly forces selectively suppress or

neutralize the enemy’s air attack capability and disrupt synchronization. Information operations (IO) shape

the enemy’s perceptions and can influence enemy air avenues of approach, attack profiles, possible landing

zone/drop zones, and weapons engagement ranges to ensure all participants understand the enemy air

capabilities. The information helps to shape future AMD operations. Fires contribute to shaping operations

and create conditions for successful defensive operations.

SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE

4-44. Air defense artillery provides the security for sustainment operations in the defense. A primary

concern for commanders is organizing forces within the terrain to protect sustainment operations and retain

freedom of action. Commanders group ADA forces into bases and base clusters for protection and security.

Base and base clusters organize for self-defense. Commanders designate response forces and tactical

combat forces to augment base cluster self-defense capabilities.

4-45. In the forward areas of the battlefield, the maneuver commander should submit their high value

assets for inclusion to the CAL. ADA units may protect these high value assets such as MSRs, combat/field

trains, refueling, and rearming points. In the rear areas of the battlefield, ADA forces concentrate on POL,

ammunition, and maintenance facilities/areas. Sustaining the battle for ADA includes missile re-supply

along with maintenance and other supplies needed by ADA units.

JOINT COUNTERAIR

4-46. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive and

defensive operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat Figure 4-1. These operations

may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to-surface missiles, special

operations forces (SOF), and elements of information operations to counter the threat. Joint forces must be

integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations to destroy,

neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats, both before and after launch.

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FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Chapter 4

Figure 4-2. Defensive counterair

operations

Offensive

Counterair

Operations

4-49.

Offensive Counterair (OCA)

is offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize

enemy aircraft,

missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting

structures and

systems as close to their source as possible

(JP 3-01).

4-50.

This enables friendly use of

otherwise contested airspace, enhances freedom of action, and reduces

the enemy’s air and missile threat to friendly forces. The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of

aircraft and missiles

by destroying

them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior

to employment.

These

operations range throughout

enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly

forces. OCA consists of attack operations, fighter sweep, escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, and

electronic warfare (EW).

ACTIONS BEFORECONTACT

4-51.

Prior to contact, adversaries

will attempt

to locate our

forces using

ISR UAS, electronic support

measures-equipped

aircraft and SOF; conduct

air ambushes; attack with

long-range rockets, artillery,

mortars, and rotary-wing aircraft;

and otherwise

attempt to disrupt friendly force operational tempo. ADA

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25 November 2009

Offensive and Defensive Operations

forces counter by providing tailored SA and focused EW of air and missile attack to at-risk forces. ADA

forces also counter by conducting surveillance, engagements, and conducting counter-ISR operations.

4-52. ADA forces employ passive and active countermeasures against UAS. Passive UAS countermeasures

include employing camouflage, concealment and deception techniques. However, employing passive

countermeasures hinders the forces freedom to maneuver. The most effective active countermeasure to

UAS or other aerial ISR platforms is their destruction in flight by ADA interceptors. Active UAS

countermeasures include locating and destroying the UAS prior to launch; destroying the ground control

station and/or disrupting/jamming the data link controlling the UAS.

ACTIONS DURING CONTACT

4-53. Once friendly forces come in contact with the enemy, the enemy may employ adaptive tactics in

addition to the ones already established in the tactical environment. Maneuver forces initiate decisive

contact at the chosen time and place, continue to develop the situation in and out of contact, and integrate

maneuver and fires at standoff ranges.

4-54. ADA sensors provide information to C2 nodes to disseminate the continuous tailored air situational

awareness and understanding required to prosecute and sustain the engagement, and provides focused early

warning to forces at risk. Multiple sensors are needed to maintain coverage for the attacking maneuver

elements. ADA sensors are not capable of providing coverage while moving.

4-55. ADA shooters engage threats at optimum times and places within the third dimension of the joint

operational environment to maximize probability of kills and minimize collateral damage from debris or

fallout. By detecting and destroying UAS and other aerial threats, ADA provides full dimensional

protection and continuous tailored situational understanding for the maneuver forces to ensure it can

conduct a tactical assault and finish decisively without hindrance from enemy aerial threats.

4-56. ADA prohibits the enemy from influencing the objective area from the third dimension, or the

vertical portion of the battlefield. ADA provides continuous tailored situational awareness/understanding to

all supported units.

See First

4-57. ADA forces disseminate sensor data to provide tailored air and missile threat SA and focused EW to

at-risk forces, deploy sensors to perform surveillance, and conduct counter ISR operations to deny the

enemy aerial ISR options.

4-58. ADA sensors conduct surveillance to fill the gaps at critical locations within the operational

environment thereby contributing to vertical and horizontal integration of surveillance information. ADA

sensors detect air and missile attacks and transmit early warning information to C2 nodes. C2 nodes then

fuse the data and disseminate focused EW (and “all clear”) to at-risk forces.

4-59. In addition to providing tailored situational awareness and focused early warning information, ADA

sensors and operational nodes play a key role in preventing adversaries from collecting ISR information on

friendly forces. ADA sensor elements detect aerial ISR platforms at long ranges and enable ADA weapons

to engage and destroy these platforms before they can collect and disseminate information.

Understand First

4-60. ADA assists JIIM forces to aggressively shape the operational environment and set conditions for the

fight by providing air situational awareness and understanding. ADA integrates into a netted

communications system architecture to provide SA/SU information, and fuses sensor data to create a

common operational picture to support force-wide understanding of the operational environment and

positive airspace control. ADA supports aerial combat identification thereby enabling differentiation

between hostile and friendly aircraft.

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4-9

Chapter 5

Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations

This chapter describes the participation of ADA forces in stability operations and

civil support operations. Stability operations are conducted outside the U.S. and its

territories to promote and protect U.S. national interests. Civil support operations are

conducted to address the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents,

and incidents within the U.S. and its territories. This chapter describes ADA

participation in support of Homeland Security, Homeland Air Security, and counter-

drug operations. ADA units may be tasked to provide soldiers and ADA equipment

for civil support operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

5-1. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the

United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and

secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and

humanitarian relief. Stability operations are normally conducted in noncontiguous AOs and are often time

and manpower intensive. Commanders must analyze each defended asset and adapt to the operational

framework, factors of METT-TC, and elements of operational design to fit the situation. However,

determining the military actions necessary to achieve the desired political end state can be more

challenging than offensive and defensive operations.

5-2. Army forces are trained, equipped, and organized to control/occupy land, populations, and situations

for extended periods. ADA forces provide the combatant commanders air and missile defense for

protection of JIIM forces allowing flexible options to maneuver commanders to meet theater operational

requirements.

5-3. Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing enemy actions,

political ambitions, and information dimensions of the operational environment. They include

developmental, cooperative activities during peacetime and coercive actions in response to crisis. ADA

forces accomplish stability goals through air defense operations in JIIM operations. The air defense

activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term, as demonstrated in

Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm. The purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability.

5-4. Commanders constantly assess the situation in terms of the application and inter-relation of the

factors of METT-TC. The enemy is more diverse now than ever before, it has taken on new stressing

characteristics and may be encountered in virtually every part of the world. Missions may change as the

situation becomes less or more stable. A mission can be as simple as the presence of TMD systems to

accomplish a peace enforcement mission.

5-5. Adversaries may disrupt peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and threaten the stability of a country

through acts of aggression, terrorism, or drug trafficking. ADA forces may deploy to: deter aggression;

protect critical assets; provide focused early warning; integrate with space based surveillance, joint sensors,

and host nation and/or interagency communications system; conduct positive airspace control; employ

sensors to detect and track aerial threats to alert host nation authorities; and to support stability operations

in crises or before, during, and after the initiation of hostilities.

5-6. Stability operations include employment of ADA units for defense of populations, forces, and

geopolitical assets. During stability operations ADA units are contributors of purely defensive capabilities.

Even though combat forces may not be present, the threat may dictate a long term ADA presence overseas.

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Chapter 6

SECURITY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

5-7. Security assistance operation programs support U.S. national policies and objectives by providing

defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan,

credit, or cash sales. Examples of U.S. security assistance programs are foreign military sales, foreign

military financing, and international military education and training, the economic support fund, arms

export control act-licensed commercial sales. ADA forces provide support in security assistance efforts

through training, education, and related activities such as humanitarian operations and general support of

multinational ADA forces.

5-8. ADA forces will participate in multinational exercises and operations to improve multinational

interoperability and understanding.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

5-9. Humanitarian assistance operations provide emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made

disasters when initiated in response to domestic, foreign government, or international agency requests for

immediate help and rehabilitation. Disaster relief operations include operations such as refugee assistance,

food distribution, medical treatment and care, restoration of law and order, damage and capability

assessment, and damage control (to include environmental cleanup or other programs such as firefighting).

The Army can provide logistics support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims,

establish emergency communications, conduct direct medical support operations, and render emergency

repairs to vital facilities. The Army also can provide manpower for civil relief or assist civil authorities

with public safety. ADA units may be tasked to participate in this type of operation; however, they are not

particularly equipped to perform these tasks due to specialization of authorized equipment. Some examples

of an ADA unit providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief were the firefighting teams provided

by ADA battalions during the wilderness preserve fires and the use of ADA transportation assets during

Hurricane Andrew disaster relief.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

5-10. Noncombatant evacuation operations

(NEO) relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from

locations in a foreign country to regions of safety. These operations may involve U.S. citizens abroad

whose lives are in danger. It could also include selected host nation citizens, third country nationals, or

members of non-government organizations who may be conducting operations in the area. NEO normally

occurs in a peaceful, orderly fashion but may require forcible means.

5-11. ADA forces will support NEO by providing AMD protection of collection points, evacuation routes,

and embarkation ports. ADA forces also may be tasked to perform ground transportation of noncombatants

using organic vehicles.

COMBATING TERRORISM

5-12. Combating terrorism has two major sub-components: antiterrorism and counter-terrorism. During

peacetime, the Army combats terrorism primarily through antiterrorism actions including passive defensive

measures taken to minimize vulnerability to terrorism. Anti-terrorism is a form of force protection, and

thus, the responsibility of Army commanders at all levels. Antiterrorism complements counter-terrorism,

which is the full range of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Army

elements, such as special operations forces, assist in this interagency effort by applying specialized

capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents abroad. Counter-terrorism occurs in

conflict and war; antiterrorism occurs across the continuum.

5-13. ADA units may face a terrorist threat during stability operations and must be prepared to implement

antiterrorism measures. In addition, if terrorists or other hostile regional powers possess the means to

conduct terrorist activities using aircraft, missiles, rockets, or mortars ADA units may be deployed to

protect U.S. or host nation forces and facilities.

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FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Army ADA and Information Superiority

SHOW OF FORCE

5-14. The U.S. conducts shows of force for three reasons: to bolster and reassure allies, deter potential

aggressors, and gain or increase influence within a theater. These shows of force are designated as flexible

deterrent options. Shows of force are designed to demonstrate a credible and specific threat to an aggressor

or potential aggressor. The presence of powerful and capable ADA forces signals potential aggressors that

we are prepared to defend U.S. interests. For extended show of force operations, ADA force commanders

may establish deployment rotation options in contingency plans.

PEACE OPERATIONS

5-15. Peace operations is a broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response

and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to

contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and

facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace

enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts

(JP

3-07.3). Army forces

conduct the following types of peace operations:

Peacekeeping.

Peace building.

Peacemaking.

Peace enforcement.

Conflict prevention.

5-16. Army ADA forces serve as deterrent elements in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

ADA systems are visible symbols of U.S. resolve to maintain peace during crises, before hostilities begin,

or after conflict is terminated. ADA capabilities are interoperable with Army, joint, and multinational

forces. To conduct peace operations, ADA forces will provide protection, situational awareness and

understanding, and early warning. They will also provide positive airspace control, when the situation

requires, in collaboration with host nation capabilities.

5-17. U.S. military forces will establish secure points or zones throughout noncontiguous areas of

operations. Within these areas, ADA forces will provide air and missile protection for U.S. and indigenous

forces, facilities, and geopolitical centers. ADA forces will also provide air and missile protection for

airbases and USAF aerospace expeditionary forces operating from those air bases.

5-18. ADA forces possess inherent situational awareness and airspace control capabilities. This data will

be disseminated via netted and distributed communication system architectures to provide situational

awareness and understanding. This enables commanders and staffs to execute current operations and plan

for future operations. These capabilities are realized primarily through sensor systems and communications

systems. Integrated with space-based surveillance, joint, host nation, and/or interagency sensors and

communication systems, ADA forces are postured to conduct positive control in support of aerial

operations. ADA sensor and communication system elements provide SIAP, which is a real-time

visualization of the airspace. With this visualization comes a commensurate understanding of the aerial

operational environment. Near-real and real-time control and integration of planned military and civilian

aerial activities will be required to synchronize operations. Collectively, these capabilities support

confidence-building measures that facilitate stability and sustain peace. ADA sensors can also provide

focused early warning.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

5-19. Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.

They stabilize conflict between two or more nations, and as such, require the consent of all parties involved

in the dispute.

5-20. ADA forces can play major roles in peacekeeping operations. ADA units can be used to deter the

threat from using missiles, aircraft, and UAS. ADA units provide key support to these operations in view of

the proliferation of offensive missiles. Support to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

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5-3

Chapter 6

Republic of Korea are prime examples of AMD peacekeeping support. ADA units deployed to Southwest

Asia after Desert Storm is another example of peacekeeping operations. Special rules of engagement apply

to this type of operation and are usually very restrictive.

5-21. ADA provides capabilities that are critical for other types of peacekeeping operations as well. ADA

units are integrated into the joint counterair campaign to enforce no-fly zones and safe havens established

by the United Nations. ADA units assist in the identification of aircraft operating in the no-fly zone or safe

haven.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

5-22. Peace enforcement operations are military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to maintain

peace between hostile factions. Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile

factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement, therefore, cannot

maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared at all times to apply

warfighting functions to restore order, separate warring factions, and return the environment to conditions

more conducive to civil order and discipline.

5-23. ADA units may play a major role in providing force protection and protection of geopolitical assets

from missile or air attack. By denying one of the warring parties the advantage of air power, peace may be

maintained. Army ADA has the potential to support the enforcement of no-fly zones.

SUMMARY

5-24. Regardless of the type of stability operations, ADA units will always deploy as force-tailored

packages by deploying and/or employing ADA units to accomplish the following:

Deter aggression.

Protect critical assets.

Provide focused early warning.

Integrate with space-based surveillance, joint and host nation sensors and/or interagency

communications systems.

Conduct positive airspace control using elevated sensors to detect, track aerial drug traffickers,

and alert law enforcement agencies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

5-25. Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies,

and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 1-02). Civil support includes operations that

address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the

United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations when the size and scope of

events exceed the capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. Civil support operations are

usually noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational

design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping, and sustaining

operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points and even

the desired end state can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations.

When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to define the enemy

differently. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.

5-26. The homeland defense mission for ADA is to prevent, deter, or interdict foreign and domestic aerial

threats that are directed towards the United States and its citizens or specified area of operations (AO), such

as the National Capitol Region. Nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations are increasingly likely

to attack the U.S. and its territories using missiles and aircraft.

5-27. The homeland air security (HAS) air and missile threat spectrum Figure 5-1 ranges from traditional

military threats to terrorist threats, from medium and long range ballistic missiles, bombers to land attack

cruise missiles, terrorist-controlled aircraft, and radio-controlled sub-scale aircraft. The use of an air vehicle

as a terrorist weapon is the most stressing HAS threat. State-sponsored military threats are addressed by

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Army ADA and Information Superiority

war plans, operational concepts, and our military’s capabilities. The HAS threat spectrum is depicted

below.

Threat Spectrum

Future

Threat

Ballistic

Fighter

CM*

Airliners

Gen

Ultra Light

Other

Missiles

Bomber

Commercial

Aviation

UAS**

e.g. Balloons

/ Chartered

Aircraft

* Cruise Missile (CM)

Traditional Military Threat

** Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)

Figure 5-1. HAS air threat spectrum

5-28. Government agencies other than the Army will often have the lead in civil support operations. ADA

commanders may answer to a civilian chief or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency.

Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of

cooperation. ADA commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political,

economic, and psychological in nature.

5-29. The U.S. Constitution allows the use of Army forces to protect the states against invasion and, upon

request of a state, to protect it against domestic violence. Army forces, under joint command, provide the

nation with critical capabilities, such as missile defense, necessary to secure and defend the homeland.

5-30. The amended Posse Comitatus Act significantly restricts using federal military forces in law

enforcement. The Stafford Act defines and clarifies the role of U.S. military forces in support of domestic

civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities, commanders need a detailed analysis

of their legal authorities for each mission. Generally, ADA troops and systems performing civil support

operations, by the nature of their missions, are in compliance with the law and need only be aware of the

limitations of their authority.

ENVIRONMENT

5-31. The Army develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills useful for a

variety of civil support operations. Doctrine for war complements doctrine for civil support operations.

Some of the same principles apply to both environments, though modified to accommodate different

situations. Properly applied to the situation at hand, these principles balance the Army's response to

challenges and confrontations in war and civil support operations.

5-32. Assessments of which civil support operations ADA units support and the extent of participation are

presented in the following paragraphs. However, there are no absolutes and ADA units may be called to

participate in other operations not addressed. ADA units, as contributors of mostly defensive capabilities,

have become the units of choice for several types of civil support operations missions, normally, in support

of national interests.

5-33. ADA units perform the planning and support function for conducting many types of civil support

operations in coordination with the force commander. Some basic planning questions that apply to each

civil support operation follow:

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Are there any special requirements for the personnel participating in the operations?

What special supplies are required?

Will special requisitioning procedures be used?

Have waivers to current Army regulations to allow requisition of special supplies and excessive

quantities of supplies outside the normal requisitioning procedures been approved?

What are the special physical security requirements that must be added to the normal

procedures?

What are the rules of engagement for use of ADA weapons?

What are the conditions for firing weapons?

Who authorizes the firing of weapons?

What role does ADA have in the activity?

KEY ENABLERS

5-34. The smooth and efficient flow of information is at the core of coordinated employment. The

following four key enablers have been identified as critical to this information flow:

Intelligence information sharing.

Integrated interagency data sharing and communications.

Common air surveillance picture.

Automated decision support/response management systems.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING

5-35. A “push-pull” system among agencies ensures that all relevant information on terrorist activities is

gathered, correlated, and cross-referenced. The goal is early detection of all air threats. Early detection

enables protection against attack and provides decision makers in the Homeland Air Security Coordination

Center (HASCC) and other agency command centers with real-time, accurate, amplifying information on

an enemy’s intent.

INTEGRATED INTERAGENCY DATA SHARING AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-36. A seamless information exchange enables integrated voice and data flow among civilian, military,

law enforcement, and emergency response agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. The goal is to

enable communication throughout the forces and assets that are responding without relying on cumbersome

platform-to-platform or agency-to-agency relay.

COMMON AIR SURVEILLANCE PICTURE

5-37. A high quality common air surveillance picture enables appropriate agencies to make timely and

informed decisions on HAS actions. The situational awareness provided by the air surveillance picture

provides decision makers with the confidence to make event declarations and interdiction decisions.

AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT/RESPONSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

5-38. An information management system that provides decision makers with immediate access to critical

information to support all levels of decisions and actions. Examples are information on such things as: air

interdiction assets available with their location and response times, affected law enforcement jurisdictions,

preferred divert airfields appropriate for force-down according to aircraft type, locations and phone

numbers for nearest local law enforcement and emergency/disaster response forces, and emergency

equipment types and locations.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM (BMDS) INTEGRATION

5-39. BMDS provides a layered defense capable of countering threat missiles in all phases of flight, and

provides early warning about missile launches, The Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment

(ITW/AA) system distributes launch warnings to civilian and military authorities.

5-40. The Command and Control, Battle Management Communications (C2BMC) network mission

is to defend the United States against a limited strike of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from

rogue nations, and unauthorized or accidental launches from nations with weapons of mass destruction

(WMD). The GMD element uses a combination of shared and dedicated components that includes the

following sub-systems:

GMD Battle Management, Command and Control and communications network.

In-Flight Interceptor Communications System.

Long range sensors, including Upgraded Early Warning Radars and a sea-based X-Band Radar,

AEGIS Long Range Search and Track, AEGIS Spy-1, and Forward-based X-Band Radars

(TPY-2).

Ground Based Interceptor emplacements, consisting of a silo-based ICBM-class booster motor

stack and the exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle.

5-41. Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMDS) related applications are an integral part of AMD

operations. These systems and applications support IPB, target cueing, communications and data exchange,

and battle damage assessment.

Protection—ADA forces will be capable of protecting U.S. and friendly assets by engaging and

destroying hostile missiles.

Prevention—ADA forces will provide a credible deterrence to potential adversaries through the

deployment and demonstration of ADA system capabilities.

Negation—ADA forces will combine with other U.S. space and space-related assets and negate

hostile access to, or use of, U.S. or other assets through deception, denial, disruption,

degradation, and destruction.

Surveillance—ADA forces will assist in performing surveillance and exchanging C2,

communications system, and ISR information.

HOMELAND SECURITY

5-42. Homeland Security is a national effort to coordinate government agencies. The Department of

Homeland Security prepares for and mitigates the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the

U.S. In performing this function the department works with federal, state, and local agencies, and private

entities to coordinate efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. The department also

works with the military services commanders to protect the U.S. and its critical infrastructure from state-

sponsored attacks or terrorist attacks.

5-43. A recent example of ADA in homeland defense involves Avengers and Sentinels protecting our

nation’s capitol. The following article and picture Figure

5-2 illustrates a defensive reaction to the

9/11/2001 attacks.

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OPERATION CLEAR SKIES

Air Defenders Deploy to Defend National Capital Region Against Terrorist Aerial Attacks

by MAJ. Rousell Thomas and MAJ. Kevin Hutchison

"Clear Skies" is the name of a series of air defense exercises and operations conducted by joint and

interagency entities in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Following these

attacks, the Director of the Joint Staff initially tasked the Joint Air and Missile Defense Agency

(JTAMDO) to assume the lead role for developing long-range operational concepts and architectures

for the Homeland Air Defense (HAD) mission areas (the National Capitol Region—Washington,

D.C.—and other key U.S. sites) in coordination with the North American Aerospace Defense

(NORAD) Command and the Armed Forces. HAD is a subset of the interagency Homeland Air

Security (HAS) mission.

Figure 5-2. An Avenger protects a high-value asset

HOMELAND AIR SECURITY

5-44. The homeland air security/air defense mission is to deter, prevent or interdict aerial threats and

aggression directed towards the United States. HAS complements other homeland defense and security

missions including Land and Maritime Security. HAS is dependent on close integration, cooperation,

coordination, and collaboration among international, federal, state, local agencies and governments. The

main focus of HAS is on counter-air terrorism. It employs the full spectrum of agency capabilities, from

intelligence to law enforcement to military force, to complete the mission. The amalgamation of individual

agency capabilities into an integrated, multi-layered response is the lynchpin of HAS.

EMPLOYMENT

5-45. HAS is centered around four phases with elements that range from event recognition to event

reconstruction. Although sequentially phased, HAS execution/employment may not always flow

sequentially from phase to phase.

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5-46. Throughout these phases, intelligence collection

supports decisions and actions. The key to

successful intelligence gathering is detailed

intelligence preparation that

enables predictive analysis

of the

terrorist threat.

Intelligence preparation determines likely terrorist aerial threat courses of action and

associated alternatives. Intelligence also describes how they organize and the environment within

which

they may conduct operations.

. This process

contributes to

the identification of gaps in knowledge

of the

threat, forming the basis for intelligence requirements in each of the four

phases.

5-47. The foundation of the four phases is

the development of national and agency

policies, plans, and

procedures that

lead to the

establishment

of a non-permissive environment, to

enhance deterrence.

Examples include: regulatory

changes that

require hardening of cockpit

doors, policy

changes increasing

the number of Air Marshals, and federalizing airport security screening

personnel. The four phases

of the

HAS concept are recognition, assessment and warning, interdiction, and recovery and follow-up.

These

phases are described below and illustrated in

Figure 5-3.

Phase

1-Recognition. Implementation of policy, procedures,

plans, training, and education that

combine to create an environment of awareness. Trigger events are created

by awareness of a

terrorist act, the preparation for a

terrorist act,

recognition of

other illegal

air activity by

some

agency, the public of abnormal activity.

Phase

2-Assessment and Warning. Following

recognition

of a trigger event, an evaluation

process occurs which potentially

includes one

or more of

focused surveillance or enhanced

intelligence collection in order to confirm whether or not a

terrorist act

is being planned or

underway. Simultaneously, when

the necessary

information is

available, specific response

plans

and actions are initiated, including

focused warnings to threatened areas or facilities.

Phase

3-Interdiction. Once an

assessment is

complete and depending

on how the

threat

determination is made, interdiction actions are taken to prevent the launch/takeoff of a threat air

vehicle. If airborne, interdiction

actions will be used to neutralize the air threat. This

phase

requires the ability

to seamlessly transition between law enforcement and military actions.

Phase

4-Recovery

and Follow-Up. After interdiction has been

completed, recovery and follow-

up is

necessary. Notification and

transition of

responsibility

is then made to the appropriate

agencies for disaster response

and consequence management. Then a

formal HAS

event

termination is issued.

Figure 5-3. Four phases of the HAS concept command and control

5-48. A standing Homeland

Air Security Coordination Center

(HASCC) plans, coordinates, and

synchronizes air security operations. It coordinates all HAS operations, whether day-to-day operations, a

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national special security event or a HAS trigger event. The coordination center is manned by

representatives from all appropriate federal agencies which contribute to the HAS mission. The HASCC is

tailorable and scaleable to meet specific HAS requirements. The HASCC is survivable, providing

continuity of operations, with robust command, control, and communications systems. These systems are

interoperable, responsive, and sustainable in both benign and hostile environments. The main tasks the

HASCC performs include the following:

Lead the interagency process to develop a HAS plan, ensuring integration with the Land and

Maritime Homeland Security missions.

Focal point for interagency air security intelligence information.

Assess HAS trigger events to determine the appropriate course of action (COA).

Declare HAS events.

Coordinate and synchronize interagency responses to HAS events.

5-49. Supporting agencies develop their own unique plans to support the overall mission of the HASCC

and define their supporting roles. These plans feed into a coordinated interagency process. The homeland

air security director (HASD) coordinates and synchronizes execution of the HAS mission. The HASD is

responsible for leading the interagency development of air security objectives and plans, coordinating with

supporting agencies, and managing execution of the HAS plan. The HASD is responsible for the following:

Assessing trigger events and supporting information.

Declaring HAS events.

Initiating and terminating event responses.

Synchronizing agency responses to HAS events.

De-conflicting and/or elevating policy matters to the appropriate level for resolution.

5-50. National Executive Coordination Centers provide notification and situational awareness for the

executive level of government. The HASCC, as well as departments and agencies, must coordinate with

these centers as appropriate. International/Allied participation within the command and control structure is

needed but has yet to be determined.

SUPPORT TO COUNTER DRUG OPERATIONS

5-51. Military efforts support and complement, rather than replace, the counterdrug efforts of other U.S.

agencies, the states, and cooperating foreign governments. Army support can occur in any or all phases of a

combined and synchronized effort to attack the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during

distribution. Army participation in counterdrug operations will normally be in support of law enforcement

agencies.

5-52. Support to host nations includes assistance to their forces to destroy drug production facilities;

collaboration with host nation armed forces to prevent export of illegal drugs; and nation assistance to help

develop economic alternatives to production, exportation, and distribution of drugs. Support to interdiction

efforts center on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit as well as integrating command, control,

communications, and intelligence systems. U.S. forces may well assist host nation forces at war while they

are in stability and support operations postures.

5-53. Support for domestic counterdrug operations includes military planning and training assistance for

domestic law enforcement agencies, participation by the National Guard, equipment loans and transfers,

use of military facilities, and other assistance as requested and authorized. This support may expand as

national policy and legal prohibitions evolve.

5-54. ADA sensor surveillance will be the primary role for ADA units. ADA sensors are ideally suited to

provide surveillance support to this type of operation. This support will normally be provided to U.S.

Customs and Border Patrol organizations along the U.S. borders. The forward-looking infrared (FLIR) is a

heat sensor that can track people coming across the border. FLIRs are mounted on Avengers. Sentinel

radars and Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) can be used

to support counter drug operations by detecting and tracking low-flying aircraft approaching and

penetrating the border.

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Army ADA and Information Superiority

This chapter describes the Army ADA contribution to and benefit from achieving

information superiority. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived

from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of

information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.

Information superiority is the product of intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR), information management (IM), and information operations

(IO). Information superiority enables ADA forces to see first, understand the situation

more quickly and accurately, and act faster than their adversaries.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

6-1. Adversaries and enemies pursue their own relative information advantages, very likely in asymmetric

ways, while continually attempting to deny information superiority to friendly forces. Because opposing

forces constantly adapt and situations continually evolve, information superiority is only possible through

constant vigilance. Commanders assess the quality of their own information against their decision-making

requirements. Against that assessment, they estimate the quality of the enemy’s operational picture.

Commanders avoid any complacency associated with relative levels of military technology. They are aware

that their enemy may, by chance or countermeasures, uncover the sources of friendly informational

advantage, block them, or use them to deceive.

6-2. Commanders recognize that unless they envision and direct operations designed to achieve and

maintain information superiority, they may lose it. Commanders exploit any advantages in information

capability and intelligence to increase the effects of combat power. They constantly seek to improve their

situational understanding and to assess that of their enemy. They know that losing information superiority

may result in losing the initiative.

6-3. The ADA perspective on information superiority is characterized by gaining, maintaining and

distributing timely and accurate information on the three-dimensional positions, vector, and track

identification (friend, foe, or neutral) of all aircraft. TBM impact point predictions are also information sets

needing immediate attention. ADA units deny information to the enemy using OPSEC and communications

security, and by practicing electronic emission control. ADA denies the enemy the ability to observe and

target friendly forces by engaging and destroying UAS in flight. By cutting the link between enemy

commanders, and their eyes, ADA causes the enemy to operate in the blind, to be reactive to U.S.

operational initiatives, and to lose offensive potential.

6-4. Friendly forces must rapidly collect, process and disseminate information to permit combat units to

operate in depth and maintain initiative, agility, and synchronization. The force’s dependence on the

prompt flow of information makes battle command centers prime targets for enemy air and missile

operations. Therefore, the protection of battle command nodes is a key objective of air and missile defense

operations.

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

6-5. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect,

process, or disseminate information; also included is the information itself. The climate, terrain, and

weapons effects (such as electromagnetic pulse or blackout) affect the information environment but are not

part of it. The information environment includes the C2 nodes of friendly and enemy forces and those of

other organizations and groups. Commanders consider the explosive growth of information and the

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pervasive nature of the information when they visualize an operation. They include that part of the

information environment that affects their operation in their operational environment.

6-6. Distance has little meaning in the information environment. Army information systems are “in

contact” with enemy information systems before any operation starts. They remain in contact after the

operation ends. Commanders understand that there is no sanctuary for friendly information. Before Army

forces arrive in theater, the battle for information superiority begins.

6-7. Army ADA information systems include C2 nodes at the AAMDC and ADA brigades/battalions,

sensors (THAAD, Patriot and Sentinel radars), and joint communications networks, Patriot’s multi-routed,

multi-channel network, EPLRS, and combat net radios). The joint data net (JDN) is the primary data

exchange network in the ADA environment.

6-8. The JDN is the collection of near real time communications and information systems used primarily

at the coordination and execution levels. It provides information exchange necessary to facilitate the joint-

service battle manager’s comprehension of the tactical situation and provides the means to exercise C2,

communications system and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) beyond the range of

organic sensors. The JDN carries near real time tracks, unit status information, engagement status,

coordination data, and force orders. The JDN can provide information to cue sensors as well. The backbone

of the JDN is Link 16 transmitted via the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) and

multifunctional information distribution system (MIDS) terminals. However, other data links such as

TADIL A, B, or C, Link 22, and variable message format (VMF) will exchange information with the JDN

through gateways at various platforms to ensure that all participating users are included in the JDN for AD.

Satellites link geographically dispersed users in near real time without consuming limited tactical

bandwidth.

RELEVANT INFORMATION

6-9. Commanders must understand, visualize, describe, and direct efforts that contribute to information

superiority. These contributors fall into the following four primary areas:

Army information tasks—tasks used to shape the operational environment.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—activities conducted to develop knowledge about

the operational environment.

Knowledge management—the art of using information to increase knowledge.

Information management—the science of using information systems and methods

6-10. Commanders and staffs can use ADA generated/related information to analyze and comprehend the

air-ground situation and to determine relevant gaps, potential enemy options/actions, the consequences of

friendly actions, and the effects of the information environment on friendly and enemy actions. These

contributors enable and complement full spectrum operations. This information and its products enable

commanders to accomplish the following:

Develop and maintain a comprehensive picture of enemies and adversaries; forecast their likely

actions.

Deny enemy and adversary information about friendly ADA forces and operations through the

use of radar emission control (EMCON) procedures.

Influence enemy perceptions as to the positions of friendly ADA forces.

Influence defense of critical and geopolitical assets.

Provide relevant information

(including targeting and intelligence) to support the decision

making process.

Synchronize airspace essential to successful three-dimensional air and ground combat

operations.

6-11. Because of the large quantity of data available, it is especially important for commanders to establish

information priorities in order to focus their staffs during their data collection. These priorities must address

the relevant information to the specific air and missile defense operations. The commander provides this

focus via commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), which are—

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Army ADA and Information Superiority

Specified by the commander and applicable only to him.

Situation-dependent and linked to present and future operations.

Based on events or activities that are predictable.

Time sensitive (answers to CCIR must be reported to the commander by the most rapid and

effective means).

6-12. Commanders determine the relevant information for each operation. CCIRs are always promulgated

by a plan or order and are an essential part of planning. The commander alone decides what information is

critical based on the mission, experience, and the higher echelon commander’s intent. The staff may

recommend CCIR to the commander as—

Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR) to allow the commander to determine the

combat capabilities of their own or adjacent friendly units (how I see myself).

Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to determine what the commander wants or needs to

know about the enemy, their purpose, and/or terrain (how I see the enemy).

6-13. Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to allow the commander to determine how to

protect the force from the enemy’s information-gathering systems (how can I prevent the enemy force from

seeing me) although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. An EFFI establishes an element of

information to protect rather than one to collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force

information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success.(FM 3-0)

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

6-14. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration is an activity that synchronizes and

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination

systems in direct support of current and future operations. ISR integration is fundamental to information

superiority. Thoroughly integrated ISR operations add many collection sources. ISR integration eliminates

unit and functional

“stovepipes” for planning, reporting, and processing information and producing

intelligence. It provides a common mechanism for all units to conduct ISR operations in a coordinated,

synergistic way.

6-15. ADA units can produce some intelligence products which can be disseminated via Link-16. ADA

units perform aerial surveillance using organic sensor systems; they do not perform reconnaissance. Aerial

surveillance is not the sole domain of Army ADA; it is a joint/multinational endeavor.

INTELLIGENCE

6-16. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,

and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Intelligence is also

defined as information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation,

analysis, or understanding. Intelligence sources may provide indications of imminent hostile activity,

potential early warning, and positive hostile identification before detection by the air defense system.

6-17. The complexity of the operational environment requires sharing intelligence from the national level

to the tactical level and among headquarters at each level. Modern information systems allow analysts to

collaborate on the overall analysis without degrading support to their own commanders, regardless of their

geographic dispersion. This distributed, collaborative analysis process starts with the initial intelligence

preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and continues throughout operations.

6-18. ADA commanders use intelligence information to predict likely aerial avenues of approach, TBM

launch areas, aircraft types and numbers, and potential carriers of WMD. Intelligence is used to predict

enemy intent thereby contributing to the identification of prioritized critical assets to defend. The

information gathered through intelligence supports the development of the AADP and defense designs.

SURVEILLANCE

6-19. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons,

or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. Surveillance, in an ADA context,

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involves electronic observation, using radar, of the airspace above and outside the area of operations.

Surveillance is a continuous function before and during hostilities except when the radars relocate. During

relocation, other Army and joint TAMD radars provide continuity and complete coverage of the third

dimension.

6-20. Surveillance information is shared and distributed among Army and joint TAMD systems. This

information is used to cue fire control radars and weapon systems to potential targets. ADAM Cells

distribute surveillance information as early warning and aerial situation awareness to non-ADA units.

Surveillance information can also be used to support airspace management and control.

RECONNAISSANCE

6-21. Reconnaissance is, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities

and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,

hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. ADA commanders can request a

reconnaissance mission be initiated to gather information on potential aerial threat support or launch

facilities that were not identified through prior intelligence gathering.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

6-22. Information Management (IM) is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect,

process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information. More

information on IM can be found in FM 3-0 chapter 7.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

6-23. Information systems are the equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display and

disseminate information. These include computers and communications as well as policies and procedures

for their use. Information systems are integral components of communications system and Intelligence.

Effective information systems automatically process, disseminate, and display information according to

user requirements. IM centers on the commander and the information relevant to C2. Commanders make

the best use of information systems when they determine their information requirements and focus their

staffs and organizations on meeting them.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY EXECUTION

6-24. To aid information superiority force protection combines operations security (OPSEC) and deception

operations, to help keep the enemy from locating friendly units. Proper dispersion helps reduce losses from

enemy fires, as does the use of camouflage, discipline, counter-reconnaissance, security operations, and

fortified fighting positions. Air defense contributes to counter-reconnaissance by destroying UAS and

aircraft ISR operations against the force. Frequent moves disrupt the enemy ISR cycle. These measures

help commanders protect their force from enemy observation throughout the conduct of operations.

6-25. Communications connectivity is essential to information superiority in that it supports the

coordination, synchronization, collaboration, and exchange of information that exists between C2 nodes.

TAMD interoperates through multi-data link networks. These information exchanges between

organizations at all echelons support decision-making, planning, and strategy development. Intelligence

collaboration between units ensures that available information is fused and limited collection resources are

fully utilized. Communications architecture provides the paths to broadcast early warning information

generated by satellite and surface-based sensors to appropriate TOCs. ADA implements EMCON silent

procedures to prevent the enemy from detecting ADA sensors.

6-26. Passive measures are used to deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air and surveillance assets. Some

examples at the operational level are moving large units at night, developing an early warning system,

creating large area smoke screens, and establishing emissions control

(EMCON) procedures. Some

examples at the tactical level are employing radar scattering camouflage, utilizing early warning instead of

local sensors, and locating units on hardened sites.

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NETWORK APPLICATION MANAGEMENT

6-27. Networking technologies are expanding the options available for managing the flow of information.

Brigade headquarters can achieve a collaborative environment for sharing information using web pages,

public folders, and e-mail. For example, networks provide the brigade access to non-secure and secure

information, allowing individuals to send and receive unclassified and classified information worldwide.

The Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) provides access to the Internet. Secret

Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) provides access to classified information.

6-28. The intranet is a communications network where access to published information is restricted; this

applies to installations and to operational and tactical headquarters. The communication standards of the

internet and the content standards of the World Wide Web (www) are normally the basis for a joint task

force intranet. Therefore, the tools used to create an intranet are normally identical to those used for

Internet and web applications using local area networks (LANs) protected by firewalls.

Tactical Internet

6-29. The tactical Internet is the term used to describe the integrated operational environment

communications network. The term is appropriate due to functional similarities to the commercial Internet

and because the Tactical Internet communications infrastructure is based on Internet technology. A key

feature is the ability to exchange messages using the commercially based Internet Protocol.

6-30. At the brigade and below, the Tactical Internet extends Army battle command systems (ABCS) to the

Soldier and weapons platform. The Tactical Internet passes battle command and situation awareness data.

The Tactical Internet provides tactical, mobile, simultaneous multi-band, multi-node, voice and data

(possibly video) communications along with routing and network services.

6-31. Initial digital communications support consists of a space-based segment, an EPLRS-based

backbone, a SINCGARS combat net radio (CNR) segment, and a mobile subscriber equipment/tactical

packet network segment, all integrated via routers. The integrated digital transport capability of these

communications segments is key to moving information among nodes and platforms. The communications

infrastructure is focused on achieving seamless information transfer horizontally and vertically across the

operational environment.

6-32. The tactical Internet supports several key services. These services include functions such as

electronic messaging, directory, network management, and security. These services are integral to the value

of the Tactical Internet in support of the warfighter. As new host-based services are added—such as

electronic mail service—their supporting system components will be folded into the Tactical Internet

(Figure 6-1).

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

6-5

Chapter 6

Figure

6-1. Simplified tactical Internet components at brigade level

6-33.

The Tactical

Internet is a

Secret-High system. Since

all directly connected host

computers are

capable of operating

up to the secret level, direct connections

to the commercial Internet are not currently

permitted.

Electronic Mail (E-mail)

6-34.

E-mail is a system of transmitting messages and data from one computer to another,

using telephone

connection and modems. E-mail

is replacing formal messaging systems

to communicate record copy

information between

military users. E-mail uses non-tactical computers (laptops) and tactical or non-

tactical telephone systems. E-mail

permits

6-35.

rapid and asynchronous communications,

eliminating “telephone tag.” It permits a

single user to

communicate with one or several

users simultaneously. To

reduce e-mail

overloads, functional versus

individual e-mail accounts can be established. This helps prevent a message backlog for personnel not on

shift.

Establishing a

precedence

system within

e-mail permits timely handling and review of priority

messages.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM SUPPORT

6-36.

BMDS systems are an integral part of the overall deterrent posture

of the Army.

. They confer

decisive advantage

upon U.S. and friendly forces in terms of combat timing, operational environment

awareness, operating

tempo, synchronization, ability to maneuver, and application of firepower. Space-

based

warning systems provide warning of ballistic missile attack and other intelligence

information to

either

national or theater warning systems. BMDS systems can provide longer-range warning than airborne

or surface based sensors.

6-6

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Army ADA and Information Superiority

Missile Warning

6-37. The Defense Support Program (DSP) is a survivable and reliable satellite-borne system that uses

infrared detectors to sense heat from missile plumes against the earth backg1round. DSP will detect and

ground-processing stations will report in near real-time missile launches and nuclear detonations. Its

primary mission is to support the integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission.

Currently, DSP is slated to be replaced by the space based infrared system.

6-38. The theater event system (TES) is the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) missile

detection and warning architecture that provides reliable, comprehensive tactical warning support (assured

warning) to theater elements. USSTRATCOM coordinates tactical warning via a system of systems with

similar tactical support missions: JTAGS, mission control station, and Tactical Detection and Reporting.

These programs constitute the TES and mutually support each other in the mission of tactical missile and

other event reporting to theater. Within two to four minutes of launch, the theater commander is provided

tactical missile launch warning data, including the place of launch, time of launch, and a course azimuth.

This warning information can be used to alert friendly forces (defensive weapon systems such as air and

missile defense systems) and attack systems.

JOINT TACTICAL GROUND STATION

6-39. JTAGS is a transportable information processing system that receives and processes in-theater, raw,

wideband infrared data down linked from DSP sensors. The system disseminates warning, alerting, and

cueing information on theater ballistic missiles and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater

using existing communications networks.

6-40. The mission of JTAGS is to provide near real-time reporting of TBM mission event data and other

infrared events of interest to the end user in theater. Operators accomplish this by processing IR data

obtained from DSP satellites and then transmitting information on various global and in-theater tactical

data networks as well as providing voice warning to select units in theater as designated by the combatant

commanders of each supported theater. JTAGS currently utilizes the Integrated Broadcast Service-

Interactive, Integrated Broadcast Service- Simplex, and Link-16 (TADIL-J) data networks to pass TBM

warning data and the Defense Red Switch Network as well satellite communications voice networks to pass

voice warning to users in theater.

6-41. JTAGS determines the TBM source by identifying missile launch point and time and provides an

estimation of impact point and time. Since the system is normally located in theater, it reduces the

possibility of single point failure in long-haul communication systems and is responsive to the combatant

commanders. JTAGS is an essential link for the combatant commander’s situational awareness.

Operational benefits include the following:

Cueing attack operations assets to find and destroy enemy launch capability.

Timely warning for the protection of friendly forces and populations.

6-42. JTAGS receives direct down linked data from up to three DSP sensors. Features include the

following:

Threat TBM infrared data.

3-D stereo processing of multiple sensor downlinks.

Real-time reporting.

Robust multi-networks capability.

In-theater data/voice communications.

6-43. JTAGS is an Army system ADCON to SMDC/ARSTRAT and

1st Space Brigade. Army

crewmembers are MOS 14J, Air Defense C4I TOC Enhanced Operator/Maintainer.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

6-7

Chapter 7

Sustainment

Sustainment of Air Defense Artillery

(ADA) organizations presents unique

challenges to the commanders and staffs of these organizations. Although the basic

sustainment requirements are the same as all Army organizations, the diverse method

in which ADA units are employed and the highly complex nature of the systems

demand a focused approach to sustainment. The Army sustainment structure has

undergone a dramatic change in both organizations and operations which affects the

manner in which sustainment is provided to units. It is imperative that commanders

and staffs have a complete understanding of modular sustainment organizations and

operations to ensure timely and sufficient support. This chapter outlines the basic

tenants of modular sustainment to identify potential sources of sustainment support

for ADA units. Based upon the information provided, commanders, with support

from their staff, must be proactive to identify and leverage available support.

MODULAR SUSTAINMENT

7-1. For decades, each Army warfighting echelon had its own combat service support structure. This

approach produced redundant structures and capabilities throughout the Army that provided limited

flexibility in responding to a wide range of operational challenges. The challenges were met, but at high

costs in organizational turbulence, inefficiency, and slower response times than were desired. Today,

technological advances, modular unit designs, and revised doctrine have provided for increased efficiencies

and greater effectiveness in supporting full spectrum operations. One example is the elimination of

redundant logistic capabilities at the corps and division levels. This restructured hierarchy enabled more

centralized command and control (C2) and decentralized execution of intra-theater distribution system

operations and sustainment operations.

7-2. FM 4-0, the Army’s keystone field manual for sustainment, has detailed descriptions of the

sustainment organizations that support the modular Army. Sustainment organizations that will have a direct

impact on air and missile defense sustainment are described later in this chapter.

SUSTAINMENT OVERVIEW

7-3. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support to maintain

and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The Army warfighting function,

sustainment, is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services that not only enable freedom

of action and extend operational reach but also mission accomplishment. It includes the functions of

personnel services, logistics, and health service support.

Personnel services include human resources support, financial management, legal support,

religious support, and band support functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality

of life.

Logistics is the military art and science of carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.

Logistics includes maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational

contract support, and general engineering support.

Health service support includes all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by

the appropriate medical command (deployment support) to promote, conserve, or restore the

mental and physical well being of Army personnel and, as directed personnel in other Services,

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

7-1

Chapter 7

agencies, and organizations. This includes casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical

logistics.

7-4. In order to effectively support operations in a fully integrated and interdependent joint environment,

Army transformation efforts produced a total organizational redesign of combat service support units. A

new modular unit design was developed for greater flexibility and increased responsiveness in meeting

current and projected future operational requirements.

7-5. Finance, human resources, and medical proponents experienced similar transformation efforts that

brought about changes to organizations and methods of employment. For example, financial management

operations are now conducted by standardized financial management structures, and finance support and

resource management capabilities are integrated to provide improved operational capabilities.

SUSTAINING ADA ORGANIZATIONS

7-6. Successful sustainment operations are contingent upon an understanding of requirements,

capabilities, priorities, and the operational environment. The objective is responsive and agile support at the

right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity. The purpose is to build and sustain combat power

and provide for operational endurance. The following paragraphs, by sustainment function, provide the

basis for understanding how operational level sustainment capabilities are structured to support ADA

sustainment requirements within a theater, theater of operations, or JOA.

PERSONNEL

7-7. The paragraphs below address human resources (HR) support and financial management support. For

information on the remaining components of the sustainment function and personnel, see FM 4-0 and FM

1-0.

Human Resources (HR) Support

7-8. HR support to ADA units is provided by TSC sustainment brigades that provide support on an area

basis within their specified area of operations. This realignment of HR capabilities is the result of the

emergence of the sustainment warfighting function, clarifications of definitions, and the loss of traditional

HR C2 structure above company level in the modular force structure.

7-9. Depending upon the major mission a sustainment brigade performs, theater opening, theater

distribution, or sustainment, it will conduct C2 of HR companies, military mail terminal (MMT) teams,

and/or theater gateway R5 teams as appropriate to its mission. A human resources sustainment center

(HRSC) that functions as a staff element of the TSC provides technical guidance and ensures execution of

HR support as defined by the policies and priorities established by the Army service component command

(ASCC) G-1. A sustainment brigade HR branch plans, coordinates, integrates, and manages HR support

within the sustainment brigade’s specified area of operations.

7-10. HR capabilities include personnel accounting, R5 operations, casualty operations, postal operations,

and HR operations and staff planning. Each of these capabilities must be fully integrated and synchronized

with all other facets of the sustainment function in order to effectively and efficiently sustain units in or

passing through the sustainment brigade’s specified area of operations. For more detailed information on

human resources support see FM 1-0, FMI 1-0.02 and FMI 4-93.2.

Financial Management Support

7-11. Financial management support to ADA units is provided by TSC sustainment brigades that provide

support on an area basis within their specified area of operations. A financial management center (FMC)

that functions as a staff element of the TSC provides technical oversight of financial management and

resource management operations.

7-12. Subordinate financial management company and detachment capabilities include providing timely

payment for contractor and vendor services support, disbursing and funding support, enemy prisoner of war

pay support, non-U.S. pay support, and limited U.S. pay support. The financial management company also

7-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Sustainment

provides a limited resource management capability to conduct analyses of tasks and priorities as they relate

to financial and manpower requirements execution (see FM 1-06 and FMI 4-93.2).

LOGISTICS

7-13. Logistic support to ADA units beyond organic capabilities is ultimately provided by the TSC and its

subordinate organizations.

THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

7-14. Within a theater, theater of operations, or joint operations area (JOA), the TSC is responsible for

synchronizing, integrating, and otherwise conducting sustainment operations (less health service support) in

support of brigade-centric Army forces conducting full spectrum operations (see FM 4-93.4).

7-15. The TSC is responsible for planning, controlling, and synchronizing Army deployment and

sustainment for the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) or a joint force commander (JFC). It is

capable of simultaneously supporting deployment, movement, sustainment, reconstitution, and retrograde

operations.

7-16. The TSC executes its assigned missions through the use of modular forces, to include expeditionary

sustainment commands (ESC), sustainment brigades, combat sustainment support battalions, and other

modular sustainment formations. Sustainment brigades, combat sustainment support battalions, and

functional sustainment units serve as the building blocks of the force structure designed to execute TSC

missions within a theater, theater of operations, or JOA.

7-17. The TSC is the distribution manager of the intratheater segment of the global distribution system. It

executes distribution operations in accordance with priorities promulgated by the ASCC G-4. If an ESC is

deployed, it performs the role of distribution manager for its specified theater of operations or JOA. The

ESC and sustainment brigades monitor, track, and execute distribution operations in accordance with TSC

guidance.

7-18. A financial management center (FMC) and a human resources sustainment center (HRSC) collocate

with the TSC and function as staff elements of the TSC. The FMC provides technical oversight of all Army

financial management operations in the theater. The HRSC provides theater-level support to the ASCC G-1

and enables the TSC commander to plan, integrate and execute human resources support to the theater. The

HRSC integrates and ensures execution of human resources support throughout the theater as defined by

the policies and priorities established by the ASCC G-1 in postal; casualty; reception, replacement, rest and

recuperation, return to duty, and redeployment (R5); and personnel accounting and strength reporting

(PASR) core competencies.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

7-19. ADA commanders and staffs should coordinate closely with the sustainment brigade support

operations officer to communicate logistics requirements and priorities.

7-20. The sustainment brigade, attached to an ESC/TSC, provides command and control for all subordinate

units, and provides sustainment in an area of operations as defined by the ESC/TSC. The sustainment

brigade plans and executes sustainment, distribution, theater opening and reception, staging, and onward

movement of Army forces in full spectrum operations as directed by the ESC/TSC, providing support on an

area basis. Sustainment brigades are assigned multifunctional combat sustainment support battalions,

functional logistics battalions, and modular logistics companies tailored and task organized to their specific

mission.

7-21. The sustainment brigade provides support to wide array of units; a brigade combat team, support

brigades, and elements of other services or nations as directed. ADA units operating within one of these

footprints can expect to receive logistics support from the sustainment brigade unless otherwise

coordinated.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

7-3

Chapter 7

COMBAT SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT BATTALION (CSSB)

7-22. The CSSB will be a key organization in providing logistics support to ADA units. As a subordinate

element of the sustainment brigade, its operations will be directed by the sustainment brigade support

operations officer. It will usually be the prime source of all support beyond ADA organic capabilities. It is

important that ADA commanders and staff understand the composition of the CSSB from which they

expect to receive support. This ensures a full understanding of the support available and allows

commanders to accurately communicate support requirements.

7-23. The CSSB is a tailored, multifunctional logistics organization. It is a flexible and responsive team

that executes logistics throughout the depth of their assigned AO. The CSSB subordinate elements may

consist of functional companies providing supplies, ammunition, fuel, water, transportation, cargo transfer,

mortuary affairs, maintenance, field services, and human resources management. This framework enables

the employment of a tailored logistics unit capable of adapting quickly to changing tactical conditions. The

CSSB works through the sustainment brigade in concert with the TSC for logistics operations to effectively

support the maneuver commander.

7-24. Supported units are reliant upon CSSBs to meet replenishment requirements beyond their internal

capabilities. The CSSB is the entity of the sustainment brigade that provides the distribution link between

theater base and the supported units. Its function is to maintain the flow of replenishment; to retrograde

unserviceable components, end items, and supplies; to monitor the distribution of replenishment that is

throughput directly from the theater base by assets of the sustainment brigade tasked with providing theater

distribution; and to assist with coordination and delivery if necessary. The CSSB augments/supplements

supported units during the normal replenishment cycle, delivering supplies that are not being throughput

directly to units.

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION (BSB)

7-25. BSBs are organic to brigade combat teams (BCT) and all support brigades, except for the battlefield

surveillance brigade. The battlefield surveillance brigade is supported by a brigade support company. BSB

capabilities are tailored to the specific type of brigade they support. For example, the BSB of a heavy BCT

has more fuel distribution and maintenance capabilities than a fires brigade. BSB capabilities include

supply, maintenance, motor transport, but only BCTs contain Role II medical support capability. BSBs

plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute logistic operations in support of brigade operations.

7-26. Although the BSB operates in direct support of a BCT, it may be the source of logistics and medical

support for ADA units operating within the BCT area when properly coordinated.

7-27. Functional support brigades, such as ADA brigades, do not have a BSB in their structure. As a result,

they do not possess the same degree of self-sustaining operational endurance as a BCT or functional

support brigade.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

7-28. Operational contract support provides additional sources of support for required supplies and

services. Because of the cost of repair, complexity, system uniqueness, and maintenance capabilities many

ADA systems are and will continue to be supported using operational contract support. Currently, there are

three broad categories of contracted support: theater support, external support, and system support.

Theater Support. Theater support contracts are prearranged contracts, or contracts awarded from

the mission area, by contracting officers under the C2 of the contracting support brigade (CSB).

Theater-support contracts are utilized to acquire goods, services, and minor construction support,

usually from local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders.

External Support. External support contracts provide a variety of support to deployed forces.

External support contracts may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the

contingency itself to support the mission and may include a mix of U.S. citizens, third country

nationals, and local national subcontractor employees. The largest and most commonly used

external support contract is the logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP).

7-4

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Sustainment

System Support. System support contracts are pre-arranged contracts by the USAMC life cycle

management commands (LCMC) and separate Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, life

cycle Logistics, and Technology) program executive and product/project management offices.

System contractors, made up mostly of U.S. citizens, provide support in garrison and may

deploy with the force to both training and real-world operations. They may provide either

temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted support, or

long-term support for selected materiel systems, often referred to as contractor logistic support.

7-29. In many instances, the TSC will be the requiring activity (the unit requesting the support) for theater

level and external support. The Army field support brigade (AFSB) has the lead for planning and

coordinating system support contract actions. To gain an understanding of system support or contracting

and contractor management see FMI 4-93.41 and FMI 4-93.42.

7-30. ADA units requiring contracted support are responsible for development of performance work

statements, independent government cost estimate, and all other required documents as described in

regulations or doctrine. The unit is also responsible for providing a contracting officer representative for

contract oversight.

Note: General engineering support is typically provided by an engineer brigade providing

theater-level engineer support. In such cases, engineering support is usually provided on an area

basis. Requirements for general engineering support are coordinated by the ADA brigade S-4.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

7-31. The Medical Command (Deployment Support) is the senior medical command within a theater. It is

responsible for providing the requisite C2 necessary to deliver timely and responsive health service support

in support of deployed forces. Subordinate organizations include medical brigades, multifunctional medical

battalions, and other medical augmentation required by supported units. Command capabilities include the

provisioning of combat health support, medical logistics, evacuation, and humanitarian services.

7-32. A medical logistics management center (MLMC) support team, a subordinate unit of the medical

command, collocates with the TSC in order to facilitate the integrated and synchronized flow of Class VIII

materiel throughout the theater, theater of operations, or JOA.

7-33. Health service support to ADA units beyond organic capability is provided by a medical brigade

(MED BDE) multifunctional medical battalion (MMB) providing Role II care and medical logistics support

on an area basis within their specified area of operations. Role II care includes immediate lifesaving

measures, advanced trauma management, disease prevention, combat operational stress control prevention,

casualty collection, evacuation from supported units to supporting medical treatment, dental, laboratory, x-

ray, and a patient-holding capability.

ADA BRIGADE AND BATTALION ROLES IN SUSTAINMENT

7-34. Inherent in the conduct of air and missile defense

(AMD) operations is the requirement for

responsive and agile support. Although ADA units depend upon external support to sustain operations,

sustainment begins at the unit level. For the most part, sustainment functions performed within ADA

organizations are the responsibility of brigade and battalion S-1s and S-4s for staff oversight. Collectively,

they are responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring the integration and synchronization of

sustainment with the commander’s battle rhythm. For the most part, the difference in staff roles between

the brigade and battalion levels is scale and scope. The following listings highlight the core competencies

of the S-1 and S-4 staff sections.

BRIGADE AND BATTALION S-1.

7-35. The core competencies of the brigade and battalion S-1 are as follows:

HR planning and staff operations.

Personnel readiness management (PRM).

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

7-5

Chapter 7

Personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR).

Personnel information management (PIM).

Casualty operations.

R5 operations.

Postal operations.

Essential personnel services

(EPS)

(Awards & Decorations, Evaluations, Leave/Passes,

Promotions, Military Pay, etc.).

Morale, welfare & recreation (MWR) operations.

BRIGADE AND BATTALION S-4.

7-36. The core competencies of the brigade and battalion S-4 are as follows:

Logistics planning and staff operations.

Supply.

Maintenance.

Transportation.

Services.

Food Service.

Construction Support.

ROLE I-MEDICAL CARE

7-37. ADA battalions also have an organic Role I medical care capability. At this level, capabilities include

combat lifesavers, combat medics, and a battalion aid station. The care provided includes immediate

lifesaving measures, advanced trauma management, disease prevention, combat operational stress control

prevention, casualty collection, and evacuation from supported units to supporting medical treatment.

MAINTENANCE

7-38. Additionally, ADA battalions and separate batteries have organic maintenance capability in both

repair operations and maintenance management. These maintenance elements provide field level

maintenance support to all organic units including automotive, ground support equipment,

communications-electronic and missile peculiar systems. They also maintain an authorized stockage list of

repair parts to support maintenance operations. (For more information on the ADA maintenance unit

capabilities, see FM 4-30.3). Sustainment level maintenance is performed by a component repair company

operating in the theater.

7-6

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Appendix A

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

This appendix describes the IPB process as it applies to AMD operations. With the

current lack of a single well-defined threat to plan against, the IPB process will

provide continuous input toward defining that threat. Developing templates will be

more challenging and more critical in support of the IPB process.

PROCESS

A-1. FM 34-130 explains the IPB process in detail. The commander uses IPB to understand the

operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and enemy forces. IPB is a systematic,

continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific area. By applying the IPB process,

the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical

points in time and space on the battlefield. Airspace, or the aerial dimension, is the most dynamic and fast

paced of the four operational dimensions. The intelligence staff must consider all the aspects of air

operations and must be aware of the capabilities of all air threats, to include UASs, ballistic missiles, cruise

missiles, ASMs, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The G-2 and S-2 have overall staff responsibility for

IPB. ADA and aviation officers must provide input to the G-2 and S-2 when integrating air aspects into the

IPB process.

A-2. The IPB process has the following four steps:

Define the operational environment.

Describe the operational environments’ effects.

Evaluate the threat.

Determine threat courses of action.

A-3. Since terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the operational environment have different effects

on air operations and AMD operations, aerial IPB differs from ground IPB. Threat forces must be evaluated

in relation to the effects that weather, terrain, and friendly operations will have on them. The most

significant threats that must be evaluated for aerial IPB are UASs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Aerial IPB is an integral part of the IPB process at all levels.

DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A-4. The operational environment includes aerial dimensions in an area of operations, and an area of

interest. Because of the aerial dimension, each of these parts of the operational environment framework

may be different from that of ground force operations.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

A-5. The air area of operations is the area where the commander is assigned responsibility and authority

for military operations. It usually is, but does not necessarily need to be, identical to the ground area of

operations in width and depth. It extends vertically up to the maximum altitude of friendly ADA systems.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A-6. Operational environment is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to

acquire and engage the threat. It varies in width, depth, and height as the commander positions and moves

assets over time. Operational environment is not assigned by a higher commander and can extend beyond

the commander's area of operations.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

A-1

Appendix A

AREA OF INTEREST

A-7. The area of interest is the geographic area and the airspace above it from which information and

intelligence are required to facilitate planning or successful conduct of the commander's operation. The

ADA commander's area of interest is generally larger than the area of operations or operational

environment due to the great distances that enemy air and missile systems can rapidly cover. The air area of

interest will extend vertically to cover the maximum service ceilings or trajectories of aircraft, UASs, and

missile systems. Horizontally, it will extend to cover the maximum range of aircraft, UASs, and missiles,

enemy airfields, forward arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and missile sites. The area of interest

extends to the limits from which intelligence and information must be gathered about enemy forces that

could affect friendly forces.

DESCRIBE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT’S EFFECTS

A-8. The effects of terrain and weather on the enemy and friendly forces must be analyzed. They are

different than the effects on ground operations.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

A-9. Terrain analysis in support of air and missile defense is significantly different from terrain analysis

for ground operations. The nature of airspace does not eliminate the need for terrain analysis because

enemy air and friendly AD will still attempt to use terrain to their own best advantage. IPB focuses on the

impact of geographic factors on the ability of enemy air to approach, acquire, and engage a target, or

deliver airborne or air assault troops. Analysis of the terrain for air and missile defense follows the same

principles as ground analysis and uses the military aspects of terrain: observation and fields of fire, avenues

of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC).

OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE

A-10. These aspects relate to the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB

context, observation relates to optical and electronic line of sight. Many battlefield systems require line of

sight to effectively operate or acquire and engage targets. These systems include radios, radar, jamming

systems, direct-fire weapons, and airborne and ground sensors as well as friendly ADA systems. Fields of

fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Airspace must be analyzed with regard to routes that

provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area, and those that provide the best fields of

fire once they reach the target area.

AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH

A-11. Air avenues of approach are evaluated using the same criteria as for ground. A good air avenue of

approach will permit maneuver while providing terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems. Some

common air avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from the threat point of origin, and riverbeds.

Factors that should be used to determine entry and exit air avenues of approach are as follows:

Type of air threat, attack profile, and ordnance.

Air threat point of origin and ground control radar positions.

Probable threat objective.

Potential to support maneuver forces.

Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue.

Protection afforded to the air system and pilot.

Air threat and pilot capabilities.

A-12. Type of Air Threat. UASs are small and elusive. Although they usually fly at low altitudes, their

altitude can vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of engagement range

of ADA. Most surfaced-launched cruise missiles are terrain following, and they use terrain masking. Due to

their range, they may take indirect approach routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain dependent. They fly a

straight ground track from launch point to objective. Their flight is not restricted by terrain. ASMs usually

A-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

fly direct routes from launch platform to the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights.

They follow ridgelines and military crests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the target area. Fixed-

wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range, they may fly a

straight line to the target. Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude of the air system and thus

influence the selection of avenues of approach.

A-13. Point of Origin. Staff looks at the commander's entire area of interest when determining air avenues.

Analysis begins at the enemy airfield, UAS, or missile launch site and works toward the probable enemy

objective. This allows a look at the big picture. The staff considers the range of the air systems and location

of navigation aids and ground control sites.

A-14. Probable Enemy Objective. Each avenue of approach must end at a target, drop zone, landing zone,

or within reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, or target acquisition range of a target. Reverse IPB is

used to pick enemy objectives. These objectives may be used to determine critical maneuver force assets

that require AMD protection. Air assets that are used to achieve ground objectives will seek to use air

avenues of approach coincident with ground avenues of approach. Air assets attacking deep are not limited

to these ground avenues. Ground corridors do not limit missiles and ISR UASs.

A-15. The following questions should be used to evaluate the avenue’s freedom to maneuver:

Canalize the air system?

Have access to adjacent avenues?

Provide the ability to acquire a target and use available munitions?

Assist in navigation?

A-16. The following questions should be used to evaluate the avenue’s protection for the system and pilot:

Provide terrain masking (cover and concealment)?

Provide for full use of air system speed?

Provide protection against radar detection?

Provide protection from air and missile defense weapon systems and tactical air support?

Provide a standoff orbit location?

Provide a standoff orbit?

A-17. The following questions should be used to evaluate the air threat and pilot capabilities. Can the air

system or pilot:

Perform contour flying?

Fly at night?

Fly in all weather conditions?

Range the targets?

OBSTACLES

A-18. Obstacles are broken down into the following three primary types:

Those that prevent the effective employment of ADA systems.

Those that restrict contour flight.

Those that force air threats to employ a particular surveillance or attack profile, route, or to gain

excessive altitude.

A-19. Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain, which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of

approach. This will canalize movement or restrict evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the

employment of certain air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling.

Obstacles should be plotted on a modified combined obstacles overlay.

KEY TERRAIN

A-20. Key terrain is any locality or area in which the seizure, retention, or control of it will afford a marked

advantage to either combatant. In the aerial dimension, these consist of terrain features that canalize or

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Appendix A

constrain air threat systems and terrain with an elevation higher than the maximum ceiling of air threat

systems. Additionally, areas that can be used for airfields, landing and drop zones, or forward arming and

refueling points also need to be considered as key terrain (since these areas could be used to support

friendly or enemy air operations). Terrain can be used as an aid to navigation. Man-made features are also

used as cues to navigate to targets.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT

A-21. Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air systems. The following

tactics and techniques fall into the context of cover and concealment:

Contour flight. Flight at low altitude conforming generally to, and in proximity to, the contours

of the earth. It is characterized by varying airspeeds and altitudes as dictated by vegetation,

obstacles, and ambient light. Generally speaking, contour is defined as operating with the skids

or wheels between 25 and 80 feet above the highest obstacle.

Pop-up tactics. Low-level approach to the target area used by high-speed fixed wing aircraft

such as the F-16. Target acquisition and engagement is made by popping up in altitude at a

predetermined position or time to minimize exposure.

Masking. Masking is the use of terrain to hide an aircraft from visual and electronic observation

or detection. Electronic warfare is used to supplement natural terrain masking.

Cover. Protection from direct-fire weapon systems utilizes solid terrain.

Ground clutter. Characterized as a reduction of electromagnetic signal-to-noise ratio due to the

signature of a backg1round. It is different for each type of terrain or feature.

A-22. Fixed and rotary wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and possibly even UASs will use contour flying,

masking and ground clutter to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will also use

the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by using ground clutter and vegetation

as a backdrop to enhance concealment.

WEATHER ANALYSIS

A-23. Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of weather. Weather analysis for air and

missile defense operations is designed to predict the most likely time over target and other considerations

based on weather effects and light data.

A-24. Many of the same factors the G-2 or S-2 considers for ground operations are as follows:

Visibility has a significant impact on offensive air operations and ISR. Visibility has the same

effects on visually directed ADA systems and sensors.

High winds will hinder maneuver, close air support, and target engagement, especially in tight

air avenues of approach. Missiles and UASs will be adversely affected in performance and

accuracy.

Precipitation affects aircraft, missile, and UAS performance and reduces the effectiveness of

sensors. Precipitation reduces ADA sensor range.

Cloud cover and ceilings may restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings and

restricting visibility and target engagement.

Low ceilings, overcast, and clouds may restrict visually directed ADA weapons' detection and

acquisition ranges.

Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and UASs by decreasing

combat range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing aircraft) and ordnance loads.

EVALUATE THE THREAT

A-25. Threat evaluation for air operations consists of a detailed study of enemy air capabilities,

organization, and doctrine. The following steps should be used when evaluating the threat:

Collect and analyze doctrinal threat data.

Analyze enemy air capabilities.

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Conduct target evaluation.

COLLECT AND ANALYZE DOCTRINAL THREAT DATA

A-26. Typical questions that should be answered during this step must also include the commander's intent,

guidance, critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. They are as follows:

What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the enemy's air operations?

Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression?

Where are previously reported missile launch positions? What are the likely targets? What are

the range, endurance, and profile of these systems?

What is the size of the ballistic missile brigade, battalion, and battery? Does it fire as a unit?

Does the enemy have mobile, fixed, or both types of launchers?

Where do friendly air and missile defense assets fit into the enemy's objectives? Do they need to

be destroyed or suppressed for the enemy plan to work? (Answers to these two questions may

result in modification to air avenues of approach.)

What is the enemy's air order of battle? How are the assets organized? (Knowledge of enemy

organization, and who has operational control, will indicate the importance of the area of

operations. For example, if the enemy's bombers are at theater level and are in the area of

operations, then that area is probably receiving the theater's main attack.)

Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack?

How will UASs be used, for example, battle damage assessment, attack, or ISR? What are the

associated profiles?

How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne, air assault or special

operations forces in conjunction with an air or ground attack? What sizes are these forces and to

what depth are they used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the enemy have the

capability to coordinate an air attack

(possibly with varied air threat platforms that can

overmatch friendly air and missile defense capability)?

What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds?

What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling points? If the enemy's

maximum range falls short of the area of operations, where is the enemy likely to stop and refuel

or be aerial refueled?

How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction?

At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions, and exit the target area?

What is the release authority of certain types of ordnance? (This is particularly important when

dealing with CBRNE threats.)

How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets?

How has the enemy historically fought?

Was asymmetrical threat operations considered?

ANALYZE ENEMY AIR CAPABILITIES

A-27. ADA units evaluate a broad range of order-of-battle data and enemy capabilities to include the

ground force and EW threat to ADA units. They also evaluate the answers to the following questions

concerning threat systems.

Ballistic Missiles

A-28. The following questions should be asked concerning the capabilities of threat ballistic missile

systems:

Performances (missile flight time, speed, trajectory, and launch restrictions)?

Location of surveyed launch sites?

Maximum and minimum ranges?

Circular error probable?

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 22