Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

Appendix A

Crew proficiency?

Reload and fire time? What is the number of ballistic missiles available per TEL?

Warhead type and size?

Guidance modes?

Sub-munitions release altitude?

Cruise missiles

A-29. The following questions should be asked concerning the capabilities of threat cruise missiles:

Performances (duration of flight, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?

Maximum and minimum ranges?

Circular error probable?

Targeting capabilities and type?

Contour flying capability?

Vulnerability to countermeasures?

Guidance modes?

Warhead type and size?

Aircraft

A-30. The following questions should be asked concerning the capabilities of air systems:

The enemy's capability to coordinate air-to-ground attacks?

The enemy's capability to coordinate air and artillery operations? Are ground forward air

controllers used?

The enemy's capabilities for suppression of friendly air and missile defense?

Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop and weapon load capacity)?

Endurance and range (ingress and egress altitudes and speeds)?

Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate?

Ability to conduct pop-up maneuvers? What is the standoff range?

Target acquisition capability, night and adverse-weather capability, and identification ranges?

The standoff ranges for cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles?

Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of sophistication)?

Navigational capability (type of radar; can it fly at night or in adverse conditions)?

Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, and location of staging bases)?

Loiter time (how long will it have on station over the target area)?

Countermeasures environment? For example, will standoff jammers, ground-based jammers,

reconnaissance or chaff-laying UASs, or aircraft degrade friendly air defense artillery systems?

How much do they conform to doctrine?

Ability of pilots to fly at night or perform contour flying? During peacetime did the pilot train on

wartime type missions?

Types and capabilities of threat ordnance? Each type of ordnance also should be evaluated for

the following:

Range (assume engagement at maximum range and two-thirds maximum range)?

Accuracy?

Release altitude (how high or low must the aircraft fly)?

Reload and fire time. What is the number of missiles available?

Warhead type (for example, mass casualty, conventional, and sub-munitions)?

What is the release altitude?

Guidance modes (how does the pilot acquire and engage)?

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Unmanned aircraft systems

A-31. The following questions should be asked concerning the capabilities of threat UASs:

Performances (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?

Endurance and range?

Contour flying or terrain limiting factors?

Target acquisition and standoff range?

Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load mixture)?

Loiter time (how long can the UAS stay on station)?

Visibility effects on acquisition?

Modes of recovery and turnaround time?

Real-time, data-link capability?

Guidance modes (ground controlled and preprogrammed)?

Crew proficiency?

CONDUCT TARGET VALUE EVALUATION

A-32. This should determine what targets are to be labeled as high-value targets. High-value targets are

assets the enemy or friendly commander has deemed as important for the successful accomplishment of the

mission. High-value targets are determined by operational necessity and weapon system capability.

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

A-33. Determining both the enemy air and ground courses of action integrates the results of the previous

three steps into a meaningful conclusion. Given what enemy air and missile forces prefer to do, and the

effects of the operational environment, what are the enemy's likely objectives and what COA is available to

him? The G-2 or S-2 develops threat models that depict the enemy's air and missile COA. They also

prepare event templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying which COA the

enemy will execute. The process of developing these templates and matrices is covered in depth in FM 34-

130. The decision support template is an integrated staff product that results from the war-gaming of

potential friendly courses of action (FM 34-130).

SITUATION TEMPLATE

A-34. A situation template is a graphic depiction of expected enemy dispositions should they adopt a

particular COA. They usually depict the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the G-2 and

G-3. However, the G-2 or S-2 might prepare several templates representing different snapshots in time

starting with the initial threat array. The situation template integrates air attack and surveillance profiles

with terrain. It focuses on specific air avenues of approach and mobility corridors to determine which

avenues are the most capable of supporting specific attack techniques, profiles, and the most direct routes

to landing and drop zones to protect and ensure the survivability of air threat systems (FM 34-130).

EVENT TEMPLATE

A-35. An event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning. It

depicts named areas of interest (NAI) where the commander expects to see certain activities of tactical

significance and is used to confirm or deny an enemy course of action. These NAI are based on the terrain

constraints on air approach routes to potential targets and analysis of the enemy’s attack and ISR profiles.

The G-2 or S-2 develops an event matrix to support the event template by providing details on the type of

activity expected in each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other

events on the battlefield. Examples of NAI include landing and drop zones, forward arming and refueling

points, forward staging areas, and previous BM launch locations (FM 34-130).

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A-7

Appendix A

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

A-36. A decision support template is based on the situation and event templates, event matrix, and the war

gaming of friendly COA results. A decision support template should depict the following-

Air avenues of approach.

Airborne and air assault objectives.

Landing and drop zones and largest size enemy element that could be employed at the zone.

Range of threat systems.

Range of friendly air and missile defense systems.

Target areas of interest (TAI).

Decision points (DP).

A-37. Air TAI and DP are determined in the same manner as for ground operations. However, due to the

high speeds of air systems, decision points must be placed significantly farther in advance of the TAI.

APPLYING IPB

A-38. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific

geographic setting. Applying the IPB process helps the commander apply and maximize combat power at

critical points in time and space by determining the enemy's likely COA and describing the environment

and its effects on operations. Preparation and continuous updates of the aerial portion of IPB are

fundamental to the execution of the air and missile defense and land force missions on the modern

battlefield.

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Appendix B

Threat

This appendix summarizes the air and missile threats facing Army ADA forces and

systems. The summaries are generic threat capability descriptions of near-term

threats (through 2010). The air and missile threats to be countered by Army ADA

systems include theater missiles

(ballistic, cruise, and air-to-surface), unmanned

aircraft systems, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing

aircraft, and large caliber rockets. The employment of WMD in missile warheads and

use of unmanned platforms are the asymmetric methods of aggression of primary

concern to Army ADA forces. The threat environment (threats to our systems/forces)

is also described.

OVERVIEW

B-1. The evolving theater air and missile threat will take on new, stressing characteristics in the 21st

century Figure B-1. The major threat to deployed U.S. forces in 2010 will continue to be that of regional

powers as they seek to dominate their respective regions. Adversaries will continue to closely observe

emerging U.S. capabilities in an effort to identify and exploit weaknesses using asymmetric approaches.

Chemical, biological, Radiological, nuclear weapons proliferation⎯and their delivery means (particularly

ballistic and cruise missiles), stealth capabilities, and the employment of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)

will improve their military forces and the asymmetric options available to them when facing the U.S. and

its allies and coalition partners.

B-2. Fundamental capabilities that 21st century adversaries may pursue to counter U.S. strengths include,

but are not limited to, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), unmanned reconnaissance, surveillance and

target acquisition (ISR) platforms, UAS, large numbers of inexpensive rockets, low-observable cruise

missiles, and information warfare. Some states may rely on asymmetric capabilities as a substitute for, or

complement to, large conventional forces. Regional competition reinforces the perceived need to acquire

unmanned systems that provide high operational effectiveness for nominal cost.

B-3. Transformation planning must start with the evaluation of the global threat environment. Knowledge

of this environment enables AMD planners to focus resources on countering the threat. The following

perceptions of combat operations widely held within the U.S. and abroad, have been filtered through the

lens of Desert Storm, Bosnia and Kosovo. These perceptions, however, do not represent future military

reality. The U.S. conducts deliberate actions and dictates the tempo of these actions. U.S. systems and

technology are so advanced that opponents are virtually helpless to respond or retaliate by traditional

means.

B-4. Close combat operations (except for WWII, Korea and Vietnam) are based on low casualties, a

secure homeland, precision attacks and a relatively short duration of conflict. U.S. military forces have a

significant advantage in almost every measurable area.

THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

B-5. The multi-polar nature of today’s strategic environment is likely to continue at least for the next two

decades. By 2015, regional powers will emerge on the global scene as both developed and developing

states move into global networks of economic interest. This will create a strategic framework for friction as

cultures, religions, governments, economies, and people collide in a highly competitive global market.

Alliances and political alignments will change as nations within regions seek to form strategic partnerships

in an increasingly global economy.

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B-1

Appendix B

B-6. The key powers in a regional and global context will most likely be the United States, the European

Union, China, Japan, and Russia. Future alliances, coalitions, and partnerships will most likely be made

with these nations. Key regional powers with the greatest potential for creating global consequences are

most likely Indonesia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Mexico. The

implication is not that these nations represent the most powerful in a given region, but that certain

countries/regions have assumed a growing significance in the global setting.

B-7. Of the 192 Nation-States in the world today, as many as 30 have the potential to fail because they

cannot meet the needs of their populations, or because of ethnic, cultural or religious friction. Failure of a

state(s) will cause instability in a region and possibly have worldwide ramifications for the U.S. and its

allies. It is probable that within the next ten years the Koreas will reunite by either peaceful of violent

means. Such changes will affect world geopolitical and economic reality. There have been more than 50

ethnic wars, 170 border conflicts and 2 major wars involving extra regional forces in the past 10 years.

Violence on a national, transnational and sub national level will continue.

B-8. During the period from the present to 2015, The Army will operate in a geostrategic environment of

considerable instability, driven by significant demographic, geopolitical, economic and technological

dynamics. The realities of this environment will force the Army to remain engaged in a wide variety of

missions. Despite this instability, it is quite possible the U.S. will enjoy a period of relative strategic calm

in which no single conventional foreign power can threaten its survival. This is by no means a certainty,

however, as regional alliances and reallocation of spending could quickly change military capabilities.

What is certain is that numerous opponents will have the capability and the desire to challenge U.S.

interests on a regional basis.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT

B-9. State interests will determine the nature and scope of any future conflict. Adversaries will study how

we fight and develop appropriate doctrine/capabilities to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in our force

projection strategy. The potential for a high-intensity Major Theater of War will exist to 2015 and beyond,

Major Regional Crises requiring combat operations are highly probable, and Small-Scale Contingencies

will be a certainty. The Army must therefore be ready to fight across the full spectrum of conflict against

any foe, regardless of the environment. The threat will strike in unconventional and unexpected ways. U.S.

forces will have to deal with terrorists’ attacks, sophisticated ambushes, and other complex variables of the

operational environment.

Threat Tactics And Objectives

B-10. Most operations against the U.S. will be force oriented and focus on our universally perceived

strategic center of gravity—mass casualties and the resultant on our national resolve.

Denying Entry

B-11. One of the prime objectives of future Threat forces is to prevent U.S. forces from gaining entry into

the theater. The threat will want to establish a rapid tempo early on to achieve objectives and prevent U.S.

from establishing a foothold in the region. The enemy will seek to interdict U.S. forces attempting to enter

the conflict area using all means available. If the U.S. successfully gains entry, the enemy will seek battle

in complex terrain and urban environments as a way of offsetting U.S. advantages, particularly its principle

operating construct of standoff/long-range precision fires.

INTEGRATED INFORMATION AND DECEPTION PLANS

B-12. Threat forces will be capable of supporting camouflage and deception operations at all levels

throughout all battlefield operating systems. Potential adversaries will consider deception operations

imperative when fighting a U.S. force—they will try to convince U.S. commanders that conventional

tactics are being used, thereby making them vulnerable to unconventional tactics. The enemy will be

difficult to predict as it adapts and attempts to create opportunity. Coalitions, both friendly and adversarial,

will be used to limit the nature of operations. Commercial, space based ISR systems will be used to support

precision targeting and increased situational awareness. In many cases the threat could reduce “logistics

B-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Threat

signature” by pre-positioning supplies. The threat will not see the use of chemical weapons as an escalation

of the conflict.

AMBUSHES

B-13. Threat forces will also plan, prepare and execute sophisticated ambushes against U.S. forces moving

toward defended areas. These ambushes will usually take place in complex terrain, where Threat forces can

canalize advancing U.S. units into minefields. Once the U.S. force encounters the minefields, unmanned

aerial vehicles (UASs) will be used to confirm U.S. force locations. Long range artillery rockets and

standoff attack helicopters are the preferred attack means, ensuring U.S. casualties while avoiding force-on-

force contact. Artillery rockets are ideal for delivering large quantities of WMD warheads, while attack

helicopters are the fastest means of transporting standoff firepower around the battlefield. Multiple

ambushes will be planned and executed, and the combination of UASs for constant target acquisition/battle

damage assessment and the long range firepower of attack helicopters and artillery rockets pose significant

risk to the U.S. force.

Threat Capabilities

B-14. In the future, most nations will continue to improve and maintain military capabilities in line with

regional threats or opportunities. However, potential adversaries will also modernize their military

capabilities based on lessons learned from late 20th-century conflicts, particularly those involving the U.S.

Evidence exists that they will resort to a wide range of constantly modified, asymmetrically applied

conventional and unconventional tactics and capabilities to oppose the U.S. on the battlefield and to

interdict deployment of U.S. forces. Advances in information and missile technology (ballistic as well as

cruise missiles), weapons of mass destruction, genetic engineering, and an increasingly competitive global

economy will fuel continued military change. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

and long range delivery systems will enable adversaries to threaten each other at greater ranges, with

greater accuracy and lethality.

21st Century Threat Capabilities

B-15. The evolving threat will take on new, more challenging characteristics in the

21st century.

Adversaries will closely observe emerging U.S. capabilities in an effort to identify and exploit weaknesses

using asymmetric approaches. An asymmetric approach uses simple counters to negate U.S. capabilities

and avoid a direct match with U.S. strengths. Fundamental capabilities that 21st-century adversaries may

pursue to counter U.S. strengths include weapons of mass destruction; intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) via unmanned aircraft systems (UASs); precision strike technology; large caliber

rockets; cruise missiles; and information warfare (see Figure B-1). Some countries will rely on asymmetric

capabilities as a substitute for, or complement to, large conventional forces. Regional competition will

reinforce the perceived need to acquire unmanned systems that provide high operational effectiveness at a

nominal cost, as a substitute for manned aircraft. Emerging Technology Cyberspace and microelectronics

are enhancing today’s and tomorrow’s capabilities. Potential adversaries can purchase technologically-

advanced equipment that allows them to upgrade their capabilities and regional position quickly.

B-16. The best state-of-threat equipment in the world is routinely offered for sale at trade shows, via

foreign military sales, and through the Internet. Everything is available on the Internet—from sophisticated

cruise missiles, to TBM components, to satellite imagery. The microelectronics revolution has given

potential adversaries numerous means of providing their lethal systems with real-time targeting data.

Online commercially available satellite imagery, cable network news, and unmanned aerial platforms fill in

many of the gaps in intelligence that previously degraded the threat targeting capability.

25 November 2009

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B-3

Appendix B

Figure B-1. Platforms and payloads

Theater Air And Missile Threat

B-17.

The emerging

air and missile threat is diverse and complex, encompassing a wide range of missiles,

rockets, projectiles,

and aerial platforms. The

number of countries developing nuclear,

chemical, and

biological weapons

is unconstrained, and delivery systems

with increasing range and accuracy are

proliferating. The air and missile threats discussed in this chapter are concise and unclassified. Additional

classified information on producers, users and more specific characteristics and capabilities is available in

the references provided at the end of each threat category (references will be incorporated at

a later date).

Tactical Ballistic Missiles

B-18.

TBMs include

short-range ballistic missiles with ranges

up to 1,000 kilometers and

medium-range

ballistic missiles with ranges from

1,000 to 3,000 kilometers. These are surface-launched missiles with

ballistic trajectories. TBMs, often

launched from highly mobile, difficult-to-detect transporter erector

launchers, can carry

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Most TBMs

are single-stage missiles with

an estimated circular error probable accuracy of one-tenth of one percent

of the range.

State-of-the-art

guidance technologies, such as the

global positioning system and GLONASS, can increase

this accuracy to

less than 50 meters (Figure B-2).

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Threat

Figure B-2. Tactical ballistic missiles

What

Makes TBMs Threatening?

B-19. TBMs are inherently difficult to defend against. Characteristics

that increase

TBM survivability

include a small

radar cross section, high terminal velocity, short notification time for

defending forces, a

variety of difficult-to-kill warheads, and an all-weather salvo launch capability.

Rockets, Artillery, And Mortars

B-20. Though rockets and artillery are organic to field artillery units and

mortars to infantry units, they are

grouped together because they

exhibit similar characteristics and trends. They are expected to remain the

most serious threat to personnel and to all

but the most heavily protected vehicles and other equipment.

Advances in munitions and delivery systems have increased their ranges and lethality. The advent of

artillery-delivered, high precision munitions

(ADHPM) makes the

mounted and armored

forces

increasingly vulnerable to artillery indirect fire (Figure B-3).

25 November 2009

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B-5

Threat

Figure B-4. Large caliber rockets

B-22. Rockets can deliver high

rates of fire

and a variety of warheads, making them ideal weapon systems

for fire support

missions. The highly mobile launchers

can rapidly move around

the battlefield. This

mobility, coupled with the rockets’ short burn time, gives maneuver forces little warning. Their short

range

and salvo capability preclude engagement by

current missile defense systems.

Cannon Artillery

And Mortars

B-23. Artillery

and mortars are recognized

as systems of systems—each is not effective if one

of its

components (weapon, C2, reconnaissance, and munitions)

is deficient. Thus, countries are upgrading and

improving deficient components rather than

replacing the entire systems.

What

Makes Cannon Artillery

And Mortars Threatening?

B-24. Cannon artillery and mortars possess high firepower and a variety of warheads. The advent of

ADHPM represents a force multiplier, allowing smaller

forces to rapidly and accurately attack

larger

mechanized forces.

Aerodynamic Missiles

B-25. Aerodynamic missiles include cruise missiles and tactical air-to-surface missiles.

Though regarded as

distinctly separate threats, the

application of

new technologies has given cruise missiles and tactical

air-to-

surface missiles virtually identical capabilities.

25 November 2009

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B-7

Appendix B

Cruise Missiles

B-26.

Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-guided vehicles that maintain sustained flight

at one or more

predetermined constant (cruise) altitudes. These missiles carry

a warhead or other lethal payload. There are

two types of cruise

missiles: anti-ship and land

attack. The Army is most concerned with

the land attack

versions (Figure B-5).

Figure B-5. Characteristics of cruise missiles

B-27.

Cruise missiles are reliable,

accurate, survivable, and lethal. They can be launched from the land, air,

or sea; in flight, they

are difficult to

detect, can fly indirect routes at low altitudes to avoid heavily defended

areas,

and can attack

from any direction. Today’s cruise missile can hit a target with remarkable accuracy;

tomorrow’s smarter,

maneuverable, more accurate missile will

pose a far greater threat. Cruise missiles are

ideal for striking high-value targets in highly defended areas, since aircraft and aircrews are

not put at risk

Although only a few countries have operational land attack

cruise missiles in their inventories today,

Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, South Africa, and China have ongoing development programs and

are aggressive arms

exporters. Many of the cruise missiles in

development

should become operational in

the next five to ten years.

What Makes Cruise Missiles Threatening?

B-28.

Emerging cruise missiles pose a serious threat because

of their unique operational

characteristics.

New technologies used in airframe and warhead

design and in

propulsion and guidance systems increase

their lethality. Stronger and lighter

airframes made of composite materials give these missiles a lower radar

cross

section; also, low-observable

and stealth technologies are now available to further reduce the radar

cross section.

B-29.

The use of air-breathing turbojet and turbofan engines has given cruise missiles a longer range, and

the capability to fly

at high, subsonic speeds and altitudes as

low as 50 meters above ground level. Their

flight

paths can be

programmed

using sophisticated guidance systems such as the global positioning

system, the inertial navigation system, and terrain

contour matching; guidance

systems contribute to overall

accuracy, optimize surprise and help avoid air defenses. A terminal guidance

seeker can increase accuracy

to less

than 10 meters. A wide

array of conventional warheads, including individually

targetable sub

munitions, allows targeting of both soft and hard targets. Weapons of mass destruction

pose the most

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25 November 2009

Threat

serious threat, but currently only Russia, France, and the

United States

have cruise missiles with nuclear

warheads.

B-30. However,

the development of a chemical or biological warhead

is not difficult. The May

1997

Quadrennial Defense Review

noted that the

use of weapons of mass destruction is a

likely condition of

future warfare and that these weapons could

be delivered by several means, including cruise missiles.

B-31. While land attack cruise missiles pose the greatest

threat, submarine-launched cruise missiles

are a

potential threat

to the United

States in the foreseeable future. Some 19

countries currently produce

cruise

missiles, and several more have production capability. At least 54 others

countries have

some type of

cruise

missiles (mostly

anti-ship) in their arsenals, and the trend toward land attack types is growing. A significant

number of both

land and anti-ship cruise missiles can be submarine launched, and at least three countries of

concern (China,

Iran, and North Korea) have submarines. Submarine-launched cruise

missiles provide a

viable asymmetrical attack option against U.S. ports and the U.S. homeland.

Tactical Air-To-Surface Missiles

B-32. These missiles are air-launched, precision-guided munitions designed to strike ground targets.

. They

are ideal against

targets that are difficult to destroy with conventional “dumb” bombs such as bridges. They

are similar to air-launched cruise missiles, but are smaller, have shorter ranges,

lack the wings and

aerodynamic lifts associated

with cruise missile flights, and are launched by tactical fighter-bomber

aircraft. The former Soviet Union and Free

World countries widely export tactical air-to-surface missiles,

and the missiles

are operational in numerous

air forces around the world (Figure B-6).

Figure B-6. Characteristics of tactical air-to-surface missiles

What

Makes Tactical Air-To-Surface Missiles Threatening?

B-33. Tactical air-to-surface missiles are an

extremely lethal threat because of their versatility and pinpoint

accuracy. Most

threat variants are of Soviet or Russian origin and

employ radio-command,

laser,

antiradiation homing, or electro-optical guidance systems. Missiles that employ antiradiation homing

systems are referred to as antiradiation missiles (ARMs);

they represent

the greatest threat to AMD, field

artillery (counter-battery), aviation, and intelligence radars. Most have ranges of more

than 100 kilometers.

An aircraft firing an ARM will usually launch from outside the lethal envelope of the

air defense system

defending the asset. Laser-guided systems provide the least

standoff protection because

of their short

range,

generally less than 10 kilometers. Electro-optical or video-guided systems and ARMs offer the greatest

25 November 2009

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B-9

Appendix B

standoff range and aircraft survivability factor. Some electro-optical systems

have ranges of approximately

100 kilometers.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)

B-34.

UASs include

drones, characterized by

preprogrammed flight paths

and patterns, and remotely

piloted

vehicles, controlled by ground-based operators. Each

can perform a

variety of missions, ranging

from reconnaissance

and battlefield

surveillance to attack and electronic warfare (Figure B-7).

Figure B-7. Characteristics

of unmanned aircraft systems

What Makes UASs Threatening?

B-35.

UASs serve as ISR platforms for target

detection, identification, and

location; weapon targeting;

target

designation; and battle damage assessment. State-of-the-art sensors and data links provide real-time

targeting for fire support systems, maneuver forces, and aircraft. UASs equipped with laser designators

provide immediate targeting of assets for attack by smart munitions and field

artillery.

B-36.

UASs have relatively low radar cross sections, low speed, and low thermal signatures, thus making

them difficult to detect, track, and

engage. Mission-dictated flight profiles take full advantage of terrain,

increasing system survivability and optimizing coverage. Flight altitudes are

normally between 1,000 and

3,000

meters above

ground level. UASs conducting ISR missions fly at altitudes safe from

small arms fire.

In addition, UASs can stand off and detect from up to 25 kilometers.

B-37.

UAS payloads

consist of daylight television, infrared video, and film

cameras (for

reconnaissance

missions). Other major payload categories include electronic

warfare, electronic intelligence, radar, and

attack

warheads. Several nations are developing

and fielding antiradiation homing UASs with the primary

mission of attacking

battlefield radio frequency emitters (radars, communications). These platforms have

variety

of launch options and are

usually fire-and-forget systems. Other attack UASs employ terminal

guidance to kill tanks or fighting vehicles.

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Threat

Helicopters

B-38. Most countries maintain helicopter

fleets to support military operations. While the majority of

helicopters can

be armed to perform a variety of roles, the attack helicopter poses the greatest threat to

maneuver forces. The versatility and survivability of helicopters make them ideal for

use in most combat

areas (Figure B-8).

Figure

B-8. Helicopters

What

Makes Helicopters Threatening?

B-39. Threat ground force commanders

rely primarily

on helicopters to fulfill

direct air support

requirements. Helicopters can

perform a variety of missions. Hovering

and low-flying

helicopters,

taking

full advantage

of terrain masking, are difficult to acquire and target. Better fire control and weapon

capabilities will

enable helicopters to search, acquire, and fire at ground targets from longer standoff

ranges, thus increasing their survivability and

effectiveness

Fixed-Wing Aircraft

B-40. Air power

remains essential to virtually every type

of military operation, and despite the emergence

TBMs and cruise missiles,

it will continue to play a key role in future conflicts. There are more than

40,000 operational military aircraft today; of

these, some 10,000 (many produced during the Cold War era)

are in Third World inventories. Some 45 countries have an

aviation industry of some kind, and 21 countries

design their own

aircraft. Today, the United

States, France, and Russia are the leading exporters of combat

aircraft (Figure B-9).

25 November 2009

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B-11

Appendix B

Figure B-9. Fixed-wing aircraft

What Makes Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Threatening?

B-41.

Fixed-wing combat aircraft

are highly flexible and can perform a

variety of missions in both

offensive and defensive operations: air interdiction, strategic attack, suppression of enemy

air defense, and

air support. Fixed-wing aircraft can employ a variety of munitions, including guns,

rockets, cruise

missiles, and tactical

air-to-surface

missiles. Integrated navigation/bombing computers and

related mission

equipment provide new combat aircraft with a precision-strike capability day

or night and in

bad weather.

B-42.

New aircraft incorporate such features as

radar warning

receivers, on-board jammers, chaff, flares,

and a

lower radar

cross section

to improve survivability and mission success rate. In addition, the

proliferation of fixed-wing aircraft

throughout the world increases the probability that opposing forces may

employ the same aircraft in a conflict; this will further exacerbate the already challenging problem of

identification.

STRATEGIC THREAT

B-43.

Despite the end of the Cold

War, the threat of accidental, unauthorized, or limited

strategic strikes

against the United

States exists.

. Intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs) and submarine-launched

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are a threat to the United States—

they carry nuclear warheads and employ

variety

of penetration

aids.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

B-44.

Although the

only current ICBM producers are the United States, Russia, North Korea, and China,

several countries are

developing production capabilities. Thus,

the threat to the United States continues to

grow.

Other countries developing

ballistic missiles are likely

to also develop various responses to U.S

defenses. Developing countries would probably rely on available Russia

or Chinese

countermeasure

technologies such as

separating reentry vehicles,

spin stabilizing reentry vehicles, radar absorbing material,

low-power jammers, and simple (balloon) decoys

(Figure B-10).

B-12

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Threat

Figure B-10. Intercontinental

ballistic missiles

B-45. Rudimentary technologies from earlier versions of U.S. and Soviet missiles are more readily

available and are adequate for use by nations not overly

concerned with missile accuracy, reliability, or

safety. The increased availability of technical assistance from other nations and of classified information

related to ballistic missiles and weapons of

mass destruction will short-cut development programs.

Once

launched, ICBMs are difficult to defeat. Their targets may be strategic

or political,

civilian or military.

ICBMs will most likely use nuclear warheads, and many

systems (currently only Russian ones) will

carry

multiple reentry

vehicles. Projected improvements include mobile basing, improved reliability, increased

accuracy, and improved penetration aids.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)

B-46. The United States, France, Russia,

and China currently produce SLBMs.

Submarine mobility

provides launch

location options unavailable to ICBM

forces and makes detection difficult. SLBMs

provide ICBM capabilities with the added advantages of better hiding, shorter flight times, and depressed

reentry angles.

Targets will generally be identical to those of ICBMs. Projected SLBM improvements

include more sophisticated payloads and guidance systems, improved

reliability, increased range, and

improved penetration aids.

SPACE SYSTEMS

B-47. Space is the new high ground for operations. Space

systems are emerging as key

force multipliers—

they are critical

to the tactical,

operational, and strategic levels of warfighting. Space systems consist

of the

space mission element, the ground support element, and the control linkage between them. A separate but

necessary adjunct is the space

launch facility. Current military operations

dating back to

the 1991 Gulf War

illustrate the criticality of assuring our access to space and

space systems while denying it to our enemies.

Space system

functions include communications support, weather prediction, navigation support,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (Figure B-11).

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

B-13

Appendix B

Figure B-11. Characteristics of space systems

What Makes Space Systems Threatening?

B-48.

Until recently, space systems represented

revolutionary

technology

that only nation states could

afford. Today, many

of the capabilities that were

once the sole

purview of the military are

available on the

international market. Worldwide access to space

system resources is available through purchasing, leasing,

renting, or time-sharing available

assets from

one of the space developer nations or

consortia. The

commercial sector—not the Federal Government—now drives advancements in satellite

technology and

products.

B-49.

The “leveling”

of global technology and the multibillion-dollar space industry have spawned a robust

commercial industry

our adversaries can use to support a variety of military or terrorist operations. Over the

next 10 years, more than 30 commercial or government-sponsored imaging satellites are planned for

launch. The sheer number of these new satellites, and the fact that most are foreign or consortia owned,

diminishes the ability of the United States to impose political

constraints on the use of satellite imagery

products. These new

commercial imaging capabilities will allow an adversary

to challenge

the U.S. force’s

ability

to achieve strategic and tactical surprise and to gain and sustain information superiority.

B-14

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25 November 2009

Appendix C

Air and Missile Defense Planning

This appendix describes the Air and Missile defense planning process and the

specific requirements of the AMD estimate and AMD annex. The estimate process

assists the force commander in decision-making. The end result of the planning

process is the AADP annex detailing ADA support for the concept of the operation.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PLANNING

C-1. Air and missile defense planning is a distributed process occurring at all echelons. The JFC, or if

delegated, the JFACC or AADC will task components to develop a detailed prioritized list of defended

assets. The AAMDC commander in the roles of TAAMDCOORD and DAADC (AMD) is involved in this

development process by assisting the ARFOR and AADC in the planning and coordination of the critical

asset list (CAL) and creating the defended asset list (DAL). The JFC or JFACC/AADC goes through a

staffing process with the components to merge all priorities into a single list.

C-2. The AADC develops the AADP for the theater. The DAADC (AMD) assists the AADC with the

AADP development. In the role of DAADC (AMD), the TAAMDCOORD, with input from the fire support

element and the Army airspace command and control element, assists the JFLCC’s staff (J3 and J5) in

providing recommendations on Army critical asset priorities, ADA priorities, and resource allocation to

support the JFC’s air and missile defense concept.

C-3. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command is the Army’s focal point for planning, coordinating,

integrating, and executing TAMD operations. EAC ADA brigades conduct defense planning and task

organize forces to protect assigned assets from the DAL. ADA battalions continue to refine these plans and

further task organize to execute air and missile defense operations. Also, the TAAMDCOORD advises the

COMARFOR/JFLCC on the employment of the EAC ADA brigade to ensure integration into the theater

air and missile defense plan. When necessary, corps commanders may be tasked to protect theater assets on

the DAL located in the corps area using corps ADA forces.

C-4. As in the offense, the commander needs to mass enough forces at the critical place and time to defeat

the enemy's airborne platform attack and deny aerial surveillance of friendly forces. The AMD plan

addresses air defense protection of shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations. Lateral coordination helps

to preclude coverage gaps in the defense along boundaries. Depending on the size and the mission of the

covering force, the AMD plan may allocate some air defense to the covering force. If the covering force's

mission is to destroy the lead elements of the enemy force, the Avenger is the more mobile weapon system.

If the covering force is merely a screening force providing information, over-watching fires from air

defense systems farther back may suffice.

C-5. ADA units may be allocated to protect reserve or counterattack forces, C2 nodes and logistics

facilities. If the division is defending against the enemy main attack, ADA systems may be moved forward

to achieve the mass and early engagement capability needed to defeat the likely attack helicopter, CM, and

UAS threat. If the division is defending against what becomes a supporting attack, ADA systems can be

moved to rearward positions to protect forces not committed to combat. The AMD plan must support

contingency options to enable rapid transition from defensive to offensive operations. AMD plans are

synchronized with the supported force and coordinated with higher and lower ADA echelons and adjacent

ADA units.

C-6. The factor of METT-TC influences integrated air and missile defense planning from theater through

battalion level and permits reinforcement of the synchronization process. The type of theater and defensive

operation provide the framework for METT-TC analysis. The type of theater can affect our ability to

collect intelligence and targeting information on the enemy. It also affects the deployment of friendly

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

C-1

Appendix C

forces and the development timeline. The integrated planning process and products are depicted in Figure

C-1.

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN

EAC

METT-TC

JTAMD PLANS

CORPS OPERATIONS PLAN

CORPS

CORPS AMD ANNEX

DIVISION OPERATIONS PLAN

DIVISION

DIVISION AMD ANNEX

BRIGADE OPERATIONS PLAN

BRIGADE

BRIGADE AMD ANNEX

BATTALION OPERATIONS PLAN

BATTALION

BATTALION AMD ANNEX

Figure C-1. Integrated air and missile defense planning

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

C-7. The ADA commander considers METT-TC, IPB, and the supported commander's intent, concept of

operations, and develops AMD priorities. The ADA commander submits these priorities to the maneuver

commander for approval. Priorities are based on the factors of criticality, vulnerability, and threat (CVT).

CVT is the methodology used to evaluate each asset on the critical asset list (CAL). This methodology

employs objective criteria and quantifies the level of importance of each asset. The CVT methodology

assists the commander in identifying those assets to be protected from attack using available ADA

resources and accepting risk as necessary. The CVT is a mission, location, and command influenced

process, the numbers and weights, are changeable as required by the commanders’ intent or as the changing

mission dictates.

C-8. Criticality is the degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission accomplishment.

Determination of the criticality of an asset or force is made by assessing the impact on the conduct of the

operation that would result from damage to the asset or force. The degree of criticality is based on whether

damage to the asset or force prevents, seriously interferes with, or causes only limited interference with the

execution of the plan.

C-9. Vulnerability consists of two parts: susceptibility to damage, if attacked, and recuperability.

Susceptibility to damage is further subdivided into two parts: hardness and dispersion. Consideration

should be given to the asset or force’s hardness and its ability to disperse or displace to another position.

Recuperability is the degree to which an asset or force can recover from inflicted damage in terms of time,

equipment, and available manpower to continue its mission.

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FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Air and Missile Defense Planning

C-10. Threat is the assessed probability of an asset or force being targeted for surveillance or attack by

enemy air and missile threats. The use of threat information, to develop AMD priorities, is a reverse IPB

process—what we expect enemy air to detect and attack, based on IPB. Targeting information provided by

intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack methods, and enemy doctrine is useful in

evaluating AMD priorities. To determine the relative importance of assets and forces, the commander

considers certain characteristics, which make an asset or force a lucrative target for the enemy. In effect,

this is reverse target value analysis. Intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack methods,

and enemy doctrine are useful in assessing the probability that an asset or force will be targeted by the

threat. This is, in effect, reverse target analysis.

Theater-Level Critical Asset Lists

C-11. The critical asset list (CAL) is a prioritized list of critical assets identified by phase of the operation.

This list is developed by the J3/J5 with input from the components of the joint forces. They identify

candidate assets to be protected from attack. The JFC or combatant commander approves the CAL listing

and it is included in the OPLAN and AADP. The CAL development process evaluates critical assets based

on CVT, ADA resources, possible defense designs, and the elements of risk to develop the defended asset

list (DAL).

Defended Asset List

C-12. The defended asset list (DAL) is a JFC-approved prioritized listing of assets by phase that are to

receive AMD protection. This list is included in the OPLAN and the area AADP. The DAL specifies

required levels of protection for each asset. The DAL may be developed by the AADC with component

input but normally the AADC delegates the DAL process to the DAADC (AMD). The DAADC (AMD)’s

DAL recommendation (with component commanders input) is submitted through the AADC to the JFC for

approval. Figure C-2 depicts the process used to develop the DAL.

JFC JTMD Guidance

Priorities

CAL

DAL

Concept of Operations

J5 Planning Staff

AADC/DAADC

JTMD Responsibility

NAVFOR

AFFOR

CRITICAL

DEFENDED

ASSET

ARFOR

ASSET

LIST

CVT

MARFOR

LIST

ARFOR

DEFENSE DESIGN

CRITICAL

JSOTF

ASSETS

AMD RESOURCES

Conducted during

RISK

Reprioritization

MDMP

Board

Figure C-2. CAL-DAL development process

Defense Designs

C-13. Defense designs are the implementation of AMD plans. Defense designs are the detailed positioning

of the ADA systems, radar, launchers, and communications to maximize the defense of defended assets.

Through defense designs, available ADA assets are arrayed to provide required levels of protection for

25 November 2009

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C-3

Appendix C

assets on the DAL. Defense planning is a top down interactive process that covers the full range of AMD

operations from the JFC to the fire unit level. The objective of defense planning is to protect the force and

critical assets in accordance with the DAL priorities. This process ensures effective ADA coverage for

assets on the prioritized DAL utilizing all ADA systems available.

ACTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

C-14. Army ADA units will be positioned by the appropriate ground force commander in defense of

critical assets relative to suspected threat approach avenues or azimuths. Because of their limited numbers,

ADA resources are allocated based on specific air and missile defense priorities. The AAMDC provides the

air and missile defense annex to the ARFOR or JFLCC plan. In the air and missile defense plan, EAC ADA

brigades normally will protect priority assets from the combatant commander's defended asset list. ADA

commanders design defenses and task organize forces to protect designated priority assets.

PASSIVE DEFENSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

C-15. Passive measures are an essential part of air and missile defense planning at all levels. All units

conduct passive actions in conjunction with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the

effectiveness of the enemy air threat. The AAMDC has an ADA passive defense cell with the necessary

personnel and equipment to support the TAAMDCOORD.

C-16. The AMDCOORD evaluates and recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver

commander's plans and SOPs. The AMDCOORD recommends measures that may deceive, frustrate, and

surprise enemy air and surveillance assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at

night, developing an early warning system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing emissions

control

(EMCON) procedures. Some examples at the tactical level are employing radar scattering

camouflage, utilizing early warning instead of local sensors, and locating units on revetted or otherwise

prepared sites.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

C-17. Air and missile defense planning at the operational level is an interactive process. The same planning

process will occur regardless of whether the Air Force, Navy or the Marine Corps is providing the majority

of the air assets.

C-18. When the AAMDC is in theater, normally the AAMDC commander will be designated the DAADC

(AMD) and will be the principal integrator for the JFLCC to the AADC on all air and missile defense

aspects Figure C-3. An AAMDC liaison team works closely with the AADC and their staff and the BCD to

accomplish air and missile defense integration. The BCD air defense section coordinates its activities with

the AAMDC LNO team. The BCD air defense section may also augment the AAMDC LNO team as

needed. The BCD accomplishes coordination when the AAMDC is not in theater, which locates part of its

staff with the joint air operations center JAOC.

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25 November 2009

Air and Missile Defense Planning

Figure C-3. AAMDC integration with JAOC and BCD

C-19. The JFLCC, through the AAMDC commander in the DAADC (AMD) role, provides an air and

missile defense estimate to the AADC. The BCD may perform this handoff function when the AAMDC is

not in theater. With JFC guidance, the JFACC in coordination with the component commanders develops

the air operations plan.

C-20. The BCD establishes the ARFOR liaison and interface with the JFACC. The BCD eases the

coordination and synchronization of the JFACC air and ARFOR ground operations. The BCD performs its

mission by (1) exchanging operational and intelligence data between the JFACC and COMARFOR and (2)

interpreting the land battle situation for the JFACC and the air operations situation for the COMARFOR. If

the JFACC is from the USN or the USMC the BCD has a contingency mission to deploy support teams

with the USN JAOC and/or Marine tactical air command center to give the same BCD functional area links

as in the USAF JAOC. If the COMARFOR is not the JFLCC, the BCD will coordinate with the agency

determined by the JFLCC. The BCD may also be tasked by the JFLCC to provide JFLCC input to the

JFACC. The JFLCC organizes the BCD based on the type of theater and the JAOC organization. In force-

projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCD. The BCD

provides ARFOR or, if JFLCC directed, JFLCC input into the air operations planning process. Army air

and missile defense contributions are planned and coordinated through the AAMDC, EAC ADA brigade,

corps, and division CPs. Refer to FM 100-13 for a more detailed discussion of the BCD.

C-21. The AADC develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates assets for various missions (see

Figure C-4). The JFLCC's TAAMDCOORD determines whether the corps has sufficient air and missile

defense resources or if the JFLCC should allocate additional theater Army air defense assets for protection

of the corps. The TAAMDCOORD may also recommend that the JFLCC allocate corps air and missile

defense resources to protect theater assets. The TAAMDCOORD recommends to the JFLCC which assets

Army ADA units can protect and which assets require other component or multinational coverage. The

AAMDC is the only Army organization properly staffed and equipped to ensure AMD integration and is

normally collocated with the AADC. In the absence of the DAADC (AMD) when the AAMDC is not in

theater, the senior ADA commander will perform the AADC's DCA planning process. However, this is

normally a DAADC (AMD) function because the AAMDC has the necessary expertise, personnel, and

equipment to deploy to the AADC's location to accomplish AMD integration.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

C-5

Appendix C

Recommended AMD Priorities

Approved AMD Priorities

AAMDCOORD

Air and Missile

AAMDCOORD

IPB

Air and Missile

Defense Estimate

Defense Annex

IPB

Recommended

Approved OCA/TMD

Commander’s

Mission and

OCA/AMD Targeting

Targeting Priorities,

Approval

Commander’s

Prorities, Targets, and TAIs

Targets, and TAIs

Concept

IPB

Fire Support

FSCOORD

Estimate

Fire Support

Annex

Recommended Targeting Priorities,

Approved Targeting Priorities,

Targets, and TAIs

Figure C-4. Development of air defense and fire support annexes

C-22. The AAMDCs plan enables the JFLCC to finalize the air and missile defense and fire support

portions of the land operation plan. The JFLCC's priorities are the foundation for interdiction targeting. The

JFLCC's TAAMDCOORD develops the air and missile defense portion of the land operation plan.

C-23. The JFLCC allocates resources and assigns tasks to corps, which can sub-allocate assets and assign

air and missile defense missions to divisions. In each corps and division main CP, the G3 plans section

develops the maneuver plan. Within the G3 plans section, the AMDCOORD, with input from the G2, AC2

cell, and artillery’s fire direction center incorporates the air and missile defense mission into this maneuver

plan.

C-24. During the targeting process, the AMDCOORD, in conjunction with the G2, develops and

recommends OCA and AMD targeting priorities and nominates OCA and AMD targets and target areas of

interest (TAI). The AMDCOORD then develops and recommends AMD priorities to the commander for

approval. The air liaison officer participates in this process by recommending suppression of enemy and air

defense (SEAD) targets to the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD).

C-25. The FSCOORD and the AMDCOORD incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support annex

and the air and missile defense annex of the maneuver plan. The FSCOORD integrates OCA and AMD

targets, targeting priorities, and theater areas of interests into the force’s fire support plan. The

AMDCOORD includes the DCA and AMD active defense priorities and associated IPB products in the

development and coordination of the force's air and missile defense operation.

C-26. Coordination between AMDCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the OCA, DCA, and AMD

portions of the air and missile defense effort are complementary. The integration and synchronization of

DCA and AMD attack operations by the AMDCOORD and FSCOORD prevents mutual interference and

maximizes unity and economy of effort.

C-27. Coordination of OCA and AMD targets between the Army and the Air Force occurs at the AOC and

the control and reporting center (CRC). OCA, DCA, SEAD, and AMD plans are developed simultaneously

and in concert, not as separate, isolated plans. The OCA, DCA, SEAD, and AMD plans are an integral part

of the theater campaign plan and the maneuver plan at each Army echelon.

C-6

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25 November 2009

Air and Missile Defense Planning

AIR DEFENSE ESTIMATE AND ANNEX PROCESS

C-28. Estimates are evaluations of how factors in each field of interest will influence the courses of action

the commander considers. Estimates provide the basis for logically and analytically developing solutions to

situations (both in planning future operations and fighting current operations). The staff recommends how

the commander can employ the command's available assets. The commander uses this information to reach

decisions.

C-29. Once a mission is received, the estimate process begins. The ADA commander develops the air and

missile defense estimate in concert with the force S-3 or G-3. The ADA commander uses the IPB during

the estimate process. The ADA commander gathers and analyzes facts and makes assumptions. They will

use these facts and assumptions to develop logical courses of action. The commander then chooses the

course of action that will best support the mission.

C-30. After the force commander selects a course of action, the AMD planning process continues. The

result of this process is the air defense annex detailing AMD support for the concept of the operation.

AIR DEFENSE ESTIMATE FORMAT

C-31. The air defense estimate follows the basic staff estimate format. The air defense estimate provides

information regarding the air and missile defense supportability of proposed courses of action. It also

provides recommended air and missile defense priorities and an air and missile defense scheme of

maneuver. This information forms a basis for the AMD plan and is presented in the air defense annex.

C-32. The estimate must be constantly reevaluated to keep it current. The factors of METT-TC,

observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and other considerations guide the ADA

commander and staff during the estimate and subsequent planning. The degree of detail presented in the

estimate depends on the planning time available. However, all elements of the estimate must be considered

to make valid recommendations (see Figure C-5).

AIR DEFENSE ANNEX FORMAT

C-33. The estimate of the situation assists the commander in determining the most suitable course of action

to accomplish the mission. Once the commander makes this decision and clearly articulates the intent, the

staff prepares OPLANs and OPORDs.

C-34. The AMDCOORD must conduct detailed coordination with other staff sections to develop this

annex. The AMDCOORD derives information affecting the air defense annex from other staff estimates.

Additionally, the air defense estimate helps drive these other staff estimates.

C-35. The AMDCOORD writes the plan as a five-paragraph annex to the supported unit's OPLAN or

OPORD. The air defense annex assigns specific air and missile defense missions each unit must

accomplish. Concurrently or sequentially, ADA units may be preparing their own OPLANs or OPORDs

(see Figure C-6).

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

C-7

Appendix C

ESTIMATE OF THE AIR DEFENSE SITUATION

(Classification)

Headquarters

Place

Date, time, and zone

Message reference number

AIR DEFENSE ESTIMATE NUMBER____

References: Maps, charts, or other documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate:

1. MISSION

When the estimate's purpose is to support the force level commander's operation, use the force level

commander's mission statement. As the commander or operations officer, use the unit's mission

statement when the estimate's purpose is to determine which course of action best accomplishes the

support mission.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

This paragraph describes the conditions under which the unit will perform its mission and the possible

courses of action of the supported force.

(a) Characteristics of Area of Operation. For this paragraph, determine those factors of the

situation, which influence friendly and threat actions and which, therefore, may influence the choice of

a course of action. In the absence of facts, use logical assumptions that might directly affect the

mission. Includes analysis of the effects of pertinent characteristics on conducting air and missile

defense operations

1. Weather. Put the analysis of data from predicted weather and light conditions for the period

in this paragraph. Assess how the weather affects friendly operations. Also include the evaluation

of how weather and light conditions might affect the use of threat UASs; missiles; aircraft, both

fixed and rotary-wing; and airborne or air assault operations. Try to determine or predict when the

threat will probably use those assets due to the weather.

2. Terrain. Analyze the effects of terrain, including effects on observation and fire; cover and

concealment; movement (surface and air); employment of friendly and threat CBRNE weapons;

communications, electronic warfare and combat surveillance; unconventional warfare;

psychological operations; and other aspects of military operations. Determine key terrain and air

avenues of approach. Also discuss terrain features that limit air vehicle detection or target

acquisition and terrain that might canalize or force air targets to fly a particular profile. Try to

determine where the threat will most probably use air assets.

3. Other pertinent factors. List analysis of political, economic, sociological, psychological,

and other factors

(such as hydrograph, environment, communications, science, technology,

materiel, transportation, safety and accident prevention, and manpower). Include deduction about

their effects on friendly and threat operations.

Figure C-5. AMD estimate general format

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Air and Missile Defense Planning

AIR DEFENSE ESTIMATE NUMBER____

(b) Threat Forces. A threat evaluation discusses threat capabilities that are or may be a threat to

the operation.

1. Disposition. List locations of threat forces that will participate in air or missile operations or

that threaten friendly air and missile defense operations. Determine combinations of air platforms

that the threat may use when conducting a particular type of operation.

2. Composition. The threat organization for combat includes identity of units, types of air

platforms and missiles, and armament. Also address the expected number of sorties and missiles

to be flown per day, and possible composition of those sorties.

3. Strength. Consider numbers, sizes of committed and reinforcing units. Consider the

location of the threat, threat doctrine, and the unit's mission. Identify air and missile assets and air

support units that could or may affect the operation. When, where, and how many air platforms

will the threat fly during this operation?

4. Other considerations. Threat forces not discussed above.

5. Recent and present significant activities. Summarize recent threat activities that were

both successful and unsuccessful activities. Highlight any threat air activity to include number,

type of air platforms, and locations.

6. Peculiarities and weaknesses. Indicate threat peculiarities and weaknesses that might

influence combat effectiveness, including vulnerability to deception.

7. Threat courses of action. A compilation of available information from which to draw

conclusions about possible threat air courses of action and how they relate to the threat ground

courses of action.

strength. Highlight the vulnerability of the force to threat air and missile attacks and surveillance.

1. Friendly courses of action. State the force commander's course of action. Include any

guidance that affects air and missile defense operations. Include description of any phasing of

operations in the courses of action and the impact of those operations on support relationships or

requirements.

2. Current status of resources within staff area of responsibility. Report the status of personnel

and logistics in the unit. Identify civil-military operations requirements. Identify limitations that

affect or may affect the conduct of air and missile defense operations. Can the mission be

accomplished?

3. Current status of resources that affect AMD area of responsibility.

4. Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

5. Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

(d) Assumptions.

Figure C-5. AMD estimate general format (continued)

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C-9

Appendix C

AIR DEFENSE ESTIMATE NUMBER____

3. ANALYSIS

Analyze each COA using evaluation criteria to determine advantages and disadvantages. Identify

those aspects in the commander's plan, which create difficulty in providing air and missile defense

coverage and affect the ability of the force to accomplish its mission.

4. COMPARISON

Compare COAs using evaluation criteria. Evaluate and rank-order COAs for each key consideration.

A decision matrix should visually support comparison. Present an AMD course of action for each of

the supported force courses of action. Each AMD course of action presented should include the

following aspects:

• Air defense mission.

• Air defense priorities.

• Air defense fires.

• Air defense scheme of maneuver.

• AMD task organization.

•

Command and support relationships.

•

Key passive AMD measures.

•

Type of action required in each operational area (close, deep, and rear).

•

Combined arms for air defense active measures.

5. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS. Recommended COAs based on the comparison.

• Indicate which course or courses of action AMD can best support (using the elements of who,

what, when, where, how, and why).

• Recommend a list of AMD priorities.

• State the recommended AMD organization for combat, and employment of other active air

and missile defense assets.

• Possible OCA targets.

• Passive and active air and missile defense measures that will be most effective.

• Issues, deficiencies, and risks with recommendations to reduce their impacts.

________________________

NAME

RANK

(Air Defense Coordinator)

ANNEXES: (as required)

ESTIMATE OF THE AIR DEFENSE SITUATION

(Classification)

Figure C-5. AMD estimate general format (continued)

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Air and Missile Defense Planning

Copy___of___copies

Issuing headquarters

Place of Issue

Date-time group of signature

Message Reference Number

ANNEX G (AIR DEFENSE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO _____

References: Maps, charts, or other relevant documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

Task Organization:

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

1. Terrain. Identify most likely threat ingress and egress routes.

2. Weather. Identify threat aircraft all-weather capabilities and limitations.

3. Threat air capability and or activity.

(a) Air threat data. List air-capable organizations including air platforms by number and

type.

(b) Additional air threat information. List airs threat information pertinent to the operation

but not covered in the Intelligence Annex. Highlight specific air threat considerations like

sortie rates, subordination of air elements to ground units, ordnance peculiarities, target

preferences, tactics, and recent significant activities.

air platform their potential users. List all known-beginning points and describe avenue of

approach as it goes through the area of interest.

b. Friendly situation. AMD missions at all applicable levels. Describe how the air defense plan

integrates with higher echelon plans.

1. Higher units. Outline higher AMD unit intent and plans.

2. Adjacent units. Outline adjacent AMD unit intent and plans.

3. Supporting elements. Note supporting units and support relationship.

c. Attachments and detachments. Identify air and missile defense resources attached from

other commands and identify those air and missile defense resources detached.

2. MISSION

Mission statement should include who, what, when, where, how, and why statement of the

mission for the AMD unit.

Figure C-6. AMD annex general format

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

C-11

Appendix C

3. EXECUTION

a. Scheme of AMD support. Commanders overall AMD plan to include the intent, objectives, and

priorities.

b. Tasks to subordinate units. Briefly discuss AMD plan, command and support relationships,

and priority of protection.

c. Coordinating instructions. Instructions are applicable to two or more subordinate units.

Include references to other applicable annexes.

1. Coordination instructions for ADW, ADW, and LADW authority.

2. WCS authority. Include any plans to change WCS.

3. Hostile criteria. Basic rules the commander has established to assist in the identification of

friendly or hostile air vehicles. Include pre-planned changes.

4. Rules of engagement. Address ROE unique to the operation or points in the operation

where changes are intended. Include use of supplemental fire control measures.

5. Passive air defense. Addresses specific passive air defense measures that all units should

take to protect themselves from air and missile attack or surveillance during this operation.

6. Combined arms for air defense. Briefly discuss specific techniques units should use to help

in defending themselves against an air or missile attack or surveillance.

7. Early warning. Review method and format for passing early warning to the entire force.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT See Service Support Annex.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

1. AMD CP locations.

2. Succession of command.

b. Signal. See Signal Annex.

1. IFF code edition and book number.

2. Communications links for early warning equipment.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL:

RANK (Commander's rank)

NAME (Commander's last name)

APPENDIXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

ANNEX G (AIR DEFENSE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO _____

(Classification)

Figure C-6. AMD annex general format (continued)

C-12

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Appendix D

Impact of Technology on ADA Forces

This appendix covers the impact of technology on our forces. Army ADA is

transforming to align with the transformation of the Army and Joint services. The

transformation will require the Army ADA community to become more mobile,

smaller, and able to overcome a changing asymmetric air and missile threat. The

transformation will provide for a more responsive, versatile, and adaptive ADA force.

The transformed ADA force must provide a more scalable, mission-tailored,

multifunctional capability for both the Army and the joint forces commanders. We

will no longer be a weapon centric force but, we will be a capabilities, and system of

systems force that will allow ADA forces to perform the AMD mission at the

strategic, operational, and tactical level in a wide range of military operations.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

D-1. Improved ADA weapon system technology provides commanders increased flexibility for defensive

counterair operations. The fusion of information from communications system, C2, and ISR, fire support,

and ADA systems combined with the commander’s judgment allows commanders to understand their

battlespace and conduct fluid noncontiguous operations from widely dispersed locations. A SIAP/COP

based on this fused information helps commanders make better and quicker decisions.

D-2. The increasing range and precision of direct and indirect fires allow Army forces to weaken attackers

and shape the situation before entering close combat. Improved C2, communications system and ISR

systems allow commanders to disperse their forces without losing the ability to mass effects at the decisive

time and place.

D-3. Dispersed Army forces present tactical challenges to air defense artillery forces. Modern technology

is providing ADA forces with the means for protection of the force. Trained soldiers and decisive leaders

apply those capabilities in uncertain situations to defeat enemies and transition to offensive operations that

achieve the desired end state.

D-4. These new ADA systems and capabilities include Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD),

Non Divisional Patriot PAC-3, Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System

(JLENS), Enhanced Target Range and Classification and maneuver AMD systems Surface-Launched

Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), Medium Extended Air Defense System

(MEADS), and communications and Intelligence systems.

D-5. There are emerging technology improvements that will improve the capabilities of air defense that

include; Beyond Visual Range (BVR), and Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), Non-Line-of Sight

(NLOS).

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

D-6. The THAAD weapon system provides the Combatant Commander a rapidly deployable ground-

based, hit-to-kill, wide area missile defense capability and components that deepen, extend and

complement ADA systems and the Ballistic Missile Defense System. THAAD is an element of the

Terminal Defense Segment of the BMDS. Terminal Defense Elements provide the last best opportunity to

engage ballistic missiles not engaged or destroyed in the boost or mid-course phases of their trajectories.

The THAAD element contributes significant capability to the BMDS in its ability to engage and negate

ballistic missiles in both the late mid-course (exo-atmospheric engagements) and terminal phase (endo-

atmospheric engagements) of their trajectories. THAAD’s powerful radar and versatile C2BMC provide

early warning surveillance and discrimination capability to the AMD and BMDS systems through provision

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

D-1

Appendix D

of precision cues and discrimination data. Integrated with AEGIS, Patriot, and the BMDS Command and

Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC), the rapidly deployable THAAD improves

BMDS and ADA overall effectiveness.

NON-DIVISIONAL ADA

D-7. Patriot Configuration-3 is a block in a series of time-phased changes to the Patriot system to meet the

Patriot advance capability-3

(PAC-3) program requirements. This configuration consists of several

hardware modifications, a new missile, and the fielding of the post deployment build-5/5+ (PDB-5/5+)

software. The PAC-3 program provides enhanced system performance against advanced air and missile

threats.

D-8. These changes are advancements in technology designed to improve the search, detection, and

tracking capabilities of the radar; improve the discrimination of TBMs warheads from debris; increase

battlespace; improve communications within the battalion; improve interoperability with the THAAD

system and joint forces; enable BMs launch point determination; and finally, increase lethality against

BMs. In addition, these modifications provide increased system reliability, availability, maintainability, and

simplify operations.

D-9. The PDB-5/5+ software supports the hardware modifications and user requirements for the Patriot

PAC-3 program. This software is comprised of those changes necessary to support the Configuration-3

hardware modification such as Radar Enhancement Phase-3, classification discrimination identification,

remote launch and communications enhancement upgrade, THAAD integration and the PAC-3 missile

integration. The PDB-5/5+ software also include several new requirements, which were implemented with

software changes.

D-10. Patriot Configuration-3 enhancements provide increased firepower and lethality. The upgrade to

communication equipment provides improved voice and data capabilities for internal and external

integration. This enhancement increases Patriot’s capability to conduct multiple simultaneous engagements,

increases track handling capabilities, extends engagement range. Configuration-3 is designed to counter a

growing threat that is capable of conducting massed aircraft raids, integrated ballistic missile attack, and

aerodynamic missile raids. Figure D-1 is an overview of the PAC-3, Configuration-3 Enhancements.

D-11. The Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) consists of

an aerostat with radars to provide over-the-horizon surveillance for defense against cruise missiles. JLENS

is primarily intended to tackle the growing threat of cruise missiles to U.S. forces deployed abroad. The

system enhances cruise missile detection and engagement ranges with current air defense weapons JLENS

will operate at altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 feet; be capable of detecting long range, terrain masked

targets; and provide an effective fire control solution for joint theater air and missile defense weapon

systems. Additionally, it can operate from sites on both land and sea, and is tactically re-locatable.

Comparing these capabilities against the performance of our current sensor systems, the value added of

JLENS is readily apparent.

D-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Impact of Technology on ADA Forces

Figure

D-1. PAC 3,

Configuration-3 enhancements

MANEUVER AMD

D-12. Avenger/man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) improvements in digital technology

allow

ADA forces to

extend the battlespace further than before possible. Threat aircraft

may be engaged at

distances that maximize the

range of Stinger missiles. In accordance

with ROE, the forward area air

defense (FAAD) communications and Intelligence system

allows beyond

visual range (BVR) engagements.

These engagements are capable because of

the continued

improvements of the battle command system,

FAAD communications and

Intelligence and ADA weapons, and are

dependent on METT-TC.

BVR

eliminates the visual hostile ID

requirement

for Avenger shooters. MANPADS systems still require

visual

identification of

hostile aircraft. BVR stresses the use of

externally provided track data to engage hostile

aerial platforms and allows the communications and Intelligence system to

be utilized

as a

cueing/electronic warfare (EW) system.

D-13. Enhanced

Target Range and Classification (ETRAC) improves

the Sentinel radar capabilities to

detect small radar cross section targets like cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial

vehicles to enable

identification of

target beyond

visual range.

-14. Surface-launched advanced medium

range air-to-air missile (SLAMRAAM) is a lightweight, day

night, limited

adverse weather, non-line-of-sight launcher. SLAMRAAM is used to

counter low altitude

RW, FW, CM, UAS, and ISR

platforms. SLAMRAAM is

replacing the

Stinger based

systems. It supports

engagements in

close combat

areas where maneuvering forces and their

supporting units operate together.

SLAMRAAM’s

force protection mission is to engage the low-altitude aerial threats at longer range than the

Stinger missile of today.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

D-3

Appendix D

D-15. SLAMRAAM system is mounted on a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) with

a basic load of four (4) to six (6) AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles mounted on a

turntable. Targets can be engaged using unattended remote control (primary mode) or a local control

console (secondary mode).

D-16. Primary mode of fire control, target designation, and engaging platform selection is made from the

senior integrated fire control station (IFCS) or air and missile planning and control station (AMDPCS) and

transmitted over existing FAAD communications system and Intelligence networks. In all cases the

SLAMRAAM control console may be used to monitor and engage targets and to conduct operations in the

theater.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

D-17. The air defense tactical operations center is located with the TAOC and consists of the S-2, S-3, and

the air battle management operations center (ABMOC). The AMDCOORD is located at the division's main

CP and consists of the AMDCOORD equipment and staff. The air lines of communications are deployed

based on METT-TC and consists of the executive officer (XO), S1, and S4. The corps ADA element is

located at the corps main headquarters.

D-18. The air defense and airspace management

(ADAM) cell in its airspace management role,

coordinates, synchronizes, and executes in the third dimension for support of maneuver, fires, and effects.

D-19. ADAM cell personnel coordinate existing and proposed airspace control measures with ADA

forces and AC2 elements of the maneuver force. The ADAM cell receives and distributes the relevant data

from the ACO and ATO, interprets and displays the procedural airspace control means (for example,

corridors, restricted operations zones) and schedules friendly air operations that may impact on SBCT

operations.

D-20. The ADAM cell also coordinates existing and proposed airspace control means with all elements of

the SBCT force. Close coordination between ADA forces, airspace control, and other airspace users is

imperative to ensure safe, unencumbered passage of friendly aircraft while denying access to enemy

aircraft and missiles.

D-21. The ADAM cell also serves to identify and plan airspace management positive and procedural

control requirements, and de-conflict airspace by monitoring both enemy and friendly aerial activities.

D-22. The ABMOC plays a critical role in the Beyond visual Range Engagement process. Constant track

monitoring provides near real time surveillance and acquisition. The ABMOC tactical control officer

disseminates fires and manages by exception, meaning, the fire unit requests permission to engage using

BVR engagements and the tactical control officer (TCO) confirms. The ABMOC TCO will be the final

approval for beyond visual range engagements. The ABMOC TCO will also determine distances between

tracks to coincide with the “in the vicinity” condition that will allow or prevent the BVR engagement

process. The primary tool the ABMOC TCO will use to determine distance is the AMDWS. The AMDWS

provides maps of varying scales to assist the operator. The operator may also use the cursor to determine

distance.

EMERGING

D-23. Beyond Visual Range allows ADA units a marked increase in their abilities to conduct engagement

beyond visual range. ADA units receive and pass digital early warning information on tracks beyond visual

range of the shooter. This is made possible with the advent of the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) C2

information architecture that extends the integrated air picture from the engagement operations station in

the ABMOC through the radar sensor and C2 nodes to the hand-held terminal unit at each weapon system.

D-24. The FAAD C2 information system allows data from higher echelon units and the joint data network

(JDN), to be passed via the ABMOC to an ADA gunner. This data link capability gives the gunner and the

respective team chief/squad leader an enhanced capability to potentially engage hostile air threats beyond

their visual identification range, as long as the ROE engagement criteria are met.

D-4

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Impact of Technology on ADA Forces

D-25. Joint doctrine fully supports engagement of aerial threats beyond the visual range of the shooter(s) as

long as a positive identification authority has tagged the target as hostile. JP 3-01 states, “Employment of

defensive weapon systems requires early identification of Friend, Neutral, or Hostile aircraft and missiles to

maximize beyond-visual-range engagements and avoid fratricide.”

D-26. BVR engagement does not allow the gunner to shoot at all tracks. The gunner must follow the

established procedural control (WCS, ADW, volumes, etc.). If the data link to higher controlling system is

lost, BVR engagements will not occur. If track data is lost, the track must be visually identified before

engaging. The following conditions will apply to utilize BVR-

Theater ROE must allow the use of BVR.

Track is positively identified as hostile by the ID (identification) authority.

Information link to the source that is providing the track data must be stable.

There must be no friendly or unknown platforms in the vicinity (required separation distance

will be disseminated in the daily ACO as determined by the JFC) of the track to be engaged.

Line-of-sight must exist between the target and the firing unit for missile lock to occur (unit may

or may not see target for visual ID).

SINGLE INTEGRATED AIR PICTURE (SIAP) AND COMMON OPERATING

PICTURE (COP)

D-27. The single integrated air picture (SIAP) and common operating picture (COP) will consist of

common, continuous, and unambiguous tracks of detected airborne objects in the surveillance area Figure

D-2. Each object within the SIAP will have one, and only one, track number, identification, and set of

associated characteristics. The SIAP will be developed from real-time and near real-time data. Information

available via the SIAP will facilitate CID, allowing aerial objects to be accurately and absolutely identified

as friend, hostile, or neutral.

D-28. Commanders and staffs can utilize the SIAP and COP to analyze and comprehend the air-ground

situation to determine relevant information gaps, potential enemy options/actions, the consequences of

friendly actions, and the effects of the information environment on friendly and enemy actions. These

contributors enable and complement full spectrum operations. Specific objectives that contribute to

information superiority include the following-

Develop and maintain a comprehensive picture of enemies and adversaries; forecast their likely

actions.

Deny enemy and adversary information about friendly ADA forces and operations with radar

emission control (EMCON) procedures.

Influence enemy perceptions as to the positions of friendly ADA forces.

Influence defense of critical and geopolitical assets.

Continually provide relevant information (including targeting and intelligence) to support the

decision-making process.

Synchronizing airspace essential to successful three-dimensional air and ground combat

operations.

D-29. Sensor data will be used to create a scaleable and filterable single SIAP and COP that will provide

for force-wide understanding of the battlespace. Information management has four basic steps; identify

information requirements, collect and process, build a COP, and develop understanding. Information

management begins with the identification and/or updating of information requirements.

D-30. ADA sensors and communications system elements integrated within the joint architecture will

provide continuous tailored situational awareness for situational understanding. Additionally, ADA

communications system elements provide tactical mission planning and rehearsal capabilities that allow

commanders and their staffs to wargame courses of actions (COAs) and formulate battle plans en route to

and while in the maneuver area of operations.

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

D-5

Appendix D

Figure D-2.

Example of

single-integrated air picture

NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT (NLOS)

D-31.

NLOS engagements utilize the JLENS and

presently Patriot, and in the

future other ADA systems to

engage CMs and other non-TBM

targets beyond the horizon, and out to

the kinematic

limits of ADA

systems.

D-32.

The JLENS system technology allows for other engagement improvements such

as; Engage-On-

Remote, and Forward Pass through its fire control quality data and identification which is provided on

real-time basis to Patriot units currently, and future ADA systems.

KILL BOX

D-33.

The concept of the “Kill Box” and its use

and employment in the Air Defense community is new

The Kill Box is used

by both the Air Force in its

mission, and

for the Army’s field artillery

unit’s mission

The Kill Box is a three-dimensional Fire Support Coordinating Measure (FSCM) used for air-to-surface

lethal

fires in the supported commander’s Area of Operations (AO) (see Figure D-3).

D-34.

The purpose of a Kill Box

is an FSCM, which facilitates the expeditious attack of

surface targets.

When

established, the purpose of a

Kill Box is to

allow air assets to attack surface targets without terminal

attack

control. A Kill Box will not

be used for Close Air Support (CAS) missions.

D-35.

A Kill Box is

established and adjusted by

the appropriate supported commander within their AO.

possible, Kill Box lateral boundaries should be defined using the Common Geographic Reference System,

but could follow well-defined terrain features or

may be located by grid or by

a radius from

a center point.

Changes to a Kill Box require notification of all affected forces within the AO and must

allow sufficient

time for these forces

and/or components to incorporate the Kill

Box change.

D-36.

Presently the only ADA system that utilizes the Kill Box is Patriot with the Post Deployment Build

PDB 6 software upgrade.

D-6

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Glossary

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AADC

area air defense commander

AADP

area air defense plan

AAMDC

Army air and missile defense command

ABCS

Army battle command systems

ABMOC

air battle management operations center

ABT

air-breathing threat

AC2

airspace command and control

ACA

airspace control authority

ACE

analysis and control element

ACM

airspace coordinating measure

ACO

airspace control order

ACP

airspace control plan

air defense

ADA

air defense artillery

ADAFCO

air defense artillery fire control officer

ADAM

air defense airspace management

ADHPM

artillery-delivered, high precision munitions

ADIZ

air defense identification zone

ADOA

air defense operations area

ADW

air defense warning

AFFOR

Air Force forces

AMC

Air Mobility Command

AMCOM

Aviation and Missile Command

AMD

air and missile defense

AMDCOORD

air and missile defense coordinator

AMDPCS

air and missile defense planning and control system

AMDWS

air and missile defense workstation

area of operations

AOC

air operations center

AOR

area of responsibility

APOD

aerial port of debarkation

ARFOR

Army forces

ARSTRAT

Army Strategic Command

ASM

air-to-surface missile

ASP

ammunition supply point

ATO

air tasking order

AUTL

Army Universal Task List

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Glossary-1

Glossary

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

BCD

battlefield coordination detachment

BCT

brigade combat team

ballistic missile

BMDS

ballistic missile defense system

BVR

beyond visual range

command and control

C2BMC

command and control, battle management, communications

counterair

CAL

critical asset list

CAOC

combined air operations center

CAS

close air support

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives

CCDR

combatant commander

CCIR

commander’s critical information requirement

CDR

Commander

CDI

Clarification, determination, and identification

commanding general

CID

combat identification

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

C/JFLCC

combined/joint force land component commander

cruise missile

CMMC

corps materiel management center

CMO

civil-military operations

CND

computer network defense

CNR

combat network radio

COA

course of action

COCOM

combatant command (command authority)

COMARFOR

commander, ARFOR

COMMZ

communications zone

CONUS

continental United States

COP

common operational picture

COSCOM

corps support command

command post

CRC

control and reporting center

CSA

corps storage area

CSSB

combat sustainment support brigade

CSSCS

combat service support control system (legacy term)

CVT

criticality, vulnerability, threat

combat zone

Department of the Army

Glossary-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Glossary

DAADC(AMD)

deputy area air defense commander for AMD

DAL

defended asset list

DAO

division ammunition officer

DCA

defensive counterair

DIRLAUTH

direct liaison authorized

DISCOM

division support command

DLA

Defense Logistics Agency

DOCC

deep operations coordination cell

DOTMLPF

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel, facilities

decision point

direct support

DSP

Defense Support Program

electronic attack

EAC

echelons above corps

ECS

engagement control station

EEFI

essential element of friendly information

EMCON

emissions control

engagement operations

EPLRS

enhanced position location reporting system

ETRAC

enhanced target range and classification

electronic warfare

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAAD

forward area air defense system

FARP

forward arming and refueling point

fires cell

FCC

fire control center

FDC

fire direction center

FEZ

fighter engagement zone

FFIR

friendly force information requirement

FLIR

forward-looking infrared

field manual; frequency modulation

force operations

FSCM

fire support coordination measure

FSCOORD

fire support coordinator

FSU

former Soviet Union

fixed wing

G-1

assistant chief of staff, personnel

G-2

assistant chief of staff, intelligence

G-3

assistant chief of staff, operations

G-4

assistant chief of staff, logistics

GBMD

Global Ballistic Missile Defense

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Glossary-3

Glossary

GCC

geographic component commander

GMD

ground-based midcourse defense

general support

GS-R

general support - reinforcing

HAD

homeland air defense

HAS

homeland air security

HASCC

Homeland Air Security Coordination Center

HASD

homeland air security director

HHB

headquarters and headquarters battery

HIDACZ

high density airspace control zone

HIMEZ

high-altitude missile engagement zone

HNS

host-nation support

information assurance

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

identification

IEW

intelligence and electronic warfare

IFF

identification, friend or foe

IFCS

Integrated fire control station

information management

information operations

IPB

intelligence preparation of the battlefield

information requirement

IRBM

intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

ITW/AA

integrated tactical warning and attack assessment

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5

plans directorate of a joint staff

JAOC

joint air operations center

JDN

joint data network

JEZ

joint engagement zone

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JFC

joint force commander

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JIIM

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational

JLENS

Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor

System

JOA

joint operations area

joint publication

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAGS

joint tactical ground station

Glossary-4

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Glossary

JTIDS

Joint tactical information distribution system

JTF

joint task force

LACM

land-attack cruise missile

LAN

local area network

LCC

land component commander

LNO

liaison officer

LOC

line of communications

LOMEZ

low-altitude missile engagement zone

LRU

line replaceable unit

MANPADS

man-portable air defense system

MDMP

military decision-making process

METT-TC

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time available, civil considerations

MEZ

missile engagement zone

MIDS

multifunctional information distribution system

MOS

military occupational specialty

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

MRR

minimum risk route

MSR

main supply route

NAI

named area of interest

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO

noncombatant evacuation operations

NIPRNET

Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network

NLOS

non-line of sight

NMC

not mission capable

O&O

operational and organizational

OAKOC

observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,

obstacles, and cover and concealment

OCA

offensive counterair

OIF

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OPCON

operational control

OPLAN

operation plan

OPORD

operation order

OPSEC

operations security

PAC

Patriot advanced capability

PADIL

Patriot data information link

PDB

post-deployment build

PIR

priority intelligence requirement

POL

petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PTL

primary target line

R&S

reconnaissance and surveillance

RADC

regional air defense commander

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Glossary-5

Glossary

ROE

rules of engagement

rotary wing

S-1

personnel staff officer

S-2

intelligence staff officer

S-3

operations staff officer

S-4

logistics staff officer

situational awareness

SADC

sector air defense commander

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SBCT

Stryker brigade combat team

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

SHORAD

short-range air defense

SHORADEZ

short-range air defense engagement zone

SIAP

single integrated air picture

SINCGARS

single-channel ground and airborne radio system

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SLAMRAAM

surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile

SLBM

submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLS

shoot-look-shoot

SMC

support maintenance company

SOF

special operations forces

SOP

standing operating procedure

SPINS

special instructions

SPOD

seaport of debarkation

SRBM

short-range ballistic missile

STANAG

standardization agreement (NATO)

STL

Secondary target line

STO

surface-to-air missile tactical order

situational understanding

TAAMDCOORD

theater Army air and missile defense coordinator

TACON

tactical control

TADIL

tactical digital information link

TAI

target area of interest

TAMD

theater air and missile defense

TAOC

tactical air operations center

TBM

theater ballistic missile

TCO

tactical control officer

TCS

tactical control station

TEL

transporter-erector launcher

TES

theater event system

task force

Glossary-6

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Glossary

THAAD

terminal high altitude area defense

theater missile

TOC

tactical operations center

TRADOC

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSA

theater storage area

TSOP

Tactical standing operating procedure

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

UHF

ultrahigh frequency

UJTL

Universal Joint Task List

United Nations

U.S.

United States

USAF

United States Air Force

USCENTCOM

United States Central Command

USMC

United States Marine Corps

USN

United States Navy

USNORTHCOM

United States Northern Command

USSTRATCOM

United States Strategic Command

VMF

variable message format

WAD

weapons alert designator

WCS

weapons control status

WEZ

weapon engagement zone

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WMD/E

weapons of mass destruction/effects

executive officer

SECTION II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

active air defense

(Joint) Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air

and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense

weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. (JP 3-01)

active missile defense

Operations that protect selected assets and forces from attack by destroying their missile

airborne launch platforms and/or theater missiles in flight.

air defense

(Joint) Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the

atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JP 3-01)

air defense artillery

(Joint) Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the

atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JP 3-01)

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Glossary-7

Glossary

air interdiction

(Joint) Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential

before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve

objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.

(JP 3-0)

airspace control authority

(Joint) The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the

airspace control system in the airspace control area. (JP 1-02)

airspace control order

(Joint) An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved

requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order

or as a separate document. (JP 3-52)

airspace control plan

(Joint) The document approved by the joint force commander that provides specific planning

guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the joint force operational area.

(JP 3-52)

airspace management

(Joint) The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace of defined dimensions.

(JP 1-02)

air superiority

(Joint) That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the

conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and

place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 3-30)

air supremacy

(Joint) That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective

interference. (JP 1-02)

alert

Attack and launch early reporting to theater.

area air defense commander

(Joint) Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the

commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this

will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the

command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense

operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate,

to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. (JP 3-52)

attack operations

Offensive operations intended to destroy and disrupt enemy theater missile capabilities before,

during, and after launch. The objective of these operations is to prevent the launch of theater

missiles by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying

launch platforms; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms; command and

control nodes; and missile stocks and infrastructure.

ballistic missile

(Joint) Any missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and

consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-8

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

Glossary

classify

To declare a target to be a ballistic missile or air-breathing object.

close air support

(Joint) Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close

proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire

and movement of those forces. (JP 3-0)

counterair

(Joint) A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a

desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy

aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 3-01)

cueing

Providing timely position data and tentative identification of aircraft within a designated range of a

fire unit.

defensive counterair

(Joint) All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate

enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. (JP 3-01)

engagement operations

Those activities required to execute the air, missile, and counter-surveillance battles.

force operations

Those activities required to plan, coordinate, prepare, and sustain the total air and missile

defense mission.

joint force air component commander

(Joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task

force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper

employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The

joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions

and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)

joint force land component commander

(Joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task

force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper

employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces, planning and

coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)

joint targeting coordination board

(Joint) A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight

functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing

targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board

is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required,

component subordinate units. (JP 3-60)

offensive counterair

(Joint) Offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch

platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close

to their source as possible. Offensive counterair operations range throughout the enemy territory

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Glossary-9

Glossary

and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. These operations include attack

operations, fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses. (JP 3-01)

passive air defense

(Joint) All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile

air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage,

concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems,

and the use of protective construction. (JP 3-01)

suppression of enemy air defenses

(Joint) Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air

defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. (JP 3-01)

theater missile

(Joint) A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not

including short-range, non-nuclear, direct-fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or

wire-guided missiles), whose target is within a given theater of operation. (JP 3-01)

Glossary-10

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These sources must be available to the intended users of this publication.

None

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These sources contain relevant supplemental information. Most Army doctrinal publications are

available on-line at http://www.apd.army.mil/. Most joint publications are available on-line at

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, 21 February 2007

FM 1-06, Financial Management Operations, 21 September 2006

FM 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures, 28 July 2004

FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command, 15 April 2003

FM 100-13, Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), 05 September 1996

FMI 1-0.02, Theater-Level Human Resources Support, 20 February 2008

FMI 4-93.2, The Sustainment Brigade, 04 February 2009

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008

FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, 01 August 2002

FM 4-0, Sustainment, 30 April 2009

FMI 2-01.301 (FM 34-130), Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield, 31 March 2009

FM 44-100, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 15 June 2000

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS

STANAG 3805, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control -AJP-3.3.5(A), Edition 8, 05 April 2006

JOINT AND MULTISERVICE PUBLICATIONS

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001

JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 05 February 2007

JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 October 2007

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

References-1

Index

through

3-18, C-1, C-3

defensive,

acquire, 3-20, A-2, A-3, A-7,

through C-5

criticality, B-14, C-2

B-1, B-3, B-11

Area Air Defense Plan

cruise missiles (CMs), 1-2, 1-

active air defense, 2-6, 3-16,

(AADP), 1-7, 2-7, 3-4, 3-8,

7, 1-8, 3-19, 4-3, 4-4, 5-5,

3-18, 4-4, 4-5

6-3, C-1, C-3

A-1, A-4, A-6, B-1, B-3, B-

employment, 4-4, 4-5, C-

Army Air and Missile

7 through B-9, B-11, B-12,

Defense

Command

D-2, D-3

operations, 3-16, 3-18, 4-4

(AAMDC), 1-6, 1-9, 3-2,

cueing, 1-6, 3-18, 5-7, 6-7, D-

resources, C-4

3-7, 3-8 through 3-10, 3-14,

weapon systems, 2-3, 2-6,

3-15, 3-20 through 3-22, 6-

2-9, 2-10

2, C-1, C-4 through C-6

deputy area air defense

active missile defense, 3-7, 3-

liaison teams, 3-15, 3-20

commander for AMD

9, 3-18

role, 3-8, C-5

DAADC (AMD), 1-6, 3-7,

air and missile defense

attack operations, 1-5, 1-8, 3-

3-8, 3-15, C-1, C-3 through

coordinator

3-7, 3-15, 3-18 through

C-5

(AMDCOORD), 2-12, 3-8,

3-21, 4-1 through 4-3, 4-8,

decentralized control, 2-7, 3-

3-14, 3-15, 3-17,

3-19,

6-7, C-6

20, C-4, C-6, C-7, D-4

autonomous operations, 2-7,

defense readiness conditions,

air battle management, 3-4,

3-3

2-4

3-5, 3-17, D-4

Avenger, 1-9, 2-3, 3-8, 3-9, 4-

detect, 4-7

air defense (AD), vii, 1-5, 4-1

5, 5-7, 5-8, 5-10, C-1, D-3

through 4-10

active, 3-18

early engagement, 2-2, C-1

battle command

emergency, 2-5

electronic warfare,

3-18,

concept, 3-18

estimate, C-7 through C-10

20, 4-3, 4-4, 4-8, A-4, B-

elements, 3-18

operations area, 2-9

10, C-8, D-3

engagement operations, 3-

passive, 3-18

employment principles, v, 1-

air defense artillery

8, 1-10, 2-1

force operations, 3-1

employment guidelines, 1-

engagement operations

leadership, 3-1

8, 1-10, 2-2

AAMDC, 1-6, 1-9, 3-2, 3-7

systems, 3-18, 6-5, D-3

employment principles, 1-

through 3-10, 3-15, 3-21, 3-

battle

coordination

8, 2-1

22, 6-2, C-1, C-4, C-5

detachment (BCD), 1-7, 2-

geopolitical assets,

1-1

entry operations, 1-10, 4-5

12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-17, 3-20,

through 1-3, 1-8, 3-8, 3-9,

C-4, C-5

4-1, 5-2, 5-4, 6-2, D-5

fighter engagement zone

mission, 1-1

(FEZ), 2-10

air defense warnings, 2-5

centralized control, 1-8, 2-7,

Fires Cell (FC), 1-7, 1-8, 3-20

airspace control 1-7, 2-6, 2-9,

2-10, 3-4, 3-18, 3-21

fire direction center

(FDC),

2-11, 2-12, 3-5, 3-16, 3-17,

chemical weapons, B-3, B-4

3-10, C-6

4-4, 4-9, 5-1, 5-3, 5-4, D-4

classify, 4-4

fire support, 3-9 3-15, 3-19,

airspace control authority

counterair,

1-1,

1-3,

1-8

3-20, 4-2, 4-3, B-7, B-10,

(ACA), 1-8, 2-6, 2-9, 2-11,

through 1-10, 2-9, 3-5, 3-7,

C-1, C-6, D-1, D-6

2-12, 3-5, 3-7, 3-16, 3-17

3-9, 3-20, 4-4

force operations, vii, 1-7, 3-1,

AMD planning, 1-10, 3-9, 3-

defensive,

3-21,

4-4,

4-8,

3-4, 5-3, A-1

10, 3-20 through 3-22, C-7

D-1

force projection, B-2

integration with JAOC,

joint, 4-6, 4-7, 5-4

fire

support coordinator

C-5

command post (CP), 3-2, 3-

(FSCOORD), 3-20, C-6

antiradiation missile (ARM),

10, 3-15, 4-4, C-6, D-4

B-9, B-10

Area

Air

Defense

contingency, 3-9, 5-3, 7-4, C-

high-density,

airspace

Commander (AADC), 1-

1, C-5

control zone

(HIDACZ),

6, 1-8, 2-5 through 2-7, 3-4

operations, 5-3

2-9, 2-11

through

3-8,

3-11,

3-15

theater, 1-10

25 November 2009

FM 3-01

Index-1

Index

hostile criteria, 2-6, 2-7, 2-10,

Patriot, 1-9, 1-10, 2-3, 2-4, 2-

weapons tight, 2-7, 2-11

C-12

8, 2-10, 3-8, 3-9, 3-11, 3-

weapon engagement zone

humanitarian assistance, 5-2

16, 4-5, D-1, D-2, D-6

(WEZ), 2-10

procedural control,

3-16

weapons alert designator

through 3-18, D-4, D-5

(WAD), 2-4

identification criteria, 2-6

weapons

mass

information superiority, v, 1-

destruction/effects

reconstitution, 3-18, 7-3

4, 1-5, 1-7, 3-20, 4-1, 6-1,

(WMD/E), 1-2, 1-5

recuperability, C-2, C-3

6-4, B-15, D-5

redeployment, 7-3

intelligence preparation of

restricted operations area, 2-

the battlefield (IPB), vi, 1-

9 through 2-11

7, 3-15, 6-3, A-1

rules of engagement (ROE),

intelligence,

surveillance,

1-8, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-4, 3-16,

reconnaissance (ISR), 3-2

3-18, 3-20, C-12, D-3, D-4

joint force air component

surface-launched advanced

commander (JFACC), 1-

medium-range air-to-air

8, 3-5, 3-7, 3-15, 3-16, 3-

missile (SLAMRAAM), 4-

19, 3-21, 4-11, C-1, C-5

5, D-1, D-3, D-4

joint force land component

special instructions (SPINS),

commander (JFLCC), 1-

2-9, 3-17

3, 1-6, 1-8, 3-6, 3-7, 3-11,

3-21, C-1, C-4 through C-6

joint

force

maritime

theater Army air and missile

component commander

defense

coordinator

(JFMCC), 3-7, 3-15

(TAAMDCOORD),

3-8,

3-9, C-1, C-4 through C-6

tactical

ballistic

missiles

kill box, D-6, D-7

(TBM), 2-3, 2-9, 4-3, 6-1,

6-7, B-3, B-4, B-11, D-2,

logistics, 7-3

D-6

low-altitude

missile

tactical control, 3-12, A-5

engagement

zone

tactical operations center

(LOMEZ), 2-10

(TOC), 3-10, 6-4, 6-7

terminal high-altitude area

defense (THAAD), 4-5, 6-

management by exception, 2-

2, D-1, D-2

7, 3-4, 3-5

theater air and missile

military

decision-making

defense (TAMD), vii, 1-6

process (MDMP), 3-22, 3-

through 1-8, 1-10, 2-1, 3-2,

3-6, 3-11, 3-20, 3-21, 4-2,

minimum risk route, 2-10

4-5, 6-4, C-1

National Capitol Region

unmanned aircraft system

(NCR), 5-4, 5-8

(UAS), 1-7, 1-8, 2-6, 2-7,

2-10, 3-4, 3-19 through 3-

offensive counterair,

1-8,

21, 4-2, 4-8, 4-9, 5-3, 6-4,

21, 4-8

A-3, A-4, A-7, B-1, B-10,

operational control, 1-5, 3-4,

C-1, D-3

3-6, 3-11 through 3-13, A-5

weapon control status, 2-7, 3-

passive missile defense,

3-9,

1, 3-17

3-18

weapons free, 2-7, 2-10, 2-11

weapons hold, 2-7, 2-11

Index-2

FM 3-01

25 November 2009

ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

Army Training and

Headquarters

Evaluation Program

Department of the Army

No. 3-327-10-DRILL

Washington, DC, 27 December 2004

Drills for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or

Nuclear (CBRN) Domestic Support Missions

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE

iii

Chapter 1

UNIT TRAINING

1-1

1-1. General

1-1

1-2. Training Guidance

1-1

1-3. Battle Focus

1-3

1-4. Safety Consideration

1-3

1-5. Evaluation

1-3

1-6. Feedback

1-4

Chapter 2

BATTLE DRILLS

2-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to United

States Government agencies only to protect technical or operational

information from automatic dissemination under the International

Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made

on 31 July 2000. Other requests for this document will be referred to

Commandant, United States Army Chemical School, ATTN: ATSN-

CM-DT-I, 464 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2617, Fort Leonard Wood, MO

65473-8929.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent

disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Preface

This drill book provides platoon, squad, and team leaders with

standardized drills that are designed for use by trainers at the

platoon and squad level. Standardized drills are essential to the

success of platoon leaders, trainers, and small-unit leaders. These

drills provide the performance measures, standards, and sequential

procedures that will help guide the unit through training tasks for

which doctrine is just now being developed. Chemical Corps

platoons and squads must be able to perform these drills quickly,

effectively, and to standard at all times.

The target audience for this drill book is Chemical Corps squads and

platoons who have been assigned the additional chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) domestic support mission.

The proponent for this publication is HQ, TRADOC. Submit changes

for improving this publication on Department of the Army (DA)

Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank

Forms) and forward to the Commandant, United States Army

Chemical School, ATTN: ATSN-CM-DT-I, 464 MANSCEN Loop,

Suite 2617, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and

pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

iii

Chapter 1

Unit Training

1-1. General. The success of a mission depends on the ability of the

soldiers to react to a situation or order by executing key actions

instinctively and immediately. Drills are designed to focus on the

key actions that like units in the Army must master. Battle drills

and crew drills are two types of drills discussed in this document.

a. A battle drill is a collective action executed by a platoon or

smaller element without applying a deliberate, decision-making

process. This action is vital to combat success or is critical to

preserving life. The drill is initiated on a cue (such as an enemy

action or a leader command) is a trained response to a given

stimulus, is accomplished with minimal leader orders, and is

standard throughout like units.

b. A crew drill is a collective action that a crew of a weapon

system or a piece of equipment must perform to use the weapon or

equipment successfully in combat or to preserve life. This action is a

trained response to a given stimulus (such as a leader command or

the status of the weapon or equipment) requires minimal leader

orders to accomplish, and is standard throughout like units.

c. Battle and crew drills have the following advantages:

(1) They allow teams, squads, and platoons to perform

critical tasks automatically because they have been practiced to the

standards repetitively.

(2) They reduce communication requirements because the

soldiers know what they have to do.

(3) They develop leaders and build teamwork and cohesion

under stress.

(4) They save time, energy, and lives.

1-2. Training Guidance.

a. Train as you fight. This drill book is based upon the training

principles outlined in the Field Manual (FM) 25-series. Drills are

1-1

ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

trained using the talk-through, walk-through, and run-through

methods. You—as the trainer—must master the drill in order to

train your soldiers to execute the drill to the prescribed training

standards. You may wish to periodically talk your soldiers through

the drill by explaining the role of each soldier, having them go

through the drill slowly, and making on-the-spot corrections.

Whenever possible, train in an environment or under conditions

similar to actual combat conditions. Conduct the drill training

frequently in mission-oriented protection posture level 4 (MOPP4).

Be tough on yourself and your soldiers. A good team executes

training tasks instantly and precisely. Your soldiers will pay a high

price if they fail to meet the training standards.

b. Train to standard. Units fight as they are trained. Soldiers

remember the last way they performed a task; therefore, soldiers

must perform tasks according to established standards that are

strictly enforced by leaders.

c. Train at all levels. The commander is the primary trainer.

Leaders, at all levels, are responsible for training their soldiers and

their units. The success of the unit depends on the personal

involvement of the unit leaders at all levels.

d. Train the current doctrine. Leaders are responsible for

knowing and training according to the current doctrine.

e. Train performance-oriented tasks. Units become more

proficient by performing specific tasks to the standard. The majority

of unit training must involve task performance followed by a

thorough after-action review (AAR).

f. Train to sustain proficiency. The cornerstone of a drill book

is the concept of sustaining individual and unit proficiency. The unit

must train, evaluate, and continue to train at all times. Because

training sustainment requires practice and repetition, constant

evaluation of these training drills is required to identify critical

training strengths and weaknesses. Training must focus on

sustaining skills and correcting weaknesses.

g. Train to challenge. Challenging training builds competence

and confidence by developing and sharpening skills and inspires

excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to

learn.

1-2

ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

1-3. Battle Focus. Battle focus derives peacetime training

requirements from specified missions. It guides the planning,

execution, and assessment of the unit training program.

Commanders use battle focus to allocate resources for training

based on mission requirements. A successful training program is

achievable by focusing on a specific set of mission-essential tasks.

1-4. Safety Consideration.

a. Protection is an element of combat power. Conserving the

fighting potential of a force is an intricate part of protection. Leaders

must verify structural soundness of the training and evaluation

plans from a safety viewpoint. Leaders must conduct training at

levels that are consistent with the abilities of the soldiers being

trained. Leaders must instill an awareness of individual safety in all

subordinate leaders and soldiers. Soldiers must constantly be alert

to avoid situations that may result in injury or death.

b. Leaders must establish safety overwatch procedures for

training. Safety procedures should emphasize adherence to

standards, consideration of environmental factors, assessment of

risks, and prevention of accidents. Leaders must balance training

risks against training requirements and monitor conditions to

eliminate or control safety and health hazards. Leaders must ensure

the welfare of their soldiers in all situations.

c. Leaders must establish a buddy system for safety. Soldiers

should maintain a safety watch over each other with emphasis on

individual safety training and first aid responsibilities. Soldiers

must constantly be alert to and avoid situations that may result in

injury or death. Following the proper safety procedures preserves

troop strength by preventing personnel losses through accidents.

1-5. Evaluation. Training standards are provided as a part of each

drill, and the successful execution of that drill is the standard for the

task or task step.

a. Evaluations may be internal or external. Internal

evaluations are conducted at all levels and must be inherent in all

training. External evaluations are usually more formal and are

conducted by the next higher headquarters (HQ).

b. Failure to evaluate a task when it is executed is a critical

weakness. The Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP)

concept is based on simultaneously training and evaluating. Every

1-3

ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

exercise provides the potential for evaluation feedback. Every

evaluation is a training session. To optimize training, trainers and

leaders must evaluate training as it is performed.

c. Place emphasis on direct, on-the-spot evaluations.

Correcting poor performance during drills is easy to do. However, in

higher-level exercises with outside evaluators, this is usually not

feasible. AARs should be planned at frequent, logical intervals

during the exercise (usually after the completion of a major event).

This is a proven technique that allows for corrections of performance

shortcomings while the shortcomings are still fresh in the soldier's

mind. Additionally, AARs involve everyone and prevent a repeat of

poor performance or reinforcement of bad habits.

1-6. Feedback. The US Chemical School requests your

recommendations for improvement of this drill book. Your feedback

will help ensure that this book stays current with new equipment

and operational concepts that will be employed in the diverse

missions of tomorrow. Please make your comments on

DA Form 2028 or DA Form 7507 (ARTEP Mission Training Plan

User Feedback) and send to the address reflected in the preface.

1-4

Chapter 3

Drills

3-1. General. A crew drill is a collective action that a crew of a

weapon system or piece of equipment must perform to use the

weapon or equipment successfully in combat or to preserve life.

3-2. Crew Drill 03-3-DC101.

TASK: Prepare for Domestic Response Casualty Decontamination

(DRCD) Operations

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. The unit has

received an order to alert, recall, and assemble in support of a

DRCD mission. The DRCD equipment has been issued and

preloaded into shipping containers. The unit receives the order to

prepare for the DRCD operations.

STANDARDS: Each crew member conducts preventive-

maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the equipment and

vehicles according to the operator's manual. The equipment and

vehicles are prepared according to the unit standard operating

procedure (SOP) and load plan. The vehicles are assembled and

prepared for convoy movement.

SUPPORTING INDIVIDUAL TASKS:

References

Task Number Task Title

STP 3-54B1-SM

113-571-1019

Establish, Enter, and

Leave a Radiotelephone

Net

ILLUSTRATIONS: N/A

SETUP INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Resources.

(1) Tables of organization and equipment (TOE) assigned

personnel and equipment.

3-1

ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

(2) DRCD equipment augmentation packages.

(3) Maps with overlays.

b. Training Site. The training site should provide the following:

(1) A large area with suitable access and egress routes for

DRCD operations.

(2) A fire hydrant or an adequate water source to support

decontamination operations.

c. Unit Instructions. None.

TALK-THROUGH INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Objective. The mission is to prepare for the DRCD

operations by loading the equipment and supplies and preparing the

vehicles for movement.

b. Safety/Fratricide. The unit must be extremely cautious at all

times. Conduct the safety briefing and—

(1) Instruct the drivers to employ safe convoy-driving

procedures.

(2) Identify current weather and traffic hazards associated

with convoy movements.

(3) Specify the vehicle and serial convoy intervals for all

drivers and vehicle commanders.

(4) Specify vehicle breakdown and emergency roadside

procedures.

(5) Equip each vehicle with emergency roadside warning

triangles.

c. Demonstration (Optional). If a nearby unit has successfully

performed this drill, have that unit demonstrate. Describe the

actions using the performance measures as a guide. After the

demonstration, summarize what was done.

d. Explanation.

(1) Explain the objective.

(2) Use a simple sketch, a diagram, or any other means to

identify the location of each vehicle in the convoy. Identify each

vehicle by its bumper number. Issue the convoy control number, and

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ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

ensure that the number is chalked on the left and right sides of each

vehicle.

(3) Identify the locations of the staging and marshaling

areas.

(4) Issue the route strip maps.

WALK-THROUGH INSTRUCTIONS: The platoon leader should

conduct the walk-through slowly at first, making on-the-spot

corrections. Do not proceed until the drill is done right. After the

soldiers demonstrate proficiency at a slow pace, let them do it faster.

Remember that safety is never sacrificed for speed. Watch carefully

to make sure the unit achieves all of the standards for the drill.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

1. Conduct PMCS on the equipment and the vehicles.

2. Ensure that all equipment faults are corrected and that the status

is reported to the platoon leader.

3. Use current load plans to ensure that the vehicles are properly

loaded for sustained operations.

4. Conduct radio checks with proper call signs.

5. Prepare the individual, DRCD, and TOE equipment and vehicles

for inspection.

6. Notify the platoon leader when the preparation is complete.

COACHING POINT:

a. Have each member explain his part in the drill.

b. Identify (with the route strip maps) the primary route, start

point, check points, release point, designated rest and refuel points,

and convoy and catch-up speeds. Designate the alternate

communication means, call signs, and frequencies.

c. Conduct an after-action review (AAR) to identify strengths,

shortcomings, and corrective actions.

RUN-THROUGH INSTRUCTIONS: The soldiers should practice

this drill until they can perform it according to the standards

without the drill book. The initial run-through should be conducted

slowly. The soldiers should change positions in order to learn all the

steps and standards.

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ARTEP 3-327-10-DRILL

3-3. Crew Drill 03-3-DC102.

TASK: Establish a Domestic Response Casualty Decontamination

Site

CONDITIONS (CUE): Terrorist acts involving weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) are threatened or have occurred. The unit has

received the mission to establish a DRCD site. The incident

commander (IC) has established the location to receive and process

the ambulatory and nonambulatory casualties. The platoon leader

directs the unit to establish the DRCD site.

STANDARDS: The unit downloads the supplies, tentage,

equipment, and vehicles and establishes the DRCD site within

90 minutes of receiving the directive.

SUPPORTING INDIVIDUAL TASKS:

References

Task Number Task Title

STP 3-54B1-SM

071-326-0608

Use Visual Signalling

Techniques

113-600-1012

Install Telephone Set

TA-312/PT for

Operation

171-121-3009

Control Techniques of

Movement

ILLUSTRATIONS: N/A

SETUP INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Resources.

(1) Tables of organization and equipment (TOE) assigned

personnel and equipment.

(2) DRCD equipment augmentation packages.

(3) Maps with overlays.

b. Training Site. The training site should provide the following:

(1) A large area with suitable access and egress routes for

DRCD operations.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 23