Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

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deploys an advance party to
coordinate with the deployed advisor
team and counterparts.

Area assessment begins

the

minute the advisor team members
arrive in-country. The advisor team
sends the information it gathers from
the area assessment to the incoming
advisor team through the monthly
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).
The advisor team sends timely
information at any time, not just
through a scheduled monthly
INTSUM.

As soon as the advisor team

arrives, it

establishes

communications links

with the

higher in-country C2 element. The
advisor team also establishes a
communications link with the advisor
commander who has overall
authority to order the handoff. This
link becomes the information and
intelligence link between the in-
country advisor team and the
incoming advisor team. This link
must be maintained and monitored
in accordance with prescribed
communications schedules.

Training of the FF begins

soon as the advisor team is settled.

advisor team must use this time
wisely. Support for the upcoming
mission must come from all levels.

review of personnel files

must take place.

The advisor team sends training

reports at least every 30 days.
These reports indicate how the FF
unit is responding to the in-country
advisor team training program.

The incoming advisor team uses

these reports to modify its training
programs and schedules.

The advisor team sends an

INTSUM at least every 30 days or as
the military or political situations
change.

INTSUMs are not restricted to

monthly transmissions only.

The advisor team receives formal

mission notification.

All travel arrangements are

finalized; the in-country advisor team
is notified.

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45 Command

inspections

performed

by the advisor commander are a
vital part of an advisor team.

They give the commander a

chance to see firsthand what an
advisor team has accomplished to
date. The inspection will ensure that
the FF is looking after the welfare of
the advisor team, and any problems
with the FF are corrected
immediately.

If possible, one member from the

incoming advisor team accompanies
the commander.

The formal advisor team training

program begins. All other support
requirements must stop; the advisor
team mission must take priority.

Training reports, same as day

30.

INTSUM, same as day 30.

The advisor team senior medical

NCO begins screening the members’
records. He ensures all personnel
have physicals and their shots are
up-to-date. He obtains and cross-
matches their blood types within the
team.

The advisor team prepares initial

shortage lists and sends them to the
battalion S4. If the advisor team
requires special items, it requests
them as soon as possible.

The detailed intelligence report

contains more than the monthly
INTSUM. This report becomes a
major part of the incoming advisor
team mission planning process.

The incoming advisor team

receives this report the same day it
receives its mission notification and
starts its detailed planning.

Training reports, same as day

30.

INTSUM, same as day 30.
Mid-tour leaves are programmed

into the training schedule. These
leaves must be staggered so that
they do not interfere with training. In-
country leaves should be considered
if appropriate.

Final leaves are granted to

advisor team members. They ensure
their personal affairs are in order.

100 Command

inspection.

The advisor team finalizes its

travel arrangements. The initial
arrangements were made the day
the advisor team deployed.

60
to
50

A team from the incoming advisor

team may conduct an in-country
coordination. The advisor team
commander ensures only his
personnel are on this team.

The advisor team prepares its

final shortage lists and sends them
to the battalion S4. The advisor team
picks up specialized items from the
S4.

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110

120

130

150

165

The incoming advisor team has

had its formal mission notification
and has started its mission
preparation.

Training reports, same as day

30.

INTSUM, same as day 30.

Command inspection.

Training reports, same as day

30.

INTSUM, same as day 30.
This period is the most critical

phase of the mission.

The advisor team members who

were in the advance party depart.
The incoming advisor team advance
party quickly meshes with the
remaining in-country advisor team
members and their FF counterparts.
They establish rapport and begin the
next phase of training. The in-
country advisor team must have
completed all training by this time.

The advisor team medical

personnel complete a final medical
screening. Members receive their
shots at this time. All injuries
sustained during the certification and
validation should be healed.
Personnel who require more time to
recover may be replaced.

179

The in-country advisor team

(minus its already departed
members) departs.

The advisor team members’

dependents (families) receive a
briefing. Every effort is made to
answer all questions that would not
create a security risk for the
deploying advisor team.

Dependents are provided with a

POC in the event of problems.

The advisor team palletizes all its

equipment and personal gear.

The advisor team establishes a

communications link.

The advance party members

deploy to the AO. They meet with
the in-country advisor team
members, establish rapport with their
FF counterparts, and conduct all
necessary coordination.

The incoming advisor team (less

its advance party) deploys to AO.
The mission handoff is completed.

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b. Procedures.

(1) The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the
commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process
lies with the incoming commander since he will assume responsibility for the
mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the
mission will continue.
(2) The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative
handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If
this advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s
desires and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the
incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.
(3) As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the
out-going advisor team under the incoming advisor team during the changeover
process. Although this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution
to establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective
control for US forces should hostile contact occur during the process.
(4) If the incoming advisor team or the FF unit they advise are in direct contact with
insurgents during the handoff and the incoming advisor team commander has not
assumed responsibility, his team immediately comes under operational control
(OPCON) of the outgoing advisor team and is absorbed into that team’s structure.
The outgoing advisor team commander and his FF counterpart will control the battle.
If the outgoing advisor team commander has passed responsibility to the incoming
advisor team commander, the outgoing team comes under the OPCON of the
incoming team, and the FF unit coordinates its movements with the new advisor
team.

c. Considerations. The incoming and outgoing advisor team commanders must
consider seven factors:

(1) Mission. The incoming advisor team commander must make a detailed study of
the advisor mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and implied
mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets such as
specific weapons employment, or water operations. Knowing the mission,
commander’s intent, commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), priority
intelligence requirements (PIRs), and information requirements (IRs) will help him
understand the mission. After a complete in-depth study of the operational area, the
incoming advisor team commander should complete the handoff in a manner that
allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must
not allow the enemy to gain any operational advantages.
(2) Operational Area. The in-country advisor team provides continuous intelligence
updates to the advisor commander. Original PIRs and IRs were established for the
original mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The
incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing PIRs/IRs and
upcoming mission PIRs/IRs.

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(3) Enemy Forces. The incoming advisor team commander must have the latest
available intelligence on all enemy forces that affect the mission. This information
can be obtained through your unit intelligence officer and should include data on
terrorists and terrorist related incidents over the past several months. In addition to
the normal intelligence provided to the incoming advisor team commander on a
regular basis, the situation calls for a liaison from the outgoing team commander.
OPSEC is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the impending relief and
then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of US forces.
(4) Friendly Forces. To the incoming advisor team, learning about the friendly
forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The team must be familiar
with the C2 structure for daily operations. The team must know all friendly units in
adjacent AOs and be aware of conventional forces units to include the capabilities of
their mission support base. The advisor team must also be aware of other
operations, units, and their capabilities. If possible, the incoming advisor team
members should receive biographical data on their counterparts, to include
photographs. This data allows advisor team members to familiarize themselves with
their counterparts before deployment.
(5) FF. The incoming advisor team plans and prepares for a quick and friction free
transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction between
the FF unit and the incoming advisor team may cause the relief to take place more
slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing advisor teams need a
period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts
before the mission handoff. Continued execution of the mission must be achieved
within the capabilities of the advisor teams, the FF unit, and the available supporting
assets. If US combat support units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after
the relief of the advisor teams they support.
(6) Civilian Populace. The incoming advisor team must do an in-depth area study,
giving close attention to local problems. Popular support for US activities taking
place within the AO may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The
outgoing advisor team must provide all critical information and describe in detail the
completed civic action projects and those still underway. The incoming advisor team
must understand the functioning of the local government and the status of any
international civilian or government agencies involved/influencing, the situation in its
AO.
(7) Time. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations
conducted will determine the time required to exchange advisor teams. There must
be an overlap period to allow the incoming advisor team to become familiar with the
AO and to establish rapport between the team personnel and their FF counterparts.
See table 22 for a sample timeline. However, the handoff operation must take place
as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more vulnerable the
advisor team in the AO becomes as a lucrative target for insurgents or terrorists. A
quickly executed relief will reduce the time available for the enemy to strike before
the incoming advisor team has time to consolidate its position. The advisor team
commander should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing
operations for speed. The incoming advisor team needs to have enough time to

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observe training techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefings on lessons
learned.

d. The Four “What If's”. Assume you have successfully accomplished a PDSS, your
questions have been answered, and you are now confident of your mission parameters
and your operational environment. Your contact with the outgoing advisor team leader
is consistent through email and via cell-phone. You were even lucky enough to have
one of the members of the outgoing team visit you and your new team at your US
training location prior to you deploying. However, one week prior to deployment, you
have been notified of some alarming news: Your team is going to a completely different
AO, your partnered coalition unit is different, and you are going to a place that
seemingly is resource constrained—what do you do? The following “what-if” scenarios
written by LTC David Kilcullen in his paper, “

Articles,

”

provide some answers to

these questions.

1. What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied
Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be
surrounded by al-Hassan and Unizzah tribes and Shia communities. But that work was
not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: How to
analyze an operational area; how to decide what matters in the local societal structure.
Do the same work again but this time the process is easier and faster, since you have
an existing mental structure, and can focus on what is different. The same applies if
you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

2. What if higher headquarters doesn’t get counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is
telling you the mission is to kill terrorists, or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and
a base-camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This
is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat
experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create
expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no
harm.” Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher
headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires.

3. What if you have no resources? Yours is a low-priority sector: You have no linguists,
the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, and you have a low priority
for funding. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance, keep
things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. Local community leaders
are your allies in this: They know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest
with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders and get them
to choose what their priority is. Often they will find the translators, building supplies or
expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their
projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their
support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is
achievable, the situation can still work.

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4. What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare:
everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed
and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the al-Askariya shrine
bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible,
adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture
when things go wrong, now is the time to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your
balance and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. If you cede the
initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army,

“

28 Articles”

2006

4. Area Assessment

a. To analyze and understand the civilian environment in which an advisor works, many
units use the civil affairs (CA) doctrinal tool known as areas, structures, capabilities,
organizations, people, events (ASCOPE) (this section contains selections from FM 3-
05.401). The six characteristics of ASCOPE are as follows:

(1) Areas.
(2) Structures.
(3) Capabilities.
(4) Organizations.
(5) People.
(6) Events.

b. Areas are key civil localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s
operational environment. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners analyze key civil
areas from two perspectives: How do these areas affect the military mission and how
do military operations impact civilian activities in these areas? The answers to these
questions may dramatically influence planning and operations.
c. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Structures analysis involves
determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military
operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian
use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the
reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.
d. CMO planners can view civil capabilities from several perspectives—existing
capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration,
public safety, emergency services, and food or agriculture systems; and capabilities
with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works or utilities, public
health, economics, and commerce. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include
resources that military forces could use consistent with international law.
e. Civil organizations are organized groups with or without affiliation to government
agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service
organizations, and community watch groups. They might be intergovernmental
organizations (IGO) or part of the NGO community. Organizations can assist the

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commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO
and influencing the actions of the populace. They also can form the nucleus of foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs, interim-governing bodies, or civil defense
efforts.
f. People, individually and collectively, can have a positive impact, a negative impact, or
no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term “people” includes
civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to
those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the
military mission. In all military operations, US forces must be prepared to encounter
and work closely with civilians of all types.
g. Some examples of civilian events are planting/harvest seasons, elections, riots, and
evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that
impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations,
including indirect fires, and deployments/redeployments. CA and CMO planners
determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political,
economic, psychological, environmental, moral, or legal implications.
h. Although ASCOPE provides a quick analytical framework for understanding the
civilian impact on the operational environment, the following area assessment provides
a more in-depth framework to evaluate many similar social and cultural factors that
influence the advisor’s mission.
i. Area Assessment Format (FM 3-05.401,

Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures (TTP)

, July 2007) (See table 23.)

Table 23. Area Assessment Format

Rapid Assessment Current as of: (MM/DD/YY)
I. GENERAL INFORMATION.

(1) Location name.
(2)  Location (military grid reference system or latitude/longitude).
(3)  Total land area (square miles, kilometers).
(4)  Topography (basic type of geography, such as desert, mountainous, or forested).
(5)  Climate and seasons (basic description of the local climate and seasonal breakdowns).
(6)  Languages and dialects spoken.
(7) Key landmarks.
(8)  Brief area history, with focus on cultural aspects (any pertinent recent or ancient history).

II. KEY PERSONS (Brief biographies, including gender, age, family, politics, associations,
demeanor, habits, and influence).

(1) Mayor.
(2) Police chief.
(3) Religious leaders.
(4) Local military leaders.
(5) School leaders.
(6) Tribal leaders.
(7) Other leaders.
(8) IGOs/NGOs/other governmental agencies (OGAs) in the area (list all entities providing

assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and frequency of assistance).

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III. INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

(1) Population totals.

•

Families.

•

Males.

•

Average age of males.

•

Females.

•

Average age of females.

•

Children.

•

Average age of children.

(2) Ethnic composition (basic ethnic breakdowns by percentage).
(3) Religious makeup (basic religious breakdowns by percentage).
(4) Social structure or hierarchy.
(5) Distribution of specific populations and groups (intermixed or split by ethnicity or religion into
areas).
(6) General populace demeanor (pro-, neutral, or anti-United States; pro-, neutral or anti-local
government).

IV. STANDARD OF LIVING.

(1) Food (sources, quantity, quality, average diet, reliability across the community).
(2) Water (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
(3) Power (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
(4) Sewage (type, capacity, reliability across the community).
(5) Transportation.

•

Public.

Local (basic systems used for travel within the community).

Intercommunity (basic systems used for travel between communities).

•

Private

Local (basic types used for travel within the community).

Intercommunity (basic types used for travel between communities).

(6) Shelter.

•

Types of dwellings (huts, single story, multistory, high-rise).

•

Standard construction material (wood, brick, mud, steel, block).

•

Number of dwellings (total estimated number).

•

Overall category (list by percentage using the structural evaluation chart in figure 15).

Category

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Figure 15. Structural Evaluation Chart

(7) Communications

•

Telephone (percent of households, reliability, service providers).

•

Television (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service

providers).

•

Radio (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service providers)

•

Newspaper

(percent

of households, number of printings weekly, views, reliability).

(8) Medical.

•

Hospitals (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

•

Clinics (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

•

Dental offices (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

•

Veterinary offices: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

•

Mortuaries: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

(9) Education.

•

Basic education level.

•

Facilities.

Grade schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).

High schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).

Universities (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).

Religious schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule,

shortfalls).

(10) Crime.

•

Rate.

•

Types (predominant types of crime in the community).

•

Areas (locations of concentrations, bad areas).

•

Figures (identified crime figures with biographical information, if available).

•

Penal institutions (type, organization, structural information, capability, current capacity, and

locations).

(11) Unique problems and challenges (miscellaneous information).

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V. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

(1)  Type of economy (market, agrarian, industrial).
(2)  Currency (all currencies and any known exchange rates).
(3)  Unemployment rate (percent of eligible work force that is unemployed).
(4)  Self-employed (percent of eligible work force that is self employed).
(5)  Nature of self-employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the self-

employed).

(6)  Employed (percent of eligible work force that is employed by others).
(7)  Nature of employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the employed).
(8)  Trade/exchange with other locations (list major items, agreements, and methods for trade with

other population areas).

(9)  Natural resources (list all major natural resources for the community).
(10)   Main crops (main staple crops of the community, even if not an agrarian economy).
(11)   Livestock (main livestock types, locations, and uses).
(12)   Industry type (major industries that support the community).

VI. POLITICS.

(1) Political system.
(2)  Parties (number and density).
(3)  Representatives (elected or selected).
(4)  Political attitude toward the United States and local governments.
(5)  Biographies of key officials/leaders (if not covered in Section II).

VII. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. Identify friendly and hostile conventional
military forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) and internal foreign forces (including border guards,
local police, international police) that can influence mission execution. Analyze non-national
or hostile forces, as well as national (indigenous) forces, using the subdivisions shown
below.

Coalition Foreign Forces.

(1) Coalition foreign forces within the advisor team’s AO.
(2) Coalition foreign forces adjacent to the advisor team’s AO.

Indigenous Forces Forces.

(1)  Indigenous foreign forces within the advisor team’s AO.
(2)  Indigenous foreign forces adjacent to the advisor team’s AO
(3)  Morale, Discipline, and Political Reliability.
(4) Personnel Strength.
(5)  Organization and Basic Deployment.
(6)  Uniforms and Unit Designations.
(7)  Ordinary and Special Insignia.
(8)  Overall Control Mechanism.
(9)  Chain of Command and Communication.
(10)   Leadership. Note officer and NCO corps.
(11)   Non-national Surveillance and Control Over Indigenous Foreign Forces.
(12)   Training and Doctrine.
(13)   Tactics. Note seasonal and terrain variations.

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(14)   Equipment, Transportation, and Degree of Mobility.
(15)   Logistics.
(16)   Effectiveness. Note any unusual capabilities or weaknesses.
(17)   Vulnerabilities in the Internal Security System.
(18)   Past and Current Reprisal Actions.
(19)   Use and Effectiveness of Informers.
(20)   Influence on and Relations with the Local Populace.
(21)   Psychological Vulnerabilities.
(22)   Recent and Current Unit Activities.
(23)   Counterinsurgency Activities and Capabilities. Pay particular attention to reconnaissance units,

special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units,
counterintelligence units, and units having a mass chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) delivery capability.

(24) Guard Posts and Wartime Security Coverage. Note the location of all known guard posts or

expected wartime security coverage for all types of installations. Pay particular attention to
security coverage along the main line of communications (LOC) (railroads, highways, and
telecommunications lines) and along electrical power and POL lines.

(25) Forced Labor and/or Detention Camps. Note exact location and description of the physical

arrangement (particularly the security arrangements).

(26) Populace and Resources Control Measures. Note locations, types, and effectiveness of

internal security controls. Include checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.

VIII. RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION. Identify the organizational elements and key
personalities of the resistance organization. Note each group’s attitude toward the United
States, the hostile power, various elements of the civilian populace, and friendly political
groups.

Guerrillas.
(1)  Disposition, strength, and composition.
(2)  Organization, armament, and equipment.
(3)  Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
(4)  Operations to date.
(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.
(6)  Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.
(7)  Quality of senior and subordinate leadership.
(8) General health.
Auxiliaries and the Underground.
(1)  Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
(2)  General effectiveness and type of support.

IX. EMERGENCY SERVICES.

(1) Police (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, enforcement methods, and

locations).

(2)  Fire (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
(3)  Rescue (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
(4)  Militia (organization, structure, strength, equipment; product of national military policy or

separatist organizations).

(5) Unique problems and challenges.

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135

X. SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES. (This includes any major structures not already covered.)

(1) Dams.
(2) Bridges.
(3)  Water/sewage treatment plants.
(4)  Water distribution facilities.
(5) Religious structures.
(6)  Historic structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace).
(7)  Cultural structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace, to include zoos

and libraries).

(8) Power generation plants.
(9) Power distribution nodes.
(10) Rail lines, yards, and switching stations.
(11) Airports.
(12) Port areas.
(13) Government buildings.

XI. DISLOCATED CIVILIANS (DC).

(1) Location (grids for all major concentrations).
(2) Quantity (numbers broken down by male/female/children).
(3) Composition.

•

Ethnicity.

•

Religion.

(4) Disposition (general status of the DC population, for example, self-sufficient, receiving

assistance, sick, or starving).

(5) Unique problems and challenges with local community.

XII. OBSERVATIONS. (General comments on traditions, customs, or taboos observed.)

Conclusion:

j. Both ASCOPE and the civil affairs area assessment present frameworks that
advisors can use to teach their FF unit for implementation in areas where civilian
presence influences the operational environment. Civil-military operations serve as a
key line of operation in any COIN campaign and are especially important for FF
operating among civilians who are also citizens of the same country. For further
information, see FM 3-05.401,

Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

5. Post Mission Debriefing Procedures

a. The advisor team commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the
mission, military geography, political parties, military forces, insurgents, foreign forces,
underground, targets, health and sanitation practices of the populace, and E&R.
b. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment
location, the advisor team undergoes an extensive debriefing. The S-2 officer organizes
and conducts the debriefing, subject to unit SOP. (See table 24.)

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c. The S-2 coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the
advisor team debriefing, particularly if other organizations tasked the advisor team to
obtain information. All deployed personnel must be available for the debriefing.
d. After the debriefing, the advisor team leader, with the assistance of other members
of the team prepares two documents.

(1) The first is an AAR. The AAR states: who, what, when, where, and how of the
operation. It is a permanent record of the major activities of the team from isolation
to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past missions
may be compared and future missions planned. The AAR is normally submitted
through command channels to the higher commander no later than 48 hours after an
advisor team has been debriefed. The intelligence and operations officers at each
echelon keep copies of the advisor team AARs.
(2) Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the
advisor team leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the team
leader’s reflection on his most recent operation and his recommendation for the
future. One method is to organize the lessons according to the six warfighting
functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fire support, sustainment, C2, and
force protection. It addresses what worked and what did not work on the operation,
why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing
TTP in the unit.

Table 24. Post Mission Debrief

MISSION

Brief statement of mission by advisor team commander.

EXECUTION

Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.
Statement of method of operation accomplished during the operation, to include
deployment, routes, activity in the AO, and redeployment.
Uniforms and equipment used.
Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.
Communications equipment used and results.
Casualties (friendly and/or enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in
action (KIA).
Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and
results.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

Geographic name, universal transverse mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations.
Boundaries (north, south, east, and west).
Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature.
Terrain.

♦

What type of terrain is dominant in this area?

♦

What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area?

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♦

What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation?

♦

What is the approximate degree of slope?

What natural obstacles to movement did you observe and what are their locations?
What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area?

♦

Direction

flow.

♦

Speed.

♦

Depth.

♦

Type of bed.

What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements?
What is the layout of various houses within the area?
How would you describe any potential LZs or DZs?
How would you describe any beach landing sites, if applicable?
How would you describe any areas suitable for cache sites and what are their locations?
People.

♦

What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?

♦

What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?

♦

What is the principal religion of the area and how is it practiced?

♦

What influence does religion have on the people.

♦

Religious

holidays.

♦

Taboos.

♦

Conflicts in religions.

How would you describe the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color,
characteristics)?
How do the people of this area dress compared with other areas?
What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?
What symbolism is attached to certain items of jewelry and/or ornaments?
What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?

♦

Between males and females?

♦

Between young and old?

♦

Toward marriage, birth, and death?

♦

Between the populace and local officials?

What is the ordinary diet of the people?
What was the attitude of the populace toward you and the FF with you?
What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the FF troops toward the
government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?
What was the general feeling of the populace toward the United States, its policies, and
involvement with other nations?
How did the populace cooperate with advisor team?
What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?
What formal and informal educational practices did you observe?
What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area?

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Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the
country? If so, how?
What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign
languages?
Were you approached or questioned by some member of the populace about the advisor
team or your mission? If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

POLITICAL PARTIES (Major and Minor Parties)

Leaders.
Policies.
Influence on government.
Influence on the people.
Foreign influence.

♦

Ethnic and/or ideological.

♦

Regional.

♦

International.

♦

Stability, strength, and weaknesses.

MILITARY

Friendly forces.
Disposition.
Composition, identification, and strength.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
Mission.
Leadership and capabilities of officers and NCOs compared with those of the United
States.
Logistics.
Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship between the FF and the populace.
Influence on local populace.
Recommendation for these forces (military and or paramilitary) for UW contact.

INSURGENT FORCES

Disposition.
Composition, identification, and strength.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
Mission.
Leadership capabilities.
Logistics.

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Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship between insurgent forces, your advisor team, and the populace.
Influence on local populace.

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES

Disposition, strengths, and location.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Logistics.
Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship with the government and local populace.

AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND

Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
Morale and general effectiveness.
Motivation and reliability.
Support.

♦

Logistics.

♦

Intelligence.

TARGETS

Rail system.

♦

General

route.

♦

Importance to the local and general area.

♦

Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.

♦

Bypass

possibilities.

♦

Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.

♦

Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods

of large-scale interdiction.

♦

Security.

Telecommunications system.

♦

Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.

♦

Location of power sources.

♦

Location and capacity of switchboards.

♦

Critical

points.

♦

Importance to the local general area.

♦

Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum.

♦

Security.

POL storage and processing facilities.

♦

Location.

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♦

Capacity of storage facilities.

♦

Equipment used for the production of POL.

♦

Power

source.

♦

Types and quantities of POL manufactured.

♦

Methods of transportation and distribution.

♦

Rail.

♦

Truck.

♦

Ship.

♦

Air.

♦

Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.

♦

Security.

Electrical power system.

♦

Location and description of power stations.

♦

Principal power lines and transformers.

♦

Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

♦

Critical

points.

♦

Capacity

(kilowatts).

♦

Principal

users.

♦

Security.

Military installations and depots.

♦

Size.

♦

Activity.

♦

Location.

♦

Units.

♦

Equipment.

♦

Reaction

time.

♦

Security.

Highway and road system.

♦

Name and number.

♦

Type of surface, width, and condition.

♦

Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.

♦

Bypass

possibilities.

♦

Traffic

density.

♦

Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

♦

Security.

Inland waterways and canals.

♦

Name and number.

♦

Width, depth, and type of bed.

♦

Direction and speed of flow.

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♦

Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions.

♦

Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew,

facilities, and reaction crew.

♦

Location and description of navigational aids.

Natural and synthetic gas system.

♦

Location and capacity of wells and pipelines.

♦

Storage facilities and capacity.

♦

Critical

points.

♦

Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.

♦

Principal

users.

♦

Security.

Industrial facilities.

♦

Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of

essential military materials.

♦

Type of facilities.

♦

Power

sources.

♦

Locations.

♦

Sources of raw materials.

♦

Number of employees.

♦

Disposition

products.

♦

General working conditions.

♦

Critical

points.

♦

Security.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?
What cash crops are raised in the area?
What domestic and wild animals are present?
What animal diseases are present?
What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?
What systems are used for sewage disposal?
What sanitation practices did you observe in the populated and unpopulated areas?
What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?

EVASION AND RECOVERY

From which element of the populace is assistance most likely?
Would you recommend any safe houses or areas for E&R purposes?
What type shelters were used?
Were fires small and smokeless?
Were shelters adequate?
Was food properly prepared?

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Appendix C

EVALUATING SUCCESS

1. Evaluating Performance of Foreign Force Units

a. When FF reach their desired end state at the tactical level, they should be able to:

(1) Provide a reasonable level of security in the AO without infringing on the
population’s civil liberties or posing a coup threat to the government.
(2) Be founded upon the rule of law and operate within the law.
(3) Be able to sustain their operations after US or multinational forces depart.

b. Effective FF should also display the following characteristics and capabilities:

(1) Flexible. A force that is capable of accomplishing the broad missions required
by the nation, not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but
to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and
organizational structure that is workable for the host nation.
(2) Proficient.

(a) Foreign forces that are capable of working effectively in close coordination
with each other to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
(b) Foreign forces that are tactically and technically proficient, capable of
executing their national security mission, and integrating with allies.
(c) Nonmilitary foreign forces that are competent in maintaining civil order,
enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
(d) Nonmilitary security forces thoroughly trained with a modern police ethos to
include: security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court
and legal procedures.

(3) Self-sustained. Forces capable of managing their own equipment throughout its
lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conducting administrative support.
(4) Well led. Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and
appropriate military values and are selected for promotion based on competence
and merit.
(5) Professional.

(a) Foreign forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and
serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting
human rights.
(b) Foreign forces that are loyal to the central government and serve national
interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.

(6) Integrated into Society. A force that is representative of the nation’s major
ethnic groups and is not seen as the instrument of just one faction. Cultural

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sensitivities toward the incorporation of women must be observed, but efforts should
also be made to include women in police and military organizations.

c. These capabilities support the overall campaign design, and evaluations of FF
capabilities should reflect the FF ability to influence the operational environment in a
way that reinforces the overall design. Ultimately, the success or failure of a FF unit
may rest more on its ability to affect the operational environment in general than on its
ability to execute specific tasks.
d. While a campaign design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living
process, the same holds true for an advisor’s evaluation of FF success. Metrics for
evaluating success should and will change as the insurgency adapts and conditions in
the AO also shift. An advisor’s ability to implement and maintain the “learn and adapt”
imperative will lead to more accurate assessments of FF.
e. These two basic questions provide a starting point for evaluating FF:

(1) Base your evaluations on the goals of the campaign design and ask “to what
extent can the FF achieve those goals?”
(2) Keep in mind the maxims “first do no harm” and “no better friend—no worse
enemy.” To what extent do the FF reflect these maxims?

2. Assessing FF Capabilities

a. This list is drawn from FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5,

Counterinsurgency.

It is meant to

serve as a guide for advisors to assess how FF units are doing, where advisors can
help, and what FF and advisors should expect from one another. The questions posed
here provide a frame of reference to help evaluate the employment of advisors and
whether they are helping to adequately develop the FF. These questions combine
objective and subjective analysis, but to employ them effectively requires the advisor’s
interpretation and sound judgment.

(1) Leadership. Are leaders promoted based on demonstrated competence and
performance or based on family ties, party membership, or tribal ties?

(a) Do leaders seek to develop subordinates?
(b) Do leaders care and seek to maintain the welfare of their subordinates?

(2) FF Behavior. Does the unit act corruptly or abuse its power against the public?
Does the force treat all members of the public equally regardless of party or tribe?
Do foreign forces abuse civilians?
(3) Respect for FF Doctrine. Does the advisor team operate according to an “our
way is best” approach or does it seek to promote and integrate FF doctrine among
the force with which it works?
(4) Training Run by Experts. Are advisors facilitating training in their areas of
expertise (i.e., MOS, Air Force specialty code [AFSC])?
(5) Focus on COIN Operations. Do the advisors and FF understand COIN and
focus on COIN operations?

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(6) Focus of FF Assessment. Follow on assessments should start by reviewing
areas with restricted resources, determining where resources should be committed
or redirected, and deciding whether to request additional resources.
(7) Doctrine Uniformity. Are doctrine and unit structures standard (and understood)
across the FF?
(8) Warfighting Functions. Do all FF (including police) have appropriate capabilities
to achieve their mission?
(9) Doctrine Clarity and Comprehensiveness. Does doctrine provide clear,
complete instructions for discipline, acquisitions, and support activities? Do advisor
team leaders and FF counterparts understand the doctrine and have it available? Is
doctrine written at a level that FF commanders can understand? Do advisor team
leaders and FF commanders understand their responsibilities and obligations for
detainee operations?
(10) FF Diversity. Do units reflect ethnic/tribal/religious diversity of the AO? Does
desertion or any other negative trend particularly affect one group?
(11) FF Recruiting Standards. Are there clear mental, physical, and moral
standards for recruits? Are recruiting areas secure? Have recruits been vetted
against black lists and known insurgent lists?
(12) Factionalization. Are there large pockets of former members of a single illegal
unit, tribal faction, or other illegal militant faction within a single unit?
(13) Promotions. Are foreign forces promoted based on a combination of
competence, professionalism, and social status? Does the promotion system result
in the selection of competent leaders who are culturally accepted?
(14) Pay and Benefits. Are pay scales widely available and understood? Does
taxing of subordinates or other corrupt practices occur? Is a death notification and
benefit structure in place for foreign forces killed or who otherwise die in service?
Are corrupt individuals dismissed when they engage in corruption?
(15) Education. Do all foreign forces receive a basic education, job training, and
moral values inculcation while they are serving?
(16) Officer Vetting. Are all officers vetted to ensure they do not have ties to radical
or insurgent organizations?
(17) NCO Selection. Are NCOs selected from the best enlisted foreign forces?
(18) Personnel Accountability. Are personnel accountability systems in place,
understood, and enforced? Do FF commanders understand the importance of
personnel accountability? Do advisor leaders understand the FF commander’s
accountability system and are they capable of tracking it for signs of corruption or
widespread disaffection?
(19) Demobilization Planning. Have commanders completed plans for
demobilization and transition to civilian life for NCOs / officers who are considered a
hindrance to the force? Are transition systems in place for foreign forces returning to
civilian life after completing their enlistments?

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(20) Garrison Services. Do garrisons provide housing and basic healthcare for
commissioned officers, NCOs, and families?
(21) Trainer Standards. Are advisors familiar with FF organizations, equipment, and
weapons? Do they have some familiarity with local languages? Are advisors
effective in using interpreters? Can advisors distinguish between cultural practices
and excuses? Do advisors use AARs to help FF learn?
(22) Emphasis on COIN. Are advisors aware of the additional requirements that
COIN places on evaluating and training their units? In addition to evaluating soldier
skills, are advisors evaluating subjective measures such as loyalty to the local
government and the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of
corruption?
(23) Employment of FF Trainers. Do advisors focus on developing competent
cadres to conduct training? Do FF personnel conduct the majority of training?
(24) Basic Competencies of FF Units. Does initial training of FF focus on COIN-
related skills such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline? Are leaders
trained on tactics such as patrolling and urban operations? Are training systems in
place to teach FF personnel ROE and the law of armed conflict? Are FF units
trained to a standard on the following skills:

(a) Managing their security.
(b) Providing effective personnel management.
(c) Conducting logistic (planning, maintenance, and movement) operations.
(d) Coordinating indirect fires.
(e) Providing for effective medical support.

(25) FF Unit Leader Evaluation.

(a) Are FF officers competent in the following skills:

•

Intelligence collection.

•

Day and night patrolling.

•

Point security.

•

Cordon and search operations.

•

Operations with police.

•

Treatment of detainees and prisoners.

•

Psychological operations.

•

Civic action.

(b) Do FF officers understand how to:

•

Work as a team.

•

Develop and take advantage of subordinates’ skills.

•

Train subordinates.

•

Maintain discipline and assume responsibility for one’s own and one’s

subordinates’ actions.

•

Understand and enforce ROE.

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(26) Armaments. Are FF (including the police) better equipped than the insurgents
they face?
(27) Advisor Integration. Do advisors live, sleep, and eat with FF units? Is
segregation kept at an absolute minimum? Do higher level commanders understand
the roles and limitations of advisors, i.e., do they treat them as advisors or do they
treat them as command team liaisons?
(28) Employment of Cultural Understanding. Do advisors effectively use culture to
accomplish difficult tasks? Do advisors live up to the following guidelines:

(a) Learn enough of the language for simple conversation.
(b) Be subtle and patient with FF counterparts; explain the benefits of an action
and encourage them to internalize it; respect their rank.
(c) Act diplomatically in correcting FF while praising successes and helping to
instill pride in the FF unit.
(d) Understand the role of an advisor. Make sure the commander makes
command decisions, not the advisor.
(e) Keep FF counterparts informed.
(f) Work to train and improve the unit, even in a combat zone; help the
commander establish SOPs.
(g) Liaise with multinational assets including air support, logistics, civil affairs,
and humanitarian teams.
(h) Advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.
(i) Have a thorough knowledge of appropriate FF unit tactics and unit security
procedures.
(j) Use “confidence” missions to assess training.
(k) Stay integrated with the unit (e.g., eat their food).
(l) Be aware of operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.
(m) Insist on FF adherence to the laws of war and ROE standards for the
treatment of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents while reporting
violations.
(n) Be objective in reporting on FF unit and leader proficiency with special
attention to corruption and incompetence.
(o) Trust and fight alongside FF units while maintaining flexibility and forward
thinking to address future problems not addressed in doctrine.
(p) Remember that most actions have long-term strategic ramifications.
(q) Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.

(29) Local Police/Military LNOs. Do police/military LNOs exist and coordinate
military and police actions with their counterparts? Is appropriate detainee
coordination conducted between the police and military?

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(30) Police Visibility. Is police presence felt 24/7?
(31) Police Corruption. Do effective and adequate mechanisms exist to prevent
police corruption? Are corrupt police officers dismissed?
(32) Police Detainee Operations. Are police trained on the appropriate handling of
detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Are police trained on the provision
of security for both detainees and their handlers? Are police trained to effectively
interrogate detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Do police have
accountability of detainees?
(33) Police Support Personnel. Do police have trained armorers, supply specialists,
communications personnel, administrative personnel, and vehicle mechanics in
adequate numbers to accomplish their mission?
(34) Joint Police/Military Operations. In joint operations, do the police and military
establish common SOPs, conduct supporting IO, perform combined planning, and
ensure command and control interoperability?

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Appendix D

INTERPRETER SUPPORT

Understanding how to employ and manage your interpreters is key to your success as
an advisor. This appendix will outline the specifics on how to exercise, lead, and direct
your interpreter. Realizing that all coalition forces conducting missions outside the wire
employ interpreters, this appendix will focus on those guidelines and TTP that are
particularly applicable to advisor teams. Advisor teams face some unique interpreter
employment challenges with regards to security, force protection, and OPSEC. The
conventional unit employment of an interpreter is for short meeting engagements with
local leaders, community councils, or security force planning. In contrast, a transition
team must utilize their interpreters to conduct the very basic mission of advising,
coaching, and training their security force counterparts. Advisor teams will find that they
use interpreters 60-80% of the time they spend working with their counterparts, ebbing
and flowing based on their counterparts’ command of the English language. Based on
mission requirements and a limited number of interpreters per team, advisor team
interpreters will often work for long hours transitioning from social to training to
operational and formal settings.

1. Your Interpreter

a. First and foremost, your interpreter is not a US military member. Although there are
a few exceptions, most transition teams will not have the luxury of employing a US
Military trained linguist.
b. Interpreters come with different qualifications or categories (CATs). FM 3-24/MCWP
3-33.5

Counterinsurgency

, appendix C, defines interpreter categories. Generally, CAT I

interpreters are locally hired and pass a basic background screening, but do not have a
security clearance. CAT II interpreters possess a secret clearance and CAT III has a
top secret clearance. Advisor teams will usually be assigned one or two CAT I
interpreters. While many teams would like to have CAT II or higher interpreters, the
reality of supply versus demand requires many conventional units and advisor teams to
utilize CAT I interpreters.
c. For the purpose of this appendix, the term “interpreter” refers to CAT I interpreters.
The term “he” refers to male or female interpreters, as the coalition and advisor teams
employ both in the current theaters of operation.
d. Your interpreters are part of your team. These individuals will live, eat, train, and
fight next to you for the length of your tour. It is up to you to ensure that they feel like
part of the team. Your success as an advisor and your safety as a team is directly
related to your relationship with, and the ability to trust, your interpreter. If at all
possible, living quarters for interpreter should not be separated from other team
members.
e. Interpreter Considerations.

(1) Using Interpreters. Interpreters can offer valuable informal insights into local
customs, traditions, and courtesies. In most cases the interpreter can be

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approached more directly than the FF counterparts, especially if the counterparts are
of significantly higher rank than the advisor. In some cases their English, host nation
language, or interpretation skills can be poor, directly affecting the mission.
Interpreters can consider themselves superior to the average counterpart (class
consciousness), and this feeling can cause problems.
(2) Native Speaker. Interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or
geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms
should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given
to the way they talk, only to what they say.
(3) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in
their effectiveness with a target audience if their social standing is considerably
lower than that of the audience. This may include significant differences in military
rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the advisor’s
personal feelings on social status, he should remember the task is to accomplish the
mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. Local prejudices
should be accepted as a fact of life.
(4) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter
speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the advisor and the advisor
understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English should be
satisfactory. The advisor can check that "understanding" by asking the interpreter to
paraphrase, in English, something the advisor said; the advisor then restates the
interpreter’s comments to ensure that both persons are synchronized. Also,
interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information
expressed by the interviewee or target audience.
(5) Intellectual Intelligence. The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to
changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts
and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although
education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking, the better educated
the interpreter, the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse
concepts.
(6) Technical Ability. In certain situations, the advisor may need an interpreter with
technical training or experience in special subject areas to translate the "meaning"
as well as the "words." For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized,
with terms such as nuclear physics, background knowledge will be useful.
(7) Reliability. The advisor should beware of the potential interpreter who arrives
late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In
many less developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The advisor should
make sure that the interpreter understands the military’s preoccupation with
punctuality.
(8) Loyalty. If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his
first loyalty is to the foreign nation or subgroup, and not to the US military. The
security implications are clear. The advisor must be very cautious in how he
explains concepts to give interpreters a greater depth of understanding.

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Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior
motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. If the advisor
detects or suspects such motives, he should tell his commander, intelligence
section, or security manager. The advisor should be aware of and monitor these
motives with all interpreters.
(9) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously
affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In
predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female
interpreter ineffective under certain circumstances. Another example would be the
Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from
outside the target audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from
country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies
for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.
(10) Compatibility. The advisor and the interpreter will work as a team. For the
interpreter to be most effective, he should become an extension of the advisor. The
target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between the advisor
and the interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication
effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the advisor should look for
compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

2. Getting Started

a. Before you start working with your interpreter, you need to spend some time getting
to know him. This sounds obvious enough but there are two reasons why this first step
is so important. First, find out which languages he speaks. This is especially important
in a place like Afghanistan where numerous languages and dialects exist. Remember a
culture is based on personal relationships. While your interpreter is likely educated and
accustomed to the American ways of conducting business, he’s still a foreign citizen.
Secondly, you need to know what you can and cannot trust from this individual. You’re
receiving their translation, their advice, and their interpretation of the “un-said
messages” in order to accomplish your mission. Any personal baggage your interpreter
brings to his job is definitely your business.
b. A starting place for discussions with your interpreter includes:

(1) Background. How long have they been employed as an interpreter, who else
have they worked for, where have they worked? It is often interesting to listen to
their combat experience relative to their repeated patrols with US convoys.
(2) Religion. This is particularly important for a new interpreter. Knowing how they
may view an opposite sect is critical to questioning how your interpreter may be
translating a message.
(3) Where he lives.
(4) Where their family lives.
(5) Education.
(6) Previous employment.
(7) History of hostilities.

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3. Relationship with Foreign Forces

a. Often, a new advisor team inherits the interpreters from the outgoing team. As one
team completes its tour, the next will simply assume the same set of interpreters and
begin work. This is a double edged sword. On the plus side, your interpreter is able to
advise you on past conversations, a history of issues, and give you an idea of what to
expect from this unit or leader. As a challenge, interpreters inevitably develop
relationships with the foreign forces that you are charged to advise. While this is normal
and even culturally preferable, this is something you need to monitor.
b. Gifts provided from your interpreters to your military or civil counterparts are a
cultural norm. Ensure your interpreters remain up front about this and advise you as to
when or why they are providing a gift. Some of this may be a good indication that you,
as an advisor team, need to provide a gift as well. The litmus test here falls back to a
question of loyalty. You need to be able to trust your interpreter.

A national police transition team in Baghdad employed four Sunnis and one Christian
interpreter. Each of these interpreters carried three forms of identification (ID). Each
listed their real name and photo, but were used at different points in the city as they
traveled to and from work. Their government of Iraq issued ID cards were used at Iraqi
Army or Iraqi police checkpoints close to their home neighborhoods. Coalition issued ID
cards were used to enter the US FOB. Their national police ID card was flashed when
they approached an army or police checkpoint in the Shia neighborhood immediately
outside the FOB. These national police ID cards were a gift from the National Police
commander. This was an acceptable gift as it allowed the interpreters to travel to and
from work with less chance of being targeted by sectarian militias.

—Iraqi National Police Transition Team Member

4. A Cultural Advisor

a. In addition to their specified translating duties, your interpreter will provide an
invaluable role as a cultural advisor. From basic phrases to conducting the “man-kiss,”
your interpreter can instruct your team on greetings and farewells. During holidays, he
can provide a welcome source of information on gifts, observances, culturally
acceptable work hours, and customs. This is particularly relevant if you expect your
security force counterpart to begin a new operation or work longer hours during a
religious holiday.
b. One of the most valuable services your interpreter can provide is to help you say
“no,” without losing face. There will be times when you would like to refuse an offer, a
gift, or other item while not offending your counterpart. Your interpreter may provide
advice on how to accomplish this without unnecessarily damaging your relationship.
c. Your interpreter will provide you with a better understanding of the culture, provided
you ask the right questions. Questions on religion or politics that you avoid or approach
gingerly with your counterpart can more readily be discussed with your interpreter. Your
interpreter should be aware of cultural differences between sects and/or ethnic
backgrounds. The interpreter can use this information to your advantage when deciding

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on an influence or negotiation strategy. Finally, your interpreter can provide valuable
advice on appropriate courtesies for birthdays, births, and funerals.

5. How to Employ Your Interpreter

a. By definition, your interpreter will interpret or translate the local language to English
and vice-versa.
b. In reality, your interpreter provides you with what “he thinks” the foreign language
speaker said. This is limited by your interpreter’s skill of both languages, his mental
alertness, and his relationship with his employer (this is you).
c. When possible, choose the right interpreter for the mission. Interpreter skills vary
widely from simple conversational translation at a slow to moderate pace, to rapidly
translating military briefings. Based on their education and experience, some
interpreters will be able to hand write or type translations of documents or orders.
These written interpretations usually lack sentence structure and almost never conform
to military jargon and acronyms. Thus teams found that written interpreted products
often required a second translation to form these documents into logical sentences and
thoughts.
d. The “right” interpreter may also improve the setting in a formal meeting or tenuous
setting. Selecting an older, more mature, male interpreter may be more culturally
acceptable to a senior military or police official. Certainly, an interpreter that best
reflects your tone, inflection, and meaning goes a long way towards ensuring that your
counterpart understands what you think you said.

6. Military Briefings

a. For planned briefings or discussions with key leaders, consider briefing the
interpreter on the topic in advance. This technique is particularly useful when you are
trying to brief a large audience on military tactics or Service doctrine. Reviewing military
terms and definitions in advance will save you distracting sidebar conversations with
your interpreter during the briefing.

A transition team in Iraq had considerable difficulty with the terms “surveillance” and
“reconnaissance.” These terms commonly came up during the planning phase for
intelligence driven targets. As US brigades owned the AO, their approval was required
before the foreign forces could execute a target. Often, the foreign force’s S2 and S3
would say “yes” to any question if it expedited coalition approval of their requested
target. This problem was further exacerbated as different interpreters interchanged the
Arabic translation, further confusing the team’s Iraqi counterparts. This problem
persisted through several target iterations, until the transition team made a dedicated
effort to explain the difference in the two terms to all of the interpreters and their Iraqi
counterparts.

—Iraqi Military Transition Team Member

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7. Basic Rules for Success

a. These are some basic rules for success when using any interpreter:

(1) Look at your counterpart not your interpreter.
(2) Maintain eye contact with your counterpart.
(3) Speak to your counterpart as if your interpreter is not there.
(4) Think of your interpreter as a tool to transmit your message.
(5) Keep your statements short enough to allow easy translation.
(6) Interpreters get tired – plan periodic breaks or rotate interpreters based on the
interpreter’s skill level (60 minutes of constant translation is about the limit for most
interpreters).
(7) Rehearse the following:

(a) Greetings.
(b) Topics to be discussed.
(c) Transitions and closings.
(d) Nonverbal signals. Nonverbal signals are particularly useful when you want
to silence your interpreter without drawing any undue attention. Your
counterparts may attempt to draw you into a heated argument, or may try to
outmatch your point by progressively raising the volume. Silencing your
interpreter, using a rehearsed non-verbal signal, will effectively allow you to
regain control of the conversation.

b. Your interpreter should:

(1) Provide an accurate translation of your message.
(2) Speak in the first person – use “I” versus “He said.”
(3) Mirror your tone, inflection, and emotion.
(4) Speak for approximately the same length of time as you.
(5) Present a professional appearance – well groomed and dressed.
(6) Understand and translate military jargon – constantly learning.

c. Insist that your interpreters translate exactly what you mean.

(1) Do not allow them to add anything extra or usurp your authority by giving an
order. Giving an order turns them into defacto leaders, which can lead to major
complications about who is really in charge.
(2) Once your language skills improve, do not be afraid to correct the interpreter if
he is not translating exactly what you meant.

d. To the greatest extent possible make your interpreters live and operate under the
same conditions as counterpart/coalition troops.

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 40