Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 18
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Chapter 6: Summary
RPAs provide many operational advantages today, but to achieve their full
potential in the future - under more adverse operating conditions - four key issues need
to be addressed. These are selection and manning, airspace management/integration,
collateral damage and fratricide, and contested operations. As summarized in Figure 6-1,
these issues can be addressed by providing for better mission management, via six
enablers in technology, people, and processes including: platform/sensor
automation/autonomy, enhanced operator control stations, robust communications
systems, targeted selection and effective training, and innovative CONOPS/TTPs, and
more effective transition of the prototypes of successful ACTD efforts. However, to
achieve the full benefit of the operational advantages afforded by game-changing RPA
weapons systems, the RPA development and acquisition community must embrace
“acquisition normalization” which includes CONOPS-driven systems engineering and
operator-centric human systems integration. In conclusion, investments in technology,
people, and processes will define the future of RPAs for the Air Force.
Summary: Mission Management Will
Shape Next-Generation RPA Operations
…but AF must influence Mission Management advances
through coordinated investments:
Technology
Flexible levels of automation
Enhanced Operator Control Stations
Robust communications systems
People
Targeted selection and effective training
Processes
Improved CONOPS and TTPs
Effective ACTD transitions
Figure 6-1: Summary.
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Appendix A: Assumptions, Initial Hypotheses,
and Data Requirements
A.1 Assumptions
The Study Panel identified the following assumptions with respect to remotely piloted
aircraft:
A1: RPAs provide global vigilance, global reach, and global power in dull, dirty,
and dangerous missions.
A2: RPAs can support a select range of military operations.
A3: RPAs appetite and growth will continue (e.g., Predator/Reaper growing from
10 to 65 24/7 combat air patrols [CAPs]).
A4: Projected manpower intensity (operators, exploiters) is unsustainable, driving
a requirement for automation and autonomy.
A5: Modularity can decrease life cycle cost, improve integration/adaptability, and
enhance sustainability.
A6: RPA standards will facilitate and possibly accelerate acquisition and enhance
interoperability.
A7: Existing and new sensors create an information deluge, driving a need to
address tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
A8: Adversaries can use RPAs for both offensive and defensive operations.
A9: Adversaries will exploit our RPA vulnerabilities.
A10: Counterinsurgency
(COIN) Rules of Engagement
(ROE) constrain
operations (e.g., the protection of the civilian population is more important than
killing a high-value target [HVT]).
A11: Technology solutions for RPA challenges are available today that are not
being employed.
A12: Complexity will drive a shift to more software-intensive vehicles.
A13: A net-centric environment and distributed command and control (C2) will
require more links and more bandwidth.
A14: Coalition and multi-service collaboration and interoperability are essential,
but raise operational reasons (e.g., OPSEC).
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A.2 Initial Hypotheses
The Study Panel identified and considered a number of hypotheses with respect to
remotely piloted aircraft including:
H1: Insufficient manning threatens sustainment of future growth in operations,
as evidenced by:
-
“Our #1 manning problem in the Air Force is manning our unmanned
platforms” (LtGen Deptula, 2010, SAB Briefing)
-
A freeze on all RPA operator re-assignments
This is exacerbated by insufficient training requirements, objectives, and
methods.
H2: Information overload threatens operational success because new, high
bandwidth, wide area sensors challenge both limited communications
bandwidth and limited human analytic capability.
H3: Platform autonomy
(e.g., take off, land/recover, navigation, collision
avoidance including separation assurance
(sense and avoid) and terrain
avoidance) will increase RPA loiter, reach, effectiveness; and decrease the
operator/RPA ratio (10 to 1).
H4: Operator error, insufficient training, and system complexity are the primary
contributors to operational failure
-
Decision-making error and skill-based error account for primary AF
operational failures.32
-
Effective training, morale, and automation significantly improve
performance (e.g., some attribute difference in Global Hawk vs. Predator
mishap rates to differences in volunteerism, 100 percent former vs. 15
percent latter; and auto takeoff/land in the former).
H5: RPA missions will increase in diversity and complexity (e.g., surveillance,
counterinsurgency).
H6: Threats against RPAs will increase in number and gain in sophistication.
H7: Reliability will improve with increased system maturity, and can be
accelerated with targeted efforts.
H8: Multi-aircraft control (MAC) is a force multiplier and will increase mission
effectiveness.
H9: Increased autonomy will change the communication rate and bandwidth
requirement (could go up and/or down).
32 (cf. UAV Mishaps 1994-2004).
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H10: Automated on-board processing is required to support Wide Area
Airborne Surveillance (WAAS) in the face of fixed communications bandwidth.
H11: Exploitation rate
(TPED) is the primary limiting factor, not link
bandwidth; bottleneck will shift in future.
H12: Link vulnerability provides insurgents with an advantage.
H13: Lack of RPA platform/sensor data link standards (most are proprietary and
system unique) impede interoperability of ground and platform/sensor limiting
control
-
Global Hawk is the only operational RPA with Common Data Link (CDL)
–
Need validation of STANAG 4586 and interoperability testing of systems.
H14: ISR forensics are essential to counter insurgency, counter-IED mission.
H15: Interoperability with joint and coalition partners is essential to mission
effectiveness.
H16: Advanced TTPs reduce support personnel per RPA CAP.
H17: A Joint RPA/manned airspace management plan will increase airspace
efficiency, safety, and mission effectiveness.
H18: USAF RPA investment portfolio is not well matched to mission
requirements/needs.
A.3 Data Requirements
During the process of testing hypotheses, the Study Panel identified a number of essential
elements of information that are important to assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of
RPA operations. The key ones are captured here to motivate their collection for future
analyses.
A.3.1 Manning
• What is manning requirement by platform (e.g., Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk)?
• What skills, mission essential competencies (MECs), and experiences are required
to successfully operate various platforms and missions?
A.3.2 Operations
• What are the flight hours breakdown by mission tasks (e.g., ferrying; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
[ISR]; weapons engagement; battle damage
assessment) by platform (e.g., Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk)?
• How many requirements/tasks (e.g., ISR, close air support, strike) that could be
addressed by RPAs are not satisfied (e.g., requirement for coverage, speed)?
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A.3.3 Civilian Causalities
• What percentage of civilian causalities is caused by RPAs?
• How many civilian causalities are avoided because of RPA persistent
surveillance?
• What percent of initial enemy determinations were reversed with additional RPA
data?
A.3.4 Training
• How many hours of training are required for various RPA roles (e.g., pilots,
sensor operators, information exploiters, maintainers)?
• What is the distribution of training hours in terms of class room, simulator, and
live operations?
A.3.5 Communications
• What is the experience of lost-link by percent of flight hours by platform
(Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk)?
• What is the average duration and variance of lost-link?
• What are the causes of lost-link
(e.g., mechanical failure, human error,
interference, jamming)?
• What is the trained response to various link losses?
A.3.6 Contested Environments
• What kinds of threats and at what frequency are they experienced by area,
platform (e.g., Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk), mission?
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Appendix B: Analysis of Impact of Findings and
Recommendations
This appendix captures a detailed qualitative assessment of the impact of the
Study Panel’s findings and recommendations on identified operational gaps. Importantly,
our analysis did not consider cost or quantitative impacts of various recommendations but
rather reflects expert judgment by the Panel based on individual and Panel expertise and
experience. Our assessments reflect our collective best judgment given the short study
time. Accordingly, we caveat our analysis as not being a formal life cycle cost/benefit
analysis, which would require further effort.
The Study Panel’s analytic method included considering the effects of closing the
identified mission management gaps discussed in Chapter 3, in terms of ameliorating the
operational issues articulated in Chapter
2
(i.e., manning and selection, airspace
deconfliction and management, collateral damage, and contested environments). Figure
B-1 depicts a matrix illustrating the benefits of addressing known mission management
gaps (rows) on the operational issues (columns). For example, investments in solving
automation the mission management gaps in Operator Control Station
(OCS),
communications, selection/training, and CONOPS/TTP (Concepts of Operations/Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures) will improve the identified operational issues. Each cell in
the matrix is numbered and colored as green (high impact), light green (medium impact),
and white (little or no impact) to indicate the degree of contribution an investment has in
terms of correcting the operational issue. A justification for each assessment is captured
below indexed by the cell number for ease of access. Rows indicate how improvements
affect issues: thus cells
1 through 4 indicate how flexible levels of automation will
contribute to the four operational issues. For example, cell number 2 indicates how
investments in automation will improve airspace deconfliction and management. The
following paragraphs explain the qualitative assessments made for each cell.
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Mission Management Gaps Drive RPA
Operational Issues
█ High
Airspace
Contested
█ Med
Manning &
Collateral
Deconfliction &
Environment
Selection
Damage
█ None
Management
Operations
Flexible Levels of
1-H
2-H
3-H
4-H
Automation
Enhanced OCS
5-H
6-M
7-M
8-H
Robust
Communications
9-M
10-H
11-M
12-H
Systems
Targeted
Selection &
13-H
14-M
15-M
16-H
Training
Improved
17-M
18-M
19-M
20-H
CONOPS & TTPs
Figure B-1: Impact of Addressing Mission Management Gaps on Operational
Issues.
Cell 1 (High): Increasing automation will reduce personnel and manning requirements
for pilots, sensor operators, and exploiters. Automation can reduce the need for sensor
operators, lessen selection criteria requirement for pilots, and enable multi-aircraft control
(MAC). Improved automation will make aircraft handoffs more rapid and allow one pilot
to handle more than one aircraft.
Cell
2 (High): Effective automation could enable more precise and timely flight
planning and improve sense and avoid, and automate reactions to time-critical events.
Automation is a key solution to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) see-and-avoid
requirements and will have significant impact on the ability of RPAs of all groups to
successfully integrate with manned aircraft in the National Airspace (NAS).
Cell
3 (High): Effective and accurate automation could enhance automated target
cueing/tracking and ease of adjusting levels of automation to best fit mission need, and
could help avoid deadly errors in collateral damage estimation. Enhanced small RPA
flight control could enable close-in access in contested environments, and automatic
receipt of high resolution imagery could enable rapid and reliable human confirmation of
targets with positive identification. Improved automation transparency/feedback could
decrease operator situation awareness and safety.
Cell 4 (High): Automation of the recognition, avoidance, and/or countering of threats, as
well as the ability to act autonomously to remain stealthy would increase effectiveness in
contested environments. Readily available, prioritized ISR would allow more efficient
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operations in contested environments. Automation (particularly multi vehicle control,
swarming, and group autonomy) would enable quick reaction to changing threat
scenarios, rapid and automated reallocation of tasks across platforms, smart use of
redundancy to recognize cyber intrusions, and could provide ways for coordinated
response/recovery to damage and platform degradation.
Cell
5
(High): Improved/intuitive OCSs can ease selection and reduce training
requirements by providing better situation awareness, enable multi-RPA operations and
collaborative operations, including more rapid handoffs, and allow one pilot or sensor
operator to handle more than one aircraft.
Cell 6 (Medium): Better OCSs could improve operator situational awareness (SA) of
airspace
(overcoming
“soda straw” displays), a significant aspect of airspace
management and deconfliction (e.g., see and avoid). Enhancements in RPA Command
and Control communications will not solve all airspace deconfliction issues, but should
limit RPA “lost-link episodes” and thus increase FAA confidence for flights in the NAS.
Cell 7 (Medium): Better OCSs can improve pilot SA of environment (overcoming “soda
straw” displays), allowing better decisions to be made on strike opportunities to avoid
collateral damage, although better sensors and georegistration would have an even higher
impact. Current RPA OCSs do not promote effective, safe mission management because
of inefficient and ineffective acquisition and processing of information, lower mission
SA, and higher operator workload. Current OCS re-architecture efforts inadequately
address: 1) automation and adjustable human-automation interaction, 2) human computer
interaction (HCI) for future capabilities and 3) distributed mission operations.
Cell 8 (High): Better designed OCSs can make operations in contested environments (see
and avoid) less challenging. Better OCSs are required for pilots to understand and react
more rapidly and more effectively to the threats in contested environments.
Improvements in sensor and communications links could improve the effectiveness of
OCSs.
Cell 9 (Medium): Communications system improvements could partially improve some
operator-RPA interaction, reduce demand for specialized skills, and, through distribution,
increase platform and pilot/exploiter utilization with more efficient tasking.33
33 Briefing entitled
“Globally Distributed Mission Management Operational Benefits Analysis”, 2009,
Booz Allen Hamilton
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Cell 10 (High): Lost-link conditions are a major concern for FAA, particularly where
sense and avoid systems are not fielded. Communications improvements could increase
the likelihood of maintaining positive control of RPAs.
Cell
11
(Medium): Limited communications could inhibit weapon employment
opportunities, latencies in satellite links inhibit real-time, emergency command and
control (C2) and lack of interoperability limits distributed operations. Reduced latency
links promise to enable random diverts and better communications and networking
promises to increase SA and fusion from multiple assets, with the potential to improve
target recognition/confirmation. In addition, an open communications architecture would
enable not only distributed Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED), but also
distributed global operations.
Cell 12 (High): A lack of diversity and dependence on existing systems (e.g. SATCOM)
increases vulnerability in contested environments and limited communications inhibit
real-time threat warnings. Increased redundancy in communication links increases
resilience to communication link attacks. Better QoS provisioning will allow for quick
adaptation to changing mission scenarios.
Cell
13 (High): Improving selection and training will mitigate manning problems.
Scientifically based selection and training can help acquire the right personnel, accelerate
training, and reduce attrition. Training and selection of pilot candidates can especially
impact the desired capability to handle multiple RPAs.
Cell
14
(Medium): For RPAs that are
“virtually manned,” that is flown by
pilots/operators remotely thru the Ku Band satellite infrastructure like the Predator series,
better trained pilots will improve airspace management in NAS and Military Controlled
Airspace (MCA). Also, simulation training in Distributed Mission Operations (DMO)
environments can be used to test NAS CONOPS and train for airspace coordination.
Cell 15 (Medium): Selection criteria are not based on capabilities associated with each
RPA position, and squadron instructors have expressed concern with the combat
readiness of Beta pilot graduates. Improvements in simulation facilities, especially for
sensor operator training, structured continuation training for mission management skills,
and simulation training in DMO environments can be used to train mission coordination
to prevent collateral damage. Training and simulation under stressful conditions could
provide the needed experience for positive identification and tactical patience, both key
to the prevention of collateral damage.
Cell 16 (High): Targeted selection and training for contested environment operations are
crucial for mission assurance. Selection of warfighters who are able to make decisions
under uncertainty and who can manage dynamic mission environments are essential for
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effective operation in contested space. Better simulators that incorporate realistic kinetic
and electronic threats can enhance force resiliency. Finally, simulation training in DMO
environments can be used to train mission coordination in contested environments.
Cell 17 (Medium): Improving CONOPs and TTPs helps identify possible inefficient
RPA applications, particularly for exploitation. However, CONOPS and TTPs indirectly
affect the manning requirements of RPAs, their use in contested environments, and
whether a single pilot can handle multiple RPAs.
Cell 18 (Medium): Until CONOPs and TTPs are developed, airspace management will
remain inefficient and difficult. Improvements in CONOPs and TTPs should improve
effectiveness and efficiency of military RPA operations in MCA in combat AORs, but
will not completely satisfy FAA deconfliction requirements in the NAS.
Cell 19 (Medium): CONOPS and TTPs are often developed “after the fact” following
development and deployment, rather than as a concurrent effort in an “incremental
development” program. CONOPs for distributed mission management and collateral
damage avoidance should be part of well-structured TTPs. CONOPS and TTPs that
ensure positive identification and tactical patience promise to reduce collateral damage.
Cell
20 (High): Adversarial actions dramatically increase uncertainty in mission
execution. CONOPS and TTPs addressing contested environments and scenarios are
important not only for warfighter preparation, but also for developing requirements for
weapon systems.
Figure B-2 depicts a matrix illustrating the benefits of technology, people, and
process investment (shown down columns) to fill known mission management gaps
(shown across in rows). That is, investments in reducing existing limitations in
automation, OCS, communications, selection/training, and CONOPS/TTPs will reduce
the identified mission gaps, such as the need for flexible automation. Each cell in the
matrix is numbered and colored as green (high impact), light green (medium impact), and
white (little or no impact) to indicate the degree of contribution an investment has to
correcting a mission management gap. A justification for each assessment is captured in
the text remainder of this appendix, indexed by the cell number for ease of access. For
example, cells 21 through 25 indicate that implementing the Study Panel’s mid-term
enhanced OCS recommendation will significantly improve all gap areas, from enabling
flexible automation to improving future CONOPS and TTPs.
In particular, employing a cohesive Human-System Integration (HSI) process and
usability design/testing to develop a family of networked, interoperable OCSs with new
non-proprietary, standards-based OCS architectures with plug-and-play components for a
full range of functions will enable automation, facilitate interoperability and modularity,
improved networked communications, ease training, and support and foster novel
CONOPS/TTPs. As is evident, the main diagonals between major columns and their
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respective mission management gaps are equivalent (e.g., automation for automation)
therefore are left out of the detailed analysis.
Technology, People, and Processes
Can Fill Mission Management Gaps
█ High
Technology, People and Processes
█ Med
Robust
Automation
Enhanced
Selection
CONOPS and
ACTD
█ None
Communicati
& Processing
OCSs
and Training
TTPs
Transition
ons
Flexible
Automation/
1-H
2-H
3-H
4-N
5-H
6-M
7-N
8-M
9-M
10-N
11-M
1
2-M
13-H
14-M
15-H
16-M
17-H
18-M
Processing
System Based
19-H
20-H
21-H
22-H
23-H
24-H
25-M
26-N
27-H
28-N
29-M
30-N
31-H
32-H
33-H
34-H
35-H
36-H
Design of OCS
Networked
37-M
38-H
39-H
40-N
41-H
42-N
43-M
44-M
45-H
46-N
47-N
48-N
49-H
50-H
51-M
52-M
53-H
54-M
Communicatio
nsSystems
Targeted
55-M
56-M
57-M
58-M
59-H
60-M
61-N
62-N
63-M
64-H
65-H
66-H
67=M
68-N
69-N
70-M
71-M
72-M
Selection &
Training
Future CONOPS
73-M
74-H
75-H
76-M
77-H
78-M
79-N
80-M
81-H
82-N
83-M
84-H
85-H
86-H
87-H
88-H
89-H
90-M
& TTPs
Figure B-2: Impact of Investing in Technology, People, and Processes on Solving
Mission Management Gaps.
Cell 1: Main diagonal.
Cell
2
(High): Automation aids will drastically affect OCS design and training
requirements. Also, automatic transmission of high-value imagery will simplify OCS
design and use.
Cell 3 (Medium): Single platform automation will enable network communication
systems to support basic distributed control. In addition, on-board auto-compression and
processing of imagery will greatly reduce the burden on networked communication
systems.
Cell 4 (Medium): Single platform automation affects training and selection. Sensor
operator training will be improved when realistic simulator conditions are available for
single-platform automated imagery capabilities.
Cell 5 (Medium): Future CONOPS and TTPs will be enabled or disabled by the
effectiveness of automation of platform and payload functions (e.g., imagery selection
and compression in complex systems such as ARGUS-IS).
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Cell 6: Main diagonal.
Cell 7 (High): Mission level automation aids will drastically affect OCS design and
training requirements. Automatic selection of the highest-valued imagery from platforms
will improve efficiency of OCS-related activities, particularly reducing the burden on the
sensor operator.
Cell 8 (High): Combining automation and networked communications across multiple
platforms enables global distributed RPA management. Automated compression of
imagery from/among multiple platforms will greatly reduce the burden on networked
communications systems.
Cell 9 (Medium): Multi-platform automation affects multi-platform training. Sensor
operator training will be improved when realistic simulator conditions are available for
multi-platform automated imagery capabilities.
Cell 10 (High): Future CONOPS and TTPs will be affected by mission level automation,
eliminating many manual procedures and streamlining overall workflow.
Cell 11: Main diagonal.
Cell 12 (High): Multi-platform automation aids will drastically affect OCS design and
training requirements. Auto-selection of the highest-valued imagery from/among
multiple platforms and timely reporting of high-priority events will improve efficiency of
OCS-related activities.
Cell 13 (High): Mission level automation can more effectively leverage networked
communications which are required for distributed collaborative mission management.
Automated compression and delivery-when-needed of images for particular missions can
reduce the burden on communications systems and enhance their efficiency.
Cell 14 (Medium): Multi-platform automation affects multi-platform training. Sensor
operator training will be improved when realistic simulator conditions are available for
integrated multi-RPA-platform and for dealing with all-source imagery/intelligence.
Cell
15
(High): Multi-platform automation enables new concepts like globally
distributed RPA management, but also enables new ways to perform multi-RPA
collaborative missions, like swarms. Future CONOPS and TTPs will be affected by
automation of imagery selection and compression from complex systems such as
ARGUS-IS on multiple platforms when integrated automatically with all-source
intelligence.
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Cell 16 (None): Improved HMIs will leverage and facilitate incorporation of flexible
automation.
Cell 17: Main diagonal.
Cell 18 (None): Improved HMIs would have little effect on networked communications.
Cell 19 (Medium): Improved HMIs will ease training somewhat, but not significantly.
Cell 20 (Medium): Improved HMIs will enable better operations.
Cell 21 (High): Open OCS architectures will enable new auto modules to be easily
inserted.
Cell 22: Main diagonal.
Cell
23 (High): New, open architecture OCSs will enable interconnectivity and
improved communications through standard protocols.
Cell 24 (High): New interoperable OCSs will streamline training through maximizing
commonalities, reducing modeling and simulation requirements.
Cell 25 (High): New interoperable OCSs can significantly impact development of new
CONOPS and TTPs by enabling control of heterogeneous RPAs from a single OCS.
Cell 26 (Medium): Advanced S&T promotes improvements in automation aids, which
further enables flexible automation.
Cell 27: Main diagonal.
Cell 28 (None): Advanced S&T for OCSs (e.g. multiple heterogeneous platform
teaming) could increase reliance on networked communications, but will not directly
improve them.
Cell 29 (Medium): Advanced S&T will reduce manpower requirements by allowing
fewer operators to do more (force multiplication).
Cell 30 (Medium): Advanced OCS operator aids will extend the ability of the human to
supervise multiple RPAs simultaneously in collaborative missions.
Cell 31 (None): Short-term fixes to communications will not affect flexible automation.
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Cell 32 (Medium): Immediate fixes to the communications systems will enable reading
data from existing ground control stations (GCSs), and disseminating the information
better throughout the network.
Cell 33: Main diagonal.
Cell 34 (None): Short-term fixes to communications will not affect targeted selection and
training.
Cell 35 (None): Short-term fixes to communications will not impact future CONOPS and
TTPs.
Cell 36 (Medium): Communications diversity, efficiency, and robustness will enable
processing that is now done on the ground to be placed on-platform.
Cell 37 (None): Communications diversity, efficiency, and robustness will not affect
OCS designs.
Cell 38: Main diagonal.
Cell 39 (None): Communications diversity, efficiency, and robustness will not affect
targeted selection and training
Cell 40 (Medium): Use of relay options will enable new CONOPS/TTPs.
Cell 41 (Medium): As with Cell #8, but allows for dynamic load balancing or tasking
(e.g., with facilities like cloud computing).
Cell 42 (High): Open and interoperable communications architectures will significantly
enhance the functionality of OCSs by making them fully networked.
Cell 43: Main diagonal.
Cell 44 (Medium): Interoperable communications will enable distributed simulation and
training.
Cell
45 (High): Implementation of a full communications architecture will enable
CONOPS/TTPs that exploit networks of assets, not just operating platforms.
Cell 46 (None): Targeted selection and training will have no impact on automation.
Cell 47 (None): Selection and training will not affect OCS design and should not be a
fix for poor design.
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Cell 48 (None): Selection and training will not impact communications.
Cell 49: Main diagonal.
Cell 50 (None): Targeted selection will not affect future CONOPs/TTPs.
Cell 51 (Medium): Developing a realistic simulator could help identify the requirements
for and/or design characteristics of automation (e.g., enabling the exploration of different
levels of automation).
Cell
52
(Medium): Although better training simulators could improve operator
performance, they won’t necessarily directly result in improved OCSs. However,
developing a realistic simulator could help identify the requirements for and/or design
characteristics of a family of better OCSs.
Cell 53 (None): Better training simulations will not impact communications.
Cell 54: Main diagonal.
Cell 55 (Medium): Better training simulators could help develop and test CONOPs/
TTPs.
Cell 56 (Medium): Team coordination training can be conducted in the context of MAC
and other human-automation experiences. Better team training could result in discovery
of where mission level automation can help performance.
Cell 57 (None): Better training in team coordination will have no affect on the design of
OCS.
Cell 58 (High): Team coordination will not improve networks and communications.
Cell 59: Main diagonal.
Cell 60 (High): Team coordination training environments can serve as testbeds for
creating and evaluating human-in-the loop CONOPS/TTPs.
Cell
61 (High): Distributed global operations will depend on high levels of well-
structured automation, and well-defined CONOPS/TTPs will drive appropriate
automation.
Cell 62 (High): Well-articulated CONOPS/TTPs for distributed global operations can
guide the design of OCSs which can result in more efficient and effective use of
operators.
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Cell 63 (High): Clarity of CONOPS/TTPS for distributed global operations will provide
clear requirements for the design of robust, networked communications systems design.
Cell 64 (Medium): The skillsets mandated by distributed operations must be defined and
included in personnel selection and training. Clear CONOPS/TTPs for distributed global
operations will help focus personnel selection and training curricula.
Cell 65: Main diagonal.
Cell 66 (Medium): Integration of manned and unmanned operations on any significant
scale will depend upon appropriate automation and be driven by requirements for
manned/unmanned operations.
Cell 67 (High): Integrated manned and unmanned operations will be impossible without
an appropriate OCS, but will not enhance the OCS.
Cell
68
(High): Clarity of CONOPS/TTPS for integration of manned/unmanned
operations will provide clear requirements for the design of robust, networked
communication systems design.
Cell
69 (None): Development of manned/unmanned CONOPs/TTPs will not affect
targeted selection and training.
Cell 70: Main diagonal.
Cell 71 (High): A path toward well-engineered automation should be a part of each
spiral.
Cell 72 (High): One of the major limitations of the current Predator and Global Hawk
systems is the poor design of the OCSs. In large part, this arose from the way these
programs were pursued, as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs)
focused on technology, without a direct view towards acquisition or even operational
needs. A clearer focus on the transition of ACTDs to an operational system should have
resulted in a more successful OCS, and such should be pursued for future RPA concepts
and missions.
Cell 73 (Medium): The spiral development of CONOPS/TTPS has a moderate impact on
the design of the networked communications plan.
Cell 74 (None): Spiral development of CONOPs/TTPs will not affect targeted selection
and training.
Cell 75: Main diagonal.
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Cell 76 (Medium): Improving the transition process for moving the products of ACTDs
into acquisition would have relatively minimal impact on the ability to introduce
flexibility in the automation process. This is a developmental feature that would be
incorporated in the technology design phase.
Cell
77 (High): Improving the transition process of advanced OCSs ACTDs into
normalized acquisition would address a significant mission management gap for well-
engineered OCSs.
Cell 78
(Medium): Effective transition of communications/networking ACTDs enables
the demonstration of new communications approaches to address the current challenges
of a contested, heterogeneous, and bandwidth hungry environment.
Cell 79 (Medium): An improved transition process should include training needs and
processes. As such, the methodology for choosing RPA operators and determining a
valuable training course, including meaningful metrics and means of providing
operational feedback, should be part of the acquisition considerations.
Cell 80 (High): The development of future CONOPS/TTPs must inform the technology
development and transition process. Indeed, one can argue that a significant limitation in
current RPA systems has been that the technology was developed without a detailed
understanding of the CONOPS. As such, the identification of future missions and
employment strategies, including RPA interactions with other systems, is an essential
part of an ACTD transition strategy.
Cell 81 (High): Proper systems engineering must include a detailed analysis of the
degree of automation required for mission prosecution, and the required flexibility for
such a system. This leads to a high degree of coupling between proper systems
engineering practices and the ability to provide a “dial-in” capability in setting levels of
autonomy appropriate for a given mission or operational phase. Detailed human-machine
interaction studies are required, considering actual operational experiences with current
RPAs, and projected future needs and uses.
Cell 82 (High): System engineering practices will have direct and significant impact on
improved design of future OCSs.
Cell 83
(High): A systems engineering approach to communications/networking will
result in more robust communications and interoperability enabling secure/distributed
operations, although this may delay fielding of systems.
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Cell
84
(Medium): Systems engineering should, by its nature, include some
considerations of training and operator selection and a disciplined system engineering
process should result in capabilities that ease or enhance training.
Cell 85 (High): Disciplined systems engineering practices can result in more robust,
flexible, and effective systems that can enable future CONOPS/TTPs. Moreover,
systems engineering practices can be applied to enhance the development of new
CONOPS/TTPs.
Cell 86 (Medium): An essential role for an HSI evaluation team will be to determine the
desired degree of autonomy for any RPA system, and the best way to incorporate that
into operations.
Cell 87 (High): An HSI effort should have a major role in designing, or modifying, an
OCS.
Cell 88 (Medium): Communications/networking systems that incorporate HSI will be
more tailored to operator performance.
Cell 89 (Medium): Part of the analysis of human-machine interactions should include
training issues, ease of use, and means of coupling training simulations to operator
control stations.
Cell 90 (Medium): Effective application of HSI processes can better enable future, and
potential future, RPA CONOPS/TTPs. Considering human-machine interface and
human-human interaction during design can maximize flexibility across multiple mission
scenarios and well as best engage human and machine talent in future CONOPS and
TTPs.
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Appendix C: Study Members
Study Leadership
Dr. Greg Zacharias, Chair
Dr. Mark Maybury, Vice Chair
Study Membership
Dr. Nancy Cooke
Dr. Mary Cummings
Dr. Kevin Fall
Maj Gen George Harrison, USAF (Ret)
Mr. Neil Kacena
Maj Gen Michael Kostelnik, USAF (Ret)
Dr. Mark Lewis
Dr. David Moore
Mr. Charles Saff
Dr. Robert Schafrik
Prof. Michael Stroscio
Prof. Janos Sztipanovits
Dr. Peter Worch
General Officer Advisor
Lt Gen David Deptula, AF/A2
Col Michele Cook
Col Jeff Eggers
Col David Sullivan
Government Participant
Dr. Mark Draper, AFRL/RH
Study Management
Lt Col Robert Ward, Program Manager
Mr. Matthew Gorski, Deputy Program Manager
Study Execs
Lt Col Anne Johnson
Lt Col Daniel Markham
Lt Col Gary Mills
Maj Harris Hall
Capt Geoffrey Bowman
Capt Amy Zwiers
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Appendix D: Visits and Briefings
Air Staff
SAF/AQI
AF/CC-SA
ASC
AF/A1
OSD-ATL
AF/A2
AAC/XP
AF/A3/5
AF/A8
Research
AF/A9
AFRL: RB, RH, RW, RY
Army AMRDEC
Operational Organizations
Arizona State University
CENTCOM: J2, J3, J5, J8
DARPA: TTO, IPTO, AEO, STO
SOCOM
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab
AFSOC: CC, A2, A3, A5, A8, A9, 11
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
IS, USAFSOS
MIT
ACC: A2, A3, A8, 26 WPS, USAFWC,
MITRE
432 WG, 11 RS, 480 Wing, DGS-1,
ONR
DGS-2
United Technologies Research Center
Other Organizations
Industry
Army G2
Airborne Technologies
JFCOM: J5, JCOA
BIT Systems
NASIC
Boeing
NGA
General Atomics
CIA
Lockheed Martin
DIA
Northrop Grumman
DHS/CBP
Raytheon
FAA
SRS Technologies
Related Activities/Studies
AF UAS Task Force
RAND Project Air Force
Defense Science Board
Acquisition
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Appendix E: Acronyms
ACO
Air Coordination Order
ACS
Advanced Control Station
ACTD
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
AFRL
Air Force Research Laboratory
AFSOC
Air Force Special Operations Command
AMOC
Air Maritime Operations Centers
ANA
Afghanistan National Army
ANP
Afghanistan National Police
ARGUS
Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance
Argus-IS
ARGUS Imaging Systems
ASOC
Air Support Operations Center
ATD
Advanced Technology Demonstration
ATO
Air Tasking Order
ATC
Air Traffic Control
AF
Air Force
BACN
Battlefield Airborne Communications Node
BFT
Blue Force Tracker
BPC
Building Partnership Capacity
BDA
Bomb Damage Assessment
C2
Command and Control
CAOC
Combined Air Operations Center
CAP
Combat Air Patrol
CAS
Close Air Support
CBP
Customs and Border Patrol
CENTCOM
Central Command
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CIVCAS
Civilian Casualties
COA
Certificate of Authorization
COCOM
Combatant Command
COIN
Counter Insurgency
CONOPS
Concept of Operations
COTS
Commercial off the Shelf
CT
Counter Terrorism
DCGS
Distributed Common Ground Station
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DIB
DCGS Integration Backbone
DNI
Director of National Intelligence
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DSB
Defense Science Board
DSO
Distributed System Operations
EA
Electronic Attack
ECM
Electronic Countermeasure
EP
Electronic Protection
ESOW
Expeditionary Special Ops Wing
EW
Electronic Warfare
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID
Foreign Internal Defense
FMV
Full Motion Video
GA
General Atomics
GD
General Dynamics
GCS
Ground Control Station
GEOINT
Geospatial Information Intelligence
GIG
Global Information Grid
GIG-BE
Global Information Grid Bandwidth Extension
GPS
Global Position Satellite
HART
Heterogeneous Airborne Reconnaissance Team
HUMINT
Human Intelligence
HSI
Human-System Integration
HCI
Human Computer Interaction
HVT
High Value Target
IADS
Integrated Air Defense System
IFR
Instrument Flight Rules
IMINT
Imagery Intelligence
ISAF
International Security Assistance Forces
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IW
Irregular Warfare
IR
Infrared
JSOA
Joint Special Operations Area
JTAC
Joint Terminal Attack Controller
LMCO
Lockheed Martin Corporation
LO
Low Observable
LOS
Line-of-sight
LPI
Low Probability of Intercept
MASINT
Measures and Signatures Intelligence
MALE
Medium Altitude Long-Endurance UAV
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MCA
Military Controlled Airspace
MEC
Mission Essential Competencies
MM
Mission Management
MTI
Moving Target Indicator
NAS
National Airspace System
NTC
National Training Center
NGA
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NRO
National Reconnaissance Office
NIPRNET
Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
OCS
Operator Control Station
OSINT
Open Source Intelligence
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PED
Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination
PI
Person Identification
PSYOP
Psychological Operation
RCS
Radar Cross Section
ROE
Rules of Engagement
ROZ
Restricted Operating Zone
RPA
Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SA
Situation Awareness
SAA
Sense and Avoid
SAM
Surface to Air Missile
SEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SIGINT
Signals Intelligence
SIPRNET
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOCOM
Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM
Southern Command
SPO
System(s) Program Office
SUAS
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems
TAO
Terminal Area Operations
TAOC
Terminal Area Operations Center
TCAS
Terminal Collision Avoidance System
TOR
Terms of Reference
TTP
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TPED
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
UAS
Unattended/Unmanned Airborne System
UAV
Unattended/Unmanned Airborne Vehicle
UCAS
Unattended Combat Airborne System
UTOC
UAS Tactical Operation Center
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UW
Unconventional Warfare
VFR
Visual Flight Rules
WAAS
Wide Area Airborne Surveillance
WAPS
Wide Area Persistent Surveillance
WOC
Wing Operations Center
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Appendix F: References
Alliger, G.M., R.M. Beard, W. Bennett, Jr., C.M. Colegrove, and M. Garrity.
“Understanding Mission Essential Competencies as a Work Analysis Method” (AFRL-
HE-AZ-TR-2007-0034). Mesa AZ: Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness
Directorate, Warfighter Readiness Research Division. 2007.
Booz Allen Hamilton. “Globally Distributed Mission Management Operational Benefits
Analysis, 2009.” [Briefing provided to SAB during Summer Board Meeting in Irvine,
CA, June 2010.].
Billingsley, 2Lt Thomas B. “Safety Analysis of TCAS on Global Hawk using Airspace
Encounter Models”, USAF Academy and MIT/Lincoln Labs, June 2006.
Card, Stuart K., Thomas P. Moran, and Allen Newell. The Psychology of Human-
Computer Interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1983.
Cooke, Nancy J., Heather L. Pringle, Harry K. Pedersen, and Olena Connor, eds. Human
Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles. Oxford, UK: Elsevier/JAI Press, 2006.
Cummings, Missy, Sylvain Bruni, Stephane Mercier, and Paul J. Mitchell. “Automation
Architecture for Single Operator-Multiple UAV Command and Control.” The
International Command and Control Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2007): 1-24.
Erwin, Sandra I. “Controlling Iraq’s Crowded Airspace No Easy Task.” National Defense
Magazine. December 2005.
Controlling5482.aspx
Gramm, Joshua and Steven Pappan. 2009. “Insatiable Demand: ‘Manning’ the US Air
Force’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems with Capable Pilots,” Harvard Kennedy School of
Government, March 2009.
Lacher, Andrew, et al. “Airspace Integration Alternatives for Unmanned Aircraft,”
Presented at the AUVSI Unmanned Systems Asia-Pacific Conference. Pan Pacific Hotel,
Singapore. 1 February 2010.
La Franchi, Peter. “Animation: Near Misses Between UAVs and Airliners Prompt NATO
Low-Level Rules Review.” Flight International 14 March 2006.
Morgan, Dwayne, Ron Streich, Barton Bull, and Chuck Grant. “Telemetry Tracking &
Control (TT&C) - First TDRSS, then Commercial GEO & Big LEO and Now Through
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LEO.” NASA Technical Paper (Document ID 20010020063). 2001.
United States. AF/A2. “CAP Comparisons - MQ1~MQ9~RQ4~MC12 (20 Apr 10).”
[Briefing provided to SAB during Summer Board Meeting in Irvine, CA, June 2010.]
United States. Defense Science Board. Department of Defense Policies and Procedures
for the Acquisition of Information Technology. Washington, DC. March 2009.
United States. Deptula, Lt Gen David. “The Way Ahead: Remotely Piloted Aircraft in the
United States Air Force.” [Briefing presented to SAB during Winter board Meeting in
Arlington, VA, January 2010].
United States. Department of the Air Force. “The 21st Century Air Force Irregular
Warfare Strategy White Paper.” January 2009.
United States. Hansen, Blair, Brig. Gen. “Project Liberty ‘MC-12’,” Presented January
2009.
United States. Air Force Audit Agency. Unmanned Aerial System Pilot Force
Management. F2009-0005-FD4000. Washington, DC. 17 December 2008.
United States. Joint Center for Operational Analysis. “Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan:
2007-mid 2009.” [Briefing provided to SAB in May 2010.]
United States. Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems
Integrated Roadmap, Second Edition. Washington, DC. April 2009.
United States. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles in Perspective: Effects, Capabilities, and Technologies. Volume 1: Summary.
SAB-TR-03-01. Washington, DC. September 2003.
United States. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Virtual Training
Technologies. SAB-TR-09-01. Washington, DC. August 2009.
United States. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Human-System
Integration in Air Force Weapon Systems Development and Acquisition: Executive
Summary and Annotated Brief. SAB-TR-04-04. Washington, DC. July 2004.
Warrick, Joby and Peter Finn. “Amid Outrage over Civilian Deaths in Pakistan, CIA
Turns to Smaller Missiles.” Washington Post 26 April 2010: A1.
dyn/content/article/2010/04/25/AR2010042503114.html
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Appendix G: Initial Distribution
Air Force Leadership
SAF/OS - Secretary of the Air Force
SAF/US - Under Secretary of the Air Force
AF/CC - Chief of Staff of the Air Force
AF/CV - Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Air Force Secretariat
SAF/AQ - Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)
SAF/CIO A6 - Information Dominance and Chief Information Officer
Air Staff
AF/CVA - Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force
AF/RE - Chief of Air Force Reserve
AF/SB - Scientific Advisory Board Military Director
AF/ST - Chief Scientist of the Air Force
AF/TE - Test and Evaluation
AF/A1 - Manpower and Personnel
AF/A2 - ACS Intelligence
AF/A3/5 - Air, Space, and Information Operations, Plans, and Requirements
AF/A4/7 - Logistics, Installations and Mission Support
AF/A8 - Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs
AF/A9 - Studies and Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned
AF/A10 - Director Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration
NGB/CF - Chief of the Air National Guard
Air Force Major Commands
ACC - Air Combat Command for distribution to
A2, A3, A8; 26 WPS; USAFWC; 432 WG; 11 RS; 480th Wing, DGS-1, DGS-2
AETC - Air Education and Training Command
AU - Air University
AFMC - Air Force Materiel Command
CC - Commander, Air Force Materiel Command
EN - Directorate of Engineering and Technical Management
AFRC - Air Force Reserve Command
AFSOC - Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSPC - Air Force Space Command
AMC - Air Mobility Command
PACAF - Pacific Air Forces
USAFE - US Air Forces in Europe
Other Air Force Elements
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AFOSR - Air Force Office of Scientific Research
AFOTEC - Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
AFRL - Air Force Research Laboratories
AFRL/RB - AFRL Air Vehicles Directorate
AFRL/RB - AFRL Munitions Directorate
AFRL/RH - AFRL Human Effectiveness Directorate
AFRL/RI - AFRL Information Directorate
AFRL/RY - AFRL Sensors Directorate
AFSAA - Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency
AF UAS Task Force
AFISRA - Air Force ISR Agency
ASC - Aeronautics Systems Center
ESC -Electronics Systems Center
NASIC - National Air and Space Intelligence Center
SMC - Space and Missile Systems Center
Other Service Elements
Army/G2 - Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Army Research Laboratory
Marine Corps DC/S (A) Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation
AMRDEC - Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center
NRL - Naval Research Laboratory
ONR - Office of Naval Research
US MCWL -Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Executive Office of the President
National Security Council
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies
OSD AT&L - Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
DDR&E - Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for distribution to offices:
TTO, IPTO, AEO, STO
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Secretariat for distribution to:
Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Manpower and Personnel (J-1)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Intelligence (J-2)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations (J-3)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Logistics (J-4)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of C4 Systems (J-6)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8)
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Combatant and Regional Commands
US African Command
US Central Command
US European Command
US Joint Forces Command
USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)
US Northern Command
US Pacific Command
US Southern Command
US Special Operations Command
US Strategic Command
US Transportation Command
Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency - Persistence Surveillance Laboratory
National Reconnaissance Office
Defense Intelligence Agency
Other Government Agencies
Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security/S&T
Coast Guard
Department of State
Federal Aviation Administration
Advisory Boards
Army Science Board
Defense Policy Board
Defense Science Board
Intelligence Science Board
Naval Research and Advisory Committee
Naval Studies Board
Other
Service Academies and Officer PME
National Defense University
Aerospace Corporation
Institute for Defense Analyses
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab
MITRE
RAND
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Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and manipulating the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of
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for reducing the burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis
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22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188),
Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)
2. REPORT DATE
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)
1 August 2010
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Operating Next Generation RPA for Irregular Warfare
6. AUTHORS:
Dr. Greg Zacharias, Dr. Mark Maybury, Dr. Nancy Cooke, Dr. Mary Cummings, Dr.
Mark Draper, Dr. Kevin Fall, George Harrison, MGen (ret), Neil Kacena, Michael
Kostelnik, MGen (ret), Dr. Mark Lewis, Dr. David Moore, Charles Saff, Dr. Robert
Schafrik, Prof. Michael Stroscio, Prof. Janos Sztipanovits, and Dr. Peter Worch
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
HQ USAF/SB
REPORT NUMBER
1180 AF PENTAGON RM 5D982
SAB-TR-10-03
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1180
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY
REPORT NUMBER
SAF/OS, AF/CC
AIR FORCE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1670
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
PENDING SECURITY REVIEW
Pending
ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)
Operating Next Generation RPA for Irregular Warfare:
The Air Force (AF) tasked the SAB to examine how the AF operates remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
for irregular warfare, and make recommendations for reducing manning, enhancing operational effectiveness,
and planning for future operations. The Study Panel observed 1) approximately 70 percent of the manning
requirements represent exploiters and maintainers and are expected to grow, 2) manually intensive airspace
deconfliction and management is inefficient, will not scale, and hampers manned/unmanned integration, 3)
RPAs contribute to minimizing collateral damage because of persistence, increased “eyes on target”, and use
of focused lethality munitions, and 4) inexpensive and proliferating kinetic and electronic threats are an
increasing RPA concern. Findings include 1) insufficient and inflexible platform and sensor automation, 2)
poorly-designed operator control stations, 3) limited communications systems to address interoperability, lost-
link, and scaling, 4) inadequate selection criteria and training, and 5) CONOPS and TTPs that lagged systems.
Based on these findings, the Panel recommends the AF 1) improve automation to enable variable levels of
autonomy, 2) enhance operator control stations, 3) create robust communications systems, 4) develop targeted
selection and enhanced training, 5) improve CONOPS and TTPs, and support distributed operations, and 6)
improve the transfer of ACTD results to acquisitions.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
remotely piloted aircraft, irregular warfare, remote split operations, human machine interaction,
civilian causalities, airspace deconfliction, airspace integration
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
REPORT
THIS PAGE
ABSTRACT
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS
Subcourse Number MP 1005
EDITION C
United States Army Military Police School
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030
6 Credit Hours
Edition Date: April 2006
SUBCOURSE OVERVIEW
We designed this subcourse to teach you how to use crowd control techniques and plan for and supervise
control forces during a civil disturbance.
There are no prerequisites for this subcourse.
This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time it was prepared. In your own work situation,
always refer to the latest official publications.
Unless otherwise stated, the masculine gender of singular pronouns is used to refer to both men and women.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE
ACTION:
Plan for, supervise and employ crowd control forces and techniques for a civil disturbance.
CONDITION: You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the
subcourse examination.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section
Page
Subcourse Overview
i
Lesson 1: Plan Operations to Control a Civil Disturbance
1-1
Part A: Planning
1-1
Part B: Troop Support/Training
1-13
Part C: Operational Techniques/Application of Force
1-17
Part D: Operational Tasks
1-28
Practice Exercise
1-36
Answer Key and Feedback
1-38
Lesson 2: Crowd Control Techniques
2-1
Part A: Crowd Control
2-1
Part B: Neutralization of Special Threats
2-11
Practice Exercise
2-26
Lesson 3: Crowd Control Formations
3-1
Part A: Types of Formations and Weapons
3-1
Part B: Unit Organization
3-8
Part C: Squad Formations
3-13
Part D: Platoon Formations
3-15
Part E: Company Formations
3-32
Practice Exercise
Lesson 4: Riot Control Agent Disperser
4-1
Practice Exercise
4-8
Examination
Appendix: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (M33A1)A-1
LESSON 1
PLAN OPERATIONS TO CONTROL A CIVIL DISTURBANCE
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
This lesson is designed to describe the nature and causes of disaffection and social unrest; define the potential
for social unrest in the United States; identify the types of confrontations; define crowd behavioral and
psychological influences; identify patterns of disorder.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION:
Plan operations to control a civil disturbance.
CONDITION:
You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil.
STANDARD:
To demonstrate competency of this task you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent
on the subcourse examination.
REFERENCES:
The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 3-
19.15; FM 10-10; FM 3-19.4.
PART A - PLANNING
1. Mission of Military Forces during Civil Disturbances. The mission of military forces during civil
disturbances, both in CONUS and OCONUS, which cannot be overly emphasized, is to help local and state
authorities to restore and maintain law and order. This mission may be accomplished by breaking up
unauthorized gatherings and by patrolling the disturbance area to prevent the commission of lawless acts.
During operations to restore order, military forces may present a show of force, establish roadblocks, break up
crowds, employ crowd control agents, patrol, serve as security forces or reserves, and perform other operations
as required. Successful fulfillment of the missions will depend to a large extent upon sufficient planning,
training, police information, and coordinated actions of individuals and units.
2. Planning and Preparation. To be most effective, planning should be coordinated with local civil authorities
to provide a complete coverage of all matters pertaining to operations and ensure that areas requiring joint
efforts are properly considered. The provost marshal performs a key role in civil disturbance planning due to
the mission of restoring law and order assigned a military force in confrontation management operations. His
knowledge of police methods is particularly valuable to the commander and staff in their preparation to assist a
community to restore law and maintain order. Considerations should be given to the provost marshal as a
member of the advance party to further coordinate and represent the commander with civil police agencies.
Planning is a continuing process involving personnel, correct information, logistics, and operational
considerations. It provides for action to be taken before, during, and after disturbances. A military unit
preparing for confrontation management duty passes through two general phases: the planning and training
phase, and the alert phase.
a. The Planning and Training Phase. In planning for crowd control or civil disturbance operations,
planners must decide what data, equipment and training will be needed in order to respond to the
demonstration and restore law and order. This phase includes all preparations that are made prior to the
unit being alerted. Included in this phase are preparations of unit alert plans and standing operating
procedures (SOP), survey of areas and routes, preparation of plans for probable areas of disturbances,
preparation of equipment and crowd control devices to include both non lethal and lethal munitions,
training in confrontation management operations, and rehearsals of plans.
b. The Alert Phase. This phase may be a short time or may extend over a period of days. During this
phase, the unit is fully prepared and ready to move. Vehicles are loaded with equipment and ready for
movement. Soldiers are dressed in the prescribed uniforms. Weapons, ammunition, non-lethal munitions,
crowd control agent munitions, and supplies are ready for issue. Soldiers must be briefed on the situation
and mission to the extent possible in conformance with instructions from higher headquarters. Talks by
company commanders and platoon leaders must prepare the Soldiers psychologically for the forthcoming
mission
c. National Guard Units. During the planning phase, National Guard units which may be subject to call
for duty should make the preparations prescribed in AR 135-100. Special attention must be given to the
orientation of personnel with regard to their status when federalized.
3. Alert Plan. Each organization which may be involved in civil disturbance should prepare a detailed alert
plan, based upon expected missions. It must be a logical development of the alert plan of the next higher unit.
The plan must provide for an orderly process by which the unit will be brought to a state of operational
readiness which will help it to perform its assigned mission promptly and efficiently.
a. The alert plan should be based upon local conditions and whether you are in CONUS or OCONUS. It
must be revised as a result of lessons learned and experience gained by rehearsals, or as necessary, to
conform to changes in the alert plan of the next higher headquarters. It should include such items as:
(1) Verification procedures for the warning order.
(2) Personnel notification procedures and places of assembly.
(3) Required actions for each element of the organization.
(4) Procedures for issuing special equipment, supplies, and material.
(5) Vehicle preparation.
(6) Security restrictions.
(7) Administrative details
(8) Tentative briefing requirements for unit personnel.
(9) Provisions for opening a unit journal and establishing a journal file immediately upon receipt of the
warning order.
(10) Coordination with civil authorities.
(11) Reconnaissance.
(12) Communications.
b. The alert plan must be thoroughly understood by every member of the unit. Each individual must know
his duties, those of his next senior, and the unit's mission. He must be prepared to replace his next senior.
4. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Procedures for confrontation management operations should be
included in unit SOP. In addition, procedures for apprehension, search, detention of persons, seizure of
property, obtaining witnesses and statements, crowd control formations, identifying extraction and apprehension
teams and reserve forces to assist with crowd control when needed. Additionally it should also identify the type
of crowd control equipment to be utilized, and the procedures for employment and use of non lethal weapons
and munitions.
5. Organization. The development of an effective force capable of controlling civil disturbances depends
largely upon proper organization. The following five principles of organization should be considered in
planning for all civil disturbance operations:
a. Essentiality.
b. Balance.
c. Coordination.
d. Flexibility.
e. Efficiency.
6. Unit Integrity and Decentralized Control.
a. General. An important aspect of confrontation management is the great number of missions involved
which creates the need for forces to engage in a variety of operations at the same time. This is a factor
which must be thoroughly planned for and constantly evaluated in the development of an effective control
force. The need for immediate decisions is great and the requirement for direct supervision is important;
therefore, control must be decentralized. Commanders must develop small units capable of functioning as
separate teams, as well as part of the overall force. These small units must be responsive to the changing
situation and capable of immediate reaction based on the decisions of their leaders.
b. Unit Integrity. To use small unit capability to the best advantage, organizational development should be
based on unit integrity. For instance, for an infantry unit the squad should be considered the basic patrol
unit; this gives a platoon (minus the weapons squad) the capabilities of a total of three 10-man patrols and
the company (minus the weapons platoon) a total of nine. If smaller units are necessary, the fire team
concept should be used. Other types of units may need to organize in a similar fashion.
c. Decentralized Control. For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should
be assigned to the lowest possible level and adequate authority given to the responsible person to permit
him to do his job effectively.
d. One of the most important phases of civil disturbance planning is the selection of personnel for
confrontation management duty. Personnel selected for this duty should be selected using the following
criteria:
(1) The ability to remain calm under physical, mental, and emotional strain.
(2) Respect all persons.
(3) Maintain an impartial, patient attitude.
(4) Be able to issue orders in a manner crowd members can understand.
(5) Must not show signs of fear.
(6) Be in a good physical condition.
e. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) has a tremendous duty in this area. The NCO is usually the
person closest to the Soldiers on a day-to-day basis and may be in the best position to see a man who may
have become unreliable for civil disturbance control duty. This type of observation is priceless to the
commander.
7. Logistical Planning.
a. General. Civil disturbance operations involve special consideration for logistical support depending on
whether you’re here in the United States or overseas. Logistical planning covers all phases of such
operations from preparation and training to the end of the mission. Planners must include provisions for
necessary supplies, services, and facilities, through local services, if necessary. These may include
provisions for food, beverages, ammunition, special crowd control equipment and sanitation facilities.
b. Equipment and Material.
(1) Individual and organizational equipment prescribed in common tables of allowances (CTA) and
tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for Soldiers and units usually are sufficient for civil
disturbance control operations. Additional you may add non-lethal munitions to your existing organic
weapons systems such as the M203. For example, adding the M9 pistol for the extraction and
apprehension teams, a M16 or M4 with a 203 attached, or a 12 gage shotgun with non lethal munitions
capabilities. The shotgun with non lethal capabilities can be utilized by the over watch personnel. Other
examples of additional equipment which may be needed are armored vehicles, mechanical crowd control
agent dispersers, floodlights, spotlights, searchlights, cameras of the Polaroid type, movie cameras,
public address systems, heavy construction equipment, aircraft, ambulances, first aid kits, firefighting
equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, special weapons, communications equipment, and recording
devices. Equipment that will not be needed should be left behind.
(2) Plans must also provide for a supply of barricade and roadblock materials and equipment such as:
heavy single strand wire, barbed wire, concertina wire, heavy stakes, heavy nails and spikes, and power
saws. Signs and sign making materials, including quick-drying paints, must be available for use with
barricades and roadblocks
(3) Unit-Accompanying Supplies. Preparation of unit-accompanying supplies and equipment is
important for rapid reaction in emergency situations. Among the items which must be provided for are
ammunition, food, water, gasoline, lubricants, spare parts, crowd control agents, maps, and
administrative supplies. Unit-accompanying supplies should be developed with unit integrity in mind.
A running inventory must be kept and complete inspections made as necessary. Based upon the
characteristics of each item, a procedure for periodic exchange of certain items should be established.
For example, crowd control agents, ammunition, foodstuff, and gasoline deteriorate in prolonged
storage. Retention of unserviceable materials will have grave consequences in the event of an
emergency. Further, ammunition should be kept apart by type as well as lethal and non lethal
c. Transportation. Plans must provide for all types of transportation needed in civil disturbance operations.
In developing transportation requirements, consideration must not be given only to requirements of
deployment, but must also include requirements within the disturbed area. Commercial buses for mass
transportation within the objective area, and the use of rental sedans should be considered. TOE vehicles
should be increased as necessary to provide sufficient flexibility and mobility for operational and support
elements. In this regard, transportation units are to be considered in the task force development.
d. Maintenance. Considerations should be given to expanding the existing maintenance capability of the
unit. Particular attention should be given to replacement of windshields, tires, rearview mirrors, lights, and
radio antennas. Coordination should be made with the field maintenance facility to establish maintenance
and evacuation procedures after the unit is committed.
e. Re-supply. Definite procedures must be established for re-supply in the objective area. Consideration
should also be given to the establishment of logistical contact teams in the objective area. These contact
teams should have direct communications with support units so that critical supplies can be obtained as soon
as required with a minimum of delay. Priorities for requisitions should be established to afford the
maximum response to requests for re-supply.
f. Loading Plans.
(1) Personnel Loading Plan. To ensure the disturbance control force arrives in the objective area
prepared for immediate employment, commanders must develop personnel loading plans around the
principle of unit integrity. Loading plans must be rehearsed and should become SOP within the unit.
Personnel loading plans must be developed for each mode of transportation mentioned above.
(2) Equipment Loading Plan. Attention to unit integrity also must be given the equipment loading plan.
Each element of the force must be escorted by its required equipment and a small reserve of
ammunition, crowd control agents, and basic supplies.
g. Medical Facilities. Plans must provide for the provision of emergency medical attention to military
personnel and civilians. Plans should provide for qualified personnel, ambulance service, medical and
civilian, whenever possible.
8. Operations Planning.
a. Prior to deploying the control force, a counterdemonstration working group should be developed to
coordinate the resources that will need to be employed by the task force (TF). Detailed planning for the
procedures used in civil disturbance operations at each level of command should include provisions to
implement plans of the next higher echelon. This working group should include:
(1) Public Affairs
(2) Joint military commission (JMC), if organized
(3) Provost marshal office (PMO)
(4) G2, Assistant Chief of Staff nG5 (Civili Afairs) (G5), Assistant Chief of Staff G-6 (signal) (G6)
(5) PSYOP
(6) Civil Affairs
(7) Army Airspace command and control (A2C2)
(8) Chaplain
(9) Engineer
(10) Surgeon
(11) Fire support element
b. Plans should be prepared for each probable major operational area. These plans should be based on a
physical reconnaissance whenever possible. Each plan should indicate an assembly area with primary and
alternate routes thereto, tentative locations of road-blocks and observation posts, temporary quarters for
billeting and feeding, a patrol plan, a security plan for certain facilities, and other such details. Maps,
overlays, aerial photographs, and sketches should be obtained and necessary plans developed for
distribution and reserve stockpiling.
c. An outline should be provided for command and control of joint operations with civil authorities to
include joint patrols, exchange of equipment, etc. Full use of existing civil police operational limits will
prove helpful for adjusting and sending Soldiers for best area coverage.
9. Movement. Movement to the main areas must be considered in developing operations plans. The
disturbance control force is extremely weak during movement and could receive a substantial setback if rioters
disrupt the movement route and debarkation points. En route security, to include aerial observation, must be
provided at such places as over-passes, high buildings, and other vulnerable points. Further, the means of
movement is critical to the success of the operation because of the time factor involved. Normally, Soldiers will
be committed to civil disturbance missions on extremely short notice and must arrive promptly if the
disturbance is to be contained with minimal damage to property and injury to persons. Since rioters can apply
tactics which will delay the arrivals of Soldiers, the most direct routes are selected which are least vulnerable.
Alternate routes must be planned for.
10. Assembly Areas. Movement planning must include the advance selection of areas for assembly of units
and the accounting for personnel and checking equipment. Assembly areas should be sufficiently removed
from the disturbed areas to preclude their being engulfed by the riotous element.
11. Bivouac Areas and Billets.
a. The selection of bivouac areas and billets should be based on the following desirable characteristics:
(1) Close distance to disturbed area.
(2) Large enough to avoid congestion.
(3) Relatively easy to secure.
(4) Adequate primary and alternate routes available to the scene of disturbances.
(5) Adequate sanitation facilities.
(6) Communications facilities.
b. Whenever possible, maximum use of federal, state, or public property should be made in order to stop
extra claims for property damages and displeasure among the public. The use of public schools provides
excellent billeting, communications, water, and sanitary facilities. However, if school is in session, use of
schools may act as an irritant to the public. National Guard armories and Reserve Centers are ideal if
available.
12. Command Posts. Locations for command posts should be selected in advance and plans prepared for
staffing and equipping them with a minimum of delay. Consideration should be given to both the main
command post and to tactical command posts within the various subdivisions where rioting is most likely to
occur. Security measures must be taken to ensure command posts are not penetrated or overrun be unruly
elements. Collection of military and civil police command elements from highest to lowest level represents the
best solution to the problem of command and control because of joint aspects involved. Consideration should
be given to use of police precinct stations for collocated command posts because of their strategic locations
throughout the entire area. Collocation of command posts in this manner facilitates continuing coordination
between military and civil authorities.
13. Army Aircraft. Operations planning includes consideration for the use of Army aircraft (helicopters and
fixed-wing) for command and control, communications, observation, reconnaissance, en route security,
distribution of crowd control agents, controlling the movement of units, removing casualties, movement of
Soldiers, re-supply, dropping leaflets, airborne loudspeaker broadcasting, and other appropriate requirements.
Plans should include searchlight-equipped observation helicopters to be used in organizing ground patrols to
ensure complete coverage day and night.
PART B - Public Relations and Information.
1. Public relations.
a. Civil disturbance plans must include provisions for furnishing commanders in the area of operations with
the personnel and equipment resources necessary to conduct information activities.
b. In order for public relations with the press to run smoothly, plans should provide for:
(1) Giving accredited media representative's locally devised press passes that will make their passage
through police lines and military checkpoints easier.
(2) Coordinating press requests for coverage of operations in the disturbance area to include
arrangements for furnishing military personnel to act as press escorts where necessary.
(3) Establishment of a press room by the public affairs officer of the task force commander. This
facility should be used for periodic press briefings and as a central point for giving the press unclassified
information in the form of fact sheets and other backg1round data concerning the operation.
(4) To keep Soldiers informed, plans should include:
(a) Arrangements for preparation and issuance of a daily fact sheet by the public affairs officer of
the force commander.
(b) Arrangements for giving participating units free copies of local and regional newspapers, if
practical.
(c) Answer press questions.
(5) Battalion and larger size units in the area of operation must be capable of:
(a) Responding to press questions or providing the public affairs officer of the next higher
headquarters with correct data about the unit.
(b) Providing press escorts.
2. Information Planning.
a. General.
(1) Due to the sensitivity and importance of information collection, analysis, and dissemination; all
personnel engaged in civil disturbance operations must be familiar with and follow the policies of the
Department of the Army.
(2) At the national level, the Department of the Army relies upon the Department of Justice to provide:
(a) Civil disturbance threat information required for support planning throughout the Army for
military civil disturbance needs.
(b) Early warning of civil disturbance situations which may exceed the capabilities for control by
local and state authorities.
(3) Army information resources are not used for the collection of civil disturbance information until the
Department of the Army has made a determination that there is a distinct threat of civil disturbance
beyond the capability of local and state authorities to control. Even after this determination has been
made, the Army does not acquire, report, process, or store civil disturbance information on civilian
individuals or organizations whose activities cannot, in a reasonable manner, be related to the distinct
threat of a civil disturbance which may require the use of federal military forces (in accordance with AR
380-13).
(4) When the Department of the Army or higher authority directs federal Soldiers to be placed on
standby or be committed to help in restoring order, those troop elements involved are responsible (upon
order) for processing civil disturbance data obtained by liaison personnel.
(5) The production of data, when authorized, is accomplished under the supervision of the intelligence
officer; however, the collection effort required is a coordinated and continuing one on the part of all
concerned. The collection effort must be based on essential elements of data required for sound local
planning and the conduct of operations. The collocation of command posts and the establishment of
joint operation centers make the collection and exchange of information run smoothly. Rapid
distribution or this data is vital to enable a quick and effective response by the task force.
b. Collection.
(1) Military information elements having counterintelligence resources will maintain the ability to
collect civil disturbance threat data during the period in which there is a distinct threat of actual civil
disorder requiring the use of federal military forces.
(2) On activation by the Department of the Army, military intelligence elements having
counterintelligence capability will:
(a) Establish and maintain contact with suitable local, state, and federal authorities.
(b) Collect civil disturbance data concerning incidents, and estimate the capability of civil
authorities to control the situation. This can be achieved through direct contact with civil authorities.
(c) Report collection results to the Department of the Army in accordance with current plans.
(d) Keep appropriate commanders informed.
(e) Provide intelligence support to the Personal Liaison Officer Chief of Staff of the Army.
(f) Recommend methods of overt collection, other than liaison, if required, to the Department of the
Army for approval.
(3) Military intelligence elements may employ methods of collection other than liaison only on order of
the Department of the Army.
(4) Covert agent operations are not used to obtain civil disturbance data on persons or organizations
without specific advance approval of each operation by the Under Secretary of the Army.
(5) Basically, the following vital elements of data will be required for sound planning and operations
once approval has been received:
(a) Objectives of elements which are a distinct threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(b) Times and locations of disturbances.
(c) Cause of disturbances.
(d) Existence of persons, groups, or organizations which have distinctively threatened or are
creating disturbances.
(e) Estimated number of persons who will be or are involved in civil disturbances.
(f) Assembly areas for crowds.
(g) Presence and location of known leaders and persons who are a distinct threat to cause civil
disturbances.
(h) Organization and activities planned by the leaders who are a distinct threat to cause civil
disturbance.
(i) Source, types and locations of arms, equipment, and supplies available to the leaders who are a
distinct threat to cause civil disturbance.
(j) Use of sewers, storm drains, and other underground systems by the elements who are a distinct
threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(k) Identification of new techniques and equipment not previously used by elements that are a
distinct threat to cause civil disturbances.
(l) Attitude of general masses towards:
(a) Groups causing civil disturbances.
(b) Civil law enforcement authorities.
(c) Federal intervention to control the disturbance.
(m) Possible threat to public property including private utilities.
(n) Communications and control methods employed by elements referred to in paragraph 1 above.
PART C - Request for Federal Support/Training
1. Request for Federal Support.
a. Providing military support to state and local governments to assist them in quelling a civil disturbance or
riot requires close coordination through a host of state and federal agencies. It requires a though briefing of
Soldiers at all levels on what they can and cannot do with respect to law enforcement. Civil authorities must
be briefed on the restrictions placed on federal forces by the Constitution of the United States, federal
statutes and laws.
b. Under the Constitution of the United States and United State Codes the President is empowered to direct
federal intervention in civil disturbances to:
(1) Respond to state request for aid in restoring order
(2) Enforce the laws of the United States.
(3) Protect the civil rights of citizens
(4) Protect federal property and functions.
c. The Secretary of Defense retains approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of
DOD forces, personnel, and equipment. The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense executive
agent is the approval authority for federal emergency support in response to natural or man-made disasters
(except weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). The Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) plans and
executes the DOD domestic support mission to civil authorities. The DOMS is the DOD primary contact
for all federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic support operations.
DOMS is also the staff agency responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army and Secretary of the Army for
recommending to them appropriate measures necessary to cope with civil disturbances and terrorism and to
transmit the approved recommendations to Department of Defense agencies for execution and to supervise
the execution. The missions and functions of DOMS are outlined in AR 500-50. Additional roles of
responsibilities of various agencies can be found in FM 3-19.15
Prior to activating federal military forces there is a sequence of steps that must occur. When data begins to
show that a disturbance may develop into a situation that will require the help of federal forces, several
actions are introduced at the federal level while state and local law enforcement agencies attempt to contain
the disorder. Such actions may include increasing the readiness posture of forces named to help the
jurisdiction concerned.
d. As the situation worsens and the state employs its National Guard, the U.S. Attorney General would send
his personal agent to the scene of the disorder. This agent is named as the Senior Civilian Representative of
the Attorney General (SCRAG) and is the organizer of all federal activities in the area of the disorder,
including contact with local civil authorities. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army would
send his personal liaison officer (PLOCSA) to the scene along with members of the Department of the
Army Liaison Team (DALT) that serves as his planning staff.
e. At the same time the PLOCSA and DALT are sent, the Chief of Staff might order the task force
commander with his key staff officers and unit commanders to the disturbed area for reconnaissance. These
military personnel would try to blend in by wearing civilian clothing and using rental or police
transportation.
f. Should the disturbance continue to increase beyond local and state government capabilities, the state
legislature or the governor would send a request to the President for help by federal Soldiers. The Attorney
General of the United States has been named by the President to receive and organize requests from states
for federal military aid.
g. The task force commander and the PLOCSA would report their findings and recommendations to the
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who in turn passes the data to the Secretary of Defense. The Senior Civilian
Representative from the Attorney General, after consultation with the PLOCSA and the task force
commander, makes his recommendation to the Attorney General. Following consultation with Department
of Defense officials, the Attorney General, as an organizer of all federal civil disturbance activities, makes
the recommendation to the President for using federal forces to help in restoring law and order.
h. Before the President can send federal Soldiers, he must first issue a proclamation prepared by the
Attorney General. The proclamation orders the crowd to leave the scene peaceably within a specified
period of time. At any time during this sequence, the Attorney General may seek informal Presidential
approval to pre-position federal Soldiers in the area of the disturbance. By policy, pre-positioning of less
than a battalion does not require Presidential approval.
i. The President's executive order triggers the employment of the task force; this move is fulfilled in a
minimum amount of time as a result of sound planning and realistic training.
j. With a letter of instruction as guidance, the task force commander will start operations to subdue the
disturbance. The letter of instruction specifies command and control, rules of application of force, policy on
custody and detention of civilians, limitations on searches, and required reports. The commander supports
the local authorities but he does not take orders from them.
k. After federal Soldiers are committed, the Department of the Army transmits to the state governor and
others concerned, messages announcing the federalizing of Army and designated National Guard and Air
National Guard units to active duty. These forces, once federalized, are placed under the command of the
task force commander. Throughout the operation, the task force commander consults with the Senior
Civilian Representative from the Attorney General regarding military operations and decisions, when
feasible. He promptly advises the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on action taken as a result of the consultations.
The Senior Civilian Representative from the Attorney General, in consultation with the task force
commander, establishes and maintains liaison with civil authorities in the areas of operation and is the
primary coordinator for all federal activities. After the disturbance has been reduced to the point that civil
authorities are again capable of maintaining law and order, the decision to redeploy federal forces is made
with the same care and coordination that took place prior to deployment. The announcement to redeploy
will usually be made by the Secretary of the Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will order federal forces
back to home stations and the National Guard and Air National Guard will be returned to state control.
2. Training.
a. The best made plans are of little value if the men carrying them out are not capable and well-trained.
Therefore, all supervisors must ensure that each person is trained and equipped to handle the various tasks
that he may be required to handle during a civil disturbance control mission. Civil disturbance training must
be incorporated into the annual training program. The training must be intensive, realistic and sustained to
better prepare the Soldiers to perform the civil disturbance mission. A lack of individual training in civil
disturbance operation may result in adverse effect to the point of endangering lives, especially the lives of
Soldiers.
b. There are two basic areas of training to be considered in this lesson: individual training and unit/team
training.
3.
Individual Training.
a. Soldiers involved in civil disturbance duty require training to adjust themselves to the noise and
confusion created by large numbers of people facing them. Countless other elements contribute greatly to
anxieties and tensions. Individual Soldiers will be shouted at, insulted, shamed, belittled or called abusive
names. They must learn to ignore these taunts and not allow personal feelings to interfere with the
fulfillment of their mission. Any unauthorized actions taken against the demonstrator, may result in
unfavorable publicity blaming the control force as using brutal tactics. Additionally, Soldiers can expect
objects to be thrown at them, but must learn to avoid these objects; they must never throw objects back.
Soldiers should understand that the well-disciplined fulfillment of orders is the most effective force applied
against troublemakers. They must be instructed in all aspects of self-control so they may be mentally
prepared for participation in civil disturbance operations.
b. Psychological influences.
(1) The action of civil disturbance participants and the general civil disturbance environment combine
to impose strong pressure upon members of the controls force. Just as the crowd may be swept into
violence by such psychological influences as hoping to remain anonymous, the transference of moral
responsibilities, and the release of deep set emotions, reactions of the control force may be improper
because of the effect of such factors on them. Control force personnel must be made aware of these
factors so they do not become victims of their influence. For instance: control force personnel at Kent
State fired at a group of students. As far as can be determined, no one gave the order to fire and no one
knows who fired first, but the actions of one or more persons were certainly imitated by other members
of the control force.
(2) Civil disturbance operations and the emotional involvement and stress they create cause potentially
dangerous situations which can lead to the excessive use of force by control force personnel. You must
learn to expect the actions of civil disturbance participants and to operate in this stress environment.
Above all, you must control your emotions and guard against excessive response and the urge to get
revenge.
c. Unit Training.
(1) In the development of a unit training program for civil disturbance, many considerations should be
addressed in term of resources that are available. An analysis of the units personnel, of who is trained
and who is not, what Soldiers have real life experience and have graduated from the Non lethal
Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC), type of equipment that is available, non lethal
capabilities, times and locations to conduct training. Additionally you must look at incorporating the
units SOP in civil disturbance (depending on your theater of operations, CONUS and OCUNUS).
(2) The Unit training program should utilize the seven step approach found in FM 7-0 and 7-1, and be
based on the unit's METL, expected contingencies, prior training and the proficiency of the unit. The
training program should not only cover the items described above but also cover all aspects of civil
disturbance operations and should entail more than developing mechanical skill in crowd control
formations. Training should emphasize protection of fire-fighters, their equipment, residents of the area,
use of non lethal weapons and tactics and other people trying to control the disturbance. Training should
also include techniques of operations in those areas where you are most likely to be used, as well as
procedures for neutralizing special threats.
(3) The purpose of training the units in civil disturbance training is to evaluate their capability to
respond and carry out their assigned mission to quickly and deliberately execute the disturbance control
procedures required to prevent loss of life and property and regain control; of a civil disturbance.
Training should focus on, but is not limited to:
(a) Instructors.
(b) Individual and collective drills.
(c) Leaders.
(d) Equipment.
(e) Weapons.
(f) Munitions.
(g) Live-fire range exercises.
(h) Qualifications and familiarization.
(i) Soldier training exercises (STXs)
(j) Culminating exercises.
(4) Generally speaking, the basic unit training objectives are:
(a) Unit training is designed to develop persons to function as a team. To be effective, this training
must include all members of the unit.
(b) Unit training must cover all aspects of civil disturbance operations. It must include more than
developing mechanical skill in riot control formations.
(c) Rehearsals of alert phases, loading plans, and operations plans should be held as often as deemed
necessary to reach and keep the required degree of skill.
(d) Integrated and concurrent training, stated in the appropriate ARTEPs should be included in unit
training. Additional information on range set up and non-lethal training can be found in FM 3-
19.15.
d. Weapons and Special Equipment. Personnel armed with special equipment must be well trained in its
use. Examples of these special items may include the following: crowd control agent dispersers, non lethal
weapons and munitions, grenade launcher, shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable public address systems,
night illumination devices, firefighting equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, armored personnel
carriers, and roadblocks/barricades. It is important that every member of the control force be trained in
using his assigned weapon and special equipment.
e. Special Procedures. There are numerous threats, such as sniping and bombing, which may be
encountered during civil disturbance operations, which will require a specialized response to safely and
effectively neutralize them. Experience shows the effectiveness of these countermeasures depends upon
control and precision in execution. These in turn depend upon the quantity and quality of prior planning and
proper training for handling such events.
f. Leadership. The conduct of civil disturbance operations places unusual demands on leadership skills.
Control force supervisors should be made aware of these unusual demands and be prepared to cope with
them. Therefore, training for civil disturbance operations should not be restricted to the Soldier.
Commander and staff, at all levels, must examine their own experiences and degree of skill in these matters,
to determine training required to reach operational readiness.
PART D - Operational Techniques/Application of Force
1. Operational Techniques.
a. General. In assisting civil authorities in the restoration of law and order, military forces will be called
upon to take action in a multitude of situations of varying magnitudes. The application of the principles
discussed in this lesson will contribute in great measure to the successful accomplishment of a civil
disturbance mission.
b. Minimum Force. The commitment of military forces to enforce civil law must be considered as a drastic
last resort, and their involvement must be limited to that degree justified by necessity. In combat situations
Soldiers are taught to fight and eliminate threats. In civil disturbance, Soldiers must deal with
noncombatants that have internationally recognized rights. These rights must be respected while
maintaining public order. The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with
mission fulfillment. The use of excessive or unnecessary force may subject the responsible person to civil
or criminal liability and may serve to increase public sympathy for the demonstrators.
(1) The commitment of large numbers of Soldiers in a civil disturbance operation should not be
misunderstood as the application of unnecessary force or the application of more than minimum force.
Early and massive commitment of Soldiers has in the past prevented, in many instances, the worsening
of a low-level civil disturbance into a violent confrontation.
(2) When actually committing forces in a civil disturbance operation, consideration must be given to the
relative merits of deploying forces in maximum number on a "high visibility" or "low visibility" basis.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches; however, the determining factor should be
the mood of the riotous element--the approach that is expected to produce the strongest deterrent effect
upon their desire to commit further violence.
c. Operational Considerations. Military forces must be prepared for commitment in a civil disturbance role.
An integral part of this readiness is the preparation of appropriate plans of operation. In developing these
plans, commanders and staff must consider certain basic principles which are considered applicable to the
execution of civil disturbance missions.
(1) Objective Area. The objective of military forces in civil disturbance control operations is the
restoration of law and order within the area of operations. To fulfill this objective, the area of operations
should be filled with well-disciplined, well-equipped, and well-trained Soldiers. Action must be taken
to hold back attempts by rioters to cause injury and damage to persons and property, and all persons
succeeding in such acts of lawlessness apprehended and turned over to civil police.
(2) Positive Action. The successful application of the positive action principle depends to a great extent
on getting correct data. Actions must be directed at defeating the overall purpose of the unruly element.
They must be designed so that the commander is in the position of gaining and exercising the initiative
with an ultimate objective of imposing his will upon the unruly group. Plans must be flexible enough
that advantage can be taken of rapidly changing situations, while recognizing the requirement to be
prepared to meet unexpected developments. When applying this principle, stick strongly to rules of
engagement, standards of conduct, and fair treatment of civilians.
(3) Mass. Proper consideration should be given to the commitment of sufficient forces at the proper
time and place. It is important in this regard, therefore, that forces prevent or subdue successfully and
rapidly any and all acts of disorder and lawlessness. When forces are committed piecemeal and in
inadequate numbers, they may not be able to cope with the situation. If successful in their acts, rioters
will gain confidence and further acts of violence will be pursued, causing the disturbance to worsen.
Vital to the proper application of the principle of mass is the need for good intelligence and close
observation of the crowd and mob behavioral patterns. The most critical areas depend largely on the
local situation and the reasons for the disturbance. In general, however, the business and industrial areas
are most vulnerable to acts of violence.
(4) Economy of Force. This principle should not be considered as in conflict with the principle of mass.
It should, instead, be considered as complementing the principle of mass. Skillful and discreet use of
force will assist the control force to apply both principles with minimum outlay of resources. The key to
applying both of these principles at the same time and successfully is the use of highly mobile, well-
equipped reserve forces. Plans should call for the situation of the disturbance area with patrols equipped
with non lethal capabilities to gather information and create the psychological impression of the control
force being everywhere. However, the entire force should never be committed for this purpose. Patrol
forces should be instructed to handle only acts of lawlessness which they are sure they can cope with
and call for help in the more serious disturbances. Reserve forces should be strategically placed
throughout the area and be capable of responding quickly to these calls for help.
(5) Maneuver. Proper maneuver is vital in gaining and maintaining the advantage. In a civil
disturbance operation, the object of maneuver is to employ force in such a manner as to give them the
advantage and thus achieve results which are least costly in men and material. This involves the
selection of patrol areas and the control of critical routes to ensure freedom of movement. It also
involves the choice of key terrain where a crowd may be more easily controlled. Finally, military forces
should be able to move easily to help them reach the scene of any disturbance quickly.
(6) Unity of Command. Unity of command assures unity of effort by the action of all forces toward the
common goal of restoring law and order. While unity of command is best achieved by vesting, a single
commander with the required authority to fulfill tasks that must be done, it is not always possible.
Because of legal sanctions, local, state, and federal forces cannot be united under one commander in
civil disturbance operations. Federal military forces to include the National Guard when federalized will
not fall under the control of any local or state agency. Therefore the establishment of joint operations
centers, and the recognition of each other's capabilities and limitations, will create a positive attitude and
will contribute to unit of effort.
2. Application of Force.
a. General.
(1) Civil disturbance operations by federal forces will not be authorized until the President is advised by
the highest officials of the state that the situation cannot be controlled with nonfederal resources
available. The mission of the control force is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until
such time as state and local forces can control the situation without federal help. In performing this
mission, the control force may have to actively participate, not only in subduing the disturbance, but also
in helping to detain those responsible for it. Control force commanders are authorized and directed to
provide such active participation, subject to restraints on the use of force.
(2) Prior to committing any federal forces in the quailing of civil disturbance whether in CONUS or
OCONUS commanders should train and continually brief the control force on the rule of engagement
(ROE). The commander is responsible for drafting, interpreting, disseminating, and training the control
force on the ROE. The staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be included in the ROE development to
ensure that it will not improperly constrain actions, but still will remain consistent with domestic and
international laws, polices, and orders of the chain of command.
(3) If non lethal weapon and munitions are to be utilized, they should be addressed within the ROE and
disseminated to the lowest level, preferable to platoon and squad levels. This requires that all personnel
have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander's intent.
(4) While serving with a multinational operation under the preview of the United Nations (UN) charter
or customary international law the UN will may mandate certain restrictions on the use of force. By the
use of overwhelming force during a civil disturbance under the UN may compromise diplomatic efforts
to reach a peaceful solution. Commanders must beware that any confrontation of the ROE made by
soldiers can have strategic political implications on current and future operations.
(5) The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in helping state and local authorities to
restore law and order is that the control force use only the minimum force required fulfilling the mission.
This chief principle should control both the selection of appropriate operational techniques and the
choice of options for arming the control force. In carrying out this principle, the use of deadly force is
authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific standards are met. To emphasize
limitations on use of firepower and to restrict automatic fire, rifles with only a safe or semiautomatic
selection capability or modified to such a capability will be used as a basic weapon for Soldiers in a civil
disturbance area.
(6) By utilizing the scalable effects concept in response to a gathering crowd or demonstration, the use
of force policy must be clearly understood by the soldiers or control force that they may only use the
minimum amount of force to quall the situation without the graduated response, which may cause a
escalation of hostilities or violence. Commanders should consider using the following scalable effects
process:
(a) Try to persuade the crowd to quietly disperse by talking to the leaders of the demonstration.
(b) Use translators as necessary.
(c) Let the first approach to the leaders or demonstrator by the local or state authorities (governor,
mayor or law enforcement personnel).
(d) Pass out handbills requesting that the crowd return home.
(e) Use video tale and still cameras to photograph individuals and events for later use in trails.
(f) Give warning before moving to the next level of force.
(7) All personnel, prior to participation in civil disturbance operations, need to be trained and briefed as
to:
(a) The specific mission of the unit.
(b) Rules of engagement and use of force governing the application of military force as they apply
to the specific situation.
(c) A psychological orientation on the local situation, specifically addressing types of abuse which
military personnel may be expected to receive and the proper response to these types of abuse.
b. Use of Deadly and Non-deadly Force.
(1) Commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes,
and to detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree of force used must be not greater than
that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, in effect, invokes the power
of summary execution and can, therefore, be justified only by extreme circumstances. Accordingly, its
use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death
or serious bodily harm. If a mission cannot be accomplished without the use of deadly force, but deadly
force is not permitted under the guidelines authorizing its use, accomplishment of the mission must be
delayed until sufficient non-deadly force can be brought to bear. All the requirements of paragraph (b),
below, must be met in every case in which deadly force is employed.
(2) The use of deadly force is authorized only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort
when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably be employed. Deadly force is justified under
one or more of the following circumstances:
(a) Self- defense and defense of others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to
protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
(b) Assets involving national security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent
the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically
designated as “vital to national security” only when their loss, damage, or compromise would
seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear
weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted area as
containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.
(c) Assets no involving national security but inherently dangerous to others. When deadly force
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as
operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the
hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily
harm to others. Examples include high risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition,
explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.
(d) Serious offenses against persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent
the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm.
Examples include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.
(e) Arrest or apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest,
apprehend, or prevent the escape of a person who, there is probably cause to believe, has committed
an offense of the nature in (2) through (4) above.
(f) Escapes. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD
Components and reasonable appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided
law enforcement or security personnel have probable cause to believe that the escaping prisoner
poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or others.
(3) Every Soldier has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself
against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations of this paragraph are not intended to
infringe on this right, but to prevent the unauthorized or random use of other types of deadly force.
(4) In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:
(a) Give an order to halt.
(b) Warning shot will not be fired.
(c) When a firearm is discharged it will be fired with the intent of rendering the person(s) at whom it
is discharged incapable of continuing that activity or course of behavior prompting the individual to
shoot.
(d) Shot will be fired only with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
(e) In the case of holstered weapons, a weapon should not be removed from the holster unless there
is reasonable expectation that use of the weapon may be necessary.
(5) Even when its use is authorized, deadly force must be used only with great selectivity and precision
against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire, however
deadly, from an unknown location can never justify "returning the fire" against any or all persons who
may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such random response is far too likely to result in
accidents among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is
to take cover and try to locate the source of the fire so that the threat can be neutralized.
(6) Task force commanders are authorized to have live ammunition issued to personnel under their
command. The individual Soldier will be instructed, however, that he may not load his weapon except
when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under the direct control and supervision of an
officer, when the situation would justify the use of deadly force. Keeping control over the loading of
weapons until such time as the need for such action is clearly established is of critical importance in
stopping the unjustified use of deadly force. When possible, command and control arrangements should
be specifically designed to facilitate such careful control of deadly weapons.
(7) The presence of loaded weapons in tense situations may invite the application of deadly force in
response to being annoyed which, while subject to criticism, is not sufficient to justify its use; and
increases the danger that the improper discharge of a weapon by one or more persons will lead others to
a reflex response on the mistaken assumption that an order to fire has been given. Officers should be
clearly instructed, therefore, that they have a personal obligation to withhold permission for loading until
circumstances show a high probability that deadly force will probably be necessary and justified under
the guidelines previously discussed. Strong command must be exercised to assure that the loading of
weapons is not authorized in a routine, premature, or blanket manner.
(8) Positive control over weapons must be exercised at all times. Individual Soldiers will be instructed
that they may not fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under
the direct control and supervision of an officer, when circumstances would justify the use of deadly
force. He must not only be thoroughly familiar with the rules for use of deadly force, but he must also
realize that whenever his unit is operating under the immediate control of an officer, that officer will
determine whether the firing of live ammunition is necessary.
c. Command and Control.
(1) The chain of command and areas of responsibility must be clearly defined at all levels. Whenever
practicable, the assigned unit boundaries should coincide with the local police subdivisions to simplify
coordination of activities in the area. Boundaries are usually located in streets or alleys with
coordinating points at street intersections. When a street is named as a boundary, responsibility for both
sides of the street is given to one unit to ensure proper coverage. Arrangement should be made to have
civil police and Soldiers operate together. In addition to the joint action by police and Soldiers in the
streets, arrangements should be made to exchange liaison officers at each headquarters from company
through division on a 24-hour basis. Arrangements should also be made for the collocation of military
and civilian police command elements.
(2) A written copy of special orders must be given to Soldiers upon their arrival on the scene. These
orders, along with the restrictions in effect for the operations, must be understood and complied with by
all Soldiers. The populace must be treated fairly in all cases. Any incident of unnecessary property
damage or bodily harm will create anger which may result in increased acts of violence.
(3) Commanders at all levels should ensure that the Soldiers establish the immediate impression that
they are well-disciplined, well-trained, and fully ready to fulfill their mission. This initial impression
must then be maintained throughout the operation. Appearance is extremely important and the Soldiers
should wear Kevlar helmets, web gear, and carry weapons at all times when outside buildings. Rest
areas should not be located near assigned posts in public view. The psychological impact on the civilian
populace of being faced by an alert, well-disciplined military force effectively deters some potential
rioters and looters. Soldiers assigned to stationary posts and motorized or foot patrols should be relieved
from those duties often since alertness fades quickly in this type of duty.
(4) To ensure that the Soldiers remain alert and observe the orders and instructions in effect, it is
important that commanders at all levels get on the ground with the Soldiers to supervise their activities
and to provide guidance in questionable cases. Having the commander on the ground with Soldiers is
also an important morale factor and strengthens the Soldier's sense of accomplishment.
d. Apprehension.
(1) The apprehension of an individual lawbreaker or groups of violators is a vital function during civil
disturbance operations. Because of the legal considerations involved, civil police should be used to
make the actual apprehension whenever possible. When military forces detain or take a civilian in to
temporary custody, he will be turned over to civil police as soon as possible.
(2) Military personnel should be instructed not to ask questions at the scene. No questions should be
asked of the suspect other than identification inquiries such as name, place of residence, or place of
employment. Questioning pertaining to the incident could create legal complications which might
prevent a subsequent conviction.
(3) Personnel must promptly report to their superiors, follow-up in writing all important data concerning
the detention of civilians, including the names and locations of witnesses. DD 2708, Receipt for Inmate
or Detained Person, may be used for this purpose. Photographs taken at the scene and attached to the
report are very valuable for identification purposes and for later use in court testimony. The report
should be retained at the appropriate headquarters, and used as a basis for preparing a report to the civil
police. Any physical evidence obtained, together with evidence tags and receipts completed as required,
will be delivered with the detained person.
(4) Violators must be treated fairly and impartially. Minimum force necessary should always be a
guiding principle. Consideration must be given to the safety of innocent bystanders, the seriousness of
the incident, and the weapons of the violators. Attitudes and commands are especially important. An
offender may respond to firm statements regarding the disadvantage to him of further action. If the
desired response is obtained, the apprehension or detention should be made using clear and concise
commands with the exercise of due caution and vigilance.
e. Handling and Processing of Detainees.
(1) It is important that military commanders give special consideration to the proper procedures in
handling detainees even though this problem normally is the primary concern of civil authorities. The
large numbers of offenders which may be apprehended or detained in an area of civil disorder poses a
special problem for disturbance control forces. If time permits, prior formal arrangements concerning
details of handling civilians taken into custody should be made; if this cannot be done, arrangements
should be formalized at the earliest possible time.
(2) Detainees should be quickly processed and removed from the scene of the arrest. This procedure
should include a quick search, out of sight of onlookers, if possible. They should then be separated prior
to removal from the area. The separation is based on the amount of custody needed to secure the
detainee, sex, and age. Injured prisoners must be removed to medical facilities. Female personnel must
be provided to search female detainees. It is especially important that names and addresses of witnesses
be recorded by apprehending or detaining personnel.
f. Army Detention Facilities.
(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel
apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the
Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons
apprehended.
(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons
apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the
facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA,
specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the
persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the
confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.
(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided
they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if
possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel.
However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located
elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in
the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control
operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for
the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.
(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required
to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of
such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as
long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever
females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control
of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement
personnel.
(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody,
control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where
sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for
temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary field-
type facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.
(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities
and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures
establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements
will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in EPW
Operations, FM 3-19.40.
g. Special Equipment. Certain items of equipment available to military and civil police forces can do much
to limit injuries to civilian and military personnel and destruction of property. These items increase the
psychological effects of a show of force and offer additional protection and versatility to civil disturbance
forces during the operations.
(1) The 12 gage shotgun is a pup action shotgun currently in the non lethal capabilities set (NLCS)
inventory. The pump action shotgun is chambered to take up to 3-inch shells. The 3-inchchamber
allows for the use of M1012 and M1013 NL munitions. This shotgun also provides a visually distinct
alternative to standard military weapons that may be desired based on mission considerations.
(2) The shotgun, as in the case of other firearms used in civil disturbance operations, is fired only on the
orders of a qualified superior officer when lesser measures of force are not effective, or when the
individual Soldier has no other means of protecting his life.
(3) The M7 is a 66-millimeter vehicle-mounted NL grenade-launching device that is mounted on a
HMMWV. It is a indirect fire support system that can deliver the M99 blunt trauma grenade that creates
a sting-ball effect. The M315 installation kit is used to install an M7 discharger on the turret ring of
appropriate HMMWV variants. An adjustable bracket allows the launch angle to be depressed for
engaging targets at ranges of 50, 75 and 100 meters. The system enforces standoff distances and deters
potential threats.
(4) The M1012 is a single projectile round made of hard rubber that is shaped like a bomblet and
designed to be fired at a single target. With the muzzle velocity of 500 feet per second, the M1012 as
the effective range of no closer that 5 meters and no further that 30 meters. Engagement inside of 5
meters could result in serious bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the kinetic dissipates to the
point where the round becomes ineffective.
(5) The M1013 is a multiple projectile round with .23 caliber hard rubber pellets that is designed to be
fired at and employed with the purpose of affecting multiple targets. With a muzzle velocity of 900 feet
per second, the M1013 has an effective range of no closer than 5 meters and no further that 30 meters.
Engagements of less than 5 meter can result in seriously bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the
kinetic dissipates to the point where the round becomes ineffective
(6) The midsize riot control disperser (M37) is the size of a standard fire extinguisher that uses
compressed air to force the RCA out to a range of 30 feet. It has the capacity to employ 18 burst of
RCA into a hostile crowd while maintaining excellent standoff capabilities. The M37 can be refilled
and is rechargeable. It can be refilled with CR solution (liquid agent) or CS (dry agent). For the purport
of training the M37 can be filled with water and CS can be substituted with talcum power.
(7) The Squad riot control agent disperser (M33A1) is designed to provide crowd control and protection
at the squad level. It is capable of projecting a ballistic stream of RCA's beyond 25 feet in up to 25 half-
seconds burst. It consists of a frame and harness assembly, compressed-gas cylinder (agent container
assembly) air pressure assembly, gun and hose assembly, multi-jet spray unit, and check valve assembly.
The M33A1 can be refilled and is rechargeable. For training purposes, CR can be substituted with water
and CS and be substituted with talcum power.
(8) The above mention items are but just a few of the non lethal weapons and munitions available to the
commander and unit to utilize during a response to the civil disturbance, and can be utilized to train and
prepare Soldiers. Additional non lethal weapons and munitions as well as protective gear can be found
in FM 3-19.15.
3. Vehicles. Armored vehicles and transport vehicles add to the readiness of the crowd control force. The use
of these vehicles increases flexibility, reduces troop commitments, and provides protection for personnel. In
considering the use of vehicles, however, it must be remembered that they should be secured by foot elements.
a. Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) can be used in several ways to keep the effects of civil disturbances at
a minimum.
(1) Their use adds a considerable psychological effect to riot control formations while providing added
protection for Soldiers. They provide a readily accessible barrier for Soldiers to crouch behind if
necessary, and excellent protection for those inside.
(2) Their use as mobile command posts offers the added advantages of security, communication, and
mobility.
(3) They are well adaptable to roadblock operations providing the advantages listed above, while at the
same time providing an excellent barrier.
(4) Their use for patrolling an area of violence adds to the psychological effect, and allows Soldiers to
maneuver in close to snipers in order to make an apprehension.
b. Standard military transport vehicles can be modified with sandbags, armor plating, wire screening, or
similar materials to give some protection against sniper fire and thrown objects. They provide mobility and
communication capability for area coverage. Soldiers should be deployed with ample vehicles to provide
sufficient flexibility to handle all situations in an area of civil disturbance. TOE allowances should
probably be increased for this purpose.
3. Other Equipment. In addition to the special equipment discussed above, certain other items should be available
for use in operations within the disturbance area.
a. Armored vests and protective masks are required for anti-sniping operations and at other times when
violence is expected. Flexibility is an important consideration. For example, the limitation on visibility
must be considered when requiring the use of protective masks, and the limitation on mobility when
wearing the armored vests.
b. Successful conduct of the overall operation may depend on other items. Auxiliary lighting should be
available to include hand-portable lights, vehicular-mounted searchlights, spotlights, flood-lights,
flashlights, flares (with caution toward fires), and vehicle headlights. Prefabricated wood or metal barriers,
or suitable materials, such as wire or ropes, may be used to block off an area; signs should be provided to
supplement these barriers. Evidence equipment, including movie and still cameras with telescopic lenses,
and recording devices should be obtained and placed into position.
c. Other items of equipment should also be provided. Helicopters should be used for observation,
communication relay, illumination, resupply, reserve displacement, and numerous other tasks. Adequate
firefighting and fire protection equipment are vital in civil disturbance.
d. Provisions should be made for appropriate communications equipment for use at the scene and between
the scene and the operations headquarters. Every available means of communications to include public
address systems--both hand-portable and vehicle-mounted--should be used.
PART E - Operational Tasks
1. General. In any civil disturbance operation, certain tasks must be accomplished to reach the ultimate
objective of restoring and maintaining law and order. To do this, action must be taken to gain control of the
situation. Control forces must perform certain tasks that will develop a physical and psychological environment
which will permit law enforcement personnel to enforce the law and maintain order. The importance of having
a high degree of flexibility and selectively in the response cannot be overemphasized. It is just as important that
the tasks selected be completed only after a careful evaluation of the situation. This evaluation must consider
the particular uniqueness of the situation. In this respect, the commander selects those tasks that are most likely
to reduce the intensity of the given situation. Therefore, not all tasks will apply in all situations, but control
force commanders and unit leaders must identify those tasks which must be performed and then develop plans
and procedures for their accomplishment. The operational and integrated tasks listed below are discussed in
detail in the paragraphs and lessons to follow.
a. Operational Tasks.
(1) Isolate the area.
(2) Secure likely targets.
(3) Control crowds or mobs.
(4) Establish area control.
(5) Neutralize special threats.
b. Integrated Tasks.
(1) Gather, record, and report information.
(2) Apprehend violators.
(3) Maintain communications.
(4) Maintain mobile reserves.
(5) Inform the public.
(6) Protect the fire service operations.
(7) Process detained personnel.
2. Isolate the Area.
a. This task includes the restriction and sealing off of the disturbed area. The objectives of sealing off the
disturbed area are to prevent the disorder from spreading to unaffected areas, to prevent escape of persons
bent on expanding the disturbance, to speed up the exit of the uninvolved, and to exclude unauthorized
personnel from entering the affected area. In order to prevent the disturbance from expanding in size and
strength, it is critical to prevent the inflow of extra demonstrators or curious onlookers into the disturbed
area.
b. When military forces are committed to helping the civil authorities in controlling civil disturbances, the
situation will be beyond the capability of local law enforcement agencies and a scene of major disorder
should be expected. This disorder may be characterized by small, dispersed groups which are looting,
burning, and generally causing havoc in the area, or it may be characterized by large groups participating in
varying degrees of illegal conduct. The initial action taken by military forces to control the disorder is
critical and should include the immediate isolation of the disturbed area.
c. The initial commitment of control force personnel may be required to clear a building or an area in order
to isolate the persons creating the disturbance from those not yet motivated or actively involved. The
primary emphasis should be on identifying what area and who has to be isolated.
3. Isolated Techniques. There are several techniques to use when isolating a disturbed area.
a. Barricades and Roadblocks. Barricades and roadblocks are physical barriers which deny or limit entry
into and exit from the disturbed area. They can be used to totally deny passage of people and vehicles or to
permit certain designated categories of persons and vehicles to pass. They must be positioned so as to
prevent their being bypassed, surrounded, or cut off from support. In many cases, it may be impractical to
physically seal an area due to the physical and geographical considerations, such as in the case of a college
campus or a suburban area.
b. Barricades Against Personnel. Civil disturbance operations contingency planning should provide for the
availability of portable barricades which slow down the passage of personnel. Concertina wire is a suitable
material for rapid construction and effectiveness, although wooden sawhorses, ropes, and other field
expedient devices may suffice. Concertina wire should be used sparingly and only under serious
circumstances as it is indicative of violent disorders.
c. Roadblocks Against Vehicles. The erection of effective roadblocks which cannot be easily breached by
vehicles requires large, heavy construction materials. One item that can be stockpiled in advance is 55-
gallon drums to be filled with water or earth on site. Other materials include sandbags, earthworks, trees, or
heavy vehicles. Several roadblocks placed at intervals of 25 to 50 feet provide sufficient depth to prevent
breaches by heavy or high-speed vehicles.
d. Construction Considerations. The construction of barricades and roadblocks should provide cover from
small arms fire where this threat is likely. Provisions should be for night illumination of approaches to the
position; however, care must be taken not to silhouette the personnel manning it. Construction materials
which would chip or shatter upon impact by thrown objects should be covered with canvas or sandbags to
prevent injuries from flying fragments. Warning signs should be placed in front of the position directing
authorized personnel not to approach the position. One technique of providing a quickly erected barrier is
the use of vehicles parked bumper to bumper; however, this procedure may subject the vehicles to damage
by a hostile crowd. Another device which may be effectively used both as a barricade and a part of a
formation is the use of a locally built frame of wood or metal with wire covering.
e. Perimeter Patrols. Perimeter patrols should be established to prevent entry or exit from the disturbed
area, particularly by persons or groups trying to bypass barricades and roadblocks. These patrols operate
along the outer operational boundary of the disturbed area. Perimeter patrols can be integrated with area
patrol routes within the disturbed area.
f. Pass and Identification Systems. Unit, installation, or municipal contingency planning should include a
pass and identification system providing for the entry and exit of authorized personnel to and from the
isolated area. Procedures should be established for press personnel, emergency medical personnel, public
utility work crews, and for any other personnel who have a legitimate purpose for entering and exiting the
isolated area. Consideration must be given to those persons residing within the disturbed area who must
travel to and from work. An effective pass and identification system requires careful and detailed planning
as a contingency measure.
g. Public Utility Control. Ensure that civil authorities have established a means for controlling public
utilities to include street lights, gas, electric, water, and telephone services so that they may be turned on or
off to support the tactics employed by the control forces.
4. Secure Likely Targets.
a. General. Certain buildings, utilities, and services are critical to the economic and physical well-being of
a community and require security to prevent disruption of essential functions. In addition, certain facilities
and buildings have become symbolic targets to radical or extremist elements and should be identified and
afforded protection with the priorities established. Among the likely targets to be attacked are control force
command posts, billeting areas, and motor parks. Another potential problem in civil disturbance operations
is the threat posed by dissident elements intent on doing bodily harm to control force personnel and civilian
dignitaries in the disturbed area. When such threats exist, military personnel may have to be committed to
security operations. In particular, security must be placed on armories, arsenals, hardware, and sporting
good stores, pawnshops, and gunsmith establishments, or other places where weapons or ammunition are
stored. To conserve manpower, consideration may be given to evacuating sensitive items, such as weapons
from stores and storing them in a central facility. Priorities for physical security must be established to
prevent waste of available forces on less important facilities or those which have their own physical security
forces. The degree of security necessary to protect various buildings and utilities is determined by
considering the following:
(1) The importance of the facility to the overall well-being of the installation or community. Examples
of this consideration include the loss of water or electrical power which would endanger the health of the
community, the destruction of government buildings which would disrupt the functioning of
government, and dissident capture of communications media which would provide a psychological
advantage for further spread of the disorder.
(2) The vulnerability of the facility to acts of violence. Planning should estimate the possible degree of
risk expected during a civil disturbance based on the facility's physical layout, type construction, and
existing protective measures.
(3) The intent and capability of the demonstrators. This consideration is an analysis of the destructive
intent and capability of dissident elements. This includes determining likely targets and the degree of
violence such activity will likely entail.
b. Security Techniques. The techniques for securing likely targets consists of providing physical control,
the procedures for which can be found in FM 19-30, Physical Security. Military forces are ideally
organized and equipped to perform this task; security of government buildings and public utility facilities is
a normal mission for military forces in most types of civil disturbances. This releases civil police to operate
within the disturbed area in their law enforcement capacity. Security techniques used to fulfill this task fall
into two broad categories as discussed below.
(1) Use of Personnel. This category includes employment of sentinels, walking guards, and
checkpoints. Military personnel used in this manner should be committed jointly with existing guard
forces from the protected facility or agency. Consideration should be given to the possibility of
increasing existing guard forces capability with additional equipment. When manning fixed security
posts, guard teams must be of sufficient size to fulfill their mission and protect themselves until help
arrives; however, availability of reserve forces in lieu of stationary guards should be considered in an
effect to conserve guard forces.
(2) Use of Material. This category includes use of perimeter barriers, protective lighting and alarm
systems, and intrusion detection devices. These are designed to deter and detect intruders and/or to slow
down access to a facility by unauthorized personnel. Various measures of this type may or may not be
in effect at the time of the civil disturbance. Military emergency planning should anticipate the
requirement for the quick employment of additional physical security measures.
5. Building/Area Searches.
a. General. The conduct of a building/area search can be a hard and dangerous operation, especially when
searching for a sniper. Whenever possible, searches should be performed by a special reaction team which
has been trained and equipped for such an operation.
b. The command element of the team should establish a central location for coordination of all elements.
Communications should be established and maintained with the force securing the area and with
observation posts.
c. Deployment of Security Element. The security element should be positioned on the immediate perimeter
of the area or building to observe any activity and all exists. The security element should also establish a
preferred route of entry in to the building or area.
d. Preparation for the action element prior to their entry into the area or building should include the
following:
(1) A briefing on the area of building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable residents.
(2) Equipment and communications checks.
(3) The issuance of an operations order.
e. Commit the Action Element to the Area or Building. When committing the action element to an open
area, crowd control agents should be used to saturate the area prior to entry. The action element should
enter the area on one side of the perimeter established by the cover element and then proceed through the
area towards the other side of the perimeter. When committing the action element to a building, the
following methods of entry can be utilized.
(1) Enter at the top when possible.
(2) If entry at the bottom is necessary, an armored personnel carrier should be used.
f. Whenever a search is conducted, whether of a building or an area, it must be done systemically.
(1) In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover, firing
only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security or action element may use crowd
control agents to aid the advance of the action element. The security element on the opposite side should
remain in position as the noose closes. The purpose here is to force the sniper or other dissidents to
withdraw making themselves vulnerable to capture by the security element. The techniques used for
neutralizing dissidents/snipers in an open area will require close coordination and communication
between all elements involved.
(2) In an apparent unoccupied building the military working dog (MWD) should be used whenever
possible. A well-trained MWD with its highly developed sense of smell can pinpoint the location of a
dissident/sniper quickly and with a minimum of risk to members of the search force. When the MWD is
not available, each room should be searched by at least a two-man team. One may throw a crowd
control agent grenade in, wait for it to discharge, then enter quickly and place his back against the
nearest wall. The second person follows and searches the room in detail. If available, a third person
remains in the corridor to ensure that the suspect does not move from room to room while the two others
are conducting their search. The action element leader should be kept informed of the team's progress.
When using riot control agents to help in the clearing of a building, grenades of the non-burning type
should be used to avoid the possibility of fire.
(3) In an occupied building, when the dissident's/sniper's location is unknown, all suspected rooms
must be searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of
their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the sniper's
location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe that the
dissident/ sniper is located in the room, a complete physical search of the room or rooms should be
conducted. Use of the patrol dog will help in conducting such searches.
(4) In a building occupied or not, where the dissident's/ sniper's location is known, the action element
should proceed directly to the immediate area of that location. If the dissident/sniper refuses to exit
voluntarily, crowd control agent grenades should be thrown or projected into the room from the outside
by the security forces. If this is not practical, the door should be opened or broken down and crowd
control agent grenades thrown into the room. If crowd control agents cannot be used, the patrol dog in
his attack role can again be effectively used in subduing and capturing the dissident/sniper with a
minimum of risk to the search element.
SUMMARY
During the course of this lesson you have learned that if your personnel are not trained or adequate plans have
not been made, your control forces cannot be relied upon to react properly. Civil disturbances cannot be
predicted as to the exact time or place they will occur, but, you can assist the commander with the planning
considerations necessary to manage and effectively control these disorders.
Lesson 1 Test
The following questions are multiple choices and/or true/false. You are to select the one that is correct. Show your
choice by CIRCLING the letter beside the correct choice directly up the page. This is a self-graded lesson exercise. Do
not look up the correct answer from the lesson solution sheet until you have finished. To do so will endanger your ability
to learn this material. Also, your final examination score will tend to be lower than if you had not followed this
recommendation.
1.
When developing plans for use of Military Forces in a civil Disturbance role, which of the following IS NOT an
operational consideration?
A. Psychological influences.
B. Mass.
C. Economy of force.
D. Maneuver.
1.
A military unit preparing for Civil Disturbance missions passes through two general phases. These phases are:
A. Logistical and alert.
B. Alert and operational.
C. Planning/training and alert.
D. Planning/training and operational.
1.
When selecting bivouac or billeting for the Soldiers during a civil disorder, which of the following should be
considered?
A. They should be located far away from the disturbed areas to minimize the stress placed on the demonstrators.
B. Only one route to and from the disturbed area is necessary.
C. Communications facilities should be restricted to avoid rumors which could be picked up by the media.
D. Use federal, state, or public property in order to prevent excessive claims for property damages.
1.
When involved in individual training, the Soldier should be subjected to:
A. Excessive crowd noise.
B. Quiet demonstrators.
C. Brutality.
D. Impersonality.
1.
When military personnel apprehend a suspect during a civil disturbance, any questions should be limited to:
A. Questions pertaining to the incident.
B. Questions about other demonstrators.
C. Questions about future demonstrations.
D. Questions about their identification.
1.
For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should be assigned to the lowest possible
level.
A. True.
B. False.
2.
The mission of military forces during civil disturbances, both in CONUS and OCONUS, which cannot be overly
emphasized, is to help local and state authorities to restore and maintain law and order.
A. True.
B. False.
1.
Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are not required to operate
temporary detention facilities.
A. True.
B. False
9.
What two items can be utilized with the shotgun?
A. M7 66-millimeter projectile with M315 installation kit.
B. M1012 single projectile and M1013 multiple projectile.
C. M33A1and M37 riot control dispenser.
D.
40 millimeter projectile with M774 installation kit.
10. Who retains the approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of DOD forces, personnel and
equipment?
A. Director of Military Support
B. Defense Coordinating Officer
C. Secretary of Defense
D. State Coordinating Officer
EXERCISE SOLUTIONS
ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK
Item
Correct Answer and Feedback
1.
A.
Psychological influences. (page 1-18)
2.
C.
Planning/training and alert.
(page 1-4)
3.
D.
Use federal, state, or public property in order to...
(page 1-10)
4.
A.
Excessive noise. (page 1-15)
5.
D.
Make identification inquires. (page 1-24)
6.
A.
True. (page 1-6)
7.
A.
True. (page 1-4)
8.
B.
False. (page 1-25)
9.
B
M1012 single projectile and M1013 multiple projectile (page 1-25)
10.
C
The Secretary of Defense. (page 1-14)
LESSON 2
CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson you will learn to use crowd control techniques and supervise immediate action to be taken upon
contact with an explosive device.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION:
Use crowd control techniques and react to a explosive device.
CONDITION: You will have this subcourse.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a score of 70 percent on the
subcourse examination.
REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publication: FM 3-19.15;
FM 3-19.10; FM 3-19.4.
INTRODUCTION
Confrontation management operations will require control forces which can effectively confront a variety of
crowds and mobs. Fast, effective crowd control is vital in every type of civil disturbance. Of equal importance
is the maintenance of crowd control once order has been established.
PART A - CROWD CONTROL
1. Control.
a. Manner of Control. A suitable manner of controlling various types of crowds will be influenced by
many variables. These include:
(1) The current strength level of the civil disturbance.
(2) Public opinion.
(3) Current policies.