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(1) When necessary, interpreters should wear protective gear, observe noise/light
discipline, and tactically blend in with the advisor team.
(2) Do not let class distinctions get in the way. This will reinforce counterpart class
stereotypes that you are seeking to break down.

e. Be aware of the interpreter’s family/tribal affiliations. They will leverage class
distinction based on who they are interpreting for. Do not allow this to happen.
f. Be aware of the placement of the interpreter. He should not be in a position in which
he detracts from the conversation between the advisor and his counterpart.
g. When engaged in a conversation, do not look at the interpreter when they speak.
Always look your counterpart in the eye when speaking with them. Insist that your
counterpart adhere to this protocol as well.
h. If possible validate, through a third party, the job that the interpreter is doing.
i. Consider conducting an AAR with your interpreter following the meetings with your
security force counterparts. This may not be as relevant later in your tour, but is
especially helpful during those first two months as you are getting to know your
counterpart and your interpreter. Your interpreter can provide his assessment of your
counterpart’s commitment or truthfulness to your questions. Much of this will be
“Culture 101” for you, as you learn to read a different culture’s body language and learn
which questions will never be answered as forthright as you may like. Additionally, it is
likely that your interpreter will have worked with your counterpart under the last advisor
team and will know the foreign forces better than you.

8. Managing Your Interpreter

a. When it comes to managing your interpreter, one team member needs to be in
charge of the interpreters. This responsibility typically falls to one of the team’s NCOs
as an additional duty. The interpreter NCO handles the schedule, training,
replacements, and time sheets while a government contractor hires, pays, and provides
interpreters to coalition units in country. A US division or corps manages the number of
interpreters required for each coalition element as there are seldom enough for all units.
b. Depending on the number of interpreters available per team, the schedule usually
permits interpreters 4-8 days off per month. Interpreters are provided living space on
the US FOBs to permit 24/7 employment. Some advisor teams live at a separate FOB
than their FF, occasionally you may receive a cell phone call in the middle of the night
from your FF counterpart. Access to interpreters 24/7 is essential to conducting routine
business, including conversations over a cell phone.
c. The interpreter NCO further coordinates periodic counterintelligence screenings for
interpreters. These are required every 6 months and are usually conducted at a set
number of locations. Given the lack of security clearances for CAT I interpreters, these
screenings are essential to maintain some degree of security.
d. The interpreter NCO also serves to centralize any disciplinary issues within the
advisor team structure. Much like young Service members, interpreters may require
motivation from time to time to ensure they arrive at work on time, are prepared for
missions, or are dressed in the proper uniform. You have a number of options for

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curbing negative behavior before you resort to pursuing a replacement. The majority of
disciplinary issues can be resolved through a simple verbal counseling, as most
interpreters desperately want to keep their jobs. Other options include adjusting the
number of work hours or removing privileges. Replacing interpreters is often viewed as
a last resort as new interpreters, if available, are often recycles from other units and
have unknown capabilities.

e. The interpreter NCO should also create a personnel folder for each interpreter. This
should include a basic personnel file with contact information, a picture, and any
operational notes. Aside from serving as a pass-on from one team to another, this file
may assist the team in the event of an investigation in which the interpreter is
suspected or if the interpreter is kidnapped. Further, this information may assist the
team if they decide to replace the interpreter. Often, the government contractor will
annotate the interpreter’s employment record with favorable or unfavorable remarks
when submitted by the coalition. Many teams found one of the ways to reward their
interpreters for a job well done was to provide a letter of commendation to the
government contractor. This letter may then be used to relocate the interpreter to a
more senior position in the future.

9. Interpreter Force Protection

a. Depending on your location and higher headquarters’ rules, you may find it
advantageous for your interpreter to carry a weapon when on patrol. This situation
provides an advantage to your advisor team when you dismount to accompany your
counterparts, as you are always short on dismounted firepower. However, before you
commit to arming your interpreter, you should consider the disadvantages. First, as
mentioned in the beginning of this section, your interpreter is not a US military member.
They did not receive training on the use of force, rules of engagement, Geneva-Hague,
or Law of War.
b. Perhaps even more important is their understanding and practice of weapon’s
status/condition (i.e., green, amber, red / 4, 3, and 1) and muzzle discipline may prove
more of a hindrance than a help. Further, you may find an armed interpreter more likely
to personally assault an objective with the FF vice staying at the advisor team’s side.
Finally, you should consider where and when your interpreter will have access to
weapons. Depending on your local FOB rules, you may not want or be permitted to
allow your interpreter to have access to a weapon on the FOB.
c. Regardless of your interpreter’s weapon’s status, you should provide a minimum of
body armor and a ballistic Kevlar helmet to your interpreter. Again, as your interpreter
is not a US military member, you may find them reluctant to routinely wear this
protection. Despite the risks, teams often had to force their interpreters to wear their
protective equipment in the summer time temperatures. Remember, this is not all about
their personal safety; this is also a matter of protecting your mission critical asset.
d. You may also find that your interpreter insists on wearing a face mask in particular
situations. This is usually at the interpreter’s discretion when they fear that their
compromised identity will endanger their family. For this reason, interpreters often use
pseudonyms to avoid revealing too much information during detainee interrogations or
media engagements.

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e. Clearly, the most dangerous time for an interpreter is during their transit to and from
the FOB. Their risk for kidnapping or murder by terrorists, insurgents, or sectarian
militias is particularly high during these predictable movements. As pay checks must be
hand carried to waiting families, there is little flexibility in these visits home. However,
you should consider any means within reason that mitigates this risk for your interpreter
but there is certainly a balance. Combat patrols outside of sector or requests for
coalition air lift are generally considered excessive. More routine means include
allowing your interpreter to carry a weapon when in transit, adjusting the schedule to
mitigate predictability, or dropping off the interpreter at a different location.

10. A Part of the Team

a. As a part of your team and routine member of your combat patrol, you should ensure
that your interpreter participates in your convoy battle drills. Actions on dismount,
whether armed or unarmed, require a rehearsal. Actions at a halt may vary depending
on where your interpreter rides in relation to your team leaders’ vehicle.
b. You should further consider training your interpreter on the very basics of first aid
and the operation of US individual and crew-served weapons. US units conducting a
ground MEDEVAC have utilized interpreters on more than one occasion to man crew-
served weapons.

11. Be Careful with Precedents

a. As an advisor team, you have access to an extraordinary array of capabilities and
influences. Use caution when using these to benefit your interpreter, regardless of the
immediate situation. The use of coalition air transportation and detained interpreters
illustrate this point.
b. Requests for coalition air lift to transfer interpreters from the FOB to home may make
sense at the immediate team level. However, at a larger level, it sets a dangerous
precedent for other teams as their interpreters request the same privilege to visit family
that has relocated to the other end of the country.
c. Interpreters detained by local army or police forces can usually be released by
coordinating with the local advisor team and the security force headquarters. While this
process appears simple enough on the surface, teams may not fully understand the
circumstances that led to the interpreter’s detention. Further, the advisor team that
“negotiates” the detainee release often loses credibility, as their counterparts perceive a
lack of trust or favoritism for different detainees. Often, the most effective course of
action in this circumstance is to visit and express a high degree of interest in the welfare
of the detained interpreter. A request for an expedited investigation and a review of the
evidence (or lack thereof) usually secures the interpreter’s freedom within 72 hours. By
requiring the foreign force to exercise their own procedures for release of questionable
detainees, both advisor teams stand to benefit. An internal review of the detention’s
legitimacy will serve as a learning point for the foreign forces. This review may also
reveal more information for the interpreter’s owning advisor team. Do not allow yourself
to assume away a problem because you “know” your interpreter is a “good guy.” There
is always the possibility that “your interpreter” is working for more than your team.

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12. Information Security and OPSEC

a. Protecting classified or critical information from your interpreter is a “team”
responsibility. Based on the current operating environment and information sharing
programs, the average transition team has access to a wealth of classified or critical
information. Limited to CAT I interpreters, most teams are forced to find creative ways
to protect this information.
b. This protection starts with the periodic background screenings. While these are not
equivalent to a security clearance, they do provide a comparable level of screening as
those held by your foreign force counterparts. In essence, if the classified information
you receive is releasable to your counterparts, your interpreter will learn about it through
his translation duties. If the classified or critical information is not marked for release to
the FF, your interpreter should not have access.
c. You can further protect against interpreter OPSEC violations by managing “how”
material is passed through your interpreter. Limiting access to written classified or
critical material and rotating interpreters through different meetings mitigates the
amount of information any one interpreter accumulates. You should also consider not
allowing your interpreter to attend internal team meetings, as these often include
classified material that does not need to be shared (i.e., significant activities, convoy
routes, the next day’s timeline, etc.).
d. Cell phones and access control pose the final risks to your team and your mission.
Depending on higher headquarters or FOB rules, your interpreters may be permitted to
carry a cell phone. This should be a deliberate decision by your team, as the payoff to
the interpreter is generally not worth the risk to the team.
e. Access control is one of those requirements that is easily neglected with your
interpreters. If you are assigned to advise foreign forces at a joint FOB, you may find
that your interpreters are not required to submit to normal access control measures.
Interpreter access to privately owned vehicles and movement between US and security
force areas without searches, pose force protection risks. Ensure that you maintain the
standards of searching your interpreters every time they come into and leave your area.
Other coalition units will often accomplish this task for you; however, it is your
responsibility to ensure that safeguards are in place.

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An advisor team in Iraq employed a particularly talented interpreter during their year
tour. The interpreter received especially high praise from the outgoing team as he had
manned a M240B after the team lost a HMMWV to an IED strike. This interpreter, who I
will call Simon, was especially skilled at translating during military briefings, having
mastered much of the US military jargon. This interpreter first raised eyebrows in the
eyes of his new advisor team when he stated that all of his friends and family at home
knew he worked for the Americans as an interpreter. This was unusual as all of the
other interpreters told their family and/or neighbors elaborate stories about business
contracts they had in neighboring provinces that required them to leave for weeks at a
time.
Simon continued his duties, for the most part, without arousing suspicion until he found
out that he would not be attending all of the Iraqi security force (ISF) targeting meetings.
As a means of mitigating risk using OPSEC measures, the advisor team chief had
decided to rotate different interpreters through these meetings so that no one interpreter
could assemble too much information. Simon found this odd and began to inquire what
targets came out of a particular week’s meeting. Asking questions that were outside of
his “need to know” again aroused the team’s suspicions.
Neither of these set off any particular alarm bells and missions continued as usual until
the team chief received notification that he was the target of a kidnapping and
assassination plot. Given the number of hours the team chief spent working with the
ISF on a daily basis (this was a joint FOB), the threat was especially relevant.
This threat was further given credence when an ISF commander allegedly enlisted the
assistance of an interpreter to participate in this action in exchange for $10,000 US.
The team chief, in this situation, took a short leave of absence while an investigation
was conducted. As the advisor team reviewed their assigned interpreters to determine
which one was likely the guilty party, an alarming chain of events was pieced together.
It seemed that each advisor team member knew something slightly different that, when
combined, yielded a startling picture.
Simon was observed meeting with the ISF commander without advisor team members
present. He had received a number of gifts from the ISF commander, including a silver
plated AK-47 and a highly prized, Glock 9mm pistol. Further, Simon had approached
one of the transition team members approximately a week earlier and asked him to hold
a large sum of cash. Simon stated that he had saved this cash over the last several pay
checks and did not feel safe taking it all home. This seemed a little odd, since Simon
was newly married and expecting a child. The team member agreed however, and
Simon gave him $10,000 US to hold.
In this case, the US division G-2 assisted the team in scheduling counterintelligence
screenings for all of the assigned interpreters. The suspected interpreter was given
additional scrutiny and broke under pressure. Simon was detained and, at the time of
this writing, is being held as a coalition detainee.
The advisor team chief returned to work, advising the same ISF commander that had
conspired against him. Simon did not reveal any information that personally linked the
ISF commander to the threat. The ISF commander was eventually reassigned for a
host of other issues.

—Iraqi Military Transition Team Member

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13. Trusting Your Interpreter

a. So, knowing the risks, can you trust your interpreter? The frank answer is, “you have
to trust them.” A vetting process was conducted prior to their hiring, and a
determination was made that they were not a security risk to US forces. Keep in mind
that their first loyalty is probably to their nation or ethnic group, not to the US military.
The fine line of success with your advisor team / interpreter relationship is staying aware
of the risks and mitigating them when possible. Keep in mind that the vast majority of
interpreters are hard working, honest, local nationals that are committed to their jobs.
Of course they are paid well, but many risk personal injury and place their families in
grave danger to perform their duties. Many interpreters tell stories of repeated family
moves, death threats, and terse moments at insurgent controlled checkpoints. The vast
majority of interpreters can be trusted and readily put their lives on the line to ensure
advisor teams and other US units can perform their missions.
b. However, for those few interpreters that may still have questionable motives, you can
use a few techniques as indicators of loyalty. Loyal interpreters will often provide more
info than what is asked. This is particularly relevant when advisor team members sit
down in an office to conduct a meeting with their FF counterparts. These counterparts
will often have other FF members in the room tending to other business or monitoring
the meeting. Good, loyal interpreters prove their worth by providing an insight into
those sidebar conversations once the team member and interpreter leave the room.
c. Loyal interpreters may also provide the advisor team with atmospherics on the forces
entering or leaving a compound. Your interpreter will pick up these atmospherics from
those lower enlisted conversations he overhears and from the body language he
observes from your counterpart. This may be part of your formal AAR once you leave
the compound, but a loyal interpreter will often provide this sort of information without
being asked. When the interpreter feels like part of your team he has an investment in
your collective mission accomplishment and security.

14. Closing Thoughts

The nature of your job requires team work and trust. Your interpreter will likely gain
your “trust,” becoming a close friend. He will further serve as an irreplaceable advisor
and a member of your team. Team work is essential, but “trust” is relative. Your
interpreter will risk his life, often daily, to contribute to the accomplishment of your
mission. However, at the end of the work week your interpreter will return to his home
and family. While your interpreter is a member of your team and an invaluable asset,
he remains a member of his tribe, community, or sect first. Use your interpreter to
accomplish your mission, but do not allow your “trust” to comprise the protection or
security of your advisor team.

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161

REFERENCES

Joint Publications

JP 3-07.1,

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense

(FID)

. 30 April 2004.

Multi-Service Publications

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5,

Counterinsurgency

. 15 December 2006.

Army

FM 3-05.137,

Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense

. 30 June 2008.

FM 3-05.202,

Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations

. 2 February 2007.

FM 3-05.401,

Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

. 5 July 2007.

FM 3-07,

Stability Operations

. 6 October 2008.

TC 31-73,

Special Forces Advisor Guide

. 2 July 2008.

Occasional Paper 18,

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea,

Vietnam, and El Salvador

, Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat

Studied Institute (CSI) Press, 2006. Available online at http://www-
cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey.pdf.
Occasional Paper 19,

Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from

Lawrence to the Present

, Robert D. Ramsey III. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat

Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006. Available online at http://www-
cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_op19.pdf

Marine Corps

FMFRP 12-15,

Small Wars Manual

. April 1987.

NAVMC 3500.59,

Advise, Train, and Assist Partner Nation Forces Training and

Readiness Manual

. 5 January 2009.

Air Force

AFDD 2-3.1,

Foreign Internal Defense

. 15 September 2007.

Other

DODD 5132.03,

DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.

October 2008.
NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy. 21 December 2004. Available online at
http://www.scd.state.hi.us/documents/HSPD13.pdf.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report

. 6 February 2006. Available online at

https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32488.
10 U.S.C.

Armed Forces

22 U.S.C.

Foreign Relations and Intercourse

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GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR

after action report

ADPE

automated data processing equipment

AFDD

Air Force Doctrine Document

AFI

Air Force instruction

AFSC

United States Air Force specialty code

AFTTP

Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

AKO

Army Knowledge Online

ALSA

Air Land Sea Application (Center)

area of operations

ASCOPE

areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events

AT/FP antiterrorism/force

protection

BATNA

best alternative to a negotiated agreement

Bde brigade
BFT

blue force tracker

BPC

building partner capacity

BUB

battle update brief

command and control

CA civil

affairs

CAS

close air support

CASEVAC casualty

evacuation

CAT category
CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CCIR

commander’s critical information requirement

CCP

casualty collection point

CI counterintelligence
CL #

class of supply

CMO civil-military

operations

COA

course of action

COIN counterinsurgency
CREW

counter radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic
warfare

DC dislocated

civilian

DLP

Doctrinal Literature Program

DOD

Department of Defense

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DODD Department

Defense Directive

DZ drop

zone

E&R

evasion and recovery

EEI

essential element of information

EPA

evasion plan of action

EOC

emergency operations center

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FF foreign

forces

FHA

foreign humanitarian assistance

FID

foreign internal defense

FM field

manual

FMS

foreign military sales

FOB

forward operating base

FOO

field ordering officer

FP force

protection

FRAGORD fragmentary

order

G2 Intelligence
GPS

global positioning system

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HUMINT human

intelligence

ID identification
IDAD

internal defense and development

IDN initial

distribution number

IED improvised

explosive

device

IGO intergovernmental

organizations

IMT individual

movement

techniques

INTSUM intelligence

summary

IO information

operations

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

IR information

requirement

ISF

Iraqi Security Force

IW irregular

warfare

J-K-L

JAARS

Joint After-Action Reporting System

JP Joint

Publication

KIA

killed in action

LNO liaison

officer

LOC

line of communications

LP listening

post

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MCCDC

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCPDS

Marine Corps Publication Distribution System

MCRP

Marine Corps reference publication

MDMP

military decision-making process

MEDEVAC medical

evacuation

METL

mission-essential task list

METT-T

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available (joint and USMC)

METT-TC

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (Army)

MILSTRIP

military standard requisitioning and issue procedure

MiTT

military transition team

MOE

measures of effectiveness

MOS

military occupational specialty

MRE

meal, ready to eat

MTT

mobile training team

MTTP multi-Service

tactics, techniques, and procedures

NAC

neighborhood action council

NAVSUP Navy

Supplement

NCO noncommissioned

officer

NCOPD

noncommissioned officer professional development

NGO nongovernmental

organization

NSPD National

Security

Presidential Directive

NSS

National Security Strategy

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NVG

night vision goggles

NWDC

Navy Warfare Development Command

OGA

other government agency

OIC

officer in charge

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

OP observation

post

OPCON operational

control

OPD

officer professional development

OPORD operations

order

OPR

office of primary responsibility

OPSEC operations

security

ORM

operational risk management

OTERA

organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise

PCC pre-combat

checks

PCI pre-combat

inspections

PDSS

predeployment site survey

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PIR

priority intelligence requirement

PM preventative

maintenance

PMCS preventative

maintenance, checks, and services

PMESII-PT

political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure, people, and time

POC

point of contact

POI program

instruction

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

PR&C

purchase request and commitment

PSYOP psychological

operations

Q-R

QDR Quadrennial

Defense

Review

QRF

quick reaction force

RIP

relief in place

ROE

rules of engagement

S2 Intelligence
S3 Operations
S4 Logistics
SA security

assistance

SAO

security assistance organization

SC security

cooperation

SCO

security cooperation officer

SF special

forces

SFA

security force assistance

SME

subject matter expert

SODARS special

operations

debrief and retrieval system

SOF

special operations forces

SOFA status-of-forces

agreement

SOP

standard operating procedure

SOW statement

work

SSE

sensitive site exploitation

T/E

table of equipment

TCP

traffic control point

TOA transfer

authority

TRADOC

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TTP tactics,

techniques, and procedures

U-V-W-X-Y-Z

UA unmanned

aircraft

UAS unmanned

aircraft

system

US United

States

UW unconventional

warfare

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PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advisor/advisor team.

In the context of this MTTP publication, the terms advisor and

advisor team are defined as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise
foreign forces (FF) in order to develop their professional skills.

conventional forces

. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.

(JP 1-02)

internal defense and development.

The full range of measures taken by a nation to

promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that
respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

irregular warfare.

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy

and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other
capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW.
(JP 1-02)

measures of effectiveness.

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end
state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02)

security assistance.

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training,
and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of
national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.1)

security assistance organization.

All Department of Defense elements located in a

foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance
management functions. It includes military assistance advisor groups, military missions
and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense
attaché personnel designated to perform SA functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 3-07.1)

security cooperation.

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security
interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and
multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access
to a host nation. Also called SC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.1)

security cooperation activity.

Military activity that involves other nations and is

intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include
programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve

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mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential
coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater
strategy as articulated in the theater campaign plan. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

security cooperation planning.

The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to

support the Department of Defense’s security cooperation program. This planning
supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

foreign internal defense

. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

mobile training team.

A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian

personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The
mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ
weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular
skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian
indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests. Also called MTT. (JP 1-
02.)

FM 3-07.10

MCRP 3-33.8A

NTTP 3-07.5

AFTTP 3-2.76

10 September 2009

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

Official:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

0930207

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Not to be distributed;
electronic me

dia

only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF
Commander
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ACCESSIBILITY:

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Cover photo credits (left to right, top to bottom):

1. PLA Air Force soldiers shout slogans during a welcoming ceremony for Laos' Prime Minister

Bouphavanh in Beijing, 2007. Reuters: Jason Lee

2. PLA Marine competes in an obstacle course in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

3. PLA recruits stand still as they balance books on their heads during training session at military base

in Hefei, 2008. Reuters: Jianan Yu

4. PLA Marines in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

5. PLA Marine Honor Guard, Zhanjiang, 2006. Lt. Col. Marcus Annibale, USMC

6. Chinese and American Marines participate in a rifle competition in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States

Marine Corps

7. Chinese and American Marines compete in an obstacle course in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States

Marine Corps

8. Officers from the PLA Navy, ground forces, and Air Force salute in the latest upgrade uniform,

Beijing, 2007. Reuters/China Daily

9. PLA Marine competes in an obstacle course in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

10. PLA Marines in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

11. Soldiers carry an injured woman after rescuing her from the ruins of a collapsed building in Miaoxian,

Sichuan Province, 2008. Reuters/China Daily

12. PLA Marine competes in an obstacle course in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

13. PLA Marine competes in an obstacle course in Zhanjiang, 2006. United States Marine Corps

14. Soldiers carry an injured woman after rescuing her from the ruins of a collapsed building in Miaoxian,

Sichuan Province, 2008. Reuters/China Daily

15. Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, ADM Timothy Keating, meets Chinese Air Force Lt.

General Liu Chengjun in Beijing, 2008. Reuters: Andy Wong

16. Tanks from motorized division of the PLA drive into the "war zone" during a military exercise in

Henan Province, 2006. Reuters/China Daily

17. PLA Marine Honor Guard, Zhanjiang, 2006. Lt. Col. Marcus Annibale, USMC

18. Chinese troops march in Tiananmen Square, 1997. Reuters: Will Burgess

19. Zhang Mengyun, 82, bids farewell to PLA Air Force personnel in quake-hit Pengzhou, 2008.

Reuters/China Daily

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Printed: 2009

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Culture of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................ v

ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................... vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... vii

Background.................................................................................................................................vii

Key Findings...............................................................................................................................viii

Origins of PLA Culture ...........................................................................................................viii

The PLA’s Emphasis on Morality ..............................................................................................ix

PLA Values ..............................................................................................................................xi

PLA Views on Officer-Enlisted Relations .................................................................................xii

PLA Organizing Principles .....................................................................................................xiii

Decision-Making in the PLA ..................................................................................................xiv

Authority and Influence ..........................................................................................................xv

Challenges to PLA Culture .....................................................................................................xvi

Interacting with the PLA........................................................................................................xvii

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

Why does military culture matter? ........................................................................................... 1

What is “PLA military culture”?................................................................................................ 1

Military culture in transition..................................................................................................... 2

Purpose of the study................................................................................................................. 2

Research approach .................................................................................................................. 3

Organization............................................................................................................................ 3

CHAPTER 1 : ORIGINS OF PLA CULTURE........................................................................ 5

Introduction: Where does PLA culture come from? .................................................................... 5

Ancient sources ........................................................................................................................... 5

Confucianism........................................................................................................................... 6

Martial classics ........................................................................................................................ 8

Literary classics...................................................................................................................... 12

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought .................................................................................. 14

Phase One: Soviet indoctrination and the First United Front ................................................. 14

Phase Two: Breaking with the KMT and forming the Red Army ............................................. 17

Phase Three: Modifying Marxist-Leninist principles to fit Chinese circumstances................... 17

The PLA’s selective interpretation of China’s modern history ................................................... 20

1839–1921: Foreign intrusion and internal disorder .............................................................. 21

1921–1949: The rise of the CCP and the Red Army ............................................................... 23

1949–1979: “New China,” post-liberation wars, and the Cultural Revolution ....................... 24

Lessons the PLA takes from its history ....................................................................................... 25

Western nations are by nature aggressive, forcing China to wage defensive wars. ................. 25

The PLA must strive to protect both China’s external sovereignty and domestic stability. ...... 27

The CCP and the Red Army “saved” China from foreign aggressors and domestic tyrants...... 28

The victories of the Red Army and the PLA derive from their loyalty to the Party................... 29

The greatest victories of the Red Army and the PLA have been achieved against larger ,more

technologically advanced adversaries ............................................................................... 29

The PLA has won every war that it has fought........................................................................ 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAPTER 2 : PLA VALUES .............................................................................................. 31

Introduction: The “human factor”............................................................................................. 31

How the PLA developed the “human factor” ............................................................................ 31

Soldiers’ poor traditional image ............................................................................................. 32

A new kind of Chinese army .................................................................................................. 33

Moral and disciplinary codes................................................................................................. 35

Moral standards for today’s PLA............................................................................................. 36

The PLA’s core values ................................................................................................................ 37

Loyalty ................................................................................................................................... 37

Honor and heroism................................................................................................................ 39

Discipline .............................................................................................................................. 41

Strength of will....................................................................................................................... 43

Unity of purpose .................................................................................................................... 44

“Professional” qualities .......................................................................................................... 47

How does the PLA inculcate the “human factor” into its personnel?........................................ 49

CHAPTER 3 : PLA ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES................................................................ 53

The PLA is a “Party-Army.” ....................................................................................................... 53

The Party controls the PLA’s national command authority. .................................................... 53

The Party maintains control of the PLA through its “political work” system. .......................... 54

State institutions have little authority over the PLA................................................................... 61

The State CMC has no independent authority. ....................................................................... 62

The Ministry of National Defense serves primarily as a foreign liaison office. ........................ 63

The PLA coordinates with State institutions on certain issues. ................................................ 64

Formal authority in the PLA flows simultaneously along vertical and horizontal lines.............. 65

Vertical lines.......................................................................................................................... 66

Horizontal lines ..................................................................................................................... 69

Implications ........................................................................................................................... 70

Individuals’ status within the PLA hierarchy is determined by their grade, not their rank. ....... 72

What is a grade? .................................................................................................................... 72

What about ranks? ................................................................................................................. 74

Determining an officer’s grade: looking for clues................................................................... 75

Addressing a member of the PLA ........................................................................................... 77

There are three sources of authority and influence in the PLA.................................................. 77

Status within the PLA ............................................................................................................. 77

Party position......................................................................................................................... 77

Informal networks .................................................................................................................. 78

CHAPTER 4 : DECISION-MAKING IN THE PLA .............................................................. 83

Introduction: An opaque process............................................................................................... 83

PLA decision-making principles ................................................................................................. 83

All members of the PLA are politically equal. ........................................................................ 83

The Party takes the lead in decision-making. ......................................................................... 83

Party committees make decisions “democratically,” in consultation with all affected parties. 84

Decisions are made collectively. ........................................................................................... 85

Decisions should be made by consensus. .............................................................................. 86

PLA decision-making practices .................................................................................................. 87

Consensus-based decision-making within PLA units tends to follow certain steps.................. 87

All members of a unit may provide input to the Party committee through “democratic”

mechanisms....................................................................................................................... 89

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